United Nations: Status of U.S. Contributions and Arrears (Letter Report,
07/28/1999, GAO/NSIAD-99-187).
To reduce its arrears and avoid losing the right to vote in the U.N.
General Assembly, the United States will need to pay about $153 million
in addition to the $508 million that the State Department now expects to
pay before the end of 1999. The United States risks losing its vote in
the General Assembly in January 2000 because the sum of its assessed
contributions for the last two years--the "yardstick" for measuring U.S.
arrears when applying Article 19--had declined each year since 1996.
This decline largely reflects a decrease in assessments for U.N.
peacekeeping operations since 1995. In essence, the United States now
faces the loss of its right to vote in the General Assembly because its
assessed contributions are substantially less than in 1996 while its
arrears have stayed about the same. This explains why, with basically
the same level of arrears as in past years, the United States narrowly
avoided losing its right to vote on January 1, 1999. U.N. records show
that U.S. arrears for regular budget, international tribunals and
peacekeeping operations totaled $1,294 million on January 1, 1999. Of
this amount, the United States has refused to pay $472 million--about 36
percent--for legislative and policy reasons. The United Nations reported
in February 1999 that 44 of the 185 U.N. members had arrears equaling or
exceeding their assessed contributions for the preceding two full years
as of January 1, 1999. As of mid-May, six of these members had paid
enough to regain their right to vote in the General Assembly; eight
others were allowed to vote temporarily because their failure to pay was
judged to be due to conditions beyond their control, such as civil wars
or natural disasters. The remaining 30 members lost the right to vote in
the General Assembly.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-99-187
TITLE: United Nations: Status of U.S. Contributions and Arrears
DATE: 07/28/1999
SUBJECT: Budget outlays
Future budget projections
Federal aid to foreign countries
Financial management
International organizations
International relations
Debt
IDENTIFIER: Kosovo (Serbia)
Sierra Leone
East Timor (Indonesia)
Western Sahara
Angola
Central African Republic
Macedonia
Yugoslavia
Somalia
Eastern Slovenia
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GAO/NSIAD-99-187
A Report to the Chairman, Committee on International
Relations, House of Representatives
July 1999 UNITED NATIONS Status of U. S. Contributions and Arrears
National Security and International Affairs Division
B-282243 Letter July 28, 1999 The Honorable Benjamin Gilman
Chairman, Committee on International Relations House of
Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman: For several years the United States has been in
arrears in the payment of its assessed contributions for the U. N.
regular budget, international tribunals, and peacekeeping
operations. Assessed contributions which are levied on U. N.
members to fund the organization's activities are considered to be
in arrears if unpaid by December 31 of the year they came due.
Article 19 of the U. N. Charter states that a member shall lose
its right to vote in the
U. N. General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or
exceeds the amount of its assessed contributions for the preceding
2 years. You were concerned that the United States could lose its
right to vote on January 1, 2000, unless it reduces its arrears
before the end of 1999. As you requested, this report (1)
estimates the amount the United States will need
to pay before the end of 1999 to avoid losing its right to vote,
taking into account currently anticipated payments; (2) discusses
the trend in U. S. assessed contributions and arrears that has led
to the current situation; (3) discusses current U. S. arrears and
the amounts withheld for legislative and policy reasons; and (4)
describes the status of member states that lost their
right to vote in the General Assembly at the beginning of 1999.
This report updates information contained in our prior report to
you on U. N. financial issues and U. S. arrears. 1
Results in Brief We estimate that the United States will need to
pay about $153 million in addition to the $508 million that the
Department of State currently anticipates paying before the end of
1999 to reduce its arrears sufficiently
to avoid losing its right to vote in the General Assembly on January 1, 2000. Our estimate reflects the difference between projected U. S. arrears on that date of $1,435 million and projected assessed contributions for the preceding 2 years (1998 and 1999) of $1,282 million. Anticipated U. S. 1 United Nations: Financial Issues and U. S. Arrears (
GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR
, June 18, 1998).
to avoid losing its right to vote in the General Assembly on
January 1, 2000. Our estimate reflects the difference between
projected U. S. arrears on that date of $1,435 million and
projected assessed contributions for the preceding 2 years (1998
and 1999) of $1,282 million. Anticipated U. S. 1 United Nations:
Financial Issues and U. S. Arrears ( GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR , June
18, 1998).
payments during 1999 consist of $3 million from fiscal year 1998
funds, $301 million from fiscal year 1999 funds, and $204 million
from fiscal year 2000 funds. 2 The Department of State has
requested congressional authorization to reprogram $66 million of
fiscal year 1999 funds to pay expected additional assessments for
the U. N. peacekeeping operations in Kosovo and East Timor
recently authorized by the U. N. Security Council.
Payment of this amount would reduce our estimate of the needed
additional U. S. payment to $87 million. Changes in these
assumptions or U. N. financial needs during the remainder of 1999,
particularly changes in the amount of peacekeeping assessments
that the United States pays, would affect our estimate. The United
States faces the loss of its vote in the General Assembly in
January 2000 because the sum of its assessed contributions for the
prior 2 years the yardstick for measuring U. S. arrears when
applying article 19 has declined each year since 1996. This
decline largely reflects a decrease in assessments for U. N.
peacekeeping operations since 1995. In essence, the United States
now faces the loss of its right to vote in the General Assembly
because its assessed contributions are substantially less than in
1996 while its arrears have remained about the same. This explains
why, with basically the same level of arrears as in past years,
the United States narrowly avoided losing its right to vote on
January 1, 1999, and will lose its right to vote on January 1,
2000, unless it reduces its arrears. Figure 1 shows the decline in
U. S. assessed contributions for the prior 2
years relative to U. S. arrears on January 1, 1996- 2000. 2 The
anticipated payment from fiscal year 2000 funds assumes that
Congress will appropriate the $304 million requested for payment
of the U. N. regular budget for 1999, subject to a $100 million
withholding pending executive branch certification that the U. N.
's biennium regular budget remains below $2. 533 billion. The
United States has paid its calendar year assessments with funds
appropriated for the following fiscal year since 1983.
Figure 1: Comparison of U. S. Assessed Contributions for the
United Nations for the Prior 2 Years and U. S. Arrears on January
1, 1996- 2000 Dollars in millions
$3, 000 $2,643
$2, 500 $2,098
$2, 000 $1,480
$1,435 $1, 500
$1,231 $1,303
$1,313 $1,320 $1,294 $1,282 $1, 000
$500 $0
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 (est)
Calendar year
Assessed contri buti ons for pri or 2 years Arrears balance Note:
Article 19 of the U. N. Charter states that a member shall lose
its right to vote in the U. N. General Assembly if its arrears
balance exceeds its assessed contributions for the prior 2 years.
Estimated
arrears balance for 1999 assumes that the Department of State will
make all currently anticipated payments before the end of 1999,
including a $204 million payment from fiscal year 2000 funds.
Source: Compiled by GAO from U. N. and Department of State
financial data.
As reflected in figure 1, U. N. records showed that U. S. arrears
for the regular budget, international tribunals, and peacekeeping
operations were $1,294 million on January 1, 1999. This amount
accounted for about 64 percent of the $2 billion of arrears owed
by U. N. members on that date for the U. N. regular budget,
international tribunals, and peacekeeping
operations. Of its $1,294 million of arrears, the United States
has determined it will not pay $472 million (about 36 percent) for
legislative and policy reasons. In February 1999, the United
Nations reported that 44 of 185 U. N. members had arrears equaling
or exceeding their assessed contributions for the preceding 2 full
years as of January 1, 1999. As of mid- May, six of these
members had paid enough to regain their right to vote in the U. N.
General Assembly; and eight others were permitted to vote
temporarily, because their failure to pay was judged to be due to
conditions beyond their control, such as civil war or severe
natural disasters. The remaining 30 members lost the right to vote
in the General Assembly. Based on past experience, the Chief of
the U. N. Contributions Service expects that, by the end of the
year, most of the remaining members will make at least the minimum
payment necessary to regain their right to vote in the General
Assembly.
Background Article 17 of the U. N. Charter states that the U. N.
's expenses shall be borne by its members as apportioned by the
General Assembly. Basic U. N. operations, including most
headquarters activities, are funded through regular budget
assessments paid by member states. Currently, the United States is
assessed at a rate of 25 percent for the U. N. regular budget.
Member states are assessed separately and at different rates for
the budgets of international criminal tribunals 3 and U. N.
peacekeeping operations. Currently, the United States is assessed
at an average rate of 27.7 percent of the amount budgeted for
international tribunals 4 and about 30.4 percent of the amount
budgeted for peacekeeping operations. 5 Regular budget assessments
are due on January 31 of each year and assessments for
international tribunals and peacekeeping operations are due within
30 days of the date they are billed. These assessed contributions
are considered to be in arrears if unpaid by December 31 of the
year they came due. Table 1 shows U. N. assessments for the U. N.
regular budget, international tribunals, and peacekeeping
operations for
the 10 largest contributors for 1999, as of June 30, 1999. 3 The
United Nations has established international criminal tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to investigate and prosecute
persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in those regions. 4 The
United States is assessed at the regular budget rate (25 percent)
for one- half of the tribunals' budgets and at the peacekeeping
rate (currently about 30.4 percent) for the other half, for an
average rate of about 27. 7 percent. 5 U. S. payments for U. N.
peacekeeping after fiscal year 1995 are capped at 25 percent of
the total of all assessed contributions for an operation under
Section 404( b)( 2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of
1994- 95 (P. L. 103- 236). The United Nations, however, continues
to assess the U. S. at the higher rate because the U. N. General
Assembly has not changed its methodology for calculating the U. S.
and
other members' peacekeeping assessment rates.
Table 1: U. N. Assessments for the Regular Budget, International
Tribunals, and Peacekeeping Operations for 1999, as of June 30,
1999
Dollars in millions Regular
International Peacekeeping
Member state budget tribunals operations a Total
United States $304. 4 $45.3 $72.4 $422.1
Japan 207. 7 30.3 44.9 282.8
Germany 101. 9 14.9 22.4 139.2
France 68. 0 11.0 15.2 94.1
Italy 56. 4 8. 2 12.4 77.1
United Kingdom 52. 9 8.5 14.2 75.6
Canada 28. 6 4.2 6. 4 39.1
Spain 26. 9 3. 9 5.9 36.8
Netherlands 16. 9 2.5 3. 7 23.2
Russian Federation 15. 5 2. 5 4.9 22.9
All others 204. 6 23.6 29.6 257.8 Total $1, 083. 7 $154.8 $232.1
$1,470.7
a Partial year assessment through June 30, 1999. Source: United
Nations.
Article 19 of the U. N. Charter states that a member will lose its
right to vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears
equals or exceeds the sum of its assessed contributions for the
preceding 2 full years. The
General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote
if it judges that the member's failure to pay was due to
conditions beyond its control. A member regains its right to vote
as soon as it reduces its arrears below the level of its assessed
contributions for the preceding 2 years. A member's loss of its
right to vote in the General Assembly does not affect its right to
vote in the U. N. Security Council or in several U. N. specialized
agencies.
Although article 19 specifies that a member state's arrears must
not exceed its assessed contributions for the prior 2 years, it
does not specify how the amount of a member's arrears and assessed
contributions should be calculated or the timing of the
calculation and application of the sanction (loss of vote). In
practice, a member state is considered to be subject to article 19
if its arrears as of January 1 of a given year equal or exceed the
amount of its assessed contributions for the preceding 2 full
calendar
years. (See app. I for additional details about the calculation of
arrears and assessed contributions under article 19.)
Our Estimate of the We estimate that the United States will need
to pay about $153 million in U. S. Shortfall
addition to currently anticipated payments of $508 million before
the end of 1999 to reduce its arrears sufficiently to avoid losing
its right to vote in the General Assembly on January 1, 2000. Our
estimate of this shortfall reflects the difference between a
projected arrears balance on January 1, 2000, of $1,435 million
and projected assessed contributions for 1998 and 1999 of $1, 282
million (see table 2). Changes in these assumptions or U. N.
financial
needs during the remainder of 1999, particularly changes in the
amount of peacekeeping assessments that the United States receives
and pays, could affect our estimate.
Table 2: Estimated U. S. Contributions Shortfall on January 1,
2000 Dollars in millions
Amount U. S. assessed contributions due through 1999 (estimated)
$1, 963
Arrears (outstanding contributions for 1998 and prior periods) (1,
294) 1999 assessed contributions (estimated) (669)
Less estimated payments during 1999 $508
Fiscal year 2000 appropriations (estimated) (204) Fiscal year 1999
appropriations (estimated) (301) Fiscal year 1998 appropriations
(3)
Less U. N. credits (estimated) 20
Subtotal (projected arrears balance on January 1, 2000) $1, 435
Less projected assessed contributions due for most recent 2- year
$1, 282 period 1998 assessed contributions (613)
1999 assessed contributions (estimated) (669)
Estimated shortfall on January 1, 2000 $153
Source: Compiled by GAO from U. N. and Department of State
financial data.
The projected arrears balance on January 1, 2000, shown in table 2
reflects anticipated payments before the end of 1999 of $3 million
from fiscal year 1998 funds, $301 million from fiscal year 1999
funds, and $204 million from fiscal year 2000 funds; and credits
that the United States may receive for
unspent contributions to U. N. peacekeeping. Anticipated U. S.
payments during 1999 are comprised of the following elements:
$100 million in fiscal year 1999 funds appropriated to pay
assessed contributions for the 1998 U. N. regular budget, 6 $41
million in fiscal year 1999 funds appropriated to pay assessed
contributions for the international tribunals in Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, 7 $160 million in fiscal year 1999 funds 8 and $3 million
in fiscal year 1998
funds appropriated to pay assessed contributions for U. N.
peacekeeping operations, 9 and $204 million in fiscal year 2000
funds that the Department of State anticipates will be
appropriated to pay assessed contributions for the 1999 U. N.
regular budget.
In addition to these payments, the Department of State estimates
that the United States will receive about $20 million in credits
from the United Nations by the end of 1999, as shown in table 2.
These credits are for unspent balances from U. S. payments toward
U. N. peacekeeping
operations in prior financial periods. 10 The projected assessed
contributions for the most recent 2- year period shown in table 2
the yardstick for measuring U. S. arrears when applying article 19
on January 1, 2000 is the sum of expected U. S. assessed
contributions for 1998 and 1999 for the U. N. regular budget,
international tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and U. N.
peacekeeping operations. Table 3 shows the calculation of the
projected U. S. assessed contributions
for the 2- year period ending on January 1, 2000. 6 These funds
are available in two parts of $50 million each, subject to
executive branch certification in spring and summer 1999 that the
U. N. 1998- 1999 regular budget will not exceed $2.533 billion.
The United States paid the balance of fiscal year 1999 funds
appropriated for the U. N. regular budget (about $198 million) in
late 1998 to avoid a contribution shortfall and loss of vote on
January 1, 1999. The U. N. budget certification requirement is
contained in the Fiscal Year 1999 Commerce, State, and the
Judiciary Appropriations Act as contained in the Fiscal Year 1999
Omnibus Appropriations Act (P. L. 105- 277). 7 This amount is
comprised of about $25 million for the tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia and $16 million for the tribunal for Rwanda. 8 Congress
appropriated $231 million in fiscal year 1999 for payments for
contributions to international peacekeeping activities. 9 The
fiscal year 1998 funds were a payment for the U. N. Observation
Mission in Sierra Leone made in March 1999.
10 The United Nations refers to these as unencumbered balances.
Table 3: Estimated U. S. Assessed Contributions for the 2- Year
Period Ending on January 1, 2000 Dollars in millions
Regular International
Peacekeeping Period budget tribunals operations Total
1998 assessed contributions $298 $30 $285 $613
1999 assessed contributions (estimated) 304 45 320 669 2- year
total (estimated) $602 $75 $605 $1, 282
Note: 1999 assessments are estimated through December 31, 1999. As
of June 30, 1999, the United States had been assessed $304 million
for the regular budget, $45 million for international tribunals,
and about $72 million for peacekeeping operations. Source:
Compiled by GAO from U. N. and Department of State financial data.
According to Department of State officials, potential sources of
funding to cover the shortfall include $575 million in fiscal year
1998 and 1999 funds appropriated for arrears reduction contingent
on congressional authorization and/ or $446 million included in
the President's fiscal year 2000 budget request for arrears
payment. Congress would need to enact new legislation for the
Department of State to reduce U. S. arrears using any
of these funds. 11 Estimate Would Be Affected The estimated
shortfall of about $153 million assumes that, during 1999, the by
Changes in U. S. United States will be assessed a total of $669
million for the U. N. regular Payments
budget, international tribunals, and peacekeeping; make payments
against those assessed contributions of $508 million; and receive
credits of $20 million. Changes in the amount of U. S. payments or
U. N. credits would alter the estimated shortfall. Of these two
items, the amount of U. S. payments for assessed contributions for
U. N. peacekeeping is most susceptible to change during the rest
of the year, according to Department 11 Congress appropriated $100
million in fiscal year 1998 and $475 million in fiscal year 1999
to pay U. N. arrears contingent on authorization language.
However, the President vetoed the fiscal year 1998- 99 Department
of State authorization bill (H. R. 1757), and the Fiscal Year 1999
Omnibus Appropriations Act (P. L. 105- 277) continued to make
arrears payments contingent on authorization language. The
President's fiscal year 2000 budget requests an additional $446
million to pay arrears. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (P. L.
105- 33) allows federal budget spending caps to be adjusted to
accommodate appropriations for arrears payments through fiscal
year 2000.
of State officials. 12 As shown in table 3, our estimate assumes
that the United States will be assessed about $320 million for
peacekeeping in 1999, including about $80 million for the U. N.
operations in Kosovo and East Timor recently authorized by the U.
N. Security Council. As of June 30, 1999, the United States had
been assessed $72. 4 million for peacekeeping for 1999.
U. S. payments could change substantially in response to changes
in assessed contributions for U. N. peacekeeping. Additional U. S.
payments during 1999 in response to increased U. N. assessments
would decrease the estimated shortfall by the amount of the
additional payment. 13 In June 1999, the Department of State
requested congressional authorization to reprogram $66 million of
fiscal year 1999 funds to pay for the recently authorized U. N.
operations in Kosovo and East Timor. Payment of this amount during
1999 would reduce the estimated shortfall from about $153 million
to $87 million. In contrast, decreased U. S. payments in response
to a reduction in expected U. N. assessments for other operations
would increase the estimated shortfall.
Peacekeeping assessments could increase substantially over those
assumed in our estimate for several reasons. First, the U. N.
Security Council could authorize additional operations later this
year, for example, a
follow- on operation in East Timor, 14 or expand existing
operations, for example, the ongoing operation in Sierra Leone.
Second, the timing and amount of assessments for the newly
authorized U. N. operation in Kosovo could increase substantially.
The Department of State's reprogramming notice to Congress
estimates that this new operation will cost about $500 million
annually and assumes that the United Nations will assess member
states for half of this amount during 1999. However, according to
Department of State officials, the United Nations could assess
member states for the entire annual cost in 1999. In addition,
these officials told us 12 Department of State officials are
confident that actual credits received for unspent peacekeeping
balances will not vary substantially from their estimate. However,
we note that the United States received an unexpected $42 million
credit in July 1998 for unspent balances from prior financial
periods for U. N. peacekeeping operations. Increased credits would
reduce the estimated shortfall dollar for dollar; decreased
credits would have the reverse effect.
13 As of early June 1999, about $71 million of the $231 million of
fiscal year 1999 funds appropriated for contributions for
international peacekeeping activities were available to pay
additional peacekeeping assessments. Additional payments above
this amount would require additional appropriations.
14 According to Department of State officials, a follow- on U. N.
operation would be likely if East Timor moves toward independence
from Indonesia. In addition, the U. N. Security Council could
authorize new peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic
of Congo or Eritrea/ Ethiopia.
that the operation's annual cost could be as high as $800 million
to $1 billion. Peacekeeping assessments also could decrease
substantially from those assumed in our estimate if, for example,
the Security Council ended some operations earlier than expected
as it recently did for the operation in Angola or shortened their
mandates as it recently did for the operation in the Western
Sahara. According to the U. N. Under Secretary General for
Management, forecasting needs for peacekeeping operations is very
difficult because the levels of assessments change, the frequency
of assessments is unpredictable, the timing of the receipt of
credits of unspent funds from closed operations is uncertain, and
the troop and equipment
requirements change. Assessed The sum of U. S. assessed
contributions for the prior 2 calendar years the Contributions
yardstick for measuring U. S. arrears when applying article 19
each year declined by about $1.4 billion between 1996 and 2000.
Over the same Yardstick Declines period, U. S. arrears as
calculated by the United Nations remained relatively stable,
increasing by $138 million. The decline in U. S. assessed
contributions explains why, despite basically the same level of
arrears, the United States narrowly avoided losing its right to
vote in the General Assembly in 1999 and faces the loss of its
right to vote in 2000.
On January 1, 1996, the sum of U. S. assessed contributions for
the prior 2 years (1994 and 1995) was about $2.6 billion. By
January 1, 2000, we estimate that the sum of U. S. assessed
contributions for the prior 2 years (1998 and 1999) will have
fallen to about $1.3 billion. This decline largely reflects a
decrease in assessments for U. N. peacekeeping operations between
1995 and 1999, from about $1 billion to an estimated $320 million.
15 Peacekeeping assessments have declined because the U. N.
Security Council has approved fewer and/ or smaller peacekeeping
operations in recent years. 16 Figure 2 shows U. S. assessments
for the U. N. 15 The decline is assessments reflects the
substantial fall in the number of U. N. peacekeepers in the field
over the same period from almost 70, 000 in early 1995 to about
12,500 by the end of May 1999.
16 U. S. policy on authorizing U. N. peacekeeping operations is
discussed in Presidential Decision Directive- 25, a classified
document issued in May 1994. An unclassified summary was issued at
the same time. Among the factors to be considered under this
directive in deciding to authorize or continue operations are
whether (1) U. N. involvement advances U. S. interests; (2) there
is a threat to or breach of international peace and security; and
(3) the operation has clear and practical objectives, a mandate
appropriate to its mission, realistic exit criteria, and an
identified end point for U. N. involvement.
regular budget, international tribunals, and peacekeeping
operations between 1994 and 1999.
Figure 2: U. S. Assessments for the U. N. Regular Budget,
International Tribunals, and Peacekeeping Operations, 1994- 99
Dollars in millions
$1, 200 $1,020
$1,003 $1, 000
$800 $600
$444 $386
$400 $298
$315 $321
$312 $298
$320 $304 $285 $200
$30 $45
$0 $7
$8 $10
$0 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 (est)
Calendar year
Peacekeeping operati ons Regular budget Internati onal tribunals
Source: Compiled by GAO from U. N. and Department of State
financial data.
In contrast, U. S. arrears have been relatively stable between
1996 and 2000, increasing from about $1.2 billion to an estimated
$1.4 billion. 17 This increase reflects both the difference
between the higher U. N. assessment rate and the lower U. S.
payment rate for peacekeeping and U. S. decisions not to pay its
assessed contributions for certain U. N. operations, such as the
current U. N. operation in the Central African Republic although
the U. S. voted in favor of authorizing this operation in the U.
N. Security Council.
17 U. S. arrears increased by $762 million between 1995 and 1996,
from $469 million to $1,231 million.
Table 4 shows the decline in assessed contributions for the prior
2 years relative to U. S. arrears on January 1, 1996- 2000. As
depicted, the United States narrowly avoided losing its right to
vote on January 1, 1999, and will lose its right to vote on
January 1, 2000, unless it reduces its arrears.
Table 4: Comparison of U. S. Assessed Contributions for the United
Nations for the Prior 2Years and the U. S. Arrears on January 1,
1995- 2000
Dollars in millions Calendar year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
(estimated)
Assessed contributions for prior 2 years $2,643 $2,098 $1,480 $1,
320 $1, 282 Arrears balance 1, 231 1,303 1,313 1,294 1, 435
Difference (shortfall) $1,412 $795 $167 $26 ($ 153)
Note: Article 19 of the U. N.. Charter states that a member shall
lose its right to vote in the U. N. General Assembly if its
arrears balance exceeds its assessed contributions for the prior 2
years. Estimated arrears balance for 1999 assumes that the
Department of State will make all currently anticipated payments
before the end of 1999, including a $204 million payment from
fiscal year 2000 funds.
Source: Compiled by GAO from U. N. and Department of State
financial data.
Analysis of U. S. As reflected in table 4, U. N. records show that
U. S. arrears for Arrears contributions to the U. N. regular
budget, international tribunals, and peacekeeping were about $1.3
billion on January 1, 1999. This amount accounted for about 64
percent of the $2 billion of arrears owed by U. N. members on that
date for the U. N. regular budget, international tribunals, and
peacekeeping operations. For legislative and policy reasons, the
United States has determined it will not pay $472 million (about
36 percent) of its total arrears of about $1.3 billion. As of
December 31, 1998, the United Nations owed about $1.1 billion to
member states for their participation in U. N. peacekeeping
operations.
U. S. Arrears for the U. N. U. N. records showed that, on January
1, 1999, the United States was in Regular Budget
arrears $316 million for assessed contributions to the U. N.
regular budget for 1998 and prior periods. U. S. arrears accounted
for about 76 percent of the $417 million total arrears owed by U.
N. members for the U. N. regular budget. Table 5 shows U. S. and
other countries' U. N. regular budget arrears for 1998 and prior
financial periods.
Table 5: U. S. and Other Member States' U. N. Regular Budget
Arrears, 1998 and Prior Periods Dollars in millions Percent Member
state Arrears of total
United States $316 75.7 Withheld for legislative and policy
reasons (162) Undisputed amount a (154) Brazil 31 7.4 All others
71 16.9
Total $417 100.0
Note: Dollar amounts reflect payments received by the United
Nations through December 31, 1998; these amounts may not add due
to rounding. a Undisputed amount includes $100 million withheld
from fiscal year 1999 funds pending certification of a $2. 533
billion U. N. biennium budget plus $54 million that would be paid
under the proposed arrears payment plan.
Source: Compiled by GAO from U. N. and Department of State
financial data.
Since the early 1980s, the United States has declined to pay a
portion of its assessed contributions for the U. N. regular budget
for legislative and policy reasons. The $162 million that the
United States has declined to pay to date accounts for about 51
percent of the U. S. arrears shown in table 5. The United States
has withheld an additional $100 million pending executive
branch certification that the U. N. regular budget for the 1998-
99 biennium will not exceed $2.533 billion, bringing the total
currently withheld to $262 million. Department of State officials
expect to be able to meet this certification requirement and pay
this $100 million in 1999. As previously noted, our estimate of
the shortfall assumes that the Department of State will make this
payment as planned. Table 6 shows the amounts the United States
had declined to pay and withheld from U. N. regular budget through
the end of 1998.
Table 6: Amounts the United States Has Declined to Pay and
Withheld From the U. N. Regular Budget Dollars in millions Purpose
Amount Amounts not paid due to legislative prohibitions
U. N. General Assembly approval of the construction of the
Conference Center for the Economic Commission of Africa $28.8
(Addis Ababa) in the mid- 1980s during the famine in Africa a U.
N. assistance to the Palestine Liberation Organization a 16.8
Sundquist Amendment prohibiting a portion of the U. S. payment to
the U. N. because of kickbacks paid from Soviet 6.3 nationals'
salaries to their governments a Kasten Amendment of the mid- 1980s
preventing payment for excessive U. N. post adjustments b 1.3
U. N. activities relating to the South- West Africa People's
Organization a 0.7 Temporary increase in "effective" assessment
rate increase in 1992 following the breakup of Czechoslovakia 0. 3
Subtotal $54.2 Amounts not paid due to policy decisions
Withheld payment to the U. N. Tax Equalization Fund because of
alleged excessive tax reimbursements paid to U. S. $100.4
nationals employed by the U. N. Law of the Sea Preparatory
Commission 7.5
Subtotal $107.9 Amounts withheld until U. N. meets reform
conditions c
U. N. regular budget not to exceed $2. 533 billion $100.0
Subtotal $100.0 Total $262.1
Note: Dollar amounts reflect withholdings through December 31,
1998. a Prohibitions codified as a note to 22 USCA 287e.
b P. L. 98- 473 c These amounts are not disputed.
Source: Compiled by GAO from Department of State financial data.
U. S. Arrears for U. N. records showed that, on January 1, 1999,
the United States was in
International Tribunals arrears about $3 million for payments to
international tribunals. U. S. arrears accounted for about 15
percent of the nearly $20 million of total
arrears owed by U. N. members for international tribunals. U. S.
arrears reflect the Department of State's application of the 25
percent cap on U. S. payments for U. N. peacekeeping 18 to the
half of the tribunals' budgets that 18 Section 404( b)( 2) of the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1994- 95 (P. L. 103- 236).
are assessed at the higher rate for peacekeeping operations,
currently 30.4 percent.
U. S. Arrears for U. N. U. N. records showed that, as of January
1, 1999, the United States had Peacekeeping arrears of about $976
million for assessed contributions to U. N. peacekeeping
operations. 19 U. S. arrears accounted for about 61 percent of the
$1, 594 million total arrears owed by U. N. members for U. N.
peacekeeping. Table 7 shows U. S. and other countries'
peacekeeping arrears for 1998 and prior periods.
Table 7: U. S. and Other Member States' U. N. Peacekeeping
Arrears, 1998 and Prior Periods
Dollars in millions Percent Member state Arrears of total
United States $976 61.2 Withheld for legislative and policy
reasons (307) Undisputed amount (669) Russia 126 7.9 Japan 98 6.2
Brazil 14 0.9 All others 380 23.8
Total $1,594 100.0
Note: Dollar amounts reflect payments received by the United
Nations through December 31, 1998. Source: Compiled by GAO from U.
N. and Department of State financial data.
Since the 1980s, the United States has declined to pay a portion
of its assessed contributions for U. N. peacekeeping for
legislative and policy reasons. In 1994, for example, Congress
enacted legislation to cap U. S. payments for peacekeeping at 25
percent of the total of all assessed contributions for an
operation. 20 Amounts the United States has declined to pay
accounted for about 31 percent of the U. S. arrears shown in table
7. 19 Two U. N. peacekeeping operations the U. N. Truce
Supervision Organization (in the Middle East) and the U. N.
Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (in Kashmir) are
financed through the U. N.
regular budget. 20 Section 404( b)( 2) of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act of 1994- 95 (P. L. 103- 236).
Table 8 shows the amounts the United States has declined to pay
for U. N. peacekeeping operations through the end of 1998.
Table 8: Amount the United States Has Declined to Pay for U. N.
Peacekeeping Operations
Dollars in millions Purpose Amount Amounts not paid due to
legislative prohibitions
Cap on peacekeeping assessments at 25 percent after October 1,
1995, $163 versus the U. N. assessment (currently 30. 4 percent)
Amounts not paid due to policy decisions
Cap on peacekeeping assessments at 30. 4 percent versus the 31.7
percent $123 set by the General Assembly to cover shortfalls in
peacekeeping contributions following the breakup of the Soviet
Union
U. N. Mission in the Central African Republic 10 U. N. Haiti
operations 5 Fiscal year 1997 funds for the U. N. Mission for the
Referendum in Western
3 Sahara Closeout activities for the U. N. Transitional Authority
in Cambodia 2
Judicial monitoring activities for the U. N. Mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina 1
Subtotal $144 Total $307
Note: Dollar amounts reflect withheld payments through December
31, 1998. This table does not include withheld payments that would
be paid under the proposed arrears payment plan, for example,
payments withheld from fiscal year 1995 and 1996 funds for the U.
N. operation in Western Sahara.
Source: Compiled by GAO from Department of State financial data.
Reimbursements Owed by Because of member states' arrears, the
United Nations has not reimbursed the United Nations to all U. N.
members for troops, equipment, and other services contributed to
U. N. peacekeeping operations. 21 As of December 31, 1998, the
United Members States for Nations owed 73 member states about
$1,102 million for troops, Participating in U. N. equipment, 22
letters of assist, 23 and death and disability payments to
Peacekeeping Operations 21 See United Nations: Financial Issues
and U. S. Arrears (GAO/NSIAD-98-201BR, June 18, 1998). 22 The
United Nations refers to this as contingent- owned equipment. 23
Letters of assist request and govern the provision by member
states of equipment and services for U. N. peacekeeping, for
example, air transportation.
peacekeepers or their families. About $704 million of this amount
about 63 percent was for reimbursements owed for troops and
equipment contributed to the U. N. operations in the Yugoslavia,
Somalia, Angola, Macedonia, and Eastern Slovenia. 24 Table 9 shows
the amounts owed member states for their participation in U. N.
peacekeeping operations through the end of 1998.
Table 9: Top 10 U. N. Member States Owed Reimbursement for
Participation in U. N. Peacekeeping Operations Dollars in millions
Contingentowned Letters of
Death and Member state Troops
equipment assist disability Total
France $3.9 $127.6 $20. 8 $4.3 $156.6 United States 32. 8 30.0 79.
9 0. 0 142.7 United Kingdom 2. 4 45.6 6. 9 1.7 56.6 Italy 0. 4
33.6 19. 4 0. 0 53.4 India 4. 2 42.8 4. 0 0.0 51.0 Netherlands 0.0
45.2 4. 6 0.0 49.8 Pakistan 18. 7 19.5 0. 0 0.0 38.3 Belgium 0. 0
29.7 8. 4 0.0 38.1 Canada 1.8 27.0 1. 2 5.2 35.3 Slovakia 0.0 28.9
0. 4 0.0 29.3 All others 79. 2 298.6 59. 6 13.3 450.8
Total $143.4 $728.6 $205. 2 $24.6 $1,101.9
Note: Dollar amounts reflect reimbursements through December 31,
1998. Voluntary contributions are not included. Not all equipment
costs are reported to the United Nations. In some cases, members
dispute the amounts owed. The United Nations adopted new
guidelines for reimbursing contingent- owned equipment costs in
1996 (see U. N. document A/ Res/ 50/ 222, Apr. 11, 1996).
Source: Compiled by GAO from U. N. financial data.
24 The amounts owed for these former U. N. operations is as
follows: the former Yugoslavia $1. 4 million for troops and $390.
2 million for equipment; Somalia$ 29. 2 million for troops and
$100.2 million for equipment; Angola$ 4.9 million for troops and
$$ 82.9 million for equipment; Macedonia$ 19.8 million for troops
and $29.9 million for equipment; and Eastern Slovenia
$62, 000 for troops and $45. 7 million for equipment. The United
Nations was unable to breakout by operation the amounts owed for
letters of assist and death and disability payments.
U. N. Members Have At the beginning of 1999, 44 of 185 U. N.
members (about 24 percent) had Lost Their General arrears equaling
or exceeding the sum of their assessed contributions for the
preceding 2 full years and were subject to article 19. Yugoslavia
needed Assembly Vote to pay the largest amount to regain its right
to vote in the General Assembly almost $13 million and Grenada,
the smallest amount just over $5,000.
By mid- May, 6 of the 44 members had paid enough to regain their
right to vote in the General Assembly. These six members were
Afghanistan, El Salvador, Honduras, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Saint
Vincent and the
Grenadines, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In
April 1999, the General Assembly granted six other members
permission to vote temporarily, because their failure to pay was
judged to be due to conditions beyond their control, such as civil
war or severe natural
disasters. 25 Three of these members Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Cambodia, and Georgia were permitted to vote through June 30,
1999. Three others Congo, Guinea- Bissau, and Nicaragua were
permitted to vote through June 30, 2000. Previously, in October
1998, the General Assembly had granted two other members Comoros
and Tajikistan permission to vote through the current (53 rd )
session of the General Assembly. Iraq applied for permission to
vote despite its arrears, arguing that the sanctions authorized by
the Security Council, plus the U. N. 's refusal to accept payment
in Iraqi currency, had left it without a means of paying its
assessed contributions. The Committee on Contributions did not
make a recommendation to the General Assembly on Iraq's request,
concluding that the political issues raised by its request
exceeded the committee's
technical advisory role. 26 As of mid- May, the remaining 30
member states did not have the right to vote in the General
Assembly. The Chief of the U. N. Contributions Service stated
that, based on past experience, he expects that, by the end of the
25 The Committee on Contributions considers applications from
member states for permission to vote. Based on information
provided by the applicant and the U. N. Secretariat, the committee
makes a recommendation on the application to the General
Assembly's Fifth Committee, which deals with financial matters.
The Fifth Committee, in turn, makes a recommendation to the
General Assembly, which ultimately decides whether to grant the
applicant permission to vote. As a rule, a member state
is permitted to vote for a specific, limited period and only when
its failure to pay is judged to be due to conditions beyond its
control. 26 Addendum to the report of the Committee on
Contributions (U. N. document A/ 53/ 11/ Add. 1).
year, most of these remaining members will make at least the
minimum payment necessary to regain their right to vote in the
General Assembly. Appendix II shows the status of member states
subject to article 19 at the beginning of 1999.
In a 1998 report, the Committee on Contributions noted that the
loss of voting rights under article 19 was the only sanction
available against member states that did not meet their financial
obligations to the United Nations. 27 In a 1999 report, it also
noted that many member states regularly
paid only enough to retain or regain their right to vote. 28 At
the General Assembly's direction, the committee has reviewed
alternative procedures for applying article 19, such as
calculating and applying article 19 both at
the beginning of the calendar year and at the beginning of the
peacekeeping fiscal year on July 1. 29 Some committee members were
concerned, however, that such a change would increase the number
of member states falling under Article 19 and possibly interfere
with the operation of the General Assembly. 30 The issue remains
under review.
Agency Comments In written comments on a draft of this report, the
Department of State concurred with our analysis and commented that
our report succinctly stated the facts currently available and
estimated the amount of money required to avoid loss of vote in
the General Assembly in January 2000. State underscored that given
the many financial factors involved in the loss of vote process,
it is impossible at this moment to state precisely how much the
United States will have to pay. The Department of State's written
comments are reprinted in appendix III. State also provided
several technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
Scope and To gather information for our analysis, we reviewed U.
N. and U. S. financial
Methodology reports and other records from 1994 to 1999 that
showed the amounts of 27 Report of the Committee on Contributions
(U. N. document A/ 53/ 11).
28 Addendum to the report of the Committee on Contributions (U. N.
document A/ 53/ 11/ Add. 1). 29 U. N. General Assembly resolution
52/ 215 B. 30 According to Department of State officials, such a
change would have a major impact on U. S. arrears and the
application of article 19 to the United States because of the U.
S. practice of paying its calendar year assessments with funds
appropriated for the following fiscal year.
assessed contributions, arrears, and reimbursements owed member
states and the application of article 19. We also reviewed reports
and other records on these matters prepared by other
organizations, for example, the Congressional Research Service. To
confirm and expand our understanding of the data and other
information in these reports and
records, we interviewed officials at the U. S. Department of
State's Bureau of International Organizations Affairs, the U. S.
Mission to the United Nations, and U. N. headquarters.
We estimated the contribution shortfall on January 1, 2000, by
analyzing U. N. and U. S. financial data using a computer model we
developed for the purpose. This model calculates a projected
arrears balance and a projected amount of assessed contributions
for the preceding 2 full years, based on expected assessments for
1999, arrears from 1998 and prior years, estimated U. S. payments,
and expected credits that the United States may
receive from the U. N. regular, international war crimes tribunal,
and peacekeeping budgets. We varied some of our assumptions about
U. S. assessments and payments to determine how the estimated
shortfall was affected by these changes. For example, we
calculated the shortfall assuming different levels of peacekeeping
assessments and payments for the recently authorized U. N.
operation in Kosovo. We verified our analysis by discussing it
with U. N. and Department of State officials and reviewed similar
analyses conducted by Department of State officials.
We used a commercially available spreadsheet software program to
tabulate and display information compiled from U. N. and U. S.
financial reports and other records to analyze (1) trends in U. N.
assessments and U. S. arrears leading to the shortfall, (2) U. S.
arrears and the amounts withheld for legislative and policy
reasons, and (3) the status of member states that had lost their
vote in the General Assembly. We verified our analyses of these
issues by discussing them with U. N. and Department of
State officials. We did not independently verify the accuracy of
financial data obtained from U. N. and U. S. reports or other
records. Because we are an agency of the United States, we do not
have direct audit authority to review the operations or financial
records of the United Nations. Instead, we reviewed audit reports
prepared by the U. N. Board of Auditors to ensure
that U. N. financial information was reliable. We conducted our
work from April to July 1999 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
We are providing copies of this report to other congressional
committees; the Honorable Madeline Albright, Secretary of State;
the Honorable A. Peter Burleigh, Acting Permanent Representative
of the United States of America to the United Nations; the
Honorable Jacob Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget;
and the Honorable Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United
Nations. Copies also will be made available to others upon
request.
Please contact me at (202) 512- 4128 if you or your staff have any
questions about this report. Key contributors to this report were
Tetsuo Miyabara and Michael Rohrback.
Sincerely yours, Harold J. Johnson Associate Director
International Relations and Trade Issues
Letter 1 Appendix I
24 Summary of U. N. Methodology for
Applying Article 19 Appendix II
26 Status of U. N. Member States in Arrears Under Article 19 of
the U. N.
Charter on January 1, 1999 Appendix III
29 Comments From the Department of State
Tables Table 1: U. N. Assessments for the Regular Budget,
International Tribunals, and Peacekeeping Operations for 1999, as
of June 30, 1999 5
Table 2: Estimated U. S. Contributions Shortfall on January 1,
2000 6 Table 3: Estimated U. S. Assessed Contributions for the 2-
Year Period Ending on January 1, 2000 8
Table 4: Comparison of U. S. Assessed Contributions for the United
Nations for the Prior 2 Years and the U. S. Arrears on January 1,
1995- 2000 12 Table 5: U. S. and Other Member States' U. N.
Regular Budget
Arrears, 1998 and Prior Periods 13 Table 6: Amounts the United
States Has Declined to Pay and
Withheld From the U. N. Regular Budget 14 Table 7: U. S. and Other
Member States' U. N. Peacekeeping Arrears, 1998 and Prior Periods
15
Table 8: Amount the United States Has Declined to Pay for U. N.
Peacekeeping Operations 16 Table 9: Top 10 U. N. Member States
Owned Reimbursement for
Participation in U. N. Peacekeeping Operations 17 Figures Figure
1: Comparison of U. S. Assessed Contributions for the
United Nations for the Prior 2 Years and U. S. Arrears on January
1, 1996- 2000 3 Figure 2: U. S. Assessments for the U. N. Regular
Budget, International Tribunals, and Peacekeeping Operations,
1994- 99 11
Summary of U. N. Methodology for Applying Appendi I x Article 19
Article 19 of the U. N. Charter states that a member will lose its
right to vote
in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or
exceeds its assessed contributions for the preceding 2 full years:
A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment
of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no
vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals
or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the
preceding two full years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless,
permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure
to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member.
Article 19 does not specify how the amount of arrears and assessed
contributions due should be calculated or the timing of the
calculation and application of the sanction (loss of vote). In
practice, a member state is considered to be subject to article 19
if its arrears as of January 1 of a given year equal or exceed the
amount of assessed contributions due from it for the preceding 2
full calendar years.
The current interpretation of arrears is linked to regulation 5.4
of the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations. This
regulation provides that assessed contributions shall be
considered due and payable in full within 30 days of (1) receipt
of notice from the Secretary General or (2) as of the first day of
the calendar year to which they relate, whichever is later. It
further provides that, as of January 1 of the following calendar
year, the unpaid balances of such contributions are considered to
be in arrears. Thus, for example, only assessed contributions due
before January 1, 1999, are considered to be in arrears at any
time during 1999 and
included in the calculation of the amount of arrears under article
19. In line with the interpretation of arrears under the current
provisions of regulation 5.4, the term contributions due for the
preceding 2 full years has, since 1950, been interpreted to mean
the preceding 2 full calendar
years. As in the case of the calculation of arrears, U. N.
practice has been to include only those assessed contributions due
before the end of a given year in the calculation. Thus, for
example, only those assessed contributions that fell due and
payable under regulation 5.4 between January 1, 1997, and December
31, 1998, were included in the amount of contributions due for the
preceding 2 full years for the purposes of calculations for
article 19 on January 1, 1999. Under the current method for
calculating article 19, arrears are computed in net terms, that
is, actual amounts payable after adjustments for income and other
items, such as unspent balances from earlier financial periods.
The amount of assessed contributions due for the preceding 2 full
years, however, has been interpreted to mean the amounts as
apportioned by the General Assembly under Article 17 of the U. N.
Charter, 1 that is, the gross amounts assessed on member states.
As the gross amounts are, in most cases, higher than the net
amounts, this approach tends to reduce the amount of minimum
payments that member states must make to retain or regain their
right to vote in the General Assembly.
1 Article 17, paragraph 2, Charter of the United Nations.
Status of U. N. Member States in Arrears Under Article 19 of the
U. N. Charter on Appe ndi I
I x January 1, 1999 Dollars in millions Minimum
payment needed to
Permitted Member state
regain vote a to vote? Comments
Afghanistan $133,000 Yes Made at least the minimum payment to
regain its vote. Bosnia and
1,274,200 Yes Permitted to vote until June 30, 1999. Despite some
members' doubts, the Herzegovina Committee on Contributions
concluded that Bosnia and Herzegovina's failure to pay was due to
conditions beyond its control, citing the impact of protracted
civil war, high unemployment, and low government revenues on its
ability to pay. b Burundi 143,800 No Cambodia 199,300 Yes
Permitted to vote until June 30, 1999. The Committee on
Contributions concluded that Cambodia's failure to pay was due to
conditions beyond its
control, citing the impact of years of war and the significant
cost of post- conflict activities such as clearing landmines and
military demobilization on its ability to pay and Cambodia's
continuing dependence on foreign assistance. The committee also
noted Cambodia's expressed intention to make the necessary minimum
payment by June 1999. b Cape Verde 93,100 No Central African
122,500 No Republic Comoros N/ A Yes Permitted to vote through the
53 rd session of the General Assembly. The Committee on
Contributions concluded that Comoros' failure to pay was beyond
its control, citing the impact of severe political, economic, and
social problems and the loss of control over some of its territory
on its ability to pay
and its inability to meet other financial obligations. c Congo
316,500 Yes Permitted to vote until June 30, 2000. The Committee
on Contributions concluded that Congo's failure to pay was beyond
its control, citing the impact
of the 1997 civil war and continued fighting on its ability to
pay. b Democratic Republic of 41,000 No the Congo Djibouti 143,500
No
Dominica 143,500 No Ecuador 35,299 No El Salvador 24,200 Yes Made
at least the minimum payment to regain its vote. Equatorial Guinea
43,467 No Gambia 143,000 No Georgia 4, 639,800 Yes Permitted to
vote until June 30, 1999. The Committee on Contributions concluded
that Georgia's failure to pay was due to conditions beyond its
control, citing the impact of civil war, serious drought, and the
economic crisis
of a major trading partner (Russia) on its ability to pay. The
committee also noted the presence in Georgia of a U. N.
peacekeeping operation as well as Georgia's expressed intention to
make some payments by April 1999 and submit a payment schedule. b
Dollars in millions Minimum
payment needed to
Permitted Member state
regain vote a to vote? Comments
Grenada 5,300 No Guinea 133,500 No Guinea- Bissau 273,600 Yes
Permitted to vote until June 30, 2000. The Committee on
Contributions concluded that Guinea- Bissau's failure to pay was
due to conditions beyond
its control, citing the impact of the armed conflict and the need
to devote limited government resources to the country's urgent
needs on its ability to pay. Some committee members noted that
Guinea- Bissau was among those
member states that followed a practice of paying at or close to
the minimum amount due each year to retain or regain its vote. b
Haiti 42,000 No Honduras 108,600 Yes Made at least the minimum
payment to regain its vote. d Iraq 9,135,200 No Iraq requested an
exemption, arguing that sanctions authorized by Security
Council Resolution 661 (1990) plus the United Nations' refusal to
accept contributions in Iraqi dinars had left it without an
effective means of paying its outstanding assessments. The
Committee on Contributions did not make a recommendation to the
General Assembly on Iraq's request, concluding that the political
aspects of the issues raised by Iraq's request exceeded its
technical advisory role to the General Assembly. b
Kyrgyzstan 502,600 No Liberia 939,100 No Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
557,900 Yes Made at least the minimum payment to regain its vote.
Madagascar 44,700 No Mauritania 122,300 No Mongolia 114,222 No
Nicaragua 155,200 Yes Permitted to vote until June 30, 2000. The
Committee on Contributions concluded that Nicaragua's failure to
pay was due to conditions beyond its control, citing the impact of
hurricane Mitch on its economy and physical and
social infrastructure and the need to devote limited government
resources to the country's rehabilitation and reconstruction on
its ability to pay and efforts to reduce the country's external
debt. Some committee members noted that Nicaragua was among those
member states that followed a practice of paying at or close to
the minimum amount due each year to retain or regain its vote. b
Niger 142,000 No Republic of Moldova 1, 310,900 No Rwanda 138,809
No Saint Vincent and the
26,900 Yes Made at least the minimum payment to regain its vote.
Grenadines Sao Tome and Principe 404,000 No
Seychelles 87,900 No Sierra Leone 136,900 No Somalia 805,400 No
Dollars in millions Minimum
payment needed to
Permitted Member state
regain vote a to vote? Comments
Tajikistan N/ A Yes Permitted to vote through the 53 rd session of
the General Assembly. The Committee on Contributions concluded
that Tajikistan's failure to pay was beyond its control, citing
the impact of civil war, natural disasters, and collapse of trade
and economic relations among former Soviet republics on its
ability to pay; a substantial increase in foreign debts and the
rescheduling of some debts; and Tajikistan's receipt of
significant international assistance, including a U. N.
peacekeeping operation. c
The former Yugoslav 90,363 Yes Made at least the minimum payment
to regain its vote. Republic of Macedonia Togo 62,500 No
Turkmenistan 494,200 No Vanuatu 144,700 No Yemen 123,300 No
Yugoslavia 12,678,500 No Total $36,276,760
Note: Table reflects payments and actions through May 14, 1999. a
Minimum payment necessary to reduce the member state's outstanding
contributions (arrears) below the gross amount assessed for the
preceding 2 full years.
b The Committee on Contributions' conclusions and recommendations
on this matter are contained in U. N. documents A/ 53/ 11/ Add. 1
(Feb. 16, 1999) and A/ 53/ 11/ Add. 1/ Corr. 1 (Feb. 23, 1999).
Based on the committee's report, the Fifth Committee recommended
the adoption of a draft decision permitting Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Cambodia, and Georgia to vote until June 30, 1999;
and Congo, Guinea- Bissau, Nicaragua, and Honduras to vote until
June 30, 2000 (A/ 53/ 464/ Add. 4, Mar. 31, 1999). On April 7,
1999, the General Assembly adopted the draft decision as amended
(by Honduras, which had made the minimum payment needed to regain
its vote see table note d). c The Committee on Contributions'
conclusions and recommendations are contained in U. N. document A/
53/ 11/ Suppl. No. 11 (1998). Based on this report, the Fifth
Committee recommended the adoption of a draft decision permitting
Comoros and Tajikistan to vote through the 53 rd session of the
General Assembly (U. N. document A/ C. 5/ 53/ L. 4, Oct. 6, 1998).
On October 7, 1998, the General Assembly adopted this draft
decision. d In early January 1999, Honduras requested an exemption
from article 19. In mid- February 1999, the Committee on
Contributions concluded that Honduras' failure to pay was due to
conditions beyond its control and recommended permitting it to
vote until June 30, 2000. In its report, the committee cited the
impact of hurricane Mitch on Honduras' economy and physical and
social infrastructure, the need to devote limited government
resources to the country's rehabilitation and reconstruction on
its ability to pay and efforts to reduce and reschedule the
country's external debts. Some committee members noted that
Honduras was among those member states that followed a practice of
paying at or close to the minimum amount due each year to retain
or regain its vote. Subsequent to the Fifth Committee's
recommendation that Honduras be permitted to vote (see table note
b), Honduras made at least the
minimum payment needed to regain its vote. Source: GAO analysis of
U. N. documents.
Appendi I I I x Comments From the Department of State
GAO United States General Accounting Office
GAO/NSIAD-99-187
Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-187 United Nations United States General
Accounting Office
Washington, D. C. 20548
Let t er
B-282243 Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-99-187 United Nations
Let t er
B-282243 Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-99-187 United Nations
B-282243 Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-99-187 United Nations
B-282243 Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-99-187 United Nations
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Contents
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Appendix I
Appendix I Summary of U. N. Methodology for Applying Article 19
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Appendix II
Appendix II Status of U. N. Member States in Arrears Under Article
19 of the U. N. Charter on January 1, 1999
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Appendix II Status of U. N. Member States in Arrears Under Article
19 of the U. N. Charter on January 1, 1999
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Appendix III
(711424) Let t e r
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