Military Recruiting: New Initiatives Could Improve Criminal History
Screening (Letter Report, 02/23/99, GAO/NSIAD-99-53).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of
Defense's (DOD) processes for investigating military enlistees' criminal
history, focusing on: (1) the extent to which relevant criminal history
information on potential enlistees is available to the military
services; and (2) federal government initiatives that could improve the
process of obtaining criminal history information.
GAO noted that: (1) the military services have extensive policies and
procedures for encouraging applicants to self-report criminal history
information; (2) among other things, the services repeatedly query each
applicant, providing as many as 14 opportunities to disclose any
criminal offenses to as many as seven different service and military
entrance processing station officials; (3) the services also conduct
periodic inspections and investigations to ensure the integrity of the
entire recruiting process, which includes the disclosure of
disqualifying information; (4) the services, however, are not always
able to obtain or substantiate all available criminal history
information because of service policies and federal, state, and local
laws and policies that sometimes preclude access; (5) the services do
not use fingerprints to substantiate the majority of enlistees' criminal
histories; (6) without full fingerprint searches, the services cannot
detect undisclosed aliases and ensure that they are aware of all
available criminal history information; (7) federal law and state and
local laws and policies, which generally limit or prohibit disclosure of
criminal history information, impede the recruiting community's access
to certain criminal history information; (8) in addition, state and
local governments sometimes charge fees or require fingerprints to
release the information; (9) available criminal history databases (not
controlled by DOD) are incomplete; (10) of further concern is the
services' practice of sending enlistees to basic training before the
results of criminal record checks are received; (11) this practice
results in training costs that could be avoided; (12) several DOD and
Department of Justice initiatives are underway that could improve the
access of obtaining criminal history information; (13) these initiatives
have the potential of making available to DOD and the services more
complete information upon which to make moral waiver decisions and
expedite the process for obtaining record checks; and (14) however, DOD
and the services have not yet formulated a coordinated approach for
using these initiatives to better ensure that the military does not
enlist and train individuals with undesirable backgrounds.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-99-53
TITLE: Military Recruiting: New Initiatives Could Improve Criminal
History Screening
DATE: 02/23/99
SUBJECT: Enlisted personnel
Data integrity
Military recruiting
Law enforcement information systems
Criminals
IDENTIFIER: DOD Delayed Entry Program
DOD Electronic Personnel Security Questionnaire
FBI Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System
FBI Criminal Justice Information Services Division
Strategic Plan
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to the Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee
on Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate
February 1999
MILITARY RECRUITING - NEW
INITIATIVES COULD IMPROVE CRIMINAL
HISTORY SCREENING
GAO/NSIAD-99-53
Military Recruiting
(703226)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
DMDC - Defense Manpower Data Center
DOD - Department of Defense
FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-281719
February 23, 1999
The Honorable Wayne Allard
Chairman
The Honorable Max Cleland
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Personnel
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
To enter the military services, applicants must meet several
Department of Defense (DOD) entrance qualification standards, such as
moral character, physical fitness, and dependency status, or be
granted a waiver. Notwithstanding the moral character standards, a
criminal history record\1 for any type of crime, including a felony,
does not automatically eliminate someone from consideration because
they may be granted a "moral character waiver" (referred to in this
report as moral waiver)--an agreement to enlist an individual despite
past behavior. Of the 1.5 million individuals the military services
enlisted in fiscal years 1990 through 1997, about 192,000 were
granted a waiver for moral character reasons.
Concerned about the moral character qualifications of enlisted
personnel, you requested that we (1) determine the extent to which
relevant criminal history information on potential enlistees is
available to the military services and (2) identify any federal
government initiatives that could improve the process of obtaining
criminal history information. We are also providing data comparing
enlistees entering military service with moral waivers to those
without, and their reasons for separation. This information is
presented in appendix I.
--------------------
\1 "Criminal history records" are fingerprint cards or their
electronic counterparts, linked with identifying information and
available data on arrests, convictions, and sentences. Not included
are state or local criminal justice agency records sealed under law.
Records of offenses committed by juveniles are frequently sealed.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
The military services have extensive policies and procedures for
encouraging applicants to self-report criminal history information.
Among other things, the services repeatedly query each applicant,
providing as many as 14 opportunities to disclose any criminal
offenses to as many as seven different service and military entrance
processing station officials. The services also conduct periodic
inspections and investigations to ensure the integrity of the entire
recruiting process, which includes the disclosure of disqualifying
information. The services, however, are not always able to obtain or
substantiate all available criminal history information because of
service policies and federal, state, and local laws and policies that
sometimes preclude access. First, the services do not use
fingerprints to substantiate the majority of enlistees' criminal
histories. Without full fingerprint searches, the services cannot
detect undisclosed aliases and ensure that they are aware of all
available criminal history information. Second, federal law and
state and local laws and policies, which generally limit or prohibit
disclosure of criminal history information, impede the recruiting
community's access to certain criminal history information. In
addition, state and local governments sometimes charge fees or
require fingerprints to release the information. Third, available
criminal history databases (not controlled by DOD) are incomplete.
Of further concern is the services' practice of sending enlistees to
basic training before the results of criminal record checks are
received. This practice results in training costs that could be
avoided.
Several DOD and Department of Justice initiatives are underway that
could improve the process of obtaining criminal history information.
These initiatives have the potential of making available to DOD and
the services more complete information upon which to make moral
waiver decisions and expedite the process for obtaining record
checks. However, DOD and the services have not yet formulated a
coordinated approach for using these initiatives to better ensure
that the military does not enlist and train individuals with
undesirable backgrounds.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
Military enlistees must meet basic DOD and military service entrance
qualification standards on age, citizenship, education, aptitude,
physical fitness, dependency status, and moral character. Screening
to determine whether applicants meet these standards or merit being
granted a waiver begins with a recruiter's initial contact with a
potential applicant and continues through their entrance into basic
training. In deciding whether to grant a moral waiver, the services
employ the "whole person" concept: They consider the circumstances
surrounding the criminal violations, the age of the person committing
them, and personal interviews.
As figure 1 shows, the services differ in both the way they
categorize criminal offenses and the criteria they use for requiring
moral waivers. In general, however, the services require moral
waivers for convictions or adverse adjudications for criminal
offenses as follows: (1) "felonies"--such as murder and grand
larceny;\2 (2) "non-minor (serious) misdemeanors"--assault and petty
larceny; (3) "minor misdemeanors"--discharging a firearm within city
limits and removing property from public grounds; (4) "minor
non-traffic"--disorderly conduct and vandalism; (5) "serious
traffic"--driving with revoked license and failure to comply with
officer's directions; and (6) "minor traffic"--speeding and driving
without a license. The services, except for the Army, also grant
moral waivers for preservice drug and alcohol abuse. None of the
services grant waivers for certain offenses, such as the trafficking,
sale, or distribution of illegal drugs.
Figure 1: Level of Offenses
and Military Service Criteria
for Requiring Moral Waivers
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: Service regulations.
Appendix I provides detailed information about how often and for what
reasons the services granted moral waivers to enlistees during the
fiscal years 1990 through 1997 period. Overall, DOD's Defense
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) data for this 8-fiscal year period shows
the following:
-- moral waivers accounted for 62 percent of all waivers granted\3
and represented 13 percent of all individuals enlisted;
-- although annual DOD-wide enlistments fluctuated between about
162,000 and 223,000 during this period, the rate of granting
moral waivers consistently declined from 17.5 percent to 7.8
percent of all enlistees--a total decrease of over 60 percent;
-- of the moral waivers granted, non-minor (serious) misdemeanors
and preservice drug and alcohol abuse categories accounted for
over 75 percent, minor non-traffic and traffic offenses for
about 20 percent, and felonies committed either as an adult or
juvenile about 3 percent; and
-- the number of moral waivers granted in all categories decreased,
but felony and non-minor misdemeanor waivers increased as a
percentage of total moral waivers granted.
--------------------
\2 10 U.S.C. 504 provides that no person convicted of a felony may
be enlisted in any of the armed services; however, the secretaries of
the respective services are authorized to make exceptions in
meritorious cases.
\3 Includes waivers granted for age, citizenship, education,
aptitude, physical fitness, dependency status, and moral character.
SCREENING POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES ARE EXTENSIVE, BUT
RECORD CHECKS ARE LIMITED
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
The services' policies and procedures for screening for criminal
histories and granting moral waivers are extensive and are intended
to encourage applicants to reveal their criminal history information.
However, because of limitations in records checks, the services are
not always able to obtain or substantiate all available criminal
history information. First, the majority of the national agency
checks are conducted without using an applicant's fingerprints to
verify or search for records. Also, service policies and federal,
state, and local laws and policies sometimes limit or preclude access
to criminal history information, and the criminal history databases
relied on by the services for record checks are incomplete. Of
further concern is the services' practice of sending enlistees to
training before the results of criminal record checks are received,
which incurs unnecessary costs.
EXTENSIVE POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES EXIST FOR
GATHERING CRIMINAL HISTORY
INFORMATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1
Each service screens for criminal background information in a similar
manner. Figure 2 shows how the following screening tools fit in the
recruiting process: (1) face-to-face interviews, briefings, and
completion of forms; (2) law enforcement agency record checks at the
state and local levels; and (3) national agency record checks
conducted by the Defense Security Service.\4
Figure 2: Recruiting Process
and Criminal History Screening
Tools
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: A moral waiver can be initiated when criminal history
information is disclosed during any of these steps.
Source: Data compiled from the Military Entrance Processing Command
and the military services' policies and procedures.
According to recruiting officials, screening to identify criminal
histories begins when recruiters contact potential applicants
informally--over the telephone, at shopping malls, or in schools.
Through interviews and briefings listed in figure 3, the services
provide applicants with as many as 14 different opportunities to
disclose any prior criminal offenses and convictions to as many as 7
different recruiting, military entrance processing station, and
training officials. The recruiting officials also stated that
security interviews are conducted for applicants enlisting in jobs
requiring secret or top secret clearances.
Figure 3: Interviews and
Briefings for Gathering
Criminal History Information
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Notes: Slight variations occur by service. Recruiter chain of
command personnel include Army recruiting station commanders, Marine
Corps substation noncommissioned officers in charge, and Air Force
flight chiefs. Service liaisons include Army guidance counselors,
Navy liaison petty officers and classifiers, Marine Corps
noncommissioned officers, and Air Force liaisons. Basic training
personnel include personnel from the Army Training Battalion, Navy
Recruit Quality Assurance Team, Marine Corps Basic Training Recruit
Liaison Section, and Air Force Training Squadron.
Source: Service and Military Entrance Processing Command interviews,
briefings, and regulations.
Applicants are required to complete the following forms used in
obtaining criminal history information: (1) Record of Military
Processing--Armed Forces of the United States (DD Form 1966), (2)
Personnel Security Questionnaire (SF-86), (3) the Police Record Check
(DD Form 369),\5 and (4) the Armed Forces Fingerprint Card (DD Form
2280). These forms elicit information on police record histories,
drug and alcohol use and abuse, financial records and delinquencies,
and any juvenile arrest or criminal activity. At this point,
recruiters may request state and local background checks.
After formal interviews with recruiters, applicants go to 1 of 65
military entrance processing stations to take the Armed Services
Vocational Aptitude Battery test; undergo a physical exam; submit
fingerprints; participate in more interviews and briefings; and take
their first oath of enlistment, which formally enlists them as unpaid
members of the Individual Ready Reserve forces and places them into
the Delayed Entry Program.\6
Entry into the Delayed Entry Program signals the beginning of the
national agency check. Most of these record checks are conducted
using descriptive data--an applicant's name, social security number,
sex, date of birth, and race--without using fingerprints. When the
checks involve fingerprints, the services request a fingerprint
verification--a comparison of an enlistee's fingerprints against FBI
criminal records to ensure that they are from the same individual
whose name was associated with a possible arrest record identified
through the descriptive data search.
Also, during the Delayed Entry Program, recruiters are in contact
with the enlistees and continue to inquire about their criminal
background and any current contact with law enforcement agencies. If
recruiters discover that enlistees have a criminal history or that
they committed offenses while in the Delayed Entry Program, the
enlistees may be discharged.\7 After the Delayed Entry Program
period, enlistees report again to a military entrance processing
station where they undergo a second physical examination and more
interviews and briefings and, if qualifications are met, take a
second enlistment oath (which places them on active military duty).
Subsequently, enlistees are asked again to disclose disqualifying
information when they report to basic training, which lasts from 6 to
12 weeks depending on the service. By the 6-month point in their
first terms, most enlistees have completed follow-on training in
technical skills, though the length of such training can vary widely
(from a few weeks to a year or more).
Moral waivers can be initiated at any stage of the recruiting
process--during contacts with recruiters, visits to the military
entrance processing stations, or the Delayed Entry Program. The
level at which the moral waivers are approved depends on the
seriousness of the offense. Waivers for the most serious offenses
must be approved by the commanders of the recruiting commands in the
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force and by the two regional recruiting
commanders in the Marine Corps. Applicants or enlistees that
intentionally conceal any disqualifying information may be refused
enlistment at any point during the recruiting process or, after
enlisting, discharged for fraudulent enlistment.
Quality control procedures have been incorporated into the recruiting
process to ensure that recruiters do not conceal negative information
about applicants. Each service (1) has established performance and
moral character standards that recruiters must meet; (2) requires
successful completion of a recruiter training course; (3) assigns
some of its most senior recruiter personnel to military entrance
processing stations; (4) conducts periodic inspections of recruiting
activities; and (5) investigates all allegations relating to
recruiter improprieties, which include an irregularity, misconduct,
or malpractice.\8
Malpractice, in particular, is considered by DOD to include willfully
concealing disqualifying factors, misleading or misinforming
applicants, or violating recruiting policies and procedures resulting
in processing an ineligible applicant. Examples of recruiter
malpractice include telling the applicant to not claim all dependents
or to conceal bankruptcies or previous criminal history. DOD data
for the 7-fiscal year period ending September 30, 1997, show that the
percentage of recruiter impropriety investigations opened was less
than 1 percent of the total DOD enlistments; the percentage of
investigations substantiated was less than 0.1 percent of these
enlistments.
--------------------
\4 This check, referred to as the Entrance National Agency Check, is
a records search by appropriate federal agencies, including the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (for felony and serious
misdemeanor offenses), the Central Intelligence Agency, and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service.
\5 In this form, applicants give state and local law enforcement
agencies permission to disclose (1) police or juvenile records
(including minor traffic violations) and (2) any ongoing court
action.
\6 The Delayed Entry Program is intended to serve as a time for
enlistees to make the necessary arrangements in their personal lives
before embarking on their new career. For example, enlistees that
are seniors in high school when they make the commitment need the
extra time to get their diploma. The program also helps the military
services meet their recruiting goals and training schedules. (For
example, applicants may enlist for specific career fields that are
not immediately available but offered at some future date.) The
program also prepares the enlistees for basic training.
\7 Based on DMDC data, 987,368 enlistees entered the Delayed Entry
Program during fiscal years 1993 through 1997; 219,500 (22.2 percent)
of these were discharged from the program for a variety of reasons,
including moral character. Complete information regarding the
specific reasons for these discharges was not available in the DMDC
database. However, according to data provided by three of the four
services, 13,866 (8.3 percent of these three services' total
discharges of 166,420) were discharged from the Delayed Entry Program
for moral character reasons.
\8 DOD considers that an "irregularity" is an intentional action to
mislead or misinform a prospective applicant about any aspect of
processing to induce enlistments. "Misconduct," such as sexual
harassment or misuse of a government vehicle, is considered willful
behavior that is contrary to law, regulation, or policy, but does not
apply to recruiting someone into the military fraudulently as
malpractice impropriety does.
LIMITATIONS EXIST FOR RECORD
CHECKS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2
DOD's checks of criminal history records are limited because (1) the
majority of national agency checks are conducted without using
fingerprints, (2) the services have limited access to criminal
history information, and (3) criminal history data sources are
incomplete.
MAJORITY OF NATIONAL
AGENCY CHECKS ARE
CONDUCTED WITHOUT USING
FINGERPRINTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2.1
The services do not always require fingerprint verification because
they do not believe the risk is great that enlistees will enter the
service with undisclosed serious criminal histories, and they are
concerned about the time and cost associated with fingerprint
verification.\9 However, it is the services' policy to conduct
national agency checks with fingerprint verifications when (1) the
descriptive data check reveals a possible arrest record; (2)
applicants are aliens in the United States, prior service persons, or
individuals who have criminal record activity; or (3) any information
is revealed that may require more investigation for a security
clearance. As a result, 73 percent of the enlistees in fiscal years
1992 through 1997 were checked for criminal history information at
the national level using only descriptive data--name, social security
number, race, sex, and date of birth. Fingerprint verification
checks were made on the remaining 27 percent, accounting for 32
percent of the cases in the Army, 25 percent in the Navy, 22 percent
in the Marine Corps, and 20 percent in the Air Force.
According to FBI officials, this fingerprint verification currently
used by the services provides less certainty than a full fingerprint
search, which compares an enlistee's fingerprints against all
criminal records in the FBI files. For example, fingerprint
verification does not assure the services that the search results are
accurate if an applicant has used an alias not recorded in the
criminal records. A full fingerprint search is required to
positively identify the person and detect when they have used
undisclosed aliases.
--------------------
\9 During fiscal years 1992 through 1997, the average processing time
for national checks using descriptive data was 10 to 14 days;
fingerprint verifications took 25 to 38 days. The FBI charged DOD
$4.00 for national descriptive data checks and an additional $8.00
for checks requiring fingerprint verification.
SERVICES HAVE LIMITED
ACCESS TO CRIMINAL
HISTORY INFORMATION
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2.2
The services do not obtain or substantiate all available criminal
history information because federal, state, and local laws and
policies limit or prohibit access.
DOD policy states that the military services shall obtain and review
criminal history record information from the criminal justice system
and Defense Security Service to determine whether applicants are
acceptable for enlistment and for assignment to special programs.\10
However, under the Security Clearance Information Act (5 U.S.C.
9101), criminal justice agencies are required to provide this
information to DOD only when an individual is being investigated for
eligibility for access to classified information or sensitive
national security duties. These agencies, which include federal,
state, and local agencies, are not required to provide this
information for determining basic eligibility or suitability for
enlistment (i.e., employment). DOD gains access to this information
through the national agency checks, which are used for granting
security clearances to enlistees.\11 These national agency checks are
initiated by military entrance processing station personnel for all
enlistees soon after they enter the Delayed Entry Program and are
employed as unpaid members of the reserves. Recruiters attempting to
gain assess to this information for screening applicants prior to
sending them to the military entrance processing stations, however,
cannot obtain it when state and local laws and policies restrict
access. The sooner applicants' criminal records are known to
military managers, the sooner they can make informed decisions about
whether to grant moral waivers.\12
Section 520a of title 10 of the U.S. Code authorizes DOD and the
services to request from state and local government criminal history
record information regarding enlistees.\13 However, state and local
policies sometimes prohibit the release of information, or require
fees or fingerprints to obtain it. A telephone survey of the states
by the Navy Recruiting Command in 1996, showed that 43 states
released information on crimes committed by adults. The survey also
showed that 33 states charged fees ranging from $5 to $59 and that 18
states and the District of Columbia required fingerprints before
releasing information. The Army has a policy to request local and
state record checks for all applicants, but will not pay these fees,
and therefore, does not obtain information from states that charge
fees. The other services request these record checks only if an
applicant admits to a criminal history. Navy and Marine Corps policy
allows recruiters to pay for the checks; Air Force policy requires
applicants to obtain the checks and pay any fees associated with the
checks. Further, because the services do not take fingerprints until
after local and state record checks have been requested, the services
do not obtain information from 18 states and the District of
Columbia.
Finally, recruiters frequently cannot obtain information on
applicants' juvenile criminal records. Generally, most state laws
restrict access to juvenile records. The 1996 Navy survey showed
that only three states release these records. In addition, under 18
U.S.C. 5038, federal juvenile delinquency proceedings' records are
safeguarded from disclosure to unauthorized persons. Specifically,
federal juvenile records may not be disclosed for any purposes other
than judicial inquiries, law enforcement needs, juvenile treatment
requirements, employment in a position raising national security
concerns, and disposition questions from victims or victims'
families. These juvenile crime records are likely to be a major
source of criminal history information for the population targeted by
military recruiters--men and women generally 17 to 21 years old.
However, according to Department of Justice officials, when juveniles
are charged with serious crimes such as murder and rape, most states
try them as adults in criminal court. Their records, if reported by
states, are available in the FBI's national criminal records system.
Criminal history checks, therefore, should identify many of the more
serious juvenile criminal offenders who are tried as adults.
In 1992, the Department of Justice revised its regulations (28 C.F.R.
20.32) to allow the FBI to collect, maintain, and provide authorized
access to juvenile records for juveniles tried or otherwise
adjudicated in juvenile proceedings. Before 1992, the FBI was
prohibited from collecting juvenile records with the exception of
those cases when a juvenile had been processed as an adult. However,
according to Department of Justice officials, each state determines
whether its own laws permit submitting these juvenile records to, or
authorizing access through the FBI. Also, states may elect not to
record the offense, and local law enforcement may decide to label the
offense a status violation (truancy, for example) rather than a
criminal violation. As of February 1998, about 213,700 (less than 1
percent) of the 37,857,111 criminal subjects in the FBI's
identification records system were under the age of 18.
--------------------
\10 According to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the criminal
justice system includes state, county, and local law enforcement
agencies; courts and clerks of courts; and other government agencies
authorized to collect, maintain, and disseminate criminal history
record information.
\11 According to an Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) official,
between 50 to 60 percent of all enlistees require a security
clearance during their first term of enlistment. Air Force
Recruiting Service officials told us that all Air Force enlistees
require a security clearance.
\12 For fiscal years 1998 and 1999, DOD proposed legislative changes
to give it the authority to readily obtain access to state and local
criminal history information at reasonable costs for the purpose of
accepting or retaining individuals into military service. According
to one assistant secretary of defense official, DOD plans to continue
pursuing these changes because their proposals have not been enacted.
\13 Under this law, criminal history record information pertaining to
any juvenile or adult arrest, citation, or conviction describes the
offense involved; age of the person involved; dates of arrest,
citation, or conviction, if any; place of the alleged offense; place
of arrest and assigned court; and disposition of the case.
CRIMINAL HISTORY DATA
SOURCES ARE INCOMPLETE
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2.3
Department of Justice studies have shown for decades that criminal
history databases are incomplete and, as discussed in the next
section, they have funded initiatives for improvements. The FBI
considers a record to be complete when all significant events, such
as the arrest and disposition, are available. A complete record also
includes the individual's name, social security number, age, sex,
fingerprints, and other physical descriptive type information.
According to FBI officials, completeness of the FBI database is
dependent upon states' submissions of arrest information and court
disposition actions, and the states depend on local agencies to
submit information to the state repository. Reporting of this
information by all levels of law enforcement agencies to the next
higher level is voluntary and does not always occur.
The Department of Justice periodically requests information from the
states regarding the completeness of their criminal history
databases. As of December 31, 1997, among the 50 states and the
District of Columbia, the percentage of arrest records that have
final dispositions recorded varied greatly, ranging from 5 to 98
percent. Also, for arrests within the last 5 years, three states
reported that less than 30 percent of their records were complete.
Conversely, nine states reported that 90 percent or more of their
records were complete for the same period. At the federal level, as
of June 1998, the FBI database had a total of 76,427,487 active
arrests, but dispositions were on file for only 46 percent of the
arrests.
According to a Department of Justice Assistant Attorney General,
state criminal records systems tend to be more comprehensive than the
federal system. This is particularly true in the case of non-felony
arrests and convictions. Many nonserious offenses are either not
reported to the FBI or, once reported, are not retained because they
fail to satisfy retention criteria specified in regulation (28 C.F.R.
20.32). For example, the FBI is prohibited from maintaining
nonserious offenses such as drunkenness, traffic violations, and
vagrancy. The FBI database, however, includes reports of vehicular
violations, which resulted in personal injury or property damage and
driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs.\14
--------------------
\14 Although the more complete state criminal history records are
currently unavailable for responding to noncriminal justice inquiries
to the FBI system (such as those for military recruiting), these
records are available for criminal justice purposes under the FBI's
Interstate Identification Index that was operational in 39 states as
of February 1999.
SERVICES RISK INCURRING
UNNECESSARY COSTS WHEN
ENLISTEES ARE SENT TO
TRAINING BEFORE RESULTS OF
RECORD CHECKS ARE KNOWN
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.3
The military services' policies allow enlistees to begin basic and
follow-on training and, in some cases, enter their first-duty
stations before investigative results of record checks are available.
If the national record search does not reveal that an enlistee has a
criminal history, results from the national agency check are usually
received during the Delayed Entry Program. If the national record
search reveals that an enlistee has a criminal history, the national
agency check usually takes longer in order to positively identify the
individual, obtain records, and in some cases, conduct an
investigation. The results of this check may not be available until
after the beginning of basic training. In some cases, an enlistee
may be in a follow-on technical school or even at a first-duty
station before the results of investigative reports are received.
The frequency with which enlistees enter basic and follow-on training
with undisclosed serious criminal histories and are subsequently
discharged because of unfavorable record checks is unknown. The
Navy, however, had limited data regarding the actions taken as a
result of this unfavorable information. During the first 11-1/2
months of 1997, the Navy reviewed 2,368 enlistee cases that contained
unfavorable criminal history information; 389 (16.4 percent) were
subsequently discharged because of unfavorable information.
When enlistees are discharged from service after beginning basic
training, the services incur training costs that could have been
avoided. On the basis of the Navy's 389 discharges, we estimate that
the Navy incurred over $2 million in unnecessary costs.\15 The other
services could not provide data that would allow us to make
comparable estimates. The services risk having to absorb these costs
because they are trying to avoid the cost of not filling allotted
training slots.
Only the Army conducts an in-depth interview with enlistees whose
record checks have not been received to determine the possibility of
a concealed record and assigns them control numbers before sending
them to basic training. Army officials told us that, with few
exceptions, no one is sent to a first-duty station unless the records
check has been received.
--------------------
\15 The Navy discharged 332 enlistees from basic training, 22 from
follow-on training, and 35 from first-duty stations during the first
11-1/2 months of 1997. To estimate costs incurred, we used the
Navy's cost estimates for pay, food, and housing of $146 per day,
clothing costs of $817, transportation costs of $166 (to and from
recruit training), and basic training medical examination costs of
$91. For the 332 enlistees separated from basic training, we used
the Navy's estimate that a recruit remains at basic training an
average of 25 days before being separated. We used the full 9-week
(63 days) basic training period to estimate the costs for the 57
enlistees that were separated during follow-on training or first-duty
stations.
NEW INITIATIVES COULD IMPROVE
RECORD CHECKS, BUT DOD LACKS AN
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
There are several ongoing initiatives that would help DOD to improve
the process for obtaining complete and timely criminal history
information and avoid enlisting and training individuals with
undesirable backgrounds. These initiatives include more thorough
background checks using full fingerprint searches and credit checks,
automation of security questionnaire information, a new FBI
fingerprint imaging and classification system, and continuing efforts
to improve the completeness of the criminal history database.
Although these initiatives cover several aspects of the criminal
history screening process, fall under the responsibility of various
organizations, and would require some changes in current policies and
procedures, DOD has not developed an approach for planning and
coordinating their implementation. As a result, it is not yet in a
position to take full advantage of the benefits of these initiatives.
INITIATIVES ARE UNDERWAY
THAT COULD IMPROVE DOD'S
PROCESS FOR OBTAINING
CRIMINAL BACKGROUND
INFORMATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1
First, on January 1, 1999, DOD implemented Executive Order 12968,
signed August 4, 1995, which expands the requirements for background
investigations for all individuals in jobs requiring a security
clearance. The Defense Security Service will be responsible for
conducting a (1) national agency check using fingerprints; (2) local
agency check, which requests local jurisdictions to provide criminal
record information; and (3) credit check that provides information on
financial responsibility. (Prior to January 1, 1999, the minimum
requirement for background investigations for enlistees requiring
secret and confidential clearances included the national agency check
using only descriptive data, not fingerprints.) This new requirement
will increase the quality of criminal history record checks for those
enlistees filling jobs requiring a security clearance.
Second, the Defense Security Service requested that, by January 1,
1999, all DOD activities exclusively use the Electronic Personnel
Security Questionnaire, which replaces the paper version of the
SF-86. The automated form allows personnel security data to be more
efficiently recorded, checked for completeness, and transmitted in
electronic form. Also, the Defense Security Service will be able to
expedite its performance of background investigations and efficiently
store information for future retrieval.
Third, in July 1999, the FBI plans to implement the Integrated
Automated Fingerprint Identification System. The FBI developed this
system to capture, submit, process, match, and store fingerprints in
a paperless environment, which will permit electronic--rather than
manual--fingerprint searches. With it, the FBI expects that (1)
electronically scanned fingerprints will be more readable--thereby
eliminating the delays caused by rejecting smudged fingerprints,
which must be resubmitted; (2) fingerprint matches will be more
accurate because more fingerprint detail will be taken into account;
(3) the turnaround time for fingerprint searches for DOD national
agency checks will be reduced--24 hours instead of the current
average of 16 days; and (4) the workload of full fingerprint searches
for DOD could be processed in a timely manner without a significant
change to current fees.
Finally, during the last several years, the need to improve the
quality of criminal history records has been one of the major
challenges facing federal, state, and local criminal justice
agencies. The FBI Criminal Justice Information Services Division's
Strategic Plan has a goal of having at least 80 percent of its
criminal history records complete (containing both arrest and
disposition information) by fiscal year 2003. Also, the Department
of Justice has supported three major programs since 1988 that provide
funding incentives to the states to improve the accuracy and
completeness of criminal record information. During fiscal years
1990 through 1998, these programs awarded over $1.47 billion to the
states.
DOD NEEDS TO DEVELOP A
STRATEGY FOR IMPLEMENTING
THE NEW INITIATIVES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2
DOD does not have a clear strategy for implementing these
initiatives. First, regarding the implementation of Executive Order
12968, the services have not determined the number of enlistees that
will require a security clearance and, therefore, be subject to the
required expanded background checks. Currently, about 50 to 60
percent of military jobs require a security clearance, and according
to an Assistant Secretary of Defense official, the number may
increase as technology becomes more sophisticated. Also, the
services have not determined when these investigations will occur.
If the Defense Security Service initiates record checks early in the
recruiting process, the services could avoid the costs incurred when
enlistees are sent to basic training before receiving disqualifying
criminal history information.
Second, the Defense Security Service has made the new Electronic
Personnel Security Questionnaire available and provided training;
however, with the exception of the Air Force, use of the form has
been extremely limited. According to Military Entrance Processing
Command officials, the services have not used the new form because of
technological limitations. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) told the
services that investigations may take longer and be more costly when
this new form is not used.
Third, regarding electronic fingerprinting, although several military
entrance processing stations have tested electronic fingerprint
scanners, DOD has not determined how it will use this automated
system to enhance the quality and timeliness of their record checks.
Also, DOD and the FBI have not reached agreement regarding the
options that will be available for new services and costs that will
be incurred under the FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint
Identification System.
Furthermore, DOD has not formulated a coordinated approach for
integrating these initiatives into the recruiting process to address
some of the deficiencies in their record checks. The DOD officials
pointed out that the initiatives have not been implemented yet and
that DOD was dependent on the Department of Justice to make available
the new fingerprint technology and provide greater completeness of
the national criminal records database. However, DOD is responsible
for and will be implementing in 1999, the Executive Order 12968
requirements for more thorough security clearance background
investigations and the Electronic Personnel Security Questionnaire.
The services and their recruiting commands, the Military Entrance
Processing Command, and the Defense Security Service have not yet
determined how they will implement these initiatives within their
current recruiting practices or whether new practices are needed to
take full advantage of the possible benefits.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
The services have extensive policies and procedures for gathering
self-reported criminal history information and granting moral
waivers. Their reliance, however, on applicant self-disclosure,
completion of required forms, and criminal history record checks from
state, local, and national criminal history databases without a full
fingerprint search limits the screening process and increases the
risk of enlisting individuals with undesirable backgrounds. Use of
the Electronic Personnel Security Questionnaire could minimize the
time and costs associated with investigations conducted as part of
the Defense Security Service's national agency checks. Use of the
FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System could
facilitate the use of full fingerprint searches as part of the
recruiting process and make the record checks more thorough.
Collectively, these initiatives give DOD the opportunity to more
fully obtain and substantiate criminal history information in a
timely manner, avoid enlisting individuals with undesirable
backgrounds, and eliminate the need to send enlistees to training
before all criminal history information is available. Implementing
these initiatives would also enable DOD to benefit from having more
complete criminal history information available as a result of the
database improvements funded by the Department of Justice. However,
DOD has not determined how it will integrate these initiatives into
its current criminal history screening process and, therefore, has
not put itself in a position to take full advantage of them. Because
these initiatives cover several aspects of the screening process,
fall under the responsibility of various organizations, and represent
some changes in current policies and procedures, it is essential that
DOD carefully plan and coordinate its efforts to implement them.
Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the
following actions:
-- Develop and monitor a DOD-wide plan to use the initiatives cited
in this report. Such a plan should, at a minimum, incorporate
the benefits of using the Defense Security Service's Electronic
Personnel Security Questionnaire and the FBI's Integrated
Automated Fingerprint Identification System. Additionally, the
plan should address the integration of these two initiatives
with the expanded security clearance background investigation
requirements contained in Executive Order 12968. The plan
should also include specific time frames and budget requirements
for implementation.
-- Require all national agency checks for enlistment into the
military services to be based on a full fingerprint search to
(1) reduce the risks associated with enlisting individuals who
have been convicted of the more serious misdemeanors and
felonies and (2) identify individuals who have used aliases.
-- Direct the services, after the initiatives available in 1999 are
in use, to end their practices of sending enlistees to training
and to first-duty stations without having all available criminal
history information.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD and the Department of
Justice generally concurred with the report findings and
recommendations, and emphasized several areas of concern.
DOD described its plans to act on the report recommendations as
follows:
-- To develop and monitor a DOD-wide plan to use the initiatives
cited in this report, DOD stated that the Defense Accession Data
Systems Integration Working Group, chaired by the Deputy
Director of Operations, Military Entrance Processing Command,
has identified the need to establish a subgroup led by the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence) to address these initiatives
and develop a DOD-wide plan. The Working Group discussed plans
for the subgroup at its quarterly meeting in January 1999.
-- To reduce the risks associated with enlisting individuals who
have been convicted of the more serious misdemeanors and
felonies, and to identify individuals who have used aliases, DOD
stated that it will require a full fingerprint search for all
potential enlistees. It noted, however, that implementation
will depend upon availability of automated fingerprint scanners
at the military entrance processing stations.
-- Regarding the services' practices of sending enlistees to
training and first-duty stations without having all available
criminal history information, DOD stated that before directing
such a change, a system needs to be developed to ensure a prompt
turnaround time and allow the flexibility to process applicants
without completed criminal history checks as exceptions to
policy when criminal history information is delayed. DOD
emphasized that enlistment screening will be improved with a
system that ensures prompt availability of all applicant
criminal history information, including that from state and
local law enforcement agencies, including juvenile records.
DOD noted that our report does not fully address its need for timely
access to state and local criminal information at a reasonable cost.
It noted that many records of youth crime do not reach national
databases. DOD commented that the absence of complete data makes it
difficult to evaluate enlistment waiver rates because the services
cannot waive offenses they cannot identify. The Department of
Justice also stated that DOD needs to obtain juvenile records
presently protected under existing state laws. We agree that
juvenile criminal records may contain information that would provide
DOD with a more complete assessment of the criminal histories of
applicants and our report generally describes limitations on access
beginning on page 12. However, evaluating the pros and cons of
access to juvenile records was beyond the scope of our review, and we
clarified the Scope and Methodology section accordingly.
The Department of Justice also emphasized that fingerprint
verification currently used by the military services is not to be
confused with, nor is it a substitute for, positive identification by
a full fingerprint search. It believes that only through a full
fingerprint search can the military be assured that enlistees have
not fraudulently listed their identities. The Department of Justice
provided additional information to support its views on the
importance of full fingerprint searches, which our report recommends.
We agree with the distinction between fingerprint verification and
full fingerprint searches and modified the report to clarify this
point.
DOD's and the Department of Justice's comments are presented in their
entirety in appendixes II and III, respectively. DOD and the
Department of Justice also provided technical comments, which we have
incorporated as appropriate.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
This review focused on DOD's policies and procedures for screening
criminal history information for enlistees, including national agency
checks, and for granting moral character waivers. To determine the
extent to which relevant criminal history information on potential
enlistees is available to the DOD military services, we reviewed the
Air Force, the Army, the Marine Corps, the Navy, and the U.S.
Military Entrance Processing Command policy guidance and regulations
and discussed them with recruiting command and U.S. Military
Entrance Processing Command officials. Also, we discussed with these
officials the internal control and quality assurance procedures used
to monitor screening procedures. We reviewed applicants' enlistment
files at three military entrance processing stations to determine
whether screening procedures had been followed.
To identify federal government initiatives that could improve the
process of obtaining criminal history information, we interviewed DOD
and Department of Justice officials and discussed the new
requirements for security clearances, the Integrated Automated
Fingerprint Identification System, automation of security
questionnaire information, and continuing efforts to improve the
completeness of the criminal history database.
Regarding the completeness of and access to state and local records,
we obtained information from DOD and Department of Justice officials.
We did not obtain information directly from state and local officials
regarding their laws and policies pertaining to DOD's access to their
criminal history records. Also, we did not assess the pros and cons
of restricted access to juvenile criminal history records.
To supplement our objectives, we analyzed DMDC enlistment and waiver
data for fiscal years 1990 through 1997 to determine the extent to
which the services granted moral waivers and the type of moral
waivers approved. To determine the reasons and rates of separations
for enlistees granted moral waivers compared with those without moral
waivers, we analyzed DMDC separation data for enlistees entering the
military in fiscal years 1990 through 1993 who separated within their
first 4 years of service. Fiscal years 1990 through 1993 were the
most recent years for which complete separation data were available.
We performed our work at the following DOD, service, and Department
of Justice locations:
-- Directorate for Accession Policy, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense, Force Management Policy, Washington, D.C.;
-- Security Directorate, Security and Information Operations,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence), Washington, D.C.; and Defense
Security Service, Baltimore, Maryland;
-- U.S. Army Recruiting Command, Ft. Knox, Kentucky; Navy
Recruiting Command, Arlington, Virginia; Marine Corps Recruiting
Command, Arlington, Virginia; and Air Force Recruiting Service,
Randolph Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas;
-- U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command, North Chicago,
Illinois; Military Entrance Processing Station, San Antonio,
Texas; Military Entrance Processing Station, Chicago, Illinois;
and Military Entrance Processing Station, Richmond, Virginia;
and
-- FBI, Washington, D.C.; FBI Criminal Justice Information Services
Division, Clarksburg, West Virginia; Office of Justice Programs,
Bureau of Justice Statistics and Bureau of Justice Assistance,
Washington, D.C.; and Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention, Washington, D.C.
We conducted our review from October 1997 to January 1999 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :7.1
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense,
the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and the Commandant of the
Marine Corps. We are also sending copies to the U.S. Attorney
General; the Director, FBI; the Administrator, Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention; and the Administrator, Office of
Justice Programs. We will make copies available to others upon
request. Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff
have any questions concerning this report. Major contributors to
this report are listed in appendix IV.
Mark E. Gebicke
Director, Military Operations
and Capabilities Issues
ANALYSIS OF MORAL WAIVER DATA
=========================================================== Appendix I
To supplement the overall objectives of this review, we analyzed
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) enlistment and separation data.
Our objectives were to (1) determine how often and for what reasons
the services granted moral waivers to enlistees and (2) compare the
reasons for separation for those enlistees who entered the services
with and without moral waivers. For sound analyses, we needed
high-quality data that were accurate, reliable, and comparable. DMDC
data, however, are of limited quality because enlistees may have
entered military service without their past criminal history records
being discovered and, therefore, entered without a moral waiver that
should have been granted. Also, the services and the Military
Entrance Processing Command apply moral waiver codes inconsistently,
and the services differ in the way they use separation codes.\1
Nonetheless, until the Department of Defense (DOD) completes its
database improvements to standardize definitions and coding
structures for enlistment and separation data,\2 the DMDC data are
the best available for describing DOD's experiences with granting
moral waivers.
Given these data limitations, however, the following analyses
generally indicate that the number and percentage of new active duty
enlistees\3 granted moral waivers has consistently decreased during
the 8-year period ending fiscal year 1997. Furthermore, during the
first 4 years of service, enlistees granted moral waivers in fiscal
years 1990 through 1993 generally separated from military service for
similar reasons and at comparable rates to those enlistees who were
not granted moral waivers.
--------------------
\1 To assess data quality, we reviewed DMDC documentation and our
previous reports that used DMDC data, performed tests of ranges and
frequencies to identify missing data and unusable data elements, and
discussed service data with service recruiting command officials for
corroboration and to determine data anomalies. We could not
determine, however, the extent to which data quality problems
affected the results of our analyses.
\2 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L.
105-85) directed DOD to improve the system of pre-enlistment waivers
and separation codes, which was recommended by us. Our analyses for
this report reaffirm the need for a consistent DOD-wide database that
contains reasons for separation and enlistment waiver data. The
services and DMDC recognize the need for these improvements and plan
to implement waiver revisions in 1999 to make these data more
complete and consistent.
\3 The data presented in this appendix do not include enlistees
discharged from the Delayed Entry Program before taking the oath for
active duty.
TRENDS IN GRANTING MORAL
WAIVERS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1
Table I.1 shows the number and percentage of enlistees granted moral
waivers for fiscal years 1990 through 1997 for each service and
DOD-wide.
Table I.1
Number and Percentage of Enlistees
Granted Moral Waivers (fiscal years
1990-97)
Se
rv
ic
e 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
-- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
Ar 5,989 5,648 5,186 4,301 3,304 3,203 2,260 2,394
my
(P (6.7) (7.2) (6.7) (5.6) (4.9) (5.1) (3.1) (2.9)
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
o
f
A
r
m
y
e
n
l
i
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
)
Na 11,890 9,016 7,244 8,028 5,759 6,248 7,323 6,554
vy
(P (18.6) (18.2) (16.7) (16.2) (16.2) (17.3) (18.8) (14.7)
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
o
f
N
a
v
y
e
n
l
i
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
)
Ma 20,451 17,610 15,791 10,162 6,997 5,205 4,076 3,992
r
i
n
e
C
o
r
p
s
(P (61.2) (59.2) (49.7) (29.3) (22.0) (16.2) (12.4) (11.7)
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
o
f
M
a
r
i
n
e
C
o
r
p
s
e
n
l
i
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
)
Ai 712 850 1,672 2,269 1,883 2,093 1,945 1,868
r
F
o
r
c
e
(P (2.0) (2.9) (4.8) (7.2) (6.2) (6.7) (6.3) (6.2)
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
o
f
A
i
r
F
o
r
c
e
e
n
l
i
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
)
==================================================================================
DO 39,042 33,124 29,893 24,760 17,943 16,749 15,604 14,808
D
w
a
i
v
e
r
s
==================================================================================
DO 222,567 187,156 187,146 193,029 164,921 161,707 175,466 190,464
D
e
n
l
i
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
==================================================================================
(P (17.5) (17.7) (16.0) (12.8) (10.9) (10.4) (8.9) (7.8)
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
o
f
D
O
D
e
n
l
i
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The services differ in the criteria they use for granting
moral waivers. For example, the Army is the only service that
considers preservice drug or alcohol abuse a medical, not a moral
character, issue.
Source: GAO's analysis of DMDC data.
Table I.2 shows the types, number, and percentages of moral waivers
granted to enlistees DOD-wide for fiscal years 1990 through 1997. As
shown, the services are granting fewer moral waivers in all
categories. Although felony and non-minor misdemeanor waivers
increased as a percentage of total waivers granted over the period
(from 2 to 5 percent for felonies and 33 to 58 percent for non-minor
misdemeanors), the actual number of these waivers granted decreased
from 857 to 705 for felonies and from 12,858 to 8,542 for non-minor
misdemeanors.
Table I.2
Type, Number, and Percentage of Moral
Waivers Granted to Enlistees DOD-wide
(fiscal years 1990-97)
Type
of
mora
l Total
waiv (1990-
er 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1997)
---- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ----------
Felo 857 913 776 738 593 617 725 705 5,924
ny 2.2% 2.8% 2.6% 3.0% 3.3% 3.7% 4.6% 4.8% 3.1%
Non- 8,889 8,845 8,043 8,542 80,624
min 12,858 11,077 10,343 12,027 49.5% 52.8% 51.5% 57.7% 42.0%
or 32.9% 33.4% 34.6% 48.6%
mis
dem
ean
or
Pres 7,504 5,754 5,119 4,964 3,442 66,185
erv 16,401 12,605 10,396 30.3% 32.1% 30.6% 31.8% 23.2% 34.5%
ice 42.0% 38.1% 34.8%
dru
g
and
alc
oho
l
Mino 8,446 8,061 7,995 4,323 2,559 1,981 1,560 1,709 36,634
r 21.6% 24.3% 26.7% 17.5% 14.3% 11.8% 10.0% 11.5% 19.1%
tra
ffi
c/
non
-
tra
ffi
c
Othe 480 468 383 168 148 187 312 410 2,556
r/ 1.2% 1.4% 1.3% 0.7% 0.8% 1.1% 2.0% 2.8% 1.3%
unk
now
n
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO's analysis of DMDC data.
The services could not explain the reasons for these trends.
However, we were told that the following service policy changes in
waiver criteria account for some, but not all of the changes:
-- In July 1994, the Marine Corps, which had the largest decrease,
loosened its requirements for minor traffic offense criteria
from "more than three" to "more than four." At the same time,
preservice drug abuse criteria were tightened to include any
marijuana experimentation or use.
-- In fiscal year 1995, the Army revised its moral waiver criterion
for non-minor misdemeanors from one offense to two.
-- The Navy's granting of moral waivers remained fairly constant
until fiscal year 1997. Prior to 1997, the Navy waivers
included the moral waivers granted for both enlistment and
special programs such as advanced electronics and nuclear
fields, which required more stringent moral character standards.
In fiscal year 1997, however, the Navy began to report
enlistment and program moral waivers separately.
-- The Air Force's granting of moral waivers increased during the
8-year period. Air Force officials could not specify the
reasons for this increase, but suggested the following factors:
(1) fluctuations in Air Force moral waiver criteria for minor
traffic violations; (2) changing attitudes of law enforcement
and judicial communities, such as getting tough on crime,
greater use of adverse adjudications, and community service; and
(3) decreasing trends in Air Force enlistments.\4
--------------------
\4 Air Force officials noted that their enlistments declined over the
8-year period from a high of 36,090 in fiscal year 1990 to 30,310 in
fiscal year 1997; as their granting of moral waivers to deserving
individuals continued over this period of declining enlistments, the
percentage of moral waivers granted increased.
COMPARISON OF SEPARATION
REASONS FOR ENLISTEES WITH AND
WITHOUT MORAL WAIVERS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2
Of the enlistees beginning service during fiscal years 1990 through
1993 (the most recent years for which most separation data are
available), 573,160 separated within their first 4 years of service
for the reasons shown in figure I.1.\5 Of these separations, the
93,632 enlistees granted moral waivers separated from the enlisted
force within 4 years of service for generally the same reasons and at
similar rates as the 479,528 who enlisted without moral waivers.\6
Figure I.1: Reasons and Rates
for DOD-wide Separations for
Individuals Enlisting During
Fiscal Years 1990-93 and
Separating Within Their First 4
Years of Service
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Notes: These charts depict the population of enlistees who entered
military service in fiscal
years 1990 through 1993 and separated or reenlisted within their
first 4 years of service.
OCS--Officer Candidate School
Source: GAO's analysis of DMDC data.
Regarding the principal positive reasons for separating, 31 percent
of those granted a moral waiver completed their term and left the
service compared with 26 percent of those without a moral waiver.
However, as shown in figure I.2, an additional 17 percent of those
without a moral waiver not only completed their initial term but also
immediately reenlisted compared with 9 percent of those with a moral
waiver.\7
Figure I.2: Reasons and Rates
for DOD-wide Separations for
Enlistees With and Without a
Moral Waiver (fiscal years
1990-93) (excludes medical,
hardship, and other)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: This chart depicts the population of enlistees who entered
military service in fiscal
years 1990 through 1993 and separated or reenlisted within their
first 4 years of service.
Source: GAO's analysis of DMDC data.
For those leaving the service before completing their initial terms,
enlistees not granted a moral waiver left more often for substandard
performance reasons (such as failure to meet minimum qualifications
and unsatisfactory performance), and enlistees granted moral waivers
left more often for misconduct reasons.\8 Of the 16 misconduct
reasons, drugs and fraudulent enlistment accounted for about
two-thirds of the 7.3 percentage point difference between separating
enlistees with and without moral waivers;\9 the two groups differed
very little in the other 14 misconduct reasons. Further, as shown in
table I.3, enlistees with moral waivers for minor traffic and minor
non-traffic offenses and preservice drug and alcohol abuse separated
more often for drugs, fraudulent entry, alcoholism, and court martial
than those enlisted with no moral waiver. Enlistees that entered the
services with non-minor (serious) misdemeanor waivers generally
separated at similar rates and for the same misconduct reasons
(except for drugs and alcoholism) as those without waivers.
Enlistees with felony waivers separated at a higher rate for
fraudulent entry, court martial, and alcoholism.
Table I.3
DOD-wide Separation Rates for Misconduct
by Type of Moral Waiver (fiscal years
1990-93)
Type of moral waiver
----------------------------------------------
Minor
traffic Preservice
Without and minor drug/ Non-minor
Reason for moral non- alcohol misdemeano
separation waiver traffic abuse r Felony
-------------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
Drugs 9,094 591 1,780 1,700 85
14.2% 17.9% 25.3% 20.8% 17.4%
Fraudulent 5,753 594 1,670 773 101
enlistment 9.0% 17.9% 23.7% 9.5% 20.7%
Commission of a 12,225 331 636 1,737 40
serious offense 19.1% 10.0% 9.0% 21.2% 8.2%
Discreditable 8,959 416 775 1,132 69
incidents 14.0% 12.6% 11.0% 13.8% 14.1%
Good of the service 6,857 299 512 724 41
in lieu of court 10.7% 9.0% 7.3% 8.9% 8.4%
martial
Alcoholism 3,271 242 487 706 35
5.1% 7.3% 6.9% 8.6% 7.2%
Court martial 1,707 243 464 166 58
2.7% 7.3% 6.6% 2.0% 11.9%
Pattern of minor 5,636 293 353 246 30
disciplinary 8.8% 8.9% 5.0% 3.0% 6.1%
infractions
Dropped for 984 15 2 103 2
imprisonment 1.5% 0.5% 0.0% 1.3% 0.4%
Civil court 505 27 29 72 0
conviction 0.8% 0.8% 0.4% 0.9% 0%
All other misconduct 8,888 259 332 819 27
reasons 13.9% 7.8% 4.7% 10.0% 5.5%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Bold numbers indicate that those enlistees with moral waivers
in that category had a separation rate that was at least 25 percent
greater than those without moral waivers. Shaded numbers indicate
that those enlistees with moral waivers in that category had a
separation rate that was at least 25 percent less than those without
moral waivers.
Source: GAO's analysis of DMDC data.
In addition, figure I.3 shows that enlistees granted moral waivers
leave at generally the same point (first year, for example) during
their first enlistment for misconduct and substandard performance as
those without moral waivers.
Figure I.3: Time of DOD-wide
Separations for Misconduct and
Substandard Performance Reasons
for Enlistees With and Without
a Moral Waiver (fiscal years
1990-93)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: This chart depicts the population of enlistees who entered
military service in fiscal
years 1990 through 1993 and separated or reenlisted within their
first 4 years of service.
Source: GAO's analysis of DMDC data.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix II
--------------------
\5 In collaboration with officials in the office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense, Military Personnel Policy, we grouped the
DMDC's 72 interservice separation codes into several broad categories
to facilitate our analyses.
\6 At the time of our review, fiscal year 1993 was the most recent
year for which complete separation data was available because 4 years
is the typical enlistment commitment term; those enlisted during
fiscal years 1994 through 1997 could not have completed their first
4-year term of service. To provide a complete and consistent
analysis across the 4 fiscal years, we further focused our analysis
on separations that occurred during the first 4 years of service--the
time period during which most enlistees will have separated.
\7 The services decide which members are eligible or ineligible to
reenlist and which may reenlist with a waiver. Generally, enlistees
granted moral waivers have a similar rate of reenlistment eligibility
as those without moral waivers. For example, in the Army, 42 percent
of those without a moral waiver were eligible for reenlistment
compared with 38 percent of those with a moral waiver. On the other
hand, in the Air Force, 57 percent of those without a moral waiver
were eligible for reenlistment compared with 60 percent of those with
a moral waiver.
\8 The misconduct category (83,190) included 16 different reasons.
The five reasons that accounted for 68.7 percent of this category
were commission of a serious offense (18.1%), drugs (16.0),
discreditable incidents (13.7%), fraudulent entry (10.7%), and good
of the service in lieu of court martial (10.2%). The substandard
performance category (63,609) included 11 different reasons. The
three reasons that accounted for 92.1 percent of this category were
trainee discharge/entry level performance and conduct (54.0%),
expeditious discharge/unsatisfactory performance (21.6%), and failure
to meet minimum qualifications for retention (16.5%).
\9 Fraudulent enlistment is intentional concealment of any
disqualifying information. The database does not specify the type of
information concealed, such as criminal backgrounds or medical and
psychological conditions.
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
=========================================================== Appendix I
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix III
COMMENTS FROM THE U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE
=========================================================== Appendix I
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix IV
NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Carol Schuster
Christine Fossett
NORFOLK FIELD OFFICE
Dudley Roache
Bradley Simpson
Paul Gvoth
Patty Lentini
RELATED GAO PRODUCTS
Military Attrition: Better Data, Coupled With Policy Changes, Could
Help the Services Reduce Early Separations (GAO/NSIAD-98-213, Sept.
15, 1998).
Military Attrition: DOD Needs to Better Analyze Reasons for
Separation and Improve Recruiting Systems (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-117, Mar.
12, 1998).
Military Attrition: DOD Needs to Better Understand Reasons for
Separation and Improve Recruiting Systems (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-109, Mar.
4, 1998).
Military Recruiting: DOD Could Improve Its Recruiter Selection and
Incentive Systems (GAO/NSIAD-98-58, Jan. 30, 1998).
Military Attrition: Better Screening of Enlisted Personnel Could
Save Millions of Dollars (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-120, Mar. 13, 1997).
Military Attrition: Better Screening of Enlisted Personnel Could
Save Millions of Dollars (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-102, Mar. 5, 1997).
Military Attrition: DOD Could Save Millions by Better Screening
Enlisted Personnel (GAO/NSIAD-97-39, Jan. 6, 1997).
Military Recruiting: More Innovative Approaches Needed
(GAO/NSIAD-95-22, Dec. 22, 1994).
*** End of document. ***