Cruise Missile Defense: Progress Made but Significant Challenges Remain
(Letter Report, 03/31/99, GAO/NSIAD-99-68).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of
Defense's (DOD) progress in establishing adequate mechanisms for
coordinating cruise missile defense programs, focusing on the: (1)
organizational structure and mechanisms for coordinating cruise missile
defense efforts; (2) potential measures of the progress of coordination
efforts; (3) progress of coordination using these measures; (4)
challenges that DOD officials believe still must be overcome; and (5)
defense against land attack cruise missiles.

GAO noted that: (1) the organizational structure for coordinating cruise
missile defense efforts across all services consists of the Joint
Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO) and the Ballistic
Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) supported by a three-tiered set of
integrated product teams; (2) JTAMDO is to focus on operational
requirements issues, while BMDO is to focus on acquisition issues; (3)
these organizations are to work closely together, using a three-tiered
set of teams comprised of personnel from all organizations involved in
theater air and missile defense development, acquisition, and
operations; (4) these teams are to develop and refine the overall
mechanism for coordinating cruise missile defense efforts--the Theater
Air and Missile Defense Master Plan; (5) the individual military
services are primarily responsible for funding and developing systems
and modifications for cruise missile defense; (6) DOD officials told GAO
the ultimate measure of the effectiveness of the coordination process
would be the fielding of a cost-effective, interoperable cruise missile
defense capability; (7) full accomplishment of this goal is several
years away, and DOD has not specified interim measures of progress
toward the goal; (8) GAO identified some outputs and results that would
indicate progress toward coordinating these efforts, including: (a)
developing and refining an overall defense strategy and options for
implementing the strategy; (b) gaining acceptance of the master plan by
affected organizations; (c) developing and approving overall
requirements for a family of theater missile defense systems; (d)
planning and conducting joint demonstrations of the systems; (e)
achieving agreement between the master plan and the services' proposed
budgets; and (f) establishing investment priorities; (9) DOD has made
initial progress toward coordinating its cruise missile defense efforts
based on both the process and output measures; (10) DOD officials
recognize they still face coordination challenges in acquiring a
cost-effective cruise missile defense; and (11) there are technical
challenges to be overcome, including developing mechanisms to enhance
warfighters' ability to fight jointly and a capability to intercept
cruise missiles outside the view of weapon system operators, improving
sensors' abilities to detect and track low observable cruise missiles,
fielding interoperable systems, and developing low-cost defense systems
to counter attacks by large numbers of unsophisticated cruise missiles.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-99-68
     TITLE:  Cruise Missile Defense: Progress Made but Significant 
             Challenges Remain
      DATE:  03/31/99
   SUBJECT:  Performance measures
             Combat readiness
             Weapons research and development
             Interagency relations
             Defense capabilities
             Surface to air missiles
             Air defense systems
             Federal agency reorganization
             Missiles
IDENTIFIER:  DOD Theater Air and Missile Defense Master Plan
             Tomahawk Cruise Missile
             Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
             
Cruise Missile Defense: Progress Made but Significant Challenges Remain
(Letter Report, 03/31/99, GAO/NSIAD-99-68).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of
Defense's (DOD) progress in establishing adequate mechanisms for
coordinating cruise missile defense programs, focusing on the: (1)
organizational structure and mechanisms for coordinating cruise missile
defense efforts; (2) potential measures of the progress of coordination
efforts; (3) progress of coordination using these measures; (4)
challenges that DOD officials believe still must be overcome; and (5)
defense against land attack cruise missiles.

GAO noted that: (1) the organizational structure for coordinating cruise
missile defense efforts across all services consists of the Joint
Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO) and the Ballistic
Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) supported by a three-tiered set of
integrated product teams; (2) JTAMDO is to focus on operational
requirements issues, while BMDO is to focus on acquisition issues; (3)
these organizations are to work closely together, using a three-tiered
set of teams comprised of personnel from all organizations involved in
theater air and missile defense development, acquisition, and
operations; (4) these teams are to develop and refine the overall
mechanism for coordinating cruise missile defense efforts--the Theater
Air and Missile Defense Master Plan; (5) the individual military
services are primarily responsible for funding and developing systems
and modifications for cruise missile defense; (6) DOD officials told GAO
the ultimate measure of the effectiveness of the coordination process
would be the fielding of a cost-effective, interoperable cruise missile
defense capability; (7) full accomplishment of this goal is several
years away, and DOD has not specified interim measures of progress
toward the goal; (8) GAO identified some outputs and results that would
indicate progress toward coordinating these efforts, including: (a)
developing and refining an overall defense strategy and options for
implementing the strategy; (b) gaining acceptance of the master plan by
affected organizations; (c) developing and approving overall
requirements for a family of theater missile defense systems; (d)
planning and conducting joint demonstrations of the systems; (e)
achieving agreement between the master plan and the services' proposed
budgets; and (f) establishing investment priorities; (9) DOD has made
initial progress toward coordinating its cruise missile defense efforts
based on both the process and output measures; (10) DOD officials
recognize they still face coordination challenges in acquiring a
cost-effective cruise missile defense; and (11) there are technical
challenges to be overcome, including developing mechanisms to enhance
warfighters' ability to fight jointly and a capability to intercept
cruise missiles outside the view of weapon system operators, improving
sensors' abilities to detect and track low observable cruise missiles,
fielding interoperable systems, and developing low-cost defense systems
to counter attacks by large numbers of unsophisticated cruise missiles.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-99-68
     TITLE:  Cruise Missile Defense: Progress Made but Significant 
             Challenges Remain
      DATE:  03/31/99
   SUBJECT:  Performance measures
             Combat readiness
             Weapons research and development
             Interagency relations
             Defense capabilities
             Surface to air missiles
             Air defense systems
             Federal agency reorganization
             Missiles
IDENTIFIER:  DOD Theater Air and Missile Defense Master Plan
             Tomahawk Cruise Missile
             Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
             
Cruise Missile Defense: Progress Made but Significant Challenges Remain
(Letter Report, 03/31/99, GAO/NSIAD-99-68).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of
Defense's (DOD) progress in establishing adequate mechanisms for
coordinating cruise missile defense programs, focusing on the: (1)
organizational structure and mechanisms for coordinating cruise missile
defense efforts; (2) potential measures of the progress of coordination
efforts; (3) progress of coordination using these measures; (4)
challenges that DOD officials believe still must be overcome; and (5)
defense against land attack cruise missiles.

GAO noted that: (1) the organizational structure for coordinating cruise
missile defense efforts across all services consists of the Joint
Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO) and the Ballistic
Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) supported by a three-tiered set of
integrated product teams; (2) JTAMDO is to focus on operational
requirements issues, while BMDO is to focus on acquisition issues; (3)
these organizations are to work closely together, using a three-tiered
set of teams comprised of personnel from all organizations involved in
theater air and missile defense development, acquisition, and
operations; (4) these teams are to develop and refine the overall
mechanism for coordinating cruise missile defense efforts--the Theater
Air and Missile Defense Master Plan; (5) the individual military
services are primarily responsible for funding and developing systems
and modifications for cruise missile defense; (6) DOD officials told GAO
the ultimate measure of the effectiveness of the coordination process
would be the fielding of a cost-effective, interoperable cruise missile
defense capability; (7) full accomplishment of this goal is several
years away, and DOD has not specified interim measures of progress
toward the goal; (8) GAO identified some outputs and results that would
indicate progress toward coordinating these efforts, including: (a)
developing and refining an overall defense strategy and options for
implementing the strategy; (b) gaining acceptance of the master plan by
affected organizations; (c) developing and approving overall
requirements for a family of theater missile defense systems; (d)
planning and conducting joint demonstrations of the systems; (e)
achieving agreement between the master plan and the services' proposed
budgets; and (f) establishing investment priorities; (9) DOD has made
initial progress toward coordinating its cruise missile defense efforts
based on both the process and output measures; (10) DOD officials
recognize they still face coordination challenges in acquiring a
cost-effective cruise missile defense; and (11) there are technical
challenges to be overcome, including developing mechanisms to enhance
warfighters' ability to fight jointly and a capability to intercept
cruise missiles outside the view of weapon system operators, improving
sensors' abilities to detect and track low observable cruise missiles,
fielding interoperable systems, and developing low-cost defense systems
to counter attacks by large numbers of unsophisticated cruise missiles.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-99-68
     TITLE:  Cruise Missile Defense: Progress Made but Significant 
             Challenges Remain
      DATE:  03/31/99
   SUBJECT:  Performance measures
             Combat readiness
             Weapons research and development
             Interagency relations
             Defense capabilities
             Surface to air missiles
             Air defense systems
             Federal agency reorganization
             Missiles
IDENTIFIER:  DOD Theater Air and Missile Defense Master Plan
             Tomahawk Cruise Missile
             Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
             
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NS99068.book GAO United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Research and
Development, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives

March 1999 CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE

Progress Made but Significant Challenges Remain




GAO/NSIAD-99-68

  GAO/NSIAD-99-68

United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548
Lett er

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

GAO

National Security and International Affairs Division

B-278428 Letter March 31, 1999 The Honorable Curt Weldon Chairman,
Military Research and Development Subcommittee Committee on Armed
Services House of Representatives Dear Mr. Chairman:

Because of the Committee's concerns that the Department of Defense
(DOD) might not be giving sufficient emphasis to cruise missile
defenses, you asked us to review DOD's progress in establishing
adequate mechanisms for coordinating cruise missile defense
programs. 1 Our objectives were to (1) identify the organizational
structure and

mechanisms for coordinating cruise missile defense efforts, (2)
determine potential measures of the progress of coordination
efforts, (3) assess the progress of coordination using these
measures, and (4) identify the challenges that DOD officials
believe still must be overcome. Because of your interest, this
report focuses on defense against land attack cruise missiles.

You also asked us to identify the systems that have or will have
cruise missile defense capabilities and the amount of funding
being requested or planned for these programs. We agreed to
provide the system and funding information in a separate briefing.
Results in Brief The organizational structure for coordinating
cruise missile defense efforts across all services consists of the
Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense

Organization and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
supported by a three- tiered set of integrated product teams. The
Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization is to focus on
operational requirements issues, while the Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization is to focus on

acquisition issues. These organizations are to work closely
together, using 1 A cruise missile is an unmanned, armed aircraft
that can be launched from another aircraft, ship, submarine, or
ground- based launcher to attack ships (antiship cruise missiles)
or ground- based targets (land attack cruise missiles).

B-278428 Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

a three- tiered set of teams 2 comprised of personnel from all
organizations involved in theater air and missile defense
development, acquisition, and operations. These teams are to
develop and refine the overall mechanism for coordinating cruise
missile defense efforts the Theater Air and Missile Defense Master
Plan. The individual military services are primarily

responsible for funding and developing systems and modifications
for cruise missile defense.

DOD officials told us the ultimate measure of the effectiveness of
the coordination process would be the fielding of a cost-
effective, interoperable 3 cruise missile defense capability.
However, full accomplishment of this goal is several years away,
and DOD has not specified interim measures of progress toward the
goal. Progress can be measured in terms of both the process and
the outputs or results of the

process. We identified some process measures, for example, whether
affected organizations were involved. We also identified, through
discussions with senior- level officials, some outputs and results
that would indicate progress toward coordinating these efforts.
These measures are (1) developing and refining an overall defense
strategy and options for implementing the strategy (the Theater
Air and Missile Defense Master Plan), (2) gaining acceptance of
the master plan by affected organizations,

(3) developing and approving overall requirements for a family of
theater missile defense systems, (4) planning and conducting joint
demonstrations of the systems, (5) achieving agreement between the
master plan and the services' proposed budgets, and (6)
establishing investment priorities.

DOD has made initial progress toward coordinating its cruise
missile defense efforts based on both the process and output
measures. The three- tiered team approach is improving
coordination through joint efforts to define and reach consensus
on the issues. Through December 1998, the teams had prepared four
iterations of the master plan, each revising and expanding on
prior versions. Future iterations are planned on an annual basis.
One of the teams also significantly contributed to the development
of the Theater Missile Defense Capstone Requirements Document,
which

was approved in July 1998. The Capstone Requirements Document 2
The three- tiers working level, integration, and overarching are
staffed by progressively higher levels of DOD management. Each
team includes representatives from DOD, the Joint Staff, each of
the military services, the theater combatant commands, and other
organizations involved with the air and missile defense mission. 3
The ability of two or more systems to exchange information and use
that information to work together toward accomplishing the
mission.

B-278428 Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

contains the overall requirements for the family of theater
missile defense systems. In addition, although the master plans
and the services' budgets are not yet in full agreement, the new
coordination process has affected

budgets and acquisition programs to a limited extent, and other
budget issues have been identified for future resolution. Even
though progress has been made, DOD officials recognize they still
face coordination challenges in acquiring a cost- effective cruise
missile defense. These include getting the services to work
together to resolve issues in a joint fashion; identifying,
defining, and obtaining service agreement on the threat; and
funding the technologies most vital to an effective cruise missile
defense. In addition, there are technical challenges to be
overcome. The technical challenges identified by the senior level
officials include developing mechanisms to enhance warfighters'
ability to fight jointly and a capability

to intercept cruise missiles outside the view of weapon system
operators, improving sensors' abilities to detect and track low
observable (stealthy) cruise missiles, fielding interoperable
systems, and developing low- cost defense systems to counter
attacks by large numbers of unsophisticated cruise missiles.

We recommend in this report that DOD develop a time- phased set of
interim measures to assess progress toward DOD's goal of a cost-
effective, interoperable family of cruise missile defense systems
and that DOD report such progress to the Congress in a timely
manner for annual budget deliberations.

Background Land attack cruise missiles, most of whose ranges vary
from about 90 to 190 miles, may be sufficiently accurate to impact
within a few feet of their intended targets. Defending against
these cruise missiles will stress air defense systems because
these missiles are very difficult to detect, track, and intercept
under the best conditions. Cruise missiles are smaller, and
therefore much less visible to radar than aircraft or ballistic
missiles, and can fly at low altitudes to stay below radar
coverage. For example, due to the earth's curvature, a ground
based radar can detect a low flying cruise missile that is about
20 miles away. In comparison, an aircraft flying at 10, 000 feet
can be detected when it is about 150 miles away. Newer

missiles are incorporating stealth features to make them even less
visible to radars and infrared detectors. A picture of a cruise
missile is shown in figure 1.

B-278428 Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

Figure 1: Cruise Missile

Source: National Air Intelligence Center.

DOD officials believe that a credible land attack cruise missile
threat does not yet exist but that the threat could emerge
rapidly. Threat planners believe that, because of the Tomahawk's
apparent success during the Persian Gulf War, development of
cruise missiles will greatly increase. According to a 1998 report
by the National Air Intelligence Center, only

three countries currently have operational land attack cruise
missiles, but the threat will increase after the year 2000 when
several countries will start production, and probably export a new
generation of land attack cruise missiles. Countries interested in
acquiring cruise missiles can do so by developing new systems,
modifying antiship cruise missiles or unmanned aerial vehicles, or
purchasing them directly. A 1994 Defense Science Board Summer
Study 4 concluded that, while land attack cruise missiles are not
4 Report of the 1994 Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force
on Cruise Missile Defense.

B-278428 Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

widely available, potential adversaries have the motives and means
to acquire them. The study group also concluded that coping with
the threat would require a comprehensive strategy to prevent or
delay possession and to deter and defend against their use.
According to the group's report, cruise missile defense should be
pursued within the concept of overall theater air defense. The
report identified an overall acquisition strategy based on (1)
improving the capabilities of existing air defense systems to
share data and work together, (2) upgrading selected sensors and
missiles

to deal with stealthy cruise missiles, and (3) fielding new
airborne surveillance and fire control systems. The report noted
that effective joint air defense required two centers of expertise
one for joint doctrine, requirements, and concepts of operations
and the other for systems engineering and battle management
command, control, and communications.

The Fiscal Year 1996 Authorization Act directed the Secretary of
Defense to undertake an initiative to coordinate and strengthen
the cruise missile defense programs to ensure that the United
States develops and deploys affordable and effective defenses. The
act directed the Secretary to ensure, to the extent practicable,
that cruise missile programs and ballistic missile defense
programs are coordinated and mutually supporting. The act required
DOD to prepare a plan to carry out the initiative, including
organization and management changes that would strengthen and
further coordinate cruise missile defense programs. The act also
directed the

Secretary to ensure that the appropriate existing and planned air
defense systems be upgraded to provide an affordable and
operationally effective defense against existing and near- term
cruise missile threats. The Fiscal

Year 1997 report of the House Committee on Appropriations, issued
in June 1996, expressed concern that each of the services and the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency were developing unique
cruise missile defense systems rather than building systems
optimized to meet the needs of the theater combatant command
Commanders in Chief in joint service operations.

In July 1996, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Technology advised the Chairman, House Committee on National
Security, that the key elements of a land attack cruise missile
defense program had been identified. The key elements are

 an advanced mix of airborne sensors (aerostats and fixed- wing
aircraft systems);

B-278428 Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

 using the airborne sensors to direct surface- to- air weapons
such as Patriot and Aegis;  fighters with air- to- air missiles
supported by airborne sensors;  missile seekers with improved low
altitude target performance;  networking sensors and weapons by
the way of the Joint Tactical

Information Distribution System, the Cooperative Engagement
Capability, and other similar systems;  integration of land attack
cruise missile defense with air defense and

ballistic missile defense into a joint theater defense; and  a
strong technology program to demonstrate advanced sensor and

missile seeker concepts. A 1997 Defense Science Board 5 report
recognized that DOD had made progress but expressed concern that
DOD still had neither joint concepts of operation nor mechanisms
to prioritize investment options. It also noted that the system
engineering to integrate the available defense assets was

missing. Such integration is necessary to allow the theater
combatant commanders to deal effectively with the cruise missile
threat. Current Defense Planning Guidance requires the military
services to field the full cruise missile defense capabilities by
2010 and provide a capability to defend against emerging threats
in the near term. Each service is developing unique capabilities
to address cruise missile and other threats

in the different combat environments that are specific to that
service. These unique capabilities are normally part of
multimission weapon systems that provide defense against a wide
range of threats. For example, the Navy Aegis is expected to
engage theater ballistic missiles, aircraft, cruise missiles,
surface targets, and submarines. The first service to enter an
emerging combat arena must be able to provide a credible
capability to protect its own assets and meet the critical needs
of the theater combat commander. However, the services' unique
capabilities must also be able to operate together with those of
the other services to provide an

interoperable cruise missile defense capability. 5 Report of the
Defense Science Board Task Force on Land Attack Cruise Missile
Defense, dated May 1997.

B-278428 Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

Organizational Structure and Coordination Mechanisms Established

In late 1996, DOD created an organizational structure for
coordinating theater air and missile defense activities, including
cruise missile defenses. The structure consists of a partnership
between a new organization the Joint Theater Air and Missile
Defense Organization (JTAMDO) and an existing one the Ballistic
Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) supported by a three- tiered
set of integrated product teams. The teams consist of
representatives of those organizations and activities responsible

for planning, acquiring, and using theater air and missile defense
systems. Together, these organizations are to develop and refine a
theater air and missile defense master plan. The individual
military services' continue to be responsible for funding and
developing systems and modifying existing systems for cruise
missile defense.

New Management Arrangement Created

DOD established JTAMDO as the warfighters' (theater commanders,
Joint Staff, and the services) focal point for developing joint
operational architectures, 6 overall requirements, and operational
concepts. 7 JTAMDO is also responsible for validating the
capabilities through simulations and demonstrations. It reports to
the Joint Staff's Director for Force Structure, Resources, and
Assessment. DOD also directed BMDO to assume the role of
integration systems

architect. Working jointly with JTAMDO, BMDO is to translate the
operational architectures into system architectures, 8 perform
systems engineering at the architecture level, plan and ensure
integrated testing of defense architectures, and lead program
acquisition activities. For example, BMDO is to work with the
services and the joint program offices to develop an overall plan
for acquiring systems with integrated

capabilities. DOD directed that the two organizations work closely
together and with others involved in air and missile defense
requirements, acquisitions, and operations, using a three- tiered
integrated product team approach

6 An operational architecture describes the basic framework and
structure of what is to be built and defines the field deployment
of system components to the force. It describes who needs to
exchange information, what information needs to be exchanged, and
how that information will be used. 7 An operational concept is a
description of how to fight and how to use the equipment.

8 A systems architecture is a description of the specific systems
(hardware and software) and interconnections necessary to fight a
battle.

B-278428 Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

working level, integration, and overarching teams. The teams are
composed of representatives from JTAMDO, BMDO, the Joint Staff,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, each of the services, the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, and theater combatant commands. Their goal is
to achieve coordination

through collaboration and consensus building. The structure of the
coordination process is shown in figure 2.

Figure 2: Coordination Process Structure

Source: JTAMDO.

There are eight working level integrated product teams: threat;
requirements; operations and architecture; battle management
command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
(BMC4I); systems integration; demonstration; cost; and attack
operations. The

responsibilities of each team are shown in table 1.

Executive Committee

Overarching Integrated Product Team

Integration Integrated Product Team

JTAMDO Requirements BMDO

Acquisition Working Level Integrated Product Teams Demonstration
BMC4I Requirements Threat System Integration Cost Attack
Operations Operations and

Architectures Joint Staff Combatant

Commands Army

Navy Air Force Marine Corps Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency Others

BMDO JTAMDO

B-278428 Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

Table 1: Working Integrated Product Team Responsibilities

Each team was chartered to develop and refine its assigned part of
the overall master plan for theater air and missile defense,
identify and investigate the issues related to its area, and
resolve those issues in a collaborative manner. Their goal is to
reach a consensus at the lowest possible level. To more
expeditiously accomplish the tasks, most teams are

broken into subgroups, but their products or issues are addressed
and approved by the full team. Personnel from JTAMDO and BMDO lead
most of the teams, but, in some cases, teams are led by personnel
from the

Defense Intelligence Agency, the Joint Staff, and the Atlantic
Command 9 when the subject matter warrants. For example, the
threat working- level team is co- chaired by representatives from
the Defense Intelligence Agency and JTAMDO, and the requirements
team is co- chaired by representatives from JTAMDO and the
Atlantic Command, a combatant command.

The integration integrated product team, co- chaired by the Deputy
Director, JTAMDO, and the Deputy for Theater Air and Missile
Defense, BMDO, provides management guidance and focus; directs the
coordination of the requirements and acquisition activities;
builds consensus among the services and other participants; and
approves the master plan before it Team Responsibilities

Operations and architecture Develop operational and battle
management concepts and associated architectures. Cost Develop
cost estimates and perform trade- off analyses. Threat Obtain
comprehensive threat intelligence. Systems integration Coordinate,
establish, and maintain system- level architectures for an
interoperable family of systems.

Requirements Document theater air and missile defense- related
requirements and assist in developing the Theater Missile Defense
Capstone Requirements Document.

BMC4I Produce a BMC4I architecture to describe the interfaces to
achieve a joint integrated air and missile defense system. Attack
operations Integrate attack operations data into joint theater air
and missile defense plans. Demonstration Develop approaches and a
plan for validating the family of system capabilities.

9 The Atlantic Command has been assigned responsibility to help
enhance joint force capabilities through a blending of technology,
systems, and doctrine. See U. S. Atlantic Command: Challenging
Role in the Evolution of Joint Military Capabilities (GAO/NSIAD-
99-39, Feb. 17, 1999).

B-278428 Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

goes to the next level. The overarching integrated product team
co- chaired by the Director for Strategic and Tactical Systems,
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Technology, and the Director for Force Structure, Resources, and
Assessment, Joint Staff provides policy and financial guidance,
receives and refines the recommendations from the integration
integrated product team, examines any germane issues, and suggests
a review of appropriate cruise missile defense issues by the
Executive Committee. The Theater Air and Missile Defense Executive
Committee, co- chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Technology and the Vice- Chairman, Joint

Chiefs of Staff, provides DOD level guidance. Master Plan Is to Be
Overall Coordination Mechanism

The Theater Air and Missile Defense Master Plan is to be the
overall mechanism for achieving coordination. The plan, which is
to be updated annually in the future, is designed to develop and
articulate the rationale for improving the defense capabilities
and to focus attention upon the decisions necessary to implement
the improvements. It outlines a concept for joint theater air and
missile defense operations (including cruise missile defense),
describes a family of systems to accomplish the mission,
identifies current and future shortcomings, defines the
demonstrations needed to validate the family of system
capabilities, and makes specific

recommendations for implementing future capabilities. The plan is
intended to (1) better focus service and BMDO proposed budgets and
procurement of new systems and (2) influence service priorities
for upgrades to existing systems.

According to the former Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition
and Technology) and the Vice- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the coordination process is not intended to alter the
services' traditional responsibilities for program execution and
resource management. Unlike

the case for ballistic missile defense programs, neither JTAMDO
nor BMDO controls most cruise missile defense funding; rather it
is included in the services' budgets. Therefore, obtaining funding
for specific cruise missile defense programs often requires
influencing the services to include funding in their budget
proposals.

B-278428 Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

Potential Interim Indicators to Assess Progress

Many senior- level officials told us the ultimate measure of
coordination would be to field a cost- effective, interoperable
cruise missile defense, but that goal is not scheduled to be
accomplished until 2010. In the interim, DOD has not specified
time- phased measures that can be used to gauge whether the
coordination process is on track to accomplish its goal.
Coordination progress can be measured both in terms of extent to
which the process has been implemented (process measures) and the
outcomes and results of the progress (output measures). We
identified two process

measures whether issues were being discussed in a collaborative
manner and whether the affected organizations are involved in the
process. To identify some potential output measures, we solicited
opinions regarding interim measures of coordination progress from
22 current and former

senior- level officials. These officials currently are or have
been involved in development, acquisition, or operation of air and
missile defenses. The primary indicators follow:  Maturation of
the master plan. Many officials, including co- chairs of the

integration and overarching integrated product teams, believed
that obtaining a coordinated master plan and maturation of the
master plan over time would be a progress indicator. For example,
successive iterations of the master plan should better define the
family of systems needed, the joint demonstrations needed to
validate the capabilities, the priority of acquiring these
systems, and the estimated cost.  Acceptance of the master plan by
the services. The Director, BMDO, the

Director for Theater Air and Missile Defense, BMDO, and one
service representative told us that cruise missile defense
coordination progress will occur as the services increasingly "buy
into" the master plan,

approaching cruise missile defense with complete agreement
regarding establishing priorities and making trade- off decisions.
Development and approval of a Theater Missile Defense Capstone

Requirements Document. This document identifies overall
requirements for a family of theater missile defense systems and
is to guide the services in developing (1) system operational
requirements documents and (2) systems that will work together.
Several officials stated that development and approval of this
document indicates progress is being made in coordinating cruise
missile defense efforts.

 Joint demonstrations of systems. Several officials said that,
since fielding the joint cruise missile defense is several years
away, an interim measure of progress would be to plan and
successfully conduct joint, cross- service demonstrations of
systems that work together.

B-278428 Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

 Agreement between the master plan and the services' budgets.
Several DOD and service officials said that, if progress is
occurring, the master plan and the services' budgets for cruise
missile defense activities should agree. The Director, JTAMDO,
told us that the December 1998 version of the master plan should
provide sufficient information for the services to make decisions
regarding their proposed budgets.  Development of investment
priorities. The Director of Strategic and Tactical Systems told us
that an agreement on investment priorities and

the ability to cancel some programs and accelerate others would
indicate progress. According to this official, priorities cannot
be established in a few years, but if cruise missile defense
priorities are not established, the process will not be effective.

The need for output measures is consistent with the provisions of
the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (P. L. 103-
62). The Results Act requires federal agencies and activities to
clearly define their

missions, set goals, link activities and resources to goals,
prepare annual performance plans, measure performance, and report
on their accomplishments. The Senate and House reports on the
Results Act legislation anticipated that the act's principles
would be institutionalized

and practiced at all organizational levels. Initial Progress Has
Been Made

DOD is making progress toward coordinating cruise missile defense
efforts both in terms of implementing the process and outcomes
resulting from the process. In terms of process, the three- tiered
integrated team approach is improving coordination by more
intensive examination of air and missile defense issues,
collaboration on these issues, and attempts to reach consensus.
And, although still limited, JTAMDO has obtained more involvement
by theater combatant command representatives responsible

for wartime operations. In terms of outcomes, joint planning
documents to enhance coordination have been prepared or assisted
by the coordination process. Although the services' budgets do not
yet fully support the master plan, budgets and programs have been
affected to a limited extent, and

other budget issues have been identified. Issues Are Being
Identified and Discussed

Most working level team members we spoke with believe that
coordination has been enhanced. They cited the following examples:
(1) issues are addressed jointly, (2) the varying team members
obtain information regarding the other organizations' positions
and rationale on the issues, (3) each team member is responsible
for coordinating with his/ her

B-278428 Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

respective organization, and (4) they attempt to resolve the
issues at the lowest possible level. They said this process
requires collaboration and builds consensus.

Each working level integrated product team is responsible for
drafting a specific section of the Theater Air and Missile Defense
Master Plan. As a part of this process, the working level teams
and subgroups identify issues related to their part of the master
plan, examine the issues, and attempt to resolve them to all
members' satisfaction. For example, during a meeting, the
requirements team discussed a set of effectiveness values, but one

service representative expressed concern about the values. As a
result, JTAMDO and BMDO provided funds for the service to perform
a further analysis; the service presented its results during the
next team meeting. New values were subsequently adopted. The team
member, who raised the issue, informed us that had the issue not
been resolved, the dissenting view

would have been raised to the next tier the integration integrated
product team.

In addition, the master plan and other products developed are
examined and approved by the integration integrated product team
and the overarching integrated product team. This process provides
oversight on product development and guidance regarding the
products and permits consensus building at levels higher than the
working- level teams. The higher tier teams are composed of higher
level representatives from each of the services and the other
organizations associated with theater air and

missile defense. Affected Organizations Are Involved

The three- tiered integrated product teams include representatives
from the organizations responsible for determining requirements
and developing, acquiring, and operating theater air and missile
defense systems. Also, the theater combatant commanders
responsible for operational control of military forces in a
specific theater or region of the world 10 are becoming

more involved in the theater air and missile defense coordination
process. According to the commanders' representatives, their
involvement in the coordination process has been limited because
of the high cost of travel

and the lack of staff to fully participate. However, JTAMDO and
BMDO have obtained combatant command comments on the iterations of
the 10 A combatant command is comprised of forces from two or more
services.

B-278428 Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

master plan, and the combatant commands provided input to the
Capstone Requirements Document.

In addition, JTAMDO and BMDO have begun a program to obtain more
involvement in the coordination process by the combatant commands'
representatives. Under this program, JTAMDO and BMDO visited each
theater command to increase awareness of the coordination process
and invited all representatives to a week- long meeting to (1)
inform the representatives about the air and missile defense
initiatives and future direction and (2) provide opportunities for
the representatives to express

their opinions concerning direction and focus. JTAMDO also has
initiated a newsletter to keep theater commands better informed
about the key issues addressed at working- level team meetings,
and it has placed a representative in each theater. The
representative is to assist the theater command with and provide
expertise on emerging issues and facilitate the

exchange of information among JTAMDO, BMDO, and the combatant
commands. Joint Planning Documents Have Been Started

The integrated product teams have produced or assisted in
producing several joint planning documents to enhance
coordination. These documents include the Theater Air and Missile
Defense Master Plan, the Joint Theater Air and Missile
Demonstration Plan, and the Theater Missile Defense Capstone
Requirements Document.

Through December 1998, the master plan had been published in four
iterations, each revising and expanding on prior versions. The
initial master plan was published in May 1997. The April 1998
version provides better- defined and updated information about
requirements and systems as

well as an acquisition roadmap not included in previous versions.
The December 1998 version makes additional improvements, including
revised and more refined analyses of the system architecture and
additional information about the single integrated air picture. As
of January 1999, the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense
Executive Committee had not approved this plan. The master plan is
to be updated annually in the future. Future iterations, for
example, are to include a refined cruise missile

defense architecture to support the current strategy that
accommodates emerging threats in the near term. Another document
is the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Demonstration Plan,
which is incorporated into the master plan, and identifies the
joint demonstrations necessary to validate the family of

B-278428 Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

systems capabilities, using cross- service capabilities. Several
joint demonstrations are scheduled annually between 1998 and 2004,
including eight specifically related to cruise missile defense.
These demonstrations are to be conducted at already planned
exercises and test events by adding features to demonstrate joint
cruise missile defense capabilities.

The requirements working level team assisted the Atlantic Command
in producing the Theater Missile Defense Capstone Requirements
Document. The document not only identifies the overall
requirements for a family of theater missile defense systems
(including cruise missile defense) to protect forces and critical
assets in a theater or region from missile attacks but also
establishes joint warfighting standards for defense capabilities
to

be provided to the theater commanders. It is intended to (1) guide
the services in developing operational requirements for future
systems and (2) facilitate development of interoperable systems.
The requirements apply to any service or other acquisition
authority. It was approved by the

Joint Requirements Oversight Council in July 1998. Now the
services must modify their formal requirements for new defense
systems and improvements to existing defense systems to achieve
the requirements in the capstone document. In some cases,
incorporation of the capstone requirements will necessitate
modifications to existing systems such as changes needed to
achieve required levels of interoperability. In addition, the
Atlantic Command has drafted a Mission Need Statement for Theater
Air and Missile Defense, and the draft is currently being
coordinated. 11 Budgets and Programs Have Been Affected to a
Limited

Extent According to JTAMDO and BMDO officials, the services'
budgets do not yet

fully support the master plan. For example, the budgets do not
include the amounts these officials believe are required for the
single integrated air picture a mechanism to enhance the services'
ability to fight jointly. However, the coordination process has
affected budgets and programs to a

limited extent. For example, in the fiscal year 1998 budget
process, JTAMDO identified disconnects between the master plan and
one service's proposed budget for funding key technology upgrades.
JTAMDO officials briefed DOD leadership on the disconnects and
proposed funding

11 A mission need statement is a statement of operational
capability required to perform an assigned mission.

B-278428 Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

alternatives to correct the problem. As a result, DOD issued a
program budget decision that realigned the funding for the
upgrades. 12 In addition, JTAMDO officials conducted a cruise
missile defense study that identified disconnects between the
services' fiscal year 1999 budgets and the demonstration plan;
many of the disconnects were resolved. We were informed that one
service was asked to provide funding to eliminate

the remaining disconnect, but the matter has not yet been fully
resolved. Challenges Remain While there has been progress toward
coordinating cruise missile defense

efforts, the senior level officials with whom we spoke and
documents we reviewed recognize that challenges remain both
managerial and technical which must be overcome before achieving a
cost- effective, coordinated cruise missile defense. Managerial
challenges must be met to ensure continued coordination progress.
Technical improvements are required because (1) more countries are
expected to obtain cruise missiles

and (2) the newer cruise missiles are expected to be more
difficult to detect and track than current cruise missiles.
Managerial Challenges One of the challenges for continued
coordination progress identified by the

senior level officials is getting services to work together. Many
of the officials told us that one of the more formidable
challenges is obtaining a genuine commitment from the services to
develop a joint, interoperable cruise missile defense. One
official said getting the services to work together on the joint
mission, rather than being advocates for a specific

system or plan, is the challenge; however, he acknowledged that,
as the process has matured, the services are working together
better than at the beginning. Another official believed that the
greatest challenge is overcoming the interservice rivalry for
funds in a tight budget environment. Another official said that
the challenge is obtaining agreement on joint tactics, procedures,
and rules of engagement that may require changing

some service procedures. We reported on the conflicts of service-
oriented priorities in the context of the Atlantic Command's
mission in our February 1999 report. 12 Further details are not
included because of the classified nature of these upgrades.

B-278428 Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

Another challenge is correctly defining the threat. According to
the co- chair of the overarching integrated product team,
identifying and characterizing the threat and timing the
acquisition of defense capabilities to that threat is a major
challenge. The Director, BMDO, and the co- chairs of the
integration integrated product team also identified determining
the correct threat as a major challenge. The land attack cruise
missile threat has been limited, but it could emerge rapidly
through development of new

systems, conversion of antiship cruise missiles, or purchase of
advanced systems from other countries. Although the threat is
expected to increase, changes could be difficult to detect. The
threat information could be vital to timing the development of
cruise missile defense capabilities.

A third challenge is adequately funding the most vital programs.
According to the 1997 Defense Science Board report, funding for
all of the promising concepts being pursued by the services is
insufficient. The report further stated that if priorities are not
set and choices are not made, none of the concepts are likely to
move forward rapidly enough to be in place when needed. However,
the Director, Strategic and Tactical Systems, told us that
canceling programs would be a difficult task. Neither JTAMDO nor
BMDO

can ensure that funding is requested for the items considered most
vital to cruise missile defense because most funding requests are
included in the services' proposed budgets, not in JTAMDO's or
BMDO's budget request. Therefore, the funding for the priority
items must be obtained by influencing the services to include the
funding requests in their proposed budgets. According to the
Director, JTAMDO, the goal is to provide sufficient rationale and
support to convince the services to adequately fund
recommendations in the master plan.

Technical Challenges A number of technical challenges must be
overcome before the effective defense envisioned for 2010 is
possible. Some were identified as key elements of a land attack
cruise missile defense by the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition and Technology) in 1996 (see p. 5).

Senior level officials identified acquiring the capability to
develop and share a single integrated air picture as a technical
challenge. Future employment concepts will view individual weapon
systems (whether air, sea, or land based) as just contributing
elements to an overall defense

capability. The real time execution of an integrated defense plan
will require a level of coordination and communication far beyond
that currently available. At its core is an air picture that will
allow each member of the force to make decisions based on the same
information. This is the

B-278428 Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

single integrated air picture. The single integrated air picture
will merge data from multiple sensors and provide all system
operators and decisionmakers with one common set of information
about each airborne target in the battle area.

Another identified challenge is to improve sensor technologies to
meet future threats. To counter the future threat, sensor
technology will need to be improved to detect stealthy cruise
missiles at longer ranges, distinguish them from friendly
aircraft, and intercept them over enemy territory. Defense Science
Board reports and current and former theater air and missile
defense officials stated that this capability would require
significant upgrades to surveillance sensors, tracking sensors,
and interceptor missile sensors as well as the acquisition of
additional improved elevated (airborne) sensors. The upgrades and
new systems are to ensure the early detection and engagement that
is needed to (1) provide the maximum number of potential
engagements and (2) destroy cruise missiles carrying weapons of
mass destruction while they are still over enemy territory. A
third challenge is to achieve over the horizon intercepts. To
intercept cruise missiles at longer ranges, the sensors will need
to be connected to enable an over the horizon intercept. Elevated
sensors (such as the

Airborne Warning and Control System, the E- 2C, and the Joint Land
Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System) would
detect the target; the sensors would notify a sea- based or
ground- based system (such as the Patriot) where to fire the
interceptor; the system would fire the interceptor; and the
interceptor would be guided to a target not visible to

its ground- based radar. This concept is referred to as air-
directed, surface- to- air missile operations.

A fourth challenge is to develop interoperable weapon systems.
Most existing air and missile defense systems were developed with
the premise that each service would direct the use of its own
weapons; however, the systems must now operate jointly with other
services' systems under the direction of the Commanders in Chief
of the combatant commands and with allied forces. Some theater
combatant command representatives said that the Commanders in
Chief have systems that do not interoperate with U. S. forces or
with allies and that they have been forced to develop tactics,

techniques, and procedures to compensate for the lack of
interoperability. In a July 1998 meeting to discuss joint theater
air and missile defense issues, most of the theater combatant
command representatives stated that interoperability of current
and future air and missile defense systems is their highest
priority.

B-278428 Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

The final challenge identified by the senior level officials was
developing a defense against massive attacks. A Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency official told us that one challenge is to
develop low- cost cruise missile defense systems capable of
engaging massive attacks by unsophisticated cruise missiles. The
Director of that agency said that the proliferation of inexpensive
cruise missiles with improved accuracy and range gives adversaries
the option of trying to overwhelm U. S. defenses with large
numbers. However, he believes that one manner of addressing the
threat is to build low- cost interceptors that would not have the
capabilities against high- performance cruise missiles but could
contribute

where an enemy attack includes large numbers of inexpensive
missiles. The agency is studying this issue, and it will continue
its efforts until 2001.

Conclusions DOD has established the mechanisms for coordinating
cruise missile defense efforts by creating a new arrangement for
managing theater air and

missile defense. Senior level officials generally agreed that the
ultimate measure of coordination effectiveness would be to field a
cost- effective, interoperable cruise missile defense, and they
suggested some interim measures of progress toward that goal.
While DOD is making progress toward coordinating its cruise
missile defense efforts, it has not yet specified time- phased
interim measures of coordination progress. In addition, there are
still challenges both technical and managerial to be

overcome before a coordinated, cost- effective cruise missile
defense can be achieved.

We believe that the development of time- phased interim measures
of coordination progress is warranted. Such measures would be
consistent with the Government Performance and Results Act of
1993, which call for performance planning to include measures to
help assess whether goals and missions are being accomplished. We
also believe that the interim measures of outputs and results
identified in this report are a sound building block for the
establishment of such measures of coordination progress.

Recommendations Because the final results of the coordination
process will not be known for several years, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense develop a

time- phased set of interim measures that can be used to assess
progress toward a cost- effective, interoperable family of cruise
missile defense systems. These measures should include, as a
minimum, metrics that will

B-278428 Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

show progress toward developing the operational and system
architectures required, resolution of the technical and managerial
challenges, demonstration of needed technology, and investment
priorities. To enable congressional committees responsible for
funding and oversight of theater and missile defense activities to
have information with which to assess DOD's progress and make
appropriate policy and funding decisions, we recommend that the
Secretary (1) incorporate these time- phased

measures into the Theater Air and Missile Defense Master Plan and
(2) provide the most recently approved master plan to the Congress
in a timely manner for annual budget deliberations.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In its comments responding to a draft of this report, DOD
partially agreed with our recommendation to develop a set of
interim measures to assess progress toward achieving cost-
effective and interoperable theater air and missile defense
systems. DOD stated, however, that the measures should be broad in
nature because air and missile defense are complex mission areas
supported by multimission systems. DOD said that allocating a
system cost for each mission supported by multimission systems,
such as Patriot, F- 22, and Aegis, would be difficult and
counterproductive. We agree and have modified our recommendation
to delete cost as a measure.

We also agree that the measures may have to be somewhat broad;
however, we believe that they should be sufficiently specific to
permit an objective assessment of progress.

DOD did not agree with our recommendation to use the measures in
conjunction with the annual budget requests to provide the
Congress with reports of progress being made. DOD said that its
progress toward achieving a cost- effective and interoperable
family of systems for air and missile defense will be documented
each year in the Theater Air and

Missile Defense Master Plan. DOD also said that the master plan
includes the measures we recommended. Our understanding is that
the master plan has not, until now, been provided to the Congress,
nor has it included time- phased measures of progress. DOD's
future use of the master plan as a vehicle to communicate progress
to the Congress could meet the intent of our recommendation.
However, DOD would need to ensure that

(1) time- phased measures of progress are incorporated in the
master plan and (2) the master plan is submitted in a timely
manner for consideration during budget deliberations. We have
modified our recommendation to reflect such clarification.

B-278428 Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

DOD also provided additional technical comments, which have been
incorporated as appropriate. DOD's comments are included in
appendix II. Scope and Methodology

To identify the coordination mechanisms, assess the progress of
coordination efforts, and identify challenges, we reviewed theater
air and missile defense plans, held discussions with appropriate
officials, and attended team meetings. To identify results
oriented progress measures and to obtain additional information
regarding the progress to date and the challenges, we identified
and interviewed 22 current and former

senior- level DOD, service, and theater combatant command
officials who are or have been involved in the development,
acquisition, or operation of air and missile defenses. See
appendix I for additional information about our scope and
methodology.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its
contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report
until 30 days from its issue date. At that time, we will send
copies of this report to other interested congressional
committees; the Honorable William Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the
Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army; the Honorable
Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; the Honorable F. Whitten
Peters, Acting Secretary of the Air Force; Rear Admiral Herbert

Kaler, Director, JTAMDO; Lt. Gen. Lester Lyles, Director, BMDO,
and the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director, Office of Management and
Budget. Copies will also be made available to others on request.

Please contact me at (202) 512- 4841 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this
report were Lee Edwards, Wayne Gilliam, Mark Lambert, and Reginia
Grider.

Sincerely yours, Allen Li Associate Director Defense Acquisitions
Issues

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

Contents Letter 1 Appendix I Scope and Methodology

23 Appendix II Comments From the Department of Defense

26 Figures Figure 1: Cruise Missile 4

Figure 2: Coordination Process Structure 8

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense BMC4I Battle Management Command,
Control, Communications,

Computers and Intelligence BMDO Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization JTAMDO Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense
Organization

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

Appendix I Scope and Methodology Appendi x I

We obtained information regarding the process and mechanisms for
coordinating cruise missile defense efforts by (1) reviewing the
directives establishing the theater air and missile defense
management process and the charters for the Joint Theater Air and
Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO) and the Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization (BMDO); (2) reviewing various iterations of
the Theater Air and Missile Defense Master Plan; and (3)
discussing the process and mechanisms with officials from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, JTAMDO, BMDO,
each of the services, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Atlantic, Central,
European, and Pacific Commands.

We obtained information regarding the organizational progress by
(1) reviewing various iterations of the master plan and other
joint planning documents; (2) discussing the process progress with
officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint
Staff, JTAMDO, BMDO, and integrated product team members from each
of the services, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency; and (3) observing selected
integrated product team meetings. To identify interim output
measures of coordination progress, we interviewed

22 current and former senior level officials who are or have been
involved with the development, acquisition, or operation of air
and missile defense programs. These officials are listed below.

 Director, Strategic and Tactical Systems, Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (Co- chair of
the Overarching Integrated Product Team).  Director for Force
Structure, Resources and Assessments, Office of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff (Co- chair of Overarching Integrated Product
Team).  Director, JTAMDO (former co- chair of the Integration
Integrated

Product Team).  Director, BMDO (member of the Executive
Committee).  Deputy Director, BMDO (member of the Overarching
Integrated Product Team).

 Deputy for Theater Air and Missile Defense, BMDO (Co- chair of
the Integration Integrated Product Team).  Director, Joint
Advanced Warfighting Programs, Institute for Defense

Analysis (Co- chair of the 1994 Defense Science Board Task Force
on Cruise Missile Defense and Chair of the 1996 Task Force).
Former Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans,
Department of the Army (former member of the Integration
Integrated Product Team).

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

 Program Manager, Advanced Technology and Overland Cruise Missile
Defense, Program Executive Office for Theater Surface Combatants,
Office of the Under Secretary of the Navy for Research,
Development, and Acquisition (member of the Integration Integrated
Product Team).

 Deputy Chief, Theater Air Defense Division, Director of Global
Power Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Acquisition).

 Program Manager for Ground- based Air Defense Systems, U. S.
Marine Corps Systems Command.  Chief, Theater Missile Defense
Branch, U. S. Central Command.  Deputy Director, Plans and Policy
Directorate, U. S. European

Command.  Director for Operations, U. S. Pacific Command.  Chief,
Theater Air and Missile Defense Operations Division, U. S.

Atlantic Command.  Director, Directorate of Combat Developments,
U. S. Army Air Defense

Artillery School.  Director, Sensor Technology Office, Defense
Advanced Research

Projects Office (member of the Overarching Integrated Product
Team).  Director, Strategic Defense and Space Programs, Program
Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense
(member of the

Integration Integrated Product Team).  Former Commander (August
1992 August 1994), U. S. Army Space and

Strategic Defense Command.  Former Commander (August 1994 August
1996), U. S. Army Space and

Strategic Defense Command.  Former Director, Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (former member of the Executive
Committee).

 Former Director, Sensor Technology Office, Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (former member of the Overarching
Integrated Product Team and member of the 1996 Defense Science
Board Task Force on Cruise Missile Defense).

We obtained information regarding the progress of coordination
efforts through (1) reviewing various versions of the master plan,
the Theater Missile Defense Capstone Requirements Documents and
other documents such as minutes of integrated product team
meetings; (2) attending an

integration integrated product team meeting and a working level
team meeting; and (3) discussing progress with the co- chairs and
selected members of each of the working level teams as well as the
22 officials listed above.

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

We obtained information concerning the technical and managerial
challenges by reviewing the master plan and other documents such
as minutes of the integrated product team meetings and discussions
with JTAMDO and BMDO officials and the 22 officials listed above.

We conducted our work from October 1997 through January 1999 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-68 Cruise Missile Defense

Appendix II Comments From the Department of Defense Appendi x I I

(707297) Let t er

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