Military Personnel: Actions Needed to Better Define Pilot Requirements
and Promote Retention (Chapter Report, 08/20/1999, GAO/NSIAD-99-211).
The Defense Department (DOD) reported shortages of about 2,000 pilots at
the end of fiscal year 1998 and projects that shortages will continue
for several years. Retaining qualified pilots is important not only to
ensure that operational requirements can be met, but also to recoup the
substantial investments the services make in training their pilots. This
report reviews and identifies the reasons for the reported pilot
shortages and offers solutions to the problem. GAO determines (1) the
military services' reported and projected estimates of their pilot
shortages, (2) the basis for the services' pilot requirements, (3) key
factors that account for the reported pilot shortages, and (4) concerns
that are causing pilots to consider leaving the military.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-99-211
TITLE: Military Personnel: Actions Needed to Better Define Pilot
Requirements and Promote Retention
DATE: 08/20/1999
SUBJECT: Aircraft pilots
Military personnel
Military recruiting
Projections
Human resources utilization
Attrition rates
Military reenlistment bonuses
Job satisfaction surveys
Military enlistment
Job classification
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GAO/NSIAD-99-211
ns99211 A Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives
August 1999 MILITARY PERSONNEL
Actions Needed to Better Define Pilot Requirements and Promote
Retention
National Security and International Affairs Division
B-283075 Letter August 20, 1999 The Honorable Steve Buyer Chairman
The Honorable Neil Abercrombie Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Military Personnel Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
This report responds to the request of the Chairman and former
Ranking Minority Member that we review and identify reasons for
the reported military pilot shortages and offer solutions to
address the issue. Specifically, we determined (1) the services'
reported and projected estimates of their pilot shortages, (2) the
basis for the services' pilot requirements, (3) key factors that
account for the reported pilot shortages, and (4) concerns that
are causing pilots to consider leaving the military. We are
sending copies of this report to Senator Wayne Allard, Chairman,
and Senator Max Cleland, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on
Military Personnel, Senate Committee on Armed Services; Senator
Ted Stevens, Chairman, and Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Ranking
Minority Member, Subcommittee on Defense, Senate Committee on
Appropriations; and Representative Jerry Lewis, Chairman, and
Representative John P. Murtha, Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Defense, House Committee on Appropriations. We are
also sending copies of this report to the Honorable William S.
Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Lewis Caldera,
Secretary of the Army; the
Honorable John H. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy; the Honorable F.
Whitten Peters, Secretary of the Air Force; and General James L.
Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps. Copies will also be made
available to others upon request. If you have any questions about
this report, please contact Brenda S. Farrell or me at (202) 512-
5140. Other key contributors to this report are listed in appendix
III.
Mark E. Gebicke Director, National Security Preparedness Issues
Executive Summary Purpose The Department of Defense (DOD) reported
shortages of approximately 2,000 pilots at the end of fiscal year
1998 and projected that shortages would continue for several
years. Retaining qualified pilots is important not only to ensure
that operational requirements can be met, but also to recoup the
substantial investments the services make in training their
pilots.
Concerned about reports of pilot shortages, the Chairman and
former Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on Military
Personnel, House Committee on Armed Services, asked GAO to review
and identify reasons for the reported pilot shortages and offer
solutions to address the issue. Specifically, GAO determined (1)
the services' reported and projected estimates of their pilot
shortages, (2) the basis for the services' pilot requirements, (3)
key factors that account for the reported pilot shortages, and (4)
concerns that are causing pilots to consider leaving the military.
1 Background At the end of fiscal year 1998, DOD had about 28,000
active duty commissioned and warrant officer pilots. These
included approximately
13,300 pilots in the Air Force; 6,600 pilots in the Navy; 4,800
warrant officer pilots in the Army; and 3,300 pilots in the Marine
Corps. The Army is the only service that uses warrant officers as
pilots. Generally, DOD pilots follow career paths that require
them to serve in both cockpit and nonflying positions. These
positions range from operational positions that have a direct
combat mission to nonoperational positions that exist to carry out
support activities, training functions, and other noncombat
related activities. Pilot requirements are based on cockpit and
operational positions needing aviation expertise as well as on a
number of nonflying positions needed to develop pilots' leadership
skills for
advancement purposes. Additional considerations in establishing
requirements include the need to permit sufficient time between
deployments and the fact that a certain percentage of pilots will
not be available for assignment at any given point in time due to
factors such as education and training, medical conditions, and
transfers between assignments. 1 GAO has several additional,
ongoing reviews requested by Congress related to military
personnel issues, including an analysis of data from a broad
military personnel survey to be implemented later this year, a GAO
survey of servicemembers in retention critical specialties, and an
historical examination of military retention rates.
All pilot candidates must complete basic flight training, lasting
1 to 2 years, to earn their initial qualifications, or wings.
According to DOD, the cost to train each military pilot through
basic flight training is about $1 million; the cost to fully train
a pilot with the requisite operational experience can be more than
$9 million. These costs will vary significantly depending on the
type of aircraft. Upon entering pilot training, pilots begin to
receive aviation career incentive pay (ACIP), commonly referred to
as flight pay, which was designed to attract and retain officers
in a military aviation career. Once
pilots complete their initial aviation commitment of 6 to 8 years,
the services are further authorized to offer bonuses, called
aviation continuation pay (ACP), to encourage pilots to continue
in their military career beyond their initial obligation.
Currently, the services are authorized to offer ACP to pilots
through 14 years of aviation service. Pending
legislation contains provisions that would authorize the services
to continue these ACP payments through a pilot's 25 th year of
aviation service. DOD's pilots, whether assigned to flying or
nonflying positions, are eligible to receive both ACIP and ACP,
provided they meet the other eligibility criteria. ACIP can be as
high as $840 a month. ACP is authorized up to $25,000 a year; the
largest bonus currently offered is $22,000 a year.
Results in Brief The services currently report that no unit is
deploying without 100 percent of its pilots, and they believe that
they will continue to be able to meet their operational missions.
The services are able to fill their operational cockpits by
extending some pilots on deployments and by sending senior pilots
to what have traditionally been junior cockpit positions. However,
the Air
Force and the Navy, and to a lesser extent the Army and the Marine
Corps, are all reporting that they are unable to fill some
nonflying positions that they have designated for pilots. The
services project that these shortages will continue for several
years but the extent of these shortages has not been specifically
determined. While the services have procedures to review their
requirements, they have not comprehensively assessed whether all
of their required positions truly need to be filled with active
duty military pilots. If other personnel could fill some of these
nonflying positions, the services could reduce their pilot
requirements and thereby reduce their reported shortages. DOD
needs to clearly determine the magnitude of the shortages and
understand the extent to which the shortages are temporary or
longer lasting before the services implement wholesale and
potentially costly changes to their current aviator management
systems.
The significance of reported and projected pilot shortages is
difficult to ascertain because the basis for current pilot
requirements has not been firmly established or documented. For
example, while the Air Force has examined its nonflying positions,
established certain priorities, and made the decision to leave
more than 1,000 positions reserved for pilots unfilled, it has not
formally transferred the 1,000 empty positions to other
communities and is still carrying them as pilot requirements. The
services have not sufficiently explained which nonflying positions
active duty pilots must fill nor have they classified positions
according to their operational nature or designated which
positions are needed for career advancement purposes. In addition,
the Air Force was unable to break down its data on pilot
requirements and inventories in a way that would allow this type
of comprehensive assessment. Without such information, the
services cannot easily evaluate which positions it must fill on a
priority basis or assess whether other personnel such as retired
military personnel, reservists, warrant officers, military
personnel who are not pilots, DOD civilians, or contractors could
fill some positions in times of shortages.
Although data on pilot requirements is incomplete, GAO identified
three key factors that are contributing to the services' reported
and projected pilot shortfalls. First, the Air Force and the Navy
reduced the number of pilots they recruited during the personnel
reductions that occurred through most of the 1990s. This action
has unintentionally contributed to an insufficient number of
pilots to fill the overall current pilot requirements. Second, the
Navy and the Marine Corps have experienced delays in their
training pipelines due to problems in coordinating training
phases, a lack of spare parts, and other factors. These delays
have increased training times and reduced the number of pilots
available for their first assignments. Third, many pilots are
leaving the military before retirement since today's economy
provides many career opportunities for pilots in private industry.
The first two factors have resulted in what may be temporary
shortages since the number of pilots entering pilot training has
increased and the Navy and the Marine Corps are addressing the
training backlog. Pilots are reporting a number of concerns that
are leading them to consider leaving the military the high pace of
operations, inadequate spare parts and equipment to effectively do
their jobs, and dissatisfaction with leadership that, in their
view, too easily accepts unacceptable demands on service
personnel. Although these concerns are not unique to pilots, GAO
identified two concerns that have particular relevance to pilots.
First, many pilots are now being asked to remain in cockpit
positions, which means they are not being given the opportunity to
serve in other types of
career- enhancing positions. Some of these pilots have become
concerned that they will not be competitive for promotion. In
contrast, some pilots are pleased to be able to spend more time in
the cockpit and have, in fact, expressed their dissatisfaction
with assignments that take them away from flying. Both the Air
Force and the Navy have considered fly- only career tracks in the
past, but to date neither has adopted options that would match
individuals who wish to fly additional duty with extra flying duty
or instituted a fly- only career track that might deal more
permanently with cyclical shortages.
A second concern is the ACP. A pilot's decision to accept a bonus
no longer provides assurance that the pilot will stay in the
military until the pilot is eligible to retire. Chief complaints
voiced by pilots are that the ACP
eligibility dates are outdated and that the end of the bonus
payment at year 14 represents a cut in pay. Pending legislation,
originally requested by DOD, would address this concern by giving
the services the flexibility to offer bonus payments through a
pilot's 25 th year of aviation service. GAO is making a number of
recommendations to promote more accurate data on pilot
requirements. These recommendations are intended to help the
services identify opportunities to reduce their pilot requirements
and, in doing so, reduce their reported shortages. GAO is also
making recommendations to address pilot concerns that are causing
pilots to consider leaving the military. Principal Findings
The Air Force and the The services currently report that they are
able to fill their operational
Navy Are Reporting the positions and that no unit is deploying
without 100 percent of its pilots. The
services have been able to fill their operational cockpits by
extending some Greatest Pilot
pilots on deployments and by sending senior pilots to positions
formerly Shortages filled by more junior servicemembers. As a
result, the current reported shortages are occurring primarily in
the nonoperational flying and support positions.
The Air Force and the Navy are reporting the greatest shortages;
within these two services, the shortages are more apparent in some
pilot specialties than in others. At the end of fiscal year 1998,
the Air Force projected that its greatest shortages would occur
during fiscal years 2002 to
2007, primarily among its fighter, tactical airlift, and bomber
pilots. The Air Force projected overall shortages of between 1,
900 and 2,155 pilots, or between 14 and 16 percent of its pilot
requirements. Fighter pilot shortages were projected to reach 820
pilots, or 17 percent of its fighter pilot requirements. Tactical
airlift pilot shortages were projected to reach 311 pilots, or 15
percent of the tactical airlift pilot requirements. Likewise, the
Air Force projected a shortage of 294 bomber pilots, or 28 percent
of the bomber force pilot requirements. Despite these reported
shortages, the Air Force believes that it will be able to continue
to fill its operational cockpit positions and that shortages will
occur in nonoperational positions. The Navy believes that it
experienced its greatest shortage of 1,153 pilots in fiscal year
1998, though it projects that a shortage will continue
indefinitely. The Navy's shortage of 1,153 pilots, out of a
requirement of 7,712 pilots, represented about 15 percent of its
pilot requirements. In fiscal year 1998, the Navy was short 536
helicopter pilots, or 17 percent of its helicopter
pilot requirements. In the case of propeller aircraft, the Navy
was short 311 pilots, or 17 percent of its propeller aircraft
pilot requirements. In the jet community, the Navy was short 216
pilots, representing about 10 percent of its jet pilot
requirements. As in the Air Force, nonoperational positions will
continue to be most affected by the shortages. Basis for Pilot
Although the Air Force and the Navy are reporting shortages and
predicting Requirements Has Not a continuation of those shortages,
the services have not comprehensively
assessed whether all of their required positions need to be filled
with active Been Clearly duty military pilots. Currently, the Air
Force's nonflying positions represent Established or slightly more
than 20 percent of its total pilot requirements and the Navy's
Documented
nonflying positions represent 22 percent of its pilot inventory.
These figures lack precision, however, because this type of
breakdown does not capture the extent to which the flying and
nonflying positions carry an associated operational or combat-
related function as opposed to a nonoperational or support
function. Disparate databases do not permit these services to
uniformly report data on their pilot requirements and inventories
nor do they enable the services to identify any imbalances in the
various types of positions. In addition, job descriptions do not
clearly explain why positions require active duty military pilots.
If some positions could be filled with other personnel such as
navigators, warrant officers, retired military personnel, DOD
civilians, contractors or reservists with the required aviation
expertise active duty pilot requirements, and thereby shortages,
could be reduced. It is also possible that aviation expertise,
while desirable, might not be absolutely necessary for some
positions.
Predictions about future shortages must also be viewed within the
limitations under which such predictions are made. Historically,
pilot shortages have been recurrent and difficult to predict. For
example, the Air
Force revised its projections in April 1999 and is now projecting
355 fewer shortages than were projected at the end of fiscal year
1998. Several Factors Are GAO has identified three factors that
are contributing to the services' Contributing to reported
shortages. First, the Air Force and the Navy reduced the number of
pilots they recruited during the reductions in force during the
1990s to Reported Shortages avoid the involuntary separation of
pilots already in the force. This decision unintentionally
contributed to an insufficient number of pilots to fill the
overall current pilot requirements. Consequently, certain year
groups are atypically small and current aviation personnel
managers are challenged to find ways to fill requirements as this
population matures through the
workforce. The Air Force, for example, reduced active duty pilot
accessions from more than 1,500 in fiscal year 1990 to
approximately 500 annually during fiscal years 1994 to 1996.
Recognizing that it needed to increase accessions, the Air Force
has steadily increased its pilot production since that time. In
fiscal year 1990, the Navy accessed
1,039 pilots; in fiscal year 1994 the Navy accessed only 471
pilots but has increased accessions since then. Second, the Navy
and the Marine Corps, which share the same pilot training
facility, have experienced training delays due to problems in
coordinating training phases, a lack of spare parts, and other
factors. As a result, pilots have been delayed in reporting to
their first operational assignments by as many as 40 weeks. The
delays have left entry- level positions empty, and the requirement
for new ensigns and lieutenants is going unmet. Finally, pilots
state that factors, such as a good job market, are making a
career in private industry more attractive. Civilian airlines are
experiencing an increased demand for pilots, and projections show
this demand for experienced military pilots will likely continue.
The airlines can ultimately pay greater salaries with less
stringent schedules than the services. According to the Air Force,
a pilot who currently leaves the military with
16 years of service is typically earning a regular military
compensation of
about $78,000 a year, or more, depending on the location. 2
Although it will take the pilot more than 5 years to earn a
comparable salary, since newly hired pilots start at the bottom in
private industry, that same pilot could potentially earn as much
as $160,000 a year before retiring at age 60.
Pilots' Concerns Are The services have conducted studies of
personnel matters during the past
Contributing to Low few years. While not all of the results are
projectable to the entire pilot population, they did identify
sources of frustration for military pilots. In Retention addition,
GAO administered questionnaires to more than 180 pilots in the Air
Force and in the Navy from several different aviation career
specialties. Although GAO also cannot project to the universe of
pilots from this limited number, the responses were similar to the
factors the services have identified in their studies. DOD surveys
show that along with other military
personnel, pilots are concerned about retirement and health care
benefits, the high pace of operations, inadequate spare parts and
equipment to effectively do their jobs, and dissatisfaction with
leadership that, in their view, too easily accepts unacceptable
demands on service personnel. However, certain concerns are
specific to pilots. For example, a number of pilots raised
concerns about the lack of opportunities for career development
and promotions. While some pilots expressed concerns about the
reduced opportunities for pilots to seek nonflying positions to
broaden their experience and prepare for greater responsibilities,
others expressed their desire to spend their careers exclusively
in the cockpit.
Pilots also raised concerns about the ineffectiveness of the
current retention bonus system that stops after 14 years of
aviation service. Many pilots did not view the current bonus
system as a viable retention tool. In fact, a pilot's decision to
accept a bonus no longer provides the services with the assurance
that the pilot will stay in the military until the pilot is
eligible to retire at 20 years of service. The Air Force, for
example, has seen increasing numbers of pilots resign after 14
years of service during the past 4 years. A chief complaint voiced
by pilots is that the ACP eligibility dates are based on outdated
assumptions. While it was previously assumed that pilots would
stay until retirement once they reached 14 years of service, some
pilots told us that they now see the end of the bonus payment at
year 14 as a cut in pay and are more likely to leave their
military service rather 2 In computing a pilot's regular military
compensation, the Air Force includes basic pay, basic allowance
for subsistence (nontaxed), basic allowance for housing (also
nontaxed), and the equivalent of the tax advantage that is derived
from these last two categories.
than stay. DOD has developed a proposal that would authorize the
services to continue bonus payments through a pilot's 25 th year
of aviation service. Provisions substantially similar to the DOD
proposal are contained in pending legislation. The proposed
legislation, if approved, will give the services the flexibility
to implement their new bonus programs in a manner that will
address the pilots' concerns. The Navy has already developed a
model to offer bonuses to pilots at key career decision points
throughout their careers in order to be a true bonus rather than
an entitlement. However, GAO believes that the services might be
able to phase out the
bonus earlier than a pilot's 25 th year of aviation service since
pilots are rarely in the cockpit at that point in their careers.
Recommendations GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the services to take the following actions:
Develop criteria and detailed job descriptions for designating
positions to be filled with pilots, classify the positions
according to their operational and flying status, and specify the
types of duties that make pilots essential. Moreover, for jobs
that are held for pilots based on reasons of career development
and rotation, descriptions should contain a clear justification.
Using the newly developed criteria, analyze each pilot position
to identify those positions where active duty pilots are not
required and take the necessary actions to fill those positions
with other personnel possessing appropriate expertise, such as
warrant officers, retired military, contractors, DOD civilians,
reservists, or navigators. Revise their databases so that the
services can (1) uniformly report data on future pilot
requirements and inventories and (2) identify any
imbalances in their operational and nonoperational flying and
nonflying positions. To the extent that shortages exist after
these recommendations are implemented, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the services to take the following
actions:
More fully evaluate the merits of a fly- only career path for a
segment of the pilot community. In the short term, identify those
pilots desiring additional flying duty and match them to this
extra duty to the extent possible. If the pending legislation to
extend the ACP is enacted, only offer the bonus to those pilots
who make affirmative decisions to continue their
career rather than to all pilots reaching specified gates. This
would preclude the bonus program from being interpreted as an
entitlement. Agency Comments and
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially
agreed with GAO's Evaluation four of GAO's five recommendations,
but stated that GAO's executive summary did not represent the sum
and substance of the report as a whole in that it did not reflect
the positive steps DOD had taken to address pilot issues. DOD also
commented that GAO's recommendations were actually
refinements to DOD's own initiatives. GAO added information to its
executive summary to acknowledge DOD's actions and to better
explain how GAO's recommended actions differ from ongoing efforts.
In disagreeing with GAO's fifth recommendation about the proposed
bonus system DOD said that its current bonus systems are tied
precisely to key career decision points and do not occur at
arbitrary points in time, as GAO had originally suggested. GAO
agrees that arbitrary is not a fair characterization of these
points in time and has deleted this reference. GAO has revised its
recommendation to better reflect its intent that the
bonus system be offered to pilots as a reward for affirmative
career decisions rather than being interpreted as an entitlement.
In addition, GAO has clarified its report to emphasize that some
assumptions about the success of bonuses in encouraging pilots to
stay until retirement may be outdated and should be revisited.
In partially agreeing with GAO's other recommendations, DOD
outlined existing and ongoing activities that it believes satisfy
the intent of GAO's recommendations. Although DOD has taken
positive steps to address pilot issues, GAO believes that DOD
needs to build on these steps by establishing criteria for
designating positions for pilots and identifying specific
positions where active duty pilots are not needed. These actions
would enable DOD to more systematically identify how positions
could be filled with other personnel. DOD also suggested several
technical changes to the draft, which we have incorporated where
appropriate. DOD's comments are presented in their entirety in
appendix II.
Letter 1 Executive Summary 2 Chapter 1
Requirements Include Flying and Nonflying Positions 16
Introduction
The Services Use Special Pays to Retain Their Pilots 18
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 20
Chapter 2 The Services Report That They Can Fill Their Operational
The Air Force and the Requirements 23
Current and Predicted Pilot Shortages 24 Navy Are Reporting the
Pilot Shortages Are Recurrent and Difficult to Predict 29 Greatest
Pilot Shortages
Chapter 3 The Services Reserve Nonflying Positions for Pilots for
a
Opportunities May Number of Reasons 31 Job Descriptions for
Nonflying Positions Do Not Fully
Exist to Reassess and Explain the Requirement for Pilots 32 Better
Document Pilot
Personnel Other Than Active Duty Pilots Might Be Able to
Requirements
Fill Some Requirements 32 Current Reporting of Flying and
Nonflying Positions Has
Limited Utility 34 Chapter 4
The Air Force and the Navy Reduced Pilot Accessions in the Several
Factors Are
1990s 39 The Navy and the Marine Corps Have Experienced
Significant Contributing to Delays in Their Training Pipelines 42
Reported Pilot Today's Economy Provides Pilots With Civilian Job
Opportunities 44 Shortages
Chapter 5 Indicators Show a Retention Problem 48
Pilot Concerns Are Surveys Show Consistent Areas of
Dissatisfaction 49 Contributing to Low Retention
Chapter 6 Conclusions 57
Conclusions and Recommendations 60
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 61 Recommendations
Appendixes Appendix I: Pilot Retention Measurements 64 Appendix
II: Comments From the Department of Defense 68 Appendix III: GAO
Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 72
Tables Table 1.1: ACP by Service (fiscal year 1999) 20 Table 2.1:
Key Projected Air Force Pilot Shortages, Fiscal Year 2007 26
Table 2.2: Key Navy Pilot Shortages, Fiscal Year 1998 26 Figures
Figure 2.1: U. S. Air Force Pilot Requirements Versus Inventory,
Fiscal Years 1992- 2009 25
Figure 2.2: U. S. Navy Pilot Requirements Versus Inventory, Fiscal
Years 1992- 2009 a 28 Figure 3.1: Distribution of Inventory of
Navy Pilots by Category, as of April 1999 36 Figure 3.2: Navy
Pilot Positions and Inventories 37 Figure 4.1: U. S. Air Force
Pilot Goals and Accessions, Fiscal Years
1988- 2004 40 Figure 4.2: U. S. Navy Pilot Goals and Accessions,
Fiscal Years
1988- 2005 41 Figure 4.3: Naval Undergraduate Pilot Training
Pipeline 43 Figure I. 1: Navy and Air Force Cumulative
Continuation Rates,
Fiscal Years 1989- 98 65 Figure I. 2: Navy and Air Force Pilot ACP
Take- Rates, Fiscal Years
1989- 98 67
Abbreviations
ACIP aviation career incentive pay ACP aviation continuation pay
AIR, Inc. Aviation Information Resources, Incorporated ALPA Air
Line Pilots Association DOD Department of Defense UPAS Universal
Pilot Application Service
Chapt 1 er Introduction Military pilots serve in both flying and
nonflying positions, and the services take several factors into
account when they establish their pilot requirements. It takes
several years and millions of dollars to produce pilots who are
fully trained to serve in operational units. Due to the high costs
associated with each loss of a pilot from the military, the
services rely on incentive pays to retain their qualified pilots.
Requirements Include
At the end of fiscal year 1998, the Department of Defense (DOD)
reported that it had about 28,000 active duty commissioned and
warrant officer Flying and Nonflying
pilots. 1 These included approximately 13,300 pilots in the Air
Force, Positions
6,600 pilots in the Navy, 4, 800 warrant officer pilots in the
Army, and 3,300 pilots in the Marine Corps. The Army is the only
service that uses warrant officers. 2 The services include cockpit
and nonflying positions when they determine
their pilot requirements and take several factors into account. To
determine the number of pilots they need to fill their operational
cockpits, the services follow Defense guidance that defines the
missions upon which they are to establish their operational
requirements. From this guidance, the services calculate the
structure of their squadrons and the number of crews for each
aircraft by considering such things as the frequency and duration
of sorties, time to repair aircraft and conduct routine
maintenance, and crew rest time. The services also consider the
number of additional pilots they need to support the squadron
missions. These latter pilot requirements include positions such
as squadron commanders, operations officers, squadron instructors,
and safety officers. Requirements for a given combat aircraft are
fairly consistent; however, cockpit requirements for support
aircraft will vary for specific types of aircraft, depending on
their mission. For example, an Air Force C- 9 aircraft used for
medical evacuations within the Atlantic Command has a crew- seat
ratio of three pilots per seat, whereas the same aircraft used for
transporting personnel within the same command has a crew- seat
ratio of 1 This figure does not include pilots beyond paygrade O-
5. It also does not include student pilots who are in basic flight
training and have not earned their wings. 2 Army warrant officers
usually enter the service as enlisted personnel and are selected,
based on their superior performance, to serve as specialists in
the warrant officer community. In some cases, personnel will join
the service and immediately enter the warrant officer program.
Warrant and commissioned officers follow separate career paths and
are subject to separate pay scales. Warrant officer pilots
typically fly throughout their careers.
two pilots per seat. Air Force officials indicated that the pilot
requirement for the medical evacuation aircraft is greater to
enable the aircraft to operate around the clock in a combat
environment. The total number of pilots needed to fill the
cockpits is determined by multiplying the crew- seat ratio by the
number of seats in the cockpit (which in the case of the C- 9 is
two). Therefore, each aircraft used for medical evacuations
requires six pilots, and each aircraft used to transport personnel
requires four pilots. This figure is then multiplied by the number
of aircraft required to carry out a particular mission. For
example, if 10 C- 9 aircraft are needed for medical evacuations,
the Air Force will have a requirement for 60 pilots. If 10
aircraft are needed to transport personnel, the Air Force will
have a requirement for 40 pilots to operate the same number of
aircraft.
Air Force C- 130 aircraft used for search and rescue or electronic
jamming have a crew- seat ratio of two pilots per seat. The C- 130
aircraft has two cockpit pilot positions. Therefore, the total
pilot requirement is four. If
10 C- 130 aircraft are required to carry out search and rescue
missions, the Air Force will have a requirement for 40 pilots.
Alternatively, C- 130 aircraft used in special operations have
crew- seat ratios of 1.5 pilots per seat, reducing the pilot
requirement for each aircraft to three. According to Air
Force officials, the primary reason for the difference in the
crew- seat ratios for these C- 130 aircraft is the expected lower
number of hours that the aircraft will be used each day. If 10 C-
130 aircraft are required to carry out special operations, the Air
Force will have a requirement for 30 pilots. In contrast, crew-
seat ratios for Air Force fighter aircraft do not show this
variance because their missions do not change. For example, Air
Force data for fiscal years 1997 through 2004 show a constant
crew- seat ratio of 1.25 for F- 15 and F- 16 aircraft.
After the services determine their operational cockpit positions,
they consider a number of other factors to determine their
remaining requirements. These factors, which are not as
quantitative as those that are used to determine operational
cockpit requirements, include requirements to send pilots to
operational staffs, joint duty assignments, assignments to the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, staff positions for career
enhancement, and pilot instructor positions. These requirements
are added to the number of pilots required to meet operational
flying missions. The services anticipate that a certain percentage
of their pilots will not be available for assignment at any given
point in time due to factors such as education and training,
medical conditions, and transfers between
assignments, and adjust their total pilot requirements upward
accordingly. Currently, the Air Force uses a factor of 12 percent
and the Navy uses a factor of 10 percent.
The Services Use Under ideal conditions, it takes DOD
approximately 1 to 2 years, Special Pays to Retain depending on
the type of aircraft, to produce a fully trained, operational
pilot. All military pilots, whether they will fly fixed- or
rotary- wing aircraft, Their Pilots
receive about 1 to 2 years of undergraduate pilot training. After
completing their undergraduate pilot training and receiving their
wings, graduates in all of the services then receive additional
advanced specialized aircraft training before they are assigned to
an operational unit. The cost of a pilot's training and flying
experience varies depending on the
type of aircraft. According to DOD, the cost to train each
military pilot through basic flight training is about $1 million,
and the cost to fully train a pilot with the requisite operational
experience can be more than $9 million. In exchange for their
expensive training, each pilot incurs a commitment to serve an
additional 6 to 8 years of aviation service following pilot
training. 3 For example, the Air Force estimates a training cost
of slightly more than $1 million to get an F- 15 pilot through
initial training and another $2 million through flight lead/
aircraft commander qualifications. For an F- 15 pilot separating
at the end of the 8- year service obligation, the Air Force
estimates that it will forfeit an investment of about $8 million.
These figures include those costs associated with operating and
maintaining the pilot training commands as well as those costs
associated with operating and maintaining the aircraft used for
training purposes in the operational squadrons. The figures also
include the pay and allowances for command, staff, and support
personnel at the training commands, but do not include the pay and
allowances of the pilots in training. The Army estimates that it
has invested about $2 million by the time an Apache helicopter
pilot completes the service obligation. In view of the investment
in training its pilots, the services currently rely on a system of
special pays to promote retention and avoid the cost of replacing
pilots who leave. Upon entering basic flight training, each new
pilot currently begins to receive aviation career incentive pay
(ACIP), 3 The Air Force will raise the commitment to 10 years
beginning in fiscal year 2000. Pilots can also incur other
obligations to serve in the military at various points in their
military careers, usually for shorter
periods of time, for such things as accepting orders to new
assignments or attending particular schools.
commonly referred to as flight pay. The ACIP, which was designed
to attract and retain officers in a military aviation career,
starts at $125 a month for up to 2 years of service and rises over
the years to $840 a month for a pilot with 15 to 23 years of
aviation service. For the period of service after 22 years, the
amount gradually decreases until it reaches $250 a month after 25
years of service. Once pilots complete their initial aviation
commitment, the services are
authorized to offer bonuses, called aviation continuation pay
(ACP), to encourage them to continue in their military career
beyond the initial aviation obligation. The services have offered
this incentive even in those cases where pilots have already
incurred an additional obligation to serve the military for a few
more years. 4 Current law 5 authorizes the services to pay ACP
bonuses of up to $25,000 per year to aviators for each additional
year of commitment if they have completed between 6 and 13 years
of aviation service and agree to remain on active duty to complete
14 years of aviation service. Currently, the Air Force offers
$22,000 per year to all pilots with the required years of aviation
service who sign a commitment to stay in the service 5 additional
years and smaller dollar amounts to those who sign a commitment
for 1, 2, or 3 years. The Marine Corps offers $12,000 a year to
pilots in targeted aircraft specialties where the shortages are
critical. The Navy targeted its ACP bonuses to critically short
pilot communities in the past but is now offering a flat 2- year
bonus of
$12,000 per year to all eligible pilots. The Army began offering aviation continuation pay for the first time in fiscal year 1999. Currently, the Army is offering $12,000 a year to Apache helicopter pilots. Table 1.1 presents the fiscal year 1999 ACP program by service. 4 We previously reported on the ACP bonus in our report entitled Aviation Continuation Pay: Some Bonuses Are Inappropriate Because of Prior Service Obligations (
GAO/NSIAD-95-30
, Oct. 14, 1994).
$12,000 per year to all eligible pilots. The Army began offering
aviation continuation pay for the first time in fiscal year 1999.
Currently, the Army is offering $12,000 a year to Apache
helicopter pilots. Table 1.1 presents the fiscal year 1999 ACP
program by service. 4 We previously reported on the ACP bonus in
our report entitled Aviation Continuation Pay: Some Bonuses Are
Inappropriate Because of Prior Service Obligations ( GAO/NSIAD-
95-30 , Oct. 14, 1994).
5 37 U. S. C. 301b.
Table 1. 1: ACP by Service (fiscal year 1999) Annual Service
payment Duration Eligibility
Air Force $22, 000 Long term a All eligible pilots $12, 000 3
years
$9, 000 2 years $6, 000 1 year Navy $12, 000 2 years All eligible
pilots and naval flight officers Marine Long term Pilots and naval
flight officers in critically Corps $12, 000 short aircraft
specialties
Army $12, 000 Long term Apache pilots a Long term is defined as an
agreement to stay through 14 years of aviation service.
Source: GAO from service data.
Military pilots, whether assigned to flying or nonflying
positions, are eligible to receive both ACIP and ACP, provided
they meet the other eligibility criteria. Objectives, Scope, and
In response to concerns of the Chairman and former Ranking
Minority Methodology
Member, Subcommittee on Military Personnel, House Committee on
Armed Services, about the potential impact of pilot shortages, we
reviewed and identified reasons for the pilot shortages and
solutions to alleviate the shortages. Specifically, we determined
(1) the services' reported and projected estimates of their pilot
shortages, (2) the basis for the services' pilot requirements, (3)
key factors that account for the reported pilot shortages, and (4)
concerns that are causing pilots to consider leaving the
military. To determine the extent of projected pilot shortages, we
gathered data on pilot shortages from each of the services. We
also gathered data on past shortages so that we could identify
trends and place an historical
perspective on the projected shortages. We concentrated on Air
Force and Navy data when we conducted our analyses because these
two services are reporting the greatest number of pilot shortages.
Furthermore, we limited our scope to active duty pilots.
To determine the basis for pilot requirements, we documented the
procedures used in determining requirements and what process the
services follow to validate these requirements. In pursuing this
objective,
we discussed methodologies with officials from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the military services. We gathered data
on Air Force and Navy flying and nonflying pilot requirements and
worked closely with service officials to resolve discrepancies
that appeared in different data sets that the services provided to
us. In addition, we conducted our own
analysis to categorize the flying and nonflying pilot positions
according to whether they were operational or nonoperational. Our
definition of operational positions, whether flying or nonflying,
included those positions that exist primarily for conducting and
supporting combat activity. Our definition of nonoperational
positions included those positions that exist primarily to carry
out support activities, training functions, and other noncombat
related activities. We also reviewed 275 Air Force justifications
for positions to be filled by active duty military pilots.
To identify factors contributing to reported shortages, we met
with officials in each of the services to gain their perspectives
on factors contributing to pilot shortages. In addition, we
reviewed past retention studies conducted by the Congressional
Research Service, the Congressional Budget Office, and private
research organizations including the Commonwealth Institute and
RAND. To analyze the reasons why pilots are leaving the service,
we reviewed quality- of- life surveys conducted by the Air Force
and the Navy. In addition, to corroborate the results of these
surveys, we administered our own questionnaire to more than 180
pilots in the Air Force and the Navy at
5 installations and conducted follow- on discussions with more
than 120 of the pilots who responded to our questionnaire. 6 We
selected the installations in order to talk to pilots in a number
of different specialties. These included Air Force fighter and
tactical airlift pilots and Navy helicopter pilots, jet pilots,
and propeller aircraft pilots. While we cannot project our results
to the universe of pilots from our limited number of
questionnaires, the responses we received were consistent with
existing studies, and the comments from the participants were
instructive.
To determine the extent to which job opportunities exist for
military pilots with the commercial airlines, we met with
representatives from private industry, including the Air Line
Pilots Association (ALPA) and the Universal Pilot Application
Service (UPAS) and gathered data from Aviation Information
Resources, Inc. (AIR, Inc.). 6 Some navigators were included in
these discussions.
To help us identify any lessons learned and possibilities for
solutions from foreign militaries, we conducted interviews with
defense officials from the German, British, and Australian
embassies in Washington, D. C., and the Canadian National Defense
Forces in Ottawa, Ontario. We also consulted the government
auditing agencies of Germany, Australia, Canada, and Britain.
We performed our work at the following locations: Directorate for
Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management, Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Washington, D. C.; Air Force
Personnel Center, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas; Naval Bureau of
Personnel, Arlington, Virginia; Headquarters, U. S. Air Force,
Arlington, Virginia; Headquarters, Marine Corps, Quantico,
Virginia; Davis- Monthan Air Force Base, Tucson, Arizona;
Langley AFB, Norfolk, Virginia; Naval Air Station, Cecil Field,
Florida; Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Florida; and
Naval Station, Mayport, Florida. We conducted our review between
July 1998 and June 1999 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
The Air Force and the Navy Are Reporting the
Chapt 2 er Greatest Pilot Shortages The services currently report
that no unit is deploying without 100 percent of its pilots, and
they believe that they will continue to be able to meet their
operational missions. The services have been able to meet their
operational commitments by sending senior pilots back to junior
positions and having pilots spend more time on deployments. In all
communities, therefore, the
shortages are occurring almost exclusively in nonoperational
positions. Currently, the Air Force and the Navy are reporting the
greatest number of pilot shortages, and within these two services,
the shortages are more apparent in some pilot specialties than in
others. The two services project that their pilot shortages in
nonflying positions will continue for the next several years, but
that they will continue to be able to fill their operational
cockpits. It is important to note, however, that shortages are
historically recurrent and the services are limited in their
ability to accurately project future pilot inventories. The
Services Report The services currently report that they are able
to fill their operational
That They Can Fill flying positions and that no unit is deploying
without 100 percent of its pilots. The services report that this
is at some cost, however, as they are Their Operational only able
to fill their flying positions by sending pilots back into the
cockpit Requirements
at higher ranks and having pilots spend more time on deployments.
As a result of these actions, the shortages are occurring
primarily in nonflying positions, and the services believe that
they will continue to be able to fill their operational flying
positions.
Air Force officials have made cockpit positions a staffing
priority, and they are making a concerted effort to fill these
positions before they fill their nonflying positions. The Air
Force is filling its cockpit positions by sending senior- graded
pilots back into the cockpit. Currently, approximately 3,100
pilots, or 54 percent of majors and lieutenant colonels, are
filling junior cockpit positions normally filled by lieutenants
and captains. Under ideal conditions, these pilots would be
assigned to career development assignments to prepare them for
future leadership positions. Generally, when a pilot reaches the
major and lieutenant colonel level, the pilot would serve in
positions such as squadron commander or operations officer. The
Chief of Naval Operations has set a goal that no unit will deploy
without 100 percent of its required pilots and the Navy has
reported that no operational cockpit is going empty. The Navy has
worked to fill its cockpits by extending the length of time that
first tour operational pilots
spend on sea tours from 36 to 42 months and by reducing the length
of time
a pilot spends in shore tours from 36 months to 30 months. To
accomplish this, the Navy is leaving some nonflying billets empty.
Current and Predicted
Despite being able to fill their operational positions, each of
the services is Pilot Shortages reporting pilot shortages, but to
varying degrees. At the end of fiscal year 1998, the Air Force
anticipated that its greatest shortages would occur in fiscal year
2007, while the Navy reported that its greatest shortages already
occurred in fiscal year 1998. The Army is only experiencing
significant shortages within its Apache helicopter pilot community
and believes it can address the shortages with management tools
already
available to it. The Marine Corps anticipates increasing shortages
of fixed- wing pilots until fiscal year 2005. As noted, all
services have given priority to filling their operational flying
positions, and as a result, shortages are occurring almost
exclusively in nonoperational positions. Air Force Shortages Will
At the end of fiscal year 1998, the Air Force reported that it had
a shortage Peak in Fiscal Year 2007
of 648 pilots, or 5 percent of its 13,986 pilot requirement. The
shortages were in the fighter and tactical airlift pilot
communities. The fighter pilot specialty had a requirement of
4,876 pilots, with a shortage of 499, or 10 percent of fighter
pilot requirements. Tactical airlift pilot requirements were
2,054, with a shortage of 113 pilots, or 6 percent of the tactical
airlift pilot requirements. At the end of fiscal year 1998, the
Air Force anticipated that its most critical shortages would occur
during fiscal years 2002 through 2007, when it projected shortages
of between 1,900 and 2,155 pilots, or between 14 and 16 percent of
its overall pilot requirements. Figure 2.1 displays the actual Air
Force's stated pilot requirements and its inventory for fiscal
years 1992
through 1998 and projected requirements and inventory for fiscal
years 1999 through 2009. The divergence between requirements and
the supply of pilots that begins in 1997 can be attributed in part
to the affects of reduced pilot accessions in the early 1990s.
This will be discussed in more
detail in chapter 4.
Figure 2.1: U. S. Air Force Pilot Requirements Versus Inventory,
Fiscal Years 1992- 2009
17, 500 17, 000 16, 500 16, 000 15, 500 15, 000 14, 500 14, 000
13, 500 13, 000 12, 500 12, 000 11, 500
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Requirements Inventory Note: Air Force
data include both flying and nonflying positions. Source: GAO from
fiscal year 1998 U. S. Air Force data.
The Air Force projected that its greatest shortage would occur in
fiscal year 2007, and would continue in the fighter and tactical
airlift communities; the Air Force also projected that shortages
will begin to emerge in bomber pilot communities, peaking in 2007.
The Air Force projected shortages of 15 percent of its tactical
airlift pilots, 17 percent of
its fighter pilots, and 28 percent of its bomber force pilot
requirements. Table 2.1 displays the key projected shortages for
Air Force pilots in fiscal year 2007.
Table 2. 1: Key Projected Air Force Pilot Shortages, Fiscal Year
2007 Shortage as a Projected
percentage of Aircraft type Requirement a force size Shortage
requirement
Tactical airlift 2, 015 1,704 311 15 Fighters 4, 715 3,895 820 17
Bombers 1, 049 755 294 28 a Includes both flying and nonflying
requirements. All aircraft types are not included.
Source: U. S. Air Force data from end of fiscal year 1998.
Navy Shortages Peaked in Navy data shows that its greatest
shortage of pilots was in fiscal year 1998. Fiscal Year 1998 The
Navy's shortage of 1,153 pilots, out of a requirement of 7,712
pilots, represented about 15 percent of its pilot requirements.
Navy data also show that the greatest number of shortages occurred
among those pilots who fly helicopters, followed by those who fly
propeller aircraft, and, finally, jets. As shown in table 2.2, in
fiscal year 1998, the Navy was short
10 percent of its requirements for jet pilots, 17 percent of its
helicopter pilot requirements, and 17 percent of its propeller
aircraft pilot requirements.
Table 2. 2: Key Navy Pilot Shortages, Fiscal Year 1998 Shortage as
a percentage of Aircraft type Requirement a Force size Shortage
requirement
Jets 2, 221 2, 005 216 10 Helicopters 3, 195 2, 659 536 17
Propeller aircraft 1, 845 1, 534 311 17 a Includes both flying and
nonflying requirements. All aircraft types are not included.
Source: U. S. Navy data.
Over the next 5 years, the Navy projected that, if actions it is
currently taking are successful, its pilot shortages will
dissipate, but not disappear.
The overall shortage of Navy pilots is projected to improve from
15 percent to 8 percent by fiscal year 2004. The Navy projected
that its propeller pilot community will be slightly healthier,
with a shortage of 213 pilots out of a requirement of 1,845
pilots. This shortage represents 12 percent of the Navy's
propeller pilot requirements, and shows an improvement from the
shortage of 17 percent that the Navy experienced in fiscal year
1998. The jet pilot community is projected to improve slightly,
from a shortage of 10 percent in fiscal year 1998 to 9 percent in
fiscal year 2004, representing a shortage of 189 pilots out of a
fiscal year 2004 jet pilot requirement of 2,211 pilots. Finally,
the helicopter community is projected to see the most improvement,
with its shortage declining from 17 percent in fiscal year 1998 to
5 percent in fiscal year 2004, when the Navy projects it will be
short 161 pilots out of a requirement for 3,307 helicopter pilots.
Figure 2.2
displays the Navy's pilot requirements and inventory for fiscal
years 1992 through 1998 and projected requirements and inventory
for fiscal years 1999 through 2009.
Figure 2.2: U. S. Navy Pilot Requirements Versus Inventory, Fiscal
Years 1992- 2009 a
9,500 9,000 8,500 8,000 7,500 7,000 6,500 6,000 5,500 5,000
1992 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
2006 2007 2008 2009 Requirements Inventory
a The Navy's data from fiscal year 1994 was incomplete and is not
included. Note: Navy data include both flying and nonflying
positions. Source: GAO from U. S. Navy data and projections as of
February 1999.
Army Shortages Are Limited According to Army data, in fiscal year
1998, the Army had an overall
to Apache Helicopter Pilots requirement of 4,745 warrant officer
pilots and an inventory of
4,799 warrant officer pilots, for a surplus of 54 warrant officer
pilots, or 1 percent. At the end of fiscal year 1998, the Army
reported a shortage of 106 pilots out of a requirement of 1, 059
pilots in its Apache helicopter pilot
force, or 10 percent. The Army projected that it would be able to
meet its future Apache helicopter pilot requirements by (1)
offering the ACP beginning in fiscal year 1999, (2) allowing
certain pilots who were not promoted to stay on active duty, and
(3) allowing others who left the service to return to active duty.
The Army did not foresee a shortage for the rest of its helicopter
fleet. 1
Marine Corps Fixed- wing The Marine Corps reported an overall
shortage of 406 pilots at the end of Pilot Shortages Will Peak in
fiscal year 1998, representing a shortage of about 11 percent of
its overall
Fiscal Year 2005 requirement of 3,676 pilots. The Marine Corps
reported shortages in its fixed- wing community with a shortage of
311 pilots out of a requirement of 1,452 pilots, or 21 percent of
requirements at the end of fiscal year 1998. The rotary- wing
community reported a shortage of 95 pilots out of a
requirement of 2,224 pilots, or about 4 percent of requirements.
The Marine Corps projected an increasing shortfall in the fixed-
wing community culminating in a shortage of 402 pilots, or 29
percent of its requirement for 1,411 fixed- wing pilots in fiscal
year 2005. Meanwhile, the rotary- wing community is predicted to
experience a surplus of 145 pilots, or 7 percent above the 2,033
helicopter pilot requirements, in fiscal year 2005. Pilot
Shortages Are
It is important to note that pilot shortages in general tend to be
recurrent. Recurrent and Difficult While the services undertake
efforts to control the cycles of gains and losses in the pilot
communities, the difficulties inherent in predicting the to
Predict behavior of individuals make these efforts particularly
challenging for personnel planners.
A previous GAO study shows that pilot shortages are not a new
phenomenon. In 1982, for example, we reported that the Navy
experienced or projected pilot shortages of between 10 and nearly
26 percent between fiscal years 1977 and 1983. 2 In that same
report, we also found that the Marine Corps experienced or
projected a pilot shortage of between 3 and 14 percent during the
same time frame. In addition, the Air Force 1 Unlike the other
services, the Army has relatively few fixed- wing aircraft. The
Army currently has 5, 005 rotary- wing aircraft and 276 fixed-
wing aircraft. 2 Millions Spent Needlessly in Navy and Marine
Corps' Aviation Bonus Program (GAO/FPCD-82-56, Aug. 9, 1982).
experienced pilot shortages in 7 of the fiscal years between
fiscal year 1988 and fiscal year 1997, ranging from a high of 9
percent in fiscal year 1989 to a low of slightly less than 1
percent in fiscal year 1992. Because of the difficulties inherent
in making predictions, DOD's ability to predict future inventories
is also limited. For example, in 1988, DOD
reported to Congress that the Air Force had a shortage of about
1,300 mid- grade pilots. DOD further predicted that by fiscal year
1994, the Air Force would be short 2,900 pilots. Instead of
experiencing this shortage, the Air Force had a surplus of 413
pilots, or about 3 percent of its requirements, in fiscal year
1994. Finally, mid- fiscal year 1999 figures demonstrate these
points. For example, the Air Force now projects, as of April 1999,
that its shortages will not reach their nadir until fiscal year
2008
and at that point will be about 1,800 rather than the 2,155 that
the Air Force projected just 6 months before.
Opportunities May Exist to Reassess and
Chapt 3 er Better Document Pilot Requirements The current and
projected shortages reported by the services must be viewed within
the context of how they determine and document their pilot
requirements. Pilot requirements are based on many other factors
in addition to the number of cockpits that must be filled. For
example, the services must reserve additional nonflying positions
to provide pilots with opportunities for career development and
relief from tours of duty where pilots are likely to be away from
home. However, we found that the services have not comprehensively
assessed all of the positions reserved for pilots to determine
whether they truly need to be filled with active duty military
pilots. If other military and civilian personnel who cost less and
take less time to train could fill some positions, the services
may be able to reduce their pilot requirements and thereby their
reported shortages. Moreover, improved classification of pilot
positions by their operational or nonoperational nature would help
the services decide which positions should be filled on a priority
basis in times of shortages and to better evaluate which positions
might be filled by personnel other than active
duty pilots. The Services Reserve As noted in chapter 1, the
services consider a number of factors in Nonflying Positions for
establishing their pilot requirements. As a result of their
requirements determination processes, a substantial number of
nonflying positions are Pilots for a Number of included in their
requirements. Accordingly, a number of nonflying
Reasons positions for pilots are needed to permit them to advance
in their careers and avoid excessive deployments away from home.
Pilots in the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps are
commissioned officers and, as such, they are required to fill
duties in addition to their flying responsibilities. The usual
career progression for pilots includes rotations through flying
and nonflying positions because the services view staff
assignments as essential to the development of officers who will
assume greater leadership responsibilities. In addition, other
opportunities for pilots to receive graduate school education or
training require them to be assigned to nonflying billets at
certain times in their careers. Nonflying positions also permit
pilots respites from deployment cycles and offer opportunities for
pilots to participate in community and family activities and
engage in academic pursuits. Such assignments allow pilots
intervals at home between deployments, which some officials
believe favorably affects retention. The Air Force's nonflying
positions currently represent slightly more than 20 percent of its
total pilot requirements, and the Air Force expects this to
remain relatively constant over the next several years. The Navy's
nonflying positions currently represent 22 percent of its pilot
inventory.
Job Descriptions for Job descriptions for nonflying positions do
not explain why the positions Nonflying Positions Do have to be
filled by active duty pilots. For example, the Air Force prepares
job descriptions to demonstrate why active duty pilots should fill
nonflying Not Fully Explain the
positions and provided us with a sample of pilot justifications
for 275 Air Requirement for Pilots Force Headquarters staff
positions. Pilots in these nonflying positions perform a range of
duties, including planning deployments, providing guidance for
developing cockpit avionics and displays, and evaluating
modernization proposals to existing and future aircraft. In these
job descriptions the Air Force demonstrated that particular work
centers require a mix of pilots and other personnel. However, the
justification for a specific number of pilots was not clear
because the job descriptions did not explain how these
designations or skill mixes were established. For
example, one job description called for a pilot with the rank of
major to serve in a policy and programs division within a test and
evaluation directorate. However, the job description also stated
that the work center consists of six aviators, six officers who
are not aviators, and two civilians. It did not demonstrate how
the mix of personnel was determined. While the Navy maintains
brief descriptions for its different positions, these descriptions
also do not clearly explain why these positions need to be filled
with active duty pilots. Personnel Other Than Several
opportunities exist to reduce current active duty pilot
requirements Active Duty Pilots and fill those positions with
other personnel. In 1997, we recommended that the services develop
criteria and review the duties of each nonflying Might Be Able to
Fill
position to identify those that could be filled by personnel other
than Some Requirements pilots. 1 We noted that such an assessment
could allow the services to reduce their pilot requirements. These
other personnel could include
warrant officers, retired military, contractors, DOD civilians,
reservists, or navigators and naval flight officers. During our
current review, we found that the Air Force has converted more
than 500 positions formerly reserved for aviators and is filling
them with other Air Force officers. The Air Force has also
examined its nonflying positions, established certain priorities,
1 DOD Aviator Positions: Training Requirements and Incentive Pay
Could Be Reduced (GAO/NSIAD-97-60, Feb. 19, 1997).
and made the decision to leave more than 1,000 positions reserved
for pilots unfilled. However, the Air Force has not formally
transferred the 1,000 empty positions to other communities and is
still carrying them as pilot requirements. We also found that the
Navy has left certain nonflying
positions unfilled and has not formally transferred its nonflying
positions to other communities. The Navy is currently predicting
an excess of naval flight officers beginning in fiscal year 2001,
increasing to a surplus of 344 naval flight officers by fiscal
year 2004. The Navy also reports that most of its nonflying
positions are interchangeable and can be filled by either pilots
or naval flight officers and that it takes less time and money to
train a naval flight officer than a pilot. This extra pool of
aviators created by the surplus of naval flight officers could be
used during pilot shortages to fill some of the nonflying
positions currently reserved for pilots. The Air Force also has a
surplus of navigators that could be used to fill nonflying
positions.
In addition, the Navy is exploring the possibility of filling a
few positions, such as hangar deck officers and fuels officers,
with limited duty officers 2 and chief warrant officers. The Navy
recently explored this issue in June 1999. The Navy has also
prioritized its general and unrestricted officer positions that do
not require flying or combat operations to determine how many
should be filled by air, surface, and submarine warfare officers.
However, since retention challenges exist in all warfare
communities, the Navy is reluctant to pass the aviator share of
these positions on to other communities. This continuing problem
reflects the importance of thoroughly reviewing whether civilians
or others could fill some positions.
The Air Force addressed the issue of how to best fill its
nonflying positions at a conference on April 13, 1999. One of the
recommendations coming out of this conference was to examine the
Air Force nonflying positions and identify alternatives to filling
them with pilots. Alternatives being considered include using
civilian contractors, reserve officers, and nonpilots and allowing
former active duty pilots to return to military service. Returning
former active duty military pilots to the cockpit is not entirely
new. Since 1995, the Air Force's recall program has resulted in
114 pilots being returned to active duty. The Army has instituted
a recall 2 Limited duty officers are former enlisted personnel
who, on the basis of their outstanding performance, compete to
become commissioned officers. They enjoy the same precedence and
exercise the same authority as unrestricted commissioned officers.
However, their promotion potential is limited to the Navy rank of
captain.
program for former active duty Army pilots. This voluntary recall
program has resulted in 111 pilots accepting, with nearly all now
on active duty. Similarly, the Navy has an active duty recall
program focusing on intermediate strike instructor pilots
associated with Naval reserve units. Through our work, we found
that the British Royal Air Force provides an example of aviator
requirements being reduced successfully. The Royal Air Force,
which has 3,714 pilots and navigators (of the equivalent of major
rank and below), is experiencing pilot shortages. After analyzing
1,230 ground- based aviator positions, the Royal Air Force
determined that 465 or 38 percent could either be transferred to
other branches or eliminated. This reduction in requirements was
the second major round of cuts for the Royal Air Force in recent
years. In the last round, more than 250 positions were removed or
transferred. In addition, the Royal Air Force reviewed
nonoperational flying positions and identified an additional
61 positions for removal or transfer. Each squadron was asked to
rate its aviator positions for aviator essentiality. Headquarters
personnel reviewed these justifications and returned questionable
justifications to the squadrons for confirmation. This difficult
process resulted in a dramatic cut in requirements. Royal Air
Force officials also told us, however, that their actions
increased the number of ground- based personnel needed to fill the
positions previously designated for aviators, and that it would
take
5 to 8 years to fully staff these positions with ground- based
personnel. We acknowledge that converting pilot positions will be
a long- term process and that it will take time for other
communities to absorb pilot requirements that may be transferred
to them. However, given the high costs and length of time
associated with training pilots, we continue to believe that
converting pilot requirements has merit. Current Reporting of The
services' reporting of data on flying and nonflying positions lack
Flying and Nonflying
precision because this type of breakdown does not capture the
extent to which these positions carry an associated operational or
primary military Positions Has Limited
function as opposed to a nonoperational or support function.
Without this Utility information, it is difficult to evaluate
which positions the services should fill on a priority basis and
whether some positions could be filled by other personnel during
times of shortages. Operational positions, whether flying or
nonflying, include those positions that exist primarily for
conducting combat activity. Positions that are operational and
flying would include cockpit positions that have a combat
mission. Positions that are operational but nonflying require a
pilot because of the pilot's aviation background, experience, or
warfare expertise; however, these positions do not require a pilot
to operate an aircraft in support of specific military operations.
Examples of positions that are operational and nonflying would
include catapult and arresting
gear officers on an aircraft carrier and joint staff officers who
develop operations plans. Pilots in nonoperational positions carry
out support activities, training functions, and other noncombat
related activities. Nonoperational positions that have a flying
aspect are designated for pilots who fly frequently in the
performance of their duties but do not have a direct combat
mission, such as flight instructors and test pilots.
Nonoperational positions that do not have a flying requirement are
designated for pilots based on the needs of the service to fill
officer billets. These positions may draw on the pilot's expertise
or they may be general enough for any officer to perform. These
positions would include positions such as accident investigators,
advisors to foreign militaries, military academy teachers, and
recruiters. We attempted to analyze the extent to which Air Force
and Navy pilots are
serving in positions that are flying, nonflying, operational, and
nonoperational. We concentrated on these two services when we
conducted our analyses because they are reporting the greatest
number of shortages. The Navy provided us with figures to
demonstrate its pilot distribution according to these categories.
According to mid- fiscal year 1999 data provided by the Navy, its
total pilot inventory was 5, 575. 3 About 3,200 of these pilots
were in operational positions. Of these, approximately 2,600
pilots were in operational positions that are flying and 600
pilots were in operational positions that are nonflying. The Navy
also had 2, 375 pilots in nonoperational positions. Of these,
1,750 pilots were in flying positions and 624 pilots were serving
in nonoperational billets that are nonflying. Figure 3.1 displays
the percentages of Navy pilots that fill these different types of
positions.
3 These figures exclude about 745 pilots who were categorized as
unavailable for duty because they were in transit between duty
stations, in training, on medical leave, or imprisoned.
Figure 3.1: Distribution of Inventory of Navy Pilots by Category,
as of April 1999
Nonflying/ operational 10% Nonflying/ nonoperational
11% Flying/ operational
47% Flying/ nonoperational
32% Source: GAO from U. S. Navy data.
Certainly, the justification is greatest for military pilots to
fill flying operational positions since this is what they have
been trained to do. The possibility exists that personnel other
than active duty military pilots could fill some of the flying
nonoperational and nonflying positions. Especially during a period
of critical pilot shortages, it is not clear why the Navy is
filling 624 positions that are both nonflying and nonoperational
with pilots. These 624 positions represent 55 percent of the
Navy's mid- fiscal year 1999
shortage of 1,130 pilots and provide the Navy with several
possibilities to fill some of these positions with personnel other
than active duty military pilots. This type of analysis is also
useful in that it can identify for the services the extent to
which they are filling their positions on a priority basis. For
example, Navy data show that the Navy is currently experiencing a
15- percent shortage in its flying operational positions, a 30-
percent shortage in its flying nonoperational positions, a 34-
percent shortage in its nonflying operational positions, and 16-
percent shortage in its nonflying
nonoperational positions. As previously noted, the Navy has been
able to fill its operational cockpits by extending some pilots on
deployments and
by sending senior pilots to positions formerly filled by more
junior service members. The Navy is meeting the nonflying levels
by using both pilots and naval flight officers. Figure 3.2 shows
the number of positions, by category, and the extent to which each
category is filled.
Figure 3.2: Navy Pilot Positions and Inventories
3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000
500 0
Flying/ Flying/
Nonflying/ Nonflying/
operational nonoperational
operational nonoperational
Positions 3,067 2,512 1,659 973 Inventory a 2,602 1,751 1,097 820
Shortage -465 -761 -562 -153
Shortage as a percent 15% 30% 34% 16%
of requirement a Nonflying/ operational and nonflying/
nonoperational inventories include both naval flight officers and
pilots. Source: GAO from U. S. Navy data.
The Air Force provided us with a breakdown of its flying and
nonflying positions but was unable to identify which of the
nonflying positions were
nonoperational. Currently, approximately 1,000, or 36 percent of
the Air Force's nonflying positions are vacant. These positions
are equivalent to 47 percent of the 2,155 pilot shortages that the
Air Force projects will occur in fiscal year 2007. Although it may
not be realistic to assume that the Air
Force could convert all 1,000 positions, they do provide the Air
Force with several opportunities to reevaluate its requirements
and fill some of these positions with personnel other than active
duty military pilots.
Several Factors Are Contributing to Reported Chapt 4 er Pilot
Shortages Several factors have contributed to the services
reported current and projected pilot shortages. First, the Air
Force and the Navy reduced their
new pilot entries (accessions) during the military downsizing that
began in the early 1990s. Because fewer pilots entered the force,
the services are now reporting shortages in relation to their
pilot requirements. In addition, the Navy and the Marine Corps
have experienced training delays that have resulted in pilots
reporting to the final phase of their training as many as 40 weeks
late. Furthermore, the current economy is providing military
pilots with job opportunities in private industry and pilots are
finding the pay and benefits associated with those job
opportunities attractive.
The Air Force and the During the military force reductions that
took place during this decade, the
Navy Reduced Pilot Air Force and the Navy significantly reduced
their pilot recruiting goals and actual new pilot accessions. One
of the intended purposes behind these
Accessions in the 1990s decisions was the desire to arrive at a
smaller force by taking in fewer new pilots instead of forcing
highly experienced and highly trained pilots already in the force
to leave the military. Although the decisions to reduce
accessions may have helped the services avoid involuntary
personnel separations, they have produced the unintended
consequences that the services are facing today. The services did
not foresee today's operating environment, which includes a high
level of military operations, a much smaller force, a sustained
good economy, and an expanding private airline
industry that provides military pilots with ample civilian job
opportunities. Consequently, these actions have produced
insufficient numbers of pilots to support current requirements,
which has contributed to the services' need to retain more pilots.
Certain year groups are atypically small, and current aviation
personnel managers are challenged to find ways to fill
requirements as this smaller pilot population matures through the
workforce. The Air Force, for example, reduced active duty pilot
accessions from more than 1,500 new pilots in fiscal year 1990 to
approximately 500 new pilots each year during fiscal years 1994
through1996. Recognizing that it needed to increase accessions,
the Air Force has steadily increased its pilot production since
that time. The service accessed approximately 900 new pilots in
fiscal year 1998 and expects to meet its capacity of 1, 100 new
pilot accessions by fiscal year 2000. The capacity to access
pilots beyond 1,100 is limited by the current number of training
facilities and training slots for
new, inexperienced pilots. Figure 4.1 shows Air Force pilot actual
accessions and goals for fiscal years 1988 through 1998 and
projected goals for fiscal years 1999 through 2004. The lack of a
gap between accessions
and goals during these fiscal years reflects the decision to lower
the accession goals during this time. Figure 4.1: U. S. Air Force
Pilot Goals and Accessions, Fiscal Years 1988- 2004
1,800 1,600 1,400 1,200 1,000
800 600 400 200
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
2001 2002 2003 2004
Actual Goal Source: GAO from U. S. Air Force data.
The Navy experienced a similar pattern. In fiscal year 1990, the
Navy accessed 1,039 student pilots; in fiscal year 1994, the Navy
accessed just 471 student pilots. In fiscal year 2000, the Navy
will access 728 new pilots and thereafter will access 878 student
pilots each year for the foreseeable future. Figure 4.2 shows Navy
pilot actual accessions and goals for fiscal
years 1988 through 1999 and projected goals for fiscal years 2000
through 2005.
Figure 4.2: U. S. Navy Pilot Goals and Accessions, Fiscal Years
1988- 2005
1,400 1,200 1,000
800 600 400 200
1998 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Actual Goal Source: GAO from U. S. Navy data.
The Navy and the In addition to problems with pilot accessions,
the Navy and the Marine Marine Corps Have Corps have experienced
significant delays in moving new trainees through their new pilot
training pipelines. In some cases, it has taken 40 weeks
Experienced
longer than expected to produce trained pilots. These delays have
further Significant Delays in contributed to the pilot shortages.
Fiscal year 1998 data show that there Their Training were about
600 new Navy student pilots still in training who should have
already reported to their first operational assignments. This
increase in Pipelines training time, coupled with the smaller
numbers of new pilots created by reduced accessions, has
exacerbated the shortfalls in both the Navy and the Marine Corps.
However, the Navy now has a working group to better integrate the
different phases of training to minimize delays and to identify
choke points.
For the most part, Navy and Marine Corps student pilots train
side- by- side, and all pilots must first complete naval
undergraduate pilot training, which is divided into several
segments, before they receive their initial qualifications, or
wings. These segments include aviation preflight indoctrination,
primary fixed- wing training, intermediate flight training, and
advanced flight training. Preflight indoctrination takes place in
a classroom setting. Primary fixed- wing training takes place in
fixed- wing trainer aircraft, regardless of the type of aircraft
the Navy or the Marine Corps aviator will ultimately fly.
Following the preflight indoctrination and
the primary fixed- wing training, the services decide what
aircraft the pilot will fly depending on the pilot's grades, the
desires of the pilot, and the needs of the service. The pilot in
training begins to specialize at this point in time and is
assigned to one of four tracks to receive the intermediate and
advanced flight training. These tracks are (1) jet aircraft, (2)
carrier propeller aircraft, (3) propeller aircraft, and (4)
helicopters. Upon successful completion of the advanced flight
training, pilots receive their wings. New pilots then proceed to a
fleet replacement squadron, at which point they receive
specialized training in a specific type of operational aircraft.
Depending on the type of aircraft, this specialized training will
take an additional 6 to 9 months. It is at this point in time that
a pilot is prepared to report to his or her first operational
squadron. At the completion of this 3- year operational tour, the
Navy and the Marine Corps consider the pilot to be seasoned.
Figure 4.3 displays the planned training pipeline from
commissioning through the completion of the first operational
assignment.
Figure 4.3: Naval Undergraduate Pilot Training Pipeline
Classroom Fixed- wing
Jet, prop, carrier prop Specialized
Squadron trainers
Jet or helicopter trainers aircraft Aviation
Primary Prop
Fleet preflight Pilot assigned
Intermediate fixedwing and
Wings replacement
1st tour
Seasoned
to aircraft advanced
= pilot
indoctrination training
Carrier squadron
prop flight training
Helo 6 weeks 5 months 6- 13 months
6- 9 months About 36 months Note: The Navy also adds in travel
times of roughly 2 weeks between each training segment. Source:
GAO from U. S. Navy and U. S. Marine Corps information.
Marine Corps pilots follow the same training track, with the
exception that they, like all other new Marine Corps officers, are
required to attend the Basic School at Marine Corps Base Quantico,
which lasts 26 weeks, prior to reporting to pilot training.
Data provided by the Navy in June 1999 illustrating current
training times from the beginning of pilot training through the
assignment to a fleet replacement squadron demonstrate the
magnitude of the training delays. For example, the planned time to
train for a jet pilot through the fleet replacement squadron is 30
months, but the actual time to train was
45 months, representing a delay of 15 months or approximately 65
weeks. In the case of propeller aircraft, the planned time to
train is 24 months, but the actual time to train was 30 months,
representing a delay of 6 months or approximately 26 weeks. In the
case of helicopters, the planned time to train is 24 months, but
the actual time to train was 28 months, representing a delay of 4
months or approximately 16 weeks. Data provided to us by the
Marine Corps, as of February 1999, demonstrate the delays pilots
in training have been experiencing even before they reported to
the fleet replacement squadron. For example, the planned time to
train a jet pilot through wings including the 26 weeks for Marine
Corps Basic School and 4 weeks for travel is 105 to 119 weeks,
depending on the
training aircraft used. However, the actual time to train was 145
to 153 weeks, or a delay of 32 to 41 weeks, depending on the type
of jet trainer used. In the case of propeller aircraft and
helicopters, the planned time to train to earn wings is 90 weeks,
and the actual time to train was 120 to
129 weeks, or a delay of 30 to 39 weeks. Navy officials attributed
these delays to several factors. For example, while the services
may have emphasized getting a student pilot through a particular
phase of the pilot training, these phases were not properly
coordinated, and backlogs occurred while student pilots waited to
report to the next segment. Additional problems have occurred at
the fleet replacement squadrons. Officials attributed many of the
delays during this phase of training to a lack of spare parts,
available aircraft for training, mechanical problems with some
trainer aircraft, and shortages in enlisted air crew. They
explained that the fleet replacement squadrons find themselves
competing with the operational squadrons for parts and aircraft,
and they have often been given lower priority.
The Navy has contracted with a private firm to help the Navy and
the Marine Corps to better align the different phases of training
in order to decrease the delays between segments and better
coordinate all areas of training. As a result, delays have come
down between 6 and 26 percent, depending on the community. Today's
Economy The potential for job prospects in private industry, the
allure of potentially
Provides Pilots With large salaries, and the appeal of private
airline retirement packages are currently providing military
pilots with attractive options. Commercial
Civilian Job airline hiring projections made by private industry
suggest that the current Opportunities demand for experienced
military pilots will likely continue. Projections of airline
hiring factor in an increased requirement for pilots caused by
growth in the regional and major airline industries and mandatory
airline pilot retirement at age 60. Any increases that result from
airline industry expansion or continuing favorable economic
conditions will further fuel the commercial airlines' need for
pilots. Military pilots possess skills that are readily
transferable to the airlines industry. They have received
extensive formal training in areas such as aircraft systems,
aerodynamics, air traffic control procedures, and meteorology.
Further, military pilots can be easily trained on the jet and/ or
heavy aircraft qualifications required by the airlines.
DOD closely monitors data produced by Aviation Information
Resources, Incorporated (AIR, Inc.), which studies various trends
within the commercial airline industry. Currently, this company is
projecting significant growth among the private airlines. In a
1998 job market analysis, AIR, Inc., reported that 57,019 pilots
were employed by the 14 major U. S. airlines in 1998 and projected
that 40, 000 new job openings to fly large jets would occur due to
industry growth, pilot attrition, and retirement by 2007. The AIR,
Inc., analysis also projected that the number of U. S. commercial
aircraft would grow from 7,334 aircraft in 1997 to 9,218 aircraft
by the year
2005. In terms of retirement, the analysis reported that many
pilots hired during a big hiring surge in the mid- 1960s are now
retiring. The analysis showed that there were more than 1,150
major airline pilot retirements in 1997 and projected that there
would be an additional 16,400 pilot retirements by 2007. For one
major airline alone, AIR, Inc., projected that 54 percent of that
company's pilots would retire between 1998 and 2008. Military
pilots find the potential for large salaries and lucrative
retirements attractive. Although initial private airline salaries
are low, they can grow significantly. AIR, Inc., reported in 1998
that the average annual pay for pilots in the first year of
employment in the 14 major airlines was $30,144. However, AIR,
Inc., also reported that this average salary could rise to
$161,052 for an airline captain who has more than 10 years of
employment in 1 of the 14 major airlines. (Of the 14 major
airlines, AIR, Inc., reported that the salary range for pilots in
the highest bracket is between $92,424 and $195,480.) In addition,
the airlines offer generous retirement packages. AIR, Inc.,
estimated that the value of a 30- year career with one of the
three largest major airlines for a pilot, hired at age 30, who
flies until age 60 and enjoys a normal retirement, is between $6.7
to $8. 0 million. (It is very unlikely that a military pilot could
fulfill a minimum military service obligation and a 30- year
career with a commercial airline. However, a military pilot may be
able to complete a 29- year career.) Military pilots also consider
the fact that airline salaries are driven totally by seniority
within a particular airline. Although increased experience within
the military, a private regional airline, or another major airline
might make a pilot more competitive for employment, this
additional experience
will have no bearing on the pilot's salary with the particular
airline. One consequence of this structure is that military pilots
experience a reduction in their pay before they start receiving
the larger salaries.
The following scenario illustrates this. According to the Air
Force, a typical military pilot with 10 years of experience who is
promoted at
normal rates currently receives an annual regular military
compensation 1 of about $57,000. When flight pay is added, the
salary grows to approximately $65,000. (This figure assumes that a
pilot has not accepted a retention bonus and also does not include
any local cost of living adjustments, which vary depending on
where a pilot is assigned.) In addition, a pilot with 10 years
experience is likely to be assigned to a nonflying position in the
military that will reduce his or her competitive
status in the airline industry. If that pilot decides to leave the
military and finds employment with 1 of the 14 major airlines,
that pilot will receive an average starting salary of about
$30,000, representing a salary reduction of about half of the
military compensation. However, this pilot is facing the potential
for greater pay and benefits. By the 6th year, that same pilot
will receive a private industry average salary of about $88, 000
and will have 6 years of contributions into a retirement plan,
increased retirement benefits, and increased seniority in the
airline. The pay alone will be approximately equivalent to the
salary the pilot would receive had he or she stayed in the
military. A typical salary for a military pilot with 16 years of
service is about $78,000. When flight pay is added in, the pay is
equivalent to approximately $88,000. The Air Force has calculated
that military pilots who ultimately leave the military to go to a
private airline lose a percentage of their lifetime earnings in
each additional year that they stay in the military. Several
factors account for this. First, the initial pay differential
increases as the military salary rises. Second, the number of
years in which a pilot can participate in a commercial airline
retirement plan decreases. Finally, military pilots will attain
seniority in the commercial airlines, and the associated larger
salaries, later in their careers. According to Air Force
calculations, the total career earnings of a pilot who enters the
military at age 22, leaves the military after 9 years, is hired by
a private airline, and then retires at age 60 is $4,368,460.
Conversely, the total career earnings of a pilot who enters the
military at age 22, accepts a retention bonus, retires at 20 years
of service, receives military retirement pay, is hired by private
industry, and then retires at the mandatory age of 60, is $4, 063,
472. According to Air
Force calculations, it will cost the military member almost $305,
000 to remain in the service until retirement. 1 In computing a
pilot's regular military compensation, the Air Force includes
basic pay, basic allowance for subsistence (nontaxed), basic
allowance for housing (also nontaxed), and the equivalent of the
tax advantage that is derived from these last two categories.
In addition to job opportunities and potentially more lucrative
pay and benefits packages, many pilots are attracted to private
industry by the promise of a better quality of life and a chance
to spend more time with their families. Military members often
work long hours and spend extended periods of time away from their
homes. Conversely, private industry
officials told us that many commercial pilots work no more than 15
days a month. Although these pilots may spend many of these nights
away, they will also spend the remainder of the month at home.
Private industry officials described a commercial pilot's job as
the best part- time job an individual could find.
There is, of course, a down side to joining private industry, and
one of the biggest problems is a lack of job security. In the
early 1990s, for example, the airline industry laid off
approximately 2,000 pilots. Because the airlines operate
exclusively under a seniority- based system that is company
specific, a commercial pilot with years of experience who leaves
one airline to join another will be hired at a entry- level
salary. Commercial pilots in mid- career can expect to experience
significant salary reductions should the airline industry face
future downturns.
Pilot Concerns Are Contributing to Low
Chapt 5 er Retention Air Force and Navy actions to reduce pilot
accessions during DOD's reductions in force and the training
delays in the Navy and the Marine Corps have produced reported
pilot shortages and are driving the need to retain more pilots in
the service. Furthermore, this need to retain additional pilots is
exacerbated by an increase in pilot resignations. The services
have conducted several studies over the past several years and
have identified frustrations that pilots state they are
experiencing in their military careers. We administered our own
questionnaire to more than 180 Air Force and Navy pilots at
several different installations and held small group discussions
with over 100 of these individuals. While we cannot project the
results of our own questionnaires to the pilot community as a
whole, our results were consistent with the findings that the
services have identified in their own surveys. The services have
taken certain actions to respond to these concerns. However,
opportunities exist for additional action. Indicators Show a In
general, the services are currently experiencing retention
problems in Retention Problem their pilot communities. DOD uses
several indicators to measure retention, including the cumulative
continuation rate, the ACP take- rate, and number of pilot
resignations. A full description of the cumulative continuation
rate and the ACP take- rate is in appendix I. Although the
indicators used by the services are limited in their predictive
value, these three indicators show that retention is currently an
issue in the Air Force and the Navy. For example, between fiscal
years 1997 and 1998, the Air Force's pilot cumulative continuation
rate declined from 71 percent to 46 percent. The Air Force bonus
take- rate for all of its contracts declined from a high of 81
percent in fiscal year 1994 to 42 percent in fiscal year 1998. The
number of Air Force pilot resignations increased from 498 in
fiscal year 1996 to 1,052 in the first 10 months of fiscal year
1998. Based on the same indicators, the Navy is also experiencing
a retention problem. The Navy's cumulative continuation rate
declined from 39 percent in fiscal year 1997 to 32 percent in
fiscal year 1998. The Navy's bonus take- rate for pilots declined
from 50 percent in fiscal year 1994 to
21 percent in fiscal year 1998. The number of pilot resignations
in the Navy actually decreased from 316 resignations in fiscal
year 1996 to 299 resignations in fiscal year 1997, but then
increased to 347 resignations in fiscal year 1998.
Surveys Show The Air Force and the Navy have conducted different
studies in recent Consistent Areas of years that have identified
reasons why pilots are leaving or are considering leaving the
service. While all of the results are not projectable to the
entire Dissatisfaction pilot population, the results of these
surveys show that along with other military specialties, pilots
are concerned about retirement and health care benefits and other
quality of life issues. In addition, there are areas of concern
that are particularly relevant to pilots, including the pace of
operations, limited spare parts and equipment, senior military and
civilian leadership, aviator retention bonuses, and promotion
opportunities and assignments. We administered our own
questionnaire to more than 180 pilots in the Air
Force and the Navy and conducted small group discussions with more
than 120 pilots who responded to our questionnaire at several
different Air Force and Navy bases. 1 Our questionnaire results
and discussions identified the same primary reasons for pilot
separations as disclosed by the Air Force and the Navy studies.
Examples of some DOD surveys we reviewed include an Air
Force- administered Careers and New Directions survey in 1996 of
random groups of personnel who intended to remain in the service
and of other groups of personnel who had established a date of
separation. Pilots were included in this survey. In 1997, the Air
Force also administered a quality of life survey to more than 200,
000 personnel. Again, this survey included pilots. In 1998, the
Air Force conducted phone interviews with pilots who did not take
a retention bonus. The Navy has also administered different
studies in recent years. These include an aviator retention study
conducted by a Navy aviator retention team in 1997, a retention
study conducted by the Navy's Atlantic Command in 1997, a
retention study conducted by the Pacific Command in 1998, and a
second 1998 retention study that was conducted by the Naval
Postgraduate School.
Concern About High Pace of According to the 1997 Air Force quality
of life survey administered to more Operations than 200, 000
personnel, one of the critical issues facing the Air Force
during the past several years has been the high level of
operations. Additionally, other studies have shown that Air Force
pilots who declined 1 Some navigators were included in these
discussions.
the retention bonus in fiscal years 1996 through 1998 cited the
pace of operations, additional duties, and family issues as
primary concerns. The Air Force reported that since 1995, there
has been a slow, but steady increase in the number of reported
temporary duty days and the number of hours worked by military
personnel. Other work that we have done supports this observation.
2 For example, the Air Force reported that since about 1989, the
average number of personnel deployed for operations other than war
has more than quadrupled, from about 3,400 personnel in 1989 to
about 14,600 personnel in 1997. We found that deployments are
concentrated in a small percentage of career fields and that 5
percent of Air Force active duty personnel accounted for 27
percent of the temporary duty assignments in fiscal year 1998.
Pilots, for example, comprised 4 percent of total active duty
personnel, but accounted for 9 percent of total temporary duty
assignments. In response to our questionnaire and small group
discussions, Air Force
pilots identified the frequency and length of deployments and lack
of clear mission objectives as their primary concerns. The Air
Force pilots we met expressed concerns specifically about the
frequency of deployments to Southwest Asia, the austere living
conditions, and the inability to train during those deployments.
They questioned the need for a sizeable, constant presence in that
area, and suggested that they would be better off training in U.
S. air space and deploying on an as- needed basis. They also
expressed concerns about the Air Force expeditionary force
initiative that, though intended to add more predictability to
pilot deployments, would result in an increase in the length of
Air Force deployments from 45 to
90 days. Navy pilots had a different expectation about the length
of deployments since naval deployments are typically 6 months in
length. However, Air Force and Navy pilots alike raised concerns
about the pace of operations between deployments. Several Navy
pilots told us that the schedule between deployments is often more
demanding than the deployments themselves. One pilot said that he
often gets more sleep and communicates with his wife more often
via e- mail while on deployment than he does when he is working
10- to 12- hour days between deployments. The services have taken
several actions to address these concerns. For example, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been working to 2
Military Operations: Impact of Operations Other Than War on the
Services Varies (GAO/NSIAD-99-69, May 24, 1999).
reduce the number of deployments and exercises. This includes a
15- percent reduction in joint exercises in fiscal year 1998 and
plans for an additional 5- percent reduction in service exercises
in fiscal years 1999 and 2000. The Navy has mandated a 25- percent
reduction in operational duties associated with the Inter-
Deployment Training Cycle. The Air Force
recently reduced Southwest Asia unit rotations from 90 to 45 days.
The Air Force is currently reorganizing itself into an
expeditionary force with the explicit intent of providing greater
stability and predictability in deployments and will increase the
length of deployments back to 90 days. Under this reorganization,
air crews and support teams will be assigned to 1 of 10
expeditionary forces, 2 of which would be on call for 1 90- day
deployment every 15 months. This reorganization is still in
development and is to be implemented on January 1, 2000.
Concerns About Pilots further expressed their concerns about
conducting their missions Constrained Resources with inadequate
resources. Navy pilots surveyed by the U. S. Atlantic Fleet in
1997 reported low job satisfaction due to a lack of flight time
and poor parts support. They complained about additional nonflying
demands and other exercise requirements and doing more with less.
The pilots in our
survey cited aging fleets, a lack of spare parts, and increased
demands on aircraft maintainers as sources of concern. Pilots in
both services told us that they only learn on a day- to- day basis
whether or not they will be able to fly on training missions due
to the limited number of operating aircraft in their squadrons.
These pilots expressed concerns that they are not maintaining
their requisite combat skills under these conditions. Other work
we have done in the Air Force has shown that this perceived
shortage of spare parts may be due more to deficiencies in
forecasting requirements, inventory management, repair problems,
and budgeting problems. 3 Nevertheless, the perception of the
pilots we interviewed was that spare
parts are not available to them and that aircraft mechanics spend
an inordinate amount of time inefficiently removing working parts
from one aircraft to repair another. In fact, when we asked pilots
to provide us with the single change that would encourage them to
stay in the military, one of the Navy pilots' top answers was a
fix for spare parts shortages. The pilots also expressed their
concerns for their enlisted mechanics, adding that it is difficult
for them to motivate their enlisted personnel in such a difficult
work environment. 3 Air Force Supply: Management Actions Create
Spare Parts Shortages and Operational Problems (GAO/ NSIAD/ AIMD-
99- 77, Apr. 29, 1999).
In response to these concerns, the Navy has added $4.2 billion to
spare parts and flying hour funding over 4 years to fully fund
flight hour programs, spare parts, and maintenance. In our work on
the Air Force flying hour program, we found that programmed hours
were not flown for a number of reasons, but that lack of funding
was not a cause for underflying
the program. 4 Concerns About Leadership On another theme related
to these issues, many pilots also expressed through discussions
and in responses to questionnaires their frustration with military
and civilian leadership above their immediate chain of command.
They perceived reluctance on the part of leadership to stand up
and say no to expanded work under decreasing budgets and reduced
manpower. They added that DOD needs to cut back on its commitments
to match the personnel reductions in the force, suggesting that
military and civilian leaders are holding pilots to new missions
within old structures. Concerns About the Bonus
Pilots also have voiced concern about compensation, including
retirement System and health care issues and particularly for
pilots the effectiveness of the bonus system. The Navy's Retention
Group found that pilots were frustrated by the erosion of
compensation and benefits. The Air Force's 1997 Quality of Life
survey indicated that pilots believe their pay and benefits were
not as good as those offered in the private sector. In a survey of
pilots conducted by the Navy's Atlantic Fleet Command in 1997,
pilots said that, while the bonus sweetens the pot for fence
sitters, it did not
affect the decision of many polled to stay in the service. Of the
80 bonus takers we interviewed, only 32, or 40 percent, told us
that they were very likely or definitely planning to stay in the
military after they completed their current obligation. All others
were undecided, somewhat unlikely, or very likely to leave the
military. The pilots we met with also raised concerns about the
inequities in the current bonus system and stated that it is not
working effectively for a
number of reasons. The bonus was developed in order to encourage
aviators to stay through their 14 th year of service. Until very
recently, most bonus recipients continued their military service
after their bonus payments terminated to retirement. Prior to
fiscal year 1995, the Air 4 Defense Budget: Observations on the
Air Force Flying Hour Program (GAO/NSIAD-99-165, July 8, 1999)
Force expected 93 percent of pilots who accepted a bonus
obligating them to stay in the military through their 14 th year
of aviation service to then go on and stay until they were
eligible to retire at 20 years. However, in fiscal year 1998, the
Air Force projected that only 25 percent of pilots who accepted a
bonus will stay until they are eligible to retire. In addition,
some
pilots we talked to complained about the perceived cut in pay that
occurs when a pilot reaches 14 years of aviation service and is no
longer eligible to receive bonus money. Air Force data confirms
this concern. DOD has reviewed the shortcomings in the current
bonus system including the fact that the 14- year cutoff date for
the ACP is no longer effective at retaining pilots and Congress is
considering legislation that would expand the authority of the
services to provide bonuses. DOD has developed a proposal that
addresses the concern about the 14- year cutoff date by allowing
the services to offer up to $25,000 a year to aviators through
their 25 th year of aviation service. It requires that the pilot
must have completed the minimum service requirement and signed an
agreement to serve at least 1 additional year in order to receive
the ACP. The DOD proposal does not, however, require the services
to identify a critical shortage in an aviation specialty in order
to offer the ACP. Moreover, although the proposal would authorize
the services to pay the
bonus through a pilot's 25 th year of aviation service, we believe
that paying the bonuses up to that point may be unnecessary since
pilots are rarely in the cockpit at that point in their careers.
Provisions substantially similar to DOD's proposal are included in
pending defense authorization legislation. The Navy has already
developed a model, called Aviation Career Continuation Pay, to
implement this new system. If the proposal becomes law, the Navy
plans to offer bonuses to individuals at major career decision
points rather than focusing on gates based on specific years of
service. The bonus would be offered to those, for example, who are
beginning a department- head tour or those who agree to take on an
additional tour of sea duty, and they would allow the Navy to
reward aviators who decide to make the Navy a career. This would
also make the ACP a true bonus, rather
than an entitlement. We believe that the outline of the Navy's
model addresses some of the pilot concerns about the current
system. Concerns About Career Pilots are also concerned about
career progression and promotion Progression opportunities.
Military pilots are normally required to serve in a variety of
positions in order to be promoted and to develop the necessary
leadership skills. In the ideal career path within the Air Force,
for example, lieutenants
fill cockpit positions to develop pilot proficiency and become
mission ready during their first tour assignments. Upon completing
this tour, pilots are normally promoted to the rank of captain and
report to their second assignment. The focus of this tour is to
increase the depth of their cockpit experience and to enable the
pilots to assume greater squadron responsibilities. Senior
captains report to a third assignment and begin
performing duties aimed at broadening their experience and
preparing them for increased leadership responsibilities. These
pilots will serve in positions such as weapons school instructors,
test pilots, and staff
assignments. These pilots also focus on professional and
educational development activities, which could include work on a
master's degree. Successful pilots can expect to be promoted to
the rank of major during this assignment. Subsequent assignments
at the major and lieutenant colonel level emphasize leadership
enhancement and career broadening assignments to include positions
as squadron commanders, operations officers, and joint duty
assignments. However, many pilots are now being asked to remain in
cockpit positions, rather than serving in career- enhancing
positions, and pilots we met raised concerns about the lack of
opportunity for career development and promotions. These pilots
have grown up in a military environment in which they have seen
separation incentives, 15- year retirements, and forced early
retirements after 20 years of service. They do not see the
military as a guaranteed job. Some Air Force pilots raised
concerns to us about being sent back to junior flying positions
and not getting assignments to the traditional military leadership
positions. These pilots believe that the personnel assignment and
promotion systems are no longer synchronized since they believe
they will be penalized for their nontraditional career paths. For
example, pilots in the Air Force perceive that promotion boards
still expect them to gain staff and education experiences to be
competitive for promotion. In addition, Navy officials are
concerned about pilots being promoted without the requisite career
developing experiences. While some pilots expressed their concerns
about the reduced opportunities for pilots to seek nonflying
opportunities to broaden their experience and prepare for greater
responsibilities, others expressed a
desire to spend their careers exclusively in the cockpit. Some of
the pilots we spoke with said that, in essence, the Air Force is
creating a fly- only path, and they suggested that the services do
this formally. The Navy pilots surveyed by the Atlantic Command
specifically expressed the desire to fly more, stating that they
joined the Navy to fly military aircraft. Similarly, over 60
percent of the pilots we questioned stated that the number one
reason they joined the service was for excitement and love of
flying. The Navy's Retention Team reported that two of the primary
comments from pilots concerned the increased workload and
collateral duties and the
pilots' desire to eliminate the current focus on secondary duties.
Pilots told us that they lose their edge in the cockpit when they
go to staff positions. They said these nonflying duties are an
incentive to leave the service as soon as they complete their
service obligation in order to join the airline industry while
they were still current in their flying skills. The Army's warrant
officer community offers an example of a fly- only career path
that works well. The warrant officers are brought from the
enlisted corps and are given helicopter flight training, but they
do not take on leadership positions. The aviation leadership
positions are reserved for a small corps of commissioned officer
pilots in the Army. The warrant officer pilots have a higher
retention rate than their commissioned officer counterparts in
other services. While the Air Force does not have a fly- only
career path, it is implementing a program that allows senior
pilots to volunteer to return to the cockpit. The purpose of this
program, called Phoenix Aviator 20, is to make it more attractive
for pilots to stay in the Air Force until they can retire at 20
years of service. It is designed to ease the transition at
retirement from a military to a commercial airline career. Among
the provisions, pilots who enroll in the program will, during
their last 3 years of service, be assigned a tour of duty that
guarantees them flying experience in order to keep their flight
credentials current. During this time, the Air Force will provide
financial
assistance for the military pilot to obtain his or her
certifications. In addition, the military pilot will be guaranteed
a job interview with private industry. The program is relatively
new, and slightly fewer than 400 military pilots have enrolled
during its first year.
In addition, we met with officials from the British Royal Air
Force who described their fly- only career path option called the
Specialist Aircrew. The Specialist Aircrew, which was introduced
in the early 1970s, is designed to be a retention measure. This
option is reserved for pilots who have been asked to remain in the
service, but reach the age of 38 without having been promoted to
the rank of major. At that point, a pilot can choose to become
part of the Specialist Aircrew and remain in the cockpit. The
Royal Air Force limits the size of the Specialist Aircrew, which
currently comprises nearly 25 percent of the Royal Air Force pilot
population. By becoming a member of the Specialist Aircrew, a
pilot agrees to stay in the Royal Air Force until age 55, is given
an enhanced rate of flying pay and is
promised a flying position for the duration of his or her career.
However, if a pilot is promoted to major before the age of 45,
that pilot has the option of going back into the traditional
career path. The Royal Air Force considers its Specialist Aircrew
pilots to be expert pilots. The Navy does not support the concept
of a fly- only career path because it views this option as
inconsistent with its current promotion and assignment systems.
The Air Force does not support this track because it believes that
the existence of this type of career path would take flying
opportunities away from pilots who remain on the leadership track.
Nevertheless, we found that the services are, at least on a
temporary basis, creating a fly- only career track by returning
many pilots to flying duties. As we previously stated, the Air
Force is currently sending 54 percent of its majors and lieutenant
colonels to fill junior cockpit positions normally filled by
lieutenants and captains, and the Navy has extended the time that
first tour operational pilots spend at sea from 36 to 42 months.
If the
services were to implement a fly- only career path, we believe
that they should put controls on it similar to the British model
such as limiting the number of personnel who go into this system
to an elite corps, limiting the promotion potential, and requiring
an extended obligation. In order to gain a better understanding of
why pilots are leaving the
military, DOD is currently conducting a comprehensive survey of
more than 60,000 active duty military members that will examine
the reasons servicemembers are leaving the military. DOD
anticipates that the results of this survey, which we plan to
analyze, will be available in calendar year 2000. 5 5 In addition,
we have other ongoing reviews requested by Congress related to
military personnel issues. These include a survey of
servicemembers in retention- critical specialties and an
historical examination of military retention rates.
Chapt 6 er Conclusions and Recommendations Conclusions The
services currently report that no unit is deploying without 100
percent of its pilots, and they believe that they will continue to
be able to meet their operational missions. Nevertheless, the Air
Force and the Navy, and to a lesser extent the Army and the Marine
Corps, are reporting pilot shortfalls, and they project that these
shortages will continue for several years. However, the full
extent of these reported shortages has not been identified because
neither the Air Force nor the Navy have comprehensively assessed
their nonflying positions to determine whether they truly need to
be filled with active duty military pilots. Opportunities may
exist to reduce pilot requirements and thereby reduce the reported
shortages. Shortages can pose significant challenges because each
pilot replacement costs DOD
millions of dollars in training costs and years of investment in
training time and experience. We believe that DOD needs to clearly
determine the magnitude of the shortages and understand the extent
to which the shortages are temporary or longer lasting before the
services implement wholesale and potentially costly changes to
their current aviator management systems.
An important first step is to determine whether or not pilot
requirements are valid. If an assessment determines that not all
positions now designated for pilots are needed to (1) meet
operational flying and support positions; (2) provide career
advancement opportunities; or (3) enable the pace of operations
for pilots to remain within acceptable limits, then pilot
requirements could be reduced. Exploring how some positions might
be filled by personnel other than active duty military pilots
offers the biggest payoff because this would make available more
active duty pilots to fill requirements in the cockpit. Moreover,
filling positions with personnel other than pilots can provide the
services with increased flexibility because these other
populations do not require as much time and money to train as
pilots require.
Both the Air Force and the Navy maintain requirements for pilots
to fill flying and nonflying positions and, to a certain degree,
have developed job descriptions for these positions. However, the
job descriptions do not clearly state why the positions have been
reserved for active duty pilots. Thus, we believe it is difficult
for anyone in the chain of command to validate the established
requirements. We further believe it would be beneficial for the
services to classify their pilot positions according to their
operational nature and include specific statements in the job
descriptions to show whether the positions are operational flying,
operational nonflying, nonoperational flying, or nonoperational
nonflying. Where positions are
designated to provide pilots with opportunities for career
development and relief from tours of duty where pilots are likely
to be away from home, this should be clearly noted. By revising
their databases to account for pilot positions according to their
flying and operational status, service officials could more
uniformly report shortages, more easily evaluate which positions
they must fill on a priority basis, and better assess whether some
positions could be filled by other personnel in times of
shortages. These personnel could include retired military
personnel, reservists, active duty military officers who are not
pilots, DOD civilians, and contractors. We also believe that it
would be beneficial for the services to reconstruct their
databases to reflect this type of analysis and capture the extent
to which their pilot requirements have an operational and flying
aspect. Doing so would enable all of the services to report future
pilot requirements and inventories in a uniform manner and
identify any future imbalances in their operational and
nonoperational flying and nonflying positions. An important second
step to clarifying the extent of shortages is to separate out
those contributing factors that are temporary in nature and are
not attributable to retention. Doing so will more accurately
identify the
degree and type of corrective action that is required. Some of the
reported shortages, for example, can be attributed to the fact
that the Air Force and the Navy reduced their accessions during
the reductions in force in the mid- 1990s to avoid the involuntary
separation of pilots already in the force. The unintended
consequence of the reduced accessions is that aviation personnel
managers are now challenged to find ways to fill current
requirements from year groups of pilots that are insufficient in
size to fill
those requirements. However, this condition will resolve itself as
this population matures through the workforce. Other shortages can
be attributed to the fact that two of the services have
experienced significant delays in their pilot training pipelines
that have left entry- level positions empty. Although these delays
create the illusion that additional shortages exist, this
condition will be resolved as the services reduce their training
delays. Finally, we believe that some of the reported shortages
can be defined in terms of retention, and DOD needs to understand
what pilots consider when they make their decisions to stay in or
leave the service. Although many of the pilots' concerns may be
shared by military members in other specialties and are not
unique, we identified two concerns that have particular relevance
to pilots.
One factor that clearly needs to be addressed is the pilot
assignment system. Currently, the Air Force is sending
approximately 3,100 majors and lieutenant colonels back to the
cockpit to fill positions normally filled by lieutenants and
captains, and the Navy has increased the length of time that first
tour operational pilots spend on sea tours from 36 months to 42
months. By increasing the time pilots serve in cockpit positions,
the services have taken pilots away from traditional career
tracks, which has led pilots to become concerned that they will
not be competitive for promotion within the military in the
future. Such concerns, if unaddressed, could fuel retention
problems. In contrast, other pilots are pleased to be able to
spend more time in the cockpit and have, in fact, expressed their
dissatisfaction with assignments that take them away from flying.
These disparate views about the merits of flying more suggest that
no single solution will address the concerns of all pilots and
that a variety of approaches may be needed. In light of these
disparate views and the
current stresses that are being placed on the personnel management
systems, it would be beneficial if the services could identify
pilots desiring additional flying duty and assign them according
to their preferences. In the longer term, the services might wish
to make this process more formal by establishing a fly- only
career path for a segment of their pilot communities. A second
factor that needs attention is the bonus system. Many pilots do
not view the current bonus system as a viable retention tool, and
a pilot's decision to accept a bonus no longer provides assurance
that the pilot will stay in the military until the pilot is
eligible to retire. The Air Force, for example, has seen
increasing numbers of pilots resign after 14 years of service
during the past 4 years. Chief complaints voiced by pilots are
that the ACP eligibility dates are based on outdated assumptions
and pilots see the end of the bonus payment at year 14 as a cut in
pay. These complaints are occurring at the same time that pilots
see potentially lucrative career opportunities in private
industry. DOD has reviewed the current bonus system and developed
a proposal to address the shortcomings. Congress is considering
legislation with provisions substantially similar to DOD's
proposal that would expand the
current bonus authority by allowing the services to offer up to
$25,000 per year to aviators through their 25 th year of aviation
service. Pilots could perceive this new program as an entitlement
if the program is not properly implemented. On the other hand, the
Navy has developed a model to implement the pending legislative
changes that we believe has merit. Under this plan, the Navy would
offer bonuses to individuals at major career
decision points and provide the Navy with the capability to reward
pilots who make an affirmative decision to make the Navy a career.
Doing so would make the ACP a true bonus rather than an
entitlement. DOD is currently conducting a comprehensive survey of
more than 60,000 active duty military members that will examine
the reasons servicemembers are leaving the military. DOD
anticipates that the results of this survey, which will be shared
with us, will be available sometime next year.
Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct
the services to take the following actions:
Develop criteria and detailed job descriptions for designating
positions to be filled with pilots, classify the positions
according to their operational and flying status, and specify the
types of duties that make pilots essential. Moreover, for jobs
that are held for pilots based on reasons of career development
and rotation, descriptions should contain a clear justification.
Using the newly developed criteria, analyze each pilot position
to identify those positions where active duty pilots are not
required and take the necessary actions to fill those positions
with other personnel possessing appropriate expertise, such as
warrant officers, retired military, contractors, DOD civilians,
reservists, or navigators. Revise their databases so that the
services can (1) uniformly report data on future pilot
requirements and inventories and (2) identify any
imbalances in their operational and nonoperational flying and
nonflying positions. To the extent that shortages exist after
these recommendations are implemented, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the services to take the following
actions:
More fully evaluate the merits of a fly- only career path for a
segment of the pilot community. In the short term, identify those
pilots desiring additional flying duty and match them to this
extra duty to the extent possible. If the pending legislation to
extend the ACP is enacted, only offer
bonuses to those pilots who make affirmative decisions to continue
their career rather than to all pilots reaching specified gates.
This would preclude the bonus program from being interpreted as an
entitlement.
Agency Comments and In written comments on a draft of this report,
DOD partially agreed with Our Evaluation
four of our five recommendations, disagreed with one
recommendation, and stated that our executive summary did not
represent the sum and substance of the report as a whole in that
it did not reflect the positive steps DOD had taken to address
pilot issues. DOD also commented that our recommendations were
actually refinements to the DOD's own initiatives. We have added
information to our executive summary to acknowledge DOD's actions
and to better explain how our recommendations differ from ongoing
efforts. With respect to developing criteria and detailed
justifications for pilot positions, DOD said that, while it
partially agreed with our
recommendation, it had long- standing procedures to review billet
requirements against operational mission requirements, including
pilot requirements. DOD further stated that these procedures
provide data sufficiently detailed and accurate to support
legislative language addressing a broad spectrum of pilot
initiatives. DOD noted that the services have procedures for
reviews of rated officer requirements. We note, however, that
despite these procedures the Air Force and the Navy
found it necessary to conduct special meetings in April and June
1999, respectively, to review their own requirements for pilots in
nonflying positions. In addition, while we agree that DOD has
procedures to review pilot requirements, the procedures do not
provide the criteria used to justify a pilot filling a particular
position. Our recommendation would have
DOD establish criteria and detailed job descriptions, classify the
positions according to their operational and flying status, and
specify the types of duties that make pilots essential. This would
enable the services to possibly reduce their pilot requirements
and enable them to better decide which positions should be filled
on a priority basis in times of shortages. DOD also partially
agreed with the intent of our recommendation to identify those
active duty pilot positions that could be filled with other
personnel. It noted that it has filled pilot positions with
recalled active duty pilots, warrant officers, reserve officers,
and limited duty officers. Although it is true that the services
have filled some positions with personnel other than pilots, there
has been no systematic means of analyzing pilot positions to
determine what other types of personnel might be used to fill the
positions. Our recommendation is intended to encourage systematic
consideration of all possible alternative means of filling pilot
positions during periods of shortages.
While DOD partially concurred with the intent of our
recommendation on uniformly reporting data, it believed that its
current databases were sufficient to respond to DOD's
requirements. DOD saw no advantage to a single cross- service
database that would track pilots given each service's unique
culture and mission. We did not, however, recommend a single
database, but rather that the services revise their databases so
that they
can uniformly report data. During our review, we encountered
several instances of inconsistent reporting. For example, in March
1999 hearings before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, House
Committee on Armed Services, the Air Force reported shortages of
648 pilots at the end of fiscal year 1998, and the Navy reported
shortages of approximately 500 pilots as of March 1999. These
reported shortages were not comparable since the as- of dates were
different, and the Navy's data did not include those pilots whose
training had been delayed. Comparable data that we obtained showed
that, as of the end of fiscal year 1998, the Navy had a shortage
(including those pilots whose training had been delayed) of 1,153
pilots. Consistent data presentations, as our recommendation
suggests, would assist DOD and Congress in deciding how best to
address pilot shortages.
DOD also partially agreed with our recommendation that the
services consider the merits of a fly- only career path, but said
that such a track has been studied by each service, and in some
cases tested. It further commented that these tests have found
that instituting a fly- only career track created a different set
of problems for the services. In addition, DOD noted that the
challenge currently facing the services is a staff shortage, not a
cockpit shortage. DOD also acknowledged that a percentage of
pilots just want to fly and have little desire for nonflying
assignments. DOD agreed that a fly- only career path could be
considered at a later date, when it would be addressed within a
broad context that considers areas such as compensation,
retirement, and advancement of individuals in this type of career
progression path. We agree with DOD that this option would need to
be considered within the broad context outlined by DOD. In
disagreeing with our fifth recommendation about the proposed bonus
system, DOD said that its current bonus systems are tied precisely
to key
career decision points and do not occur at arbitrary points in
time, as we had originally suggested. We agree that arbitrary is
not a fair characterization of these points in time and have
deleted this reference. We have also revised our recommendation to
better reflect our intent that the bonus system be offered to
pilots as a reward for affirmative career decisions rather than
being interpreted as an entitlement. In addition, we
have clarified our report to emphasize that some assumptions about
the success of bonuses in encouraging pilots to stay until
retirement may be outdated and should be revisited.
Appendi I x Pilot Retention Measurements The services use two
statistical measures to monitor pilot retention. Cumulative The
cumulative continuation rate, commonly referred to as a retention
Continuation Rate
rate, measures the tendency of pilots who start pilot training
together to remain on active duty beyond their minimum service
commitment. The services measure the propensity of a cohort of
pilots in a particular year group to stay in the military for a
specified additional number of years. The Air Force measures the
propensity of an aviator in the 6 th year of service to stay
through the 11 th year of service while the Navy measures the
propensity of an aviator in the 7 th year of service to stay
through the 12 th year of service. For example, the Navy uses two
data points to monitor pilots who entered pilot training in 1986.
The first measure would be
7 years after their accession, in 1993, while the second would be
12 years after their accession, in 1998. In this case, for every
hundred pilots who were still on active duty in 1993 (7 years
after accession), 32 remained on active duty in 1998 (12 years
after accession). This represents a pilot cumulative continuation
rate for fiscal year 1998 of 32 percent. The cumulative
continuation rate varies depending on the years selected, and
anomalies may not carry into the future. For example, several
times in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the services (except for
the Army) changed the minimum service obligation which created
artificially high cumulative continuation rates since not all
individuals in the cohort were eligible to leave active duty when
it was measured. These variations make it difficult to identify a
normal loss rate. Other factors, such as differences in the
populations in specific cohorts, further stress its limitations.
When the services quote changes in the retention rates of pilots,
they are not quoting the actual number of pilot losses, but rather
an estimate based on an entire cohort's behavior. Figure I. 1
shows the Navy and the Air Force's cumulative continuation rates
from 1989 to 1998.
Figure I. 1: Navy and Air Force Cumulative Continuation Rates,
Fiscal Years 1989- 98
100 Percent 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10
0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Navy CCR 38 41 33 33 42 40 35 52 39 32 Air Force CCR 36 37 35 34
62 82 87 77 71 46
Note: The Air Force spike between fiscal year 1993 and 1995 and
the Navy spike in fiscal year 1996 are due to multiple minimum
service obligation extensions that reduced the number of pilots
eligible to leave active duty during those years. Source: GAO from
DOD data.
Aviator Continuation The ACP take- rate measures the percentage of
aviators, of those who are Pay Take- Rates eligible in a
particular year, who take a bonus in exchange for an agreement to
extend their service commitment through 14 years of service. By
law, ACP is only offered to those aviators in critical aviation
specialties who
have completed their minimum service obligation, but have
completed less than 13 years of aviation service. With the
exception of the Army, the services have offered the bonuses for
time frames as short as 1, 2, or 3 years. The bonus take- rate is
considered the leading indicator of near- term aviator retention
because service experience has shown that
90 percent of pilots separate within a year of declining a bonus.
It is important to note that not all pilots are eligible for the
bonus at any given point in time and that the bonus take- rate
only measures the percentage of pilots who take the ACP out of
those who are eligible in a given year. Because the services
simply measure the number of aviators out of the number eligible,
a high bonus take- rate could signal that a service
has given bonuses to too many aviators. For example, if a service
had a community of 100 pilots, and 30 pilots took the bonus, this
would represent a 30- percent take- rate. Since the take- rate
represents the number of pilots who accepted a bonus, rather than
the number of pilots that the service
wanted or needed to take it, the take- rate could be 30- percent
and still fulfill the needs of the service. The services could
fill 100 percent of their goals and still report a 30- percent
take- rate. The Navy and the Marine Corps currently do not tie
their goals or desired take- rates to requirements. Instead, they
base their take- rate projections on historical patterns and
educated guesses of how many pilots are likely to take the bonus
in the future. Additionally, since the ACP is offered to different
aviation specialties in different years, for differing periods of
time, and the take- rate
for communities that have not been offered the ACP in the past is
usually higher, the variations in take- rates can stem from many
different causes. Figure I. 2 shows the ACP take- rates for the
Navy and the Air Force for
fiscal years 1989 to 1998.
Figure I. 2: Navy and Air Force Pilot ACP Take- Rates, Fiscal
Years 1989- 98
90 Percent 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10
0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Navy 33 54 22 22 28 50 39 28 21 21 Air Force 67 38 40 69 79 81 77
59 46 42
Source: GAO from U. S. Navy and Air Force data.
Appe ndi I I x Comments From the Department of Defense See pp. 10
and 61.
Now on pp. 9 and 60. Now on pp. 9 and 60.
New on pp. 33- 34. Now on pp. 9 and 60. Now on pp. 9 and 60.
Now on pp. 9 and 60. See pp. 10 and 62.
Appendi I I I x GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments GAO
Contacts Mark E. Gebicke, (202) 512- 5140 Brenda S. Farrell, (202)
512- 5140 Acknowledgments In addition to those named above, Carol
R. Schuster, David E. Moser,
Harry E. Taylor, Jane D. Trahan, and Tracy A. McCaffery made key
contributions to this report.
GAO United States General Accounting Office
GAO/NSIAD-99-211
United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548
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Executive Summary Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel
Executive Summary Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel
Executive Summary Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel
Executive Summary Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel
Executive Summary Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel
Executive Summary Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel
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Executive Summary Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel
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Contents
Contents Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel
Contents Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel
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Chapter 1
Chapter 1 Introduction
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Chapter 1 Introduction
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Chapter 1 Introduction
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Chapter 1 Introduction
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Chapter 1 Introduction
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Chapter 1 Introduction
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Chapter 2
Chapter 2 The Air Force and the Navy Are Reporting the Greatest
Pilot Shortages
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Chapter 2 The Air Force and the Navy Are Reporting the Greatest
Pilot Shortages
Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel
Chapter 2 The Air Force and the Navy Are Reporting the Greatest
Pilot Shortages
Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel
Chapter 2 The Air Force and the Navy Are Reporting the Greatest
Pilot Shortages
Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel
Chapter 2 The Air Force and the Navy Are Reporting the Greatest
Pilot Shortages
Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel
Chapter 2 The Air Force and the Navy Are Reporting the Greatest
Pilot Shortages
Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel
Chapter 2 The Air Force and the Navy Are Reporting the Greatest
Pilot Shortages
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Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel
Chapter 3
Chapter 3 Opportunities May Exist to Reassess and Better Document
Pilot Requirements
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Chapter 3 Opportunities May Exist to Reassess and Better Document
Pilot Requirements
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Chapter 3 Opportunities May Exist to Reassess and Better Document
Pilot Requirements
Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-99-211 Military Personnel
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