NATO: Progress Toward More Mobile and Deployable Forces (Letter Report,
09/30/1999, GAO/NSIAD-99-229).
NATO revised its strategic concept in 1991 to reflect the reduced threat
of a large east-west military confrontation. The revision called for
major changes in NATO's integrated military forces, including reductions
in size and readiness; improvements in mobility and deployability for
such contingencies as crisis management, search and rescue, and
peacekeeping; and greater use of multinational formations. Because of
instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of
crises at the periphery of the alliance, the strategic concept was
revised again in 1999 to remphasize the need for greater mobility and
deployability of forces to meet these potential crises. The United
States is able to send troops and equipment over large distances. Many
U.S.-European allies, however, do not see the need for this kind of
capability because during the Cold War they were planning to fight in
place with logistical support provided by fixed facilities and their
civilian economies. This report discusses (1) how NATO determines its
force requirements and each member's contribution to meeting those
requirements and (2) how NATO allies have responded to the need for
greater mobility and deployability in their military forces.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-99-229
TITLE: NATO: Progress Toward More Mobile and Deployable Forces
DATE: 09/30/1999
SUBJECT: International cooperation
Reductions in force
Military downsizing
Defense contingency planning
Cost sharing (finance)
NATO military forces
NATO military agreements
IDENTIFIER: NATO
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GAO/NSIAD-99-229
Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on
Defense, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate
September 1999
NATO
Progress Toward More Mobile and Deployable
Forces
*****************
*****************
GAO/NSIAD-99-229
Letter 3
Appendixes
Appendix I:Fieldwork Observations, by Country
24
Appendix II:Characteristics of Transport and In-flight Refueling Aircraft
in NATO Nations' Inventories
30
Appendix III:Characteristics of Sealift Vessels in NATO Nations' Inventories
32
Appendix IV:Comments From the Department of Defense
34
Table 1: Increases, Decreases, or No Change in Airlift, Sealift, and
In-flight Refueling Capabilities 5
Table 2: Events in the 2-Year Defense Planning Process and
Annual Defense Review 11
Table 3: Countries' Increases in Transport Aircraft Since 199014
Table 4: Countries That Have Not Increased Their Transport
Aircraft and Airlift Capability Since 1990 15
Table 5: Countries' Inventories of Large Amphibious and Sealift
Vessels 16
Table 6: Countries' Inventories of In-flight Refueling Capability17
Table 7: Force Restructuring in Selected Countries19
Table 8: Characteristics of Transport Aircraft 30
Table 9: Tanker Aircraft, by Type and Fuel Offload Capacity31
Table 10: Characteristics of Sealift Vessels 32
Figure 1: NATO Members' Active Duty Forces and Percent of
Conscripts 18
DOD Department of Defense
MNC Major NATO Commanders
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SDR Strategic Defence Review
NATO: Implications of European Integration for Allies' Defense Spending
National Security and
International Affairs Division
B-283443
September 30, 1999
The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
In 1991, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) revised its
strategic concept to reflect the reduced threat of a large east-west
military confrontation. The concept revision provided for major changes in
NATO's integrated military forces, including reductions in size and
readiness; improvements in mobility and deployability for contingencies
such as crisis management, search and rescue, and peacekeeping; and
greater use of multinational formations. Because of instability in and
around the
Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of crises at the periphery of the
alliance, the strategic concept was revised again in 1999 to further
emphasize the need for greater mobility and deployability of forces to
meet these potential crises. The United States has the capability to
deploy troops and equipment over large distances. Many of our European
allies, however, did not see the need for this kind of capability because
during the Cold War, they were planning to fight in place with logistical
support provided by fixed facilities and their civilian economies.
Concerned about European allies' ability to share in the cost of providing
a common defense and specifically whether they are improving mobility and
deployability, you asked us to undertake two studies: one to assess how
the European Economic and Monetary Union, the enlargement of the European
Union, and other factors may affect countries' ability to share in the
cost of NATO over the long run and another to address NATO force planning
and implementation issues. On June 30, 1999, we reported to you on the
first study./Footnote1/ This study identifies (1) how NATO determines its
force requirements and each member's contribution to meeting those
requirements and (2) how NATO allies have responded to the need for
increased mobility and deployability in their military forces.
To address this study, we assessed the forces of 13 NATO
members/Footnote2/ to determine whether their military forces had become
more mobile and deployable. To make this assessment, we consulted with
Department of Defense (DOD) officials and other experts and developed 10
indicators:
(1) the number of active duty personnel; (2) the percent of the force that
is a professional volunteer force rather than a conscripted force, and
thus generally more deployable; (3) airlift inventory; (4) sealift
inventory;
(5) in-flight refueling aircraft inventory; (6) the number of trucks to
transport heavy equipment, and petroleum, oil, and lubricants; (7) the
number of transport helicopters; (8) the number of satellite communication
terminals; (9) the number of mobile airfield communications systems; and
(10) changes in types of training. We analyzed data on these indicators
obtained from U.S. embassies in 13 countries and did follow-up work in
6 countries/Footnote3/ that represent over 80 percent of the 13 countries'
active duty personnel. (App. I summarizes our country-specific findings.)
Results in Brief
----------------
NATO establishes its force goals through an iterative 2-year defense
planning process that starts with an analysis of the threat and other NATO
missions, such as search and rescue; incorporates political and
affordability considerations through multiple negotiations with each
country; and ends with the members' defense ministers' adoption of force
goals. Through this process, NATO commanders and planners identify the
forces needed and seek commitments from member countries to develop the
forces necessary for the broad range of potential NATO missions. The force
planning process differs from the process for generating forces for
specific operational missions such as those in Bosnia. Although U.S. and
NATO officials believe that the planning process is a fair method for
distributing the burden of providing for NATO's common defense, the
process does not quantify the costs associated with what each country is
asked to contribute.
As NATO members' forces have become smaller in size and the composition of
those forces has changed, NATO allies have become more mobile and
deployable as envisioned by the strategic concept. Our analysis of 10
indicators for the 13 countries' military forces indicates that each
country has acquired specific equipment to increase mobility, and some
have reorganized and restructured forces to make them more deployable.
Table 1 shows, for example, whether countries have increased, decreased,
or maintained the same airlift, sealift, and in-flight refueling
capability. It shows that for these indicators almost all countries have
either increased or maintained existing capabilities, which combined with
force reductions would indicate greater mobility and deployability of
existing forces.
Table****Helvetica:x11****1: Increases, Decreases, or No Change in
Airlift, Sealift, and In-flight Refueling
Capabilities
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Country : Airlift : Sealift : In-flight |
| : : : refueling |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Belgium : a : 0 : 0 |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Canada : + : - : + |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Denmark : 0 : 0 : 0 |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Germany : + : + : 0 |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Greece : + : + : 0 |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Italy : + : + : + |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Luxembourg : 0 : Not applicable : 0 |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| The Netherlands : + : + : + |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Norway : 0 : 0 : 0 |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Portugal : 0 : 0 : 0 |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Spain : + : + : + |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Turkey : + : + : + |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| United Kingdom : - : + : - |
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legend
+ = increase
- = decrease
0 = no change
aBelgium has one less aircraft, but that was offset by the increased
capacity of two aircraft purchased to replace two older aircraft.
Source: GAO analysis.
Other indicators we assessed also show general gains in the mobility and
deployability of forces. However, the alliance still faces challenges to
continue to improve mobility and deployability capabilities. Recognizing
that challenges still exist, NATO launched the Defense Capabilities
Initiative at the April 1999 summit.
Background
----------
NATO, a military alliance of 19 European and North American countries,
receives support from its members in two ways. First, countries, at their
own expense, maintain forces and assets that they pledge to NATO through a
defense planning process. Second, countries make contributions to NATO's
commonly funded budgets. NATO does not quantify the cost of the forces
that national governments commit to the alliance, although a country's
level of defense spending helps approximate this measure.
In establishing force goals, NATO considers the missions it may be facing
in the future. Before the end of the Cold War, NATO's primary mission was
to defeat a large-scale invasion by the Soviet Union and its allies with
little or no warning. Accordingly, the alliance planned, through its
defense planning process, to maintain (1) large numbers of forward-
deployed forces, (2) the ability to reinforce Europe by safeguarding the
Atlantic sea lanes, and (3) a robust nuclear deterrent. This plan enabled
countries like Germany to rely on the civilian sector for support elements
such as hospitals and transportation assets. In addition, host nations
agreed to support
forward-deployed forces from other countries, and those countries and NATO
funded the development of substantial infrastructure, including aircraft
shelters, prepositioned weapon storage facilities, and fuel storage and
distribution networks.
The end of the Cold War transformed the European security environment and
made highly unlikely a large-scale attack on Western Europe; nevertheless,
potential risks to security from instability or tension remained. In 1991,
NATO revised its strategic concept to reflect the changed security
environment from the threat of a single, massive global war to risks posed
by diverse multinational contingencies. Specifically, the concept called
for NATO to move from a large, static force structure to fewer, but more
mobile, forces that could react to a wider range of contingencies. In many
cases, this required countries to reorganize their militaries, acquire
transport assets for mobility and sustainability, acquire deployable
communications, and refocus training exercises to enable them to deploy
forces outside their countries' borders.
NATO Defense Planning Process
-----------------------------
NATO establishes its force goals through an iterative 2-year defense
planning process that starts with a threat assessment and mission analysis
by NATO military commanders and planners. NATO assumes it may face
missions ranging from small search and rescue missions to the largest
possible invasion of NATO territory. Based on the force requirements
generated from these assessments, NATO commanders and planners seek
commitment from member nations to develop the necessary forces. This is
done through negotiations among NATO international civilian and military
staffs and member countries' military and political representatives.
During this process, a range of political and affordability considerations
are taken into account to determine what forces each country should have
available for NATO to fulfill its missions. This aspect of the defense
planning process is completed when NATO defense ministers adopt the force
goals.
Although affordability is a consideration when developing members' force
goals, the alliance does not actually estimate the cost of the goals, and
the process therefore does not necessarily ensure a strictly equitable
sharing of the defense burden. Additionally, NATO's force planning process
does not ensure that forces will be available for specific operations.
When specific operations are approved, NATO embarks on a force generation
process to obtain a commitment of forces from its member countries.
Development of Force Goals
---------------------------
The basis of the force goal development process is guidance that NATO
members' defense ministers develop biennially and the North Atlantic
Council approves at a meeting at the defense ministers level./Footnote4/
The ministerial guidance establishes overall aims for members' planning
and force structure during a 6-year planning period. NATO staff draft the
guidance, and the defense ministers approve it in the December preceding
the first year of the planning process. For example, Ministerial Guidance
approved in December 1998 will guide the development of force goals to be
approved in the spring of 2000.
The development of NATO force goals is rooted in the defense requirements
review conducted by the major NATO commanders (MNC)./Footnote5/ The review
is developed in even-numbered years, and its output is usually issued in
January of odd-numbered years. MNCs develop the review based on NATO
strategic intelligence guidance and planning scenarios illustrative of the
kinds of operations they could be called upon to execute during the 6-year
planning cycle. Through modeling of the scenarios, planners generate a set
of force requirements necessary to execute the full range of possible
missions. Planners then rely on the ministerial guidance to determine how
many situations and the scale of which they need to be prepared for at one
time. Through this process, the overall requirements of the alliance are
established. The planners then look at the forces each of the allies was
asked to provide in the past and determine what each nation should be able
to contribute toward meeting the new requirements in the future. Part of
the future requirements for each country is based on a concept called
reasonable challenge. Under this concept, force requirements are based on
what a country could be expected to contribute and additional requirements
that represent a fair and reasonable challenge to the country, above and
beyond the requirements in its national plans.
The results of this analysis serve as the basis for the MNCs force
proposals. The military planners then develop for each member country the
force proposals for forces, capabilities, and facilities to be provided to
enable the alliance to accomplish the full range of NATO missions during
the 6-year planning period.
The draft proposals are then evaluated in a series of meetings with an
expanding number of participants whose views and analyses are incorporated
through a process of negotiation. When these proposals are first
developed, they are shared with the member countries' military planners in
"bilateral" meetings between two parties: the MNC planners and the country
military representatives. These meetings are held in March of odd-numbered
years in the country whose force proposals are being developed. After the
military planners incorporate the results of this meeting into revised
force proposals, NATO's civilian and military staffs examine the draft
force proposals. "Trilateral" meetings are then held among the MNC
planners, the country military representatives, and the civilian and
military staffs. The trilateral meetings are held at NATO headquarters in
January of even-numbered years.
Finally, in each of a series of "multilateral" meetings, which include the
parties from the trilateral meetings and representatives of all the member
countries, one country's force goals are debated. Force goals are assigned
to the country under review based on consensus minus one. That is, all the
countries except the country being reviewed must agree to the assignment
of the force proposal to that country. When that occurs, usually during
March and April of even numbered years, the force proposals are forwarded
for approval by the defense ministers at NATO's Defense Ministerial
meetings in June of even-numbered years. Force goals have four parts:
o Force tables that show the required forces, by specific type of asset
or unit, that include readiness and command characteristics such as
number and types of ships, aircraft, or units.
o Force goals stated in narrative statements that qualitatively describe
the required capability, such as a nuclear, biological, or chemical
capability and its priority.
o Long-term requirements that are outside the 6-year planning horizon.
o Military assistance requirements, or unassigned force goals, that
countries can volunteer to undertake. (NATO military authorities in
practice work to minimize or eliminate these force goals, according to
officials from the U.S. Mission to NATO.)
Review of Force Goal Implementation
-----------------------------------
A country's status in achieving an assigned force goal is reviewed in an
annual defense review. A full defense review is conducted in the autumn of
even-numbered years. In odd-numbered years, the preceding year's review is
updated. The review process is similar to the force goal development
process in that a series of meetings are held with an expanding list of
participants. The mechanism for this review is the defense planning
questionnaire, to which each country is asked to respond by July, on the
status of achieving each force goal. Countries can classify the status of
a force goal in one of five ways: (1) fully implemented, (2) partially
implemented, (3) extended implementation, (4) under consideration, and (5)
will not be implemented. For those goals that are not being fully
implemented, countries are required to provide an explanation.
MNCs initially assess the questionnaire responses and follow that
assessment with trilateral meetings, beginning in September, that include
the country representatives and representatives from NATO's civilian and
military staff. Thereafter, all the members review each country's
questionnaire response in multilateral meetings in the Defense Review
Committee in October. The result of this review is captured for each
country in a report that summarizes the status of the country's force goal
achievement. In addition, the Military Committee assesses the military
suitability and attendant risk associated with any resulting shortfalls in
force availability. On the basis of the country chapters and the military
assessment, the Defense Review Committee submits to the North Atlantic
Council a general report, in which it recommends a NATO 5-year force plan
for adoption by the Defense Ministers. Table 2 shows the chronological
order of events in the force goal development process and annual defense
reviews.
Table****Helvetica:x11****2: Events in the 2-Year Defense Planning
Process and Annual Defense Review
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
| Month : Planning process : Annual defense review |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| December : Ministerial : |
| : Guidance issued : |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| January (odd- : Defense : |
| numbered years) : requirements review : |
| : report is issued : |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| March : Major NATO : Questionnaire is |
| : commanders' discuss : updated and |
| : draft force : distributed to |
| : proposals with : nations for responses |
| : nations : |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| July : : Countries reply to |
| : : questionnaires |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| September : : Trilateral meetings |
| : : are held for |
| : : defense review update |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| October : : Multilateral |
| : : meetings are held |
| : : for defense review |
| : : update |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| November : : Multilateral |
| : : meetings continue |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| December : : Defense ministers |
| : : agree and issue |
| : : update year General |
| : : Report |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| January (even- : International staff : |
| numbered years) : and international : |
| : military staff : |
| : jointly screen : |
| : major NATO : |
| : commanders' force : |
| : proposals : |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| March : Each individual : Questionnaire is |
| : country's : updated and issued |
| : representatives : for full defense |
| : meet with all other : review |
| : country : |
| : representatives : |
| : present : |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| June : Defense ministers : |
| : adopt force goals : |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| July : : Countries reply to |
| : : questionnaires |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| September : : Trilateral meetings |
| : : are held for full |
| : : defense review |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| October : : Multilateral |
| : : meetings are held |
| : : for full defense |
| : : review |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| November : : Country chapters |
| : : and general report |
| : : are submitted to |
| : : North Atlantic |
| : : Council for approval |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| December : Ministerial : Defense ministers |
| : Guidance issued : agree and issue |
| : : General Report |
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO Summary of NATO Documents.
Out-of-Cycle Requirements
-------------------------
The planning process allows for dealing with unforeseen events that occur
outside the planning cycle. Out-of-cycle consultation with allies can be
conducted when a country is contemplating important changes to commitments
and plans that would substantially impact the common defense. Out-of-cycle
force goals may also be developed for emerging requirements that should
not wait for the next biennial cycle.
Force Planning Differs From Operational Planning
------------------------------------------------
Force planning as conducted in the defense planning process and
operational planning for specific operations are quite different. The
former requires countries to identify and commit forces to the alliance to
meet various missions envisioned in the planning process. On the other
hand, in planning for a proposed contingency operation such as that in
Kosovo, NATO defines the missions, tasks, and force structure of the NATO
force for the specific operation. The forces committed in the defense
planning process are not automatically available to the alliance for these
proposed operations. Through a separate force generation process, NATO's
military headquarters determines the resources required for the specific
contingency operation under consideration, and each NATO member decides
what resources it will provide to address those requirements. Although all
members must agree to NATO's conduct of contingency operations, they are
not obligated to provide forces identified or committed for them during
the defense planning process.
Alliance Members Have Become More Mobile and Deployable, but NATO Still
Faces Challenges
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our analysis indicates that each of the 13 allied countries we studied
have achieved greater mobility and deployability either by procuring
additional assets or by reorganizing their force structures. While we were
able to develop consistent data that compares airlift and sealift assets
and personnel (which fall under the first five indicators we used) among
the
13 countries, the data on trucks, transport helicopters, communications,
and training (which fall under the last five indicators) are less
consistent among the countries. Thus, we describe achievements in the
latter in terms of the specific country and make no comparisons among
countries. Despite the 13 countries' achievements, NATO may be challenged
in fulfilling its missions because of the changing nature of the
contingencies it is likely to face in the future.
Airlift Inventory
-----------------
In evaluating countries' airlift capabilities, based on increases in the
quantity and capacity of their transport aircraft, we found that NATO
allies as a whole have more lift capability now than they had in 1990, but
some countries have achieved more than others./Footnote6/ Seven of the 13
countries for which we collected data increased airlift capability, 4
countries made no change in airlift capability, and 1 country (the United
Kingdom) decreased airlift capability./Footnote7/ In one country a change
in quantity was offset by a change in capacity, and we concluded that
capability had neither increased nor decreased.
Despite NATO's progress, the alliance still depends heavily on the United
States for airlift capability. For example, only the United States has the
capability to airlift unusually large or heavy weapon systems such as a
Patriot missile system. (Tables 3 and 4 show the progress made in
acquiring airlift assets by country. App. II contains information about
the characteristics of the assets described in the tables.)
Table****Helvetica:x11****3: Countries' Increases in Transport Aircraft
Since 1990
------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Country : Assets : Changes since 1990 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Canada : 32 CC- : Added six C-130s (two C-130H-30s) and five |
| : 130E/Hs, : CC-150s; eliminated three Boeing 707s, one |
| : 5 CC- : CC-132, and eight CC-115s. The CC-150s have |
| : 150s : greater capacity than the 707s and the |
| : (Airbus : CC-132s, and CC-115s are about half the |
| : 310s), : size of C-130s and cannot carry the same |
| : 6 CC- : types and volume of cargo. |
| : 115s, : |
| : 2 CC-142s : |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Germany : 86 C- : Added seven Airbus A310 aircraft and added |
| : 160s, : one Tu-154 from the East German inventory, |
| : 7 A310s, : while eliminating one C-160 and 3 707 |
| : 1 Tu-154 : aircraft for a net gain of four aircraft. |
| : 1 707 : |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Greece : 10 C- : Added five C-130Hs, one 747 and three A- |
| : 130Hs, : 300s; eliminated 2 C-130Hs and retired four |
| : 5 C-130Bs,: old C-47 aircraft. The three A-300s are |
| : 4 C-47s, : leased by the military. |
| : 1 747, : |
| : 3 A-300s : |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Italy : 11 C- : Added one C-130H and has 18 C-130Js on |
| : 130Hs, : order. |
| : 32 G-222s : |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Netherla : 2 F-50s, : Added all transport aircraft; eliminated 12 |
| nds : 4 F-60s, : older F-27s. The eight new aircraft |
| : 2 C-130H- : represent an overall increase in payload |
| : 30s : and range. |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Spain : 7 C-130Hs,: Added 2 C-130Hs and 11 CN-235s. |
| : 34 C-212s,: |
| : 18 CN-235s: |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Turkey : 6 C-130Bs : Added 6 C-130Bs and 54 CN-235s; eliminated |
| : 7 C-130Es : 40 old C-47s and 1 C-160D. This represents |
| : 19 C- : a net increase in both cargo and troop |
| : 160Ds, : transport capacity and results in a |
| : 54 CN-235s: significantly modernized transport fleet. |
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: The countries' ministries of defense and the International
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) The Military Balance 1998/99, The
Military Balance 1990/91, and Jane's World Air Forces 1997-98.
Table****Helvetica:x11****4: Countries That Have Not Increased Their
Transport Aircraft and Airlift Capability
Since 1990
------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Country : Assets : Changes since 1990 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| No change in airlift capability |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Denmark : 3 C-130Hs : No change in transport aircraft |
| : : inventory. |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Luxembourg : None : None. |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Norway : 6 C-130Hs : No change in transport aircraft |
| : : inventory. |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Portugal : 6 C-130Hs, : No change in transport aircraft |
| : : inventory. |
| : 18 C-212s : |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Decrease in airlift capability |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| United Kingdom: 55 C-130s, : Added one Tristar; eliminated five C- |
| : : 130s. The loss of five C-130s |
| : 3 Tristars : represents a decrease in cargo |
| : : capacity not completely offset by the |
| : : addition of the Tristar. However, 25 |
| : : C-130Js are on order. |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Data inconclusive regarding airlift capability |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Belgium : 11 C130Hs, : Lost one C-130 in an accident and |
| : : replaced two Boeing 727 aircraft with |
| : 2 A310- : Airbus A310-200s. The A310-200s are |
| : 200s, : more capable than the 727s in both |
| : : payload and range, but the loss of |
| : 3 HS 748s : the C-130 means a loss in the ability |
| : : to carry certain types of cargo. |
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: The countries' ministries of defense, IISS The Military Balance
1998/99, The Military Balance 1990/91, and Jane's World Air Forces 1997-98.
Sealift Inventory
-----------------
In evaluating countries' inventories based on increases in the quantity
and capacity of their naval vessels, we found, as with the airlift
inventories, that NATO allies as a whole have greater sealift capability
now than in 1990 although some countries have achieved more than others.
Seven of
12 countries/Footnote8/ increased sealift capability, 4 countries made no
change in sealift inventories, and one decreased sealift capability.
(Table 5 shows the progress made in acquiring sealift assets, by country,
and app. III provides information on the characteristics of the assets.)
Table****Helvetica:x11****5: Countries' Inventories of Large Amphibious
and Sealift Vessels
------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Country : Assets : Changes since 1990 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Increase in sealift capability |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Germany : 1 roll-on, roll- : Added one. A civilian |
| : off vessel : shipping company owns it, but |
| : : the military has absolute |
| : : priority in its use. |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Greece : 10 amphibious : Replaced five old smaller |
| : vessels : amphibious vessels with two |
| : : new amphibious vessels; three |
| : : more are on the way. |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Italy : 3 amphibious : Added one amphibious vessel. |
| : vessels : |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Netherlands : 1 amphibious vessel: Acquired one amphibious vessel. |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Spain : 5 amphibious : Acquired one new amphibious |
| : vessels : vessel and two newer |
| : : amphibious vessels to replace |
| : : three old amphibious vessels. |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Turkey : 8 amphibious : This represents an increase |
| : vessels : of one amphibious vessel. |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| United Kingdom: 8 amphibious : Added one amphibious vessel. |
| : vessels and 2 : Also added two roll-on, roll- |
| : roll-on, : off vessels, which are leased |
| : roll-off vessels : and not equipped to enter war |
| : : zones. |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| No change in sealift capability |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Belgium : 0 : No change. |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Denmark : 0 : No change. |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Norway : 0 : No change. |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Portugal : 0 : No change. |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Decrease in sealift capability |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Canada : 2 auxiliary vessels: No dedicated sealift assets; |
| : : reduced auxiliary vessels, |
| : : which can carry limited |
| : : amounts of cargo, troops, and |
| : : equipment, by one. |
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sources: The countries' ministries of defense and IISSs, The Military
Balance 1998/99, The Military Balance 1990/91, and Jane's 1997-1998
Fighting Ships.
In-flight Refueling Capability
------------------------------
In-flight refueling capability increases the deployability of national
forces because it can extend the range of aircraft. Prior to 1990, only
three NATO countries other than the United States had in-flight refueling
capability; today that number has doubled to six. Turkey, Italy, and the
Netherlands have developed in-flight refueling capabilities that they did
not possess before 1990. The Netherlands is using its newly acquired
capability to participate in air operations in the Balkans. Further, the
Netherlands and Belgium have agreed to the joint use of their assets and
Luxembourg army assets for peace support operations under the auspices of
the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, NATO, or the Western European Union. Through this agreement,
Belgium has access to the Netherlands' refueling capabilities, and the
Netherlands has access to Belgium's airlift assets. Table 6 shows the 13
countries' in-flight refueling aircraft capabilities.
Table****Helvetica:x11****6: Countries' Inventories of In-flight
Refueling Capability
------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Country : Assets : Changes since 1990 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Increase in in-flight refueling capability |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Canada : 5 KC-130 : Five KC-130s have |
| : tanker/transports : replaced two CC-137 |
| : : tanker/transports |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Italy : 4 707-320 : All added |
| : tanker/transports : |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Netherlands : 2 DC-10 : All added |
| : tanker/transports : |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Spain : 5 KC-130s, : Added two 707 |
| : : tanker/transports |
| : 4 707 : |
| : tanker/transports : |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Turkey : 7 KC-135R : All added |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| No change in in-flight refueling capability |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Germany : None : No change |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Belgium : None : No change |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Denmark : None : No change |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Greece : None : No change |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Luxembourg : None : No change |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Norway : None : No change |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Portugal : None : No change |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Decrease in in-flight refueling capability |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| United Kingdom : 2 Tristar K-1 : Reduced by two VC-10-K- |
| : tanker/transports, : 2 tankers and one |
| : 4 Tristar KC-1 : VC-10C-1/C-1K |
| : tanker/cargo, : tanker/transport |
| : 3 VC-10-K-2 tankers, : |
| : 4 VC-10-K-3 tankers, : |
| : 12 VC-10C-1/C-1K : |
| : tanker/ transports : |
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: The country ministries of defense, IISS The Military Balance
1998/99, The Military Balance 1990/91, and Jane's World Air Forces 1997-98.
Personnel
---------
In general, the alliance members have made progress in establishing
smaller militaries, as envisioned by the strategic concept, and more
professional militaries. Professional forces are generally more
deployable, as many European countries have legislation limiting the
deployability of conscripts. Of the 13 countries from which we collected
data, 12 have reduced the total end strengths of their militaries, and 10
have changed the composition of their forces by increasing the proportion
of professional forces (see fig. 1).
Figure****Helvetica:x11****1: NATO Members' Active Duty Forces and
Percent of
Conscripts
*****************
*****************
Source: Countries' Ministries of Defense.
Force Reorganization and Restructuring
--------------------------------------
The strategic concept recognized that the changing security environment
required different force structures and capabilities. Accordingly, some
countries have reorganized their force structures, and others have begun
to reorganize their force structures from largely territorial defense
forces to force structures that can deploy outside their territory. The
forces of all six countries we visited had reorganized. In most cases,
countries reorganized because of the changed security environment and
financial considerations. Although force restructuring was not in response
to any specific NATO force goals, it was consistent with the direction of
the new strategic concept and emphasized by officials in the countries we
visited. The countries' restructuring is summarized in table 7.
Table****Helvetica:x11****7: Force Restructuring in Selected Countries
------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Country : Force restructuring |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Germany : Developed reaction forces, which do not contain |
| : conscripts, for peace support, rescue and |
| : evacuation, or relief operations. Forces are |
| : maintained in a high state of readiness for rapid |
| : response to NATO defense operations. Main force |
| : for territorial defense largely comprises |
| : conscripts maintained at lower readiness levels |
| : than during the Cold War, since Germany assumes it |
| : will have 12 months' warning as opposed to |
| : 48 hours for any aggression. |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Italy : Implementing a new defense model that calls for a |
| : reduced but more flexible and readily deployable |
| : force capable of undertaking a wider range of |
| : operational capabilities. Also participating in |
| : more diversified operational scenarios in a more |
| : multinational joint context. |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Netherlands : Military restructuring, begun in 1991 and expected |
| : to conclude in 2000, is intended to increase |
| : ability to sustain prolonged crisis management or |
| : peacekeeping operations and meet NATO's collective |
| : defense requirements. Has eliminated conscription |
| : and is now an entirely professional force. Is |
| : disbanding three tank battalions, increased the |
| : number of combat-ready armored infantry companies |
| : from six to nine, plans to increase combat-ready |
| : division by 800 personnel, and consolidated |
| : medical services into a joint brigade. Each of |
| : three partially active mechanized brigades will be |
| : capable of deploying one battalion-sized task |
| : force for SFOR-type operations.a |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Spain : Reorganized and has begun to modernize its army. |
| : Cut the number of army personnel in half and |
| : closed many small bases and detachments. Will also |
| : end conscription officially in 2003. |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Turkey : Finished restructuring of forces in 1993. Has |
| : developed more independent, deployable brigades |
| : and leased or purchased tanker aircraft for |
| : greater flexibility. New force structure provides |
| : for a minimum of one-third of the land forces to |
| : be combat ready. |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| United Kingdom: Defense review envisions a joint rapid reaction |
| : force comprising air, ground, and naval assets. |
| : Will restructure its army to retain two deployable |
| : divisions, one based in Germany and the other in |
| : Britain, and will establish an additional |
| : mechanized brigade. It also plans to convert |
| : airborne brigade to mechanized brigade and reduce |
| : front-line naval forces, including destroyers and |
| : frigates. |
------------------------------------------------------------------------
aSFOR = Stabilization Force, NATO's ongoing operation in Bosnia.
Source: GAO analysis.
Trucks, Transport Helicopters, Communication, and Training Capabilities
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The data for these indicators were less consistent across countries due to
definitional problems, so we have not made any comparisons between or
among countries, but rather have noted change in a country between 1990
and the present. Most countries' defense ministries reported little change
in inventories of transport helicopters and trucks for heavy equipment and
fuel. Notable exceptions are the Netherlands, which added 13 CH-47 Chinook
helicopters to its inventory where they previously did not have any, and
Denmark, which more than doubled the number of its heavy equipment
transports, from 31 to 65.
Many countries have acquired satellite communications terminals and other
mobile communication assets; not all countries responded to our queries
about this indicator, however. These types of assets are necessary to
allow units to deploy from areas where they have preexisting communication
links. For example, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Portugal had no mobile
satellite communication terminals in 1990, and all have that capability
today. Similarly, Norway had no mobile airfield communications capability
in 1990 and does today.
Since 1990, NATO members have increased their focus on multinational
exercises and on exercises and missions other than countering a
large-scale invasion as called for in the 1991 strategic concept. Some
countries stated that increased deployments have reduced the frequency of
exercises but that out-of-area deployments have provided valuable
experience. For example, Spain not only has participated in NATO
operations in the Balkans but also has executed other deployments, most
recently to Central America, when it sent engineers and supplies in the
wake of Hurricane Mitch. Similarly, Belgium has deployed units to Rwanda
and the Congo in addition to its NATO activities.
Despite Progress, Challenges Remain
-----------------------------------
Although alliance members have made progress in increasing mobility and
deployability, challenges remain. Recognizing that challenges still exist,
NATO launched the Defense Capabilities Initiative at the April 1999 summit
to encourage member countries' greater movement toward mobility and
deployability of their forces by working together to develop assets that
support each other's forces. This represents a shift from the alliance's
position that each country is responsible for the sustainability
requirements and logistics resources for the forces it contributes. The
five areas identified for improvement under this initiative include
deployability and mobility of alliance forces; sustainability and
logistics; effective engagement capability; survivability of forces and
infrastructure; and command and control and information systems.
Scope and Methodology
---------------------
To describe how NATO establishes its force requirements and how it
identifies what it asks each member to contribute, we obtained and
reviewed documents relevant to the defense planning process from U.S.
Department of Defense and NATO officials. We interviewed DOD and State
officials as well as scholars and defense analysts to obtain their
perspective on the process. We also visited the U.S. Mission to NATO in
Brussels, Belgium, and conducted in-depth interviews with U.S. Mission
officials; NATO international staff and international military staff; and
U.S. European Command staff. We also interviewed military officers from
Belgium, Germany, and Norway.
To determine how NATO member militaries have become more mobile and
deployable since the adoption of the strategic concept in 1991, we
identified criteria in the 1991 strategic concept that reflected the force
structure attributes the alliance wished to forge (that is, more mobile,
flexible, and deployable forces). Using these criteria, we developed
tentative indicators that reflect mobility and deployability. We reviewed
these draft indicators with the help of expert analysts from the Brookings
Institute, the National Defense University, and the Cato Institute;
officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Program Analysis
and Evaluation Division, the Department of the Navy, and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Washington, D.C.; the Logistics Management Institute, McLean
Virginia; and U.S. and international military and civilian officials at
NATO. Based on this review we selected 10 indicators on which to collect
data.
We collected data for three points: 1990, the last year before the
adoption of the 1991 strategic concept; the most recent available data;
and future plans. We then identified six countries for in-depth fieldwork
to validate and expand on the information we received and obtained input
from those countries' ministries of defense on the status of their forces'
movement toward greater mobility and deployability. We selected these
countries based on the coverage of NATO they represented in terms of
budgets and forces and in terms of variance of progress toward the goals
of mobility and deployability. We also solicited input from DOD desk
officers for the selected countries, country delegation members at the
U.S. Mission to NATO, NATO international staff, and European Command
staff. We also collected data from published sources such as Jane's and
International Institute for Strategic Studies.
We have not made judgments about what constitutes sufficient progress,
whether any particular country has made enough progress in enhancing force
mobility and deployability, or whether any particular country can
participate in or accomplish a specific mission.
We conducted our review from August 1998 to September 1999 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Agency Comments
---------------
In written comments on a draft of this report, the Defense Department
concurred with our findings. (DOD's comments are reprinted in app. IV).
DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated where
appropriate. In oral comments on this report, the Department of State
concurred with our findings.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 15 days from
the issuance date. At that time, we will provide copies of this report to
other appropriate congressional committees; the Honorable William S.
Cohen, Secretary of Defense, and the Honorable Madeleine K. Albright,
Secretary of State. We will also provide copies to other interested
parties upon request.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me or Jim Shafer at (202) 512-4128. Key contributors to this
report were Muriel Forster, Hynek Kalkus, and Patricia Martin.
*****************
*****************
Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director
International Relations and Trade Issues
--------------------------------------
/Footnote1/-^(GAO/NSIAD-99-185, June 30, 1999).
/Footnote2/-^The United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands,
Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Luxembourg, Germany,
and Canada. We did not include Iceland, which does not have a military;
France, which does not participate in the NATO defense planning process;
or the Czech Republic, Hungary, or Poland, which have only recently
joined the alliance.
/Footnote3/-^The six countries are the United Kingdom, Germany, the
Netherlands, Spain, Italy, and Turkey.
/Footnote4/-^The North Atlantic Council comprises permanent
representatives of all member countries and has effective political
authority and powers of decision in the alliance. The Council also meets
with higher level officials such as foreign ministers, defense
ministers, and heads of government, but its decisions have the same
status and validity, regardless of the level of officials that meet.
/Footnote5/-^Major NATO commands are the Supreme Allied Commander Europe
and the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic. As of September 1, 1999,
under NATO's new force structure they will be called Strategic Commanders.
/Footnote6/-^We define capacity as the ability to move troops and tons of
equipment.
/Footnote7/-^Although the United Kingdom did not increase airlift, its
inventory of transport aircraft is among the largest in the alliance.
With a traditionally global outlook, the United Kingdom has maintained
more mobile and deployable forces than its European counterparts and has
focused most of its efforts on restructuring its forces and acquiring
major combat capabilities such as attack helicopters and cruise missiles.
/Footnote8/-^We did not include Luxembourg in our sealift analysis because
it is a landlocked country.
FIELDWORK OBSERVATIONS, BY COUNTRY
==================================
National priorities, independent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) requirements, have influenced NATO members' progress in changing
their force structures to meet the new security environment. To better
understand the changes that these militaries have undergone,
quantitatively and qualitatively, we visited six NATO member
countries--the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, and
Turkey--seeking in-depth information about our indicators and other
factors that would pertain to enhanced mobility and deployability of their
forces.
The United Kingdom
------------------
Historically, the United Kingdom has maintained a global outlook that
requires it to maintain more mobile and deployable forces than most of its
European counterparts. The United Kingdom has focused on restructuring its
forces and procuring weapons such as attack helicopters, cruise missiles,
and the Eurofighter, an attack aircraft. The United Kingdom's Strategic
Defence Review (SDR) completed in July 1998 recognized a need for more
airlift and sealift capabilities and logistics support for their forces.
The United Kingdom has reduced its forces, all of which are professional,
by over 30 percent and is restructuring them to form joint rapid reaction
forces to be operational in 2001. These forces will consist of two
echelons, the first of which will be at a very high state of readiness to
provide early entry forces, and the second of which will provide follow-up
forces. The first echelon will comprise a maritime task group; air power;
land forces, including an armored battle group; a special forces
component; and a fully equipped, rapidly deployable headquarters to
command the forces. The SDR also calls for a restructuring of the United
Kingdom's reserve forces. For example, the United Kingdom recognizes the
need for additional medical support in major operations such as the Gulf
War but finds it too expensive to maintain in the active force structure
and hopes to use reservists for such tasks.
The SDR specifically calls for enhanced strategic lift to enable movement
of the joint rapid reaction forces to an overseas theater. In the near
term, it calls for the acquisition of four C-17-like aircraft to meet
short-term strategic airlift needs in addition to the 25 C-130Js already
on order and the addition of four roll-on, roll-off container ships for
strategic sealift needs. In the long term, it recognizes the need to
replace the rest of the aging transport fleet, possibly with the European
Future Large Aircraft. Additionally, the SDR acknowledges the need for
additional medical support. According to a United Kingdom Ministry of
Defense official, prior defense cuts resulted in severe shortages in
medical support. U.S. officials and other military experts said that the
results of the SDR are consistent with NATO's vision for what allied
forces should look like and could serve as a model for other countries.
Germany
-------
In 1990, Germany's military found itself in a position unique to any NATO
state. Reunification added about 100,000 East German troops to Germany's
military, but the treaty enabling reunification mandated that the military
be reduced to a maximum of 370,000 troops. Further, Germany had spent the
past 40 years preparing to defend its territory from an invasion and did
not foresee sending any combat forces outside of Germany. Therefore, it
invested less in logistics and support, since it expected to use civilian
assets such as hospitals and trucks, and more in combat forces.
In 1994, Germany issued a white paper that detailed its restructuring
actions based on the reunification and the need for additional changes to
reflect the changed security environment. One key decision was to develop
rapid reaction units that would consist entirely of professionals or
temporary career volunteers./Footnote1/ The rapid reaction units total
53,000 men and include air, naval, and ground units.
German officials believe in the need for and benefits of conscription. For
national and NATO defense purposes they want to maintain the ability to
mobilize a 680,000-man force. To do this, Germany needs a large number of
skilled reservists, which are available through conscription. Germany's
ability to significantly increase its forces in case of a major war may
contribute to other European allies' abilities to restructure their forces
into smaller, professional militaries. At the same time, Germany maintains
that its ability to contribute up to 53,000 rapid reaction forces to a
NATO or other coalition force is significant. Also, over 50 percent of
Germany's regular officers and noncommissioned officers are recruited from
its pool of conscripts, and without conscription the overall quality of
the military would probably decrease, since entire segments of the
population would not consider military service. Finally, Germany does not
accept that professionals are necessarily better than conscripts.
According to German officials, units with conscripts have proven
themselves in military exercises, military competitions, and peacetime
support operations. For example, German units with temporary career
volunteers that are in Bosnia have performed as well as units of
professional armies, according to the Stabilization Force Commander.
Germany is now undertaking another broad defense review by a blue ribbon
panel representing all segments of German society. This review will take
at least a year to complete and will cover all aspects of Germany's
defense policy. Although the review may lead to more improvements in
Germany's ability to react to a crisis, until it is completed, Germany
will probably not undergo any major changes in its current policies.
The Netherlands
---------------
The Netherlands has made numerous changes in its force structure, but
limited defense spending may impact sustainability. Changes to date in the
structure illustrate a move toward NATO-desired mobility. In 1991,
recognizing it unlikely that its forces would be needed for home defense,
the Netherlands began to restructure its forces. As the country determined
to act militarily only in partnership with others, its goal was to
increase mobility and the ability to integrate with other forces in the
alliance. It has reduced its forces by about 50 percent and now has an all-
volunteer force, which eliminates restrictions on where they can be
deployed. In addition, the Netherlands has changed its force structure to
have more rapidly deployable, flexible, and mobile units. However,
according to the Clingendale Institute, a Dutch think tank, the force
structure changes are still insufficient. According to the Institute, the
Army needs additional combat personnel to enable it to sustain its forces
in the field for longer lengths of time.
The Netherlands plans to add about 800 additional personnel to its
combat-ready infantry companies and engineer and logistics units and is
considering consolidating logistic support among the services. The country
has increased both its airlift and sealift capability since 1990. Current
plans focus on equipment purchases: two amphibious transport ships,
Patriot missile upgrades, and Apache helicopters--all high-priced items.
However, the Netherlands plans no increases in its defense budget, which at
1.9 percent of the gross domestic product is already under NATO's average
of 2.8 percent of the gross domestic product.
According to U.S. embassy officials, the Netherlands has added some
courses to its training requests in response to NATO force goals. For
example, Dutch forces will attend civil-military affairs training in the
United States, since the Netherlands has been designated a lead country in
establishing a civil-military unit.
Spain
-----
Spain joined NATO in 1982 and joined NATO's integrated military structure
in 1999. According to U.S. and Spanish officials, Spain recognized in the
early 1990s that the integration would require a reorganization and
modernization of its armed forces. Since 1990, Spain has reduced its
active duty forces by 30 percent and reduced its proportion of conscript
forces from 72 percent to 50 percent. During this effort, Spain
reorganized its army and cut its force level by half. Conscription will
end officially in 2003, but will as a practical matter end sooner.
According to U.S. officials, modernization in the army is less advanced
than the reorganization process. Modernization of the C-130 fleet is
scheduled to be completed this year. Since 1990 Spain has increased its
sealift capacity by acquiring one amphibious vessel. Spain's newest ship
is an oiler/supply ship. Spain plans to add another amphibious vessel,
which will be configured with command and control capability.
U.S. officials described Spain as having a "small but robust military,"
but it is not a power projection force. Further, while recognizing the
need for greater mobility and deployability and making advances in that
direction, Spain believes it will never operate alone, that it will always
be part of some multinational coalition or operation. Therefore, Spain
will limit the resources it devotes to strategic acquisitions such as
lift. However, according to U.S. officials, Spain does much for the
alliance, at great domestic political cost, that tends to be overlooked,
such as making basing agreements and serving as an air bridge. For
example, over the last 4 years, Spain has permitted 50,000 U.S. flights
from its bases for various operations and contingencies. It has also
contributed to the operations in Bosnia and Albania. Spain contributed
about 1,500 troops to both the United Nations Protection Force and the
NATO-led Implementation Force. The current commitment for the
Stabilitzation Force is about 1,100 troops, which given rotation
requirements represents a commitment of about one-third of Spain's nine-
brigade army. Spain also commits one frigate each to NATO's standing naval
forces in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, which represents one-third
of its frigates.
Italy
-----
In response to the changed security environment and NATO's strategic
concept, Italy has adopted a new defense model and is now implementing it.
This model calls for a reduced but more flexible and readily deployable
force capable of undertaking a wider range of operational capabilities and
participating in more diversified, multinational operational scenarios.
Italy has reduced its active duty personnel level by 30 per cent and plans
to reduce it another 22 percent by 2005. About 47 percent of the armed
forces are conscripts, but Italy hopes to reduce that percentage to 11 per
cent by 2005. According to U.S. officials, however, this goal is
optimistic.
U.S. officials said that Italy does not have a power projection force and
that deploying more than 5,000 troops outside its territory would stretch
its lift and sustainability resources. Italy has provided support to the
alliance that has been domestically unpopular, such as the use of Aviano
Air Base. Italy also has 400 policemen in Bosnia performing civil police
duties. According to U.S. officials, Italy took the lead in this
initiative, which NATO was unable to persuade any other ally to perform.
Since 1993, Italy has maintained 1,800 troops in Bosnia, which in addition
to land, navy, and air infrastructure for land and air operations requires
a total commitment of about 10,000 personnel, according to Italy's
Minister of Defense. In 1997, Italy led a coalition of 7,000 troops from
11 nations in the United Nations-mandated Operation Alba to provide
internal peace and restore governmental authority in Albania. Italy
provided 3,000 troops and coordinated the operation through its completion
in August 1997.
Turkey
------
Turkey's security challenges differ from other NATO members, and this
difference affects its strategic posture. Turkey borders Iran, Iraq, and
Syria; has cultural and historical connections to the Balkans and
Caucasus; and is near the Middle East and central Asian energy sources.
Therefore, Turkey's defense planning is focused more on responding to
crises in this region and being reinforced with forces from its allies
than on deploying its forces great distances outside its territory.
According to U.S. and Turkish officials, this focus is entirely consistent
with NATO interests. In addition, Turkey is containing civil unrest in the
country's southeast quadrant. For these and other social and economic
reasons, Turkey plans to reduce the size of its armed forces and the
proportion of conscripts in its forces slowly. Since 1990, Turkey has
reduced its active duty forces less than 5 percent and its conscript
active duty forces from 85 percent to 83 percent. A Turkish official said
that the deployment and disposition of conscripts in the armed forces are
not constrained in any way and that conscription therefore does not
present the same problems it does for other NATO allies.
As a result of its experience in the Gulf War, Turkey realized that its
division-based army had not been easy to move to southeast Turkey, so it
has since reorganized to achieve more independent deployable brigades.
Turkish forces have participated in numerous operations, including the
United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia, with over 1,460 personnel; in
Operation Alba with about 700 personnel; and numerous other United Nations
missions. Currently, it has about 800 personnel, equivalent to half a
brigade, in Bosnia.
--------------------------------------
/Footnote1/-^Temporary career volunteers are conscripts that have
volunteered to serve for an additional 2 to 13 months beyond their basic
military service of 10 months and can be deployed for duties other than
national or NATO defense missions, which is all that is asked of regular
conscripts.
CHARACTERISTICS OF TRANSPORT AND IN-FLIGHT REFUELING AIRCRAFT IN NATO
NATIONS' INVENTORIES
===========================================================================
The range of transport aircraft varies depending on the loads they carry.
In table 8, we show the ranges for the payload listed in parentheses.
Payloads are rounded to the nearest half ton for cargo and numbers of
passengers or troops if listed that way. Nations may have reconfigured
their specific aircraft, which affect these measures.
Table****Helvetica:x11****8: Characteristics of Transport Aircraft
(Table notes on next page)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Aircraft : Range in miles : Maximum payload in |
| : : tons/passengers |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 707-320 : 3,625 (40-ton payload) : 44.5/219 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 727-300 : 2,880 (maximum payload) : 20/189 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| A310 : 5,523 : 55 /270 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| A310-200 : 4,200 (220 passengers : 36/280 |
| : with bags) : |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| C-130B : 2,090 : -/92 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| C-130E : 2,420 (maximum payload) : 22.5/92 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| C-130H : 2,238 (20-ton load) : 25/92 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| C-130H-30 : 2,238 (20-ton load) : 23/128 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| CC-150a : : |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| C-160 : 1,151 (maximum payload) : 17.5/91 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| C-212 : 519 (maximum payload) : 3/25 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| C-47 : 2,700 : 4 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| CC-115 : 754 (maximum payload) : 9/41 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| CC-132 : 1,335 (3-ton payload) : 5.5/50 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| CC-137 : 4,300 (maximum payload) : 45.5/219 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| CC-142 : 1,357 (with 50 passengers): 7/50 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| CL-215 : 1,301 (2-ton payload) : 4/26 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Cn-235 : 950 (maximum payload) : 6.5/48 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| DC-10-30 : 4,606 (maximum payload) : 53/380 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| F-27 : 1,150 (5-ton payload) : 6.5/45 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| F-50 : 2,146 (5.5-ton payload) : 6.5/48 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| F-60 : 1,208 (7.5-ton payload) or: 8.5/55 |
| : 1,841 (50 troops) : |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| G-222 : 783 (maximum payload) : 10/46 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| HS 748 : 1,898 (4-ton load) : 8.5/58 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Tristar C-2A : 5,998 (400 passengers : 48.5/400 |
| : with bags) : |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Tu-154 : 2,299 (maximum payload) : 20/166 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| YS-11-200 : 680 (maximum payload) : 7/60 |
------------------------------------------------------------------------
aThe Canadian designation for an A310.
Source: Jane's All the World's Aircraft.
Tanker aircraft in NATO members' inventories are detailed in table 9. We
converted their maximum fuel capability into U.S. gallons.
Table****Helvetica:x11****9: Tanker Aircraft, by Type and Fuel Offload
Capacity
------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Aircraft : Maximum fuel offload capability in |
| : tons/gallons |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 707 tanker/transport : 61.5/18,917 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| CC-130T : 12/3,600 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| CC-137a : 61.5/18,917 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| DC-10-30 : 100/30,760 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| KC-130 : 35/10,769 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| KC-135R : 101.5/31,221 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Tristar K-1/KC-1 : 150/46,140 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| VC-10 K2 : 81/24,884 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| VC-10 K3 : 88/27,130 |
------------------------------------------------------------------------
aCanadian designation for 707 tanker/transports.
Sources: Various Jane's All the World's Aircraft and the U.S. Naval
Institute.
CHARACTERISTICS OF SEALIFT VESSELS IN NATO NATIONS' INVENTORIES
===============================================================
Sealift vessels are described in table 10 by class, size, and capacity for
lift by either square footage or capacity of troops or equipment.
Table****Helvetica:x11****10: Characteristics of Sealift Vessels
(Table notes on next page from Previous Page)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Country : Number/class/type : Size in tons : Lift capability in |
| : : : troops/vehicles |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Canadaa : 2 Provider : 24,700 full : 16,678 square feet |
| : replenishment : : |
| : vessels : : |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Germany : 1 Germania roll- : 8,720 full : Not available |
| : on, roll-off vessel: : |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Greeceb : 2 Chios LSTs : 4,400 full : 300/not available |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| : 2 Inouse LSTs : 5,800 full : 400/18 tanks |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| : 3 Ikaria LSTs : 4,080 : 200/16 tanks |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| : 2 Roussen LSMs : 1,095 : 50/4 |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| : 1Nafkratoussa LSD : 9,357 full : 200/18 |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Italy : 2 San Giorgio LPDs : 7,665 full : 400/30-36 armored |
| : : : personnel carriers |
| : : : or |
| : : : 30 medium tanks |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| : 1 San Giusto LPD : 7,950 full : 400/30-36 armored |
| : : : personnel carriers |
| : : : or |
| : : : 30 medium tanks |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Netherlands: 1 Rotterdam LPD : 12,750 full : 611/170 armored |
| : : : personnel carriers |
| : : : or |
| : : : 33 main battle tanks |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Spain : 2 Castilla LPAs : 10,709 light : 1,657/not available |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| : 2 Cortes LSTs : 4,975 light : 374/500 tons of |
| : : : vehicles |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| : 1 Galicia LPD : 12,250 full : 611 troops or 170 |
| : : : armored personnel |
| : : : carriers or 33 main |
| : : : battle tanks |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Turkey : 1 Osman Gazi LST : 3,773 full : 900/15 tanks |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| : 2 Ertugal LSTs : 5,800 : 395/2,220 tons cargo |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| : 2 Sarucabey LSTs : 2,600 full : 600/11 |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| : 1 Cakabey LSM : 1,600 : 400/9 tanks |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| : 2 Bayraktar LSTs : 4,080 full : 200/16 tanks |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| United : 2 Fearless LPDs : 12,120 full : 400/15 main battle |
| Kingdom : : : tanks |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| : 4 Sir Belvedere : 5,674 full : 340/17 or 18 main |
| : LSLs : : battle tanks |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| : 1 Sir Galahad LSL : 8,585 full : 343/18 main battle |
| : : : tanks |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| : 1 Ocean LPHc : 20,500 full : Most equipment for |
| : : : a marine commando |
| : : : battalion |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| : 2 Sea Crusader : 23,986 : 2,300 lane meters |
| : roll-on, roll- : gross tons : of space |
| : off vessels : : |
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legend
LPA = landing platform attack
LPD = landing platform dock
LPH = landing platform helicopter
LSD = landing ship dock
LSL = landing ship logistics
LSM = landing ship medium
LST = landing ship tank
Note: Information was not always available in each category. Vessels in
italics are those added to the inventories since 1990.
aCanada does not have Amphibious or roll on, roll off vessels, but does
use its replenishment vessels for sealift. Its lift is measured by
available square footage of space.
bThree additional Chios class vessels are under construction and are all
scheduled for commissioning by the end of 1999. They are scheduled to
replace older LSTs and LSMs.
c This vessel is primarily a helicopter carrier but can carry almost an
entire marine commando battalion and its equipment.
Source: The country ministries of defense, IISS The Military Balance
1998/99, The Military Balance 1990/91, and Various years of Jane's
Fighting Ships.
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
=======================================
*****************
*****************
(711374)
Figure 1: NATO Members' Active Duty Forces and Percent of
Conscripts 18
Table 1: Increases, Decreases, or No Change in Airlift, Sealift, and
In-flight Refueling Capabilities 5
Table 2: Events in the 2-Year Defense Planning Process and
Annual Defense Review 11
Table 3: Countries' Increases in Transport Aircraft Since 199014
Table 4: Countries That Have Not Increased Their Transport
Aircraft and Airlift Capability Since 1990 15
Table 5: Countries' Inventories of Large Amphibious and Sealift
Vessels 16
Table 6: Countries' Inventories of In-flight Refueling Capability17
Table 7: Force Restructuring in Selected Countries19
Table 8: Characteristics of Transport Aircraft 30
Table 9: Tanker Aircraft, by Type and Fuel Offload Capacity31
Table 10: Characteristics of Sealift Vessels 32
*** End of Document. ***