Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments
of Chemical and Biological Attacks (Letter Report, 09/07/1999,
GAO/NSIAD-99-163).

Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the scientific and
practical aspects of a terrorist carrying out large-scale chemical or
biological attacks on U.S. soil, focusing on the: (1) technical ease or
difficulty for terrorists to acquire, process, improvise, and
disseminate certain chemical and biological agents; and (2) extent to
which the U.S. government has assessed the threats and risks posed by
chemical and biological terrorism in the United States to serve as a
basis for planned investments.

GAO noted that: (1) chemical and biological experts and intelligence
agency officials believe that the ease or difficulty for terrorists to
cause mass casualties with an improvised chemical or biological weapon
or device depends on the chemical or biological agent selected; (2)
specialized knowledge would be needed to acquire the right biological
agent or precursor chemicals, process the chemical or biological agent,
improvise a weapon or device, and effectively disseminate the agent to
cause mass casualities; (3) some virulent biological agents and
precursor chemicals are difficult to obtain, and others are difficult to
process or produce, especially in the quantities needed to cause mass
casualities; (4) in addition, effective dissemination of chemical and
biological agents can be disrupted by environmental and meteorological
factors; (5) terrorists with less sophistication could make a chemical
or biological weapon and disseminate agents, but these would be less
likely to cause mass casualities; (6) preventive measures and medical
treatments are available for some, but not all chemical and biological
agents that might be used by terrorists; (7) the intelligence community
has recently produced National Intelligence Estimates and other
high-level analyses of the foreign-origin terrorist threat that include
judgments about the more likely chemical and biological agents that
would be used; (8) unlike the foreign-origin terrorist threat, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) analysts' judgments concerning
the more likely chemical and biological agents to be used by
domestic-origin terrorists have not been captured in a formal,
authoritative, written assessment; (9) moreover, a national-level risk
assessment of potential chemical and biological terrorist incidents also
has not been performed; (10) soundly performed risk assessments could
help ensure that specific programs and related expenditures are
justified and targeted according to the threat and risk of validated
terrorist attack scenarios generated and assessed by a multidisciplinary
team of experts; and (11) in the case of the Department of Health and
Human Services national stockpile initiative, without valid threat and
risk assessments, GAO questions whether stockpiling for the items and
quantities discussed in the Department's plan is the best approach for
investing in medical preparedness.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-99-163
     TITLE:  Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and
	     Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks
      DATE:  09/07/1999
   SUBJECT:  Chemical warfare
	     Biological warfare
	     Strategic planning
	     Crime prevention
	     Terrorism
	     Emergency preparedness
	     Domestic intelligence

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GAO/NSIAD-99-163

NS99163
A
Report to Congressional Requesters
September 1999 COMBATING TERRORISM
Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks
National Security and International Affairs Division
B- 282772 Letter September 14, 1999 The Honorable Arlen Specter Chairman The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV Ranking Minority Member Committee on Veterans' Affairs United States Senate
The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives
The Honorable Christopher Shays Chairman Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans' Affairs, and International Relations Committee on Government Reform House of Representatives
As you know, many conflicting statements have been made in public testimony before Congress and in the press concerning the ease or difficulty with which terrorists could effectively disseminate a chemical or biological agent on U. S. soil and cause mass casualties. Nevertheless,
numerous federal agencies are spending billions of dollars to prepare for the possibility of a terrorist attack with chemical or biological weapons. The President's fiscal year 2000 budget proposes $10 billion 1 for counterterrorism programs an increase of more than $3 billion over the requested funding of $6. 7 billion for fiscal year 1999. Some agencies have experienced rapid increases in funding for programs and activities to
combat terrorism in recent years. For example, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) increased its spending from $7 million in fiscal year 1996 to about $160 million in fiscal year 1999 and has requested
$230 million for fiscal year 2000 for its bioterrorism initiative. As part of the same initiative, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), an 1 Of the $10 billion, $8.6 billion is for combating terrorism, including defending against weapons of mass destruction, and $1. 4 billion is for critical infrastructure protection.
operating division within DHHS, will continue to develop the national pharmaceutical stockpile to prepare for terrorist incidents involving chemical or biological agents. In view of the conflicting information and the substantial investments being
made to counter an uncertain threat, you asked us to review the scientific and practical aspects of a terrorist carrying out large- scale chemical or biological attacks on U. S. soil. Specifically, we examined the technical ease or difficulty for terrorists to acquire, process, improvise, and disseminate certain chemical and biological agents that might cause at least 1,000 casualties (physical injuries or deaths) the number DHHS uses for planning purposes without the assistance of a state- sponsored program.
You also asked us to determine the extent to which the U. S. government has assessed the threats and risks posed by chemical and biological terrorism in the United States to serve as a basis for planned investments. As agreed with your offices, for the purposes of our work, we defined
terrorists as non- state actors not provided with a state- developed weapon. The terrorists could be of foreign or domestic origin and would be operating illegally and outside a state- run laboratory infrastructure or weapon program. As also agreed, we will later report on the mechanisms in place to track medical inventories and the adequacy of medical inventory tracking systems.
Results in Brief Chemical and biological experts and intelligence agency officials believe that the ease or difficulty for terrorists to cause mass casualties with an improvised chemical or biological weapon 2 or device depends on the
chemical or biological agent selected. Experts from the scientific, intelligence, and law enforcement communities told us that terrorists do not need sophisticated knowledge or dissemination methods to use toxic
industrial chemicals such as chlorine. In contrast, terrorists would need a relatively high degree of sophistication to successfully cause mass casualties with some other chemical and most biological agents. Specialized knowledge would be needed to acquire the right biological agent or precursor chemicals, 3 process the chemical or biological agent,
2 A few biological agents (e. g., plague and smallpox) are communicable and can be spread beyond those directly affected by the weapon or dissemination device. Every biological agent, even one that is highly communicable, must be disseminated by some means that infects enough individuals to initiate a disease epidemic. 3 Precursor chemicals are materials from which chemical agents are synthesized.
improvise a weapon or device, and effectively disseminate the agent to cause mass casualties. Throughout the different stages of the process, terrorists would run the risk of hurting themselves and of being detected and would have to overcome technical and operational challenges. Some virulent biological agents and precursor chemicals are difficult to obtain, and others are difficult to process or produce, especially in the quantities needed to cause mass casualties. In addition, effective dissemination of chemical and biological agents can be disrupted by environmental and
meteorological factors. Terrorists with less sophistication could make a chemical or biological weapon and disseminate agents, but these would be less likely to cause mass casualties. Preventive measures and medical treatments are available for some, but not all chemical and biological
agents that might be used by terrorists. The intelligence community has recently produced National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) and other high- level analyses of the foreign- origin terrorist threat that include judgments about the more likely chemical and biological agents that would be used. Unlike the foreign- origin terrorist threat, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) analysts' judgments concerning the more likely chemical and biological agents to be used by domestic- origin terrorists have not been captured in a formal, authoritative, written
assessment. A formal assessment of the domestic- origin threats, combined with existing assessments of the foreign- origin threat, would provide an authoritative, written, comprehensive, intelligence community view on specific chemical and biological terrorist threats. Moreover, a national- level risk assessment of potential chemical and biological terrorist incidents also
has not been performed. A risk assessment is a decision- making support tool that is used to establish requirements and prioritize program investments. Soundly performed risk assessments could help ensure that specific programs and related expenditures are justified and targeted
according to the threat and risk of validated terrorist attack scenarios generated and assessed by a multidisciplinary team of experts. To perform a sound risk assessment, a multidisciplinary team of experts would use valid, current, documented threat information, including NIEs, to develop valid threat scenarios, rank the likelihood of a successful attack, and assure that program countermeasures are not based solely on worst- case scenarios. We have previously reported that federal programs to combat terrorism, such as DHHS' national pharmaceutical and vaccine stockpile, are being initiated without the benefit of a sound threat and risk assessment process that helps prioritize and focus investments on appropriate
countermeasures and programs. 4 In the case of the DHHS national stockpile initiative, without valid threat and risk assessments, we question whether stockpiling for the items and quantities discussed in the Department's plan is the best approach for investing in medical preparedness. We are recommending that the Attorney General direct the FBI Director to produce an authoritative threat assessment of the more likely chemical and biological agents that would be used by domestic- origin terrorists working outside a state- run laboratory infrastructure. In addition, we are recommending that the Attorney General direct the FBI Director to sponsor a national- level risk assessment using NIEs and other inputs to
help guide and prioritize appropriate countermeasures and programs designed to combat chemical and biological terrorism.
Background The 1995 attack by Aum Shinrikyo, an apocalyptic religious sect, in the Tokyo subway using the chemical nerve agent sarin elevated concerns
about chemical and biological terrorism. Twelve people were killed and many more were injured as a result of that incident. Some experts have noted that despite substantial financial assets, well- equipped laboratories,
and educated scientists working in the laboratories, Aum Shinrikyo did not cause more deaths because of the poor quality of the chemical agent and the dissemination technique used. Although not as widely publicized, a limited number of incidents involving biological agents have also occurred in the United States. For example, in 1984, the Rajneeshee religious cult in Oregon contaminated salad bars in local restaurants with salmonella bacteria to prevent people from voting in a local election. Although no one
died, 751 people were diagnosed with the food- borne illness. These events and concerns about other threats prompted Congress to establish a commission to assess the federal government's organization concerning weapons of mass destruction proliferation and to make
4 Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism (GAO/ T- NSIAD/ GGD- 99- 107, Mar. 11, 1999); Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments (

GAO/NSIAD-98-74
, Apr. 9, 1998); and Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public Health Initiatives (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 99- 112, Mar. 16, 1999).
recommendations for improvements. 5 In July 1999, the commission concluded that the United States is not effectively organized to combat the threat of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation. The commission believes that an effective capability to respond to the use of these weapons by state or subnational groups, whether at home or abroad, is critical not only in the event of an attack, but also as a deterrent. This panel recommended that the President name a national director for
combating proliferation who could coordinate the response of government agencies. While intelligence agencies continuously assess and report on various threats, an NIE analyzes issues of major importance and long- term interest to the United States and is the intelligence community's most authoritative projection of future developments in a particular subject area. 6 An NIE is intended to help decisionmakers think through critical issues by presenting the relevant key facts, judgments about the likely course of events in
foreign countries, and the implications for the United States. Examples of critical issues are threats from foreign terrorism and foreign missiles. NIEs are generally focused on foreign- origin threats. The National Intelligence Council (NIC), an organization composed of 12 National Intelligence Officers-- including one from the FBI-- who report directly to the Director of Central Intelligence, produces NIEs. To prepare an NIE, the NIC brings together analysts from all the intelligence agencies that have expertise on
the issue under review. 7 In the final analysis, an NIE is the Director of Central Intelligence's assessment, with which the heads of the U. S. intelligence agencies concur, except as noted in the NIE's text. Other high- level intelligence community products include Intelligence Community Assessments.
Intelligence and law enforcement threat information is a key input into a risk assessment process. Risk assessments are widely recognized as valid
5 The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (P. L. 104- 293) created the commission. The Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (P. L. 105- 277) extended the commission's reporting deadline to July 18, 1999. John Deutch, former Director of Central Intelligence, was the commission's chairman. Senator Arlen Specter served as vice chairman.
6 Foreign Missile Threats: Analytic Soundness of Certain National Intelligence Estimates (GAO/ NSIAD- 96- 225, Aug. 30, 1996). 7 The following organizations may participate in preparing an NIE: NIC, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, FBI, intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Treasury and Energy, and military services.
decision support tools to establish and prioritize program investments and are grounded in risk management, an approach to dealing with security issues. Risk management is the deliberate process of understanding risk
the likelihood that a threat will harm an asset or individuals with some severity of consequences and deciding on and implementing actions to reduce it. A threat analysis-- the first step in determining risk-- identifies and evaluates each threat on the basis of various factors such as its capability and intent to attack an asset and the likelihood and the severity of the consequences of a successful attack. Valid, current, and documented threat information, including NIEs, in a risk assessment process is crucial to ensuring that countermeasures or programs are not based solely on
worst- case scenarios and are therefore out of balance with the threat. Risk management principles acknowledge that (1) while risk generally cannot be eliminated, it can be reduced by enhancing protection from validated and credible threats and (2) although many threats are possible, some are more likely to be carried out than others. Risk assessments form a deliberate, analytical approach that results in a prioritized list of risks (i. e., threat- asset- vulnerability combinations) that can be used to select countermeasures to create a certain level of protection or preparedness.
Because threats are dynamic and countermeasures may become outdated, it is generally sound practice to periodically reassess threat and risk. To perform a realistic risk assessment of terrorist threats, a multidisciplinary
team of experts would require several inputs, including written foreign and domestic threat analyses from the intelligence community and law enforcement.
Chemical and biological agents pose different sets of problems for emergency planning and preparedness. For example, most chemicals quickly affect individuals directly exposed to the agent within a given geographical area. In contrast, the release of a biological agent may not be
known for several days, and both perpetrators and victims may be miles away from the point of release when an incident is identified. Also, some biological agents produce symptoms that can be easily confused with influenza or other less virulent illnesses. If communicable, the biological agent can spread throughout the population.
Many federally funded programs and initiatives have been established to better prepare for dealing with a possible large- scale chemical or biological terrorist incident, but no federal agency has defined what constitutes mass casualties. The Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Justice, and DHHS (including CDC) do not have a working definition of what constitutes mass casualties. The
metropolitan medical response systems that DHHS is establishing across the nation use 1, 000 casualties as a basis for planning local medical systems and for equipping and supplying the response teams. 8 DHHS acknowledges that this number is arbitrary but believes it is reasonable for planning purposes. Other federal agency representatives stated that whatever number overwhelms the local medical system could be considered mass
casualties. Terrorists operating outside a state- run laboratory infrastructure would have to improvise a weapon or device and effectively disseminate an agent through a delivery system. There are different stages in the process of improvising a chemical or biological weapon to cause mass casualties. Figure 1 shows the stages required for such an undertaking.
8 Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 3, Nov. 12, 1998) and Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn- Lugar- Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program (GAO- T- NSIAD- 99- 16, Oct. 2, 1998).
Figure 1: Stages for Terrorists Working Outside a State- run Laboratory to Conduct Chemical and Biological Terrorism
Acquire Acquire precursor precursor chemicals chemicals or or virulent virulent biological biological seed seed cultures
cultures Synthesize Synthesize chemical chemical agents
agents from from precursors precursors or or grow
grow biological biological agents agents in in culture
culture (unnecessary (unnecessary chemicals)
for for toxic toxic industrial industrial chemicals) Process Process the the chemical chemical or or biological biological agents agents into into a
a form form which which can can be be effectively effectively disseminated
disseminated (unnecessary (unnecessary for for some some chemical chemical agents)
agents) Improvise Improvise an an agent agent delivery delivery device
device Disseminate Disseminate chemical chemical or or biological biological agents agents to to effectively effectively to to cause cause mass
mass casualties
casualties Source: GAO, on the basis of analysis and discussion with chemical and biological warfare experts.
Scope and To perform our review, we obtained lists of potential chemical and Methodology
biological agents that might be used by terrorists from intelligence agencies, military medical health experts, the FBI, and documents provided by government officials. We discussed in detail the characteristics of these agents with numerous experts in the disciplines of science, medicine, law
enforcement, intelligence, and chemical and biological warfare. We spoke with and obtained documentation from officials at the U. S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases in Frederick, Maryland; the CDC in Atlanta, Georgia; the DHHS Office of Emergency Preparedness in Rockville, Maryland; the Department of Veterans' Affairs in Washington, D. C.; the Soldier and Biological Chemical Command and its Technical Escort Unit in Edgewood, Maryland; and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency in Dulles, Virginia. We discussed the production, weaponization,
and dissemination of chemical and biological agents with experts formerly with U. S. and foreign biological warfare programs and with several medical and scientific experts in academia. We analyzed manuals, handbooks, and
texts on infectious diseases and biological and chemical casualties. We gathered and reviewed materials, studies, and reports on chemical and biological terrorism and attended conferences on the topic. To develop the report's appendixes on selected chemical and biological agents, we analyzed and summarized information obtained from different sources. Specifically, for chemical agents, we reviewed Army Field Manual 3- 9, Potential Military Chemical/ Biological Agents and Compounds, as well as other information that we supplemented with discussions with the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency and CDC. The primary source of our appendix on selected biological agents was the Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook (July 1998) by the U. S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases. Also, we discussed the characteristics of each biological agent with infectious disease experts, including those from the U. S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases and CDC. Renowned academicians from Stanford University, Johns Hopkins University, the Rockefeller University, the
Monterey Institute of International Studies, and RAND Corporation provided information from the disciplines of physics, meteorology, virology, biology, microbiology, and terrorism all of which are technical
and operational aspects of chemical and biological terrorism. Biological warfare experts formerly with offensive programs of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the former Soviet Union gave us detailed information on the acquisition, growth, production, and dissemination of biological agents. We also discussed biological and chemical agents and obtained
documentation from chemical and biological defense experts and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. We reviewed classified documents and reports from the intelligence community and unclassified handbooks, manuals, textbooks, reports, and other open- source materials. Chemical and biological experts reviewed portions of the draft report and provided comments. In addition, technical experts from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict
reviewed the draft appendixes and offered comments as appropriate. As agreed with your offices, we limited our review to terrorist chemical or biological attacks that could be carried out by individuals or groups without access to state- run laboratories or weapon programs and that would not receive chemical or biological agents or weapons from such countries. We assumed that potential terrorists would have to acquire a biological agent or precursor chemicals, produce the agent, weaponize the agent, and deliver it. We limited our evaluation to agents that could cause mass casualties using the DHHS planning guidance of 1,000 casualties. We
focused on methods that cause mass casualties among humans by means of improvised weapons or devices and not through contamination of water, food supply, agriculture, or livestock. Officials from individual intelligence agencies briefed us and provided access to analyses on specific chemical and biological agents and on the threat of chemical and biological terrorism in general. In addition, we reviewed pertinent NIEs and Intelligence Community Assessments. We also reviewed other intelligence analyses related to terrorism. FBI officials provided their assessment of the domestic- origin terrorist threat and
information on past cases of terrorism, including data on terrorist incidents in the United States from 1987 through 1998. We interviewed and obtained documentation from DHHS and CDC officials about the proposed national stockpile of pharmaceuticals and vaccines, including the methodology used in developing an operating plan to establish a stockpile and continuing efforts to further develop the stockpile. Information on the threat and risk assessment process was
developed in our previous work on combating terrorism. Ease or Difficulty
Chemical and biological experts and the intelligence agencies believe that the ease or difficulty with which terrorists could cause mass casualties Depends on Chemical with an improvised chemical or biological weapon 9 or device depends on or Biological Agent
the chemical or biological agent selected. Experts from the scientific, Selected
intelligence, and law enforcement community told us that terrorists do not need sophisticated knowledge or dissemination methods to use toxic industrial chemicals. In contrast, these experts believe that terrorists face serious technical and operational challenges at different stages of the process (described in fig. 1) to cause mass casualties when working with other chemical or any biological agents in the scope of our review.
According to these experts, to cause mass casualties with many chemical and all biological agents in our review, terrorists would have to handle the risk of hurting themselves and of being detected, overcome acquisition and production difficulties, and effectively disseminate a chemical or biological 9 A few biological agents (e. g., plague and smallpox) are communicable and can be spread beyond those directly affected by the weapon or dissemination device. Every biological agent, even those that are
highly communicable, must be disseminated by some means that infects enough individuals to initiate a disease epidemic.
agent. In addition, these experts believe that capability, access, and specialized knowledge that are not readily available are needed when weaponizing or disseminating certain chemical agents and nearly all biological agents. Further, obtaining access to the proper strains of biological agents is a difficult hurdle to overcome. Chemical experts believe that many variables may deter terrorists from using chemical agents (other than toxic industrial chemicals). For example, precursor chemicals necessary for the production of some chemical agents are
controlled by the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention that has been in force since April 1997. According to chemical experts, illegal acquisition of precursor chemicals would raise suspicions and attention due to the provisions of the convention. Moreover, the Special Assistant to the
Director of Central Intelligence for Nonproliferation recently testified that the preparation and effective use of BW [biological weapons] by both potentially hostile states and by non- state actors, including terrorists, is harder than some popular literature seems to suggest. 10 Individuals with expertise in the disciplines of chemistry, biology, virology, microbiology, physics, meteorology, and former chemical and biological warfare programs described the more salient technical and operational
challenges of working with chemical and biological agents. We discuss these challenges in more detail in the following chemical and biological sections. Specifically,  the right precursor chemicals and biological agents or strains are very
difficult to obtain, and some chemical and many biological agents are difficult to produce, especially in sufficient quantities to produce mass casualties;
 except if using toxic industrial chemicals, terrorists would need a relatively high degree of sophistication to successfully and effectively process agents, improvise a device or weapon, and disseminate the
agents to cause mass casualties;  a crude weapon can be made with less sophistication, but it would be
less likely to cause mass casualties;  environmental (e. g., pollution) and meteorological conditions (e. g., sun,
rain, mist, and wind) might disrupt the effective dissemination of chemical and biological agents; and
10 Unclassified statement on the worldwide biological warfare threat to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, March 3, 1999.
 location of the weapon or device (interior or exterior) can play a critical role in its effectiveness. Ease and Difficulty of Using
Experts from the scientific, intelligence, and law enforcement communities Chemical Agents we spoke with agreed that toxic industrial chemicals can cause mass casualties and require little if any expertise or sophisticated methods.
Generally, toxic industrial chemicals can be bought on the commercial market or stolen, thus avoiding the need to manufacture them. Chlorine, phosgene, and hydrogen cyanide are examples of toxic industrial chemicals. DOD classified further details concerning the use of toxic industrial chemicals. Experts believe that unlike toxic industrial chemicals, for various reasons,
most G and V chemical nerve agents are technically challenging for terrorists to acquire, manufacture, and produce. Examples of the G- series nerve agents are tabun (GA), sarin (GB), and soman (GD). VX is an
example of a V- series nerve agent. According to chemical experts, developing nerve agents requires synthesis of multiple precursor chemicals. On the basis of our review of a technical report, 11 we concluded that some steps in the production process are difficult and hazardous. Although tabun production is relatively easy, containment of a highly toxic gas (hydrogen cyanide) is a technical challenge. Production of sarin, soman, and VX requires the use of high temperatures and generates corrosive and dangerous by- products. Moreover, careful temperature
control, cooling of the vessel, heating to complete chemical reactions, and distillation could be technically infeasible for terrorists without a sophisticated laboratory infrastructure. Blister chemical agents such as sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and lewisite can be manufactured with ease or with only moderate difficulty. However, experts told us that buying large quantities of the precursor chemicals for these agents is difficult due
to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Appendix I describes some chemical agents' key characteristics that we developed on the basis of technical data and reviews with experts. DOD classified additional details for appendix I. Chemical experts believe that chemical agents need to be in vapor or aerosol form (a cloud of suspended microscopic droplets) 12 to cause 11 Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, U. S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (Dec. 1993). 12 Fog and smoke are examples of visible aerosols.
optimal inhalation exposure to cause an effect. Vapors and aerosols remain suspended in the air and are readily inhaled deep into the lungs. Another method is to spray large droplets or liquid for skin penetration. A chemical agent could be disseminated by explosive or mechanical delivery. Further, chemical agents can be disseminated in vapor, aerosol, or bulk droplet form from delivery devices. According to the experts, terrorists could disseminate chemical agents using simple containers such as glass bottles with commercial sprayers attached to them or fire extinguishers. However, the chemical agent would need to withstand the heat developed if disseminated by explosives. Moreover, according to chemical experts, the successful use of chemical agents to cause mass casualties requires high toxicity, volatility (tendency
of a chemical to vaporize or give off fumes), and stability during storage and dissemination. Rapid exposure to a highly concentrated agent in an ideal environment would increase the number of casualties. These experts agree that disseminating a chemical agent in a closed environment would be the best way to produce mass casualties. Weather affects exterior dissemination, particularly sunlight, moisture, and wind. Some chemical agents can be easily evaporated by sunlight or diluted by water. The
experts stated that it is also difficult to target an agent with any precision or certainty to kill a specific percentage of individuals outdoors. For example, wind could transport a chemical agent away from the designated target
area. General Difficulties of Using
According to experts in the many fields associated with the technical Biological Agents aspects of dealing with biological agents, including those formerly with state- sponsored offensive biological weapon programs, terrorists working outside a state- run laboratory infrastructure would have to overcome extraordinary technical and operational challenges to effectively and
successfully weaponize and deliver a biological agent to cause mass casualties. Terrorists would require specialized knowledge from a wide range of scientific disciplines to successfully conduct biological terrorism and cause mass casualties. For example, biological agents have varying characteristics. Information and technical data from these experts, intelligence, and authoritative documented sources indicate that some biological agents such as smallpox are difficult to obtain. 13 In the case of
13 Known smallpox culture stocks exist only in the United States at CDC and in Russia.
other biological agents such as anthrax 14 and tularemia (both of which are bacteria), it is difficult to obtain a virulent strain (one that causes disease and injury to humans). Other agents such as plague are difficult to produce. Biological toxins such as ricin require large quantities to cause mass casualties, thereby increasing the risk of arousing suspicion or detection prior to dissemination. Furthermore, some agents such as Q fever incapacitate rather than cause death. Finally, many agents are relatively easy to grow, but are difficult to process into a form for a weapon. Appendix II describes some biological agents' key characteristics we developed from technical documents and reviews with experts. DOD classified additional details for appendix II.
According to experts from former biological warfare programs, to survive and be effective, a virulent biological agent must be grown, handled, and stored properly. This stage requires time and effort for research and development. After cultivation, the agent is wet. Terrorists would need the means to sterilize the growth medium and dispose of hazardous biological wastes. Processing the biological agent into a weaponized form requires even more specialized knowledge. According to a wide range of experts in science, health, intelligence, and biological warfare and the technical
report we reviewed, the most effective way to disseminate a biological agent is by aerosol. This method allows the simultaneous respiratory infection of a large number of people. Microscopic particles that are dispersed must remain airborne for long periods and may be transported by the wind over long distances. The particles are small enough to reach the tiny air sacs of the lungs (alveoli) and bypass the body's natural filtering and defense mechanisms. According to experts, if larger particles are
dispersed, they may fall to the ground, causing no injury, or become trapped in the upper respiratory tract, possibly causing infections but not necessarily death. From an engineering standpoint, it is easier to produce and disseminate the larger particles than the microscopic particles. Other critical technical hurdles include obtaining the proper size equipment to generate proper size aerosols, calculating the correct output rate (speed at which the equipment operates), and having the correct liquid composition.
According to key experts with experience in biological warfare, biological agents can be processed into liquid or dry forms for dissemination. Both 14 Anthrax is the disease caused by the biological agent Bacillus anthracis. Throughout the report we use the related disease term when referring to biological agents. We found that the disease term is used synonymously with the biological agent in discussions with the many experts we interviewed and documentation we reviewed.
forms pose difficult technical challenges for terrorists to effectively cause mass casualties. These experts told us that liquid agents are easy to produce. However, it is difficult to effectively disseminate aerosolized liquid agents with the right particle size without reducing the strength of the mixture. Further, the liquid agent requires larger quantities and dissemination vehicles that can increase the possibility of raising suspicion and detection. In addition, experts told us that in contrast, dry biological agents are more difficult to produce than liquid agents, but dry agents are
easier to disseminate. Dry biological agents could be easily destroyed when processed, rendering the agent ineffective for causing mass casualties. A leading expert told us that the whole process entails risks. For example, powders easily adhere to rubber gloves and pose a handling problem. Effectively disseminating both forms of agent can pose technical challenges in that the proper equipment and energy sources are needed. A
less sophisticated product and dissemination method can produce some illness and/ or deaths. DOD classified further details on technical challenges of effectively processing and disseminating biological agents. According to the experts we spoke with, exterior dissemination of biological agents can be disrupted by environmental (e. g., pollution) and meteorological (e. g., sun, rain, mist, and wind) conditions. Once released, an aerosol cloud gradually decays and dies as a result of exposure to oxygen, pollutants, and ultraviolet rays. If wind is too erratic or strong, the
agent might be dissipated too rapidly or fail to reach the desired area. Interior dissemination of a biological agent through a heating and air conditioning ventilation system could cause casualties. But this method also has risks. Security countermeasures could intercept the perpetrators
or apprehend them after the attack. Successful interior dissemination also requires knowledge of aerodynamics. For example, the air exchange rate in a building could affect the dissemination of a biological agent. Regardless
of whether a liquid or dry agent is used in interior or exterior environments, experts believe that testing should be done to determine if the agent is virulent and disseminates properly. The numerous steps in the process of
developing a biological weapon increase the chances of a terrorist being detected by authorities.
Availability of Pre- and Medical preventive measures and treatments are available for some but not
Post- exposure Medical all chemical and biological agents. Early treatment following exposure to Treatments Varies
chemical agents is critical. The availability of effective medical defenses from or treatments for a chemical or biological agent could be a risk factor and influence terrorists' choice of weapon. The lack of an effective vaccine
or antibiotic/ antiviral treatment for biological agents or of an antidote for chemical agents would pose a potential public health challenge but also pose a significant risk for terrorists as well. In the absence of medical defenses, a chemical or biological agent if effectively acquired, processed, and disseminated could become a more desirable choice because it might result in greater casualties. However, processing, testing, and disseminating the agent could equally endanger terrorists because they, too, would have no effective protection against the agent.
Medical and biological warfare experts agree that anthrax when inhaled is an agent of concern due in large part to the difficulty of diagnosis and treatment once symptoms appear and its very high lethality. 15 We recently testified on DOD's anthrax vaccination program, 16 pointing out that
 the anthrax vaccine is effective for preventing anthrax infections through the skin such as those sometimes contracted by unprotected workers who handle wool and hides and  the vaccine appears to be effective against inhalation anthrax in some
animal species for some, but not all, strains. However, due to the absence of known correlates of immunity, 17 the results of the animal studies cannot be extrapolated with certainty to humans. DOD is in the process of vaccinating military personnel against anthrax. The efficacy of the vaccine for inhalation anthrax in humans has not been proven. 18 According to CDC, supplies of the plague vaccine do not exist in the United
States; however, small supplies of killed plague vaccine may exist in Australia and the United Kingdom. CDC does not consider a vaccine useful to control an outbreak nor protect a population against a terrorist incident.
Further, there are no vaccines for other potential biological agents such as ebola and other hemorrhagic fevers, brucellosis, glanders, or 15 Post- exposure treatment for inhalation anthrax consists of using the vaccine and the antibiotic ciproflaxin, but treatment must begin immediately after exposure and before the influenza- like symptoms appear. Because the symptoms mimic common influenza, proper diagnosis may come too late for effective treatment. 16 Medical Readiness: Safety and Efficacy of the Anthrax Vaccine (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 99- 148, Apr. 29, 1999). 17 Correlates of immunity refer to biological markers that represent immunity against disease. 18 DOD believes it is prudent to vaccinate U. S. military forces against anthrax exposure, even though efficacy for inhalation anthrax has been based on animal testing.
staphylococcal enterotoxin B. Similarly, there are no specific antidotes for a number of chemical agents such as the toxic industrial chemicals chlorine and phosgene. Treatment for exposure to these chemical agents consists largely of decontamination, first aid, and respiratory support. An
antidote kit comprised of amyl or sodium nitrite exists for hydrogen cyanide. Appendixes I and II contain information on medical treatments for chemical and biological agents, respectively. Prevention and treatments are available for a number of other agents. For example, there is an effective vaccine for known strains of smallpox, 19 and there are new investigative vaccines for several other possible biological agents, including botulinum, Q fever, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, and tularemia. Antidotes such as atropine, pralidoxime chloride, and diazepam can be used to counteract the effects of a number of chemical nerve agents. The treatment for some chemical and biological agents includes respiratory
support with a ventilator. The types and quantities of vaccines, pharmaceuticals, and other items that should be available in the event of a chemical or biological attack can be determined through a methodologically sound threat and risk assessment.
U. S. Intelligence To determine the extent to which the foreign- and domestic- origin chemical Assessments of the
and biological terrorist threat in the United States has been assessed, we obtained information from U. S. intelligence agencies. The U. S. intelligence Foreign and Domestic community has issued classified NIEs and Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat in the Assessments that discuss the foreign- origin chemical and biological United States
terrorist threat in some detail. However, the FBI's assessment of the chemical and biological agents that would more likely be used by domestic- origin terrorists working outside a state- run laboratory infrastructure has not been formally reflected in a written threat assessment. Producing assessments of both foreign- and domestic- origin
threats could provide an authoritative, written, comprehensive intelligence community view on specific chemical and biological terrorist threats.
The possibility that terrorists may use chemical or biological materials may increase over the next decade, according to intelligence agencies. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), interest among 19 Vaccination after exposure to weaponized smallpox or a case of smallpox is effective in preventing disease if given within 7 days after exposure. However, it is unclear whether post- exposure treatment with smallpox vaccine would be effective due to the difficulty in diagnosing the disease within 7 days.
non- state actors, including terrorists, in biological and chemical materials is real and growing and the number of potential perpetrators is increasing. The CIA also noted that many such groups have international networks and do not need to be tied to state sponsors for financial and technical support. Nonetheless, the CIA continues to believe that terrorists are less likely to use chemical and biological weapons than conventional explosives. We previously reported that according to intelligence agencies, terrorists are less likely to use chemical and biological weapons than conventional
explosives, at least partly because chemical and biological agents are difficult to weaponize and the results are unpredictable.
Intelligence Analyses of the The intelligence community has analyzed and made judgments about the
More Likely Chemical and more likely foreign- origin chemical and biological terrorist threat agents. Biological Terrorist Threat This information has been produced in a new NIE and Intelligence
Agents Community Assessments. The CIA classified the specific agents identified in intelligence assessments that would more likely be used by foreign- origin terrorists. The CIA also classified the intelligence judgments
about the chances that state actors with successful chemical and/ or biological warfare programs would share their weapons and materials with terrorists or terrorist groups. Unlike the foreign- origin threat, the FBI's analysts' judgments concerning the more likely chemical and biological agents that may be used by domestic- origin terrorists have not been captured in a formal assessment. However, FBI officials shared their analyses of the more likely biological and chemical threat agents on the basis of substances used or threatened in actual cases.
In analyzing domestic- origin threats, FBI officials grouped chemical and biological agents and did not specify individual agents as threats. Although the FBI has not addressed the specific types of chemical or biological weapons that may be used by domestic terrorists in the next 2 to 5 years, FBI officials believe that domestic terrorists would be more likely to use or
threaten to use biological agents than chemical agents. The FBI's observation is based on an increase in reported investigations involving the use of biological materials. In 1997, of the 74 criminal investigations related to weapons of mass destruction, 30 percent (22) were related to the use of biological materials. In 1998, there were 181 criminal investigations related to weapons of mass destruction, and 62 percent (112) were related to the use of biological materials. Most of these investigations involved threats or hoaxes. The FBI estimated that in 1997 and 1998, approximately 60 percent of biological investigations were related to anthrax hoaxes.
The FBI ranks groups of chemical and biological agents on its threat spectrum according to the likelihood that they would be used.  Biological toxins: any toxic substance of natural origin produced by an animal or plant. An example of a toxin is ricin, a poisonous protein
extracted from the castor bean.  Toxic industrial chemicals: chemicals developed or manufactured for
use in industrial operations such as manufacturing solvents, pesticides, and dyes. These chemicals are not primarily manufactured for the purpose of producing human casualties. Chlorine, phosgene, and hydrogen cyanide are industrial chemicals that have also been used as chemical warfare agents.
 Biological pathogens: any organism (usually living) such as a bacteria or virus capable of causing serious disease or death. Anthrax is an example of a bacterial pathogen.  Chemical agents: a chemical substance that is intended for use in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate people. The FBI excludes from consideration riot control agents and smoke and
flame materials. Two examples of chemical agents are sarin (nerve agent) and mustard gas (blister agent).
Risk Assessments Can Risk assessments are widely recognized as valid decision- making support Help Guide Investment
tools to establish and prioritize program requirements. We have previously reported on the need for threat and risk assessments performed by a Decisions for
multidisciplinary team of experts to properly focus programs and Chemical/ Biological
investments for combating terrorism and to establish program requirements. 20 Risk assessments incorporate but go beyond intelligence Preparedness Efforts
threat analyses by using a multidisciplinary team of experts to  generate valid attack scenarios,  assess and rank the risks (likelihood and severity of consequences) of
the attack scenarios, and  decide on actions or programs focused on reducing or otherwise dealing with the risks as assessed.
Risk assessments should include sound inputs and information, such as the best available intelligence and law enforcement information and analyses,
20 Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments (GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 74, Apr. 9, 1998).
including NIEs and Intelligence Community Assessments. Soundly established requirements could help ensure that specific programs and initiatives and related expenditures are justified and targeted, given the threat and risk of validated terrorist attack scenarios. We have testified and reported on several occasions 21 that individual government programs to combat terrorism have not been based on soundly determined
requirements derived from a formal threat and risk assessment process. 22 A national- level assessment has not been performed that addresses the overall threat and risk of terrorism, including terrorist attacks using specific chemical or biological materials. Performing a sound threat and risk assessment at this level could provide a strategic guide to help shape, focus, and prioritize federal efforts to combat terrorism.
Many Counterterrorism Individual agencies request funding for numerous programs and initiatives Efforts Are Not Based on
without the benefit of a threat and risk assessment. For example, under the Risk Assessments Nunn- Lugar- Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program, first responders in 120 cities are being trained and equipped to enhance their capabilities to respond to terrorist chemical attacks, and DHHS is funding medical response teams in 27 cities as well as deployable national teams. The
Department of Justice has sponsored training programs, has funded several centers and training venues related to combating terrorism, and is implementing an equipment grant program. The Army National Guard is establishing 10 of possibly 54 assessment and detection teams. We recently testified about another example in which a threat and risk assessment process would be beneficial. 23 Beginning in fiscal year 1999, DHHS is establishing a national pharmaceutical and vaccine stockpile to prepare medical responses for possible use of chemical or biological weapons by terrorists. We found that several of the items DHHS plans to 21 Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism (GAO/ T- NSIAD/ GGD- 99- 107, Mar. 11, 1999); Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 98- 164, Apr. 23, 1998); and Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide
Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination (GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 39, Dec. 1, 1997). 22 However, several federal government organizations apply some formal threat and risk assessment process in their programs. For example, as required by the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 (P. L. 104- 264), the Federal Aviation Administration and the FBI perform joint threat and vulnerability
assessments on each airport determined to be high risk. The FBI provides threat data (i. e., intelligence and law enforcement information) that the Federal Aviation Administration is using to develop threat assessments specific to the airport or the metropolitan area in which the high- risk airport is located. 23 Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public Health Initiatives (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 99- 112, Mar. 16, 1999).
procure (1) do not match intelligence agencies' judgments, as explained to us, of the more likely chemical and biological agents terrorists might use and (2) seem to be based on worst- possible consequence scenarios generated by an ad hoc interagency group of health and medical representatives. The DHHS decision- making process was not formal, based
on a particular methodology, or documented and did not incorporate the many disciplines of knowledge and expertise or divergent thinking that is warranted to establish sound requirements for such an emerging, complex,
and challenging threat. For example, experts in processing and weaponizing chemical and biological agents, intelligence, terrorism, law enforcement, and other related areas not necessarily associated with program and funding stakeholders would comprise a multidisciplinary
team qualified to (1) generate valid threat scenarios, (2) assess and prioritize scenario risks in terms of likelihood and severity of consequences, and (3) determine appropriate countermeasures or other programmatic responses. 24 As we previously reported, without valid threat and risk assessments, we question whether stockpiling for the items and
quantities discussed in the Department's plan is the best approach for investing in medical preparedness.
Conclusions The ease or difficulty for terrorists to cause mass casualties with an improvised chemical or biological weapon or device depends on the agent selected. Experts agree that toxic industrial chemicals can cause mass casualties and require little if any expertise or sophisticated methods. Most chemical nerve agents, however, are technically challenging for terrorists to acquire, manufacture, and produce. Also, terrorists working outside a state- run laboratory infrastructure would have to overcome extraordinary challenges to effectively and successfully weaponize and deliver a biological agent and cause mass casualties. The intelligence community has issued NIEs and other assessments that discuss foreign- origin chemical
and biological terrorist threats, including judgments about the more likely chemical and biological agents that would be used. However, the FBI has not produced a formal written assessment of its judgments concerning the most likely domestic- origin chemical and biological terrorist threats. Such an assessment would complement existing assessments of the foreign- origin threat and provide a comprehensive view of the threats.
Taken together, these assessments of the foreign- and domestic- origin 24 CDC officials told us that since CDC is responsible for establishing the stockpile, it intends to review the planned items and quantities based on a multidisciplinary assessment.
threats would be important inputs for a risk assessment that could help form the basis for and prioritize programs to combat chemical and biological terrorism. Moreover, a sound national- level risk assessment that could provide a strategic guide to help shape, focus, and prioritize federal efforts to combat terrorism has not been performed. Such an assessment-- which incorporates but goes beyond intelligence threat assessments-- would be conducted by a multidisciplinary team of experts on intelligence, terrorism, chemical and biological agents, weapons, law enforcement, and health and could include other experts not necessarily associated with program and funding stakeholders. This team could use sound inputs, including NIEs, to (1) generate valid threat scenarios, (2) assess and prioritize scenario risks in terms of likelihood and severity of consequences, and (3) determine appropriate countermeasures or other programmatic responses. Without a valid threat and risk assessment, it is questionable whether federal agencies will be able to establish soundly defined program requirements and prioritize and focus the nation's investments to combat terrorism.
Recommendations We recommend that the Attorney General direct the FBI Director to prepare a formal, authoritative intelligence threat assessment that specifically assesses the chemical and biological agents that would more likely be used by domestic- origin terrorists non- state actors working outside a state- run laboratory infrastructure.
We further recommend that the Attorney General direct the FBI Director to sponsor a national- level risk assessment that uses national intelligence estimates and inputs from the intelligence community and others to help
form the basis for and prioritize programs developed to combat terrorism. Because threats are dynamic, the Director should determine when the completed national- level risk assessment should be updated.
Agency Comments and DOD, CIA, the Department of Justice, and DHHS provided official
Our Evaluation comments on a draft of this report. Comments from DOD, CIA, and DHHS
were classified and could not be printed in this report. Comments from the Department of Justice appear in appendix III. All of the agencies provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate.
DOD and CIA commented that recently produced intelligence community products partially responded to the first recommendation in our draft report. Also, Justice commented that the FBI is the appropriate entity to
implement the recommendation. As originally written, our recommendation suggested that the Director of Central Intelligence request an NIE assessing the more likely chemical and biological terrorist threats and incorporate an FBI assessment of domestic- origin terrorist
threats. On the basis of our subsequent review of these intelligence community documents, we believe that these assessments partially satisfy our recommendation. However, the intelligence community assessments do not incorporate a written, authoritative FBI analysis of the more likely chemical and biological threats from domestic- origin terrorists. As a result of our review of recent intelligence assessments and Justice's comments,
we adjusted the recommendation to call for the Attorney General to direct the FBI Director to prepare a formal written assessment of domestic- origin threats. DOD, the CIA, and Justice agreed with the second recommendation in our draft report calling for a national- level risk assessment. However, the CIA suggested that we change the wording so that the Director of Central Intelligence not be the sponsor of such a risk assessment. Justice stated
that the FBI, as the lead agency in domestic terrorist incidents, is the appropriate federal agency for coordinating a threat and risk assessment. Justice also commented that it already had a statutory mandate to develop assessments similar to those we recommend in this report. We are aware that legislation requires the Attorney General, in consultation with the FBI and others, to develop and test methodologies for assessing the threat and
risk of terrorist employment of weapons of mass destruction against cities and other local areas. 25 However, these assessments do not substitute for the broader national- level risk assessment that we are recommending in this report. The former assessments are intended to be city- specific whereas the latter would provide an overarching guide for program investments at the national level. At the time of our review, the FBI was considering methodologies for risk assessments at the city level, and had
not yet actually performed such an assessment. We agree that the FBI could sponsor a national- level threat and risk assessment. Further, the national- level threat and risk assessment process and results should provide a valuable guide for the city- specific threat and
25 Section 1404( a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (P. L. 105- 261).
risk assessments to be facilitated by the FBI. Based on Justice's comments, we have modified our recommendation to suggest that the Attorney General direct the FBI Director to sponsor a national- level threat and risk assessment. Justice otherwise generally concurred with the draft report. DHHS generally agreed with our recommendations but commented that the
assessment that we recommended should include all possible sources of the chemical and/ or biological threats such as state- sponsored terrorists. The scope of our work was to examine aspects of the terrorist threat operating outside a state- run program. Nevertheless, we agree that a risk assessment should consider a wide range of possible chemical and
biological threats. A multidisciplinary team of experts should then assess these possible threats in terms of their likelihood of occurrence and severity of consequences, since funding countermeasures for all possible scenarios is not likely to be affordable. Assessing the risk of these threats through generating validated scenarios would allow agencies to focus their program countermeasures and investments on the more likely scenarios with the more severe consequences. DHHS also commented that we underestimated the threat of a bioterrorist event and relied on data that relates to war- zone activities and conditions and not specifically to urban and metropolitan civilian populations. As our report states, our objective was to assess the technical ease or difficulty of executing a successful, large- scale bioterrorist incident. To satisfy this objective, we obtained information from biological warfare experts who
have in- depth experience and knowledge of processing and effectively disseminating biological agents to cause large numbers of human casualties (whether military or civilian). Also, we obtained information from a wide range of experts, including those in the fields of infectious diseases, virology, and civilian disaster management, and reviewed pertinent intelligence assessments. We believe that the collective expertise of those consulted for our report provided a sound basis for our conclusions about threats to civilian populations. We did not discuss biological warfare between combatants on a battlefield with these experts.
We conducted our work from September 1998 through April 1999 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after the distribution date. At that time we will send copies to
appropriate congressional committees, the federal agencies discussed in this report, and the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to other interested parties upon request.
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me or Carol R. Schuster at (202) 512- 5140. Key contributors to this report are Davi M. D'Agostino, Deborah A. Colantonio, Richard A. McGeary, and Richard H. Yeh.
Norman J. Rabkin Director, National Security Preparedness Issues
Letter 1 Appendix I
28 Characteristics of Selected Chemical
Agents Appendix II
30 Characteristics of Selected Biological Agents
Appendix III 33
Comments From the Department of Justice
Related GAO Products 36 Figure Figure 1: Stages for Terrorists Working Outside a State- run Laboratory to Conduct Chemical and Biological Terrorism 8
Abbreviations
CIA Central Intelligence Agency CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention CWC Chemical Weapons Convention DHHS Department of Health and Human Services DOD Department of Defense FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation IND investigational new drug NIC National Intelligence Council NIE National Intelligence Estimate
Appendi I x Characteristics of Selected Chemical Agents Agent Ease of manufacture Agent
Lethality First aid treatment GAO observations a
and precursor persistence availability
Choking agents Chlorine (CL) Industrial product. No Not persistent Low Move to fresh air. For skin contact,
Likely agent due to precursors required. flush with water. No antidote. availability as a Provide supportive therapy for commercial product. respiratory and cardiovascular functions.
Phosgene Industrial product. No Not persistent Low Move to fresh air. For skin contact,
Likely agent due to its (CG) precursors required. flush with water. availability as a commercial product. Nerve agents Tabun (GA) Not readily available Intermediate High Move to fresh air. For skin contact,
Likely agent due to manufacturing flush with water. Provide atropine or
availability of instructions, but pralidoxime chloride or diazepam precursor chemicals precursors available. injections.
and relative ease of Relatively easy to manufacture. manufacture. Sarin (GB) Moderately difficult to Not persistent High Move to fresh air. For skin contact,
Likely agent due to manufacture. flush with water. Provide atropine or demonstrated use by Precursor chemical pralidoxime chloride or diazepam Aum Shinrikyo, covered by Chemical injections.
although restrictions Weapons Convention on precursors could (CWC).
create difficulties for production.
Soman (GD) Difficult to Intermediate High Move to fresh air. For skin contact, Not likely agent due to manufacture.Precursor
flush with water. Provide atropine or difficulty of chemical covered by pralidoxime chloride or diazepam manufacture and
CWC. injections.
control of precursor chemical.
GF Moderately difficult to Intermediate High Move to fresh air. For skin contact, Not likely agent due to manufacture. flush with water. Provide atropine or
difficulty of Precursor chemical pralidoxime chloride or diazepam manufacture and covered by CWC.
injections. control of precursor
chemical. VX Difficult to High Very high Move to fresh air. For skin contact,
Not likely agent due to manufacture.Precursor flush with water. Provide atropine or
difficulty of chemicals covered by pralidoxime chloride or diazepam manufacture and CWC.
injections. control of precursor chemical.
Blood agents Hydrogen Industrial product. Very low Low to moderate Move to fresh air. Provide
Likely agent due to its cyanide (AC) Precursor chemicals supportive therapy. Provide amyl availability as a covered by CWC. nitrite or sodium nitrite or sodium commercial product. thiosulfate. Precursor availability may be a problem. (continued)
Agent Ease of manufacture Agent
Lethality First aid treatment GAO observations a
and precursor persistence availability
Cyanogen Not easily produced. Low Low to moderate Move to fresh air. Provide
Likely agent, although chloride (CK) Available as supportive therapy. Provide sodium precursor availability commercial product.
nitrite or sodium thiosulfate. may be a problem. Blister agents Sulfur Easy to synthesize.
Intermediate Can produce Flush skin with water and Not likely agent due to mustard (HD) Large quantity buys of to high incapacitation
decontaminate clothing. Provide difficulty in obtaining precursor chemicals
because of oxygen/ intubation, bronchodilators. precursor materials
without detection blistering. Can
and moderate difficult. Precursors also produce production are covered by CWC.
death if inhaled requirements.
or a toxic dose absorbed. Nitrogen Easy to synthesize.
Intermediate Can produce Flush skin with water and Not likely agent due to mustard Large quantity buys of incapacitation
Decontaminate clothing. Provide difficulty in obtaining (HN- 2)
precursor chemicals because of oxygen/ intubation, bronchodilators.
precursor materials without detection
blistering. Can Provide culumine ophthalmic and
and moderate difficult. Precursor
also produce topical antibiotics and dressings. production chemicals covered by death if inhaled
requirements. CWC.
or a toxic dose absorbed. Nitrogen
Easy to synthesize. High Can produce Flush skin with water and Not likely agent due to mustard Large quantity buys of
incapacitation Decontaminate clothing. Provide difficulty in obtaining
(HN- 3) precursor chemicals
because of oxygen/ intubation, bronchodilators. precursor materials
without detection blistering. Can
and moderate difficult but available. also produce production death if inhaled
requirements. or a toxic dose absorbed.
Lewisite (L, Moderately difficult to Intermediate Can produce Flush skin with water and Not likely agent due to HL) manufacture and
to high incapacitation Decontaminate clothing. Provide difficulty in obtaining
moderately difficult to because of British anti- lewisite for systemic precursor materials acquire precursor blistering. Can
effects. and production chemicals. also produce requirements.
death if inhaled or a toxic dose absorbed.
a Our observations are based on a research synthesis of discussions with experts in chemical warfare, science, intelligence, law enforcement, and medicine and of an analysis of manuals, handbooks, textbooks, studies, and reports on chemical agents. Note: The following assumptions are used: 1. Dosage and concentration are maximized for an interior environment. 2. The venue occurs at a high- profile event where a large population has gathered. 3. The terrorists have the technical competence (first- year graduate student in chemistry) and motivation to obtain and implement the dispersion of agents.
4. The interior environment has an accessible heating, ventilation, and air conditioning distribution system.
Appendi I I x Characteristics of Selected Biological Agents l
Agent Ease to acquire Agent stability Lethality Laboratory Vaccine Treatment GAO observations b
and process safety level a Bacterial agents Inhalation
Difficult to obtain Spores are very Very high. Level 3. Yes, primate
Virtually always Possible terrorist anthrax virulent seed stable. Resistant to tested. Some fatal once biological agent, but stock and to sun, heat, and some sources view symptomatic. requires successfully disinfectants.
efficacy for Treatable very sophistication to process and inhalation early with
effectively disseminate. anthrax as antibiotics and
manufacture and questionable. supportive
disseminate to create therapy.
mass casualties. Use could indicate state sponsorship.
Symptoms mimic flu and might not be quickly identified. Very high fatality rate once symptomatic. Not transmissible from person to
person. Plague Very difficult to Can be long- lasting,
Very high. Level 3. No. Very early Possible agent, but acquire seed but heat,
treatment with not likely. Fairly stock and to disinfectants, and
antibiotics can difficult to acquire
successfully sun render be effective, suitable strain and process and
harmless. supportive
difficult to weaponize. disseminate. therapy.
Glanders Difficult to Very stable. Moderate Level 3. No. Antibiotics, but
Potential agent, but acquire seed to high. no large not easy for a stock. therapeutic non- state actor to
Moderately human trials.
acquire, produce, difficult to and successfully process. disseminate. Tularemia Difficult to Generally unstable Moderate Level 3. Investigational Antibiotics very Possible agent but acquire in environment.
untreated, new drug effective in early difficult to stabilize. correct Resists cold but is low (IND).
treatment. Low lethality when
strain. killed by mild heat treated. treated.
Moderately and disinfectants. difficult to process.
Brucellosis Difficult to Very stable. Long Very low. Level 3. No. Antibiotics May not be a highly acquire seed persistence in wet moderately likely agent because stock. soil or food.
effective if given of difficulty in Moderately early when
obtaining virulent difficult to
infected. strain, long
produce. incubation period,
and low lethality. (continued)
Agent Ease to acquire Agent stability Lethality Laboratory Vaccine Treatment GAO observations b
and process safety level a Q Fever Difficult to Stable. Months on Very low if
Level 3. IND. Tested in Self- limited Not a likely agent. (rickettsial
acquire seed wood and in sand. treated. guinea pigs. illness without
Low lethality. organism)
stock. Produces treatment. Moderately adverse
Antibiotics difficult to reactions.
shorten illness. process and weaponize.
Viral agents Hemorrhagic Very difficult Relatively unstable. Depending Level 4. No. Antiviral drug
Unlikely agent due to fevers (e. g.,
to obtain and on strain,
and aggressive difficulty in acquiring Ebola)
process. can be supportivecare. pathogen, safety Unsafe to
very high. Effectiveness of considerations, and handle.
any treatment is relative instability. questionable.
Smallpox Difficult to Very stable. Moderate Level 4. Yes. One potential Very high obtain seed to high. antiviral, but
consequence agent, stock. Only generally no but likelihood of confirmed
effective usage questionable sources in chemotherapy. due to limited access United to the pathogen
States and beyond state actors.
Russia. Difficult to process.
Venezuelan Difficult to Relatively unstable. Low. Level 3. IND. Supportive Possible agent if Equine obtain seed Destroyed by heat
therapy, seed stock can be Encephalitis stock. Easy and disinfectants.
anticonvulsants. acquired, but to process Antimicrobial unstable with low and
therapy lethality. weaponize.
ineffective. Toxins Ricin Readily Stable. Very high. Not available. No, but None (unless
Not a mass casualty available. candidate ingested). agent. Moderately vaccines easy to under
process but development.
requires ton quantities for mass casualties.
Botulinum Widely Stable. Weeks in High Level 3. IND. Tested in
Antitoxin (IND) Difficult to weaponize (Types A- G) available but non- moving water
without primates.
and respiratory and not considered a high toxin and food. respiratory Toxoid vaccine support.
mass casualty agent. producers
Deteriorates in support. against some not readily bright sun.
types (A- E). available or easy to process or weaponize.
Agent Ease to acquire Agent stability Lethality Laboratory Vaccine Treatment GAO observations b
and process safety level a Staphylococcl Difficult to Very stable in dry Low. Not available. No. No effective
Lower likelihood due Enterotoxin B acquire high form. antimicrobial to low lethality, lack of
yielding seed treatment. transmissibility. stock. Ventilatory Moderately support for
difficult to inhalation
process. exposure, fluid management.
a Biosafety level 3 applies to agents that may cause serious or potentially lethal disease as a result of exposure by inhalation. Among the many precautions is a ducted exhaust air ventilation system that creates directional airflow that draws air from clean areas into the laboratory toward contaminated areas. The exhaust air is not recirculated to any other area of the building and is discharged to the outside with filtration and other optional treatment. Passage into the laboratory is through two sets of self- closing doors and a changing room. Showers may be included in the passageway. Biosafety level
4 is required for work with dangerous and exotic agents that pose a high risk of aerosol- transmitted laboratory infections and life- threatening disease. A dedicated non- recirculating air ventilation system is provided. The supply and exhaust components are balanced to ensure directional airflow from the
area of least hazard to the areas of greatest potential hazard. The differential pressure/ directional airflow between adjacent areas is monitored and alarmed. The airflow in the supply and exhaust components is monitored, and the components are interlocked to ensure inward, or zero, airflow. A specially designed suit area requires a one- piece positive pressure suit that is ventilated by a
life- support system. Entry to the area is through an airlock fitted with airtight doors. A chemical shower is provided to decontaminate the surface of the suit before the worker leaves the area. b Our observations are based on a research synthesis of discussions with experts in biological warfare, science, intelligence, law enforcement, and medicine and of an analysis of manuals, handbooks, textbooks, studies, and reports on biological agents.
Appendi I I I x Comments From the Department of Justice
Related GAO Products Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 99- 181, June 9, 1999). Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response Equipment and Sustainment Costs (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 151, June 9, 1999). Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorist Operations (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 135, May 13, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public Health Initiatives (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 99- 112, Mar. 16, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism (GAO/ T- NSIAD/ GGD- 99- 107, Mar. 11, 1999). Combating Terrorism: FBI's Use of Federal Funds for Counterterrorism- Related Activities (FYs 1995- 98) (GAO/ GGD- 99- 7, Nov. 20, 1998). Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 3, Nov. 12, 1998).
Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn- Lugar- Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 99- 16, Oct. 2, 1998). Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 98- 164, Apr. 23, 1998). Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments (GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 74, Apr. 9, 1998). Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination (GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 39, Dec. 1, 1997). Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy (GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 254, Sept. 26, 1997).
Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Changes Needed in the Management Structure of Emergency Preparedness Program (GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 91, June 11, 1997).
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Contents
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Appendix I
Appendix I Characteristics of Selected Chemical Agents
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Appendix II
Appendix II Characteristics of Selected Biological Agents
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Appendix II Characteristics of Selected Biological Agents
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Appendix III
Appendix III Comments From the Department of Justice
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NS99163 A Report to Congressional Requesters September 1999
COMBATING TERRORISM Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk
Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks National Security
and International Affairs Division B-282772 Letter September 14,
1999 The Honorable Arlen Specter Chairman The Honorable John D.
Rockefeller IV Ranking Minority Member Committee on Veterans'
Affairs United States Senate The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of
Representatives The Honorable Christopher Shays Chairman
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans' Affairs, and
International Relations Committee on Government Reform House of
Representatives As you know, many conflicting statements have been
made in public testimony before Congress and in the press
concerning the ease or difficulty with which terrorists could
effectively disseminate a chemical or biological agent on U. S.
soil and cause mass casualties. Nevertheless, numerous federal
agencies are spending billions of dollars to prepare for the
possibility of a terrorist attack with chemical or biological
weapons. The President's fiscal year 2000 budget proposes $10
billion 1 for counterterrorism programs an increase of more than
$3 billion over the requested funding of $6. 7 billion for fiscal
year 1999. Some agencies have experienced rapid increases in
funding for programs and activities to combat terrorism in recent
years. For example, the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) increased its spending from $7 million in fiscal year 1996
to about $160 million in fiscal year 1999 and has requested $230
million for fiscal year 2000 for its bioterrorism initiative. As
part of the same initiative, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), an 1 Of the $10 billion, $8.6 billion is for
combating terrorism, including defending against weapons of mass
destruction, and $1. 4 billion is for critical infrastructure
protection. operating division within DHHS, will continue to
develop the national pharmaceutical stockpile to prepare for
terrorist incidents involving chemical or biological agents. In
view of the conflicting information and the substantial
investments being made to counter an uncertain threat, you asked
us to review the scientific and practical aspects of a terrorist
carrying out large- scale chemical or biological attacks on U. S.
soil. Specifically, we examined the technical ease or difficulty
for terrorists to acquire, process, improvise, and disseminate
certain chemical and biological agents that might cause at least
1,000 casualties (physical injuries or deaths) the number DHHS
uses for planning purposes without the assistance of a state-
sponsored program. You also asked us to determine the extent to
which the U. S. government has assessed the threats and risks
posed by chemical and biological terrorism in the United States to
serve as a basis for planned investments. As agreed with your
offices, for the purposes of our work, we defined terrorists as
non- state actors not provided with a state- developed weapon. The
terrorists could be of foreign or domestic origin and would be
operating illegally and outside a state- run laboratory
infrastructure or weapon program. As also agreed, we will later
report on the mechanisms in place to track medical inventories and
the adequacy of medical inventory tracking systems. Results in
Brief Chemical and biological experts and intelligence agency
officials believe that the ease or difficulty for terrorists to
cause mass casualties with an improvised chemical or biological
weapon 2 or device depends on the chemical or biological agent
selected. Experts from the scientific, intelligence, and law
enforcement communities told us that terrorists do not need
sophisticated knowledge or dissemination methods to use toxic
industrial chemicals such as chlorine. In contrast, terrorists
would need a relatively high degree of sophistication to
successfully cause mass casualties with some other chemical and
most biological agents. Specialized knowledge would be needed to
acquire the right biological agent or precursor chemicals, 3
process the chemical or biological agent, 2 A few biological
agents (e. g., plague and smallpox) are communicable and can be
spread beyond those directly affected by the weapon or
dissemination device. Every biological agent, even one that is
highly communicable, must be disseminated by some means that
infects enough individuals to initiate a disease epidemic. 3
Precursor chemicals are materials from which chemical agents are
synthesized. improvise a weapon or device, and effectively
disseminate the agent to cause mass casualties. Throughout the
different stages of the process, terrorists would run the risk of
hurting themselves and of being detected and would have to
overcome technical and operational challenges. Some virulent
biological agents and precursor chemicals are difficult to obtain,
and others are difficult to process or produce, especially in the
quantities needed to cause mass casualties. In addition, effective
dissemination of chemical and biological agents can be disrupted
by environmental and meteorological factors. Terrorists with less
sophistication could make a chemical or biological weapon and
disseminate agents, but these would be less likely to cause mass
casualties. Preventive measures and medical treatments are
available for some, but not all chemical and biological agents
that might be used by terrorists. The intelligence community has
recently produced National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) and other
high- level analyses of the foreign- origin terrorist threat that
include judgments about the more likely chemical and biological
agents that would be used. Unlike the foreign- origin terrorist
threat, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) analysts'
judgments concerning the more likely chemical and biological
agents to be used by domestic- origin terrorists have not been
captured in a formal, authoritative, written assessment. A formal
assessment of the domestic- origin threats, combined with existing
assessments of the foreign- origin threat, would provide an
authoritative, written, comprehensive, intelligence community view
on specific chemical and biological terrorist threats. Moreover, a
national- level risk assessment of potential chemical and
biological terrorist incidents also has not been performed. A risk
assessment is a decision- making support tool that is used to
establish requirements and prioritize program investments. Soundly
performed risk assessments could help ensure that specific
programs and related expenditures are justified and targeted
according to the threat and risk of validated terrorist attack
scenarios generated and assessed by a multidisciplinary team of
experts. To perform a sound risk assessment, a multidisciplinary
team of experts would use valid, current, documented threat
information, including NIEs, to develop valid threat scenarios,
rank the likelihood of a successful attack, and assure that
program countermeasures are not based solely on worst- case
scenarios. We have previously reported that federal programs to
combat terrorism, such as DHHS' national pharmaceutical and
vaccine stockpile, are being initiated without the benefit of a
sound threat and risk assessment process that helps prioritize and
focus investments on appropriate countermeasures and programs. 4
In the case of the DHHS national stockpile initiative, without
valid threat and risk assessments, we question whether stockpiling
for the items and quantities discussed in the Department's plan is
the best approach for investing in medical preparedness. We are
recommending that the Attorney General direct the FBI Director to
produce an authoritative threat assessment of the more likely
chemical and biological agents that would be used by domestic-
origin terrorists working outside a state- run laboratory
infrastructure. In addition, we are recommending that the Attorney
General direct the FBI Director to sponsor a national- level risk
assessment using NIEs and other inputs to help guide and
prioritize appropriate countermeasures and programs designed to
combat chemical and biological terrorism. Background The 1995
attack by Aum Shinrikyo, an apocalyptic religious sect, in the
Tokyo subway using the chemical nerve agent sarin elevated
concerns about chemical and biological terrorism. Twelve people
were killed and many more were injured as a result of that
incident. Some experts have noted that despite substantial
financial assets, well- equipped laboratories, and educated
scientists working in the laboratories, Aum Shinrikyo did not
cause more deaths because of the poor quality of the chemical
agent and the dissemination technique used. Although not as widely
publicized, a limited number of incidents involving biological
agents have also occurred in the United States. For example, in
1984, the Rajneeshee religious cult in Oregon contaminated salad
bars in local restaurants with salmonella bacteria to prevent
people from voting in a local election. Although no one died, 751
people were diagnosed with the food- borne illness. These events
and concerns about other threats prompted Congress to establish a
commission to assess the federal government's organization
concerning weapons of mass destruction proliferation and to make 4
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat
Terrorism (GAO/ T- NSIAD/ GGD- 99- 107, Mar. 11, 1999); Combating
Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and
Target Program Investments (  GAO/NSIAD-98-74 , Apr. 9, 1998); and
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and
Public Health Initiatives (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112, Mar. 16, 1999).
recommendations for improvements. 5 In July 1999, the commission
concluded that the United States is not effectively organized to
combat the threat of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons
proliferation. The commission believes that an effective
capability to respond to the use of these weapons by state or
subnational groups, whether at home or abroad, is critical not
only in the event of an attack, but also as a deterrent. This
panel recommended that the President name a national director for
combating proliferation who could coordinate the response of
government agencies. While intelligence agencies continuously
assess and report on various threats, an NIE analyzes issues of
major importance and long- term interest to the United States and
is the intelligence community's most authoritative projection of
future developments in a particular subject area. 6 An NIE is
intended to help decisionmakers think through critical issues by
presenting the relevant key facts, judgments about the likely
course of events in foreign countries, and the implications for
the United States. Examples of critical issues are threats from
foreign terrorism and foreign missiles. NIEs are generally focused
on foreign- origin threats. The National Intelligence Council
(NIC), an organization composed of 12 National Intelligence
Officers-- including one from the FBI-- who report directly to the
Director of Central Intelligence, produces NIEs. To prepare an
NIE, the NIC brings together analysts from all the intelligence
agencies that have expertise on the issue under review. 7 In the
final analysis, an NIE is the Director of Central Intelligence's
assessment, with which the heads of the U. S. intelligence
agencies concur, except as noted in the NIE's text. Other high-
level intelligence community products include Intelligence
Community Assessments. Intelligence and law enforcement threat
information is a key input into a risk assessment process. Risk
assessments are widely recognized as valid 5 The Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (P. L. 104- 293) created
the commission. The Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (P. L. 105-
277) extended the commission's reporting deadline to July 18,
1999. John Deutch, former Director of Central Intelligence, was
the commission's chairman. Senator Arlen Specter served as vice
chairman. 6 Foreign Missile Threats: Analytic Soundness of Certain
National Intelligence Estimates (GAO/NSIAD-96-225, Aug. 30, 1996).
7 The following organizations may participate in preparing an NIE:
NIC, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency,
National Security Agency, State Department's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, FBI, intelligence organizations of the
Departments of the Treasury and Energy, and military services.
decision support tools to establish and prioritize program
investments and are grounded in risk management, an approach to
dealing with security issues. Risk management is the deliberate
process of understanding risk the likelihood that a threat will
harm an asset or individuals with some severity of consequences
and deciding on and implementing actions to reduce it. A threat
analysis-- the first step in determining risk-- identifies and
evaluates each threat on the basis of various factors such as its
capability and intent to attack an asset and the likelihood and
the severity of the consequences of a successful attack. Valid,
current, and documented threat information, including NIEs, in a
risk assessment process is crucial to ensuring that
countermeasures or programs are not based solely on worst- case
scenarios and are therefore out of balance with the threat. Risk
management principles acknowledge that (1) while risk generally
cannot be eliminated, it can be reduced by enhancing protection
from validated and credible threats and (2) although many threats
are possible, some are more likely to be carried out than others.
Risk assessments form a deliberate, analytical approach that
results in a prioritized list of risks (i. e., threat- asset-
vulnerability combinations) that can be used to select
countermeasures to create a certain level of protection or
preparedness. Because threats are dynamic and countermeasures may
become outdated, it is generally sound practice to periodically
reassess threat and risk. To perform a realistic risk assessment
of terrorist threats, a multidisciplinary team of experts would
require several inputs, including written foreign and domestic
threat analyses from the intelligence community and law
enforcement. Chemical and biological agents pose different sets of
problems for emergency planning and preparedness. For example,
most chemicals quickly affect individuals directly exposed to the
agent within a given geographical area. In contrast, the release
of a biological agent may not be known for several days, and both
perpetrators and victims may be miles away from the point of
release when an incident is identified. Also, some biological
agents produce symptoms that can be easily confused with influenza
or other less virulent illnesses. If communicable, the biological
agent can spread throughout the population. Many federally funded
programs and initiatives have been established to better prepare
for dealing with a possible large- scale chemical or biological
terrorist incident, but no federal agency has defined what
constitutes mass casualties. The Federal Emergency Management
Agency, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of
Justice, and DHHS (including CDC) do not have a working definition
of what constitutes mass casualties. The metropolitan medical
response systems that DHHS is establishing across the nation use
1, 000 casualties as a basis for planning local medical systems
and for equipping and supplying the response teams. 8 DHHS
acknowledges that this number is arbitrary but believes it is
reasonable for planning purposes. Other federal agency
representatives stated that whatever number overwhelms the local
medical system could be considered mass casualties. Terrorists
operating outside a state- run laboratory infrastructure would
have to improvise a weapon or device and effectively disseminate
an agent through a delivery system. There are different stages in
the process of improvising a chemical or biological weapon to
cause mass casualties. Figure 1 shows the stages required for such
an undertaking. 8 Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve
Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-
3, Nov. 12, 1998) and Combating Terrorism: Observations on the
Nunn- Lugar- Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program (GAO- T-
NSIAD- 99- 16, Oct. 2, 1998). Figure 1: Stages for Terrorists
Working Outside a State- run Laboratory to Conduct Chemical and
Biological Terrorism Acquire Acquire precursor precursor chemicals
chemicals or or virulent virulent biological biological seed seed
cultures cultures Synthesize Synthesize chemical chemical agents
agents from from precursors precursors or or grow grow biological
biological agents agents in in culture culture (unnecessary
(unnecessary chemicals) for for toxic toxic industrial industrial
chemicals) Process Process the the chemical chemical or or
biological biological agents agents into into a a form form which
which can can be be effectively effectively disseminated
disseminated (unnecessary (unnecessary for for some some chemical
chemical agents) agents) Improvise Improvise an an agent agent
delivery delivery device device Disseminate Disseminate chemical
chemical or or biological biological agents agents to to
effectively effectively to to cause cause mass mass casualties
casualties Source: GAO, on the basis of analysis and discussion
with chemical and biological warfare experts. Scope and To perform
our review, we obtained lists of potential chemical and
Methodology biological agents that might be used by terrorists
from intelligence agencies, military medical health experts, the
FBI, and documents provided by government officials. We discussed
in detail the characteristics of these agents with numerous
experts in the disciplines of science, medicine, law enforcement,
intelligence, and chemical and biological warfare. We spoke with
and obtained documentation from officials at the U. S. Army
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases in Frederick,
Maryland; the CDC in Atlanta, Georgia; the DHHS Office of
Emergency Preparedness in Rockville, Maryland; the Department of
Veterans' Affairs in Washington, D. C.; the Soldier and Biological
Chemical Command and its Technical Escort Unit in Edgewood,
Maryland; and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency in Dulles,
Virginia. We discussed the production, weaponization, and
dissemination of chemical and biological agents with experts
formerly with U. S. and foreign biological warfare programs and
with several medical and scientific experts in academia. We
analyzed manuals, handbooks, and texts on infectious diseases and
biological and chemical casualties. We gathered and reviewed
materials, studies, and reports on chemical and biological
terrorism and attended conferences on the topic. To develop the
report's appendixes on selected chemical and biological agents, we
analyzed and summarized information obtained from different
sources. Specifically, for chemical agents, we reviewed Army Field
Manual 3- 9, Potential Military Chemical/ Biological Agents and
Compounds, as well as other information that we supplemented with
discussions with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and CDC. The
primary source of our appendix on selected biological agents was
the Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook (July
1998) by the U. S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
Diseases. Also, we discussed the characteristics of each
biological agent with infectious disease experts, including those
from the U. S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
Diseases and CDC. Renowned academicians from Stanford University,
Johns Hopkins University, the Rockefeller University, the Monterey
Institute of International Studies, and RAND Corporation provided
information from the disciplines of physics, meteorology,
virology, biology, microbiology, and terrorism all of which are
technical and operational aspects of chemical and biological
terrorism. Biological warfare experts formerly with offensive
programs of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the former
Soviet Union gave us detailed information on the acquisition,
growth, production, and dissemination of biological agents. We
also discussed biological and chemical agents and obtained
documentation from chemical and biological defense experts and the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency. We reviewed classified documents
and reports from the intelligence community and unclassified
handbooks, manuals, textbooks, reports, and other open- source
materials. Chemical and biological experts reviewed portions of
the draft report and provided comments. In addition, technical
experts from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict reviewed the draft
appendixes and offered comments as appropriate. As agreed with
your offices, we limited our review to terrorist chemical or
biological attacks that could be carried out by individuals or
groups without access to state- run laboratories or weapon
programs and that would not receive chemical or biological agents
or weapons from such countries. We assumed that potential
terrorists would have to acquire a biological agent or precursor
chemicals, produce the agent, weaponize the agent, and deliver it.
We limited our evaluation to agents that could cause mass
casualties using the DHHS planning guidance of 1,000 casualties.
We focused on methods that cause mass casualties among humans by
means of improvised weapons or devices and not through
contamination of water, food supply, agriculture, or livestock.
Officials from individual intelligence agencies briefed us and
provided access to analyses on specific chemical and biological
agents and on the threat of chemical and biological terrorism in
general. In addition, we reviewed pertinent NIEs and Intelligence
Community Assessments. We also reviewed other intelligence
analyses related to terrorism. FBI officials provided their
assessment of the domestic- origin terrorist threat and
information on past cases of terrorism, including data on
terrorist incidents in the United States from 1987 through 1998.
We interviewed and obtained documentation from DHHS and CDC
officials about the proposed national stockpile of pharmaceuticals
and vaccines, including the methodology used in developing an
operating plan to establish a stockpile and continuing efforts to
further develop the stockpile. Information on the threat and risk
assessment process was developed in our previous work on combating
terrorism. Ease or Difficulty Chemical and biological experts and
the intelligence agencies believe that the ease or difficulty with
which terrorists could cause mass casualties Depends on Chemical
with an improvised chemical or biological weapon 9 or device
depends on or Biological Agent the chemical or biological agent
selected. Experts from the scientific, Selected intelligence, and
law enforcement community told us that terrorists do not need
sophisticated knowledge or dissemination methods to use toxic
industrial chemicals. In contrast, these experts believe that
terrorists face serious technical and operational challenges at
different stages of the process (described in fig. 1) to cause
mass casualties when working with other chemical or any biological
agents in the scope of our review. According to these experts, to
cause mass casualties with many chemical and all biological agents
in our review, terrorists would have to handle the risk of hurting
themselves and of being detected, overcome acquisition and
production difficulties, and effectively disseminate a chemical or
biological 9 A few biological agents (e. g., plague and smallpox)
are communicable and can be spread beyond those directly affected
by the weapon or dissemination device. Every biological agent,
even those that are highly communicable, must be disseminated by
some means that infects enough individuals to initiate a disease
epidemic. agent. In addition, these experts believe that
capability, access, and specialized knowledge that are not readily
available are needed when weaponizing or disseminating certain
chemical agents and nearly all biological agents. Further,
obtaining access to the proper strains of biological agents is a
difficult hurdle to overcome. Chemical experts believe that many
variables may deter terrorists from using chemical agents (other
than toxic industrial chemicals). For example, precursor chemicals
necessary for the production of some chemical agents are
controlled by the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention that has been
in force since April 1997. According to chemical experts, illegal
acquisition of precursor chemicals would raise suspicions and
attention due to the provisions of the convention. Moreover, the
Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for
Nonproliferation recently testified that the preparation and
effective use of BW [biological weapons] by both potentially
hostile states and by non- state actors, including terrorists, is
harder than some popular literature seems to suggest. 10
Individuals with expertise in the disciplines of chemistry,
biology, virology, microbiology, physics, meteorology, and former
chemical and biological warfare programs described the more
salient technical and operational challenges of working with
chemical and biological agents. We discuss these challenges in
more detail in the following chemical and biological sections.
Specifically,  the right precursor chemicals and biological agents
or strains are very difficult to obtain, and some chemical and
many biological agents are difficult to produce, especially in
sufficient quantities to produce mass casualties;  except if using
toxic industrial chemicals, terrorists would need a relatively
high degree of sophistication to successfully and effectively
process agents, improvise a device or weapon, and disseminate the
agents to cause mass casualties;  a crude weapon can be made with
less sophistication, but it would be less likely to cause mass
casualties;  environmental (e. g., pollution) and meteorological
conditions (e. g., sun, rain, mist, and wind) might disrupt the
effective dissemination of chemical and biological agents; and 10
Unclassified statement on the worldwide biological warfare threat
to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, March 3,
1999.  location of the weapon or device (interior or exterior) can
play a critical role in its effectiveness. Ease and Difficulty of
Using Experts from the scientific, intelligence, and law
enforcement communities Chemical Agents we spoke with agreed that
toxic industrial chemicals can cause mass casualties and require
little if any expertise or sophisticated methods. Generally, toxic
industrial chemicals can be bought on the commercial market or
stolen, thus avoiding the need to manufacture them. Chlorine,
phosgene, and hydrogen cyanide are examples of toxic industrial
chemicals. DOD classified further details concerning the use of
toxic industrial chemicals. Experts believe that unlike toxic
industrial chemicals, for various reasons, most G and V chemical
nerve agents are technically challenging for terrorists to
acquire, manufacture, and produce. Examples of the G- series nerve
agents are tabun (GA), sarin (GB), and soman (GD). VX is an
example of a V- series nerve agent. According to chemical experts,
developing nerve agents requires synthesis of multiple precursor
chemicals. On the basis of our review of a technical report, 11 we
concluded that some steps in the production process are difficult
and hazardous. Although tabun production is relatively easy,
containment of a highly toxic gas (hydrogen cyanide) is a
technical challenge. Production of sarin, soman, and VX requires
the use of high temperatures and generates corrosive and dangerous
by- products. Moreover, careful temperature control, cooling of
the vessel, heating to complete chemical reactions, and
distillation could be technically infeasible for terrorists
without a sophisticated laboratory infrastructure. Blister
chemical agents such as sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and
lewisite can be manufactured with ease or with only moderate
difficulty. However, experts told us that buying large quantities
of the precursor chemicals for these agents is difficult due to
the Chemical Weapons Convention. Appendix I describes some
chemical agents' key characteristics that we developed on the
basis of technical data and reviews with experts. DOD classified
additional details for appendix I. Chemical experts believe that
chemical agents need to be in vapor or aerosol form (a cloud of
suspended microscopic droplets) 12 to cause 11 Technologies
Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, U. S. Congress, Office of
Technology Assessment (Dec. 1993). 12 Fog and smoke are examples
of visible aerosols. optimal inhalation exposure to cause an
effect. Vapors and aerosols remain suspended in the air and are
readily inhaled deep into the lungs. Another method is to spray
large droplets or liquid for skin penetration. A chemical agent
could be disseminated by explosive or mechanical delivery.
Further, chemical agents can be disseminated in vapor, aerosol, or
bulk droplet form from delivery devices. According to the experts,
terrorists could disseminate chemical agents using simple
containers such as glass bottles with commercial sprayers attached
to them or fire extinguishers. However, the chemical agent would
need to withstand the heat developed if disseminated by
explosives. Moreover, according to chemical experts, the
successful use of chemical agents to cause mass casualties
requires high toxicity, volatility (tendency of a chemical to
vaporize or give off fumes), and stability during storage and
dissemination. Rapid exposure to a highly concentrated agent in an
ideal environment would increase the number of casualties. These
experts agree that disseminating a chemical agent in a closed
environment would be the best way to produce mass casualties.
Weather affects exterior dissemination, particularly sunlight,
moisture, and wind. Some chemical agents can be easily evaporated
by sunlight or diluted by water. The experts stated that it is
also difficult to target an agent with any precision or certainty
to kill a specific percentage of individuals outdoors. For
example, wind could transport a chemical agent away from the
designated target area. General Difficulties of Using According to
experts in the many fields associated with the technical
Biological Agents aspects of dealing with biological agents,
including those formerly with state- sponsored offensive
biological weapon programs, terrorists working outside a state-
run laboratory infrastructure would have to overcome extraordinary
technical and operational challenges to effectively and
successfully weaponize and deliver a biological agent to cause
mass casualties. Terrorists would require specialized knowledge
from a wide range of scientific disciplines to successfully
conduct biological terrorism and cause mass casualties. For
example, biological agents have varying characteristics.
Information and technical data from these experts, intelligence,
and authoritative documented sources indicate that some biological
agents such as smallpox are difficult to obtain. 13 In the case of
13 Known smallpox culture stocks exist only in the United States
at CDC and in Russia. other biological agents such as anthrax 14
and tularemia (both of which are bacteria), it is difficult to
obtain a virulent strain (one that causes disease and injury to
humans). Other agents such as plague are difficult to produce.
Biological toxins such as ricin require large quantities to cause
mass casualties, thereby increasing the risk of arousing suspicion
or detection prior to dissemination. Furthermore, some agents such
as Q fever incapacitate rather than cause death. Finally, many
agents are relatively easy to grow, but are difficult to process
into a form for a weapon. Appendix II describes some biological
agents' key characteristics we developed from technical documents
and reviews with experts. DOD classified additional details for
appendix II. According to experts from former biological warfare
programs, to survive and be effective, a virulent biological agent
must be grown, handled, and stored properly. This stage requires
time and effort for research and development. After cultivation,
the agent is wet. Terrorists would need the means to sterilize the
growth medium and dispose of hazardous biological wastes.
Processing the biological agent into a weaponized form requires
even more specialized knowledge. According to a wide range of
experts in science, health, intelligence, and biological warfare
and the technical report we reviewed, the most effective way to
disseminate a biological agent is by aerosol. This method allows
the simultaneous respiratory infection of a large number of
people. Microscopic particles that are dispersed must remain
airborne for long periods and may be transported by the wind over
long distances. The particles are small enough to reach the tiny
air sacs of the lungs (alveoli) and bypass the body's natural
filtering and defense mechanisms. According to experts, if larger
particles are dispersed, they may fall to the ground, causing no
injury, or become trapped in the upper respiratory tract, possibly
causing infections but not necessarily death. From an engineering
standpoint, it is easier to produce and disseminate the larger
particles than the microscopic particles. Other critical technical
hurdles include obtaining the proper size equipment to generate
proper size aerosols, calculating the correct output rate (speed
at which the equipment operates), and having the correct liquid
composition. According to key experts with experience in
biological warfare, biological agents can be processed into liquid
or dry forms for dissemination. Both 14 Anthrax is the disease
caused by the biological agent Bacillus anthracis. Throughout the
report we use the related disease term when referring to
biological agents. We found that the disease term is used
synonymously with the biological agent in discussions with the
many experts we interviewed and documentation we reviewed. forms
pose difficult technical challenges for terrorists to effectively
cause mass casualties. These experts told us that liquid agents
are easy to produce. However, it is difficult to effectively
disseminate aerosolized liquid agents with the right particle size
without reducing the strength of the mixture. Further, the liquid
agent requires larger quantities and dissemination vehicles that
can increase the possibility of raising suspicion and detection.
In addition, experts told us that in contrast, dry biological
agents are more difficult to produce than liquid agents, but dry
agents are easier to disseminate. Dry biological agents could be
easily destroyed when processed, rendering the agent ineffective
for causing mass casualties. A leading expert told us that the
whole process entails risks. For example, powders easily adhere to
rubber gloves and pose a handling problem. Effectively
disseminating both forms of agent can pose technical challenges in
that the proper equipment and energy sources are needed. A less
sophisticated product and dissemination method can produce some
illness and/ or deaths. DOD classified further details on
technical challenges of effectively processing and disseminating
biological agents. According to the experts we spoke with,
exterior dissemination of biological agents can be disrupted by
environmental (e. g., pollution) and meteorological (e. g., sun,
rain, mist, and wind) conditions. Once released, an aerosol cloud
gradually decays and dies as a result of exposure to oxygen,
pollutants, and ultraviolet rays. If wind is too erratic or
strong, the agent might be dissipated too rapidly or fail to reach
the desired area. Interior dissemination of a biological agent
through a heating and air conditioning ventilation system could
cause casualties. But this method also has risks. Security
countermeasures could intercept the perpetrators or apprehend them
after the attack. Successful interior dissemination also requires
knowledge of aerodynamics. For example, the air exchange rate in a
building could affect the dissemination of a biological agent.
Regardless of whether a liquid or dry agent is used in interior or
exterior environments, experts believe that testing should be done
to determine if the agent is virulent and disseminates properly.
The numerous steps in the process of developing a biological
weapon increase the chances of a terrorist being detected by
authorities. Availability of Pre- and Medical preventive measures
and treatments are available for some but not Post- exposure
Medical all chemical and biological agents. Early treatment
following exposure to Treatments Varies chemical agents is
critical. The availability of effective medical defenses from or
treatments for a chemical or biological agent could be a risk
factor and influence terrorists' choice of weapon. The lack of an
effective vaccine or antibiotic/ antiviral treatment for
biological agents or of an antidote for chemical agents would pose
a potential public health challenge but also pose a significant
risk for terrorists as well. In the absence of medical defenses, a
chemical or biological agent if effectively acquired, processed,
and disseminated could become a more desirable choice because it
might result in greater casualties. However, processing, testing,
and disseminating the agent could equally endanger terrorists
because they, too, would have no effective protection against the
agent. Medical and biological warfare experts agree that anthrax
when inhaled is an agent of concern due in large part to the
difficulty of diagnosis and treatment once symptoms appear and its
very high lethality. 15 We recently testified on DOD's anthrax
vaccination program, 16 pointing out that  the anthrax vaccine is
effective for preventing anthrax infections through the skin such
as those sometimes contracted by unprotected workers who handle
wool and hides and  the vaccine appears to be effective against
inhalation anthrax in some animal species for some, but not all,
strains. However, due to the absence of known correlates of
immunity, 17 the results of the animal studies cannot be
extrapolated with certainty to humans. DOD is in the process of
vaccinating military personnel against anthrax. The efficacy of
the vaccine for inhalation anthrax in humans has not been proven.
18 According to CDC, supplies of the plague vaccine do not exist
in the United States; however, small supplies of killed plague
vaccine may exist in Australia and the United Kingdom. CDC does
not consider a vaccine useful to control an outbreak nor protect a
population against a terrorist incident. Further, there are no
vaccines for other potential biological agents such as ebola and
other hemorrhagic fevers, brucellosis, glanders, or 15 Post-
exposure treatment for inhalation anthrax consists of using the
vaccine and the antibiotic ciproflaxin, but treatment must begin
immediately after exposure and before the influenza- like symptoms
appear. Because the symptoms mimic common influenza, proper
diagnosis may come too late for effective treatment. 16 Medical
Readiness: Safety and Efficacy of the Anthrax Vaccine (GAO/T-
NSIAD-99-148, Apr. 29, 1999). 17 Correlates of immunity refer to
biological markers that represent immunity against disease. 18 DOD
believes it is prudent to vaccinate U. S. military forces against
anthrax exposure, even though efficacy for inhalation anthrax has
been based on animal testing. staphylococcal enterotoxin B.
Similarly, there are no specific antidotes for a number of
chemical agents such as the toxic industrial chemicals chlorine
and phosgene. Treatment for exposure to these chemical agents
consists largely of decontamination, first aid, and respiratory
support. An antidote kit comprised of amyl or sodium nitrite
exists for hydrogen cyanide. Appendixes I and II contain
information on medical treatments for chemical and biological
agents, respectively. Prevention and treatments are available for
a number of other agents. For example, there is an effective
vaccine for known strains of smallpox, 19 and there are new
investigative vaccines for several other possible biological
agents, including botulinum, Q fever, Venezuelan equine
encephalitis, and tularemia. Antidotes such as atropine,
pralidoxime chloride, and diazepam can be used to counteract the
effects of a number of chemical nerve agents. The treatment for
some chemical and biological agents includes respiratory support
with a ventilator. The types and quantities of vaccines,
pharmaceuticals, and other items that should be available in the
event of a chemical or biological attack can be determined through
a methodologically sound threat and risk assessment. U. S.
Intelligence To determine the extent to which the foreign- and
domestic- origin chemical Assessments of the and biological
terrorist threat in the United States has been assessed, we
obtained information from U. S. intelligence agencies. The U. S.
intelligence Foreign and Domestic community has issued classified
NIEs and Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat in the
Assessments that discuss the foreign- origin chemical and
biological United States terrorist threat in some detail. However,
the FBI's assessment of the chemical and biological agents that
would more likely be used by domestic- origin terrorists working
outside a state- run laboratory infrastructure has not been
formally reflected in a written threat assessment. Producing
assessments of both foreign- and domestic- origin threats could
provide an authoritative, written, comprehensive intelligence
community view on specific chemical and biological terrorist
threats. The possibility that terrorists may use chemical or
biological materials may increase over the next decade, according
to intelligence agencies. According to the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), interest among 19 Vaccination after exposure to
weaponized smallpox or a case of smallpox is effective in
preventing disease if given within 7 days after exposure. However,
it is unclear whether post- exposure treatment with smallpox
vaccine would be effective due to the difficulty in diagnosing the
disease within 7 days. non- state actors, including terrorists, in
biological and chemical materials is real and growing and the
number of potential perpetrators is increasing. The CIA also noted
that many such groups have international networks and do not need
to be tied to state sponsors for financial and technical support.
Nonetheless, the CIA continues to believe that terrorists are less
likely to use chemical and biological weapons than conventional
explosives. We previously reported that according to intelligence
agencies, terrorists are less likely to use chemical and
biological weapons than conventional explosives, at least partly
because chemical and biological agents are difficult to weaponize
and the results are unpredictable. Intelligence Analyses of the
The intelligence community has analyzed and made judgments about
the More Likely Chemical and more likely foreign- origin chemical
and biological terrorist threat agents. Biological Terrorist
Threat This information has been produced in a new NIE and
Intelligence Agents Community Assessments. The CIA classified the
specific agents identified in intelligence assessments that would
more likely be used by foreign- origin terrorists. The CIA also
classified the intelligence judgments about the chances that state
actors with successful chemical and/ or biological warfare
programs would share their weapons and materials with terrorists
or terrorist groups. Unlike the foreign- origin threat, the FBI's
analysts' judgments concerning the more likely chemical and
biological agents that may be used by domestic- origin terrorists
have not been captured in a formal assessment. However, FBI
officials shared their analyses of the more likely biological and
chemical threat agents on the basis of substances used or
threatened in actual cases. In analyzing domestic- origin threats,
FBI officials grouped chemical and biological agents and did not
specify individual agents as threats. Although the FBI has not
addressed the specific types of chemical or biological weapons
that may be used by domestic terrorists in the next 2 to 5 years,
FBI officials believe that domestic terrorists would be more
likely to use or threaten to use biological agents than chemical
agents. The FBI's observation is based on an increase in reported
investigations involving the use of biological materials. In 1997,
of the 74 criminal investigations related to weapons of mass
destruction, 30 percent (22) were related to the use of biological
materials. In 1998, there were 181 criminal investigations related
to weapons of mass destruction, and 62 percent (112) were related
to the use of biological materials. Most of these investigations
involved threats or hoaxes. The FBI estimated that in 1997 and
1998, approximately 60 percent of biological investigations were
related to anthrax hoaxes. The FBI ranks groups of chemical and
biological agents on its threat spectrum according to the
likelihood that they would be used.  Biological toxins: any toxic
substance of natural origin produced by an animal or plant. An
example of a toxin is ricin, a poisonous protein extracted from
the castor bean.  Toxic industrial chemicals: chemicals developed
or manufactured for use in industrial operations such as
manufacturing solvents, pesticides, and dyes. These chemicals are
not primarily manufactured for the purpose of producing human
casualties. Chlorine, phosgene, and hydrogen cyanide are
industrial chemicals that have also been used as chemical warfare
agents.  Biological pathogens: any organism (usually living) such
as a bacteria or virus capable of causing serious disease or
death. Anthrax is an example of a bacterial pathogen.  Chemical
agents: a chemical substance that is intended for use in military
operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate people. The
FBI excludes from consideration riot control agents and smoke and
flame materials. Two examples of chemical agents are sarin (nerve
agent) and mustard gas (blister agent). Risk Assessments Can Risk
assessments are widely recognized as valid decision- making
support Help Guide Investment tools to establish and prioritize
program requirements. We have previously reported on the need for
threat and risk assessments performed by a Decisions for
multidisciplinary team of experts to properly focus programs and
Chemical/ Biological investments for combating terrorism and to
establish program requirements. 20 Risk assessments incorporate
but go beyond intelligence Preparedness Efforts threat analyses by
using a multidisciplinary team of experts to  generate valid
attack scenarios,  assess and rank the risks (likelihood and
severity of consequences) of the attack scenarios, and  decide on
actions or programs focused on reducing or otherwise dealing with
the risks as assessed. Risk assessments should include sound
inputs and information, such as the best available intelligence
and law enforcement information and analyses, 20 Combating
Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and
Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998).
including NIEs and Intelligence Community Assessments. Soundly
established requirements could help ensure that specific programs
and initiatives and related expenditures are justified and
targeted, given the threat and risk of validated terrorist attack
scenarios. We have testified and reported on several occasions 21
that individual government programs to combat terrorism have not
been based on soundly determined requirements derived from a
formal threat and risk assessment process. 22 A national- level
assessment has not been performed that addresses the overall
threat and risk of terrorism, including terrorist attacks using
specific chemical or biological materials. Performing a sound
threat and risk assessment at this level could provide a strategic
guide to help shape, focus, and prioritize federal efforts to
combat terrorism. Many Counterterrorism Individual agencies
request funding for numerous programs and initiatives Efforts Are
Not Based on without the benefit of a threat and risk assessment.
For example, under the Risk Assessments Nunn- Lugar- Domenici
Domestic Preparedness Program, first responders in 120 cities are
being trained and equipped to enhance their capabilities to
respond to terrorist chemical attacks, and DHHS is funding medical
response teams in 27 cities as well as deployable national teams.
The Department of Justice has sponsored training programs, has
funded several centers and training venues related to combating
terrorism, and is implementing an equipment grant program. The
Army National Guard is establishing 10 of possibly 54 assessment
and detection teams. We recently testified about another example
in which a threat and risk assessment process would be beneficial.
23 Beginning in fiscal year 1999, DHHS is establishing a national
pharmaceutical and vaccine stockpile to prepare medical responses
for possible use of chemical or biological weapons by terrorists.
We found that several of the items DHHS plans to 21 Combating
Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism
(GAO/ T- NSIAD/ GGD- 99- 107, Mar. 11, 1999); Combating Terrorism:
Observations on Crosscutting Issues (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23,
1998); and Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide
Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-
98-39, Dec. 1, 1997). 22 However, several federal government
organizations apply some formal threat and risk assessment process
in their programs. For example, as required by the Federal
Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 (P. L. 104- 264), the Federal
Aviation Administration and the FBI perform joint threat and
vulnerability assessments on each airport determined to be high
risk. The FBI provides threat data (i. e., intelligence and law
enforcement information) that the Federal Aviation Administration
is using to develop threat assessments specific to the airport or
the metropolitan area in which the high- risk airport is located.
23 Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and
Public Health Initiatives (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112, Mar. 16, 1999).
procure (1) do not match intelligence agencies' judgments, as
explained to us, of the more likely chemical and biological agents
terrorists might use and (2) seem to be based on worst- possible
consequence scenarios generated by an ad hoc interagency group of
health and medical representatives. The DHHS decision- making
process was not formal, based on a particular methodology, or
documented and did not incorporate the many disciplines of
knowledge and expertise or divergent thinking that is warranted to
establish sound requirements for such an emerging, complex, and
challenging threat. For example, experts in processing and
weaponizing chemical and biological agents, intelligence,
terrorism, law enforcement, and other related areas not
necessarily associated with program and funding stakeholders would
comprise a multidisciplinary team qualified to (1) generate valid
threat scenarios, (2) assess and prioritize scenario risks in
terms of likelihood and severity of consequences, and (3)
determine appropriate countermeasures or other programmatic
responses. 24 As we previously reported, without valid threat and
risk assessments, we question whether stockpiling for the items
and quantities discussed in the Department's plan is the best
approach for investing in medical preparedness. Conclusions The
ease or difficulty for terrorists to cause mass casualties with an
improvised chemical or biological weapon or device depends on the
agent selected. Experts agree that toxic industrial chemicals can
cause mass casualties and require little if any expertise or
sophisticated methods. Most chemical nerve agents, however, are
technically challenging for terrorists to acquire, manufacture,
and produce. Also, terrorists working outside a state- run
laboratory infrastructure would have to overcome extraordinary
challenges to effectively and successfully weaponize and deliver a
biological agent and cause mass casualties. The intelligence
community has issued NIEs and other assessments that discuss
foreign- origin chemical and biological terrorist threats,
including judgments about the more likely chemical and biological
agents that would be used. However, the FBI has not produced a
formal written assessment of its judgments concerning the most
likely domestic- origin chemical and biological terrorist threats.
Such an assessment would complement existing assessments of the
foreign- origin threat and provide a comprehensive view of the
threats. Taken together, these assessments of the foreign- and
domestic- origin 24 CDC officials told us that since CDC is
responsible for establishing the stockpile, it intends to review
the planned items and quantities based on a multidisciplinary
assessment. threats would be important inputs for a risk
assessment that could help form the basis for and prioritize
programs to combat chemical and biological terrorism. Moreover, a
sound national- level risk assessment that could provide a
strategic guide to help shape, focus, and prioritize federal
efforts to combat terrorism has not been performed. Such an
assessment-- which incorporates but goes beyond intelligence
threat assessments-- would be conducted by a multidisciplinary
team of experts on intelligence, terrorism, chemical and
biological agents, weapons, law enforcement, and health and could
include other experts not necessarily associated with program and
funding stakeholders. This team could use sound inputs, including
NIEs, to (1) generate valid threat scenarios, (2) assess and
prioritize scenario risks in terms of likelihood and severity of
consequences, and (3) determine appropriate countermeasures or
other programmatic responses. Without a valid threat and risk
assessment, it is questionable whether federal agencies will be
able to establish soundly defined program requirements and
prioritize and focus the nation's investments to combat terrorism.
Recommendations We recommend that the Attorney General direct the
FBI Director to prepare a formal, authoritative intelligence
threat assessment that specifically assesses the chemical and
biological agents that would more likely be used by domestic-
origin terrorists non- state actors working outside a state- run
laboratory infrastructure. We further recommend that the Attorney
General direct the FBI Director to sponsor a national- level risk
assessment that uses national intelligence estimates and inputs
from the intelligence community and others to help form the basis
for and prioritize programs developed to combat terrorism. Because
threats are dynamic, the Director should determine when the
completed national- level risk assessment should be updated.
Agency Comments and DOD, CIA, the Department of Justice, and DHHS
provided official Our Evaluation comments on a draft of this
report. Comments from DOD, CIA, and DHHS were classified and could
not be printed in this report. Comments from the Department of
Justice appear in appendix III. All of the agencies provided
technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. DOD and
CIA commented that recently produced intelligence community
products partially responded to the first recommendation in our
draft report. Also, Justice commented that the FBI is the
appropriate entity to implement the recommendation. As originally
written, our recommendation suggested that the Director of Central
Intelligence request an NIE assessing the more likely chemical and
biological terrorist threats and incorporate an FBI assessment of
domestic- origin terrorist threats. On the basis of our subsequent
review of these intelligence community documents, we believe that
these assessments partially satisfy our recommendation. However,
the intelligence community assessments do not incorporate a
written, authoritative FBI analysis of the more likely chemical
and biological threats from domestic- origin terrorists. As a
result of our review of recent intelligence assessments and
Justice's comments, we adjusted the recommendation to call for the
Attorney General to direct the FBI Director to prepare a formal
written assessment of domestic- origin threats. DOD, the CIA, and
Justice agreed with the second recommendation in our draft report
calling for a national- level risk assessment. However, the CIA
suggested that we change the wording so that the Director of
Central Intelligence not be the sponsor of such a risk assessment.
Justice stated that the FBI, as the lead agency in domestic
terrorist incidents, is the appropriate federal agency for
coordinating a threat and risk assessment. Justice also commented
that it already had a statutory mandate to develop assessments
similar to those we recommend in this report. We are aware that
legislation requires the Attorney General, in consultation with
the FBI and others, to develop and test methodologies for
assessing the threat and risk of terrorist employment of weapons
of mass destruction against cities and other local areas. 25
However, these assessments do not substitute for the broader
national- level risk assessment that we are recommending in this
report. The former assessments are intended to be city- specific
whereas the latter would provide an overarching guide for program
investments at the national level. At the time of our review, the
FBI was considering methodologies for risk assessments at the city
level, and had not yet actually performed such an assessment. We
agree that the FBI could sponsor a national- level threat and risk
assessment. Further, the national- level threat and risk
assessment process and results should provide a valuable guide for
the city- specific threat and 25 Section 1404( a) of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (P. L. 105- 261).
risk assessments to be facilitated by the FBI. Based on Justice's
comments, we have modified our recommendation to suggest that the
Attorney General direct the FBI Director to sponsor a national-
level threat and risk assessment. Justice otherwise generally
concurred with the draft report. DHHS generally agreed with our
recommendations but commented that the assessment that we
recommended should include all possible sources of the chemical
and/ or biological threats such as state- sponsored terrorists.
The scope of our work was to examine aspects of the terrorist
threat operating outside a state- run program. Nevertheless, we
agree that a risk assessment should consider a wide range of
possible chemical and biological threats. A multidisciplinary team
of experts should then assess these possible threats in terms of
their likelihood of occurrence and severity of consequences, since
funding countermeasures for all possible scenarios is not likely
to be affordable. Assessing the risk of these threats through
generating validated scenarios would allow agencies to focus their
program countermeasures and investments on the more likely
scenarios with the more severe consequences. DHHS also commented
that we underestimated the threat of a bioterrorist event and
relied on data that relates to war- zone activities and conditions
and not specifically to urban and metropolitan civilian
populations. As our report states, our objective was to assess the
technical ease or difficulty of executing a successful, large-
scale bioterrorist incident. To satisfy this objective, we
obtained information from biological warfare experts who have in-
depth experience and knowledge of processing and effectively
disseminating biological agents to cause large numbers of human
casualties (whether military or civilian). Also, we obtained
information from a wide range of experts, including those in the
fields of infectious diseases, virology, and civilian disaster
management, and reviewed pertinent intelligence assessments. We
believe that the collective expertise of those consulted for our
report provided a sound basis for our conclusions about threats to
civilian populations. We did not discuss biological warfare
between combatants on a battlefield with these experts. We
conducted our work from September 1998 through April 1999 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution
of this report until 30 days after the distribution date. At that
time we will send copies to appropriate congressional committees,
the federal agencies discussed in this report, and the Honorable
Jacob Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also
make copies available to other interested parties upon request. If
you have any questions about this report, please contact me or
Carol R. Schuster at (202) 512- 5140. Key contributors to this
report are Davi M. D'Agostino, Deborah A. Colantonio, Richard A.
McGeary, and Richard H. Yeh. Norman J. Rabkin Director, National
Security Preparedness Issues Letter 1 Appendix I 28
Characteristics of Selected Chemical Agents Appendix II 30
Characteristics of Selected Biological Agents Appendix III 33
Comments From the Department of Justice Related GAO Products 36
Figure Figure 1: Stages for Terrorists Working Outside a State-
run Laboratory to Conduct Chemical and Biological Terrorism 8
Abbreviations CIA Central Intelligence Agency CDC Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention CWC Chemical Weapons Convention
DHHS Department of Health and Human Services DOD Department of
Defense FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation IND investigational
new drug NIC National Intelligence Council NIE National
Intelligence Estimate Appendi I x Characteristics of Selected
Chemical Agents Agent Ease of manufacture Agent Lethality First
aid treatment GAO observations a and precursor persistence
availability Choking agents Chlorine (CL) Industrial product. No
Not persistent Low Move to fresh air. For skin contact, Likely
agent due to precursors required. flush with water. No antidote.
availability as a Provide supportive therapy for commercial
product. respiratory and cardiovascular functions. Phosgene
Industrial product. No Not persistent Low Move to fresh air. For
skin contact, Likely agent due to its (CG) precursors required.
flush with water. availability as a commercial product. Nerve
agents Tabun (GA) Not readily available Intermediate High Move to
fresh air. For skin contact, Likely agent due to manufacturing
flush with water. Provide atropine or availability of
instructions, but pralidoxime chloride or diazepam precursor
chemicals precursors available. injections. and relative ease of
Relatively easy to manufacture. manufacture. Sarin (GB) Moderately
difficult to Not persistent High Move to fresh air. For skin
contact, Likely agent due to manufacture. flush with water.
Provide atropine or demonstrated use by Precursor chemical
pralidoxime chloride or diazepam Aum Shinrikyo, covered by
Chemical injections. although restrictions Weapons Convention on
precursors could (CWC). create difficulties for production. Soman
(GD) Difficult to Intermediate High Move to fresh air. For skin
contact, Not likely agent due to manufacture.Precursor flush with
water. Provide atropine or difficulty of chemical covered by
pralidoxime chloride or diazepam manufacture and CWC. injections.
control of precursor chemical. GF Moderately difficult to
Intermediate High Move to fresh air. For skin contact, Not likely
agent due to manufacture. flush with water. Provide atropine or
difficulty of Precursor chemical pralidoxime chloride or diazepam
manufacture and covered by CWC. injections. control of precursor
chemical. VX Difficult to High Very high Move to fresh air. For
skin contact, Not likely agent due to manufacture.Precursor flush
with water. Provide atropine or difficulty of chemicals covered by
pralidoxime chloride or diazepam manufacture and CWC. injections.
control of precursor chemical. Blood agents Hydrogen Industrial
product. Very low Low to moderate Move to fresh air. Provide
Likely agent due to its cyanide (AC) Precursor chemicals
supportive therapy. Provide amyl availability as a covered by CWC.
nitrite or sodium nitrite or sodium commercial product.
thiosulfate. Precursor availability may be a problem. (continued)
Agent Ease of manufacture Agent Lethality First aid treatment GAO
observations a and precursor persistence availability Cyanogen Not
easily produced. Low Low to moderate Move to fresh air. Provide
Likely agent, although chloride (CK) Available as supportive
therapy. Provide sodium precursor availability commercial product.
nitrite or sodium thiosulfate. may be a problem. Blister agents
Sulfur Easy to synthesize. Intermediate Can produce Flush skin
with water and Not likely agent due to mustard (HD) Large quantity
buys of to high incapacitation decontaminate clothing. Provide
difficulty in obtaining precursor chemicals because of oxygen/
intubation, bronchodilators. precursor materials without detection
blistering. Can and moderate difficult. Precursors also produce
production are covered by CWC. death if inhaled requirements. or a
toxic dose absorbed. Nitrogen Easy to synthesize. Intermediate Can
produce Flush skin with water and Not likely agent due to mustard
Large quantity buys of incapacitation Decontaminate clothing.
Provide difficulty in obtaining (HN- 2) precursor chemicals
because of oxygen/ intubation, bronchodilators. precursor
materials without detection blistering. Can Provide culumine
ophthalmic and and moderate difficult. Precursor also produce
topical antibiotics and dressings. production chemicals covered by
death if inhaled requirements. CWC. or a toxic dose absorbed.
Nitrogen Easy to synthesize. High Can produce Flush skin with
water and Not likely agent due to mustard Large quantity buys of
incapacitation Decontaminate clothing. Provide difficulty in
obtaining (HN- 3) precursor chemicals because of oxygen/
intubation, bronchodilators. precursor materials without detection
blistering. Can and moderate difficult but available. also produce
production death if inhaled requirements. or a toxic dose
absorbed. Lewisite (L, Moderately difficult to Intermediate Can
produce Flush skin with water and Not likely agent due to HL)
manufacture and to high incapacitation Decontaminate clothing.
Provide difficulty in obtaining moderately difficult to because of
British anti- lewisite for systemic precursor materials acquire
precursor blistering. Can effects. and production chemicals. also
produce requirements. death if inhaled or a toxic dose absorbed. a
Our observations are based on a research synthesis of discussions
with experts in chemical warfare, science, intelligence, law
enforcement, and medicine and of an analysis of manuals,
handbooks, textbooks, studies, and reports on chemical agents.
Note: The following assumptions are used: 1. Dosage and
concentration are maximized for an interior environment. 2. The
venue occurs at a high- profile event where a large population has
gathered. 3. The terrorists have the technical competence (first-
year graduate student in chemistry) and motivation to obtain and
implement the dispersion of agents. 4. The interior environment
has an accessible heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
distribution system. Appendi I I x Characteristics of Selected
Biological Agents l Agent Ease to acquire Agent stability
Lethality Laboratory Vaccine Treatment GAO observations b and
process safety level a Bacterial agents Inhalation Difficult to
obtain Spores are very Very high. Level 3. Yes, primate Virtually
always Possible terrorist anthrax virulent seed stable. Resistant
to tested. Some fatal once biological agent, but stock and to sun,
heat, and some sources view symptomatic. requires successfully
disinfectants. efficacy for Treatable very sophistication to
process and inhalation early with effectively disseminate. anthrax
as antibiotics and manufacture and questionable. supportive
disseminate to create therapy. mass casualties. Use could indicate
state sponsorship. Symptoms mimic flu and might not be quickly
identified. Very high fatality rate once symptomatic. Not
transmissible from person to person. Plague Very difficult to Can
be long- lasting, Very high. Level 3. No. Very early Possible
agent, but acquire seed but heat, treatment with not likely.
Fairly stock and to disinfectants, and antibiotics can difficult
to acquire successfully sun render be effective, suitable strain
and process and harmless. supportive difficult to weaponize.
disseminate. therapy. Glanders Difficult to Very stable. Moderate
Level 3. No. Antibiotics, but Potential agent, but acquire seed to
high. no large not easy for a stock. therapeutic non- state actor
to Moderately human trials. acquire, produce, difficult to and
successfully process. disseminate. Tularemia Difficult to
Generally unstable Moderate Level 3. Investigational Antibiotics
very Possible agent but acquire in environment. untreated, new
drug effective in early difficult to stabilize. correct Resists
cold but is low (IND). treatment. Low lethality when strain.
killed by mild heat treated. treated. Moderately and
disinfectants. difficult to process. Brucellosis Difficult to Very
stable. Long Very low. Level 3. No. Antibiotics May not be a
highly acquire seed persistence in wet moderately likely agent
because stock. soil or food. effective if given of difficulty in
Moderately early when obtaining virulent difficult to infected.
strain, long produce. incubation period, and low lethality.
(continued) Agent Ease to acquire Agent stability Lethality
Laboratory Vaccine Treatment GAO observations b and process safety
level a Q Fever Difficult to Stable. Months on Very low if Level
3. IND. Tested in Self- limited Not a likely agent. (rickettsial
acquire seed wood and in sand. treated. guinea pigs. illness
without Low lethality. organism) stock. Produces treatment.
Moderately adverse Antibiotics difficult to reactions. shorten
illness. process and weaponize. Viral agents Hemorrhagic Very
difficult Relatively unstable. Depending Level 4. No. Antiviral
drug Unlikely agent due to fevers (e. g., to obtain and on strain,
and aggressive difficulty in acquiring Ebola) process. can be
supportivecare. pathogen, safety Unsafe to very high.
Effectiveness of considerations, and handle. any treatment is
relative instability. questionable. Smallpox Difficult to Very
stable. Moderate Level 4. Yes. One potential Very high obtain seed
to high. antiviral, but consequence agent, stock. Only generally
no but likelihood of confirmed effective usage questionable
sources in chemotherapy. due to limited access United to the
pathogen States and beyond state actors. Russia. Difficult to
process. Venezuelan Difficult to Relatively unstable. Low. Level
3. IND. Supportive Possible agent if Equine obtain seed Destroyed
by heat therapy, seed stock can be Encephalitis stock. Easy and
disinfectants. anticonvulsants. acquired, but to process
Antimicrobial unstable with low and therapy lethality. weaponize.
ineffective. Toxins Ricin Readily Stable. Very high. Not
available. No, but None (unless Not a mass casualty available.
candidate ingested). agent. Moderately vaccines easy to under
process but development. requires ton quantities for mass
casualties. Botulinum Widely Stable. Weeks in High Level 3. IND.
Tested in Antitoxin (IND) Difficult to weaponize (Types A- G)
available but non- moving water without primates. and respiratory
and not considered a high toxin and food. respiratory Toxoid
vaccine support. mass casualty agent. producers Deteriorates in
support. against some not readily bright sun. types (A- E).
available or easy to process or weaponize. Agent Ease to acquire
Agent stability Lethality Laboratory Vaccine Treatment GAO
observations b and process safety level a Staphylococcl Difficult
to Very stable in dry Low. Not available. No. No effective Lower
likelihood due Enterotoxin B acquire high form. antimicrobial to
low lethality, lack of yielding seed treatment. transmissibility.
stock. Ventilatory Moderately support for difficult to inhalation
process. exposure, fluid management. a Biosafety level 3 applies
to agents that may cause serious or potentially lethal disease as
a result of exposure by inhalation. Among the many precautions is
a ducted exhaust air ventilation system that creates directional
airflow that draws air from clean areas into the laboratory toward
contaminated areas. The exhaust air is not recirculated to any
other area of the building and is discharged to the outside with
filtration and other optional treatment. Passage into the
laboratory is through two sets of self- closing doors and a
changing room. Showers may be included in the passageway.
Biosafety level 4 is required for work with dangerous and exotic
agents that pose a high risk of aerosol- transmitted laboratory
infections and life- threatening disease. A dedicated non-
recirculating air ventilation system is provided. The supply and
exhaust components are balanced to ensure directional airflow from
the area of least hazard to the areas of greatest potential
hazard. The differential pressure/ directional airflow between
adjacent areas is monitored and alarmed. The airflow in the supply
and exhaust components is monitored, and the components are
interlocked to ensure inward, or zero, airflow. A specially
designed suit area requires a one- piece positive pressure suit
that is ventilated by a life- support system. Entry to the area is
through an airlock fitted with airtight doors. A chemical shower
is provided to decontaminate the surface of the suit before the
worker leaves the area. b Our observations are based on a research
synthesis of discussions with experts in biological warfare,
science, intelligence, law enforcement, and medicine and of an
analysis of manuals, handbooks, textbooks, studies, and reports on
biological agents. Appendi I I I x Comments From the Department of
Justice Related GAO Products Combating Terrorism: Observations on
Growth in Federal Programs (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181, June 9, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response
Equipment and Sustainment Costs (GAO/NSIAD-99-151, June 9, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve
Counterterrorist Operations (GAO/NSIAD-99-135, May 13, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and
Public Health Initiatives (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112, Mar. 16, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat
Terrorism (GAO/ T- NSIAD/ GGD- 99- 107, Mar. 11, 1999). Combating
Terrorism: FBI's Use of Federal Funds for Counterterrorism-
Related Activities (FYs 1995- 98) (GAO/GGD-99-7, Nov. 20, 1998).
Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic
Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov.
12, 1998). Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn- Lugar-
Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, Oct. 2,
1998). Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues
(GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23, 1998). Combating Terrorism: Threat
and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program
Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998). Combating Terrorism:
Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and
Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997). Combating Terrorism:
Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy and
Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997). Chemical Weapons
Stockpile: Changes Needed in the Management Structure of Emergency
Preparedness Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-91, June 11, 1997). GAO United
States General Accounting Office GAO/NSIAD-99-163 Page 1
GAO/NSIAD-99-163 Combating Terrorism United States General
Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548 Lett er B-282772 Page 2
GAO/NSIAD-99-163 Combating Terrorism Lett er B-282772 Page 3
GAO/NSIAD-99-163 Combating Terrorism B-282772 Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-99-
163 Combating Terrorism B-282772 Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-99-163 Combating
Terrorism B-282772 Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-99-163 Combating Terrorism B-
282772 Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-163 Combating Terrorism B-282772 Page 8
GAO/NSIAD-99-163 Combating Terrorism B-282772 Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-99-
163 Combating Terrorism B-282772 Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-99-163
Combating Terrorism B-282772 Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-99-163 Combating
Terrorism B-282772 Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-99-163 Combating Terrorism B-
282772 Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-163 Combating Terrorism B-282772 Page
14 GAO/NSIAD-99-163 Combating Terrorism B-282772 Page 15
GAO/NSIAD-99-163 Combating Terrorism B-282772 Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-
99-163 Combating Terrorism B-282772 Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-163
Combating Terrorism B-282772 Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-163 Combating
Terrorism B-282772 Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-163 Combating Terrorism B-
282772 Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-163 Combating Terrorism B-282772 Page
21 GAO/NSIAD-99-163 Combating Terrorism B-282772 Page 22
GAO/NSIAD-99-163 Combating Terrorism B-282772 Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-
99-163 Combating Terrorism B-282772 Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-163
Combating Terrorism B-282772 Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-163 Combating
Terrorism Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-163 Combating Terrorism Contents
Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-163 Combating Terrorism Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-
163 Combating Terrorism Appendix I Appendix I Characteristics of
Selected Chemical Agents Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-99-163 Combating
Terrorism Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-99-163 Combating Terrorism Appendix II
Appendix II Characteristics of Selected Biological Agents Page 31
GAO/NSIAD-99-163 Combating Terrorism Appendix II Characteristics
of Selected Biological Agents Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-99-163 Combating
Terrorism Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-99-163 Combating Terrorism Appendix
III Appendix III Comments From the Department of Justice Page 34
GAO/NSIAD-99-163 Combating Terrorism Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-99-163
Combating Terrorism Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-99-163 Combating Terrorism
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