Military Readiness: Full Training Benefits From Army's Combat Training
Centers Are Not Being Realized (Letter Report, 09/17/1999,
GAO/NSIAD-99-210).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the training provided
to active Army units at the National Training Center (NTC) in Fort
Irwin, California, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in Fort
Polk, Louisiana, and the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels,
Germany, focusing on: (1) whether units training at the centers are
adequately prepared for the exercises; (2) whether training exercises
are realistic in terms of expected battlefield conditions; (3) whether
pre-positioned equipment adequately supports the training mission; (4)
how units use lessons learned at the centers; and (5) how the Army uses
the results of the exercises to help revise training and improve the
Army's training doctrine.

GAO noted that: (1) although the majority of units that trained at the
Army's combat training centers in 1998 favorably assessed their
training, neither the Army nor individual units are achieving the full
benefits of this training; (2) this is because: (a) many units are
arriving ill prepared for the exercises; (b) training is not as
realistic as it could be; (c) the condition and age of pre-positioned
equipment has adversely affected training at two centers; and (d)
neither individual units nor the Army itself is able to effectively
capitalize on lessons learned from the centers' exercises; (3) personnel
shortages, turnover, and high operating tempo have adversely affected
units' ability to prepare for their rotations to the centers, and as a
result, units are arriving ill prepared to engage in the exercises; (4)
in February 1999, Army Forces Command issued new guidance that requires
unit commanders to establish training "gates" at their home stations to
gauge whether their units are prepared to move to more complex training
levels, including training center exercises; (5) since the guidance does
not address the causes of insufficient preparation, strict adherence to
the guidance may simply serve to exclude some units from valuable
training center experiences; (6) because units lack proficiency at the
battalion level, the centers routinely modify conditions in ways that
provide less challenging and thereby less realistic scenarios than might
be encountered on a real battlefield; (7) by limiting conditions and not
accurately portraying current and future threats, the training centers
undermine realism and limit the value of training exercises; (8) the
poor condition and age of some pre-positioned equipment at NTC and JRTC
further degrade training; (9) as of July 1999, the Army was considering
various alternatives to improve pre-positioned equipment at NTC; (10)
commanders cannot take full advantage of the lessons learned at the
centers due to ineffective take-home materials, a lack of training
opportunities once they return home, and personnel turnover that
prevents them from attending to the identified weaknesses; (11) although
the centers have collected large amounts of data, the Army has never
standardized data collection and therefore cannot combine information to
assess trends; and (12) consequently, the Army cannot take full
advantage of its lessons learned and does not know the extent to which
center exercises are improving unit and leader proficiency.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-99-210
     TITLE:  Military Readiness: Full Training Benefits From Army's
	     Combat Training Centers Are Not Being Realized
      DATE:  09/17/1999
   SUBJECT:  Combat readiness
	     Army supplies
	     Military training
	     Army personnel
	     Data collection
IDENTIFIER:  Army Training and Evaluation Program
	     Army Training and Doctrine Command Remedial Action Program

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ns99210 A Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Military Readiness, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives

GAO/NSIAD-99-210

September 1999 MILITARY READINESS

Full Training Benefits From Army's Combat Training Centers Are Not
Being Realized

National Security and International Affairs Division

B-283334 Letter September 17, 1999 The Honorable Herbert H.
Bateman Chairman The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz Ranking Minority
Member Subcommittee on Military Readiness Committee on Armed
Services House of Representatives

The Army operates three combat training centers: the National
Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California; the Joint
Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana; and the
Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) at Hohenfels, Germany.
According to Army Regulation 350- 50, 1 the Army established the
combat training centers for several reasons: (1) to increase unit
readiness for deployment and warfighting; (2) to produce

bold, innovative leaders through stressful tactical and
operational exercises; (3) to embed doctrine throughout the total
Army; (4) to provide feedback to Army and joint combined
participants; and (5) to provide a data source for lessons learned
to improve doctrine, training, leader development, organizations,
and materiel focused on soldiers to win in combat. To achieve
these purposes, the Army spends about $1 billion a

year to provide training at these centers. In view of the
importance of such training to the Army's readiness and in
response to your request, we reviewed the training provided to
active Army units at these centers. Our objectives were to
determine (1) whether units training at the centers are adequately
prepared for the exercises, (2) whether training exercises are
realistic in terms of expected battlefield conditions, (3) whether
pre- positioned equipment adequately supports the training
mission, (4) how units use lessons learned at the centers, and

(5) how the Army uses the results of the exercises to help revise
training and improve the Army's training doctrine. In addition to
visiting all three centers, we also surveyed all commanders at the
123 active- duty battalions that trained at one of the centers
during fiscal 1 This regulation, dated May 25, 1995, establishes
policy, procedures, and responsibilities for Army- wide management
of the Combat Training Center Program. It is currently being
revised.

year 1998. The responses we obtained provided us with information
on home station training prior to deploying to a combat training
center (CTC), the usefulness of the exercises, and the ability of
units to utilize the training once they returned to home station.
On February 26, 1999, we provided the preliminary results of our
work during a subcommittee hearing held at Nellis Air Force Base.
2 Results in Brief Although the majority of units that trained at
the Army's combat training centers in 1998 favorably assessed
their training, neither the Army nor

individual units are achieving the full benefits of this training.
This is because (1) many units are arriving ill prepared for the
exercises, (2) training is not as realistic as it could be, (3)
the condition and age of pre- positioned equipment has adversely
affected training at two centers, and (4) neither individual units
nor the Army itself is able to effectively

capitalize on lessons learned from the centers' exercises.
Personnel shortages, turnover, and high operating tempo have
adversely affected units' ability to prepare for their rotations
to the centers, and as a result, units are arriving ill prepared
to engage in the exercises. Although units should be proficient at
battalion- level tasks when they arrive at the centers, many have
trained only to the company level, and their leaders struggle with
the more complicated planning and synchronization tasks

required for the battalion- and brigade- level exercises conducted
at the centers. In February 1999, Army Forces Command issued new
guidance that requires unit commanders to establish training gates
at their home stations to gauge whether their units are prepared
to move to more complex training levels, including training center
exercises. Since the guidance does not address the causes of
insufficient preparation

personnel shortages, turnover, and high operating tempo strict
adherence to the guidance may simply serve to exclude some units
from valuable training center experiences.

Because units lack proficiency at the battalion level, the centers routinely modify conditions in ways that provide less challenging and thereby less realistic scenarios than might be encountered on a real battlefield. The centers frequently restrict the use of chemical weapons, mines, obstacles, artillery, and tactics, and they do not consistently replicate the conditions 2 Military Readiness: Full Training Benefits From Army's Combat Training Centers Are Not Being Realized (

GAO/T-NSIAD-99-92
, Feb. 2, 1999).
Because units lack proficiency at the battalion level, the centers
routinely modify conditions in ways that provide less challenging
and thereby less realistic scenarios than might be encountered on
a real battlefield. The centers frequently restrict the use of
chemical weapons, mines, obstacles, artillery, and tactics, and
they do not consistently replicate the conditions 2 Military
Readiness: Full Training Benefits From Army's Combat Training
Centers Are Not Being Realized (  GAO/T-NSIAD-99-92 , Feb. 2,
1999).

that would be expected on future battlefields terrorist actions,
operations in urban terrain, civilians on the battlefield, and
interactions with the media. By limiting conditions and not
accurately portraying current and future threats, the training
centers undermine realism and limit the value of training
exercises. The poor condition and age of some pre- positioned
equipment at the National Training Center and Joint Readiness
Training Center further degrade training. At the National Training
Center, 15 percent of all tank and fighting vehicle crews on
average are excluded from training because their vehicles are
broken down; on some days, the number reaches 25 percent. In
addition, the older equipment used at both centers differs
substantially

from the equipment soldiers have trained on at home, and valuable
training time is wasted simply becoming familiar with it. As of
July 1999, the Army was considering various alternatives to
improve pre- positioned equipment at the National Training Center.

Commanders cannot take full advantage of the lessons learned at
the centers due to ineffective take- home materials, a lack of
training opportunities once they return home, and personnel
turnover that prevents them from attending to the identified
weaknesses. As a result, units are not able to address weaknesses
identified during training center exercises.

Although the centers have collected large amounts of data, the
Army has never standardized data collection and therefore cannot
combine information to assess trends. Nor has the Army established
performance

measures or a methodology to periodically assess whether the
centers are achieving their objectives. Consequently, the Army
cannot take full advantage of its lessons learned and does not
know the extent to which

center exercises are improving unit and leader proficiency.
Establishing such performance measures is consistent with good
management principles and is consistent with the Government
Performance and Results Act, which calls on all government
entities to evaluate the results of their programs through the use
of performance measures. This report makes recommendations to the
Secretary of the Army that would permit units to conduct limited
independent training at the centers prior to beginning the actual
exercises, improve the realism of training, and enable the Army to
better capitalize on lessons learned at its centers by
establishing performance measures and an assessment plan.

Background To achieve the objectives set out in Army Regulation
350- 50, the Army designed the combat training centers to create a
realistic training environment, challenge unit leaders with
missions against a well- trained opposing force, and provide in-
depth analyses of performance to units and their leaders. Combat
training center exercises consist of both

force- on- force engagements against an opposing force and
separate live- fire exercises under conditions that are intended
to closely parallel actual warfare. In addition, the regulation
indicates that the scope of exercises at the centers should be
brigade level or below. Active Army units in the United States
train at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, or
Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana, about once
every 18 months, and those in Europe train at the Combat Maneuver
Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany, about every 12 months. Each
of the National Guard's enhanced brigades train at the NTC about
once every 8 years. The Army's three combat training centers offer
distinctly different training environments. The National Training
Center offers an open, mountainous, desert setting that allows
several battalions to train simultaneously during

force- on- force exercises against the opposing force. The
training area at the NTC is roughly the size of Rhode Island. (See
fig. 1.)

Figure 1: Desert Environment at the National Training Center

The Combat Maneuver Training Center is the only training area
available to Army forces in Europe for the conduct of battalion-
level exercises. According to center officials, geographical
limitations of the center's rolling wooded terrain do not allow
brigades to train at doctrinal distances, and two battalions can
only train simultaneously with some acknowledged doctrinal
degradation. (See fig. 2.)

Figure 2: Wooded Terrain at the Combat Maneuver Training Center

The training areas at the Joint Readiness Training Center include
swamplands, dense forests, and simulated civilian villages
complete with role players, as figure 3 shows.

Figure 3: Mock Civilian Village at the Joint Readiness Training
Center

The NTC and the CMTC sponsor exercises designed to train armor and
mechanized infantry units, such as those from the 1st Armored and
3rd Infantry Divisions, in a high intensity threat environment.
The JRTC provides nonmechanized or light forces, such as the 82nd
Airborne and the 10th Mountain Divisions, with exercises in a low-
to- medium threat environment. Both centers, however, do provide
training for task forces made up of heavy and light units
operating together. The CMTC and the JRTC also have constructed
mock towns for training in urban warfare. Forces from the other
military services as well as special operations units are also
brought into the exercises at all three centers. Brigades and
battalions deploy to these centers with their associated combat
service and service support units.

Each center has an active Army battalion or cavalry regiment,
consisting of 450 to 2, 400 soldiers, permanently stationed there
to serve as a dedicated opposing force. These units are organized
and specially trained to replicate a hostile force complete with
distinctive uniforms, visually modified vehicles, and both U. S.
and non- U. S. weapons (see fig. 4).

Figure 4: Opposing Force Vehicle and Soldier at the National
Training Center

At the NTC and the JRTC, the Army has established pre- positioned
stocks of equipment that units draw and use during the exercises.
The NTC equipment consists of about 3,800 major pieces of
equipment, including tanks, fighting vehicles, artillery pieces,
personnel carriers, recovery

vehicles, and various types of wheeled vehicles. Generally, units
training at the NTC ship their wheeled vehicles and unique
equipment items to the center, and they draw their tracked
vehicles from the pre- positioned stocks. The pre- positioned
equipment at the JRTC consists of about 1,100 major pieces of
equipment, mainly wheeled vehicles. Units ship their tracked
vehicles to this center for training. The CMTC does not have a
pre- positioned stock of equipment.

To add realism to the exercises and provide a real- time
assessment of casualties, force- on- force exercises are conducted
using the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System. This
system, carried on both equipment and troops, lets both soldiers
and units know immediately if a kill or near kill is scored.
Separate live- fire exercises at the NTC and CMTC (at nearby
Grafenwohr) are conducted against sophisticated target arrays

and involve armor, infantry, artillery, and air elements. At the
JRTC, live- fire exercises involve operations in urban terrain as
well as combined arms exercises. The JRTC and the CMTC also
conduct mission rehearsal

exercise's 3 for units deploying to Bosnia and other contingency
operations. All of the centers also have a cadre of experienced
officers and noncommissioned officers who serve as exercise
observers and controllers. In this capacity, they are responsible
for coaching, mentoring, and evaluating training units at all
levels of organization. The centers also

provide unit leader training programs for the units prior to their
deployment to the centers.

The NTC and the JRTC are the joint responsibility of two Army
commands in the United States: the U. S. Army Forces Command and
the U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. In Europe, the 7th
Army Training Command is the parent organization for the CMTC.

Many Units Are Not Many units arriving at the training centers
cannot take full advantage of training opportunities because they
lack the requisite skills to effectively Adequately Prepared
execute brigade- or battalion- level missions, 4 which is the
level of training for Training

that the centers are designed to provide. Over 50 percent of our
survey's respondents cited personnel shortages, personnel
turnover, or high operating tempo as one of their top three
reasons for being ill prepared for their training experiences.
(Other factors reported as adversely affecting training are shown
in app. I.) The Army Forces Command recently initiated actions to
establish training gates to certify a unit's readiness for
training center exercises. Decreased Readiness for Senior- level
officials at all three training centers acknowledged the units'
Battalion- level Training

lack of preparedness for the training. They told us that many
units arriving for training now are substantially less prepared
than in the past. The commanders of the opposing forces that we
talked to said they had observed a marked decline in unit
proficiency. For example, the opposing

force commander from the National Training Center, during
congressional hearings in February 1999, said that the proficiency
level of units arriving at the National Training Center is much
lower now than in the past. He 3 Mission rehearsal exercises are
designed to train units to conduct peacekeeping operations by
replicating the operational environment where they will be
deployed and providing realistic training scenarios. 4 A division
is divided into brigades, its brigades into battalions, its
battalions into companies, and companies into platoons, and
platoons into squads. For a unit to operate proficiently at the
next level, it needs to have developed proficiency at the level
below.

believes that commanders, staffs, and soldiers at every level
platoon to brigade display a decreasing level of knowledge, skill,
and ability to plan, conduct, and sustain combat operations. He
also told us that, in his opinion, training at the NTC would be
improved if the training focus were changed from the brigade to
battalion level. Accompanied by the NTC's Opposing Force (OPFOR)
Commander, we observed some of these inadequacies ourselves as one
training unit conducting a deliberate attack quickly shifted to a
movement to contact soon after the exercise began. The OPFOR
Commander pointed out that (1) the training unit's commander
demonstrated no effective command and control over his unit and
had no reconnaissance plan and (2) his unit had no plan to breach
obstacles constructed by the OPFOR. He added that this unit was
typical of most units training at the NTC today. Responses to our
questionnaire from units that trained at a combat training center
in fiscal year 1998 confirmed this perception. Nearly half of the
96 respondents (47 percent) said their unit was only somewhat or
marginally ready to execute battalion- level tasks at the training
center.

According to Army Forces Command documents, during the late 1980s
and early 1990s, units reporting to the centers had to undergo an
external evaluation to certify that they were ready for training.
Regulations required units to be trained at the battalion level at
their home station, and the training centers provided the next
level of proficiency that could not be achieved at home station.
In March 1998, the Army dropped the prerequisites that units train
at the battalion level at their home station and be certified as
trained before undertaking NTC exercises. According to training
center officials, this change was in recognition of the fact that
many units were simply unable to meet these requirements due to
personnel shortages and high operating tempo. According to Forces
Command Regulation 350- 50- 2, battalions participating in force-
on- force training at the JRTC should have completed train- up
exercises from platoon through battalion level within 6 months of
going to the center, but this requirement is not enforced for the
same reason. The CMTC only requires units to arrive with trained
platoons rather than trained companies or battalions in
recognition of home station training constraints. In addition,
unlike the other centers that conduct battalion- and brigade-
level

exercises during the entire training rotation, the CMTC provides
units with exercises that start at the platoon level and build
toward battalion- level exercises.

Factors That Adversely Units responding to our survey identified
personnel shortages, high Affect Training

personnel turnover, and high operating tempo as the three primary
reasons they were unable to adequately prepare for their training
rotations to the combat training centers.

Personnel Shortages Personnel shortages affect training at the
centers by limiting the options commanders have to execute
missions. Personnel shortages have many causes. 5 These include
(1) Army- wide shortages of certain specialties and personnel at
specific levels, such as combat troops, technical specialists,
experienced officers, and noncommissioned officers; (2) personnel

transferred to fill vacancies in deploying units; and (3)
personnel temporarily borrowed from their units to meet other Army
or installation requirements. As of April 30, 1999, the Army
reported an on- board strength of about 469,000, which is 11,000
below its authorized strength of 480, 000. The current on- board
number is also about 10,000 less than the on- board number from a
year ago at this time.

Some shortages are quite pronounced. For example, for fiscal year
1998, the infantry battalions that trained at the JRTC on average
arrived with only 42 of their 54 authorized rifle squads. Many of
these consisted of six soldiers on average rather than the nine
authorized. In other words, units arrived with only about half of
the personnel authorized for their rifle squads. In recent
testimony, the commanding general of the Seventh Army Training
Command stated that over the past 18 months, personnel

shortages caused units to deploy to the CMTC without fully manned
infantry squads and tanks. He cited that dismounted infantry
strength averaged 64 percent, ranging from 30 percent to 100
percent, and that only 80 percent of the tanks had the required
number of personnel. Results from our survey confirmed the units'
problems with personnel shortages. For example, 10 of the 13 units
that trained at the CMTC in fiscal year 1998 and responded to our
questionnaire said that a shortage of personnel at the company and
platoon level was one of the three factors that had the most
negative impact on training. According to the Commanding General
of the Joint Readiness Training Center, insufficient staffing is
the single biggest factor adversely affecting training. He noted

that units that arrive at the center under strength cannot
effectively train or 5 Military Readiness: Observations on
Personnel Readiness in Later Deploying Army Divisions (GAO/T-
NSIAD-98-126, Mar. 20, 1998).

maximize their training experience. Of the 36 units that trained
at the JRTC in fiscal year 1998 and responded to our
questionnaire, 18 said that a shortage of personnel was one of the
primary factors that negatively affected battalion- level training
for the exercises. Written comments provided by units responding
to our survey were also revealing, as shown in the following
examples:

At the time of the rotation, I could only man 18 of the 24
Blackhawks in my battalion. Personnel shortages in both aircrews
and senior NCO's adversely affected the training during our
rotation. The impact of personnel shortages is obvious when
examined against the requirements of an Infantry Company and
platoon. The battalion was short one line platoon per company. We
were given approximately two weeks prior to deployment to
integrate a platoon from a

sister battalion. The lack of key leaders in the 11- 20 [infantry-
sergeant] series had a negative impact on company commanders' and
platoon leaders' ability to conduct effective training. Prior to
NTC, personnel statistics [overall level of manning] were 85
percent. Shortages at the platoon level leadership impacted on
small unit proficiency/ effectiveness. Unit maintained two rifle
platoons instead of the TOE [authorized] three platoons.

The battalion went to the NTC at 80 percent fill and 20 percent of
the personnel were new. We were not plussed up [augmented from
other units] to attend our CTC training. My company- sized units
were authorized 70 soldiers but deployed with only 55.

The battalion borrowed 16 tank crews from other units to field
enough tanks to fight at the NTC. Also [the unit] went into
platoon/ company training with only 2 of 14 tank drivers trained
to properly operate their vehicles. Personnel Turnover Personnel
turnover also hampers units preparing for their rotations to the
training centers. Of the 96 units that responded to our survey, 49
said that turnover had the most negative impact on battalion-
level training at home

station, and 54 said that turnover had the most negative impact at
the company and platoon levels (see app. I).

More than half of the respondents to our questionnaire said that
personnel turnover had a negative impact on company- and
battalion- level training. Many told us that personnel turnover
requires them to teach basic tasks more often, which reduces the
time available to develop proficiency at higher levels. Some of
the specific comments provided included the following:

High personnel turnover coupled with a shortage of Non-
Commissioned Officers degraded the battalions' ability to train
and sustain readiness levels. New soldiers entering the battalion
may not have a first line supervisor to train them.

120 days before going to the NTC, the battalion had massive
personnel turnover. Examples: 39 percent turnover of warrant
officers, 33 percent turnover of crew chiefs, 54 percent turnover
of armament repairers. We went to the NTC with troops that had no
home station training with the unit.

Personnel turnover at the mid grade and senior level NCO [levels]
doesn't allow the unit to build a solid base. Assignments to
Recruiting Command, AC/ RC, [active personnel supporting reserve
component units] Korea and U. S. Army Europe (USAREUR), they all
continue to eat away from your NCO experience within the
battalion. The continuous drain of NCOs from the battalion after a
CTC rotation decreases readiness and unit cohesion.

High Operating Tempo The Department of Defense's (DOD) October-
December 1998 Quarterly Readiness Report highlighted high
operating tempo (OPTEMPO) as a key factor that has stressed
today's Army. It noted that force size had decreased 34 percent
since the end of the Cold War, while missions had

increased 300 percent. As of mid- February 1999, brigades or task
forces from all but 3 of the Army's 10 divisions were either
committed to certain parts of the world or were preparing for or
recovering from contingency

operations. In addition, in June 1999, elements of another
division (the 82nd Airborne Division) were committed to operations
in Kosovo. The Army's contribution to the international security
force in Kosovo, in addition to existing commitments in Bosnia and
elsewhere, are likely to further degrade training at home
stations. Units in Europe will be especially affected since the
1st Infantry Division in Germany has been tasked to provide the
majority of the Army's contribution to that effort. The increase
in operations other than war (OOTW) since 1991 has significantly
affected the ability of U. S. military forces to prepare and
continue to be ready for expected wartime missions. As we reported
in May 1999, 6 OOTW has affected the combat capability of the
military services, especially Army units because they generally
require more recovery time. While the primary mission of combat
units is the destruction of enemy forces, OOTW primarily focus on
peacekeeping tasks such as conducting presence patrols, inspecting
weapons storage sites, and establishing checkpoints. Because units
do not conduct armored

6 Military Operations: Impact of Operations Other Than War on the
Services Varies (GAO/NSIAD-99-69, May 24, 1999).

maneuver operations and are relieved from gunnery qualification
requirements while engaged in OOTW, the skills of individual
personnel as well as entire units decline. For example, units from
the 1st Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions located in Germany were
unable to train on many mission- essential tasks at the company-
or battalion- levels during repeated deployments to Bosnia.
Therefore, officials at the Combat Maneuver Training Center
adjusted their training model for units from these divisions to
reflect a decreased skill level in units. Several days were set
aside at the beginning of training for the units to conduct
uninterrupted training at the

company level to refine skills prior to beginning exercises
against the opposing force. Unit and center officials told us that
this time spent at the beginning of the rotation paid great
dividends during the remainder of the

training exercises because they were better prepared to fully
participate. Of the 96 units who responded to our questionnaire,
48 said that OPTEMPO had a significant negative effect on training
at the company and platoon levels at home stations. The following
are representative of the comments provided by many of the
respondents: High OPTEMPO and personnel tempo virtually eliminate
any opportunity to conduct meaningful collective training or
develop strategies for correcting deficiencies .

There is too much on everyone's agenda. As soon as we returned
from JRTC, [I] sent 3 companies to Southwest Asia and 1 company to
Haiti.

[ It is] difficult to conduct battalion- level training while
[the] unit is being asked to provide people and equipment to
support multiple brigade and above taskings.

High OPTEMPO severely limits the battalion's collective training
opportunity. You simply move from one big event' to the next
without chance to pause, evaluate, [or] develop [a] strategy to
correct deficiencies.

Since February 1999, when we reported our preliminary findings at
a congressional hearing, the Army has taken steps to address the
preparedness of units for combat training center exercises and the
adequacy of equipment used during the exercises.

Training Gates Established On February 26, 1999, the Commanding
General of Army Forces Command to Certify Units' Readiness

issued new training guidance to all unit commanders. This
guidance, which to Train at Higher Levels is expected to be fully
implemented by the end of fiscal year 2000, requires all unit
commanders to establish clearly defined objective criteria to
serve as gates during home station training for determining
whether their unit

is prepared to move to a more complex training level. The guidance
requires units to develop a certification program that includes an
assessment of whether units, staffs, and leaders are prepared for
the next higher level of training. Unit assessments will be made
using the training tasks, training conditions, and performance
standards contained in the Army Training and Evaluation Program
guidance that the U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) has developed for each type of Army unit.

The guidance also established home station training gates for
units preparing to conduct combat training center exercises. For
example, active units must complete an externally evaluated
battalion task force

maneuver exercise, a company and task force fire coordination
exercise to synchronize both direct and indirect fire weapon
systems, platoon- level gunnery exercises, and a certification
that unit staffs are proficient in making tactical decisions.
According to the guidance, battalions that do not demonstrate
proficiency through the formal external evaluation process must be
retrained and demonstrate proficiency before going to a training
center.

Army Forces Command officials expect the gate strategy to have a
positive effect on training by identifying unit shortfalls and
requiring units to develop basic proficiency foundations before
progressing to more complex training. The guidance issued by
Forces Command, however, does not address how commanders might
overcome the factors that they told us had the most negative
impact on developing proficiency at home stations: that

is, personnel shortages, personnel turnover, and operating tempo.
These factors are not likely to dissipate, and they will make it
difficult for commanders to achieve the goals of this new
initiative. Under this training

strategy, it is possible that some units might be precluded from a
combat training center experience if they are unable to
demonstrate the required proficiency. Also, there is an additional
consequence of this strategy in that the OPTEMPO for leaders of
the units not going to the CTCs will increase, because the
external evaluators must come from units not preparing for CTC
exercises.

Training Conditions According to Army Regulation 350- 50, training
at the combat training Are Routinely Limited centers is designed
to increase a units' proficiency by replicating the most realistic
and challenging battlefield available. However, because units are

and Current Threat Not arriving at the centers with lower levels
of proficiency than in the past, the Always Portrayed training
centers now routinely adjust training conditions to compensate for
the degradation. The centers routinely limit the capability of
their opposing force by restricting its use of chemical weapons,
mines, obstacles, artillery, and tactics. The following examples
illustrate these

limits:  A ceiling is placed on the numbers, types, and times that
the opposing force can use chemical weapons and mines. As a
result, units that

initially demonstrate a low level of training in chemical
environment operations or breaching mine obstacles will face fewer
of these events.  A ceiling is also imposed on the numbers, types,
and time of employment for artillery. The opposing force commander
must obtain permission to use additional artillery above this
ceiling from center

officials, who determine whether the additional artillery fires
will detract from the training objectives.  Opposing force
reconnaissance elements are now limited to destroying

a specific number of friendly vehicles with artillery at night.
This limit is imposed to ensure that training units have
sufficient forces to commence their mission in the morning.
Officials at the centers emphasized that providing scenarios with
the most challenging conditions versus limiting the conditions to
better match unit capabilities involves trade- offs. On the one
hand, it makes sense to limit exercise complexity so units can
accomplish some training objectives. However, on the other hand,
without exposure to the full spectrum of threat that units will
almost certainly face, units may not be adequately

prepared to face the most demanding threats. Moreover, as one Army
official told us, many commanders come away from their training
with an unrealistically high assessment of their individual and
unit capabilities because they leave the centers thinking that
their units performed well, when serious unit weaknesses might
have been uncovered had training conditions not been adjusted to
reduce exercise complexity.

In addition to a less challenging battlefield, the NTC and the
CMTC, for the most part, are still using a 1970s Soviet threat
model to replicate specific enemy capabilities. In the future,
however, DOD officials believe that U. S. forces will most likely
face a different type of threat, one whose systems

are not fully known in advance of conflict and one that will
require new approaches to defeat. They also believe that
operations in urban settings, terrorist activities, and civilians
on the battlefield will typify future threats and conditions. Past
operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and more recently the
situation in Kosovo show that the Army's mechanized and
nonmechanized forces may need to be prepared to conduct their
traditional missions (attack, defend, and movement to contact) in
urban settings where civilians are present and concerns about
collateral damage are real. Moreover, these operations have shown
the importance of knowing how to effectively deal with local
foreign officials and the media. These

conditions, however, are not realistically portrayed at all the
combat training centers. Table 1, which summarizes our
observations and data provided by officials at the centers, shows
that the Joint Readiness Training Center has done the most to
incorporate expected conditions into its exercises, while the
National Training Center has done the least.

Table 1: Comparison of Training Features at the Army's Combat
Training Centers Joint Readiness Training

Combat Maneuver Training National Training Center Center Center

Operations in urban terrain No Yes Limited to dismounted infantry
Terrorist activities Usually limited to security tests Yes No
Civilians on the battlefield Usually confined to one Yes Based on
unit proficiency

roadblock Dealings with local officials Only before exercises
begin Yes Based on unit proficiency Media on the battlefield Only
before exercises begin Yes Based on unit proficiency

Source: Developed by GAO from data provided by CTC officials.

Officials from all the training centers told us that the JRTC more
completely portrays the complex environment that units and leaders
operate in today because it was established to train Special
Operations Forces and light forces that in the past were tasked to
address these types of complexities. In contrast, armored units
training at the NTC and CMTC have been tasked primarily with
planning, developing, and maintaining the capability to conduct
open- area maneuver warfare. According to the Commanding General
of the NTC, however, this is not the case today because Operation
Desert Storm showed potential enemies that they cannot win on open
ground against U. S. forces. Consequently, in his view, future
conflicts will draw all types of forces into cities and urban
areas

where the enemy can mix with the general population. The Army's
Forces Command is studying how to sustain the training relevancy
of the combat

training centers, and it plans to change the opposing force
tactics and training scenarios at all centers by the end of the
first quarter in fiscal year 2001 to make them more relevant to
threats and mission requirements expected in the next 10 to 15
years. We are currently reviewing the services' efforts to train
their personnel in urban warfare in more detail, and expect to
issue our report in early 2000.

Maintenance Problems Pre- positioned equipment at the NTC and JRTC
does not adequately and Aging Equipment

support the centers' training mission. A high rate of use at the
NTC makes equipment maintenance a challenge, and, despite
additional funding from Limit Training the Congress, many tank and
fighting vehicle crews are excluded from training because their
vehicles are broken down. In addition, the majority

of units training at both the NTC and JRTC lose valuable training
time as they learn to operate equipment that is much older than
the equipment they use and maintain at home stations. The Army has
no pre- positioned equipment at the CMTC. Maintenance Problems The
equipment pre- positioned at the NTC is driven three to five times
as

many miles each year as any unit's home station equipment,
according to the NTC commander. Each tank and fighting vehicle at
the NTC is run about 3,000 miles per year. Such usage, compounded
by the rugged terrain, heat, and sand at the NTC, creates a
significant maintenance challenge for center officials. To meet
this challenge, the center uses a combination of contractor
services and Army personnel for maintaining equipment. The
contractor is responsible for servicing the equipment, and two
Army direct support companies and one general support company
stationed at the center make repairs. 7 According to Forces
Command Regulation 350- 50- 1, paragraph 3- 5a, the NTC also
maintains two brigade sets of equipment designed to ensure
equipment issued to a training unit is operationally ready.
Despite these efforts, the Army Inspector General and Army Forces
Command separately reported the typical unit begins training with
only 85 percent to 90 percent of needed vehicles rated as fully
mission capable (FMC) due to maintenance backlogs. Equipment rated
as FMC does not necessarily meet

7 A direct support company repairs equipment by replacing parts. A
general support company repairs equipment by rebuilding major
component assemblies.

the Army's equipment maintenance standards. 8 Moreover, because of
the extensive use of the vehicles (over 300 miles per rotation)
and repair parts shortages, the number of vehicles that are
mission capable rapidly

decreases to 65 percent to 75 percent over the course of the
rotation, according to the NTC commander. He also has acknowledged
that on average, 15 percent of all tank and fighting vehicle crews
miss training each day because their equipment needs repair. Units
responding to our survey provided written comments that highlight
their concerns related to the pre- positioned equipment at the
centers. For example, The equipment available for draw at the NTC
is in horrible condition. Soldiers should not have to draw broken
equipment that requires several days or even weeks to repair.
Extreme waste and abuse. Equipment issued in unsafe condition. The
draw and turn in took longer than the actual days in training. Our
battalion's poor maintenance posture during the rotation adversely
impacted our overall training experience as a battalion. Over one
third of our soldiers spent the majority of the rotation in the
UMCP [Unified Maintenance Control Point] because of broken

equipment. During the draw, over one half of the M1s [tanks] [and]
M2s [fighting vehicles] that we drew were deadlined (inoperable
due to needed repairs). Over the past 2 years, the Congress has
provided the Army $120 million in additional funding for the
operation and maintenance of the pre- positioned equipment at the
NTC. According to Army Headquarters officials, these funds were
programmed for the maintenance and upgrade of NTC equipment and
were to be used for repair parts, depot- level repairs, and
supplies and services. Despite this additional funding, the
maintenance problems at the NTC have become so acute that training
units must send some of their own maintenance personnel to the
center 2 weeks prior to training to repair broken equipment for
issue.

The NTC's June 1999 update to its strategic plan, which sets forth
its mission and business goals and assesses performance toward
these goals, also confirms a continuing problem with pre-
positioned equipment. The

8 FMC is defined in the glossary of Army Regulation 220- 1, Unit
Status Reporting, as equipment that can perform all of its
missions without endangering the lives of the crew and operators.
Equipment can be rated as FMC and have inoperable systems that
degrade its mission flexibility and usefulness. For example, an
M1A1/ A2 tank can be FMC with the driver's night sight, and
commander's independent thermal viewer all inoperable.

center's mission capable rate goal for its tracked vehicle fleet
is 90 percent. However, the actual monthly mission capable rate
for these vehicles ranged from 65 percent to 80 percent the first
6 months of fiscal year 1999. In response to these rates, the
center's strategic plan states that the consistent performance
below the 90- percent goal is primarily due to the poor condition
of the fleet. Aging Pre- positioned

The commanders of the NTC and JRTC have also expressed concerned
Equipment at the NTC and about the age of their pre- positioned
equipment. At the Joint Readiness

JRTC Lessens the Training Training Center, units are using 30-
year- old, 2- ton, and early model 5- ton Benefit trucks with
manual transmissions, while at home stations, units operate 5- ton
trucks with automatic transmissions. At the NTC, the situation is
similar. Pre- positioned tanks at the NTC are all first-
generation M1- A1 models and the Bradley Fighting Vehicles are all
first- generation M2- A1

models. However, at home stations, the Army units have second- and
third- generation tanks and third- and fourth- generation fighting
vehicles. Our comparison of serial numbers on the fighting
vehicles at the NTC with Army inventory records shows that some
vehicles came off the assembly line in 1981, the first year they
were produced, and that the average age of all the NTC's fighting
vehicles is 13 years. Army Forces Command data show about a 40-
percent commonality between the equipment training

units have at home station and what they draw from NTC pre-
positioned stocks.

Requiring units to use older equipment with different capabilities
creates (1) safety problems because soldiers are not familiar with
fire control systems and switch locations, (2) performance
degradation because target identification and designation systems
are different, and (3) maintenance problems because older vehicles
do not have built- in diagnostic systems. As a result, the centers
are obliged to devote training time to teaching soldiers how to
operate obsolete equipment, which is a waste of valuable

time and resources, according to the JRTC commander. In addition,
maintenance personnel have to maintain and repair equipment that
is different than that owned by the unit and for which they have
been trained, which degrades the usefulness of the training for
them.

Army Study Reviews The Department of the Army Headquarters is
currently reviewing the

Alternatives to Improve results of the Army Forces Command's
January 1999 study of options Equipment

available for providing the equipment needed for training at the
NTC. The study concluded that the current system of pre-
positioning tracked and

wheel vehicles was ineffective because of the significant
difference between the equipment at the center compared to the
equipment units trained on at home stations. Although there are
several different models of each type of vehicle assigned to the
operational units, even the least modernized unit does not have
some of the older equipment models

pre- positioned at the NTC. This difference between training
center and home station equipment, according to the study,
significantly impedes training since crews have to be retrained to
use and maintain older equipment. The study examined three
alternatives for meeting the equipment needs of units at the NTC.
The first alternative, the modernization of the equipment at the
center, was discounted because (1) $976 million would be required
to modernize the tracked vehicles, (2) maintenance costs at the
centers would increase, and (3) a large number of personnel would
be needed to support equipment issue and turn- in. The second
alternative, requiring units to ship all needed equipment to the
center, was discounted because of the transportation costs to the
training units. The alternative recommended by the study is to (1)
modernize the wheeled vehicles at the center and (2)

require the units to ship their tracked vehicles to the center at
an estimated cost of $222 million through fiscal year 2009. This
alternative, according to the study, would avoid the cost of
modernizing the tracked vehicles, allow a reduction in contract
maintenance costs of an estimated $104 million annually, and
eliminate the necessity of training units on older equipment. The
Army had not made a decision on whether to accept the recommended
alternative as of July 1999.

Exercise Results Are According to the Army's training center
regulation, take- home packages are Not Routinely Used to provided
to each unit to document all of its after action reviews, describe

performance strengths and weaknesses, and recommend a focus for
home Improve Proficiency

station training. However, we found that ineffective take- home
packages and a lack of training opportunities at their home
stations diminish the value of units' training experiences at the
centers. Consequently, systemic weaknesses demonstrated by units
during training center exercises are not being addressed.

Responses to our survey indicate that 30 percent of the commanders
felt that take- home packages were marginally useful or not
useful. Another 35 percent believed the take- home packages to be
somewhat useful. Several commanders described their packages as
worthless because they

were written in generic language and lacked specificity. One
commander

noted that the package arrived a full 3 months after the rotation
ended; another noted that he had not received any feedback or
materials from his unit's rotation to the training center. A third
described the take- home materials as an afterthought, built
around the shortcomings of people, not systems. Finally, one
seemed surprised at his package, noting that its content did not
seem to match the comments provided at the after- action reviews
provided during the exercise. Commanders also cited limited
training opportunities when they return to home station as
inhibiting units from using training center results to improve
their skills. Most units begin a support and recovery cycle 9
immediately following training center exercises and at the same
time begin to lose many of the people who participated in the
exercise. Forty- two

percent of the units who responded to our questionnaire said
training center exercises were only marginally useful or not
useful at all after only 3 months. Only 22 percent of the
commanders said their units had been able to maintain unit
strengths at the company level and train on weaknesses after
returning to home station. Moreover, 26 percent and

27 percent, respectively, said their units had been able to
conduct only a minimum amount of training at the company or
battalion levels.

Another reason for the limited usefulness of exercise results is
the significant personnel turnover that occurs in units following
training center exercises. One commander at Fort Hood, for
example, said that personnel turnover had left the battalion
mostly untrained within 30 days of its return from the NTC. His
unit lost 16 tank crews that it had borrowed from other

units for the exercise, 14 platoon leaders had changed jobs, and 4
company executive officers and 10 platoon leaders also left the
unit. As result, the unit that was left to put its lessons learned
to use was far different from the one that trained at the center.
Table 2 summarizes the percent of key leaders lost by units within
90 days after training at a center in fiscal year

1998, as reported to us by unit commanders who responded to our
questionnaire.

9 A support and recovery cycle is a period of time after a major
exercise during which units, for example, provide leave for
personnel, repair and clean equipment, or order new spare parts.

Table 2: Key Leaders Lost Within 90 Days in Units That Trained at
the Combat Training Centers (fiscal year 1998) Key leader Percent
of units that lost this leader

Battalion commander 21 Battalion executive officer 55 Battalion
personnel officer (S- 1) 53 Battalion intelligence officer (S- 2)
56 Battalion operations officer (S- 3) 57 Battalion maintenance
officer (S- 4) 53 Note: Based on responses from 96 units. Source:
Developed by GAO from questionnaire responses.

When information provided by commanders on personnel turnover and
training accomplished by the units 90 days following training
center exercises is compared with the readiness reported by the
units for the same 90- day period, a significant disparity is
revealed. The formal readiness assessments submitted 10 do not
reflect the lack of opportunity to train on weaknesses identified
during the exercises or the rapid loss of experienced leaders
following the training. As a result many units reported very high
levels of readiness for months after their training center
exercises even

though serious training shortcomings identified at the centers had
not been corrected and the majority of senior unit leaders had
been lost due to personnel turnover. Fifty- four of the 96
battalions that returned our survey reported the same or a higher
level of overall readiness, personnel readiness, and training
readiness, even though 95 percent reported a significant loss of
key personnel during the first 90 days after the training center
exercises and 76 percent of the commanders reported being unable
to work on all weaknesses identified at the center. 10 Under the
Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.

Assessment Plan The Army has not implemented a plan for adequately
assessing training Needed to Better results for the purpose of
integrating them with the Army's training and doctrine development
activities. Consequently, the Army is not effectively

Integrate Lessons capitalizing on the lessons that it learns from
its training centers. Learned Into Army Specifically, improvements
to training and doctrine are hampered by a lack Training and
Doctrine of standardized data to assess trends and performance
measures to evaluate the effectiveness of the centers in meeting
their objectives.

Centers Lack Standardized The Army has gathered large amounts of
data at its combat training centers Data for more than 15 years.
However, despite being one of the Army's key objectives for
establishing the centers, past data collection efforts have not
consistently been used to improve Army training and doctrine.
Because it has not standardized data collection programs at its
centers, information from the centers cannot be combined to assess
trends. Moreover, each

center has a different contractor for data collection and each
uses its own proprietary computer software. The cumulative effect
is that much of the information collected cannot be used by the
Army's Combined Arms Center (CAC) to develop lessons learned from
the exercises. For example, one study conducted by the Army Center
for Lessons Learned (CALL) 11 revealed that 90 percent of the
instrumentation data collected at the CTCs

is not sent to CALL to be archived. However, even if the data were
sent to CALL, it does not have the capability to read the data.
The problems with data collection and analysis at the Army's
training centers have existed for a long time. In July 1986, we
reported that the Army had not adequately defined its analysis
needs and corresponding data requirements, nor developed criteria
for performance measurement. 12 We concluded that the Army had
spent millions of dollars collecting

information that it was reluctant to rely on for developing Army-
wide lessons. Today, the situation is not fundamentally different.

In 1995, CAC developed a plan for collecting, analyzing,
archiving, and disseminating combat training center data. During
the period January through June 1995, CAC, with contractor
assistance, identified the data 11 The Center for Lessons Learned,
a component of the Army's Combined Arms Center, collects,
analyzes, and disseminates lessons learned from training and
actual operations to the total Army via written reports and an
electronic database. 12 Army Training: National Training Center's
Potential Has Not Been Realized (GAO/NSIAD-86-130, July 23, 1986).

needs of the centers, Army schools and doctrine proponents, and
unit leaders. The ability of data collection systems to meet these
needs was then assessed. The study group concluded that the data
being collected did not support the needs of most users outside
the centers, and CAC

developed a master plan to meet the requirements. The in- depth
plan provided the framework for on- site teams of 10 personnel to
collect and collate data at each center from units, training
center observer- controllers, and the existing instrumentation
systems. However, the Army's Training and Doctrine Command decided
not to fund the program. The estimated cost to implement this plan
was about $2 million. Consequently, the data collected today is
essentially the same as was collected in 1995, and a plan for
implementing data collection methods to meet Army needs and
fulfill one of the objectives for establishing the centers has
still not been implemented. Centers Lack Performance An even more
fundamental weakness is that the Army has no standard Measures

performance measures to gauge how well the centers are carrying
out their assigned responsibilities nor has it conducted an
assessment of the center's effectiveness either individually or
collectively. A set of measures would provide a set of benchmarks
that the Army could use to better focus the training conducted at
these centers and better gauge whether training at the centers is
improving the readiness of the Army's units to fight in these

larger formations. Establishing such performance measures is a
fundamental management principle and is consistent with the
Government Performance and Results Act, which calls on all
government entities to evaluate the results of their programs
through the use of performance

measures. Without such measures, the Army is left to a subjective
ad hoc system of measurement. For example, a 1998 review by the
Army's Center for Lessons Learned showed that units training at
the NTC have continued to make many of the same mistakes since
1994 (see table 3). The Army has not developed a similar analysis
for the other centers because the data needed is not available.

Table 3: Examples of Recurring Problems Demonstrated by Units at
the NTC Since 1994 Battlefield operating system Problem area
Examples

Maneuver Direct fire planning Company/ teams tend to develop a
scheme of movement and not a scheme of fire and execution and
maneuver. Inadequate fire control within companies results in
ineffective

placement of fires on the enemy. Movement formations

Forces do not take effective action when in contact with the
enemy. Units have and techniques problems massing combat power and
fight piecemeal. Use of dismounted

Battle staffs seldom consider dismounted infantry in planning.
Dismounted infantry infantry is not integrated with the scheme of
maneuver. Commanders do not specify a clear task and purpose for
dismounted infantry. Fire support Integration of fire

Commanders do not integrate artillery with maneuver forces,
resulting in support with inadequate support, unclear orders, and
confusion. As a result, commanders maneuver

cannot control or mass all weapons systems. Command and control
Battle tracking and

Staffs do not give their commanders sufficient information for
effective mission predictive analysis analysis. Units do a poor
job of reporting information to the tactical operations center.

Military decision Staffs lack the training required to conduct the
military decision- making process to making process standard.
Commanders often dominate the planning process. Commanders too
often spend most of their time at the main command post
supervising staff. Troop leading and Company/ team leaders do not
regularly conduct precombat checks or discipline inspections.
Small arms weapons are not properly maintained and cleaned.

Field sanitation standards are not enforced. Noise and light
discipline are not maintained. Mobility and survivability/ Force
protection When units encounter chemical agents, they do not have
a plan to react. Units nuclear, biological, chemical are generally
unprepared to conduct thorough chemical decontamination

operations. Obstacles

Obstacles are not planned or emplaced to enhance the overall
capabilities. coordination and

Commanders have weak knowledge of obstacle integration procedures.
integration Fratricide incidents are increased because minefield
records are incomplete or not forwarded to higher headquarters as
required.

Breaching operations Units fail to plan deliberate breach
operations even when mission analysis clearly indicates that it is
appropriate. Fundamentals of breaching operations are not
understood or implemented. Combat service support Medical support
Medical personnel do not see wounded soldiers in a timely manner.
The typical planning and

died- of- wounds rate is seldom below 50 percent. Casualty
evacuation is a execution

serious problem. Note: The examples shown were identified in the
source analysis as continuing through each quarter since 1994.

Source: Analysis of NTC exercise results conducted by the Army's
Center for Army Lessons Learned. In October 1996 TRADOC
established a remedial action program (T- RAP) to correct unit
deficiencies and improve performance using trend observation to
(1) identify recurring problems affecting unit performance, (2)
develop and implement comprehensive solutions, and (3) validate
that

solutions are implemented. The program has not been very
successful because accurate and complete data to use in
identifying recurring problems were lacking and the program lacks
an enforcement mechanism for implementing changes. According to
Army officials, the Army's Combined Arms Center plans nevertheless
to re- emphasize the T- RAP

program. However, the benefits that could be derived from Army
efforts to reverse negative trends through T- RAP cannot be
realized until a comprehensive data collection and analysis plan
is implemented at the CTCs.

Notwithstanding the fact that 83 percent our survey's respondents
said that the exercises were very useful in enhancing battalion-
and company- level proficiency, they also identified aspects of
training at the CTCs that they

believe should be changed to make the exercises better in
preparing units to accomplish assigned missions. Table 4 shows the
areas where the commanders believe improvement is needed.

Table 4: Aspects of Training That Commanders Believe Need to Be
Improved Training aspects Total NTC JRTC CMTC

Number of respondents 96 40 41 15 Take home materials for use at
home station 27 10 15 2 Equipment draw procedures at the CTC 23 16
5 2 After action reviews 21 9 11 1 Live- fire exercises 20 8 8 4
Deployment from home station to the CTC 11 4 4 3 Force- on- force
exercises 10 3 3 4 Source: GAO survey on CTCs.

As shown by the table, a number of respondents felt that their
training center experiences could have been enhanced through
better take- home packages, improved procedures for drawing pre-
positioned equipment, and more effective after action reports. For
example, 27 of the 96 respondents believed that improvements could
be made in the take- home packages for

use at home station. Conclusions The Army is operating training
centers that are rightfully the envy of the rest of the world's
armies, allied and enemy alike. Collectively, they offer diverse
physical environments that provide realistic battlefield
conditions

enabling the Army's personnel to experience the closest thing
possible to actual combat. Their sophisticated instrumentation and
network of trained observers provide unparalleled opportunities to
develop leaders and improve the readiness of the Army's units to
engage in combat. Over 83 percent of the units responding to our
survey believed their training at a combat training center was
very useful in enhancing their unit's combat proficiency. However,
the objectives the Army established for its combat training
centers to increase unit readiness, produce bold leaders, embed
doctrine, and provide feedback and a data source for lessons
learned are

not being fully realized. Several persistent problems personnel
shortages, turnover, and high operating tempo have decreased the
benefits of training exercises at the combat training centers
because they have inhibited units from being fully prepared for
the training. The Army's Forces Command has recently taken a first
step toward improving unit preparedness for training at the NTC
and JRTC by requiring units in the future to be certified as ready
for the training. Notwithstanding the benefits of a certification
program, the

problems related to personnel shortages, turnover, and high
operating tempo are likely to continue to adversely affect
training at home stations, and the Army has not factored those
problems into the certification

process. Optimally, units would be fully resourced and allowed to
conduct several months of uninterrupted training in preparation
for training center exercises. But, in today's environment, where
a smaller force is being used for an increased number of
operations, such a situation is not feasible. In recognition of
the impact of these factors on home station training programs, one
center the CMTC has provided units with preparatory training time
at the center before exercises begin. Unit commanders and center
officials believe this investment has resulted in effective
training for

the units. The problems of maintaining pre- positioned equipment
and the age of it have also detracted from units training
experiences at the NTC and the JRTC. Because of the amount of
equipment that is not in service at any given time, units and
personnel miss valuable training experiences at the centers that
cannot be emulated at home station. The problem of being
unfamiliar with equipment also degrades the training experience.
Training conditions at the centers are being made less stringent
to compensate for unit shortcomings. As a result, the threats and
conditions

that units will certainly face on future battlefields are not
routinely portrayed. These threats and conditions such as dealing
with terrorists, operations in urban terrain, and civilians on the
battlefield are not routinely incorporated into the exercises at
each of the centers. By limiting the conditions and not accurately
portraying current and future threats, the value of the training
provided at these centers is diminished. Moreover, because many of
the conditions cannot be replicated at home stations, units and
their leaders are being denied the best opportunity to prepare for
the demanding conditions of present and future operations. The
Army has not made a commitment to achieving its objective of
collecting data at the centers to facilitate Army- wide lessons
learned, research, and doctrine development. Until the Army
implements a plan to collect the information needed by all
organizations and establishes

performance measures consistent with the Government Performance
and Results Act, one of the most important reasons for
establishing and operating the centers will remain unmet.
Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct
the Commanders of the Army Forces Command, the Army Training and
Doctrine Command, and the Seventh Army Training Command to take
the following actions to enhance the value of the Army's combat
training centers to the Army and to units training at the centers.
Amend training exercise schedules at the centers so that time is
allocated at the beginning of each training rotation for units to
conduct a

limited amount of internal unit training before the center's
observers/ controllers and OPFOR begin training with the units.
While this might lengthen the total training time by a few days,
the gains in unit synchronization and execution skills and the
improved familiarization with pre- positioned equipment can be
expected to increase the training benefits to units and their
leaders.

 In accordance with Army Regulation 350- 50, paragraphs 1- 5 and
1- 6, which stipulates that the centers will use the most
realistic and challenging training conditions available,
incorporate into the exercises at each combat training center the
full spectrum of threats, opposing forces capabilities, and
conditions that units are likely to encounter in future conflicts,
especially ones that cannot be easily duplicated at home stations.
Specific emphasis should be afforded to operations in urban
terrain, dealing with terrorists, operations with military forces

from other countries, and activities involving civilians on the
battlefield and interactions with the media.  Develop and
implement a comprehensive data requirements and collection plan to
enable center officials to systematically collect data that can be
used to improve training and doctrine. This plan should

include (1) an approach for linking the centers by using
compatible computer software so that Army- wide assessments can be
made, (2) performance measures and the methodology to be used to
periodically assess whether the centers are meeting their
objectives, and (3) the specific information needed by research
organizations, training

and doctrine development commands, the centers, and units. The
data collection plan developed by the Army Combined Arms Center in
1995 would serve as a good basis for developing a current plan to
collect and analyze pertinent data for Army- wide use.

We are not making any recommendations on the pre- positioned
fleets at NTC and JRTC since the Army is currently reviewing
various alternatives to address the problems noted in this report
and by others. Nevertheless, it is important that the Army
promptly decide on a course of action to deal with these problems
if units are to derive maximum benefits from their training at the
centers.

Agency Comments and In commenting on a draft of this report (see
app. IV), DOD said that it

Our Evaluation generally concurred with our findings and
recommendations. With respect to our recommendation to amend
training exercise schedules so that time

is allocated at the beginning of each training rotation for units
to conduct internal training, DOD said the idea had merit and that
it would review the balance and prioritization of training events
at the centers to maximize training effectiveness. Although DOD
did not elaborate on what such a review would entail, we believe
that it is reasonable to expect that the review would compare the
training needs identified during a unit's home station training
and readiness evaluation in preparation for CTC training to the
skills needed for units to successfully conduct battalion- and
brigade- level exercises. It is also our expectation that the Army
would

consider alternatives for facilitating internal unit training
after units arrive at the training centers. For example, there may
be opportunities to streamline the activities presently conducted
by units at the centers at the beginning and end of their force-
on- force exercises. Alternatively, some force- on- force training
could be sacrificed to allow time for initial internal training.
Finally, on rare occasions, the centers might need to lengthen a
rotation by a day or two. DOD also stated that the Forces Command

commander has recently addressed this issue by requiring that
units in the future pass mandatory training gates prior to a CTC
rotation. Our report discusses this change but notes that,
problems with unit training are likely to persist because the Army
has not factored personnel shortages, turnover, and high operating
tempo into this initiative.

With respect to our recommendation that the training centers
provide the most realistic and challenging training conditions
possible, incorporating the full spectrum of threats and enemy
capabilities, DOD stated it has already started a comprehensive
review of the opposing force and battlefield dynamics at the
centers. According to DOD, the results of this review, which are
expected in the fall of 1999 will form the basis for developing
future CTC training scenarios that train units to counter the full

spectrum of threats. With regard to our recommendation to develop
and implement a comprehensive data requirements and collection
plan for the centers to provide the Army with data to improve
training and doctrine, DOD stated it will, as we suggested, use
the CTC Data Master Plan developed by the Army

Combined Arms Center in 1995 as a basis for implementing such a
system. DOD also noted implementation of a more effective data
collection and analysis system for the centers is essential to the
Army's renewed emphasis on identifying training deficiency trends
and developing corrective actions. As agreed with your office,
unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier,
we will not distribute it until 30 days from the date of this
letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report to
interested congressional committees. We are also sending copies of
this report to the Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of
Defense and the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army.
Copies will also be made available to others upon request.

Key contacts and contributors on this assignment are listed in
appendix V. Mark E. Gebicke Director, National Security
Preparedness Issues

Letter

Letter 1 Appendix I

36 Factors Adversely Affecting Home Station

Training as Reported by Units on Our Survey

Appendix II 37

Results of Our Survey on Army Combat Training Centers

Appendix III 39

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Appendix IV

42 Comments From the Department of Defense

Appendix V 45

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments Tables Table 1: Comparison
of Training Features at the Army's Combat

Training Centers 17

Table 2: Key Leaders Lost Within 90 Days in Units That Trained at
the Combat Training Centers (fiscal year 1998) 23 Table 3:
Examples of Recurring Problems Demonstrated by

Units at the NTC Since 1994 26 Table 4: Aspects of Training That
Commanders Believe Need to Be Improved 27

Table I. 1: Battalion- level Training 36 Table I. 2: Company/
Platoon- level Training 36

Figures Figure 1: Desert Environment at the National Training
Center 5 Figure 2: Wooded Terrain at the Combat Maneuver Training
Center 6

Figure 3: Mock Civilian Village at the Joint Readiness Training
Center 7 Figure 4: Opposing Force Vehicle and Soldier at the
National Training

Center 8

Abbreviations

CAC Combined Arms Center CALL Center for Army Lessons Learned CMTC
Combat Manuever Training Center CTC Combat Training Center FMC
fully mission capable JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center NTC
National Training Center OPFOR Opposing Force OPTEMPO Operating
Tempo OOTW operations other than war SORTS Status of Resources and
Training System TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command T- RAP TRADOC
Remedial Action Program

Factors Adversely Affecting Home Station Appendi I x Training as
Reported by Units on Our Survey Table I. 1: Battalion- level
Training Number of respondents

Personnel shortages 55 Personnel turnover 49 Overall operating
tempo 45 Training ranges and maneuver space 32 Special duties and
personnel taskings 29 Training money 26 Other 14 Equipment
condition 6 Peacekeeping operations 4 Equipment shortages 2

Table I. 2: Company/ Platoon- level Training Number of respondents

Personnel shortages 61 Personnel turnover 54 Overall operating
tempo 48 Special duties and personnel taskings 30 Training ranges
and maneuver space 26 Training money 14 Other 11 Equipment
condition 7 Peacekeeping operations 5 Equipment shortages 4 Notes:
Based on responses from 96 battalions that trained at an Army
Combat Training Center during fiscal year 1998.

Respondents identified multiple factors in their responses.

Results of Our Survey on Army Combat Appe ndi I I x Training
Centers In relation to your unit's wartime mission and the
expected conditions and threat, how useful or relevant were the
exercises at the combat training center (CTC) in each of the
following areas?

Somewhat Marginally

Very useful useful useful Not useful No response

Number of respondents Battalion- level proficiency in general 80
15 1 0 0 Company- level proficiency in general 81 15 0 0 0 METL
proficiency for: - Combat arms units 65 7 5 3 16 - Combat support
units 54 17 3 4 18 - Combat service support units 63 23 4 1 5
Individual proficiency for: - Combat arms soldiers 60 14 4 3 15 -
Support soldiers 62 14 2 3 15 - Service support soldiers 76 17 2 0
1 Unit deployment procedures 55 31 9 1 0 Supply/ maintenance
procedures 56 33 5 1 1 Sustainment operation 65 28 2 1 0 Medical
treatment and evacuation 60 27 9 0 0 Personnel replacement 27 37
21 11 0 Military operations in urban terrain 19 14 22 35 6 The
handling of civilians on the battlefield 42 27 17 10 0 Responding
to terrorist activities 22 26 26 19 3 Responding to chemical
attack 39 38 11 6 2 Coordinating joint operations 9 25 22 33 7

Notes: Based on responses from 96 battalions that trained at an
Army Combat Training Center during fiscal year 1998. Respondents
identified multiple factors in their responses.

In relation to your unit's wartime mission, how would you describe
the following aspects of CTC training in relation to improving the
ability of your units and overall readiness?

Somewhat Marginally

Very useful useful useful Not useful No response

Number of respondents Deployment from home station to the CTC 50
34 10 1 1 Equipment draw procedures at the CTC 20 23 33 13 7
Force- on- force exercises 75 18 1 1 1 Live fire exercises 60 16 9
3 After action reviews 61 25 9 1 0 CTC take- home materials for
use at home

31 34 23 7 1 station Follow- on training conducted since return to
36 37 20 3 0

home station Considering the personnel turnover in your unit and
training opportunities since the CTC rotation, how useful were the
exercises in relation to determining training needs and assessing
unit readiness at each of the following time intervals?

Somewhat Marginally

Very useful useful useful Not useful No response

Number of respondents Immediately upon return to home station 59
23 8 6 0 One month after return to home station 43 34 13 5 1 Two
months after return to home station 34 37 19 4 2 Three months
after return to home station 26 40 22 6 2 Now 25 30 29 11 1

Appendi I I I x Objectives, Scope, and Methodology The objectives
of our review were to determine (1) whether units training at the
Army Combat Training Centers are adequately prepared for the
exercises; (2) whether training exercises are realistic in terms
of expected battlefield conditions; (3) whether pre- positioned
equipment adequately supports the training mission; (4) how units
use lessons learned at the centers; and (5) how the Army uses the
results of the exercises to help revise training and improve the
Army's training doctrine. Our review focused on active component
Army units.

An important tool for our review was a questionnaire sent to each
commander of all 123 battalions that trained at one of the three
Army Combat Training Centers in fiscal year 1998. We received
complete responses from 104 (85 percent) of the units. Eight of
these responses were unusable because the respondents were not
with the unit when it trained at the center in 1998. We tabulated
results from the remaining 96 valid responses for report purposes.
The valid responses represent 40 units that trained at the
National Training Center (NTC), 41 that trained at the Joint
Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and 15 that trained at the
Combat

Manuever Training Center (CMTC). We also consulted with staff from
the Army Inspector General's Office regarding their study of the
Army's Combat Training Centers. To determine whether units
training at the centers are adequately prepared for the exercises,
we visited all three Army combat training centers. At the centers,
we interviewed key center officials from the command operations
group, the opposing force commanders, and center observer/
controllers. At each of the centers, we also spoke with and
obtained information from unit commanders and personnel who were
participating in exercises at each of the centers about their
preparations for their rotation to a training center. We also
visited the 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division at Fort

Stewart, Georgia, to obtain information from the command staff of
five battalions that used the National Training Center in fiscal
year 1998. Lastly, through the use of our questionnaire, we
obtained information from 96

battalions regarding their experiences in preparing for a CTC
rotation. We also obtained personnel information regarding the
Army's on- board strength and operating tempo from various
sources, including the Department of Defense's (DOD) quarterly
readiness report. To determine whether training exercises are
realistic in terms of expected battlefield conditions, we had
discussions with the command operations group, opposing force
commanders, and observer/ controllers at each of the centers, and
we observed unit training exercises at the combat training

centers. At each center the Army provided an experienced escort
officer to ensure our understanding of mission objectives and
actions taken by the training unit in response to the opposing
force threat. We also visited the Army's Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) at Fort Monroe, Virginia, to determine the basis
for the threats portrayed at the combat

training centers; we interviewed responsible officials at TRADOC's
Intelligence Directorate and reviewed appropriate documentation.
We used data from our survey to obtain information from units that
had trained at the centers about the scenarios and battlefield
conditions portrayed at the centers. We also reviewed pertinent
documentation from the Army's Forces Command.

To determine whether pre- positioned equipment adequately supports
the training mission we reviewed pertinent documentation from the
NTC and JRTC, observed equipment being issued, discussed equipment
maintenance and age problems with appropriate officials at the
training centers, compared equipment on- hand at the National
Training Center with Army inventory records to determine the age
of equipment at the center, and solicited information from unit
commanders using our questionnaire. We also worked closely with
officials from the Army's Inspector General's Office who reviewed
equipment issues at the centers during the same time

frame as our study. To determine how units use lessons learned
from the centers we reviewed after action reports to determine
their organization and the specificity of their comments and
recommendations, we attended after action reviews at the centers,
and we solicited information from battalion commanders who
completed our questionnaire. We also compared (1) personnel
turnover in these units as well as their training to correct
problems identified at the

centers during the 3 months following CTC training and (2) the
readiness reported by these unit commanders under the Status of
Resources and Training System for the same 3- month period. We
made this analysis to determine whether these factors were used to
report readiness.

To determine how the Army uses results of training exercises to
help revise training and improve doctrine, we performed work at
Department of the Army Headquarters, Army Forces Command
Headquarters, Army Training and Doctrine Command Headquarters, and
Seventh Army Training Command Headquarters. At these locations, we
interviewed responsible

personnel and obtained existing Army regulations concerning Army
assessment requirements and procedures. We also visited the Army's
Combat Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. There we met with

responsible officials at the Center for Army Lessons Learned and
obtained appropriate documentation. We conducted our review from
September 1998 to July 1999 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.

Appendi I V x Comments From the Department of Defense

Appe ndi V x GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contacts
Carol R. Schuster (202) 512- 5140 William M. Solis (202) 512- 5140
Acknowledgments In addition to the contact named above, Ray S.
Carroll Jr., Lester L. Ward, and Paul A. Gvoth Jr., made key
contributions to this report.

Figure 1: Desert Environment at the National Training Center 5
Figure 2: Wooded Terrain at the Combat Maneuver Training Center 6
Figure 3: Mock Civilian Village at the Joint Readiness Training
Center 7 Figure 4: Opposing Force Vehicle and Soldier at the
National Training

Center 8

Table 1: Comparison of Training Features at the Army's Combat
Training Centers 17 Table 2: Key Leaders Lost Within 90 Days in
Units That Trained at the

Combat Training Centers (fiscal year 1998) 23 Table 3: Examples of
Recurring Problems Demonstrated by

Units at the NTC Since 1994 26 Table 4: Aspects of Training That
Commanders Believe Need to Be Improved 27

Table I. 1: Battalion- level Training 36 Table I. 2: Company/
Platoon- level Training 36

GAO United States General Accounting Office

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Appendix I

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Appendix II

Appendix II Results of Our Survey on Army Combat Training Centers

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Appendix III

Appendix III Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

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Appendix III Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

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Appendix IV

Appendix IV Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix IV Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix V

(703250) Let t e r

Appendix V GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

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