Army Ranger Training: Final Assessment of Improvements Mandated By 1996
National Defense Authorization Act (Letter Report, 02/25/99,
GAO/NSIAD-99-57).

Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on the
corrective actions taken by the Army following the deaths of four Ranger
students in a 1995 training accident, focusing on the status of: (1)
Army Ranger training manning levels required by the fiscal year 1996
National Defense Authorization Act; (2) establishing safety cell
organizations required by the act; (3) corrective safety actions
instituted after the accident; and (4) inspections of identified safety
controls.

GAO noted that: (1) even though the Army placed the Ranger Training
Brigade on the list of units excepted from normal Army personnel
priorities and raised the Brigade's personnel distribution to 90 percent
of required numbers, it was not able to meet the act's required
personnel levels; (2) in February 1997, when the Army planned to first
meet the act's requirement, the Brigade had 97 percent of required
enlisted personnel but only 88 percent of the required number of
officers; (3) the Brigade's personnel strength was below the mandated
90-percent level for both officers and enlisted personnel from October
1997 through September 1998; (4) while Brigade officer staffing levels
were below the mandate, they were significantly higher than they were at
the time of the accident; (5) if the Army continues the current
90-percent officer distribution planning level for the brigade, it is
not necessary to continue the mandated personnel levels in law; (6) the
Army has established safety cells with personnel knowledgeable about
local terrain and weather conditions, but the frequency of personnel
rotations may make it difficult to provide sufficient continuity that
the act requires; (7) specifically, the Brigade and battalion chains of
command who serve as the safety cell members and supervise daily
training safety decisions generally rotate to new units every 2-3 years;
(8) because of the act's requirement that safety cell personnel have
sufficient continuity and experience, the Army has recently authorized
the addition of four civilian personnel to the safety cells at the
Brigade and the three training battalions; (9) the Army plans to fill
these positions by September 1999; (10) the Army has completed and
institutionalized most of the recommended corrective actions, and they
appear to be functioning effectively; (11) the Brigade has improved
safety controls at the Florida Ranger camp by developing systems to
better monitor and predict river and swamp conditions; (12) it has moved
waterborne training exercises outside high-risk areas and eliminated
discretion to deviate from established training lanes; (13) at all three
training phases, medical evacuation procedures have been revised,
rehearsed, and inspected, physician assistants have been assigned to the
Brigade and training battalions, and a Brigade communications officer
has been assigned; (14) in addition, the Brigade now requires that its
training companies be commanded by branch-qualified captains; and (15)
although frequent inspections have been conducted since the accident,
they did not evaluate continued compliance with the training safety
controls, nor were the results of the inspections adequately documented.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-99-57
     TITLE:  Army Ranger Training: Final Assessment of Improvements 
             Mandated By 1996 National Defense Authorization Act
      DATE:  02/25/99
   SUBJECT:  Military training
             Accident prevention
             Safety regulation
             Safety standards
             Occupational safety
             Emergency preparedness
             Army personnel
             Personnel management
             Investigations by federal agencies
             Inspection
IDENTIFIER:  Army Training and Doctrine Command Decision Support System
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Committees

February 1999

ARMY RANGER TRAINING - FINAL
ASSESSMENT OF IMPROVEMENTS
MANDATED BY 1996 NATIONAL DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION ACT

GAO/NSIAD-99-57

Army Ranger Training

(703263)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DOD - Department of Defense
  TRADOC - Training and Doctrine Command

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-281816

February 25, 1999

The Honorable Wayne Allard
Chairman,
The Honorable Max Cleland
Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Personnel
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Steve Buyer
Chairman,
The Honorable Neil Abercrombie
Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Military Personnel
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

This report provides our final assessment of corrective actions taken
by the Army following the deaths of four Army Ranger students in a
1995 training accident.  The Fiscal Year 1996 National Defense
Authorization Act requires us to provide a final assessment of the
matters covered in our preliminary report and our recommendation on
the need to continue the required manning levels.\1 Specifically, we
are reporting on the status of (1) Ranger training manning levels
required by the act, (2) establishing safety cell organizations
required by the act, (3) corrective safety actions instituted after
the accident, and (4) inspections of identified safety controls. 


--------------------
\1 The act (P.L.  104-106, Feb.  10, 1996) set minimum personnel
manning levels for the Army's Ranger Training Brigade and specified
that the manning level requirement shall expire 2 years after the
date on which it is first attained.  The act also required us to
provide a preliminary report within 1 year of its enactment, see Army
Ranger Training:  Safety Improvements Need to be Institutionalized
(GAO/NSIAD-97-29, Jan.  2, 1997), and a final report within 2 years
after the Army first attains the required manning levels. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

The Ranger Training Brigade, located at Fort Benning, Georgia,
conducts three phases of Ranger training to develop tactical combat
arms and leadership skills in infantry, airborne, air assault,
mountaineering, and waterborne operations.  The initial training
phase is conducted at Fort Benning, the second phase is conducted in
the Georgia mountains, and the third phase is conducted in river and
swamp terrain in Florida.  In February 1995, four Ranger students
died of hypothermia while undergoing waterborne training in the
Florida swamps. 

The Army's investigation of the accident recommended corrective
actions to improve Ranger training safety and preserve the lessons
learned from the accident.\2 Corrective actions to improve the safety
of Ranger training were also prescribed by the Fiscal Year 1996
National Defense Authorization Act.  The act required the Army to
ensure that the number of officers and the number of enlisted
personnel assigned to the Ranger Training Brigade are not less than
90 percent of required levels.  The Army defines requirements as the
minimum number of personnel needed to perform a unit's mission
effectively.  This mandate was to become effective no later than
February 1997 and expire 2 years after it is achieved.  The act also
required the Army to establish at each of the three Ranger training
locations an organization known as a "safety cell," comprising
individuals with sufficient continuity and experience in each
geographic area to be knowledgeable of local conditions and the
potential impact of weather and other conditions on training safety. 
The act further provided that these individuals shall serve as
advisors to the officers in charge of training to assist in making
training "go" and "no go" decisions in light of weather and other
conditions. 

Our preliminary report assessed the implementation and effectiveness
of the corrective actions, the Army's progress in implementing the
mandated staffing levels and safety cell organizations, and the
adequacy of Army oversight to ensure that the corrective actions are
sustained in the future.  We recommended that the Army direct the
Ranger Training Brigade to identify critical training safety controls
and ensure that the Ranger training chain of command, and
organizations outside the chain of command, conduct periodic
inspections to determine compliance with the safety controls
implemented after the accident. 


--------------------
\2 The Army's investigation also concluded that officer shortages and
personnel turnover at the Florida training camp contributed to the
accident by draining experience and insight and by limiting the
ability to keep operating procedures current, supervise standards and
policies, and observe training exercises. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

Even though the Army placed the Ranger Training Brigade on the list
of units excepted from normal Army personnel priorities and raised
the Brigade's personnel distribution to 90 percent of required
numbers, it was not able to meet the act's required personnel levels. 
In February 1997, when the Army planned to first meet the act's
requirement, the Brigade had 97 percent of required enlisted
personnel but only 88 percent of the required number of officers. 
The Brigade's personnel strength was below the mandated 90-percent
level for both officers and enlisted personnel from October 1997
through September 1998.  While Brigade officer staffing levels were
below the mandate, they were significantly higher than they were at
the time of the accident.  If the Army continues the current
90-percent officer distribution planning level for the Brigade, it is
not necessary to continue the mandated personnel levels in law. 

The Army has established safety cells with personnel knowledgeable
about local terrain and weather conditions, but the frequency of
personnel rotations may make it difficult to provide sufficient
continuity that the act requires.  Specifically, the Brigade and
battalion chains of command who serve as the safety cell members and
supervise daily training safety decisions generally rotate to new
units every 2-3 years.  Because of the act's requirement that safety
cell personnel have sufficient continuity and experience, the Army
has recently authorized the addition of four civilian personnel to
the safety cells at the Brigade and the three training battalions. 
The Army plans to fill these positions by September 1999. 

The Army has completed and institutionalized most of the recommended
corrective actions, and they appear to be functioning effectively. 
The Brigade has improved safety controls at the Florida Ranger camp
by developing systems to better monitor and predict river and swamp
conditions.  It has moved waterborne training exercises outside
high-risk areas and eliminated discretion to deviate from established
training lanes.  At all three training phases, medical evacuation
procedures have been revised, rehearsed, and inspected; physician
assistants have been assigned to the Brigade and training battalions;
and a Brigade communications officer has been assigned.  In addition,
the Brigade now requires that its training companies be commanded by
branch-qualified captains. 

Although frequent inspections have been conducted since the accident,
they did not evaluate continued compliance with the training safety
controls, as we recommended in our preliminary report, nor were the
results of the inspections adequately documented.  Documented
evaluations of the training safety controls would help ensure that
the corrective actions are continued and lessons learned from the
accident are sustained in the future. 


   ARMY INCREASED BRIGADE
   PERSONNEL BUT MANY FACTORS HAVE
   HINDERED MEETING MANDATED
   LEVELS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

At the time of the 1995 accident, the Ranger Training Brigade had a
staffing priority that authorized it to be staffed at about 85
percent of its personnel requirements.  In response to the mandated
90-percent level, the Army excepted the Brigade from normal Army
staffing priorities\3 and raised the Brigade's officer distribution
and enlisted personnel authorizations to 90 percent of the required
numbers.  It expected to staff the Brigade at this level in February
1997.  Despite these measures, the Army was not able to assign and
maintain the numbers of officers and enlisted personnel the act
required for most months since that time.  The Brigade staffing level
has improved since the accident, even though the Army has not
maintained staffing at the mandated level. 


--------------------
\3 Because of Army-wide shortages of personnel, the Army uses a
tiered system to allocate personnel to its units.  The Army gives top
priority to staffing Department of Defense (DOD) agencies, major
commands, training centers, and special operations forces.  These
entities receive about 100 percent of their personnel requirements. 
Second priority is given to early deploying Army divisions, which
normally receive about 95 percent of their personnel requirements. 
The Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and its schools,
including the Brigade, receive a "fair share" of the remaining
officers and enlisted personnel, usually about 85 percent of their
personnel requirements.  TRADOC receives a higher priority for
enlisted instructors, usually about 98 to 100 percent of instructor
requirements. 


      MANDATED OFFICER AND
      ENLISTED PERSONNEL LEVELS
      HAVE NOT BEEN SUSTAINED
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1

Although in the aggregate, the Brigade was assigned 96 percent of its
required personnel in February 1997, it had only 88 percent of the
required number of officers.  The Brigade's officer strength has
remained below the mandated 90-percent level for most of the time
between February 1997 and November 1998 and fell to under 80 percent
for 9 months.  While the Brigade was able to maintain higher enlisted
personnel levels because of the Army priority for assigning enlisted
Ranger instructors, its enlisted strength overall was also under the
mandated level for 14 months from February 1997 through September
1998, as shown in figure 1. 

   Figure 1:  Ranger Training
   Brigade Personnel Levels,
   February 1997 through November
   1998

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

At the end of November 1998, when we completed our review, the
Brigade was assigned 59 (or 80 percent) of its 74 required officers
and 596 (or 93 percent) of its required enlisted personnel.  Although
the number of assigned officers was below the act's requirement, it
was significantly higher than it was at the time of the accident,
when only 38 officers were assigned.  Further, although the Brigade
was assigned less than the required number of enlisted personnel from
October 1997 through September 1998, it did have over 90 percent of
its required number of enlisted Ranger instructors. 

As of November 1998, the Brigade would have needed eight more
officers to meet the mandated 90-percent level.  Fort Benning
officials said that they would be unable to assign any additional
officers until captains undergoing advanced infantry officer training
become available in December 1998. 

Data on the Brigade's numbers of required and assigned officers and
enlisted personnel by month are included in appendix I. 


      MANY FACTORS HAVE
      CONTRIBUTED TO SHORTFALLS IN
      MEETING REQUIRED PERSONNEL
      LEVELS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2

Many factors have contributed to the Army's shortfalls in meeting the
required numbers of officers and enlisted personnel, including
unplanned losses of officers, shortages of branch-qualified
captains\4 and certain enlisted specialties, unfilled requirements
for other service's instructors, and higher personnel requirements. 

Army officials at Fort Benning told us that the unplanned loss of
personnel was the primary reason for not meeting the mandated officer
level.  The Brigade lost several officers who resigned their
commissions or were injured while conducting Ranger training
exercises.  When these unexpected losses occurred, it was not
possible to immediately reassign officers from other Army units to
fill them.  Fort Benning officials told us that replacing experienced
and branch-qualified captains was particularly difficult because they
are in short supply throughout the Army.  As a result, Fort Benning
was unable to immediately replace the officers lost by the Brigade
and had to wait for graduates of the Infantry Officer Advanced course
at Fort Benning to become available. 

Some of the shortfall of enlisted personnel was due to unfilled
requirements for instructors from the other services.  For fiscal
year 1998, the Army determined that the Air Force, the Navy, and the
Marine Corps were to provide 20 instructors, and for fiscal year
1999, 16 instructors, based on the numbers of students they
collectively planned to enroll in the Ranger course.  However, the
other services have not provided the numbers of instructors required. 
For example, thus far, in fiscal year 1999, the Marine Corps has
provided only 2 of the 13 instructors.  If the services had met their
instructor requirements, the Army would have achieved the mandated
enlisted personnel level in most months since February 1997.  Table 1
shows the number of students the Army and other services planned to
enroll in the Ranger course in fiscal year 1999 with the required and
assigned instructors. 



                                Table 1
                
                  Army and Other Services' Fiscal Year
                    1999 Enrollment and Required and
                          Assigned Instructors

                                                  Required    Assigned
                                                instructor  instructor
Service                             Students\a           s         s\b
----------------------------------  ----------  ----------  ----------
Army                                     2,245         281         279
Marine Corps                               100          13           2
Navy                                        12           2           0
Air Force                                    9           1           0
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Planned enrollment in fiscal year 1999. 

\b As of November 1998. 

Two other factors contributed to personnel shortages in the Brigade. 
First, the Army had difficulty assigning the required numbers of
enlisted training support personnel, such as medics and signal
systems specialists, because there were, and still are, relatively
small numbers of personnel with these specialties in the force. 
Second, in October 1997, the Army added 7 additional personnel
requirements for officers and 86 additional requirements for enlisted
personnel.  Because the numbers of assigned personnel did not
significantly change along with the added requirements, the
percentages of assigned to required personnel declined significantly. 
Although Army officials at Fort Benning thought they could fill these
positions within several months, both officer and enlisted personnel
levels remained well below the mandated levels throughout fiscal year
1998. 


--------------------
\4 Branch-qualified captains are those who have had advanced training
and have served in command positions in the field to which they are
assigned. 


      OTHER ASSIGNMENTS AND
      CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SHORTAGES
      REDUCE THE AVAILABILITY OF
      THE BRIGADE'S PERSONNEL
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.3

The actual number of personnel available is often less than the
number of personnel assigned to the Brigade.  At any given time, some
Brigade personnel are attending Army schools or are assigned to other
duties, such as recruiting, thus reducing the actual number of
personnel available to conduct and support Ranger training.  As in
all Army units, Brigade personnel periodically attend Army schools to
complete their career training requirements or perform other duties
for their units.  In November 1998, the Brigade was assigned 59 (or
80 percent) of its 74 required officers.  However, 3 of the 59
officers were attending schools or performing other full-time duties. 
As a result, the Brigade only had 76 percent of its required officers
available.  In addition, Ranger training battalion commanders must
often assign soldiers to fill vacant civilian personnel positions. 
In November 1998, the Brigade had only 10 (or 20 percent) of its 49
required civilian personnel.  To compensate for these shortages,
battalion commanders periodically assigned Ranger training personnel
to maintenance, supply, administrative, and other jobs--a common
practice throughout the Army when civilian personnel requirements
cannot be met. 


      UNIQUE RANGER TRAINING AND
      PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS ARE
      NOT RECOGNIZED IN ARMY
      PERSONNEL DISTRIBUTION
      PRIORITIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.4

Both Ranger training and the requirements for the personnel that
conduct the training are unique.  Unlike training at other TRADOC
schools, Ranger training is conducted around the clock, under
hazardous conditions, at three separate locations in difficult
mountainous, river, and swamp terrain.  The training is designed to
subject students to hot and cold weather temperature extremes and
mental and physical stresses, including nutritional and sleep
deprivation--conditions that are intended to approach those found in
combat.  To conduct this type of training, Ranger instructors,
battalion and company commanders, and support personnel must be
qualified to function effectively under similar conditions. 
Therefore, many Brigade personnel are required to have special
qualifications, including airborne and Ranger qualifications, and
some are required to have swimmer and diver qualifications. 
Personnel with these qualifications are in short supply and in high
demand throughout the Army.  However, the current Army officer
distribution policy gives top priority units, such as special
operations forces, 100 percent of their requirements for these kinds
of specialties.  Without the higher priority the Army implemented to
meet the mandated levels, the Brigade would receive only about 85
percent of its officer requirement.  The Brigade would therefore
compete with higher priority units and other TRADOC schools to obtain
personnel with these specialized qualifications.  The Army's enlisted
distribution policy, however, does give a higher priority to the
Brigade for enlisted instructors because it needs between 60 and
180 days to train and certify personnel to become fully qualified
Ranger instructors. 

Further, assigning personnel is complicated because, unlike other
Army training units, the Brigade's headquarters and three training
battalions are located in separate geographic areas.  While Army
commanders usually move personnel between positions within their
units to compensate for any losses, the Brigade's ability to do so is
limited because reassigning personnel from one training battalion to
another involves permanent changes of station for soldiers and their
families.  Therefore, when losses occur, the Brigade must wait for
available personnel from other Army units rather than move personnel
internally between battalions. 


   ARMY PLANS TO STAFF SAFETY
   CELLS WITH CIVILIANS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

The act specified that safety cell personnel at each location must
have sufficient continuity and experience to be knowledgeable of
local terrain, weather, and other conditions.  Currently, members of
the Brigade and the battalions' chains of command, including the
Brigade and battalion commanders, serve in the safety cells and
supervise daily training safety decisions.  While these people have
developed a high degree of experience and knowledge of local
conditions, the frequency of their rotations to new units may prevent
the safety cells from obtaining individuals with sufficient
continuity in the local training areas.  Army officers usually rotate
to new units every 2 years, enlisted personnel about every 3 years. 
In contrast, Army civilian employees do not rotate jobs as frequently
and thus would appear to provide the continuity envisioned in the
act. 

In 1996, the Infantry Center at Fort Benning and the Brigade
considered requesting civilian personnel for the safety cells but
decided to adopt the current approach of having Brigade personnel
serve in the safety cells.  However, in September 1998, TRADOC
reconsidered this approach and began work on a plan to authorize
hiring four civilians for the safety cells at the Brigade and at each
of the three training battalions.  Army officials at Fort Benning
told us they plan to develop job descriptions, identify candidates,
and hire staff for the safety cells by September 1999. 


   CORRECTIVE SAFETY ACTIONS ARE
   INCORPORATED IN STANDARD
   OPERATING PROCEDURES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

The Army's investigation of the accident recommended corrective
actions to improve (1) risk assessments of training conditions, (2)
command and control of training exercises, and (3) medical support
and evacuation procedures.  We reported in our preliminary report
that the risk assessments had been improved, command and control
procedures had been revised, and evacuation and medical support
capabilities had increased.  In addition, in September 1997, the Army
Inspector General reviewed the corrective actions and waterborne
training safety controls at the Florida Ranger camp and concluded
that they were in place and functioning as intended. 

During our review, we found that the corrective actions had been
institutionalized in Brigade standard operating procedures\5 and that
the safety control measures and medical evacuation procedures
remained in place and appeared to be functioning effectively. 
Specifically, the Brigade continued to apply safety improvements at
the Florida Ranger camp, such as command and control systems to
better monitor and predict river and swamp conditions, and to conduct
waterborne training exercises in designated training lanes outside of
high-risk areas.  At all three training locations, medical evacuation
procedures had been revised, rehearsed, and inspected; and physician
assistants had been assigned to the Brigade and training battalions. 
In addition, the Brigade has improved safety and the supervision of
training by requiring that its training companies be commanded by
experienced and branch-qualified captains.  To better supervise
training safety, the Brigade also assigns an officer and an enlisted
noncommissioned officer to serve as training liaisons to accompany
and monitor each Ranger class through all three phases of training. 

A complete description and status of all corrective actions are
included in appendixes II through V. 


--------------------
\5 Brigade standard operating procedures include those of the
Brigade's headquarters and the three training battalions. 


   SAFETY INSPECTIONS DO NOT
   EVALUATE OR DOCUMENT COMPLIANCE
   WITH TRAINING SAFETY CONTROLS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

Our preliminary report assessing Ranger training safety recommended
that TRADOC, the Army Infantry Center, Fort Benning, the Ranger
Training Brigade, and organizations outside the chain of command,
such as the Army Inspector General, conduct periodic inspections to
determine compliance with the safety controls implemented after the
1995 accident.  Since 1997, the Army Infantry Center commander has
conducted 6 personal safety inspections, and Brigade commanders have
conducted 23 personal safety inspections.  Also, Fort Benning has
conducted two command and staff inspections, and the Brigade has
conducted three command and staff inspections.\6 In addition, the
Army Inspector General has visited all three phases of Ranger
training and, in September 1997, completed an inspection of the
safety controls. 

However, the scope and results of the personal inspections conducted
by the Infantry Center and Brigade commanders have not been
documented.  We were, therefore, unable to determine whether (1) the
commanders' inspections focused on the identified safety control
measures or (2) the commanders had determined that safety controls
were working effectively. 

While the scope and results of the Infantry Center's and the
Brigade's command and staff inspections were documented, these
inspections covered a broad range of unit activities, including
safety.  However, the safety related portion focused entirely on
general safety procedures, such as fire prevention measures, not on
training safety.  Also, although the Ranger training chain of command
was briefed on the scope and results of the Army Inspector General's
safety control inspection, a written report was not done. 


--------------------
\6 Army Inspection Policy, Army Regulation 1-201, gives commanders
the flexibility to establish both the frequency of and criteria for
the inspections. 


   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

Since the mandated staffing goal was instituted, the Ranger Training
Brigade staffing level has improved, even though the Army has not
maintained staffing at the mandated 90-percent level.  A key factor
in this improvement has been the Army's decision to give priority to
staffing the Brigade.  Without sufficient priority, we believe that
unplanned losses and other problems that have kept the Brigade's
officer strength below the mandated 90-percent levels would, over
time, degrade officer strength to the levels that existed at the time
of the accident.  In view of the increased personnel levels since the
accident, and provided that the Army continues the current staffing
priority for the Brigade, we do not believe that it is necessary to
maintain mandated personnel levels in law. 

Additionally, the failure to evaluate specific training safety
controls and document the results of such evaluations provide
inadequate assurance that safety measures and controls are in place
and functioning effectively.  Inspections are vital in ensuring that
corrective actions instituted after the accident are sustained. 

We, therefore, recommend that the Secretary of the Army

  -- continue the current 90-percent officer distribution planning
     level for the Ranger Training Brigade and

  -- direct that future inspections of the Brigade include
     evaluations of training safety controls and that the
     inspections' results are documented. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

In written comments on a draft of this report (see app.VI), DOD
concurred with the report and its recommendations.  DOD stated that
the Secretary of the Army has directed that the officer and enlisted
strength of the Brigade be sustained at or above the 90-percent
distribution level and that the Commander, Total Army Personnel
Command, has established procedures to ensure compliance.  DOD also
stated that the Army has conducted frequent inspections to evaluate
training safety controls and has moved to address the documentation
of training safety controls inspections. 

DOD also noted that its goal is to provide safe, tough, and realistic
training to Brigade students and that it believes it is meeting this
goal.  DOD also provided technical comments that we incorporated
where appropriate. 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9

To determine the status of the mandated Ranger training manning
levels, we reviewed and analyzed personnel requirements and numbers
of officers and enlisted personnel assigned to the Ranger Training
Brigade from February 1997 through November 1998.  We reviewed
changes in Army and Fort Benning personnel policies, plans, and
distribution priorities to assess the measures taken to increase
personnel to the mandated levels.  To assess the adequacy of current
personnel levels and the need to continue the mandated levels, we
analyzed personnel requirements and obtained the views of Department
of Army, TRADOC, and Fort Benning officials.  We assessed the status
of establishing training safety cells by reviewing the duties,
qualifications, and experience of safety cell members and
interviewing Fort Benning and Ranger officials. 

To determine the status of the corrective actions and determine
whether they are functioning effectively, we received briefings from
Brigade officials, observed training exercises, and reviewed safety
procedures at each Ranger battalion's facilities.  To determine
whether the Army has adequately inspected compliance with the
identified safety controls, we interviewed Brigade officials and
reviewed Army and Infantry Center inspection regulations, procedures,
and records. 

We conducted our review at Department of Army headquarters, Army
Infantry Center, Ranger Training Brigade headquarters, and the Ranger
training battalions at Fort Benning, Dahlonega, Georgia, and Eglin
Air Force Base, Florida. 

Our review was conducted from September through November 1998 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :9.1

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen, Senate and
House Committees on Appropriations, Senate Committee on Armed
Services, and House Committee on Armed Services and to the
Secretaries of Defense and the Army.  Copies will also be made
available to others upon request. 

The major contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI.  If
you or your staff have questions about this report, please call me on
(202) 512-5140. 

Mark E.  Gebicke
Director, Military Operations
 and Capabilities Issues


RANGER TRAINING BRIGADE PERSONNEL
LEVELS, FEBRUARY 1997 THROUGH
NOVEMBER 1998
=========================================================== Appendix I

                 Officers           Enlisted personnel        Brigade total
          ----------------------  ----------------------  ----------------------
Fiscal
year/     Requir  Assign  Percen  Requir  Assign  Percen  Requir  Assign  Percen
month         ed      ed       t      ed      ed       t      ed      ed       t
--------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------
1997
February      66      58      88     557     539      97     623     597      96
March         66      59      89     557     533      96     623     592      95
April         66      61      92     557     521      94     623     582      93
May           66      61      92     557     514      92     623     575      92
June          66      62      94     557     505      91     623     567      91
July          66      62      94     557     494      89     623     556      89
August        66      63      95     557     490      88     623     553      89
Septembe      66      61      92     557     510      92     623     571      92
 r
1998
October       73      57      78     643     522      81     716     579      81
November      73      57      78     643     539      84     716     596      83
December      73      57      78     643     526      82     716     583      81
January       73      57      78     643     541      84     716     598      84
February      73      57      78     643     541      84     716     598      84
March         73      58      79     643     558      87     716     616      86
April         73      60      82     643     569      88     716     629      88
May           73      59      81     643     574      89     716     633      88
June          73      57      78     643     563      88     716     620      87
July          73      56      77     643     557      87     716     613      86
August        73      60      82     643     552      86     716     612      85
Septembe      73      60      82     643     552      86     716     612      85
 r
1999
October       74      55      74     639     574      90     713     629      88
November      74      59      80     639     596      93     713     655      92
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note:  Percentages have been rounded. 


STATUS OF ACTIONS TO IMPROVE
SAFETY MANAGEMENT:  RISK
ASSESSMENTS
========================================================== Appendix II

Planned actions           Status    Comments
--------------------  --  --------  --------------------------------------------
1. Develop a              Complete  Weather, river, and swamp information
standard operating        d         obtained from local and federal agencies is
procedure to capture                integrated in training decision-making.
and use river level                 Also, three remote weather sensors on the
forecast information                Yellow River provide real-time water depth
from local agencies.                and temperatures.

2. Update risk            Complete  Risk management assessments have been
management                d         completed for all training activities.
assessment.

3. Update daily risk      Complete  Daily risk assessments capture information
assessment.               d         on changing weather, water level,
                                    temperature, student conditions, and
                                    readiness of support systems.

4. Update current         Complete  The water immersion guide is briefed at the
immersion guide.          d         beginning of each day and updated as
                                    conditions change.

5. Standardize the        Complete  Written standardized briefing formats are
in-walkers briefing       d         used for daily briefings of instructors at
for instructors.                    all three Ranger training battalions.

6. Provide                Complete  Medical and other information on selected
commanders critical       d         students and student platoons is forwarded
requirements                        to each training phase's incoming commander.
analysis of class/
platoon strengths
and weaknesses as
each class moves to
a new training
phase.

7. Erect staff            Complete  The Army Corps of Engineers erected 32 water
markers on the            d         depth markers along the Yellow River and
lanes.                              training lanes in the swamps.

8. Examine the            Complete  System reviewed, and it remains a first line
effectiveness of the      d         of safety defense. When assigned buddy is
current buddy                       not available, teams will move to three-
system.                             person system.


9. Reinstate the          Complete  The 6th Battalion now assigns a captain or
system of assigning       d         senior noncommissioned officer and a staff
tactical officers to                sergeant to each class with responsibility
each class.                         for class cohesion, student advocacy,
                                    feedback to battalion commanders, and other
                                    issues.

10. Conduct               Complete  Lesson added to the Ranger course program of
refresher training        d         instruction.
on the use of the
immersion guide.

11. Identify and          Complete  Weak swimmers are identified during the
mark weak swimmers.       d         combat water survival test and marked on
                                    their headgear and equipment.

12. Obtain                Complete  Experimental monitoring software was
physiological             d         provided to Ranger medical clinics. Due to
monitoring software.                implementation problems, the Brigade has
                                    discontinued its use.

13. Conduct               Complete  The Brigade Commander has increased meals
nutrition and             d         provided Ranger students from 1\-1/2 to 2
immunization study.                 per day based on Army nutritional studies.

14. Develop               Complete  Experimental monitors tested in June 1996,
personnel status          d         but no procurement made.
monitoring system
technology for
possible use in
Florida.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

STATUS OF ACTIONS TO IMPROVE
SAFETY MANAGEMENT:  COMMAND AND
CONTROL, EQUIPMENT, AND TRAINING
========================================================= Appendix III

Planned actions           Status    Comments
--------------------  --  --------  --------------------------------------------
1. Develop standard       Complete  Procedures have been written and included in
operating procedures      d         the Brigade and the three training phases
for conducting                      daily operating procedures.
training at the
Florida Ranger
Training Battalion.


2. Clearly identify       Complete  The Florida battalion identified specific
each training lane.       d         lanes from the Yellow River through the
                                    swamps. The lanes were narrowed and adjusted
                                    to avoid hazardous areas. Students are not
                                    allowed to deviate from designated boat drop
                                    sites and training lanes.

3. Develop a              Complete  The Brigade developed a standardized
training and              d         instructor certification program. The
certification                       program focuses on the development of
program for                         instructor competency, experience, and
instructors.                        application of procedures, safety, and risk
                                    management.

4. Upgrade tactical       Complete  Communications and computer upgrades were
operations center         d         installed and they are functioning
ability to monitor                  effectively at Florida and mountain phases.
operations.


5. Purchase earplug/      Complete  The Florida battalion acquired whisper mikes
silent radios.            d         for use with Motorola radios during training
                                    exercises.

6. Ensure that all        Complete  Florida battalion students must demonstrate
patrols are               d         their ability to properly construct a one-
equipped, trained,                  rope bridge in 8 minutes prior to entering
and prepared to                     the swamp.
conduct stream
crossing operations.

7. Develop a              Complete  A Brigade decision paper concluded that
decision paper on         d         global position receivers will be used by
the use of precision                medical evacuation helicopters and Ranger
lightweight global                  instructors. The Brigade acquired 66
position receivers                  receivers to track the movement of
by instructors                      students.
during emergencies.

8. Develop standard       Complete  Equipment and supply packing lists for
packing lists for         d         instructors, medics, and aeromedevac crews
instructors, medics,                have been updated.
and aeromedevac
crews.

9. Review the winter      Complete  The winter packing list has been reviewed,
rucksack packing          d         and minor changes were made. Instructors
list.                               inspect student rucksacks to ensure they
                                    have been tailored, weight distributed, and
                                    waterproofed.

10. Add a                 Complete  A waterproofing lesson has been added to the
waterproofing class       d         Ranger course program of instruction.
to program of
instruction.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

STATUS OF ACTIONS TO IMPROVE
SAFETY MANAGEMENT:  MEDICAL
SUPPORT AND EVACUATION PROCEDURES
========================================================== Appendix IV

Planned actions           Status    Comments
--------------------  --  --------  --------------------------------------------
1. Determine system       Complete  Air, water, surface, and ground evacuation
necessary to ensure       d         procedures have been planned, rehearsed, and
safe medical                        inspected. Joint medical evacuation
evacuation.                         procedures have been established among the
                                    Ranger training battalions and local medical
                                    services.

2. Develop a mass         Complete  Mass casualty procedures have been included
casualty standard         d         in each Ranger training battalion's standard
operating procedure.                operating procedure.

3. Initiate a             Determin  The former battalion commander concluded
project to build a        ed to be  that the road is not critical for safe
road into the swamp       not       training and that following an environmental
area in Florida.          feasible  assessment, high construction and
                                    environmental mitigation cost estimates, it
                                    is not justified.

4. Determine fuel         Complete  A 2,000-gallon tanker is on hand at the
requirement for           d         Florida camp and two tankers with about
medevac helicopters                 10,000 gallons fuel capacity are on hand at
at Florida training                 the Georgia mountain camp.
site.

5. Implement plan to      Complete  All three Ranger training battalions now
revert to full-time       d         have full-time, Ranger-qualified medics.
Ranger medic
manning.

6. Obtain C02             Complete  The Florida Ranger camp acquired 21 CO\2
inflatable one-man        d         inflatable rafts, which are used by each
rafts.                              Ranger instructor team.

7. Obtain                 Complete  Six hypothermia bags were issued to each of
hypothermia bags.         d         the Ranger training battalions.

8. Develop a system       Complete  All medevac emergency equipment is inspected
to check packing          d         for accountability and serviceability upon
list for medevac                    arrival at the training battalions.
helicopters.

9. Reinforce              Complete  Fort Benning Medical Command has developed
training and              d         training guidelines for medics and
rehearsals of                       Physician's Assistants in each camp.
medical attachments.

10. Ensure                Complete  Revised standard operating procedures
compliance with           d         outline cold and hot weather training
previous cold                       procedures.
weather procedures.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

STATUS OF ACTIONS TO PRESERVE
LESSONS LEARNED
=========================================================== Appendix V

Planned actions           Status    Comments
--------------------  --  --------  --------------------------------------------
1. Determine how          Complete  1977 and 1995 accident summaries have been
best to preserve          d         integrated into instructor certification
lessons learned.                    programs and are required reading for new
                                    members of the chain of command.

                                    VCR tape summarizing the 1977 and 1995
                                    accidents was produced and is in use in the
                                    instructor certification program.

                                    Monument to students who died was erected at
                                    the site of the accident.

2. Continue formal        Complete  Although all battalions have been inspected,
command inspection        d         the inspections do not focus on training-
program.                            related safety.

3. Review complete        Complete  The Army Inspector General completed a
waterborne                d         review of waterborne procedures in September
procedures.                         1997.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix VI
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
=========================================================== Appendix V



(See figure in printed edition.)


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================= Appendix VII

NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Carol R.  Schuster
Reginald L.  Furr, Jr. 

ATLANTA FIELD OFFICE

Kevin C.  Handley
Katherine P.  Chenault


*** End of document. ***