Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Associated With Implementing the Joint
Tactical Radio System (Letter Report, 09/09/1999, GAO/NSIAD-99-179).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the
Department of Defense's (DOD) Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)
acquisition strategy and management plans, focusing on the: (1) status
of the JTRS program, including DOD development plans; and (2) challenges
program officials will face in implementing the JTRS acquisition
strategy.
GAO noted that: (1) the JTRS program is in a start-up stage; (2) DOD has
directed the services to stop development of new radio-based programs
but has granted a limited number of waivers to meet near-term
requirements because JTRS products are not yet available; (3) DOD is
developing a JTRS architecture and detailed refinements to its
preliminary acquisition strategy; (4) DOD is scheduled to reach a major
decision point in October 2000, when it is expected to approve the
architecture and major revisions to the acquisition strategy; (5) the
revised acquisition strategy is expected to define JTRS products,
provide cost estimates for them, and allow development of an estimated
total program cost; (6) following this, the services are expected to
finalize their plans to replace existing radios with JTRS products; (7)
DOD then expects the services to begin procuring JTRS products with JTRS
Joint Program Office support; (8) DOD must successfully address three
key challenges to achieve its program objectives; and (9) these
challenges are: (a) completing a plan to develop key technologies not
available from commercial sources or other DOD radio programs and
integrating these new technologies into JTRS products; (b) defining an
architecture that will be acceptable to commercial industry, be valid
across a wide range of operating scenarios, and be useful to the
services in developing plans to replace existing radio systems; and (c)
defining interoperability requirements and establishing a strategy to
procure and test products that meet these requirements.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-99-179
TITLE: Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Associated With
Implementing the Joint Tactical Radio System
DATE: 09/09/1999
SUBJECT: Military radio
Systems design
Military research and development
Defense procurement
Systems compatibility
Requirements definition
Commercial products
Military communication
IDENTIFIER: DOD Joint Tactical Radio System
DARPA Global Mobile Information System
DARPA ULTRA COMM
DARPA Advanced Digital Receiver Technology Program
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Rev-LG logo.eps GAO United States General Accounting Office
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives
September 1999 DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS
Challenges Associated With Implementing the Joint Tactical Radio
System
GAO/NSIAD-99-179
GAO/NSIAD-99-179
Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions United States General
Accounting Office
Washington, D. C. 20548 National Security and International
Affairs Division
B-281641 Letter September 9, 1999 The Honorable Jerry Lewis
Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Department of Defense (DOD) is
consolidating various service- unique radio acquisition programs
into the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS). Through this
consolidation, DOD expects to acquire JTRS units to replace
all of its current radio inventory, avionics upgrades, appropriate
satellite terminals, and personal communications systems. Although
total program costs have yet to be determined, DOD officials
estimate it could cost billions to replace about 200 types of
radios, with a replacement potential of over 750,000 existing
units-- also known as legacy systems. The JTRS program's key
objectives are to achieve cost savings, improve performance, and
provide an interoperable communications system that enables joint
and coalition forces to work together. The former Subcommittee
Chairman requested that we evaluate the JTRS acquisition strategy
and management plans. As agreed with his office, we (1) determined
the status of the JTRS program, including DOD
development plans and (2) identified challenges program officials
will face in implementing the JTRS acquisition strategy.
Results in Brief The JTRS program is in a start- up stage. DOD has
directed the services to stop development of new radio- based
programs but has granted a limited number of waivers to meet near-
term requirements because JTRS products 1 are not yet available.
DOD is currently developing a JTRS 1 JTRS products are a
combination of hardware and software developed from and compatible
with the JTRS architecture.
Letter
B-281641 Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
architecture 2 and detailed refinements to its preliminary
acquisition strategy. DOD is scheduled to reach a major decision
point in October 2000, when it is expected to approve the
architecture and major revisions to the current acquisition
strategy. The revised acquisition strategy is expected to define
JTRS products, provide cost estimates for them, and allow
development of an estimated total program cost. Following this,
the services are expected to finalize their plans to replace
existing radios with JTRS products. DOD then expects the services
to begin procuring JTRS products with JTRS Joint Program Office
support. DOD must successfully address three key challenges to
achieve its program objectives. These challenges are (1)
completing a plan to develop key technologies not available from
commercial sources or other DOD radio programs and integrating
these new technologies into JTRS products; (2) defining an
architecture that will be acceptable to commercial industry, be
valid across a wide range of operating scenarios, and be useful to
the services in developing plans to replace existing radio
systems; and (3) defining interoperability requirements and
establishing a strategy to procure and test products that meet
these requirements. We are recommending that DOD focus on
establishing the scope of JTRS
interoperability requirements and developing a more structured
technical and architecture development process. Background The
primary impetus for the JTRS program came from congressional and
DOD concerns about the inability of service radios to adequately
work with one another and the cost of buying and maintaining these
radios. The
Secretary of Defense Planning Guidance for fiscal years 1999- 2003
directed the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence (C3I), in coordination with the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the services, to define
DOD- wide requirements for digital, modular, software-
programmable radios. This guidance also directed the Assistant
Secretary to establish a joint program for a family of radios that
would consolidate similar programs under 2 DOD defines an
architecture as a framework or structure that portrays
relationships among all the elements of the subject force, system,
or activity. The JTRS Joint Program Office describes its proposed
JTRS architecture as a technical architecture that would define
(1) the functional entities and
their interrelationships, (2) the physical implementation of the
JTRS architecture, and (3) the framework for waveform/ application
developers. A waveform is a plot of an electrical quantity's
amplitude versus time. Letter
B-281641 Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
development by the services such as the Army's Near- Term Digital
Radio (NTDR), the Navy's Digital Modular Radio (DMR), and the Air
Force's Airborne Integrated Terminal Group (AITG). In response to
this directive, DOD officially established the JTRS program in
September 1997. 3 In December 1997, the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Technology (A& T) appointed the Army as the
program's lead service and acquisition executive and directed that
a joint program
office be established to manage the development of an evolutionary
architecture and perform management functions. The Army
established a special task force for the JTRS program until the
Joint Program Office was established in October 1998.
The program's objectives, established by DOD, focus on providing a
family of digital, modular, software- programmable radios that
would allow military commanders to communicate with their forces
through voice, video, or data formats as needed. Radios would
range in configuration from a low- cost joint tactical radio to a
higher capability, joint multiband, multimode radio. This approach
accommodates the services' many individual requirements, including
space and size, and the many different configurations airborne,
ground mobile, fixed station, maritime, and
personal communications in which the radios will be used. DOD's
underlying concept is that the radios could be programmed or
configured to function in a number of modes and frequencies to fit
a user's specific needs. By combining functions and using common
components, DOD believes the services will be able to reduce unit
costs and the number of radios needed. Current Status of the JTRS
Program
The JTRS program is in a start- up stage. DOD approved a JTRS
Joint Operational Requirements Document in March 1998. Although
DOD has directed the services to stop development of new radio-
based programs other than JTRS, it has granted waivers allowing
the services to buy non- JTRS products to meet near- term
requirements because JTRS products are not yet available. DOD is
also developing a JTRS architecture and a
detailed acquisition strategy that is expected to lead to a major
program decision point in October 2000.
3 The program was originally named the Programmable Modular
Communications System. It was renamed in December 1997.
B-281641 Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
Restrictions and Waivers on Acquiring Non- JTRS Radios The JTRS
program consolidates radio development programs that were
separately funded and directed by individual services. As
acquisition executive, the Army has programmed $344 million in
research and development funds for the JTRS program through fiscal
year 2005. Joint Program Office officials said these funds will
support development and validation of the JTRS architecture,
provision of standard waveforms, 4 establishment of a
certification facility to validate that products comply with the
approved architecture, and funding for technology insertion. In an
April 10, 1998, memorandum, the Under Secretary of Defense (A& T)
expressed concern about the services continuing with near- term
radio and terminal development programs outside the JTRS program.
He believed these efforts could waste resources by continuing the
fielding of legacy
systems and delay the earliest possible fielding of JTRS
equipment. The Under Secretary of Defense (A& T) requested each
service acquisition executive to minimize development of new
programs. On August 28, 1998, the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for C3I also expressed concern about continuing efforts to
independently develop and acquire service- unique radios and
terminals. He directed the services to suspend all efforts to
develop and acquire any radio systems, including those with
software programmable radio technology. Congress has also voiced
concern that the services are continuing to develop duplicative
radio programs. The House Appropriations Committee Report on DOD
Appropriations for 1999 directed that no more than
25 percent of funds appropriated for research and development of a
tactical radio be obligated until the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for C3I certifies in a report to Congressional Defense
Committees that the development program (1) meets interoperability
requirements, (2) does not duplicate
other development efforts, and (3) is fully funded. 5 According to
an official from the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for C3I, this report was being processed in August 1999. No JTRS
products have been fielded to date, and no date for such fielding
has been scheduled. To meet near- term requirements in the absence
of JTRS products, DOD has granted a limited number of waivers to
the
4 A waveform can include system- unique data on anti- jam
characteristics, error control information, and timing
information. 5 House Appropriations Report 105- 591, DOD
Appropriations Bill, 1999, p. 177.
B-281641 Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
services to continue radio programs that meet immediate needs. As
of June 1999, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I had
granted nine waivers. DOD documentation shows that the first three
waivers addressed immediate service communication needs.
The Army received permission to buy 174 NTDR units for its
digitization program because it claimed the radios did not
duplicate any other DOD program, provided a bridge to JTRS, met
interoperability requirements, and were fully funded. The Army
told us the radios would be used to meet current battlefield
digitization requirements in the First Digitized Division;
however, it has not requested funds to buy more of these
radios for the First Digitized Corps. The Navy was allowed to buy
DMR's to meet fielding requirements for its radio replacement
program through fiscal year 1999 because JTRS products were not
available to meet these requirements and these radios were not
considered a competitor to JTRS. The Air Force received
permission to buy AITG units (an ultrahigh
frequency terminal) to meet communications and air safety
requirements because JTRS products were not available. The JTRS
Program Manager said the other six waivers were to meet near- term
requirements. These requirements include providing the services
with beyond line of sight radio capabilities and reducing the
number of radios required for special operations and close air
support. He said that all
waivers are temporary and that the services are required to
resubmit requests before further procurement of these radios.
Development of JTRS Architecture and Acquisition Strategy DOD is
developing the JTRS in three phases. In phase one, the Joint
Program Office awarded contracts to three consortia 6 to define to
what
level and how the JTRS architecture should be developed. In phase
one, which ended in June 1999, the Joint Program Office reviewed
products from the three consortia. In phase two, the Joint Program
Office plans to conduct a competition for a single award to
develop the architecture and demonstrate it in a laboratory
environment. In addition, the Joint Program Office plans to
conduct a market survey in this phase to determine industry
readiness to produce JTRS compliant systems. The Assistant
Secretary of Defense for C3I's Major Defense Acquisition Program
Overarching 6 The three consortia are teams of multiple
contractors and universities. Motorola, Boeing, and Raytheon lead
one team each.
B-281641 Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
Integrated Product Team 7 will then review the JTRS program. The
team is expected to recommend an acquisition strategy to the Under
Secretary of Defense (A& T). At the October 2000 program decision
point, the Under Secretary of Defense (A& T) is expected to
provide guidance on the JTRS acquisition strategy and
implementation. At that time, the Under Secretary of Defense (A&
T) will
review the JTRS architecture developed and validated by the JTRS
Joint Program Office, analyze the results of the market survey of
commercially available
products and technology and the recommendations of the Overarching
Integrated Product Team, and decide whether commercial technology
is adequate for JTRS to proceed directly into production or
whether additional research and development is required.
DOD and Joint Program Office officials anticipate that the
decisions reached at the October 2000 major program decision point
will provide the Army and the other services with an approved JTRS
architecture that enables them to proceed immediately into
production. DOD anticipates that this architecture will define
JTRS products, enable preparation of product and total program
cost estimates, and provide the services with sufficiently
developed hardware and software prototypes that they can use to
immediately procure JTRS products. The third phase will begin
after the Under Secretary of Defense (A& T) has chosen a detailed
acquisition strategy. This phase will consist primarily of service
procurement actions in accordance with their implementation plans
to replace legacy radio programs with JTRS products. DOD expects
the commercial marketplace to provide competitively priced
products that meet DOD requirements and are built to the JTRS
architecture because the 7 The team provides assistance,
oversight, and reviews as a program proceeds through its
acquisition life cycle and resolve issues at the lowest level
possible. The team comprises the program manager, the program
executive officer, component staff, joint staff, Under Secretary
of Defense (A& T) staff, and Office of the Secretary of Defense
staff principals or their representatives assigned to a specific
program.
B-281641 Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
architecture will be based on open system standards. 8 During
phase three, the Joint Program Office is also expected to acquire
JTRS architecture- compliant waveforms for service use, upgrade
the architecture to keep it current with technology advances, and
develop JTRS certification facilities. 9 Congress has expressed
concern that key decisions on the architecture, acquisition
strategy, and interoperability should be accelerated. The House
Appropriations Committee Report on DOD Appropriations for 2000
directed DOD to provide a report to the Committee on its strategy
for developing and fielding the JTRS by December 15, 1999. The
plan is to address priority radios for replacement, cost of the
development program, a development schedule, and estimated unit
cost of production radios. 10
JTRS Program Faces Three Key Challenges
DOD faces three key challenges to successful realization of JTRS
program objectives. First, despite DOD's expectations of success,
recent studies indicate that current commercial technology may not
be available to fully support the replacement of existing service
radios with JTRS products and may not support future JTRS
requirements. Second, a single architecture that can become the
commercial standard for software programmable radios will be
difficult to achieve. Third, the JTRS Operational Requirements
Document, although developed with input from warfighters, does not
fully define interoperability goals for joint and coalition
warfare
operations. Commercial Technology Development May Not Fully Meet
JTRS Requirements
DOD's acquisition strategy and fielding plans for JTRS rely
heavily on current commercial technology for initial fielding of
JTRS products and rapid advancement of commercial technology to
meet future JTRS requirements. DOD intends to leverage commercial
technology as well as 8 Open system standards are widely accepted
and supported standards set by recognized standards,
organizations, or the commercial marketplace. These standards
support interoperability, portability, and scalability and are
equally available to the general public at no cost or with a
moderate license fee. An open system implements sufficient open
standards for interfaces, services, and supporting formats to
enable properly engineered components to be used across a wide
range of systems with minimal changes, to interoperate with other
components on local and remote systems, and to interact with users
in a style that facilitates portability. 9 As of June 1999, the
Joint Program Office had not defined what these certification
facilities would do.
10 House Appropriations Report 106 244, DOD Appropriations Bill,
2000, pp. 214- 215.
B-281641 Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
technology being developed by the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) to support rapid technology insertion into
the JTRS program. However, DOD may have difficulty in acquiring
commercial technology to meet key JTRS requirements. In addition,
it does not have a formal plan to develop technologies not
available from commercial sources, integrate these technologies
into JTRS products, and coordinate related DOD and service
research programs with JTRS development plans. Our analysis of
recent reports by the RAND Corporation and the National
Research Council, our discussions with DOD laboratory and program
officials, and service reports all show that the private sector is
unlikely to meet all key JTRS military performance requirements
and that DOD must have a well- defined development program to meet
these unmet needs (see
app. I). The private sector does not need all of the features
included in military requirements and is unlikely to develop
needed technologies without an established market. The private
sector, for example, relies upon a fixed infrastructure for mobile
communications, while the military must be able to operate without
fixed infrastructure. The mobile infrastructure is a key
requirement to Army development initiatives. A companion report
said military and commercial users of wireless communications
systems have very different requirements, including those for
waveforms and signal processing. 11 According to the Joint Program
Office, industry has also identified key technologies that are not
required by commercial users. A November 1998 Joint Program Office
assessment of industry responses to its survey showed that
military technology hardware and software requirements exceed
commercial requirements, including those for antennas, information
security techniques, power amplifiers, and network management. In
their responses to the first architecture definition contracts,
industry officials also identified significant hardware and
software technology issues that must be addressed by the JTRS
program.
Ongoing DOD and service research programs are developing
technologies of potential use to the JTRS program that the private
sector is not expected to develop and market in the near future.
For example, DARPA began a comprehensive program in 1994 called
the Global Mobile Information Systems, which focused on developing
wireless network protocols, smart
11 Emerging Commercial Mobile Wireless Technology and Standards:
Suitable for the Army?, the RAND Corporation (MR- 960- A, 1998).
B-281641 Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
antennas, and other radio technologies. Another DARPA technology
program, called ULTRA COMM, is intended to reduce the logistical
costs and size of next- generation communications systems and add
operational
flexibility. A third DARPA program, the Advanced Digital Receiver
Technology program, was initiated to demonstrate technologies for
software- defined radios. Finally, a fourth DARPA program, called
the Battlefield Awareness and Data Dissemination Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstration, includes other radio and communications
technology such as the Global Broadcast Service. This system is a
space- based high data rate communication link providing
information from the United States or other rear- echelon
locations to military forces deployed in the field. The services
have also been allowed to continue software programmable radio
research projects that could provide useful information to the
JTRS program. For example: The Army is continuing development of
the NTDR, which can identify network management problems and
potential solutions. The Army is
also establishing a wideband network radio project that can
evaluate network protocols and software radios to deliver the high
data rates that the Army has said it requires.
In addition to its DMR program, the Navy has a High Data Rate
Line of Sight waveform development project that is software
programmable to improve battlegroup communications. The Air Force
is currently leading development of a smart network radio as part
of DOD's Defense Technology Objectives. However, leveraging this
experience may be difficult. DOD and service
research programs are not adequately coordinated with JTRS
development plans, reducing opportunities for the program to
directly address technology needs not satisfied by the commercial
marketplace. The Joint Program Office has begun initial studies of
commercial and DOD- sponsored technologies. However, no formal
process or technology
development plan exists to monitor current commercial and DOD
technology development efforts or to identify unmet technological
requirements that will have to be met to satisfy all JTRS
requirements. Such a plan is expected to be available in the near
future, according to DOD. In commenting on our draft report, DOD
stated that the Joint Program Office
is preparing a JTRS Technology Master Plan and that this plan will
provide a framework for focusing technology efforts such as those
underway Department- wide.
B-281641 Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
The Joint Program Office has also acknowledged the need for a
closer working relationship with DARPA. Joint Program Office
officials said their staff have limited, informal contacts with
individual DARPA program
managers and service technical staff because no formal mechanism
is available to ensure the transition of relevant technology from
DARPA to the Joint Program Office or the services. Joint Program
Office officials told us they are in the process of approaching
DARPA to establish a written agreement.
In addition, DOD does not have a process to manage the development
of new technologies to meet JTRS requirements, integrate existing
technologies to meet JTRS requirements, or ensure that
technologies are mature before introduction into JTRS. In our work
on best practices in managing advanced technology development, we
found that maturing new technology before including it in products
is one of the main determinants
of success in commercial product development. 12 This practice
holds promise for DOD because immature technologies have been a
main source of problems in developing weapon systems. However,
budgetary, organizational, and other factors within DOD make it
difficult to bring technologies to high readiness levels before
including them in weapon systems. These factors encourage science
and technology organizations such as DARPA to disengage from
technology development too soon and weapon system managers to
accept immature technologies. In technical comments to a draft of
this report, DOD said that it is beginning to address these
issues. According to DOD, the Technology Master Plan will provide
a necessary first step toward establishing a clearly defined
technology development and/ or management plan.
A Single Architecture Will Be Difficult to Achieve
DOD expects to approve a single architecture for the JTRS program
at the October 2000 major program decision point. It also expects
industry to adopt the architecture for widespread use in the
commercial market because the architecture will be developed by
industry under DOD
contract. DOD's strategy is based on the assumption that a single
architecture for software programmable radios based on open
commercial standards is possible and will result in a commercial
market from which the services could procure JTRS products. On the
basis of our analysis of recent reports and studies, we believe
that a single architecture based on 12 Best Practices: Managing
Advanced Technology Development Can Improve Weapon System
Outcomes (GAO/NSIAD-99-162, July 1999).
B-281641 Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
open commercial standards may not be universally adopted by
industry and may not be technically possible, at least in the near
term. A 1997 National Research Council study, sponsored by DARPA,
discussed the difficulties in achieving widespread consensus on
standards in wireless communications. The study concluded: For a
worldwide operator, the management and coordination of diverse
systems are complicated by the absence of any trend toward
convergence toward a single standard in wireless communications.
13 According to the report, Europe, Japan, and the United States
have
different wireless technologies, and although new commercial
technology may be developed, the commercial deployment of that
technology is not ensured. Another National Research Council
report said that in coalition warfare, U. S. partners would not
necessarily adopt the same set of standards-- even commercial
ones-- as those used by the United States. 14 While commercial
firms promise significant progress in software
programmable radios within the next several years, standards and
architectures in the private sector are now in a state of flux.
DOD's assumption that one architecture can meet all its
requirements also may not be technically valid. Industry
representatives cited the widely different size and power
requirements of DOD's radios, which range from small handheld
units to base station radios, as the single major roadblock to
development of a single architecture. For example, some processing
could require more power than is practical for a handheld radio.
Responding to industry representatives, a Joint Program Office
official said that JTRS provides the focus and impetus necessary
to converge on one architecture that covers the full range of
requirements. In January 1999, a Defense Science Board Task Force
on Tactical Battlefield Communications made several
recommendations designed to aggressively accelerate acquisition of
JTRS products. The Board recommended that DOD instruct the Joint
Program Office to stop its ongoing architecture development
program and contract immediately for
13 The Evolution of Untethered Communications, National Research
Council (1997). 14 Realizing the Potential of C4I: Fundamental
Challenges, National Research Council (1999).
B-281641 Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
development of multiple prototypes using architecture products
already developed by the Software Defined Radio Forum. 15 The
Board expected the prototypes to be available 12 to 14 months
after contract award. In its technical comments, DOD said the
Board's recommendation was rejected because it would have resulted
in multiple, incompatible prototypes and would not have resulted
in open systems. According to Joint Program
Office officials, development of a single architecture that will
result in compatible, open system prototypes is necessary.
However, the Joint Program Office is not funding development of
alternative architectures, should a single architecture prove
unrealizable. Joint Program Office officials said they still
expect to develop a single architecture that is flexible enough to
allow multiple implementation configurations.
Also, in its technical comments, DOD said that developing an
alternative architecture or making plans for an alternative would
serve no other purpose than to encourage the supporters of legacy
and non- interoperable systems. DOD also believes that developing
an alternative architecture
would totally undermine the current cooperation between government
and industry and among industry participants. We disagree. First,
as discussed above, a single architecture may not be universally
adopted by industry and may not be technically feasible. We
believe DOD could minimize risks by periodically assessing
progress and preparing alternatives to meet
identified risks. Second, if industry cooperation is as tenuous as
DOD believes, the assumption that industry will accept the JTRS
architecture as a standard is unrealistic.
Once approved, the Joint Program Office expects the JTRS
architecture to provide a foundation on which the services can
finalize implementation plans for replacing or supplementing
existing radios with JTRS products. Joint Program Office officials
told us they expect the approved JTRS architecture to define the
products that will be available and their capabilities. In April
1998, the Under Secretary of Defense (A& T) requested that each
service acquisition executive limit development of new programs
and transition existing development programs for radio- based
communications systems to a target single acquisition program. The
JTRS Management Execution Plan states that one of the Joint
Program Office's
15 The Forum is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to supporting
the development, deployment, and use of open architectures for
advanced wireless systems.
B-281641 Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
most important responsibilities is developing and monitoring JTRS
plans to replace or supplement existing radios with JTRS products.
16 The Joint Program Office intends to incorporate service-
prepared implementation plans into one DOD- wide plan that is
based upon a single approved JTRS architecture. However,
establishing effective implementation plans requires clear
decisions on the scope of the JTRS program and cost- effective
JTRS products. The services contend that effective implementation
plans cannot be developed in detail without a clear determination
of which systems will be affected by JTRS. DOD concurs with the
services. In technical comments on a draft of this report, DOD
said the difficulty facing the services, as they migrate to JTRS,
is the uncertainty of knowing exactly when a desired capability
will be available for incorporation into JTRS, as well as the
costs to integrate JTRS- compliant systems into host platforms.
Furthermore, implementing a JTRS architecture, however sound and
complete, will take considerable time because fiscal limitations
are likely to limit the number and capabilities of JTRS products
that can be bought in any single year. Thus, DOD's goal of
replacing its entire estimated inventory
of 750,000 radios with JTRS products will likely take many years.
For example, the Army, as of calendar year 1998, had estimated
procurement of about 270,000 Single Channel Ground and Airborne
Radio System
(SINCGARS) radios, which have an expected lifetime of 20 years.
Each of the services has stated that it would have to replace its
legacy systems over time because of funding limitations. In its
technical comments on a draft of this report, DOD also questioned
the adequacy of existing funding for the JTRS program in the
services. DOD said that while the services have
planned for radio system procurements, they have assumed, in many
cases, that they will be procuring more of the same. As a result,
DOD said, there may be inadequate funding to cover the up- front
engineering and testing necessary to integrate a new, JTRS-
compliant radio system into a host platform.
Interoperability Goals Are Not Fully Defined
The JTRS Operational Requirements Document states that joint,
combined, and coalition operations require interoperable command,
control, communications, computers, and intelligence capabilities
and that JTRS 16 The plan provides key details for operating the
JTRS Joint Program Office and outlines individual service roles,
relationships, and functions in the JTRS program.
B-281641 Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
will provide radios to meet these needs. The Operational
Requirements Document, which was developed with commanders in
chief input, generally defines these requirements. DOD has begun
an effort to further define interoperability requirements;
however, at the time of our review, these requirements were not
fully defined. In addition, the JTRS acquisition strategy does not
adequately provide for procurement and testing of JTRS products in
joint and coalition operations. DOD plans to address the
interoperability issue by providing the services with standard
JTRS waveforms that they can use in their JTRS hardware. According
to DOD's technical comments, the JTRS Operational Requirements
Document defines the required waveforms, need by dates, and
intended operating environments. However, DOD has not finalized
the selection and prioritization of the waveforms and the many
different variations needed to ensure interoperability. The Joint
Program Office intends to use an initial set of waveforms
(specified in the Operational Requirements Document) until the
major program decision point in October 2000, when it intends to
deliver waveforms according to commanders in chief priorities and
the availability of commercial
technology to support those priorities. The JTRS Program Director
said many complex questions must be answered before deciding which
waveform modes to use in which JTRS radios. He said that JTRS
radios must be compatible with existing radios, but this
requirement has not been fully defined. He asked the joint staff
for guidance on this issue, and in response, the joint staff sent
a message to the
commanders in chief and the services requesting they identify
their detailed requirements. According to the joint staff message,
a consolidated list of requirements is to be delivered for review
by the Overall Integrated Product Team no later than August 30,
1999. Problems in achieving interoperability goals may also be
expected because
each of the services places higher priority on meeting its own
rather than joint requirements. DOD management plans allow the
services to control JTRS acquisition, testing, and fielding plans.
The JTRS Management Execution Plan only allows the JTRS Program
Manager to coordinate various service production programs to meet
the operational requirements of each service. The plan also allows
the Joint Program Office to use joint
service research, development, testing, and evaluation funding
only in a manner that is most responsive to service/ mission
needs. According to the plan, members of each service assigned to
the Joint Program Office also
B-281641 Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
represent their respective service and articulate service
technical and operational requirements. In commenting on a draft
of this report, DOD agreed with our concerns about defining
communications interoperability. DOD said it fully appreciates the
requirement for the JTRS to be interoperable within the joint
environment and fully supports the need for interoperability.
According to DOD technical comments, the Joint Program Office will
be the gatekeeper through which no service procurement may pass
without demonstrating compliance with the JTRS architecture. We
believe DOD will have difficulty in enforcing such a gatekeeper
function. In previous reports we showed instances in which DOD was
unable to override service- unique priorities to achieve
interoperability and implement DOD architectures. 17 These cases
demonstrate that the services traditionally control acquisition
programs and buy to meet service, not joint, requirements.
DOD also has not prepared a comprehensive joint test and
evaluation master plan to guide service- level testing and to
ensure that joint interoperability testing is conducted. Joint
Program Office officials said they plan to establish an Integrated
Product Team for interoperability testing. The officials said
testing has been discussed with the Joint Interoperability Test
Center, the Joint Spectrum Center, various service officials, and
the Office of the Defense Operational Test and Evaluation. One
official said the Joint Program Office intends to have the team
produce a test and evaluation master plan to guide overall
testing. Conclusions The JTRS program was established as a joint
program to achieve cost savings over existing radio systems,
improve performance, and address well- known interoperability
problems among service- unique radios. DOD
issued instructions to the services to stop all current efforts to
initiate any development and acquisition activity in service-
unique radio and terminal programs. However, because JTRS products
are not yet available, DOD issued waivers to the services,
allowing them to continue procurement of other radios to meet
near- term requirements. No date for fielding JTRS 17 Defense
Management: Stronger Oversight of Joint Service Imagery Processing
System Needed (GAO/NSIAD-91-164, July 1991); Defense Information
Superiority: Progress Made, but Significant Challenges Remain
(GAO/ NSIAD/ AIMD- 98- 257, Aug. 1998); and U. S. Atlantic
Command: Challenging Role in the Evolution of Joint Military
Capabilities (GAO/NSIAD-99-39, Feb. 1999).
B-281641 Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
products has been established. Thus, DOD will most likely continue
to receive waiver requests from the services to meet near- term
requirements while the JTRS Joint Program Office prepares a JTRS
architecture and a
detailed acquisition strategy. The Joint Program Office expects
the architecture and acquisition strategy to be available for
review and approval at a major program decision meeting in October
2000. On the basis of the progress made by the JTRS program and of
the challenges ahead, we are concerned that DOD is currently not
well positioned to achieve its expectation that the private sector
will be able to meet key JTRS requirements. However, we believe
DOD can enhance its position. First, if military requirements
cannot be fully satisfied by developments in the commercial
marketplace, a detailed technology plan
would help to better leverage commercial technology development
and ongoing DOD research programs associated with programmable
radios and integrate these technologies into the JTRS program.
Such a plan could (1) identify specific technologies that could be
extracted from various commercial and DOD sources for potential
use in the JTRS program and (2) select technologies for focused
development and integration in the JTRS program. DOD could also
use the technology plan as part of the
process to ensure that the requisite technology will be mature as
the program develops. Such a plan could also set standards for
assessing the maturity of key technologies. Second, current
significant risk in DOD's JTRS architecture development and its
still- developing acquisition strategy could be reduced by
incorporating alternatives, should a single architecture prove to
be premature or not technically possible. Third, establishing
interoperability as the top program priority would set the stage
for program success. Identifying a minimum set of interoperability
requirements is paramount for an undertaking as complex and
extensive as JTRS. By knowing minimum interoperability
requirements, DOD could determine what technologies need to be
developed.
Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense
develop a JTRS technology plan for approval at the October 2000
major
decision point that (a) addresses the specific limitations of
commercial and DOD technology in satisfying current and future
JTRS requirements, (b) establishes standards for assessing the
maturity of JTRS technology, and (c) coordinates relevant DOD
research and development programs to focus on JTRS;
B-281641 Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
establish specific milestones for assessing the commercial and
technical feasibility of the single architecture approach and
develop alternative architectures if indicated by the results of
these assessments; and identify, as a priority initiative, the
precise requirements for
interoperability among tactical radio communications systems.
Agency Comments and Our Response
In a general comment on a draft of this report, DOD indicated that
it is fully supportive of JTRS and its projected capabilities, but
did not agree with our recommendations. DOD stated that the draft
showed a misunderstanding of the intent of the program in general
and of the specific conduct and direction of the program. We
disagree. Our report recognizes that the intent of the JTRS
program is to consolidate various service- unique radio
acquisition programs into a single, joint program with the
objectives of lowering costs, improving performance, and improving
interoperability in joint and coalition operations. We fully
understand that DOD's conduct and direction of the JTRS program is
based on the fundamental concept that industry, not DOD, is
developing the JTRS open systems architecture and that this
architecture is expected to result in a commercial market from
which the services can procure JTRS products. As our report points
out, our key concern is how DOD should position itself to counter
the significant risk of implementing this single architecture
concept. In our opinion, DOD must successfully address the
challenges we identified or run the risk of reaching the October
2000 major decision point without (1) clearly identified
technology deficiencies and a funded DOD- approved plan to address
these deficiencies, (2) an adequate architecture to guide JTRS
development, and (3) fully defined interoperability requirements.
Deficiencies such as these could result in wasted funds, loss of
time in program development, and renewed service pressure to
return to service- specific programs. DOD also made three specific
observations concerning our recommendations. In our opinion, DOD's
comments regarding our three
recommendations reflect greater similarity of viewpoints on the
general direction in which JTRS is already moving than is
indicated by the Department's characterization of our report.
Regarding our first recommendation, DOD said that although the
Joint Program Office is developing a Technology Master Plan, its
purpose is different than what is stated in our recommendation.
However, DOD also states the Technology Master Plan will ensure
that technology assessment is accomplished and that appropriate
technologies are incorporated. The development of this plan-- if
not already consistent with the elements listed in our
B-281641 Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
recommendation-- could be made compatible with some modification.
We also changed the language of the recommendation to emphasize
that the Technology Master Plan should be prepared for approval at
the October 2000 major decision point and address specific
limitations of DOD and of commercial technology in meeting current
and future JTRS requirements.
In disagreeing with our recommendation to prepare alternatives,
DOD commented that it is aware of the risks inherent in adopting a
single architecture for JTRS and that it may or may not be
consistent with similar commercial standards. The Department
stated that by taking this approach, the Joint Program Office is
corroborating that the single architecture accepted by DOD in the
procurement process is also valid in the
commercial market place. In this regard, DOD stated that the
fundamental concept is that industry, not DOD, is developing the
accepted open systems architecture. We believe that DOD's response
must be viewed in the context of the significant risks it is
assuming. DOD's intent that industry develop an architecture that
is valid in the market place must be contrasted with the
risks stated in our report namely, that achieving widespread
consensus on wireless standards will be difficult, and technical
difficulties will surface. DOD's point about the Joint Program
Office's recognition of risks does not address our concern that
appropriate technologies may not be available to support the
intended architecture unless DOD fully implements our
recommendation that it develop a JTRS technology plan. Our
recommendation is aimed at preparing alternative courses of action
to address risks as they are recognized at periodic milestones
leading to the
October 2000 major decision point. Additionally, our
recommendation is intended to better position DOD with
alternatives to fall back on, thus mitigating potential adverse
effects that DOD would experience should the single architecture
not come to fruition. We changed the wording of the recommendation
to emphasize that DOD should reassess the single architecture it
proposes. This change makes the recommendation consistent with our
proposal that DOD establish specific milestones and provide
alternative courses of action.
While DOD indicated that it partially concurred with our third
recommendation regarding improved interoperability, the Department
presented a discussion essentially indicating concurrence. DOD's
comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. In
addition, DOD provided technical comments that we incorporated as
appropriate.
B-281641 Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
Scope and Methodology
To determine the status of the JTRS program and future DOD
development plans for the program, we interviewed appropriate
officials in the JTRS program office; the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for C3I; and the Army, the Navy, and the Air
Force. We reviewed documentation establishing the program and its
objectives and requirements. We also reviewed correspondence, cost
and schedule data, and other documents relating to the JTRS
program. To identify challenges DOD faces in implementing its JTRS
acquisition strategy, we analyzed data from DOD and appropriate
commercial sources. To obtain this data, we interviewed
appropriate officials in the JTRS program office; the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I; and the Army, the
Navy, and the Air Force. We also interviewed some of the authors
and analyzed multiple reports prepared by non- DOD organizations
for DOD, its agencies, and the services assessing commercial
technology for military missions. We then assessed what these
experts said about each key performance parameter, specifically
whether the experts determined that the technology needed to
fulfill the requirement was commercially available or whether
further development was needed under DOD sponsorship. The scope
and methodology of our analysis of the various studies is further
discussed in the introduction to appendix I. We visited DOD and
service research organizations and laboratories and interviewed
appropriate officials to discuss and assess their research
programs, availability of relevant commercial technology for DOD
purposes, and inclusion of relevant DOD and commercial technology
into the JTRS
program. We also visited the Atlantic Command and the Central
Command to discuss user requirements for JTRS. We performed our
work from August 1998 to August 1999 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to Representative John
Murtha, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Defense,
Committee on Appropriations; Representative C. W. Bill Young,
Chairman, and Representative David Obey, Ranking Minority Member,
Committee on Appropriations; and other interested congressional
committees. We are also sending copies to the Honorable William
Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Louis Caldera,
Secretary of the Army; the Honorable Richard Danzig, Secretary of
the Navy; and the Honorable F. Whitten
B-281641 Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
Peters, Secretary of the Air Force. Copies will also be made
available to others upon request. If you have any questions
regarding this report, please contact Charles F. Rey at (202) 512
4174 or Robert R. Hadley at (202) 512- 4340. Key contributors to
this assignment were Subrata Ghoshroy and Raffaele Roffo.
Sincerely yours,
Allen Li Associate Director Defense Acquisitions Issues
Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
Contents Letter 1 Appendix I Technology Challenges for JTRS
24 Appendix II Comments From the Department of Defense
28 Tables Table I. 1: Comparison of Independent Technology
Assessments 25
Abbreviations
AITG Airborne Ingegrated Terminal Group A& T Acquisition and
Technology C3I Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency DOD Department of
Defense DMR Digital Modular Radio JTRS Joint Tactical Radio System
NTDR Near- Term Digital Radio ORD Operational Requirements
Document
Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix I Technology Challenges for JTRS Appendi x I
Table I. 1 summarizes our analysis of several recent studies and
reports published by recognized experts in the field of radio
communications who individually concluded that the Joint Tactical
Radio System (JTRS) faces a number of technological challenges. We
reviewed these studies and reports to determine if a consensus
existed among the various experts about these
technological challenges. We also interviewed some of the authors
to obtain a better understanding of the issues. The point of
reference for our analysis was the JTRS Operational Requirements
Document (ORD), which describes the performance requirements of
the Joint Tactical Radio. These requirements are classified in the
ORD as either threshold (minimum) or objective (desired by the
user), and some threshold requirements are further defined as a
key performance parameter. A key performance parameter is a
capability or characteristic that is so significant that failure
to meet it can cause the concept or system selection to be
reevaluated or the program to be reassessed or even terminated. We
identified those ORD requirements that were highlighted in these
reports, in addition to those that are already designated as key
performance parameters, and matched the specific technologies that
are needed to satisfy them. A brief description of each report
follows. The National Research Council
report titled The Evolution of Untethered Communications, was the
outcome of a yearlong study sponsored by the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The concept untethered
communications includes both mobile and wireless operations. The
primary focus of the study was to recommend to DARPA where to
invest in information technology for mobile wireless systems. The
RAND study was sponsored by the U. S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command. RAND was tasked to recommend to the Army specific basic
and applied research areas where progress was needed to address
gaps between military requirements and presently available and
emerging technologies. Overall findings of the study were
published in a report titled Fundamental Research Policy for the
Digital Battlefield. A companion report called Emerging Commercial
Mobile Wireless Technology and Standards: Suitable for the Army?
documented the results in detail. The Programmable Modular
Communications Systems Guidance Document published by the
Department of Defense provides a Systems Reference Model and rules
for its use by the communications systems designer. The document
identifies numerous technology issues that industry and government
must address, which are cited here as appropriate. Finally, we
highlight the viewpoint of industry regarding the deficiencies of
commercial technology. We used the results of a Request for
Information issued by the JTRS Special Task Force, which sought
the opinions of industry and academia on the planned JTRS
Appendix I Technology Challenges for JTRS
Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
acquisition strategy. In the Joint Program Office's assessment,
the respondents identified a number of technology hurdles and
confirmed that JTRS requires significant military capabilities not
applicable to the private sector. Table I. 1: Comparison of
IndependentTechnology Assessments
JTR ORD requirements
Specific technology required to satisfy ORD
NRC report on wireless communications 1997 RAND report 1998
PMCS guidance document
1997 Industry
viewpoint (JTRS JPO survey) 1998
Classification of the parameter in the ORD
2 MHz 2 GHz multiband, multimode Advanced antennas X X -- X Key
performance
parameter (KPP) Software programmable Filter technology, DSP X X X
X KPP
Multiple channels simultaneously Co- site
interference mitigation
X -- X X KPP Load new modes and reconfigure capabilities via
software, while in operation
Software definition of waveforms (portability) -- -- X X KPP
Internal growth capability through modular, scalable open systems
architecture Open systems architecture X -- X X KPP
Provide networking services for connected RF networks and between
different networks
Network protocol, management, mobility X X X X KPP
Secure communications Programmable TRANSEC, COMSEC, INFOSEC X X X
X Threshold
Output power: milli- watts to tens of watts 2 MHz 2 GHz
Broadband amplifiers X X X X Threshold 2 Mbps data rate High-
speed A/ D
converters X X X X Threshold (Notes on next page)
Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
Legend X = Item is identified as a deficiency and requires further
research and development -- = Item is either not emphasized or not
discussed in the study A/ D = analog to digital COMSEC =
communications security
DSP = digital signal processor GHz = gigahertz INFOSEC =
information systems security JPO = Joint Program Office Mbps =
megabits per second MHz = megahertz NRC = National Research
Council ORD = Operational Requirements Document PMCS =
Programmable Modular Communications System RF = radio frequency
TRANSEC = transmission security
Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II Comments From the Department of Defense Appendi x I I
See pp. 16- 18 Note: GAO's comments supplementing those in the
report text appear at the end of this appendix.
Appendix II Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
See comment 1. See comment 2. See comment 3.
See comment 4. See comment 5.
Appendix II Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
See comment 6.
Appendix II Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's
(DOD) letter dated August 10, 1999. GAO Comments 1. Our
recommendation is based on the recognition that there are
limitations to the technology that can be provided by commercial
developers and that these limitations need to be factored into an
acquisition strategy. We believe that industry at large may not be
capable of supporting all of the key JTRS performance requirements
and that some unique technologies may not be available to satisfy
all the requirements of the JTRS. DOD should have a plan to deal
with that possibility. Therefore, we see no inconsistency between
our recommendation and the intention and/ or principles of the
JTRS program. Furthermore, although DOD disagrees with our
recommendation, it also comments that the Joint Program Office is
in the process of developing a technology plan. According to DOD,
this Technology Master Plan is expected to ensure that technology
assessment is accomplished and that appropriate technologies are
incorporated. By adopting such a plan, DOD would meet the intent
of our recommendation, and if this plan is not already consistent
with our recommendation, it could be made compatible with some
modification. 2. Although DOD states that its philosophy is for
industry to provide the
best possible solutions for the JTRS family of radios via an open
systems architecture, DOD officials have acknowledged that DOD
does not have adequate information today to make an evaluation of
industry potential. As noted in our report, the Joint Program
Office will conduct a market survey to determine industry's
readiness to produce JTRS compliant systems. In addition, our
report identifies limitations of current and future commercial
technology to meet key military performance requirements
identified in several reports published by recognized experts in
the field of radio communications. Our report also notes that DOD
has research underway to provide necessary JTRS technology but
that departmental and service
research programs are not adequately coordinated with JTRS
development plans. 3. During our review, Joint Program Office
officials told us they have only individual staff level contacts
with DARPA but intend to approach DARPA officials to establish a
more formal working relationship. 4. Although DOD indicates
nonconcurrence, its comments show recognition of the significant
risks inherent in adopting a single architecture for the JTRS that
may or may not be consistent with similar
Appendix II Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
commercial standards. DOD's comments also recognize that the JTRS
architecture developed by the industrial consortia may not be
consistent with industry norms. Our recommendation focuses on the
development of a plan that includes such recognition. 5. DOD's
fundamental philosophy is that industry, not DOD, is developing
the open systems architecture needed for JTRS. DOD states this
philosophy is inherent in the Joint Program Office's contract
solicitations, evaluations, and selection process. DOD hopes this
open systems architecture will be widely accepted by industry.
However, DOD has no assurance that its expectations for the JTRS
architecture to receive widespread industry acceptance will be
achieved. DOD is requiring
industrial participants in the JTRS architectural development
effort to provide a plan that would ensure that the architecture
is accepted by industry at large. According to DOD, these firms
are committed to having the architecture accepted by the Software
Defined Radio Forum, a formal industrial affiliation sponsoring
the definition of software radio standards for industry and other
standards bodies. However, our report pointed out the National
Research Council discussion of difficulties in achieving
widespread consensus on standards in wireless communications.
Thus, the single consortia selected by the Joint Program Office to
develop the architecture cannot be assumed to represent an
industry- wide perspective, and the Software Defined Radio Forum
may or may not accept the JTRS architecture and sponsor it to
industry and other standards bodies. 6. Although DOD only
partially concurred with our third recommendation, actions such as
the Army's review of interoperability requirements and the
establishment of a formal Integrated Product Team to review
operational requirements are consistent with our recommendation.
(707370) Let t er
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