Defense Acquisitions: Evaluation of the Navy's 1999 Naval Surface Fire
Support Assessment (Letter Report, 09/14/1999, GAO/NSIAD-99-225).
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided an analysis of the
Navy's assessment of the short-term and long-term costs associated with
alternative methods for executing the naval surface fire support
mission, including the alternative of reactivating two battleships.
GAO noted that: (1) the Navy's assessment was limited to a comparison of
two alternatives--reactivation of battleships and its program of
developing an improved gun and munition for certain existing and future
surface ships; (2) neither alternative will meet Marine Corps naval
surface fire support requirements; (3) the assessment showed that
battleships have significantly greater firepower but less range than the
destroyers and cruisers; (4) it also showed the costs of manning the
battleships to be significantly higher than both the destroyers and
cruisers; (5) GAO found that the costs and capabilities data presented
in the assessment were derived from actual information that was
available on these ships; (6) since neither alternative will meet Marine
Corps naval surface fire support requirements, the assessment would have
been more valuable if it also compared the cost of upgrading the
battleships with capabilities necessary to meet requirements with the
Navy's plans to meet these requirements; (7) the Navy does not intend to
reactivate the battleships because they do not meet naval surface fire
support requirements and have high operating costs and large crews; (8)
it said that any modernization alterations to the battleships would be
driven by the missions that could be assigned to them and would require
further evaluation to determine their cost and schedule; and (9) an
official responsible for ship programs said that the Navy chose not to
conduct such an evaluation because it would be time consuming and
costly.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-99-225
TITLE: Defense Acquisitions: Evaluation of the Navy's 1999 Naval
Surface Fire Support Assessment
DATE: 09/14/1999
SUBJECT: Military vessels
Ground warfare
Naval warfare
Cost effectiveness analysis
Military cost control
Defense capabilities
Weapons systems
Logistics
IDENTIFIER: U.S.S. Iowa
U.S.S. Wisconsin
Ticonderoga Class Cruiser
Arleigh Class Cruiser
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A Report to Congressional Committees
GAO/NSIAD-99-225
September 1999 DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS
Evaluation of the Navy's 1999 Naval Surface Fire Support
Assessment
National Security and International Affairs Division
B-282966 Letter September 14, 1999 The Honorable John Warner,
Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin, Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services United States Senate
The Honorable Floyd Spence, Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton,
Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of
Representatives
This is our final report to you on naval surface fire- support
(NSFS) issues required by section 1015 of the Strom Thurmond
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. In the
first report, 1 we assessed the readiness of the remaining Iowa
class battleships and their associated logistic support structure.
In our second report, 2 we examined the Navy's plans and costs for
modernizing its NSFS capabilities. This letter provides our
analysis of the Navy's assessment of the short- term and long-
term costs associated with alternative methods for executing the
naval surface fire
support mission, including the alternative of reactivating two battleships. The assessment, entitled Naval Surface Fire- Support Capabilities, was provided to Congress in a March 1999 report. Results in Brief The Navy's assessment was limited to a comparison of two alternatives reactivation of battleships and its current program of developing an improved gun and munition for certain existing and future surface ships. Neither alternative will meet Marine Corps naval surface fire support requirements. The assessment showed that battleships have significantly greater firepower but less range than the destroyers and cruisers. It also showed the costs of manning the battleships to be significantly higher than both the destroyers and cruisers. We found that the costs and capabilities data presented in the assessment were derived from actual information 1 Force Structure: Navy Is Complying with Battleship Readiness Requirements (
GAO/NSIAD-99-62
, Apr. 12, 1999).
support mission, including the alternative of reactivating two
battleships. The assessment, entitled Naval Surface Fire- Support
Capabilities, was provided to Congress in a March 1999 report.
Results in Brief The Navy's assessment was limited to a comparison
of two alternatives reactivation of battleships and its current
program of developing an improved gun and munition for certain
existing and future surface ships. Neither alternative will meet
Marine Corps naval surface fire support requirements. The
assessment showed that battleships have significantly greater
firepower but less range than the destroyers and cruisers. It also
showed the costs of manning the battleships to be significantly
higher than both the destroyers and cruisers. We found that the
costs and capabilities data presented in the assessment were
derived from actual information 1 Force Structure: Navy Is
Complying with Battleship Readiness Requirements ( GAO/NSIAD-99-
62 , Apr. 12, 1999).
2 Defense Acquisitions: Naval Surface Fire Support Program Plans
and Costs (GAO/NSIAD-99-91, June 11, 1999).
that was available on these ships. Since neither alternative will
meet Marine Corps naval surface fire support requirements, the
assessment would have been more valuable if it also compared the
cost of upgrading the battleships with capabilities necessary to
meet requirements with the Navy's current plans to meet these
requirements. The Navy does not intend to reactivate the
battleships because they do not meet naval surface fire support
requirements and have high operating costs
and large crews. It said that any modernization alterations to the
battleships would be driven by the missions that could be assigned
to them and would require further evaluation to determine their
cost and schedule. An official responsible for ship programs said
that the Navy chose not to conduct such an evaluation because it
would be time consuming and costly.
Background As we reported in 1997, 3 the Navy has had no credible
surface fire- support capability since it retired its last four
Iowa class battleships in 1992. It does not intend to reactivate
battleships because the munitions fired by their 16- inch guns do
not meet Marine Corps requirements for range and accuracy. It also
cites the high cost of manning and operating battleships and their
age and uniqueness as factors arguing against their reactivation.
Each battleship requires a crew of about 1,500, whereas modern
cruisers and destroyers require crews of only 340 and 295,
respectively. Although
the Navy does not intend to reactivate them, it is maintaining two
battleships U. S. S. Iowa and U. S. S. Wisconsin in good condition
on the Naval Vessel Register, as required by law. The Navy is
executing a two- phase plan to develop modern NSFS capabilities.
In the first phase, it developed a 5- inch, 62 caliber gun and it
is developing the associated guided munitions to engage targets
between 41 and 63 nautical miles. It also plans to modify its
Standard Missile for land attack that will have a range of about
150 nautical miles. These weapons, and a mission planning system
to control their use, are to be installed on 27 newly constructed
Arleigh Burke class destroyers between fiscal year 2001 and 2009
and 22 Ticonderoga class cruisers selected for modernization
between fiscal year 2004 and 2009. However, these weapons are not
intended or expected to satisfy the full range of the Marine Corps
NSFS requirements. The second phase, to be completed by 2020, is
3 Program Status: Naval Surface Fire Support (GAO/NSIAD-97-179R,
Aug. 6, 1997).
intended to fully meet Marine Corps requirements. It includes
developing a longer- range, larger caliber advanced gun and
associated munitions and an advanced land attack missile for the
DD- 21 class land attack destroyer. The Navy plans to accept
delivery of 32 DD- 21s between 2008 and 2020. The Marine Corps is
willing to accept the risks associated with the current lack of
NSFS capability and supports the Navy modernization plans.
Navy Assessment The Navy compared its planned NSFS development
program to the cost of reactivating two battleships with the same
capabilities they had at the time of their last inactivation, but
without the Tomahawk missile launch capability. During the 1980s,
the Navy spent about $1.7 billion to modernize and reactivate its
four Iowa class battleships. During their reactivation, each of
these ships was fitted with 16 Harpoon and 32 Tomahawk missile
launchers, along with updated communications, fire control, and
target acquisition systems. The estimated cost cited for
reactivating the U. S. S. Wisconsin was $209.4 million and for the
U. S. S. Iowa, was $221.3 million, including repair of the damaged
turret. 4 To accomplish the reactivation, the
Navy estimated 14 months for industrial support and 3 to 6 months
for modernization and training on and certification of newly
installed equipment. The estimated cost of reactivating the U. S.
S. Wisconsin was based on the actual cost to reactivate the U. S.
S. New Jersey battleship in the 1980s, less the modernization
costs that occurred during its reactivation, and escalating the
figure to fiscal year 1999 dollars. The estimated cost of
reactivating the U. S. S. Iowa is the same as the U. S. S.
Wisconsin plus $12 to $14 million to repair the damage to the
number
2 turret. The Navy compared capabilities, crew size, and annual
operating costs of battleships to those of Arleigh Burke class
destroyers and Ticonderoga class cruisers that are to be equipped
with the improved 5- inch guns and extended range guided
munitions. The comparison addressed the number of guns, their fire
rate, and range. For example, it showed that each battleship has
nine 16- inch guns compared to one 5- inch gun on the destroyers
and two 5- inch guns on the cruisers. The data showed that
battleships have significantly greater firepower but less range
than the
destroyers and cruisers, assuming that the new 5- inch guns and
munitions 4 The center 16- inch gun of the U. S. S. Iowa's turret
II was rendered inoperable by an explosion in April 1989.
will perform as planned. The data presented were consistent with
pre- existing published data on these ships. The Navy also
compared the crew size and annual operating costs. It showed the
manning costs of the battleships to be significantly higher than
both the destroyers and cruisers. The crew size was based on the
officer and enlisted manpower requirements document and the costs
were estimated using the programming rates developed for the
fiscal year 2002 budget. Fiscal year 2002 was chosen because that
year would be the earliest a battleship could be reactivated. The
Navy concluded that the variety of weapons currently being planned
and developed will provide the soundest and most cost- effective
strategy
for improving its surface fire support capability and that
reactivating the battleships was neither cost- effective nor a
sound strategy. Since the new 5- inch guns and muntions and the
battleships, as currently configured, will not meet Marine Corps
naval surface fire support requirements, the assessment would have
been more valuable if it included a comparison of providing the
battleships with capabilities necessary to meet requirements with
the Navy's planned development program to meet these requirements.
The Navy said that battleship modernization alterations would
require further evaluation to determine additional costs and
schedule impacts. At
the same time, the alterations would need to fit the mission given
to the battleship. An official responsible for ship programs said
that the Navy chose not to conduct such an evaluation because it
would be costly and take at least a year to complete.
Agency Comments and DOD partially concurred with a draft of this
report (see app. I) and noted Our Evaluation
that although neither the first phase of the Navy's two- phase
naval surface fire support program nor the battleship alternative
will fully meet the Marine Corps' NSFS requirements, the second
phase is intended to fully meet requirements. This information was
already provided in the background section of the report.
DOD also said we need to balance our statement that battleships
have significantly greater firepower than cruisers and destroyers
by noting that there are only 2 battleships on the Naval Vessel
Register compared to
22 Aegis cruisers and 27 Aegis destroyers in the active force
slated for land attack improvements. This information is also
provided in our background section.
Finally, DOD said battleship reactivation costs presented in our
report did not include modernization costs that would be
significant. Our report states that the activation costs do not
include modernization costs. However, we continue to believe that
the assessment would have been more valuable if it compared the
cost of upgrading the battleships with capabilities necessary to
meet requirements with the Navy's current plans to meet these
requirements.
Scope and To provide our analysis, we reviewed the Navy's March
1999 assessment
Methodology and the data and information used in its preparation.
We held discussions with officials of the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition;
the Surface Warfare and Expeditionary Warfare Divisions of the
Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations. We performed our review in June and July 1999 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to Senator Ted Stevens,
Chairman, and Senator Robert C. Byrd, Ranking Minority Member,
Senate Committee on Appropriations; Representative C. W. Bill
Young, Chairman, and Representative David R. Obey, Ranking
Minority Member, House Committee on Appropriations; the Honorable
William Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable William J.
Lynn, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); the Honorable
Jacob Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget; the
Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army; the Honorable
Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; and General James L. Jones,
Commandant of the Marine Corps. Copies will be made available to
others upon request.
Please contact me at (202) 512- 4841 or Mr. Richard Price at (202)
512- 3630, if you or your staff have any questions concerning this
report. Key contributors to this report were Anton Blieberger and
Martha Dey. James F. Wiggins Associate Director Defense
Acquisition Issues
Appendi I x Comments From the Department of Defense
GAO United States General Accounting Office
GAO/NSIAD-99-225
Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-225 Defense Acquisitions United States General
Accounting Office
Washington, D. C. 20548
Let t er
B-282966 Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-99-225 Defense Acquisitions
Let t er
B-282966 Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-99-225 Defense Acquisitions
B-282966 Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-99-225 Defense Acquisitions
B-282966 Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-99-225 Defense Acquisitions
B-282966 Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-99-225 Defense Acquisitions
Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-225 Defense Acquisitions
Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-99-225 Defense Aquisitions
Appendix I
Appendix I Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-99-225 Defense Aquisitions (707427) Let t e r
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