Military Training: Management and Oversight of Joint Combined Exchange
Training (Chapter Report, 07/23/1999, GAO/NSIAD-99-173).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the management and
oversight of the U.S. Special Operations Forces' overseas deployments to
train with the armed forces and other security forces of friendly
foreign countries, focusing on: (1) whether the Department of Defense
(DOD) has implemented the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET)
program in accordance with legislation; (2) whether DOD and the
Department of State are providing civilian oversight to ensure that JCET
activities are consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives in
countries that GAO included in its review; and (3) how DOD is
implementing recent legislation that restricts it from training with
foreign forces involved in human rights abuses.

GAO noted that: (1) GAO's review of available JCET files, attendance at
command training conferences, observations of pre-event meetings, and
discussions with DOD officials confirmed that DOD has complied with the
statutory requirement that JCET's primary purpose be the training of
U.S. special operations forces; (2) GAO found a direct link between the
training special operations forces indicated they needed and the
training conducted; (3) however, DOD has not accurately reported to
Congress the number of JCETs that were conducted, their costs, or their
relationship to counternarcotics and counterterrorism, as also required
by statute; (4) inaccuracies in reporting have arisen because of
confusion in the field regarding how to define a JCET, how to pay for
and report costs incurred by host countries, and how to interpret the
legislative requirement to report JCETs' relationship to
counternarcotics and counterterrorism; (5) DOD's recent changes in the
JCET approval process and more explicit guidance, which it plans to
issue shortly, should improve the accuracy of the reports to Congress;
(6) regarding oversight of JCET activities in the six countries GAO
visited--Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, the Philippines, and
Thailand--DOD conducted JCETs with the knowledge and support of U.S.
ambassadors who believed that these activities were consistent with U.S.
foreign policy objectives in each country; (7) while embassy officials
were involved prior to November 1998, neither State nor DOD
headquarters' officials were routinely involved in overseeing JCETs; (8)
neither DOD personnel overseas nor U.S. ambassadors believed that any
problems occurred because of the lack of headquarters oversight; (9)
DOD's new JCET approval procedures, which require Secretary of Defense
approval and State notification, will provide greater headquarters
oversight and assurance that all factors are weighed in determining
whether a JCET should proceed; (10) State and Defense have each issued
guidance for implementing October 1998 legislation that restricts the
use of DOD funds to train with members of foreign security force units
who have been credibly alleged to have committed a gross violation of
human rights unless all necessary corrective steps have been taken; (11)
in the same six countries GAO visited, State and DOD personnel have
instituted procedures to implement the new legislation; and (12)
however, a number of issues in implementing the law still remain.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-99-173
     TITLE:  Military Training: Management and Oversight of Joint
	     Combined Exchange Training
      DATE:  07/23/1999
   SUBJECT:  International cooperation
	     Armed forces abroad
	     Foreign military training
	     Foreign military assistance
	     Civilian employees
	     Military policies
	     Foreign policies
	     Reporting requirements
	     Foreign governments
	     Statutory law
IDENTIFIER:  Bolivia
	     Colombia
	     Ecuador
	     Indonesia
	     Philippines
	     Thailand
	     Foreign Military Sales Financing Program
	     Foreign Military Sales Program
	     DOD Joint Combined Exchange Training Program

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ns99173 A Report to Congressional Requesters

July 1999 MILITARY TRAINING Management and Oversight of Joint
Combined Exchange Training

National Security and International Affairs Division

B-282835 Letter July 23, 1999 The Honorable James M. Inhofe
Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness Committee on Armed
Services United States Senate

The Honorable Pat Roberts Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities Committee on Armed Services United States
Senate

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman Chairman, Committee on
International Relations House of Representatives

The Honorable Tom Lantos Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on
Asia and the Pacific Committee on International Relations House of
Representatives

The Honorable Howard L. Berman House of Representatives

This report responds to your requests that we review the
management and oversight of U. S. Special Operations Forces'
overseas deployments to train with the armed forces and other
security forces of friendly foreign countries. These deployments,
called Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), raised concerns
that U. S. forces may be training with foreign militaries without
adequate civilian oversight and engaging in activities that are
inconsistent with U. S. policy goals. Specifically, we addressed
(1) whether the Department of Defense (DOD) has implemented JCETs
in accordance with legislation, (2) whether DOD and the Department
of State

are providing civilian oversight to ensure that JCET activities
are consistent with U. S. foreign policy objectives in countries
that we included in our review, and (3) how DOD is implementing
recent legislation that restricts it from training with foreign
forces involved in human rights abuses.

We are sending copies of this report to other congressional
committees; the Honorable Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of
State; and the Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense.
Copies will also be made available to other interested parties
upon request.

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me
at (202) 512- 5140 or Donald Patton at (202) 512- 2898. Key
contacts and other contributors to this report are listed in
appendix III.

Mark Gebicke Director, National Security Preparedness Issues

Executive Summary Purpose Overseas activities of U. S. Special
Operations Command forces,

specifically Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), have raised
concerns on the part of Members of Congress and others that U. S.
forces may be training with foreign militaries without adequate
civilian oversight and engaging in activities that are
inconsistent with U. S. policy goals.

Human rights advocates have also called attention to JCETs because
of their concerns that the United States may be training foreign
military personnel who have committed human rights abuses. In
response to these concerns, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Military Readiness, Senate

Committee on Armed Services, the Chairman of the House Committee
on International Relations, and the Ranking Minority Member of the
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, House Committee on
International Relations, asked GAO to examine the management and
oversight of JCET activities. Specifically, GAO determined (1)
whether the Department of Defense (DOD) has implemented JCETs in
accordance with legislation, (2) whether DOD and the Department of
State are providing civilian oversight to ensure that JCET
activities are consistent with U. S. foreign

policy objectives in countries that GAO included in its review,
and (3) how DOD is implementing recent legislation that restricts
it from training with foreign forces involved in human rights
abuses.

Background Special operations forces are generally organized into
small units for military action focused on strategic or
operational goals. They are tasked with a variety of missions
ranging from training, advising, and organizing

foreign groups for unconventional warfare to training coalition
forces for multinational military operations. These missions
require skills such as the ability to speak foreign languages, to
understand regional cultural and

environmental characteristics, and to quickly deploy and operate
unsupported in sometimes hostile or politically sensitive areas.
The U. S. Special Operations Command believes that the best way
its forces can train for these missions is to train with the
people in the places where they may have to operate.

In 1991, the Congress clarified the authority of the U. S. Special
Operations Command and other combatant commands to use operations
and maintenance funds for overseas deployments in which special
operations forces train and train with the armed forces and other
security forces of friendly foreign countries. The legislation
provided authority for DOD to pay training expenses for these
activities, provided that the primary

purpose was to train the U. S. servicemembers. 1 The legislation
also requires that the Secretary of Defense annually submit a
report to the Congress listing numbers of JCETs conducted, their
purpose, cost, and relationship to counterterrorism and
counternarcotics activities. Since enactment of this legislation,
such training has commonly been referred to as Joint Combined
Exchange Training. Recent legislation restricts DOD

from training with a unit of the security forces of a foreign
country if the Secretary of Defense has received credible
information from the Department of State that a member of the unit
has committed a gross violation of human rights, unless all
necessary corrective steps have been taken. 2

While the primary purpose of JCETs is to train U. S. forces, they
also have an ancillary benefit in that they can be used by the
geographic U. S. commanders in chief and ambassadors to fulfill
regional and country engagement objectives. In fiscal year 1998,
JCETs represented between 2 and 6 percent of the foreign military
interactions of the commanders in chief. In that same year, JCETs
accounted for about 8 percent of the time special operations
forces were deployed overseas.

Results in Brief GAO's review of available JCET files, attendance
at command training conferences, observations of pre- event
meetings, and discussions with

DOD officials confirmed that DOD has complied with the statutory
requirement that JCETs' primary purpose be the training of U. S.
special operations forces. GAO found a direct link between the
training special operations forces indicated they needed and the
training conducted. However, DOD has not accurately reported to
the Congress the number of

JCETs that were conducted, their costs, or their relationship to
counternarcotics and counterterrorism, as also required by
statute. Inaccuracies in reporting have arisen because of
confusion in the field

regarding how to define a JCET, how to pay for and report costs
incurred by host countries, and how to interpret the legislative
requirement to report JCETs' relationship to counternarcotics and
counterterrorism. DOD's recent changes in the JCET approval
process and more explicit guidance,

which it plans to issue shortly, should improve the accuracy of
the reports 1 10 U. S. C.  2011 (1994). 2 Department of Defense
Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. 105- 262,  8130, 112 Stat.
2279, 2335 (Oct. 17, 1998).

to the Congress. GAO is recommending further ways for DOD to
improve its reporting to the Congress.

Regarding oversight of JCET activities in the six countries GAO
visited Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, the Philippines,
and Thailand DOD conducted JCETs with the knowledge and support of
U. S. ambassadors who believed that these activities were
consistent with U. S. foreign policy objectives in each country.
While embassy officials were involved prior to November 1998,
neither Department of State nor DOD headquarters' officials were
routinely involved in overseeing JCETs. Neither DOD personnel
overseas nor U. S. ambassadors believed that any problems occurred
because of the lack of headquarters oversight. Even so, DOD's new
JCET approval procedures, which require Secretary of Defense
approval and Department of State notification, will provide
greater headquarters oversight and assurance that all factors are
weighed in determining whether a JCET should proceed.

The Departments of State and Defense have each issued guidance for
implementing October 1998 legislation that restricts the use of
DOD funds to train with members of foreign security force units
who have been credibly alleged to have committed a gross violation
of human rights unless all necessary corrective steps have been
taken. 3 In the same six countries GAO visited, State Department
and DOD personnel have instituted procedures to implement the new
legislation. For example, the embassy in Colombia investigates
each individual scheduled for training for allegations

of human rights abuses. These procedures are based on their
understanding of the Department of State and DOD guidance and the
unique foreign policy goals and challenges they face in the
countries where they conduct activities. However, a number of
issues in implementing the law still remain. As a result, State
and DOD personnel overseas were concerned that they might not be
meeting the full intent of the legislation.

GAO is recommending that the Secretary of State, after
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, provide more specific
guidance to U. S. embassies.

3 Pub. L. 105- 262,  8130, 112 Stat. 2279, 2335 (Oct. 17, 1998).

Principal Findings JCETs Are Used Primarily to

As required by 10 U. S. C. 2011, the primary purpose of the JCETs
GAO Train U. S. Forces, but

reviewed for fiscal years 1997 and 1998 was to train U. S. special
operations Reporting on These

forces. While commanders in chief and ambassadors played a large
part in Activities Has Been determining where JCETs occurred,
individual special operations forces

Inaccurate units determined what mission- essential tasks were
trained to during these

events. Special operations personnel GAO interviewed believed that
JCETs were critical to maintain proficiency in their mission-
essential tasks. JCETs also provided other benefits that were
invaluable to special operations forces, including language
training, cultural immersion, and

knowledge of the local terrain and weather. Files that GAO
reviewed at the Pacific Command, the Southern Command, and various
special operations forces units, which included programs of
instruction and after- action reports, illustrate that JCETs
provided special operations personnel with opportunities to meet
their mission- essential tasks. For example, in Thailand, the 1 st
Special Forces Group trained for military freefall parachuting,
and in Bolivia, special forces National Guard units trained in
light infantry tactics. DOD has not accurately reported to the
Congress the numbers of JCETs

that were conducted, their costs, or their relationship to
counternarcotics and counterterrorism. For example, while DOD
reported that it conducted 231 JCETs costing about $15 million in
fiscal year 1997, even this basic information is incorrect.
According to the Special Operations Command, data were inaccurate
because no one person managed the reporting process and because
field personnel lacked guidance on how to report JCETs. For
example, for fiscal years 1997 and 1998, GAO was not able to
determine how many JCETs occurred primarily due to different

interpretations of what was and what was not a JCET. Similarly,
the reported cost of JCETs was in error because (1) some
activities appear to have been erroneously charged as JCETs when
they should have been charged to other purposes such as the
delivery of humanitarian activities and (2) the full cost to the
United States of foreign nations' participation had not been
captured. Errors in the reporting of U. S. costs arose because DOD
had not issued guidance on how to report JCET activities. Errors
in the reporting of host nation costs occurred because DOD had
used multiple

appropriation accounts to pay for foreign nations' participation
without reporting each of them. Finally, because of different
interpretations of the legislative requirement to report JCETs'
relationship to counternarcotics

and counterterrorism, reporting has been inaccurate. For example,
DOD did not report some activities as related to counterterrorism
when file reviews indicated that the tasks and units involved in
the training were related to counterterrorism.

In response to recent concerns about the extent of JCET activity,
DOD changed its JCET approval process and is providing more
specific guidance on JCET activities. These changes, which include
providing a definition of a JCET and a standard format for
reporting, should improve the accuracy

of DOD's reports to the Congress. However, DOD's new guidance does
not address how to determine the relationship of JCETs to
counterterrorsim and counternarcotics activities. Neither does it
fully clarify how incremental costs for host nation participation
should be funded and accounted for.

More Headquarters To improve oversight and respond to legislation
that mandated Secretary of Oversight Should Increase

Defense approval for each JCET, DOD, in November 1998, implemented
Assurances That JCETs Are

procedures to ensure Secretary of Defense approval and State
Department Consistent With U. S. notification of JCETs. This
increase in civilian oversight will promote departmental
headquarters visibility over JCETs and help to ensure that all
Foreign Policy foreign policy issues are considered in the JCET
approval process. Previously, neither State nor DOD headquarters
officials were routinely

involved in approving JCET activities. Notwithstanding the lack of
headquarters oversight in the past, in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador,
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, U. S. ambassadors stated
that JCETs just as other military activities in country have taken
place with their support and knowledge. GAO found that embassies
used one or more

of the following activities to oversee U. S. military activities:
(1) the country clearance approval process, through which U. S.
government employees engaging in official travel must request and
receive permission from the ambassador to enter the country; (2)
regular country team meetings including the ambassador, the deputy
chief of mission, and heads of each

resident U. S. agency; (3) annual mission planning sessions; (4)
DOD briefings to the ambassador and other State personnel; and (5)
engagement plans and training calendars.

Given these procedures, ambassadors believed that the JCETs that
took place were consistent with the specific U. S. goals and
objectives in each country that GAO visited. In some cases, JCETs
were used as a strategy to achieve a specific country goal; in
other cases, the relationship was more indirect. For example, in
Bolivia, JCETs were used to help prepare the

Bolivian military to assume peacekeeping operations, a stated U.
S. goal. In Indonesia, JCETs were seen as one of a number of
military- to- military activities used to maintain access to and
develop greater influence in Indonesian military affairs to
promote the development of a democratic government and reduce the
involvement of the military in internal affairs.

Uncertainties Remain in All JCETs are covered by the recent
legislation restricting DOD from using Implementing the Law

its funds to train with a foreign security force that has been
credibly alleged Restricting Training With to have committed a
gross violation of human rights unless all necessary Human Rights
Abusers

corrective steps have been taken. To date, DOD and the Department
of State have developed separate sets of guidance for military
components and embassies to implement the legislation. However, a
number of practical concerns in implementing the legislation have
not been resolved, and some U. S. ambassadors were concerned that
they might not be meeting the intent of the legislation.

DOD has issued interim guidance implementing the legislative
restriction from training with foreign forces involved in human
rights abuses. Specifically, the guidance states that in cases in
which the State Department advises DOD that it possesses
information on gross human rights violations that it concludes is
credible, the proposed activity may be able to meet the
requirements of the law because necessary corrective steps have
been taken, e. g., through adjustments of the planned activity
and/ or adjustments to the host nation participants. The guidance
states further that if such adjustments are made and are judged
adequate by the

ambassador, the training may be approved. Thus, the DOD guidance
has defined what unless all necessary corrective steps have been
taken means.

However, while DOD's guidance states that the corrective action
must be judged adequate by the ambassador, GAO's review shows that
some ambassadors are unclear about the criteria to be used in
making this assessment. Specifically, some embassy officials are
concerned that the

intent of all necessary corrective steps has not been clearly
defined and that DOD's guidance runs counter to the human rights
policy governing foreign assistance. Under foreign assistance
legislation, if State finds credible evidence of human rights
abuses, assistance may proceed only

after the embassy is assured that the recipient government is
taking

effective measures to bring the responsible members of the
security forces to justice. 4 While the respective statutes are
written differently, some embassy officials believe that DOD and
the Department of State should employ the same standard for
addressing situations where State has found credible evidence of
human rights abuses. The Department of State has told embassies to
refer all cases in which credible evidence of human rights
violations has been uncovered to State Department headquarters and

unified commands for resolution. Other unresolved implementation
issues include determining (1) whether every individual in a unit
needs to be screened or whether screening the collective human
rights record of a unit is sufficient, (2) what DOD- funded

activities require human rights screening, (3) how far back in
time embassies must screen for human rights abuses, and (4) the
extent to which embassies must screen for human rights violations
in countries with no history of such abuse. Because of these
unresolved issues, the legislation has been implemented
differently in the six countries GAO

visited, and some officials were concerned that they might not be
meeting the intent of the Congress. For example, in the
Philippines, the embassy does not screen every individual. In
Colombia, on the other hand, where there are serious human rights
concerns, the embassy investigates each individual scheduled for
training, to include a review of whether the individual has been
the subject of judicial proceedings. However, each

embassy has questioned whether its approach is sufficient, for
example, whether participants in other military- to- military
activities, such as seminars between U. S. and Colombian officers,
must receive the same scrutiny as required for JCETs.

Recommendations To improve the accuracy of annual reports to the
Congress and the financial management of JCETs, GAO recommends
that the Secretary of Defense take the following actions and set
milestones for completing them.  Issue guidance that provides
criteria to use in determining whether JCETs are related to
counterterrorism or counternarcotics and

therefore need to be reported as such.  Issue guidance on how to
pay for and report each JCET expense. (A more detailed
recommendation appears in ch. 2.) 4 Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. 105- 277,
568, 112 Stat. 2681- 194- 195 (Oct. 21, 1998).

To clarify legislative requirements for human rights screening for
all DOD- funded training programs with foreign security forces and
to address the concern of overseas State Department officials that
they lack complete policy guidance from headquarters, GAO
recommends that the Secretary of State, after consultation with
the Secretary of Defense, clarify (1) whether every individual in
a unit needs to be screened or whether screening the collective
human rights record of a unit is sufficient, (2) what DOD- funded
activities require human rights screening, (3) how far back in
time embassies must screen for human rights abuses, and (4) the
extent to which embassies must screen for human rights violations
in countries with no history of such abuse.

Agency Comments DOD and the Department of State provided written
comments on a draft of this report (see apps. I and II). DOD
agreed with the observations and

recommendations contained in the report. DOD reiterated its belief
that the JCET program is a critical tool that enables special
operations forces to maintain proficiency in mission- essential
tasks. In response to GAO's specific recommendations, DOD
responded that it will provide guidance to determine whether a
JCET is related to counterterrorism or

counternarcotics. DOD said that it has issued interim and will
issue final guidance no later than December 31, 1999, regarding
the proper appropriation to charge for each JCET. Finally, DOD
said that it concurred with GAO's recommendation that the
Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of
Defense, clarify the issues GAO raised regarding screening foreign
forces for gross violations of human rights abuses.

In its response, State disagreed with GAO's recommendation
regarding human rights screening of foreign troops scheduled to
participate in training with U. S. forces. State believes that the
guidance it previously issued sufficiently addresses the concerns
raised in this recommendation.

State responded that vetting of every individual in a unit would
be warranted if information received merited a further review of
the unit in question and that it is continuing to work with
embassies to clarify implementation of new guidelines and address
procedural questions, such as time period and extent of screening
for human rights violations, as they arise.

GAO continues to believe that State's policy guidance does not
provide sufficient direction to embassies on how to implement the
October 1998 legislation requiring human rights screening for host
nation participants in military training. As pointed out in the
report, State has not resolved which

types of U. S. military training activities overseas require human
rights screening before they proceed, how far back in time the
embassy must go in investigating these abuses, and the extent to
which countries must screen for human rights abuses in countries
with no history of such abuse. The State Department intends to
decide these issues on a case- by- case basis. Such flexibility
does not negate the need to provide embassies with a framework and
specific policy guidance on State's interpretation of the

legislation. GAO continues to believe that current ambiguities in
the guidance cause implementation problems for embassy personnel.
Moreover, the absence of a uniform policy inhibits the ability of
the Congress to conduct oversight of JCET activities relating to
human rights policy. Therefore, GAO continues to believe that its
recommendation has

merit.

Executive Summary 4 Chapter 1

Organization of U. S. Special Operations Forces 16 Introduction

Unique Missions of Special Operations Forces 18 JCETs Are Used to
Meet Unique Training Requirements 19 Geographic Commanders in
Chief Use JCETs to Support Their Plans 19 JCETs Account for a
Small Percentage of Special Operations Forces'

Overseas Activities 23 Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 24

Chapter 2 JCETs Have Complied With Legislation Requiring That
Their Primary

JCETs Have Been Used Purpose Be to Train U. S. Forces 27

DOD Reports to the Congress on JCET Activities and Costs Are
Primarily to Train U. S.

Inaccurate 32 Forces, but Reporting

Proposed Changes to Guidance and Approval Process Are on These
Activities Designed to Improve Future Reports 39 Conclusions 40

Has Been Inaccurate Recommendations 40

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 40 Chapter 3

New Procedures Should Enhance Headquarters Oversight More
Headquarters

and Knowledge of JCET Activities 42 U. S. Ambassadors Provided
Extensive Civilian Oversight Oversight Should of JCET Activities
45

Increase Assurances Ambassadors Believed That JCETs Were
Consistent With

That JCETs Are U. S. Objectives for Their Specific Countries 47

Conclusions 49 Consistent With U. S. Foreign Policy

Chapter 4 Legislation Restricts Conducting JCETs With Forces
Involved

Uncertainties Remain in Human Rights Violations 51

DOD Has Issued Interim Guidance, but Implementation in
Implementing the Issues Remain 52 Law Restricting

Conclusions 62 Training With Human

Recommendations 62 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 63

Rights Abusers

Appendixes Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense 64
Appendix II: Comments From the Department of State 66 Appendix
III: GAO Staff Acknowledgments 67

Tables Table 2.1: JCET Activities for Fiscal Years 1995- 97 33
Table 2.2: Problems in DOD's Report to the Congress on

Fiscal Year 1998 JCETs 35 Table 2.3: JCET Costs for Fiscal Years
1995- 97 36

Figures Figure 1.1: Organization of U. S. Special Operations
Forces 17 Figure 1.2: Areas of Responsibility Assigned to
Geographic CINCs 20

Figure 1.3: Time Special Operations Forces Spent Overseas by
Activity in Fiscal Year 1998 24

Abbreviations

CINC commander in chief DOD Department of Defense GAO General
Accounting Office JAD JCET Authorization Document JCET Joint
Combined Exchange Training JMETL joint mission- essential task
list METL mission- essential task list O& M operations and
maintenance PACOM Pacific Command SEAL Sea- Air- Land SOF special
operations forces SOCOM Special Operations Command SOUTHCOM
Southern Command

Chapt er 1

Introduction Special operations forces (SOF) are generally
organized into small units for military action focused on
strategic or operational goals. They are tasked with a variety of
missions ranging from training, advising, and organizing foreign
groups for unconventional warfare to training coalition forces for
multinational military operations. These missions require special
skills that conventional forces do not have, such as the ability
to speak foreign

languages, understand regional cultural and environmental
characteristics, and quickly deploy and operate unsupported in
sometimes hostile or politically sensitive areas. The U. S.
Special Operations Command (SOCOM) believes that the best way its
forces can train for these types of missions is to train with the
people in the places where they may have to

operate. In 1991, the Congress clarified the Department of
Defense's (DOD) authority to spend training funds in connection
with SOF training overseas with friendly foreign forces, as long
as the primary purpose was to train U. S. forces. 1 Since the
enactment of this legislation, such training has commonly been
referred to as Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET). The
primary purpose of JCETs is to provide U. S. SOF training events
to develop and maintain their skills. While advancement of the
geographic

commanders in chief (CINC) engagement strategies and incidental
training benefits to friendly forces are expected, these results
must always be secondary to the primary purpose of training U. S.
SOF. Organization of U. S. U. S. SOF are under the combatant
command of SOCOM. The Congress

Special Operations mandated the creation of SOCOM in the National
Defense Authorization

Act for Fiscal Year 1987, and in April 1987, the Secretary of
Defense Forces established the Command to prepare special
operations forces to carry out assigned missions and other tasks
directed by the President or the

Secretary of Defense. 2 SOCOM has its own budget within DOD for
operations and maintenance, military construction, military pay
and research, development, and procurement of items unique to
special operations. SOCOM receives about $3 billion in annual
appropriations, or about 1. 3 percent of the DOD budget.

1 10 U. S. C.  2011 (1994). 2 10 U. S. C.  167 (1994).

SOCOM manages a force of about 46,000 active duty, reserve,
National Guard, and civilian personnel. SOCOM is organized into a
headquarters; Army, Navy, and Air Force service component
commands; and a joint command (see fig. 1.1).

Figure 1. 1: Organization of U. S. Special Operations Forces

H ead q u art e rs U . S . S p e c ial O p e ra ti on s C om m an
d

M ac D il l A ir F or c e B as e, F L U .S . A rm y

U .S . N aval U .S . A ir F orc e

U .S . J oin t S p ec i al S p e c ial O p e ra tion s C om m an d

S p e c ial W arfa re C om m an d S p e c ial O p e ra ti on s C
om m an d

O p e ra ti on s C om m an d F ort B rag g , N C

C oron ad o, C A H u rlb ert F i eld , F L

Fort B rag g , N C S p ec ia l F orc es

N aval S p ec ial S p e c ial O p e ra ti on s W i n g s W arfa re
G rou p s

R an g ers S p e c ial O p e ra ti on s G r ou p s S E A L T eam s

S p ec ia l O p erat ion s S E A L D elivery

S p e c ial T ac ti cs G rou p A viat ion

V eh i c le Team s S p e c ial W arfa re P s yc h olog ic al

U n i t s U .S . A ir F orc e

O p e ra ti on s S p e c ial O p e ra ti on s S p e c ial B oat

S c h o o l S q u ad ron s C i vil A ffa ir s

S p ec ia l W ar fare D evelop m en t G rou p S p ec ia l O p erat
ion s S u p port C om m an d

N aval S p ec ial W arfare C en t er U .S . A rm y S pec i al W
arfa re C en t er a n d

S c h o o l Source: U. S. Special Operations Command.

The Army Special Operations Command comprises special forces,
psychological operations, civil affairs, Ranger, and aviation
units, as well as a support command. The Naval Special Warfare
Command comprises two naval special warfare groups, one naval
special warfare development group, and two special boat squadrons.
Each special warfare group includes three Sea- Air- Land (SEAL)
teams, one SEAL delivery vehicle team, and forward- deployed
special warfare units. The Air Force Special Operations Command
comprises one Special Operations Wing, two forward- deployed
Special Operations Groups, and one Special Tactics

Group in its active force and two Special Operations Wings in its
Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard force. All three services
have special operations centers and schools for leadership
development, education, and training. The Joint Special Operations
Command is a joint headquarters designed to study special
operations requirements and techniques, ensure interoperability
and equipment standardization, plan and conduct special operations
exercises and training, and develop joint special operations

tactics. The Joint Special Operations Command does not conduct
JCETs. Unique Missions of Special operations forces are charged
with nine principal missions and, on Special Operations

the basis of their unique capabilities, conduct a variety of other
activities. The principal missions are (1) to train and otherwise
assist foreign Forces

militaries to combat insurgency and other threats to stability
(foreign internal defense); (2) to train, advise, and otherwise
assist local forces for guerilla warfare (unconventional warfare);
(3) to protect against and prevent the spread of nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons

(counterproliferation); (4) to use offensive and defensive
measures to prevent or resolve terrorist incidents (combating
terrorism); (5) to obtain information concerning capabilities and
activities of actual or potential adversaries (special
reconnaissance); (6) to inflict damage on an adversary or recover
personnel or material (direct action); (7) to target an
adversary's information system while defending U. S. systems
(information operations); (8) to establish, maintain, or
strengthen relations between U. S. and allied governments to
facilitate military operations (civil affairs); and (9) to
influence attitudes of foreign audiences (psychological
operations).

Because of the unique capabilities derived from their principal
missions, special operations forces are also tasked with
participation in other activities. These collateral activities may
change in response to the international environment. For example,
special operations forces are involved in training foreign
counterdrug forces and law enforcement agencies in skills needed
to detect, monitor, and interdict drug production

and trafficking. Special operations forces also participate in
peacekeeping operations and provide training to multinational
coalition partners on tactics and communications, and they provide
training in support of legislated security assistance programs
that provide U. S. defense articles and other defense- related
services to foreign militaries. SOF also train

foreign nations in humanitarian demining operations. During
wartime or contingency operations, special operations forces may
conduct personnel recovery deep within hostile territory, under
adverse conditions.

JCETs Are Used to To develop and maintain the mission- essential
skills SOF need to perform Meet Unique Training

their principal and collateral missions, the U. S. special
operations command believes that its forces must train overseas
with foreign military Requirements forces. Training overseas with
foreign forces enables special operations forces to practice their
needed skills such as providing military instruction in a foreign
language and maintaining language proficiency and familiarity with
local geography and cultures, which are essential to foreign
internal

defense and unconventional warfare missions. SOCOM, like the
military services, is authorized to use its training funds to
train its own forces. However, because special operations training
overseas involves the training of and training with foreign
forces, SOCOM

believed it needed clarified legislative authority to use its
funds for these kinds of overseas training deployments. Special
operations forces' training with foreign militaries, funded with
SOCOM's operations and maintenance

monies, resembled security assistance activities except that
security assistance training's primary purpose was to promote
national security and foreign policy through training the host
nation forces. Such host nation training was provided for in
foreign assistance legislation. In the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, the Congress, in
response to a DOD request, included a provision explicitly
granting DOD authority to use its funds for SOF to train with
friendly foreign forces as long as the primary purpose was to
train U. S. SOF. 3 Training under this authority became commonly
referred to as JCETs.

Geographic The five geographic CINCs the U. S. Atlantic Command,
the U. S. Central Commanders in Chief

Command, the U. S. European Command, the U. S. Pacific Command
(PACOM), and the U. S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) use JCETs to
Use JCETs to Support

help achieve foreign engagement objectives of the national
security Their Plans strategy in their designated areas of
responsibility. Under the strategy, engagement in the
international community is the preferred approach to addressing
the new threats and challenges of today's security environment.

Each geographic CINC has its own special operations joint
subordinate command to plan and control the employment of special
operations forces in the region for training exercises and
military operations. Figure 1.2 shows the designated areas of
responsibility for each geographic CINC. 3 10 U. S. C.  2011
(1994).

Figure 1.2: Areas of Responsibility Assigned to Geographic CINCs

Atlantic Ocean Pacific Ocean Pacific Ocean

Indian Ocean

Pacific Command Southern Command Atlantic Command European Command
Central Command On October 1, 1999, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan will be added to the
Central Command's area of responsibility.

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public
Affairs).

On the basis of the national security strategy and other
documents, each of the five geographic CINCs prepares a regional
strategy that provides the foundation for contingency planning and
peacetime engagement. To support the engagement portion of their
strategy, CINCs annually develop a Theater Engagement Plan that
defines the type and scope of foreign military engagement,
including exercises, continuing operations, and foreign military
interaction for their area of responsibility. Foreign military
interaction includes JCETs and a number of separate activities
outside of operations and exercises that are conducted with
foreign military forces.

CINCs Have Other In addition to JCETs, CINCs can use a variety of
statutory authorities to

Congressionally Authorized conduct programs and activities to
support the foreign military interaction

Options to Support Foreign portion of their theater engagement
plans. These activities include

Military Interaction bilateral and multilateral cooperation
programs, educational exchanges, and humanitarian and security
assistance programs. SOF participate in

those foreign military interaction activities described below.
CINC Initiative Fund. These funds, which may be provided to CINCs

based upon statutory priorities, can be used to conduct activities
such as force protection, force training, contingencies, selected
operations, military education and training to military and
related civilian personnel of foreign countries, and expenses of
defense personnel for bilateral and multilateral cooperation
programs. 4  Military- to- military contacts. CINCs can also fund
military- to- military contacts with foreign nations for such
activities as seminars,

conferences, and educational exchanges of civilian and military
personnel. 5 These are often called traditional CINC activities.
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance. DOD is authorized to provide

humanitarian and civic assistance in conjunction with military
operations in a CINC's area. 6 These activities must be designed
to promote the security interests and the operational readiness
skills of the U. S. and host country servicemembers. They must
also serve the basic

economic and social needs of the people of the country concerned,
including activities such as medical care in rural areas, well-
drilling, and

4 10 U. S. C.  166a (1994). 5 10 U. S. C.  168 (1994). 6 10 U. S.
C.  401 (1994).

basic sanitation facilities construction. They may also include
training the host nation cadre on land mine detection and
clearance.  Cooperative Threat Reduction activities. These DOD-
funded programs are designed to encourage military reductions and
reforms and reduce

nuclear proliferation threats in the former Soviet Union. 7 They
include expanded military- to- military and defense contacts,
demilitarization of defense industries, and prevention of the
proliferation of weapons technology and expertise.  Security
assistance. A range of assistance programs support U. S.

objectives by providing aid to other nations to defend and
preserve their national security. The Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 authorizes International Military Education and Training,
which provides training

to foreign military forces and related civilian personnel of
foreign countries. 8 The Arms Export Control Act (formerly Foreign
Military Sales Act) authorizes two assistance programs: (1) the
Foreign Military Sales Program, which allows countries to purchase
defense articles and

training from the United States and (2) the Foreign Military
Financing Program, which provides grants and loans to foreign
governments to purchase U. S. defense goods and services,
including training. 9 Security assistance programs and funding
levels are determined through

consultation between the Department of State and the Congress and
are implemented by DOD but funded by and subject to the overall
policy supervision of the Department of State. Unlike JCETs, the
primary beneficiary of any military training provided under these
programs is the recipient nation.

JCETs Are a Small Portion According to CINC engagement plan
information, JCETs do not represent a

of the CINCs' Foreign large part of the geographic CINCs' overall
foreign military interaction Military Interaction and All
activity. As discussed later in this report, the CINCs' data on
JCETs and

Special Operations' foreign military interactions are not entirely
accurate. However, the data Overseas Deployments

provide an overall perspective of JCETs' relationship to these
other engagement activities. In fiscal year 1998, JCETs
represented between 2 and 6 percent of all foreign military
interactions for the four geographic CINCs that had JCET
deployments in their areas. According to the CINCs, JCETs in
PACOM, the European Command, and SOUTHCOM in fiscal year 7 22 U.
S. C.  5951- 5958 (1994); Pub. L. 105- 261, Div. A, Title XIII,
112 Stat. 1920, 2161- 2167 (Oct. 17, 1998).

8 Pub. L. 87- 195, 75 Stat. 424 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 22 U. S. C). 9 Pub. L. 90- 629, 82 Stat. 1320
(codified as amended in scattered sections 22 U. S. C.).

1998 represented less than 3 percent of all foreign military
interaction events. In PACOM and the European Command, military
contacts such as personnel and unit exchanges and regional
conferences accounted for most of the foreign military interaction
activity. In SOUTHCOM, combined education events such as foreign
defense personnel's attendance at U. S. schools accounted for most
of the foreign military interaction activity. According to the U.
S. Central Command, JCETs represented less than 6 percent of
foreign military engagement activities in fiscal year 1998.
Military contacts accounted for most of the foreign military
interactivity in this theater. The U. S. Atlantic Command did not
conduct JCETs in fiscal year 1998.

JCETs Account for a Available data from SOCOM indicates that JCETs
do not make up a large

Small Percentage of part of the total time all special operations
forces are deployed overseas (see fig. 1.3). In fiscal year 1998,
JCETs accounted for only about 8 percent

Special Operations of the time special operations forces spent on
overseas deployments (see

Forces' Overseas fig. 1.3).

Activities

Figure 1.3: Time Special Operations Forces Spent Overseas by
Activity in Fiscal Year 1998

Operations 60% JCETs 8% Training and other activities 16%

JCS exercises 16% Source: U. S. Special Operations Command.

About 60 percent of the time special operations forces spent
overseas was for military operations such as counterdrug
operations and peacekeeping missions. About 16 percent of special
operations forces' time overseas was

spent doing joint exercises, during which they prepare with other
U. S. and foreign forces for military operations. Another 16
percent of special operations forces' time overseas was spent
conducting non- JCET training and other activities such as
conferences, school courses, and command

visits. Objectives, Scope, and

In April 1998, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Military
Readiness, Methodology

Senate Committee on Armed Services, the Chairman of the House
Committee on International Relations, and the Ranking Member of
the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, House Committee on
International Relations, asked us to examine JCETs. In March 1999,
the Chairman of the

Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Senate
Committee on Armed Services, also requested that we undertake this
work. Specifically, we sought to determine (1) whether DOD has
implemented JCETs in

accordance with legislation, (2) whether DOD and the Department of
State are providing civilian oversight to ensure that JCET
activities are consistent with U. S. foreign policy objectives in
countries that we included in our review, and (3) how DOD is
implementing recent legislation that restricts it from training
with foreign forces involved in human rights abuses.

To determine whether DOD has implemented JCETs in accordance with
the authorizing legislation, we examined the law and the
legislative history and met with congressional committee staff
members who were instrumental in developing the authorizing
legislation. Because the statute states that the primary purpose
of the training must be to train U. S. SOF, we evaluated the JCET
approval process and its consideration of special

operations forces' mission training requirements. To accomplish
this objective, we reviewed JCET files for fiscal years 1997 and
1998 at various special operations units, the Pacific Command, and
the Southern Command's subordinate theater special operations
commands. During this file review, we examined available
documentation of the training objectives, the planned programs of
instruction, and the after- action

reports that summarized the entire training event, including the
mission- essential tasks that were planned and actually conducted.
We also interviewed officials at SOCOM, the Army and the Air Force
Special Operations Commands, the Naval Special Warfare Command,
the Pacific

Command and the Southern Command, and these commands' subordinate
theater special operations commands. We attended semiannual JCET
and training planning conferences for SOCOM, the Southern Command,
and the Central Command. We also observed pre- JCET conferences
between U. S. special operations and host nation forces from the
Philippines and Thailand and observed a JCET event conducted by U.
S. and Philippine Air Force pararescue units in the Philippines.
To verify the accuracy of DOD's reports to Congress on JCETs, we
compared annual reports for fiscal years 1997 and 1998 to JCET
files in various locations in SOUTHCOM and PACOM. This
verification included attempts to confirm how many JCETs took
place in these two commands, how U. S. and host nation incremental
costs were recorded, and how DOD reported JCETs' relationship to
counterterrorism and counternarcotics.

To determine whether DOD and the Department of State have provided
civilian oversight to ensure that JCET events were consistent with
U. S. foreign policy objectives, we met with officials in the
offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict, the Joint Staff, SOCOM,
and the Department of State's Regional

and Political Military Bureaus and country desk officers. To
obtain information on how ambassadors and their country teams
approve JCETs and ensure that they are consistent with U. S.
foreign policy objectives, we

visited three countries in the Pacific Command and three in the
Southern Command. We chose to visit Colombia and Indonesia because
of congressional interest in military activities and human rights
issues in these

two countries, and we chose to visit Bolivia, Ecuador, and
Thailand because large numbers of JCETs were conducted in these
countries in fiscal years 1997 and 1998. We chose to visit the
Philippines because JCETs

have been used as the primary military contact since the status of
forces agreement expired in 1996. To identify the major foreign
policy objectives in each country we included in our study, we
reviewed the Department of State's mission performance plans. To
identify the level of JCET oversight at each embassy and determine
how JCETs have supported the embassies' objectives, we spoke with
ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and other embassy staff at
the U. S. embassies in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, the
Philippines, and Thailand. To determine how DOD and the Department
of State have implemented legislation restricting DOD from
training with human rights abusers, we first reviewed DOD's
interim guidance and State Department cables setting out guidance
for overseas embassies. We interviewed officials from the Joint
Staff and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict. We also interviewed
officials from the

Department of State's political military and regional bureaus
involved in issuing guidance to embassies regarding DOD's human
rights statute. We also met with officials at U. S. embassies in
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, the Philippines, and
Thailand to discuss the impact of the new law and the adequacy of
the guidance provided to the embassies by the Department of
State's headquarters offices. We also obtained information on the
verification procedures used at the embassies both before and
after the new requirements became effective and the nature of the
information

available in those countries for human rights verification. While
our review was in progress, DOD, in response to congressional
concerns about JCETs, implemented a new JCET approval process in
November 1998 to ensure greater oversight by senior personnel in
the Departments of Defense and State. We revisited the relevant
officials in the two departments to identify the impact of the new
approval process. We conducted our work from June 1998 to May 1999
in accordance with

generally accepted government auditing standards.

JCETs Have Been Used Primarily to Train U. S. Forces, but
Reporting on These Activities

Chapt er 2

Has Been Inaccurate DOD has complied with the statutory
requirement that JCET activities have as their primary purpose the
training of U. S. special operations forces. However, DOD has not
accurately reported to the Congress the numbers of JCETs that were
conducted, their costs, or their relationship to counternarcotics
and counterterrorism, as required by statute. Inaccuracies in
annual reports have arisen because of confusion in the field
regarding how to define a JCET, how to report the incremental
costs incurred by the host countries, and how to interpret the
legislative requirement to report JCETs' relationship to
counternarcotics and counterterrorism. Recent and proposed changes
in DOD's guidance and processes are designed to improve DOD's
ability to provide the Congress with more accurate and complete
reports.

JCETs Have Complied Our review of how JCETs have been developed
and conducted indicates With Legislation that their primary
purpose has been to train U. S. special operations forces.

JCETs provided opportunities for SOF personnel to remain
proficient. For Requiring That Their

JCETs conducted in fiscal years 1997 and 1998, we found a direct
link Primary Purpose Be to between the training special operations
forces units indicated they needed Train U. S. Forces and the
training conducted. In general, the special operations community
determines what training is appropriate during a JCET to help
maintain their proficiencies in meeting missions. Because JCETs
may also

simultaneously meet the engagement goals of the CINCs and the
ambassadors in the countries where they take place, these
individuals, after negotiations with the special operations
community, largely determine where the JCET occurs. Our review of
JCET files and our attendance at pre- JCET meetings confirmed that
these activities retained

their primary purpose of training U. S. forces. Legislation
Authorizes

Under 10 U. S. C. 2011, the commander of SOCOM or the commander of
any Special Operations Forces

other unified or specified combatant command may use command funds
to to Train Overseas With pay for special operations forces
training with the armed forces and other

Friendly Foreign Forces security forces of a friendly foreign
country, provided that the primary

purpose of the training is to train the U. S. special operations
forces. Section 2011( a)( 3) also authorizes the payment of
certain incremental expenses of friendly developing countries. All
expenses incurred in conducting training of special operations
forces under this authority, including incremental expenses of
friendly developing countries paid by

DOD, must be included in annual reports to the Congress, as
provided for in section 2011( e).

SOCOM Components The link between JCETs and SOF training needs is
first demonstrated by Determine Training Needs

the process used to design JCETs. While the process of developing
JCETs and Initiate JCETs

varies by service, it essentially begins with the special
operations community's preparation of a list of mission- essential
tasks required for individual units. For example, the Naval
Special Warfare Command empowers each platoon to develop a Plan of
Operations and Management to serve as a 2- year training plan. The
plan designates which

mission- essential task lists are to be considered core, or
required for all forces, and which are to be considered focused,
or unique to the theater the unit is deploying to. For example,
core mission- essential tasks for a member of a SEAL platoon might
include close combat search and rescue, close quarters combat, and
helicopter insertion and extraction. Its focused mission-
essential tasks might include naval gunfire support, military
free- fall insertion, or riverine infiltration and exfiltration.
The Army Special Operations Command has a similar process for

developing tasks to be completed on its JCETs. First, the command
assigns each operations team, generally made up of 12 persons,
primary and secondary countries of concentration and primary,
secondary, and tertiary missions. An Army special forces team, for
example, might have El Salvador as its primary country of
assignment and Paraguay as its secondary country. Its primary
mission might be foreign internal defense, with direct short- term
military action as a secondary mission. For each assigned mission,
the Army has a corresponding list of mission- essential tasks. For
example, foreign internal defense involves organizing, training,

advising, and assisting host country militaries to protect their
societies from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Essential
tasks include, among others, analyzing the needs of the foreign
forces, training and advising these forces in counterinsurgency
operations, and evaluating their ultimate performance. Each team
must be certified in its assigned skills once every 18 months.
Certification in assigned skills involves the

completion of certain designated tasks at stated intervals.
Because each team specializes in different countries and missions,
team leaders tailor their programs of instruction.

Overall, special operations personnel we interviewed believed that
JCETs were critical to their teams' abilities to remain proficient
in their mission- essential tasks. In some cases, JCETs provide an
opportunity for special operations forces to train in mission-
essential skills that the host

nation restricts or prohibits at U. S. bases in their countries.
For example, Air Force special operations forces based in Okinawa,
Japan, are restricted from low- level night flying. JCETs
conducted in Thailand and Malaysia give

these units access to areas where they can train in this core
mission skill. Navy SEALs and Army special forces based in the
Pacific use JCETs in Singapore, Australia, and Sri Lanka to gain
access to training areas to practice skills such as close quarters
combat and advanced demolitions,

which are prohibited at their forward base in Guam and Okinawa.
Because of environmental restrictions and controls in the United
States, Navy special boat units are able to train to certain
mission- essential tasks only in countries available to them
through the JCET program. Finally, JCETs provide other benefits
that are invaluable to special operations forces. These benefits
include language training, cultural immersion, an understanding of
the environment and host nation forces'

capabilities, exposure to non- U. S. equipment and techniques, and
teaching experience. JCETs give special operations forces
opportunities to acquire information on the local terrain,
geography, and weather, while fostering positive professional
relationships with host nation military forces.

Geographic Commands At least once a year, each service component
compiles an annual training Determine Location of

plan that will satisfy requirements to train for its mission-
essential tasks. JCETs but Do Not Change These training plans are
melded with lists of the engagement requirements Essential
Training Goals of the various ambassadors and CINCs at planning
conferences held by the CINCs. Essentially, special operations
personnel determine what training

takes place, and the CINCs and ambassadors determine where the
training occurs.

While each command operates differently, all commands develop
their final lists of JCETs after holding a conference. For
example, at the U. S. SOUTHCOM conference, special operations
personnel present briefings of

their missions and capabilities to military group representatives
from the embassies. Representatives from the theater Special
Operations Command then provide military group representatives
with a list of the JCETs each service proposes for the year.
Service representatives discuss these proposals and their timing
with military group representatives. During the conference, the
special operations, embassy, and CINC representatives

work out the details of the agreed- upon training. Other commands
operate similarly. In addition, once a year, SOCOM holds a JCET
conference to plan activities for the entire special operations
community.

Pre- JCET Meetings Also Our attendance at pre- JCET meetings,
which are held in the host nation

Indicate That Special just before a JCET takes place, also
confirmed that JCETs retain their

Operations Forces Maintain primary purpose of training U. S.
forces. During one such conference, the

Focus on U. S. Training U. S. special operations unit worked with
Philippine host nation

representatives to ensure that mission- essential skills training
was the Needs

focus of the event. Specifically, the Philippine representatives
were asked to ensure that their JCET participants had no medical
training, thereby allowing the U. S. special forces the
opportunity to teach basic medical skills and evaluate their own
teaching progress. In another conference,

also in the Philippines, the U. S. unit explained that during the
upcoming JCET, the U. S. special forces participants would prefer
to conduct their airborne operations at dusk, which was something
they were not allowed to do at their home base in Okinawa. In both
cases, we witnessed negotiations between U. S. special operations
units and host nation

representatives that illustrated that the JCET benefited both the
U. S. and host nation participants but that the focus was
primarily to train U. S. special forces in their mission-
essential tasks.

JCET Files Reveal Primary Files for JCETs conducted in fiscal
years 1997 and 1998 that we reviewed at Purpose

the unified commands, the subordinate service commands, the
geographic CINCs, individual special operations units, and U. S.
embassies provide a direct link between the training special
operations forces said they needed and the training conducted. For
example, these files contain documents that include descriptions
of the concept of operations for each JCET and outline what
mission- essential tasks will be included in the training. In some
cases, the files also contain lesson plans, or programs of
instruction, used by the special operations instructors to teach
the mission- essential tasks. These files also contain after-
action reports detailing what the special operations teams did and
how well they accomplished their missions. Our review of available
after- action reports suggests that SOF did in fact train to their
mission- essential tasks as planned.

To illustrate, files indicated that JCETs conducted during fiscal
years 1997 and 1998 provide special operations personnel with
opportunities to meet their mission- essential task requirements
in the following ways:

 Counterterrorism is a fundamental mission of special operations
forces attached to SOUTHCOM. They need to be skilled in such tasks
as reconnaissance, marksmanship, and close quarters combat. To
train for its mission, these forces conducted JCETs with
counterterrorism units in host countries throughout the region. We
viewed the lesson plans for

one of these JCETs, which consisted of 380 hours of training. The
training included pistol and rifle firing, shooting while moving,
engaging multiple targets, clearing hallways, and medical
training. This JCET ended with a 5- day live- fire scenario.  The
20 th U. S. Army Special Forces Group, which is a National Guard

unit, conducted JCETs that routinely served as their annual 2-
week training requirement. For each of these JCETs, an active-
duty special forces member served as a training evaluator and
prepared a detailed report on how well the unit trained for its
mission- essential tasks. Seven of these JCETs for the 20 th Group
took place in fiscal year 1998, in Bolivia, Honduras, Suriname,
and Venezuela. Mission- essential tasks for these JCETs included
light infantry tactics, small unit tactics, combat lifesaving,
marksmanship, grenade training, and patrolling.  The 1 st Special
Forces Group trained for many different

mission- essential tasks by conducting JCETs in various countries
within PACOM's area of responsibility. Specifically, this group
trained in small unit tactics, military freefall parachuting,
close quarters battle, and maritime operations in Thailand. In the
Philippines, it trained in airmobile and tracking/ countertracking
skills, and in Sri Lanka, it trained in leadership and mission
planning. This group believed that its critical warfighting skills
would suffer without access to the multitude of countries covered
by the JCET program.

 In May 1998, the 7 th Special Forces Group was able to
immediately apply the skills they had practiced during a JCET in
Bolivia. The JCET, which lasted from April 27 to May 22, involved
training with 80 host nation

personnel in light infantry skills needed for peacekeeping
operations. On May 22, training was curtailed when an earthquake
struck a province in Bolivia. The U. S. forces deployed with the
Bolivian unit they had just trained with to assist in rescue and
recovery operations. The forces removed rubble, searched for
survivors, disseminated information,

organized a chain of command, delivered supplies, assisted with
the wounded, and buried the dead.  In July and August 1997, Army,
Navy, and Air Force special operations

forces participated in a large JCET in multiple locations in
Thailand. With a combined total of 300 individuals, the JCET
included training for the foreign internal defense mission,
military parachuting, and conducting medical and engineering and
civic action projects. During the medical portion of the JCET, a
total of 2,492 medical patients were seen, 549 dental patients
were treated, and 847 teeth were extracted.

DOD Reports to the The legislation authorizing SOF to train
overseas with friendly forces also Congress on JCET

requires that the Secretary of Defense annually submit a report to
the Congress specifying the following: Activities and Costs Are
Inaccurate

 all countries in which the training was conducted;  the type of
training conducted, including whether the training was related to
counternarcotics or counterterrorism, the duration of the

training, the number of members of the armed forces involved, and
expenses paid;  the extent of participation by foreign military
forces, including the number and service affiliation of foreign
military personnel involved and

the physical and financial contribution of each host nation to the
training effort; and  the relationship of the training to other
overseas training programs

conducted by the armed forces, such as military exercise programs
sponsored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, military exercise programs
sponsored by a combatant command, and military training activities
sponsored by a military department (including deployments for
training, short duration exercises, and other similar unit
training events). 1 To satisfy these requirements, DOD has
provided annual data to the

Congress on JCETs conducted in each fiscal year beginning with
fiscal year 1992. According to SOCOM, however, these data have
been inaccurate. Our review confirmed this. In fact, we could not
(1) arrive at a definitive number of JCETs that occurred in PACOM
or SOUTHCOM in fiscal years 1997 and 1998, (2) determine which of
these events were related to counternarcotics or counterterrorism,
or (3) determine how much was actually spent on JCETs. Primarily,
the data were inaccurate because there were different
interpretations of what was and what was not a JCET,

because units were uncertain how to determine whether a JCET was
related to counternarcotics or counterterrorism, and because host
nation costs were paid for from different appropriations. 1 10 U.
S. C.  2011 (e) (1994). Another reporting requirement was added to
10 U. S. C.  2011( e) by Pub. L. 105- 261,  1062, 112 Stat. 1920,
2129- 30 (Oct. 17, 1998). This added requirement is discussed at
the end

of this chapter.

Confusion About the Table 2.1 shows the numbers of JCETs listed in
annual reports to the

Definition of JCETs Makes Congress for fiscal years 1995- 97.
SOCOM reviewed this data for accuracy

It Difficult to Determine and found that for the entire period,
the number of JCETs earlier reported

How Many JCETs Took had been overstated by about 21 percent.
SOCOM's revised figures on the numbers of JCETs performed are also
shown in table 2.1. For example, Place

SOCOM's revision shows that it conducted 223 JCETs, rather than
231 JCETs, in fiscal year 1997, or 8 fewer than earlier reported.

Table 2.1: JCET Activities for Fiscal Years 1995- 97 Number of
JCETs Fiscal year

1995 1996 1997 Total

As reported in annual report 200 279 231 710

As revised by SOCOM 166 200 223 589

According to SOCOM officials, data were inaccurate because no one
person managed the reporting process and because field personnel
lacked guidance on how to report JCETs. Service components were
uncertain

about even the definition of a JCET. For example, annual reports
of JCETs included activities that were not JCETs, such as
counterdrug deployments and exercises involving special operations
forces. These activities have their own funding sources and
statutory authorities that are different from those for JCETs.

We attempted to verify the revised data SOCOM provided us. In
doing so, we examined JCET files in several locations in PACOM and
SOUTHCOM for fiscal year 1997. We found that SOCOM's revised data
were overstated. For example, DOD's annual report to the Congress
indicated that 65 JCETs took place in PACOM in fiscal year 1997.
SOCOM said there were 69, adding that the JCETs were conducted in
22 countries. Our review of all JCET- related files maintained in
PACOM indicated that for fiscal year 1997, PACOM conducted 40
JCETs in 18 countries 29 fewer JCETs, or 42 percent fewer than the
69 reported by SOCOM. We found that the

annual report contained several events that were not JCETs,
including one civil affairs event and one Joint Chiefs of Staff
exercise. In addition, several JCETs had been double- or triple-
counted, and the annual report contained several training events
that had been canceled. In SOUTHCOM,

the annual report indicated that 70 JCETs took place in fiscal
year 1997. SOCOM revised this number to 71. Though we believe both
numbers are overstated, we are not confident that our revised
count of 62 JCETs in

20 countries is accurate because SOUTHCOM did not have complete
records. PACOM's files indicated that 39 JCETs took place in 21
countries in fiscal year 1998. We attempted to verify this number
of JCETs, and after reviewing all available JCET files, we
determined that 37 JCETs were held in 19 countries in fiscal year
1998. PACOM officials confirmed our determination as correct. As
in fiscal year 1997, the JCET branch had miscategorized two events
as JCETs when they had actually paid for these activities with
funds budgeted for Cooperative Threat Reduction activity.

For fiscal year 1998 JCETs in SOUTHCOM, we compared files at four
locations and determined that 52 JCETs occurred in 21 countries.
However, because of discrepancies among files at different
locations about whether one JCET had been canceled and whether an
additional nine training activities were JCETs or some other type
of event, such as humanitarian civic actions or counterdrug
training, we are not confident about our count.

After we completed our review of files, DOD issued its fiscal year
1998 report on JCETs to the Congress. We evaluated this report in
light of past reporting problems to determine whether SOCOM's
provisional guidance to the commands on reporting had resulted in
improvements. DOD's fiscal year 1998 JCET report indicates that in
many ways the information

reported to the Congress had improved. For example, DOD gave much
greater detail on what types of training were provided during
JCETs. Also, better information on the numbers of U. S. and host
nation participants in JCET events was provided. Prior to 1998,
for example, many reported JCETs did not include information on
host nation participation. Using information on fiscal year 1998
JCET activities obtained at

SOUTHCOM and PACOM, we compared our data with that reported to the
Congress. This comparison demonstrated that problems similar to
those in past reports continue. For example, some JCETs were
double- or triple- counted in the 1998 report. Also, completed
JCET events were not included in the report. Table 2.2 illustrates
the types of problems we saw in the report's listing of JCETs.

Table 2.2: Problems in DOD's Report to the Congress on Fiscal Year
1998 JCETs Problem Command

SOUTHCOM PACOM

Number of JCETs double- or triple- counted 2 7 Number of events
counted as JCETs that were not JCETs 2 0

Number of JCETs listed for which we found no files 7 0 Number of
JCETs not included in the annual report for which we saw files 12
10

Different Interpretations of Under 10 U. S. C. 2011( e), DOD must
report whether JCET training is related

What Must Be Reported on to counternarcotics or counterterrorism.
There are no instructions on JCETs' Relationship to what this
requirement means, however. As a result, officials within the
Counternarcotics and

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Counterterrorism

Low- Intensity Conflict had different interpretations of what
information should be included. One official said that this
requirement was to report JCETs' funding source and that because
JCETs funding source is different from that for counternarcotics
and counterterrorism events, JCETs will never be related to
counternarcotics or counterterrorism. On the other hand, another
official said that JCETs are related to counternarcotics or

counterterrorism when they involve host nation participants that
are involved in counterdrug or counterterrorism activities and
should be reported as such.

During our review of the fiscal year 1997 annual report to the
Congress on JCETs, we found that neither PACOM nor SOUTHCOM had
reported that any JCET was related to counternarcotics. PACOM
reported one JCET that

was related to counterterrorism, and SOUTHCOM also reported one.
Both the JCETs reported as related to counterterrorism involved
what were described to us as counterterrorism JCETs, performed by
U. S. special operations units with a counterterrorism mission.
However, there were other similar counterterrorism JCETs that were
not identified as related to counterterrorism in the annual
report. For example, in fiscal year 1997,

PACOM had 8 other counterterrorism JCETs, and SOUTHCOM had 11.
None of these 19 events were reported as related to
counterterrorism.

In the annual report to the Congress for fiscal year 1998, several
JCETs were conducted by the same SOF units with a counterterrorism
mission, but the JCETs were again not noted as related to
counterterrorism. These JCETs included training in mission-
essential tasks relating to the

counterterrorism mission, including close- quarters battle, sniper
training, room/ building clearing, and breaching. DOD's proposed
new guidance does not address how to determine when a JCET is
related to counterterrorism or counternarcotics.

Inaccurate Reporting of the Our review of JCET activities revealed
that JCET costs were not accurately

Cost of JCETs captured in annual reports to the Congress. Table
2.3 shows the costs of JCETs that were initially reported to the
Congress and SOCOM's revised list of costs. However, while the
SOCOM revisions might have more closely

identified costs associated with the program, our review showed
that these revised costs are also inaccurate.

Table 2. 3: JCET Costs for Fiscal Years 1995- 97 Fiscal year JCET
expenses 1995 1996 1997 Total

U. S. expenses as reported in annual report $23, 625,000 $18, 409,
000 $15,003, 000 $57,037, 000

U. S. expenses as revised by SOCOM 12,022,000 13, 753,000 14,295,
000 $40,070, 000

Difference in reported and revised U. S. expenses 11, 603, 000 4,
656, 000 708,000 $16,967, 000

Host country expenses as reported in annual report 1, 126, 000
135, 000 220,000 $1, 481, 000

Host country expenses as revised by SOCOM 621, 000 594, 000
300,000 $1, 515, 000

Difference in reported and revised host country expenses 505,000
(459, 000) (80,000) ($ 34, 000)

SOCOM's revised cost figures indicate that U. S. expenses reported
for fiscal years 1995- 97 have been overestimated by about $17
million, or about 42 percent. SOCOM officials explained that this
difference resulted from the removal of a number of JCETs from the
report that it identified as being non- JCETs. This confusion was
due to the absence of a standard definition of a JCET.

Because DOD did not capture all appropriated funds used to pay
foreign country incremental expenses in its annual reports to the
Congress, DOD also understated the cost of host nation
participation during this same period. DOD's annual reports to the
Congress stated that $1,481,000 was spent worldwide during fiscal
years 1995- 97 to pay for certain incremental expenses of host
nations. After reexamining the data, SOCOM raised this amount
slightly to $1,515,000, or about 2 percent (see table 2.3). We
selected PACOM to do a more in- depth look at how JCET- related
expenses of host nations were funded by DOD in fiscal year 1997.
Our work disclosed that DOD's support for host country incidental
expenses was

significantly understated. Specifically, we found that, while DOD
reported that it had spent $220, 000 on host country incidental
expenses for all commands in fiscal year 1997, PACOM alone spent
$256,247 for JCET host nation expenses. Incremental Expenses May

Section 2011( a)( 3) authorizes the payment of the incremental
expenses Be Underreported Because

incurred by a host nation as a direct result of participating in
JCETs. of Lack of Guidance on Use However, our review indicates
that the amount of such costs reported to

of Appropriated Funds the Congress may be underreported because
DOD reported only costs paid

by SOCOM, which uses a Defense- wide appropriation, while it
appears that other appropriations were used as well to pay these
costs. During the period covered by our review, these incremental
expenses have been paid from four separate and distinct operation
and maintenance (O& M) appropriations: Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Defense- wide. According to a

DOD official, approximately 50 percent of the expense authorized
to be paid under 10 U. S. C. 2011( a)( 3) incremental expenses are
paid by SOCOM from its O& M budget, which is funded from the
Defense- wide O& M appropriation. The remaining 50 percent of
these expenses are paid by the regional combatant commands from
their O& M budgets, which are funded from either the Army's O& M
appropriation (in the case of European Command and the Southern
Command), the Navy's O& M appropriation (in the case of Atlantic
Command and the Pacific Command), or the Air Force's O& M
appropriation (in the case of Central Command). DOD explained that
some JCETs are fully funded by SOCOM; some are fully funded by the
regional combatant commands; and some are funded jointly by SOCOM
and the regional combatant commands, usually with SOCOM

paying the expenses of special operations forces and the regional
commands paying the incremental expenses of the participating host
country.

Where two or more lump- sum appropriations (such as the various O&
M appropriations here) are broad enough to cover costs of an
activity (such as JCETs), agencies must determine which
appropriation it will charge, document its determination, and
charge the appropriation consistent with its determination
throughout the particular fiscal year. 2 In the

circumstances described here, DOD should have issued written
guidance or instructions articulating the criteria for selecting
the proper appropriation to charge for each JCET expense. DOD
informed us that to date, it has issued no guidance or instruction
setting forth criteria to determine which appropriation should be
charged for which JCET expense but that it plans to do so in the
future. However, DOD officials have informed us that in the
interim, DOD has included language in the message authorizing May
1999 JCETs that indicates that incremental expenses incurred by
the friendly developing country as the direct result of training
with U. S. special operations forces must be paid for using
SOCOM's O& M funds. Moreover, it stipulates that other funding
sources, such as those used to conduct exercises, should not be
used for JCETs and that the Joint Staff will not provide funding.
DOD officials have informed us that they intend to include this
language in all future monthly JCET approval documents until
permanent guidance is issued.

In response to deficiencies described above, DOD has been actively
considering permanent guidance requiring that each JCET deployment
be funded entirely from the same appropriation. This guidance
would require that SOCOM fund all JCETs that it initiates and runs
entirely from SOCOM O& M monies (i. e., Defense- wide O& M) and
would require the regional combatant command CINCs to fund the
activities authorized under section 2011 that they initiate and
run entirely from CINC O& M monies (i. e., Army, Navy, or Air
Force O& M appropriations). We believe that such guidance, if
properly implemented and consistently applied, would meet DOD's

responsibility for funds control described previously. 2 See
Funding for Army Repair Projects (B-272191, Nov. 4, 1997) and
Unsubstantiated DOE Travel Payments (GAO/RCED-96-58R, Dec. 28,
1995).

Proposed Changes to SOCOM and their component officials believed
that because of the minimal Guidance and Approval management
attention on annual JCET reports, the data were not

challenged as they moved from the service components to SOCOM
Process Are Designed

headquarters. Mistakes made at lower levels were passed forward.
We to Improve Future agree that this, along with the absence of a
clear definition of a JCET and Reports SOCOM guidance on how to
report on JCET activities, is the source of the reporting problem.
In the near future, SOCOM plans to issue a directive that will
provide guidance on the planning, execution, and reporting of
JCETs. This proposed guidance will include a definition of a JCET
that provides in part that a JCET is primarily funded by SOCOM and
uses no security assistance funds. Also, the proposed guidance
will recognize that the commanders of the combatant commands may
pay section 2011- authorized expenses, including incremental
expenses incurred by friendly developing nations. SOCOM officials
believed that this new directive should improve post- fiscal year
1997 reports to the Congress on

JCET activities. SOCOM and its components have three other
initiatives aimed at improving JCET reporting. First, SOCOM plans
to issue a directive that will provide the services with a
standard reporting format to promote consistency and completeness.
Second, in fiscal year 1999, SOCOM began to assign a unique code
to each scheduled JCET. Assignment of one code to be used by all
services participating in a JCET should eliminate the double- and
triple- counting of JCETs that has occurred in past reporting.
Third, the component commands are initiating improvements in their
accounting systems to better capture JCET costs. For example, the
Air Force Special Operations Command now assigns extraordinary and
special program

codes to individual JCETs. Any costs incurred for a particular
JCET will be entered into this accounting system under that unique
code. The Army Special Operations Command and the Naval Special
Warfare Command have initiated similar accounting systems to track
JCET expenditures. In addition to SOCOM- developed improvements,
on October 17, 1998, the Congress amended section 2011 to improve
the level of reporting and require that any related training
receive the prior approval of the Secretary of Defense. 3 The
amendment to 2011( e) requires that the reports now include a
discussion of the unique military training benefit to United
States special operations forces derived from the training
activities for which 3 Pub. L. 105- 261,  1062, 112 Stat. 1920,
2129- 30 (1998).

expenses were paid under this section. DOD's new approval process
for JCETs has been designed to collect this required information.
Conclusions Our discussions with DOD officials and our review of
files, including planning documents and after- action reports,
reveal that the JCETs we

reviewed met the primary purpose requirement of 10 U. S. C.
section 2011( b) in that their primary purpose was to train U. S.
special operations forces. Notwithstanding that JCETs we reviewed
complied with this provision, little attention was paid to
accurately reporting these activities to the

Congress as required by 10 U. S. C. section 2011( e). As a result,
the Congress received a lot of erroneous information on such basic
information as how many JCETs were conducted. We believe that the
changes DOD and SOCOM's components have proposed to their guidance
and have made to the JCET approval process should improve the
accuracy

of their reporting to the Congress in this area. In two areas,
however, contemplated changes may be insufficient. First, field
personnel do not have the criteria needed for determining when a
JCET is related to counternarcotics or counterterrorism. Second,
it is unclear to field

personnel how to report and account for host nations' incremental
expenses incurred during JCETs. Recommendations To improve annual
reporting to the Congress on JCETs, we recommend

that the Secretary of Defense issue guidance that provides
criteria to use in determining whether JCETs are related to
counterterrorism or counternarcotics and therefore need to be
reported as such. To improve financial management and the accuracy
of the reporting of JCET costs, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense issue guidance (1) articulating the criteria for selecting
the proper appropriation to charge for each JCET expense, (2)
specifying that any such selection must be documented, and (3)
clarifying that the selection must be consistently applied
throughout the applicable fiscal year. Finally, we recommend that
the Secretary of Defense set a milestone for the issuance of final
guidance on these issues.

Agency Comments and In official comments on our draft report, DOD
concurred with these

Our Evaluation recommendations. It plans to issue guidance in a
forthcoming instruction

defining criteria to be used to determine whether a JCET is
related to counterterrorism or counternarcotics. In already issued
interim guidance, DOD has defined the proper appropriation to
charge for JCETs. This

guidance will be repeated in the monthly JCET approval documents
until DOD's instruction containing final guidance is issued. DOD
expects to issue this final instruction no later than December 31,
1999.

More Headquarters Oversight Should Increase Assurances That JCETS
Are Consistent With

Chapt er 3

U. S. Foreign Policy U. S. embassy State Department officials in
the six countries we visited exercised extensive oversight of JCET
activities and believed that these activities were consistent with
U. S. policy objectives in each country. This was the case despite
the fact that prior to November 1998, neither

Department of State nor DOD headquarters' officials were routinely
involved in overseeing JCETs. While neither DOD personnel overseas
nor U. S. ambassadors believed that any problems occurred because
of the lack of headquarters oversight, new JCET approval
procedures, which require

the Secretary of Defense's approval and the Secretary of State's
notification, will provide greater assurances that all foreign
policy factors are considered before determining whether a JCET
should proceed.

New Procedures Before 1998, DOD civilian headquarters personnel
were not routinely

Should Enhance involved in approving or overseeing JCETs. Approval
and oversight were assigned to the geographic CINCs and SOCOM
components and units,

Headquarters consistent with other DOD training activities.
Similarly, State Department Oversight and

headquarters officials rarely learned of JCET activities. New
legislation and procedures will ensure that civilian headquarters
personnel are Knowledge of JCET significantly involved. 1

Activities DOD Headquarters Was Not

In August 1992, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations Routinely Involved in and Low- Intensity Conflict
provided guidance on how to implement the Managing JCETs

legislation enabling special operations forces to train overseas
with foreign security forces. 2 The guidance states that, while
the Assistant Secretary of Defense is responsible for policy
guidance, the CINCs of the unified

geographic or specified commands are responsible for the operation
of JCETs. The decision to delegate operational responsibility for
managing JCETs to service component and unified commands is
consistent with the approach used for other DOD training
activities, where the parent unit must ensure that troops are
obtaining the training they need to meet their mission. In the
case of special operations forces, SOCOM is

1 Pub. L. 105- 261,  1062, 112 Stat. 1920, 2129- 30 (Oct. 17,
1998). 2 Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from
the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict, DOD Implementation of the Provisions in the
Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Relating to the
Training of Special Operations Forces With Friendly Foreign
Forces, August 6, 1992.

responsible by statute for their training; 3 the service
components are responsible for individual service training needs;
and the CINCs of the geographic commands are responsible for all
the training requirements of special operations forces assigned to
that command. 4 As a result of this delegation of authority,
senior DOD officials became routinely involved in the JCET
approval process only when the geographic commands requested
deployment orders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 5 In those
cases, the Joint Staff learned of JCET activities as they signed

deployment orders for the JCET participants. However, only
SOUTHCOM routinely requested deployment orders to ensure that it
had operational control over forces in its theater. As a result,
DOD estimates that the Secretary of Defense had visibility over 30
percent of all JCETs.

State Department In the past, Department of State headquarters
personnel were not routinely Headquarters Did Not Have

apprised of planned JCET activities. State headquarters officials
said that an Oversight Role

the only time they would have been notified of upcoming JCETs was
when commands requested approval to use funds budgeted for the
Developing Country Combined Exercise Program to pay the
incremental costs of host country JCET participants. 6 Such a
request triggered consultation with State headquarters under the
program's authorizing statute. The focus of State's review,
however, was on the host country funding, not the JCET activities.
This decentralized approach is consistent with the overall absence
of State's involvement in approving military training deployments
other than JCETs. For example, the State Department does not
always review the approximately 175 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, exercises that take place each year. Rather, State
headquarters is consulted only when the exercises are large and
involve both U. S. and foreign forces, have

particular political significance, will occur in politically
sensitive areas, or are likely to receive prominent media
attention. This process is consistent 3 10 U. S. C.  167 (e)( 2)(
D)( 1994). 4 10 U. S. C.  164 (1994). 5 SOUTHCOM was the only
unified command that routinely requested deployment orders. It did
so because it wanted operational control of the SOF who were
stationed in the continental United States

and entering the SOUTHCOM region to participate in a JCET. 6 The
Developing Country Combined Exercise Program (10 U. S. C.  2010)
allows the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the
Secretary of State, to pay the incremental expenses that are
incurred by a developing country while participating in a combined
exercise under certain circumstances. (See ch. 2 for a discussion
of the incremental costs of host nation participation in JCETs.)

with Presidential Decision Directive 33, Significant Military
Exercises and Operations.

Legislation and Approval In April 1998, DOD initiated a plan to
improve JCET reporting and increase Procedures Now Ensure
oversight of JCET activities. Although DOD believed that civilian
oversight That the Secretary of of JCETs was appropriate and
adequate, it decided to make this oversight Defense and the more
robust because of media allegations and congressional concerns
that JCETs did not have appropriate civilian oversight and in some

Department of State Have instances may have contravened stated U.
S. foreign policy goals. DOD's

an Oversight Role plan entailed collecting and disseminating more
accurate information on

JCETs and requiring that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict review planned
JCETs quarterly. The legislation enacted in October 1998, however,
amended the JCET

authority to require even more stringent approval and reporting
requirements. 7 When coupled with the legislation restricting
training with foreign personnel alleged to have committed human
rights abuses (discussed more in depth in ch. 4 of this report),
DOD determined it needed to develop a comprehensive process to
manage and report JCET deployments.

To effectively implement the new approval and reporting
requirements, in November 1998, DOD implemented a monthly JCET
Authorization Document (JAD) process, which is used to approve
JCETs and to collect and provide information. The JAD does not
change how JCET opportunities are developed; service components
still identify training needs, coordinate them with the geographic
commands, and obtain approval from individual country ambassadors
before a JCET may proceed. The JAD ensures that the Secretary of
Defense has sufficient

information to decide whether to approve a JCET, that the
Department of State is notified of all JCET events, and that DOD
can provide the Congress the information it requires.

Under the JAD process, each geographic CINC provides SOCOM with
information on each planned JCET. Included is information on the
training to be performed, U. S. and host country units, dates,
location, skills to be trained, relationship to other exercises,
and cost. To address human rights issues, the JAD documents that
the embassy has investigated for human rights violations and who
in the embassy determined that there was no

7 Pub. L. 105- 261,  1062, 112 Stat. 1920, 2129- 30 (Oct. 17,
1998).

credible information that any individual had committed gross
violations of human rights. Finally, the JAD shows who in the
embassy approved the deployment. Each month, SOCOM consolidates
the information on JCETs scheduled to occur at least 45 days later
and provides it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This schedule allows
the Joint Staff time to review each deployment and forward the
information to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict, who
coordinates the Office of the Secretary of Defense review. Once
the Under Secretary for

Policy concurs, the Joint Staff then forwards the documents to the
Secretary of Defense, who personally reviews the documentation for
approval.

Under the current JAD process, the State Department will be
notified up to four times of an impending JCET: (1) after JCET
conferences, when lists of upcoming JCETs are compiled; (2) when
country clearances are requested; (3) around 45 days prior to the
event; and (4) around 15 days before the event, as final approval
is being granted by the Secretary of Defense. At any one of these
points, State could notify DOD that the proposed JCET

would be inconsistent with U. S. foreign policy objectives. U. S.
Ambassadors Each U. S. ambassador is responsible for ensuring that
all activities conducted by U. S. agencies abroad support U. S.
goals and objectives. 8 Provided Extensive Ambassadors in each of
the six countries we visited believed that they Civilian Oversight
of exercised extensive oversight over JCETs. The ambassador and
country

JCET Activities team members in each country believed that no
special operations forces trained in country without their
knowledge and concurrence. Embassies used a variety of methods to
oversee JCET activities in the six countries we

visited. Country Clearance Approval U. S. government employees
must request clearance to enter a country and Process conduct a
specific activity at a given time. The ambassador approves or

disapproves the request through an official embassy cable. In the
countries we visited, ambassadors and other State officials
informed us that no DOD member could conduct official business
without country clearance. 8 See 22 U. S. C.  2321i (e) and 2382
(1994).

Through file reviews, we found evidence that DOD's JCET
participants entered the country with country clearance. This
process ensures that at a minimum, the ambassador is aware that a
military deployment is planned and when it is to occur.

DOD Engagement Plans and DOD representatives in the embassy may
prepare engagement plans and

Annual Training Programs calendars that detail what activities
they plan to initiate, what U. S. goals

they will support, and with whom and when the training is expected
to take place. For example, in Ecuador, DOD personnel prepared a
5- year engagement plan and an annual exercise and training
calendar. The plan provided a long- term perspective on goals and
objectives and what types of

activities, such as JCETs, would be used to meet them. The
calendar showed by quarter for each fiscal year how planned
activities for the year supported U. S. goals and the dates,
duration, type of training, and composition of each activity. We
noted that the Ambassador in Ecuador

personally approved the fiscal year 1998 plan in August 1997.
Similarly, in Thailand, the military group develops a yearly
training program, which is sent to the U. S. Ambassador for
approval. Annual Mission Planning

Each embassy reviews DOD's planned activities in preparation of
the Sessions mission's annual performance plan. This plan details
the embassy's strategic goals, objectives, and strategy to achieve
them and discusses how

activities of assigned U. S. agencies support specific objectives.
To illustrate, the plan for Bolivia discusses how DOD activities
such as JCETs and Traditional CINC Activities support U. S. goals
and identifies increasing the number of JCET opportunities as an
embassy strategy.

Country Team Meetings Country teams generally comprise the
ambassador, deputy chief of mission, and heads of each resident U.
S. agency such as the Department of Defense, U. S. Agency for
International Development, and Drug Enforcement Agency. Country
team meetings are used to discuss and coordinate agency activities
and discuss important embassy issues. In each of the countries we
visited, we were informed that the ambassadors discussed JCETs at
country team meetings. In Bolivia, for example, the Ambassador
held meetings with the heads of agencies four times a week and
felt confident that through this process she was fully informed of
DOD's JCET activities.

DOD Briefings to the Special operations forces may brief embassy
officials during the planning

Ambassador and Other and execution phases of JCETs and other
deployments. Our review of files

State Personnel and discussions with JCET participants and embassy
officials indicate that

teams brief embassy officials before and after deployments. For
example, embassy officials in the Philippines stated that special
operations unit commanders continuously try to brief embassy staff
before and after JCET activities, and the Ambassador in Ecuador
stated he often received three briefings per deployment.

Ambassadors Believed Although the principal objective of JCETs is
to train U. S. special operations

That JCETs Were forces, JCETs also have an ancillary benefit in
that they can be used to support U. S. foreign policy objectives.
In the six countries we visited,

Consistent With U. S. ambassadors believed that the activities of
the JCETs that occurred were Objectives for Their

consistent with U. S. foreign policy objectives. In some
countries, the Specific Countries

ambassador's country plan and JCET activities were directly
linked; in others, the relationship was more indirect. In all
cases, officials could not point to any JCET activity that ran
counter to U. S. objectives. The relationship of JCET activities
to foreign policy objectives in the countries is discussed for
each country we visited.

Bolivia A principal embassy goal is to promote Bolivian
participation in international U. N. peacekeeping operations. To
meet this goal, the embassy approved the deployments of National
Guard special forces who needed to train themselves to teach basic
military skills. For example, these JCETs involved training the
Bolivian military to improve their basic military skills so they
could participate in U. N. peacekeeping operations. In one JCET
that took place in Bolivia in fiscal year 1998, U. S. National
Guard special forces trained themselves on how to conduct light
infantry training while the Bolivians learned basic military
skills such as patrolling and marksmanship. Additionally, the
counterterrorism- focused JCETs supported the U. S. objectives of
improving the capabilities of the Bolivian counterterrorism police
unit. Increasing the number of JCET opportunities in country is a
strategy the embassy employs to achieve its objectives.

Colombia A principal U. S. goal in Colombia is to reduce the flow
of narcotics into the United States. This goal has been addressed
through counternarcotics assistance on a large scale. The embassy
believes that the few JCETs that have occurred were consistent
with foreign policy objectives in country,

but because only one or two took place each year, they did not
have a major impact on the achievement of U. S. goals.
Nevertheless, these JCETs, as well as meeting SOF training
requirements, addressed the U. S.

counterterrorism objective of protecting U. S. personnel and
assets by training with Colombian counterterrorism forces in
breaching, integrated assaults, and helicopter operations, for
example. Ecuador Principal U. S. objectives in Ecuador have been
to secure a comprehensive peace agreement between Ecuador and Peru
and to persuade the Ecuadorian military to retarget its scarce
resources to address the looming drug problem. To achieve these
goals, the U. S. embassy sought to preserve

its influence within the Ecuadorian military through an extensive
program of joint exercises and military- to- military contacts.
The 12 JCETs that occurred in fiscal year 1997 and the 2 that we
believe occurred in fiscal year

1998 not only helped U. S. special operations forces train in
their mission- essential tasks, such as combat lifesaver training
and tactical decision- making, but also, embassy officials
believed, helped demonstrate

U. S. support for the Ecuadorian military. Embassy officials
believed such support encouraged the Ecuadorian military to accept
a peace agreement with Peru. Additionally, embassy officials
believed that JCETs helped to provide skills the Ecuadorian
military would need to address the threat posed by Colombian
criminal and terrorist elements that have infiltrated

the border region. Indonesia A principal U. S. goal in Indonesia
has been to encourage the development of a democratic government
and reduce the involvement of the military in internal affairs.
The Ambassador stated that the embassy has used JCETs to maintain
access and develop greater influence in Indonesian military
affairs to achieve these goals because of severe restrictions
placed on other

forms of military interaction, such as International Military
Education and Training. However, officials said that the nature of
the military engagement was less important than the engagement
itself; in fact, other types of

military engagements were used to achieve U. S. goals. In fiscal
year 1998, for example, PACOM documents indicate that the United
States engaged in 8 military exercises and conducted 13 subject
matter expert exchanges.

The five JCETs that occurred, while targeted at meeting SOF skills
such as ground/ air communication and outdoor survival, supported
the embassy's military engagement strategy. Given the current
political instability, the embassy is assessing whether, and if so
how, to engage with the Indonesian military.

The Philippines The embassy believes that maintaining a strong
military relationship with the Philippines is important because
the Philippines is a defense treaty ally, although it views
economic and trade issues with the Philippines as more important.
JCETs have been the major source of military training activity
with the Philippines since 1996, when the Status of Forces
Agreement expired. That agreement had provided a legal framework
for U. S. forces

visiting the country. Through an agreement with the Philippine
government, legal protection is accorded to deployments consisting
of fewer than 20 persons, which includes JCETs. Moreover, while U.
S. SOF train in skills such as small unit tactics and demolition,
embassy officials believed that through JCETs, relationships could
be established with potential leaders in the Filipino military.
Embassy officials informed us that if a visiting forces agreement
is ratified by the Filipino legislature, JCETs will become one
part of a larger military engagement strategy.

Thailand Thailand is one of five U. S. security treaty allies in
Asia and, according to the State Department, one of the closest U.
S. military partners in the region. One U. S. objective is to
develop and maintain a Thai military committed to respecting and
fostering democratic principles and capable

of participating in international peacekeeping operations. As
such, DOD has had a large military engagement program, and the
embassy identified its continuance as an objective. For example,
in one JCET alone 39 SOF

personnel from the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force trained with
nearly 250 Thai military in activities such as small unit tactics,
maritime beach reconnaissance/ landing, and psychological
operations. The embassy viewed JCETs as a small, but cost-
effective part of its total engagement strategy to maintain
contacts and facilitate interoperability.

Conclusions Our review of oversight procedures in the six
countries we visited suggests that DOD performed JCETs with the
knowledge and support of the ambassadors and country teams and
that such activities were consistent with U. S. foreign policy in
those specific countries. Moreover, the ambassadors did not
believe that any problems had occurred because of

the lack of headquarters oversight. It is not possible to
determine whether the number, location, or activities of JCETs
would have changed if DOD and State headquarters had been involved
in the approval process; nor is it possible to know whether a DOD
or Department of State headquarters perspective might have changed
a planned event. We agree with DOD,

however, that civilian oversight will become more robust under its
new

JCET approval process. The additional oversight should provide
greater assurances that all factors are weighed in determining
whether a JCET should proceed. Moreover, it is clear that the lack
of headquarters oversight, when coupled with the general confusion
and inaccurate

reporting on JCET activity discussed earlier in this report,
contributed to the dissemination of inaccurate information to the
Congress. The new process should, at the minimum, reduce the
amount of contradictory and erroneous information issued in the
future.

Uncertainties Remain in Implementing the Law Restricting Training
With Human Rights

Chapt er 4

Abusers Recent legislation restricts DOD from using its funds to
train with a unit of a foreign security force that has been
credibly alleged to have committed a gross violation of human
rights unless all necessary corrective steps have been taken. 1
DOD has issued interim guidance to implement the legislation. The
Department of State has also issued procedures to its embassies on
their role in human rights screening. However, embassies overseas
have encountered a number of implementation problems that the
guidance has not yet resolved. Legislation Restricts

In past years, DOD has stated that it would not train with foreign
security Conducting JCETs forces if those forces were known to be
involved in human rights violations. Until October 1998, however,
DOD was not legislatively

With Forces Involved prohibited from doing so. Until that time,
the closest legislation resembling in Human Rights

such a prohibition was in foreign operations appropriations
legislation. 2 Violations This legislation specifies that no
foreign operations funds (such as funds for International Military
Education and Training Assistance or Foreign

Military Financing to purchase equipment) are to be provided to
units of security forces of a foreign country if there is credible
evidence that units have committed gross violations of human
rights unless the Secretary of State determines and reports to the
Congress that the government of the country is taking effective
measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces
unit to justice. The process through which State Department
investigates for potential human rights abusers is generally
called vetting. Section 8130 of the Defense Appropriations Act for
Fiscal Year 1999

(Oct. 17, 1998) restricts DOD from using its funds to train with a
unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary
of Defense has credible information that a member of those forces
has committed a gross violation

of human rights. 3 Specifically, the section  prohibits DOD from
training with a unit of the security forces of a

foreign country if the Secretary of Defense has received credible
1 Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. 105-
262,  8130, 112 Stat. 2279, 2335 (Oct. 17, 1998). 2 Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. 104- 208, 110
Stat. 3009- 133 (1996), reenacted in somewhat different form in
Pub. L. 105- 118,  570, 111 Stat. 2429 (1997), reenacted again in
Pub. L. 105- 277,  568, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681- 194- 195 (1998).

3 Pub. L. 105- 262,  8130, 112 Stat. 2279, 2335 (Oct. 17, 1998).

information from the Department of State that a member of the unit
has committed a gross violation of human rights, unless all
necessary corrective steps have been taken;

 requires the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the
Secretary of State within 90 days of the enactment of the law, to
establish procedures to ensure that prior to a decision to conduct
any DOD- funded training program, full consideration is given to
all information available to the

Department of State relating to human rights violations by foreign
security forces; and  authorizes the Secretary of Defense, after
consultation with the

Secretary of State, to waive the prohibition under extraordinary
circumstances and report the waiver to the Congress within 15 days
describing the extraordinary circumstances and providing related
information.

DOD Has Issued Pursuant to legislation, in November 1998, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the

Interim Guidance, but Under Secretary of Defense for Policy issued
interim guidance on how to implement section 8130 of Public Law
105- 262. The guidance provides

Implementation Issues general procedures for ensuring that DOD-
funded training activities do not Remain

take place with human rights abusers. Specifically, it states what
DOD training activities are included and excluded and that State
Department not DOD personnel are responsible for determining
whether credible evidence shows that a unit or a member within
that unit is involved in a

gross human rights violation. The guidance defines gross human
rights violations and essentially relies on the ambassador or
other non- DOD member of the country team to assure the Joint
Staff that the Department of State possesses no credible
information on gross human rights violations by the security units
or their members with whom DOD plans to train. If the Department
of State concludes that there is credible evidence of a gross

violation of human rights, DOD guidance provides that the proposed
activity may be able to meet the requirements of the law because
necessary corrective steps have been taken, e. g., through
adjustments of the planned activity and/ or adjustments to the
host nation participants. The guidance further states that [ i] f
such adjustments can be accomplished with the host

nation, or if other necessary corrective action has been taken,
and are judged adequate by the Ambassador, the training may be
approved. Thus, the DOD guidance has defined the legislative
language unless all necessary corrective steps have been taken.
Information on corrective actions taken must be provided to the
Office of the Secretary of Defense with the JCET request. If the
State Department determines that it has no credible evidence of
abuses, DOD will continue with the JCET as planned.

Though not required to by legislation, the Department of State
also issued guidance to its embassies because of its role in
overseeing all official U. S. activities overseas in general and
in particular for screening foreign troops for human rights
abuses. Embassies overseas highlighted a number of problems that
have arisen since they have begun implementing the

legislation but that have not yet been addressed by the State
Department. The Definition of a Unit Section 8130 of the 1999
Defense Appropriations Act states that DOD

cannot train with a unit of the security forces of a foreign
country if there is credible information that a member of the unit
has committed a gross violation of human rights. 4 Defining unit
is important from two standpoints. First, the definition of the
unit determines the number of people State must investigate if the
embassy screens all individuals in a unit

associated with a JCET. During our visit, State and DOD personnel
in Colombia questioned whether the embassy would have to
investigate an entire brigade for possible human rights abuses if
the U. S. special operations forces were planning to train with
only one platoon from the brigade. Second, the definition of a
unit determines the extent to which abuses committed by the unit's
leaders affect lower- level personnel. Specifically, if a unit is
defined as a brigade, the abuses of the top official would
adversely affect the ability of hundreds of lower- level personnel
to train with the U. S. military. Defining a unit as the group
actually doing the

training, for example, a platoon, lowers the universe affected to
only a few people. The State Department believes that the issue of
the definition of a unit has

been resolved. After consultation with DOD, in a May 8, 1999,
cable to all overseas embassies, the State Department defined the
unit to be trained as the unit to be vetted. Thus, for individual
training, the individual will be vetted. For unit- level training,
the unit itself will be vetted. For example, if the training is
targeted at a platoon, only the platoon will be vetted, not the
parent unit. The Screening of Individuals The May 8 cable does not
clarify whether embassies must investigate every

individual in the unit for human rights abuses or whether it is
sufficient to determine whether there are allegations against the
unit as a whole. In this cable, State provided guidance stating
that the vetting procedures should 4 See id.

ascertain that no one against whom there are credible allegations
of gross violations of human rights is currently assigned to the
units in question. However, State officials believe that this
guidance does not require

screening every individual assigned to the unit in question. We
believe that State's written guidance and oral interpretation
could be viewed as contradictory. Specifically, the written
guidance appears to require individual vetting, while oral
interpretation of this guidance suggested that individual vetting
is not required. It is, therefore, not clear how embassies

are to ascertain that there are no credible allegations of human
rights abuses. Of the six countries we visited, only Colombia
screens every individual scheduled to participate in a JCET. The
embassy in Indonesia has determined that if it resumes JCETs in
the future, it will also screen every individual scheduled to
participate.

The Definition of Training The definition of training is important
as it establishes what DOD activities must undergo human rights
screening. In its guidance, DOD defines training as the
instruction of foreign security force personnel with the specific
purpose of improving the capabilities of foreign security forces.
5 It includes JCETs as training, even though their primary purpose
is to train U. S. forces, but does not consider training to be
military exercises and individual and collective interface
activities (such as subject matter expert exchanges and seminars)
during which the primary focus is interoperability or mutually
beneficial exchanges and not training of foreign forces. With this
definition of training, a broad array of

military- to- military activities are not required to undergo
human rights screening. Some State Department officials in
Colombia, however, believe that all military- to- military
activities should be included and have asked for clarification on
the issue. These officials in Colombia believe it equally
important to screen high- ranking Colombian officers selected to
participate in a seminar as it is to screen lower- level officials
scheduled to participate

in a JCET. The Clearance of a Unit

Embassies do not have any guidance on how far back in time they
must go With Past Human Rights to investigate human rights abuses.
Also at issue is whether the passage of Abuses

time since unresolved human rights abuses occurred is sufficient
to permit training, and if so, how much time is necessary. For
example, embassy 5 See Joint Staff message dated Nov. 14, 1998,
Human Rights Verification for DOD- Funded Training Programs With
Foreign Personnel.

officials in Colombia questioned whether an unresolved human
rights allegation in the early 1990s would preclude DOD from
training with the affected unit.

The Implementation of All DOD's guidance states that DOD may
propose corrective action to address Necessary Corrective Steps

situations where there is credible information of gross human
rights violations by a member of a unit by adjusting the planned
activity or participants. The guidance states further that the
corrective action must be judged adequate by the ambassador. Thus,
DOD has defined this legislative provision.

However, embassy officials have identified different
understandings of what all necessary corrective steps entails as a
major implementation problem. We found that some ambassadors do
not clearly understand what criteria are to be used in making such
an assessment. Some embassy officials believe that the requirement
that no training may proceed unless

all necessary corrective steps have been taken should be
consistent with the foreign operations legislation requiring that
the host country initiate judicial proceedings against the suspect
before training can begin. DOD's guidance, on the other hand,
reflects its belief that removing the offending individual from
the unit to be trained with before the training begins or

changing the unit with which U. S. forces will train meets the
intent of the legislation and permits the training. Moreover, DOD
believes it is appropriate to have different human rights
standards for foreign assistance and U. S. training activities and
that DOD was never expected to hold training activities to the
same standards set for foreign assistance funds because the
purposes of the foreign assistance activities are so different.
The Secretary of Defense believes it is inappropriate to apply
foreign assistance human rights standards for U. S. training
activities because in training activities, U. S. forces are the
primary beneficiary and many

important U. S. programs, such as humanitarian demining and
counterdrug support, are furthered in many of these training
events. In State's November 1998 instruction to overseas
embassies, it advised that until this provision of the law was
more clearly defined, overseas posts should refer any questions on
a particular deployment to both State and DOD headquarters. We met
with embassy officials who believe it important that all necessary
corrective steps be interpreted to mean that the host country is
taking effective measures to bring the responsible parties to
justice. Such an interpretation would ensure that there was one

human rights standard for all military engagements, regardless of
the

funding source or purpose of the activity, including the training
of U. S. forces. For example, State officials in Colombia noted
that if the embassy discovered that some of the potential
recipients of counternarcotics assistance appeared to have
committed human rights abuses, the embassy can provide the aid
only after the embassy is assured that the host

government is taking effective measures to bring to justice the
charged individuals. The U. S. Ambassador in Colombia believes
that this same standard should be applied to U. S. military
training activities. Embassies in Colombia and Thailand have
requested more instructions on this issue.

The May 8, 1999, guidance from the Secretary of State did not
resolve the issue of how ambassadors should assess whether all
necessary corrective steps have been taken, but it relieved the
embassies of having to make final decisions on approving or
disapproving military training. State Department officials told us
that ambassadors are expected to assess the situation if screening
reveals human rights abuses. Nevertheless, the guidance

instructed all U. S. embassies that if screening reveals human
rights abuses, embassies should forward their evaluation of
whether the evidence is credible to the Department of State and
unified commands for resolution

and further guidance. Further, State Department officials told us
they do not view the lack of a clear definition of all necessary
corrective steps as a problem. Rather, their belief is that State
generally will not allow any training to proceed if embassies
discover any credible evidence of gross human rights abuse.

The Universe of Countries The legislation requiring human rights
screening for all DOD training

in Which Screening Is neither names nor excludes countries in
which such screening must take

Required place. However, some State and DOD officials with whom we
met

questioned whether human rights screening needs to be done in
countries where there is no record of human rights abuse. For
example, officials question whether it is necessary to conduct a
screening exercise before

training with military units in NATO countries. The Effect of
Information

Embassy and DOD officials identified the lack of reliable
information on and Resource Constraints human rights abuses from
which to make decisions regarding the appropriateness of training
with an individual or a unit and limited staff to conduct
investigations as two problems in implementing the legislation.
For example, U. S. embassy officials in the Philippines, Thailand,
and

Indonesia noted that the host government does not have a
centralized database on human rights abuses, and U. S. officials
in Indonesia believed

that background checks conducted by the host nation police were
unreliable. Of the six countries we visited, only the government
of Colombia had a database that the embassy could use to determine
whether charges had been brought against individuals. Colombia had
this database only because they were required to develop one in an
agreement they signed with United States to receive
counternarcotics assistance. Moreover, we were informed that the
limited number of State Department personnel overseas prohibits
them from conducting active investigations of

host nation personnel for each DOD training activity. Such a
constraint is particularly problematic if embassies are required
to conduct investigations of every individual in a unit scheduled
to participate in a JCET. Difficulties in Complying

Another problem area officials highlighted is the difficulty of
conducting With DOD's JCET Approval human rights screening within
the time constraints DOD has imposed in its Time Frames

new approval process, especially if the embassies must screen
individuals rather than units. Specifically, no later than 45 days
before the event is scheduled to occur, DOD requires that the
geographic CINCs provide to the Joint Staff verification that
embassies have not uncovered human rights abuses. However,
according to DOD officials overseas, host nation militaries have
often not determined who will actually participate in the training
until just before the activity starts. For example, the Thai
military provides the names of its JCET participants about 1 month
prior to the

event. The embassy is attempting to obtain confirmation of Thai
participants 2 months in advance to meet JCET approval time
frames. Human Rights Screening

Embassies in the six countries we visited have developed policies
and Varies by Country

instituted procedures to implement section 8130 of Public Law 105-
262 based on their understanding of what is required, U. S. goals
in the country, and constraints each embassy faces. 6 Each embassy
has taken steps to ensure it will not be associated with human
rights abusers and to abide by its understanding of the
legislation. However, some embassy officials were concerned that
their best efforts might not be consistent with what the

Congress intended. They believed that more guidance is needed,
particularly in those countries where human rights are an issue.
The following summaries describe how the six embassies have
implemented the legislation and what concerns they have raised.

6 Pub. L. 105- 262,  8130, 112 Stat. 2279, 2335 (Oct. 17, 1998).

Bolivia According to U. S. embassy officials, human rights
violations are not a big problem in Bolivia. Nevertheless, the
embassy takes a conservative approach in screening JCET
participants for derogatory information: it screens each police
officer regardless of rank and military officers at the

rank of major and above. Enlisted personnel are not screened
because most are conscripts serving only a year and have had
limited opportunities to engage in such abuse.

DOD's military group manages the vetting process and provides
embassy officials, including the political officer and human
rights officer and heads of the narcotics affairs section and Drug
Enforcement Agency, the names,

dates of birth, and ranks of scheduled officer participants. Each
embassy official is expected to search files for any derogatory
information. For example, the Defense Attach maintains a database
on persons known to have committed human rights abuses or to have
engaged in narcotics activities. The embassy does not contact the
host nation to obtain information on human rights violations. To
date, there have been few allegations of any human rights abuses
committed by the military. The embassy had excluded only one
Bolivian military unit because of human

rights concerns. Colombia Ongoing U. S. programs in Colombia to
reduce the flow of cocaine, heroin,

and other drugs into the United States and to promote the
protection of human rights govern how the embassy manages the
screening of prospective JCET participants. Because numerous human
rights allegations against the Colombian military have been
documented, the embassy has instituted a formal procedure to
screen for abuses before counternarcotics or other military
training activities proceed. The embassy has elected to use this
same procedure to vet unit leaders and individual Colombian troops
scheduled to participate in JCETs.

Because human rights is an embassy priority, all screening is
managed and led by the Deputy Chief of Mission. Initially, the
Deputy must approve or disapprove a unit scheduled to participate
in training. If a unit is approved, the Colombian Ministry of
Defense is asked to determine whether any criminal or
administrative investigations (such as those conducted by the
Inspector General) have been initiated against any of the
individuals scheduled for training. The government of Colombia
must then conduct local background checks and certify that they
have not yielded any unsatisfactory information. As a further
check, embassy personnel, including the human rights officer,
regional security officer, and heads of

the Drug Enforcement Agency, screen each individual on the basis
of information available to them. For example, the human rights
officer maintains files on abuses committed by military units and
individuals. Upon receipt of this information, the country team,
led by the Deputy Chief of Mission, determines whether the unit is
eligible for training. Only the Ambassador can grant final
approval of any deployment. As a result of these procedures, DOD
discontinued JCETs with a unit charged with counterterrorism
responsibilities because the screening process revealed

that the head of the unit might have committed human rights
abuses. Although DOD guidance excludes other military- to-
military activities such as seminars between U. S. and Colombian
military officers, embassy officials believe that these activities
should undergo the same human rights scrutiny. The embassy wants
assurance from the Department of State that

its position requiring human rights screening for all military-
to- military activities is consistent with the intent of the
legislation. Ecuador According to U. S. embassy officials, the
Ecuadorian military is one of the

most respected and trustworthy institutions in the country and has
a good human rights record. As such, the embassy has determined it
is sufficient to conduct an in- house review of available
information on the human rights records of the parent unit of the
scheduled JCET participants. It does not consult with the host
country to obtain information. This evaluation has

generally been conducted at either the battalion or brigade level.
The embassy does not believe it necessary to screen lower- level
units such as the platoon actually conducting the JCET, individual
unit commanders, or

actual JCET participants. Moreover, DOD officials stated that such
screening would not be cost- effective and that they would not
have the resources to screen at that level unless they reduced the
number of deployments.

The U. S. military group manages the process by providing embassy
officials a list of all units with whom they plan to conduct JCETs
for the year. Each embassy unit, such as the Defense Attach,
political section, and information section, is expected to review
this list and determine whether they have credible evidence of
human rights abuses. To date, no training events have been
canceled because of allegations of human rights abuses.

Indonesia Embassy officials stated that human rights have always
been an embassy priority and are a major component of the U. S.
and Indonesian policy

dialogue. Moreover, in 1995, the embassy established a human
rights committee. The embassy said it has tried and will continue
to try to ensure that the United States does not train with human
rights violators and that it incorporates a greater respect for
human rights as a major U. S. policy objective in Indonesia. The
Secretary of Defense canceled all JCETs in Indonesia in April 1998
in response to information gathered at that time that the
Indonesian military was involved in human rights violations.
According to U. S. embassy

officials, before that time, they did not have any credible
evidence that host nation JCET participants were involved in human
rights abuses. Under the prior Indonesian administration, public
criticism of military activities was not tolerated. Because little
information was available on the conduct of military members, the
embassy applied a blanket policy not to train with Indonesian
troops stationed in locations where abuses allegedly occurred.

Nevertheless, embassy staff said that they still face constraints
in obtaining credible evidence of abuse. The embassy does not
support reinitiating JCETs until Indonesia has made greater
progress in democratic reforms to include successful free
elections, inauguration of the elected officials, and reforms
within the military, including a reduction in its responsibility
for internal security. Embassy officials said that if JCETs were
to resume, the screening of participants for human rights abuses
would be the same as the screening of Indonesian participants in
other military- to- military activities. The human rights
screening process is managed by the embassy human rights
committee. This committee is made up of the Ambassador, the Deputy
Chief of

Mission, and heads of major U. S. agencies in the embassy and
State Department sections such as the political section. To
initiate the investigation, the embassy requires candidates for
training to provide complete biographic data to include
assignments, dates and places of assignments, and positions held.
The military group and human rights committee determine whether
any of the candidates served in units when

the unit allegedly committed human rights violations. Internal
embassy records are also reviewed for any derogatory information.
Throughout each step, members of the committee may decide whether
further investigation is required. For example, staff may conduct
further checks with local human rights organizations or other
embassies. If the candidate was not a member of an offending unit
and no other derogatory information was obtained, the candidate is
approved for training.

The Philippines According to embassy officials, the Philippine
military has a generally positive human rights record. Because of
resource and time constraints,

the embassy screens parent units as a whole and only the unit
commander as an individual before JCETs can proceed.

The embassy's Labor Attach manages the screening process.
Initially, the embassy checks with the Filipino Human Rights
Commission to determine whether it has any credible allegations of
human rights abuses against the unit commander. If there are no
allegations against the commander, the embassy assumes that the
rest of the unit shares the commander's professionalism and
respect for the rights of others, and the screening process does
not continue. If allegations against the commander surface, the
embassy checks further with private human rights groups. To date,
the embassy has uncovered credible evidence of gross human

rights abuses committed by eight Filipino special forces officers,
which makes them and any members of their units on the dates of
the human rights violations ineligible for training with U. S.
SOF. The embassy does not believe it is possible to vet every
individual participating in a JCET because the Filipino military
does not determine who will actually participate in the training
until just before the event. Moreover, even if these names were
available, there is not an extensive database within any

of the human rights organizations to conduct a search on all
prospective participants. Officials are unsure, however, whether
this process meets State Department headquarters requirements and
are awaiting further guidance.

Thailand According to the State Department, Thailand is an
important U. S. military and economic partner in Asia and has an
open and democratic society that does not have a systemic problem
with human rights in the military. Embassy officials suspect that
some low- level human rights problems have

occurred with units operating at Thailand's border with Burma. DOD
avoids dealing with these units in general because of this
suspicion. Given this environment, embassy officials determined
that it was most appropriate to vet only the leadership of the
parent unit of the potential JCET participants by checking embassy
sources for any derogatory information. At the beginning of the
fiscal year, the military group provides the embassy

political section a list of the leaders of the Thai units that
plan to participate in JCETs. The political section reviews its
internal sources, which include

human rights data from different sections within the embassy. The
embassy stated it does not seek outside sources of information
because it does not have the staff or the time to do so. Moreover,
embassy officials noted that the embassy uses the same procedures
to screen for JCET activities as it does for other military- to-
military activities and to prepare its annual country report on
human rights practices. According to embassy staff, at the time of
our review the embassy had vetted personnel scheduled for one JCET
and had not found any human rights allegations.

Nevertheless, embassy staff stated that they needed further
guidance from State headquarters and have requested it in two
separate cables. Embassy officials noted that they wanted to
develop a human rights committee and reorganize their human rights
section to best meet the needs of the vetting and annual human
rights report requirements but wanted assurances that their
approach met the law's intent. They said they needed further
guidance defining what is meant by a unit and how far back to look
at a unit's history. Conclusions In the six countries we visited,
U. S. State Department and DOD personnel have taken steps to
implement the legislation restricting training with

persons believed to have committed human rights abuses. Each
embassy has adopted policy and procedures that it believes address
U. S. goals and take into consideration its resource and
information constraints. Nevertheless, we found concern in the
field regarding what the legislation requires and how it should be
implemented. Given such concern, State and DOD personnel overseas
clearly would benefit from more explicit instructions on the
appropriate implementation of the law and guidance on

whether the policy and procedures each embassy has adopted are
acceptable to State and DOD officials in Washington. Such guidance
would provide greater assurances not only to each embassy but also
to the Congress that JCET activities are consistent with the law
relating to human rights policies.

Recommendations To clarify the implementation of legislative
requirements for human rights screening for all DOD- funded
training programs with foreign security forces and to address the
concern of overseas State Department officials that they lack
complete policy guidance from headquarters, we recommend that the
Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of
Defense, clarify (1) whether every individual in a unit needs to
be screened

or whether screening the collective human rights record of a unit
is sufficient, (2) what DOD- funded activities require human
rights screening, (3) how far back in time embassies must screen
for human rights abuses, and (4) the extent to which embassies
must screen for human rights violations in countries with no
history of such abuse.

Agency Comments and DOD and State provided written comments on a
draft of our report (see

Our Evaluation apps. I and II). DOD concurred with our
recommendation. The

Department of State, however, disagreed, believing that its
previously issued guidance sufficiently addresses the concerns
raised in this report. In regard to the specific points in our
recommendation, State responded that vetting every individual in a
unit would be warranted if information received merited a further
review of the unit in question and that it is continuing to work
with embassies to clarify implementation of new guidelines and
address procedural questions, such as time period and extent of
screening for human rights violations, as they arise.

As we stated throughout this chapter, we do not believe that
State's policy guidance provides sufficient direction to embassies
on how to implement this legislation, and State has not provided
any additional information to change our opinion. State has not
resolved which types of U. S. military

training activities overseas require human rights screening before
they proceed, how far back in time the embassy must go in
investigating these abuses, and the extent to which countries must
screen for human rights abuses in countries with no history of
such abuse. The State Department

intends to decide these issues on a case- by- case basis. Such
flexibility does not negate the need to provide embassies with a
framework and specific policy guidance on State's implementation
of the legislation. We continue to believe that current
ambiguities in the guidance cause implementation problems for
embassy personnel. Moreover, the absence of a uniform

policy inhibits the ability of the Congress to conduct oversight
of JCET activities relating to human rights policy. We, therefore,
continue to believe that our recommendation has merit.

Appendi I x Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 10 and 40. Now on pp. 10 and 40.

Now on pp. 10 and 40. Now on pp. 11 and 62- 63.

Appendi I I x Comments From the Department of State

Appendi I I I x GAO Staff Acknowledgments Acknowledgments Carol
Schuster, Colin Chambers, Herbert Dunn, Beverly Schladt, and Joan
Slowitsky made key contributions to this report.

GAO United States General Accounting Office

GAO/NSIAD-99-173

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training United States General
Accounting Office

Washington, D. C. 20548

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Contents

Contents Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

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Chapter 1

Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 2

Chapter 2 JCETs Have Been Used Primarily to Train U. S. Forces,
but Reporting on These Activities Has Been Inaccurate

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Chapter 2 JCETs Have Been Used Primarily to Train U. S. Forces,
but Reporting on These Activities Has Been Inaccurate

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

Chapter 2 JCETs Have Been Used Primarily to Train U. S. Forces,
but Reporting on These Activities Has Been Inaccurate

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

Chapter 2 JCETs Have Been Used Primarily to Train U. S. Forces,
but Reporting on These Activities Has Been Inaccurate

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

Chapter 2 JCETs Have Been Used Primarily to Train U. S. Forces,
but Reporting on These Activities Has Been Inaccurate

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

Chapter 2 JCETs Have Been Used Primarily to Train U. S. Forces,
but Reporting on These Activities Has Been Inaccurate

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

Chapter 2 JCETs Have Been Used Primarily to Train U. S. Forces,
but Reporting on These Activities Has Been Inaccurate

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

Chapter 2 JCETs Have Been Used Primarily to Train U. S. Forces,
but Reporting on These Activities Has Been Inaccurate

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

Chapter 2 JCETs Have Been Used Primarily to Train U. S. Forces,
but Reporting on These Activities Has Been Inaccurate

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

Chapter 2 JCETs Have Been Used Primarily to Train U. S. Forces,
but Reporting on These Activities Has Been Inaccurate

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Chapter 2 JCETs Have Been Used Primarily to Train U. S. Forces,
but Reporting on These Activities Has Been Inaccurate

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Chapter 2 JCETs Have Been Used Primarily to Train U. S. Forces,
but Reporting on These Activities Has Been Inaccurate

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