Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Federal Counterterrorist Exercises
(Briefing Report, 06/25/1999, GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR).
Terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel and interests domestically and
abroad underscore the need for effective U.S. efforts to combat
terrorism. U.S. policy and implementing guidelines call for robust,
tailored, and rapidly deployable interagency teams to conduct
well-coordinated and highly integrated operations. Federal agencies
enhance their ability to respond to terrorist attacks by conducting
exercises that train key personnel and test response teams. GAO recently
briefed congressional staff on the numbers, the scenarios, and the
participants involved in federal counterterrorism exercises done from
June 1995 to June 1998. This report summarizes those briefings.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-99-157BR
TITLE: Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Federal Counterterrorist
Exercises
DATE: 06/25/1999
SUBJECT: Terrorism
Emergency preparedness
Explosives
National defense operations
Mobilization
Nuclear weapons
Interagency relations
Crime prevention
Training utilization
IDENTIFIER: DOD Domestic Preparedness Program
FEMA Federal Response Plan
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO report. This text was extracted from a PDF file. **
** Delineations within the text indicating chapter titles, **
** headings, and bullets have not been preserved, and in some **
** cases heading text has been incorrectly merged into **
** body text in the adjacent column. Graphic images have **
** not been reproduced, but figure captions are included. **
** Tables are included, but column deliniations have not been **
** preserved. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
** A printed copy of this report may be obtained from the GAO **
** Document Distribution Center. For further details, please **
** send an e-mail message to: **
** **
** **
** **
** with the message 'info' in the body. **
******************************************************************
United States General Accounting Office GAO
Briefing Report to Congressional Committees June 1999
COMBATING TERRORISM Analysis of Federal Counterterrorist Exercises
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR United States General Accounting Office
National Security and Washington, D.C. 20548
International Affairs Division B-282723
Letter June 25, 1999 The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking Minority
Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives The
Honorable Christopher Shays Chairman, Subcommittee on National
Security, Veterans' Affairs, and International Relations Committee
on Government Reform House of Representatives Terrorist attacks
against U.S. personnel and interests domestically and abroad
highlight the need for effective U.S. efforts to combat terrorism.
U.S. policy and implementing guidelines call for robust, tailored,
and rapidly deployable interagency teams to conduct well-
coordinated and highly integrated operations. Federal agencies
enhance their ability to respond to terrorist incidents by
conducting exercises that train key personnel and test response
plans. We recently briefed your staffs on our analysis of federal
counterterrorist exercise data that we had gathered in producing
our February 1999 classified report to you. This report summarizes
the contents of those briefings. Our objective was to determine
the numbers, types, scenarios, and participants involved in
federal counterterrorism exercises conducted from June 1995 to
June 1998. Background Presidential
directives assign leadership and supporting roles to various
federal agencies. Federal agencies' activities to combat terrorism
include responding to a terrorist crisis and managing the
consequences after a terrorist attack. Presidential Decision
Directive (PDD) 39, issued in June 1995, required key federal
agencies to ensure that their counterterrorist capabilities are
well exercised. Counterterrorism exercises include tabletop
exercises, in which agency officials discuss scenarios around a
table or other similar setting, and field exercises, where agency
leadership and operational units actually deploy to practice their
skills and Letter Page 1
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism B-282723 coordination in a
realistic field setting. One of the highest priorities in the
federal government is to prepare for terrorist attacks involving
weapons of mass destruction (WMD).1 Results in Brief
Federal agencies conducted 201 counterterrorism exercises in the 3
years following PDD 39. The number of exercises per year more than
tripled over the 3-year period, with the largest increase in the
last year. Agencies used a variety of types of exercises and
scenarios during this period. More than half of the exercises were
field exercises (where command and response personnel actually
deployed with their equipment), and the rest were tabletop
exercises (where personnel discussed a particular scenario). Very
few of the exercises included no-notice deployments of personnel
and equipment. Over one-half of the exercises dealt with managing
the immediate crisis resulting from a terrorist incident,
including stopping a terrorist attack, while the others dealt with
managing the consequences of the incident, such as caring for the
injured. Until recently, very few exercises dealt with the likely
situation of both crisis and consequence management occurring
simultaneously. More than two-thirds of the exercises had WMD
scenarios, while the others had more traditional and more likely
terrorist scenarios involving conventional arms and explosives.
Over half of the WMD exercises used scenarios that used chemical
agents. There was a variety of participants in these exercises.
More than two-thirds of the exercises included more than one
federal agency and almost one-half of them included three or more
federal agencies. Some exercises also included participants of
organizations other than federal agencies. For example, one-third
of the exercises included state and/or local government
participants, almost one-tenth of them had nongovernmental
participants, and a few had foreign government participants.
Federal agencies played various roles in these exercises,
depending on their roles and their level of participation. 1For
the purpose of this report, we define WMD as chemical, biological,
and nuclear weapons or agents. Within the federal government,
there is disagreement as to the precise definition, especially
whether large conventional explosives should be included. Letter
Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-
99-157BR Combating Terrorism B-282723 This report contains no
recommendations. However, in our February 1999 classified report
on interagency counterterrorist operations, we made five
recommendations to several agencies to improve counterterrorist
exercises.2 Agency Comments We received oral comments from the
Department of State, the Department of Defense (DOD), the U.S.
Secret Service (USSS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms (ATF). In general, these agencies stated that the report
was an accurate reflection of federal counterterrorist exercises
conducted in the period we reviewed. Many of these agencies
provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
The FBI commented that the report was an accurate empirical survey
of federal counterterrorist exercises. However, the FBI believed
that clarification would be beneficial in four areas: tabletop
exercises, state and local participation in exercises, no-notice
exercises, and our methodology to collect and analyze exercises
led by federal agencies. The FBI said that tabletop exercises can
sometimes take months to prepare for and that it was sometimes
difficult to get state and local officials to participate in
federal exercises. We changed the text to reflect these comments.
Regarding no-notice exercises, the FBI noted some of the
difficulties involved in conducting these type of exercises in a
domestic scenario. According to the FBI, no-notice exercises,
especially those broad in scope, can be disruptive to an agency's
normal functions and daily responsibilities. It noted that the
FBI's ability to dedicate resources and personnel to no-notice
exercises is limited by its primary mission to investigate
violations of federal law. According to the FBI, the primary goal
of the exercise program should be to train the participants in the
crisis management process, not to test how fast they can respond
to a no-notice exercise. PDD 39 and the guidelines and plans that
implement it call for robust rapidly deployable interagency teams.
Thus, we believe that it is also 2For an unclassified summary of
this report, see Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to
Improve Counterterrorist Operations (GAO/NSIAD-99-135, May 13,
1999). This summary, however, does not contain our recommendations
because they were classified. Letter Page 3
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism B-282723 important to test
how fast federal teams can respond to a no-notice event. Such
exercises could lead to improvements in recall and deployment
procedures to ensure that state and local first responders receive
federal assistance as soon as possible. Along these lines, the
Senate Committee on Appropriations recently directed the Attorney
General to conduct no-notice exercises with domestic scenarios
that include the participation of all key personnel who would
participate in the consequence management of a major terrorist
event involving the use of a chemical, biological, or cyber
weapon. Regarding our methodology, the FBI commented that the
number of FBI-sponsored exercises identified in our report was
incomplete because we focused on national level exercises. The
data included in the report was based on information that the FBI
and other agencies provided to us during our review. We provided
our list of exercises to FBI and other agencies to review for
completeness and accuracy. To the extent the agencies, such as
FBI, were not aware of counterterrorist exercises that their field
offices led or participated in, we may not have included such
exercises in our analysis. FBI also commented that our methodology
consisted of a simple tally of conducted exercises rather than a
more in-depth analysis of exercise scope, objectives, and number
and type of participants. We did perform such an analysis in our
February 1999 classified report, which included five
recommendations to several agencies (including FBI) to improve
counterterrorist exercises. Scope and We focused
our analysis on federal counterterrorism exercises in the 3-year
Methodology period following the issuance of PDD 39.
To gather data on exercises, we obtained documents and interviewed
officials at the Department of State, DOD, USSS, FBI, FEMA, HHS,
EPA, DOE, VA, and ATF. We compiled a list of 201 counterterrorism
exercises that were conducted from June 1995 to June 1998. To
ensure the accuracy of our list of exercises, appropriate federal
agencies reviewed it for completeness and accuracy. We also
observed interagency meetings, planning sessions, and exercises.
We performed our analysis in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards between March 1999 and May 1999 on
data we gathered in 1997 and 1998. This report is organized into
three briefing sections. Section I includes background
information. Section II presents our analysis of all federal
counterterrorist exercises, including their number, type, focus,
scenarios, and participants. Section III presents similar
information on individual Letter Page 4
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism B-282723 agencies. For the
four agencies that led most of the exercises, our data is
presented in terms of the exercises that they led. For the other
six agencies that participated in many exercises, but led
relatively few, the data is presented in terms of the exercises in
which they participated. As agreed with your offices, unless you
publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no
further distribution until 30 days after its issuance date. At
that time we will send copies to appropriate congressional
committees, the federal agencies discussed in this report, and to
the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director of the Office of Management and
Budget. We also will make copies available to other interested
parties upon request. If you have any questions about this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-5140. Major contributors to this
report are listed in appendix I. Mark E. Gebicke Director,
National Security Preparedness Issues Letter Page 5
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Contents Letter
1 Briefing Section I Policy and Strategy on Combating
Terrorism 8 Background
Counterterrorist Roles and Responsibilities
10 Purpose and Types of Exercises
12 Briefing Section II Counterterrorist Exercises From June
1995 to June 1998 14 Federal Exercises
Counterterrorist Exercises Field and Tabletop
16 Overall Counterterrorist Exercises With Notice
and No Notice 18 Counterterrorist Exercises
Crisis and/or Consequence Management 20 Counterterrorist
Exercises Conventional and WMD 22
Counterterrorist Exercises Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear
24 Counterterrorist Exercises Federal Agencies Participating
26 Counterterrorist Exercises by Types of Participants
28 Counterterrorist Exercises State and Local Participation
30 Briefing Section III Counterterrorist Exercises by Lead
Agency 32 Individual Agencies
Counterterrorist Exercises Participation and Leadership by Agency
34 Exercises Department of Defense Counterterrorist
Exercises 36 U.S. Secret Service
Counterterrorist Exercises 38 Federal
Bureau of Investigation Counterterrorist Exercises
40 Federal Emergency Management Agency Counterterrorist Exercises
42 Department of Health and Human Services Counterterrorist
Exercises 44 Environmental Protection Agency Counterterrorist
Exercises 46 Department of Energy Counterterrorist
Exercises 48 Department of State
Counterterrorist Exercises 50 Department
of Veterans Affairs Counterterrorist Exercises 52
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Counterterrorist
Exercises 54 Appendix I
56 Major Contributors to This Report Related GAO Products
59 Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR
Combating Terrorism Contents Abbreviations ATF Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms DEST Domestic Emergency Support
Team DOD Department of Defense DOE Department of Energy EPA
Environmental Protection Agency FBI Federal Bureau of
Investigation FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FEST Foreign Emergency Support Team HHS
Department of Health and Human Services PDD
Presidential Decision Directive USSS U.S. Secret Service VA
Department of Veterans Affairs WMD Weapons of Mass
Destruction Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR
Combating Terrorism Briefing Section I Background
B irief ng Secti on I Policy and Strategy on Combating Terrorism *
Presidential directives establish policy and strategy. * Strategy
includes prevention, crisis management, and consequence
management. * Priority is to prevent and respond to terrorist
attacks involving weapons of mass destruction. Page 8
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section I
Background In 1986, the President formalized U.S. policy to combat
terrorism by signing National Security Decision Directive 207,
which primarily focused on terrorist incidents overseas. After the
bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, the
President issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 in June
1995, which enumerated responsibilities for federal agencies in
combating terrorism, including domestic incidents. In May 1998,
the President issued PDD 62 that reaffirmed PDD 39 and further
articulated responsibilities for specific agencies. Federal
agencies drafted agency and interagency guidance to implement
these directives. These PDDs divide activities to combat terrorism
into three elements: preventing and deterring terrorism,
responding to a terrorist crisis, and managing the consequences
after a terrorist attack.1 Crisis management includes efforts to
stop a terrorist attack, arrest terrorists, and gather evidence
for criminal prosecution. Consequence management includes efforts
to provide medical treatment and emergency services, evacuate
people from dangerous areas, and restore government services. When
terrorist attacks occur without adequate threat warning, crisis
management and consequence management will be concurrent
activities. One of the highest priorities in the federal
government is to prevent and prepare for terrorist attacks that
use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). These attacks include
terrorist use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or
agents to cause mass casualties. The President (via PDD 39 and PDD
62) and the Congress (via legislation and committee reports) have
emphasized the importance of preparedness against this type of
threat. 1Activities to prevent and deter terrorism were not
included in the scope of this report. Page 9
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section I
Background Counterterrorist Roles and Responsibilities State leads
crisis management and consequence management overseas. FBI leads
domestic crisis management. FEMA leads domestic consequence
management. Supporting roles are assigned to other key agencies
(e.g., DOD, DOE, EPA, and HHS). Page 10
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section I
Background PDDs 39 and 62 assigned or reaffirmed lead and support
roles to various federal agencies and established interagency
support teams. The Department of State is the lead agency for both
crisis management and consequence management for terrorist
incidents overseas. The State Department would lead an interagency
Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) to provide advice and
support to U.S. ambassadors, Washington decision-makers, and host
governments. For domestic terrorist incidents, the leadership of
crisis management and consequence management is divided. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead federal agency
for domestic crisis management and would lead an interagency
Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) to provide advice and
support to FBI on-scene commanders. The Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) is the lead agency for consequence
management of domestic terrorist incidents. Other federal agencies
such as the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Energy
(DOE), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) are designated as
support agencies that would assist the lead agencies in crisis and
consequence management. Depending on the nature of the terrorist
attack, these support agencies could be part of the interagency
FEST or DEST. Briefing section III provides more detailed
information on the lead and supporting roles of specific
agencies.2 2In addition to briefing section III, our earlier
report provides detailed information on the roles and
responsibilities of lead and support agencies. See Combating
Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy
and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997). Page 11
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section I
Background Purpose and Types of Exercises * PDD-39 directed key
agencies to exercise their capabilities. * Exercises train agency
personnel and test their response plans. * Interagency exercises
enhance coordination and ability to work together. * Agencies use
both field and tabletop exercises. PDD 39 required key federal
agencies to maintain well-exercised counterterrorist capabilities.
Exercises test and validate policies and procedures, test the
effectiveness of response capabilities, and increase the
confidence and skill levels of personnel. Because a federal
counterterrorist response is inherently interagency, agencies also
exercise together. These interagency exercises enhance
coordination among agencies and help them work together. They also
allow personnel to become familiar with other agencies' procedures
and identify those areas needing further coordination. In the
absence of actual operations, exercises are an Page 12
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section I
Background important indicator of the preparedness of federal
agencies to deal with a variety of terrorist incidents. Exercises
fall into two general categories, tabletop and field exercises.3
Tabletop exercises are performed around a table, a classroom, or a
simulated command post as the players progress through a scenario
or series of scenarios and discuss how their agency or unit might
react to different situations. Tabletop exercises are used to
emphasize higher level policy and procedural issues and frequently
include more senior level agency officials. Tabletop exercises are
limited to discussions only; there is no actual deployment of
operational or tactical personnel or equipment. Thus, tabletop
exercises do not test the government's ability to actually use and
coordinate personnel and assets in a realistic setting. However,
they are a relatively inexpensive and expeditious way to identify
and resolve problems in policies and procedures. Given the
relatively few logistical requirements, agencies can plan and
conduct tabletop exercises within a few weeks or months. Field
exercises are performed in the field under simulated operational
conditions. Such exercises focus on performing tasks at the
operational and tactical levels and typically include tactics,
techniques, and procedures that would be used in a real incident.
Field exercises test agency and interagency capabilities to
actually deploy personnel and their equipment and coordinate them
as they perform their tasks in a realistic setting. Field
exercises are generally more expensive than tabletop exercises
because they involve more players, increased transportation and
other travel expenses, and added wear and tear on equipment.
Depending on their scope, field exercises may require up to a year
of advance planning to prepare detailed objectives, identify
essential tasks, script the scenario, develop an evaluation plan,
and schedule transportation and other logistic support. 3Different
agencies use slightly different nomenclature to categorize types
of exercises. Our definition of tabletop exercises includes
"seminar" exercises, "command post" exercises, and "functional
exercises." Our definition of field exercises includes "full
field" exercises, "full-up" exercises, and "muddy boots"
exercises. Page 13
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
Exercises Overall
Briefi ng Section II Counterterrorist Exercises From June 1995 to
June 1998 116 53 32 June 1995 - June 1996 June 1996 - June
1997 June 1997 - June 1998 Page 14
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
Exercises Overall Federal agencies sponsored a large number of
counterterrorism exercises in the 3-year period following the
issuance of PDD 39. In total, federal agencies sponsored 201
counterterrorism exercises to improve their preparedness for
counterterrorist operations. Most of the exercises responded to a
domestic terrorist attack and were conducted in the United States,
while some addressed international attacks and were conducted
overseas. The number of exercises increased from 32 to 116-an
increase of 263 percent-over this 3-year period. The 1996 Defense
Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, commonly known as the
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act, required DOD to enhance domestic
preparedness by providing local emergency response personnel with
training and advice. DOD's program to accomplish this, known as
the Domestic Preparedness Program, had some impact on the overall
increase in exercises. There were 26 Domestic Preparedness Program
exercises conducted in the third year, which is 13 percent of all
the exercises done over the 3-year period. While we did not
collect data beyond June 1998, DOD has continued to sponsor these
types of exercises in conjunction with local governments and other
federal agencies. We reported earlier on this program.1 1See
Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic
Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov.
12, 1998) and Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can
Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74,
Apr. 9, 1998). Page 15
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
Exercises Overall Counterterrorist Exercises Field and Tabletop 70
60 60
56 50 40 37 30 23
20 16 9 10 0 June
1995 - June 1996 June 1996 - June 1997 June 1997 -
June 1998 Field Exercises Tabletop Exercises
Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR
Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal Exercises Overall
As discussed earlier, exercises are categorized as tabletop or
field exercises. We found that federal agencies conducted a
mixture of tabletop and field exercises. Of the total 201
exercises in the 3-year period, 116 (58 percent) were field
exercises and 85 (42 percent) were tabletop exercises. Although
field exercises exceeded tabletop exercises overall, the number of
tabletop exercises increased at a much faster rate (567 percent
versus 143 percent). One factor in the increase in tabletop
exercises was DOD's implementation of the Domestic Preparedness
Program in the third year. This trend may reverse somewhat in
future years as program exercises shift from tabletop to field
exercises. Some agencies, such as FEMA, relied mostly on tabletop
exercises, and others, such as the U.S. Secret Service (USSS),
held mostly field exercises. DOD, FEMA, and FBI led the most
tabletop exercises during this period and DOD, USSS, and FBI led
the most field exercises. Page 17
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
Exercises Overall Counterterrorist Exercises With Notice and No
Notice No Notice - 4 With Notice - 197 Page 18
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
Exercises Overall Very few of the counterterrorism exercises were
conducted without advance notice to the participants. Such
exercises, known as "no-notice" exercises, provide the highest
degree of challenge and realism to federal counterterrorism teams.
Only four (2 percent of the total) exercises had no-notice field
deployments of federal personnel and equipment. All of the no-
notice exercises had international scenarios and were sponsored by
DOD or DOE. They included rapid deployments of command elements
and tactical units to locations worldwide and included the FEST to
practice supporting the ambassador at a post in a terrorist
situation. Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-
157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal Exercises
Overall Counterterrorist Exercises Crisis and/or Consequence
Management 60
55 50 38 40 33 30
28 30 20 13 10 2 2 0 0 June
1995 - June 1996 June 1996 - June 1997 June 1997 -
June 1998 Crisis Management Consequence
Management Both Page 20
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
Exercises Overall Counterterrorist exercises generally focus on
either crisis management or consequence management. While the
number of both types of exercises increased, consequence
management exercises rose dramatically. Crisis management
exercises increased from 30 to 55 (83 percent), while consequence
management exercises rose from 2 to 28 (1,400 percent) over the 3-
year period. Initially, very few exercises focused on both crisis
and consequence management as there were none in the first year
and only two in the second year. In a major terrorist incident
without adequate threat warning, crisis management and consequence
management would need to occur simultaneously. By the third year,
however, there were 33 exercises that included both crisis
management and consequence management. Of these 33, most of them
(26 exercises) were tabletop exercises sponsored by DOD under the
Domestic Preparedness Program. Crisis management exercises include
both international and domestic scenarios. Each year, DOD and DOE
sponsor several international interagency field exercises. The
State Department uses these exercises to practice its leadership
role in international terrorist incidents. Domestic crisis
management exercises are led by law enforcement agencies and
primarily provide training to prepare for crisis response. The FBI
and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) have crisis
management exercise programs that periodically test crisis
response teams and include field office personnel. The USSS
conducts many field exercises related to its mission to protect
the President and other key officials and to ensure continuity of
operations at the White House. Consequence management exercises
generally had domestic scenarios.2 FEMA sponsored a series of
interagency tabletop exercises that focused on interagency and
intergovernmental issues. Other federal agencies, such as DOD and
the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), have also sponsored
consequence management exercises. 2While there have been some DOD
and State Department sponsored consequence management exercises
with international scenarios, we did not include them in our
review. Page 21
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
Exercises Overall Counterterrorist Exercises Conventional and WMD
90
84 80 70 60 50 40
32 32 30 23 21 20
9 10 0 June 1995 - June 1996 June 1996 - June 1997
June 1997 - June 1998 Conventional WMD Page 22
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
Exercises Overall Federal counterterrorist exercises included both
conventional and WMD scenarios to prepare their personnel for a
wide variety of possible situations. Exercises with both
conventional and WMD scenarios increased more than 250 percent
over the 3-year period. The ratio of conventional scenarios to WMD
scenarios was roughly the same (about 2.5) in the third year as in
the first year.3 DOD, FEMA, FBI, and USSS led the most exercises
that included WMD scenarios. All of the 26 Domestic Preparedness
Program exercises that were conducted in the third year had WMD
scenarios. Although the number of exercises with WMD is more than
double those with conventional scenarios, conventional terrorist
incidents are more likely to occur. According to intelligence
agencies, conventional explosives and firearms continue to be the
weapons of choice for terrorists. Terrorists are less likely to
use WMD agents, in part, because they are more difficult to
obtain, develop, and weaponize or otherwise disseminate. However,
the likelihood that terrorists may use chemical and biological
materials may increase over the next decade, according to
intelligence agencies. DOD led the most WMD exercises (89
exercises), and a high percentage (92 percent) of the exercises
that it led had WMD scenarios. DOD officials said that they need
to train against the most challenging threat (i.e., WMD) and that
such training also prepares their personnel for less challenging
conventional threats. Another factor in the relatively high number
of exercises with WMD scenarios is the strong emphasis on WMD
voiced by the President (in PDDs) and the Congress (in legislation
and committee reports). 3To some extent the number of WMD
scenarios is overstated because we classified exercises that had
both WMD and conventional scenarios as WMD exercises. Page 23
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
Exercises Overall Counterterrorist Exercises Chemical, Biological,
and Nuclear 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% WMD - 139
Chemical - 59 Biological - 18 Nuclear - 21 Multiple WMD - 41
Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating
Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal Exercises Overall Federal
agencies had scenarios that used all three types of WMD (chemical,
biological, and nuclear) in their counterterrorism exercieses
during the 3-year period. Chemical agents, such as sarin, were
the most common and were included in 59 (42 percent) of the WMD
exercises. All of the 26 Domestic Preparedness Program exercises
included chemical agents. Biological agents, such as anthrax, were
less common and were included in 18 (13 percent) of the WMD
exercises. Nuclear threats (including radiological), such as
uranium bombs and plutonium, were included in 21 (15 percent) of
the exercises. In addition, of the 139 WMD exercises, 41 (29
percent) including more than 1 type of WMD in the scenario.4 An
example of a multiple WMD scenario was a DOD exercise where
terrorists teams were at two locations, one team with a chemical
weapon and one team with a biological weapon. While DOD officials
acknowledged that such a multiple WMD scenario was not likely,
they said each individual team in the exercise focused on its
individual target, so the training they received at the tactical
level was the same as in a single WMD scenario. 4To some extent
the number of multiple WMD scenarios is overstated because we
included exercises in that category if the data indicated they
were WMD, but we could not determine the exact type of agent in
the scenario. Page 25
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
Exercises Overall Counterterrorist Exercises Federal Agencies
Participating 61 94 46 One Agency - 61 Two Agencies - 46 Three or
More Agencies - 94 Page 26
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
Exercises Overall The number of federal agencies participating in
exercises ranged from a single agency to many agencies. Of the 201
exercises, 61 exercises (30 percent) only included the agencies
that led them. There were 140 exercises (70 percent) that were
interagency exercises-they involved at least 2 federal departments
or independent agencies.5 Ninety-six (47 percent of the total)
exercises were major interagency exercises because they included
three or more departments or independent agencies. DOD, FEMA, FBI,
and USSS led the most major interagency exercises during this
period. 5For the purpose of this report, we define "interagency"
as involving more than one federal department or independent
agency. For example, DOD-led exercises that included both Army and
Navy participation, or FBI-led exercises that included other
Department of Justice participants (e.g., the Bureau of Prisons)
were not considered interagency exercises. Page 27
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
Exercises Overall Counterterrorist Exercises By Types of
Participants 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Total
Exercises - State and / or Local Non-government - Foreign -
4 201 - 69 18 Page 28
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
Exercises Overall In some of the 201 exercises, federal agencies
gained experience working with state and local authorities,
nongovernmental organizations, and foreign governments. Of the 201
exercises, 69 (34 percent) had state and/or local government
participation, such as police and fire departments. In addition,
18 (9 percent) of the total exercises included nongovernmental or
other private organizations. Examples of such organizations
include disaster relief charities (e.g., the Red Cross), private
firms (e.g., hospitals, airlines, and oil companies), and
organizations set up for special events (e.g., the Atlanta
Committee for the Olympic Games). Four of the exercises (2
percent) included foreign government participation and simulated
federal agency integration in international incidents. DOD led
most of the exercises with state and local participation because
of the intergovernmental nature of the Domestic Preparedness
Program exercises. After DOD, FBI and FEMA led more exercises with
state and local participation than the other agencies. Page 29
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
Exercises Overall Counterterrorist Exercises State and Local
Participation Federal, State and / or Local
Federal, State and / or Local Field and Tabletop
WMD Versus Conventional 9 20 49
60 Field Tabletop
Conventional WMD Page 30
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
Exercises Overall Federal counterterrorist exercises that included
state and/or local participation tended to be tabletop exercises
with WMD scenarios. Of the total 69 exercises, 49 (71 percent)
were tabletops and 60 (87 percent) had WMD scenarios. The 26
Domestic Preparedness Program exercises (which were all tabletops
using WMD scenarios) accounted for 26 (38 percent) of the 69
exercises that included state and/or local participation.
According to the FBI, field exercises offer hands-on training that
cannot be replicated by tabletop exercises and valuable
opportunities to test interactions among federal, state, and local
agencies. For this reason, the FBI views participation by state
and local agencies in federally sponsored field exercises as a top
priority as it continues to plan and execute counterterrorist
exercises. However, staffing and budget considerations or
restrictive union contracts sometimes hinder state and local
participation in federal exercises, according to the FBI. The FBI
noted that it is not budgeted to pay state or local overtime for
participation in FBI-led exercises, and until this budget problem
is resolved, there will never be extensive state and local
participation in FBI-led exercises. The FBI stated that the
Department of Justice's Office of Justice Programs may be able to
provide funding for state and local participation in federally
sponsored field exercises. Page 31
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
Individual Agencies Exercises
Briefi ng Secti on III Counterterrorist Exercises By Lead Agency
FEMA - 16 USSS - 46 HHS - 3 FBI -
24 EPA - 1 DOE - 5
State - 1 Other VA - 4 ATF - 4 Other - 3 DOD - 97 Page 32
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
Individual Agencies Exercises Federal counterterrorist exercises
were generally led by one agency. The lead agency was responsible
for planning the exercise, setting the objectives, scripting the
scenario, coordinating the logistics, and evaluating the results.
Thus, the lead agency usually expended the bulk of the personnel
and resources to conduct an exercise. This is especially the case
in field exercises, which are more resource intensive than
tabletop exercises. The role of agencies that just participated
varied by exercise and by agency. Some participating agencies were
very involved in exercise planning and provided substantial
resources to exercises led by other agencies. For example, in some
field exercises, participating agencies attended numerous planning
sessions and deployed several personnel and substantial equipment
to the exercise location. In contrast, in some tabletop exercises,
some participating agencies contributed one or two personnel just
for the day of the exercise. Four agencies led more than 90
percent of the counterterrorist exercises. These four agencies,
and the number (and percentage) of federal exercises that they
led, were DOD with 97 (48 percent), USSS with 46 (23 percent), the
FBI with 24 (12 percent), and FEMA with 16 (8 percent). No other
single agency led more than five (2 percent) of the total
exercises over the 3-year period. For the few cases when more than
one agency led an exercise, we counted all sponsoring agencies as
a lead agency; thus, the total in our briefing slide (204)
slightly exceeds the 201 exercises conducted during this period.
(and Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR
Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III Individual Agencies
Exercises Counterterrorist Exercises Participation and Leadership
by Agency 160 143 140
Participated in Exercise Led Exercise 120 99 97 100 80
76 68 65 60 46 47 40
36 24
24 20 16
12 10 3 5 1
1 44 0 DOD FBI FEMA HHS
USSS EPA DOE State VA ATF
Page 34
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
Individual Agencies Exercises Some agencies (e.g., DOD, USSS, FBI,
and FEMA) not only led many exercises but also participated in
many exercises led by other agencies. Other agencies we reviewed
led 5 or fewer exercises but participated in at least 10 exercises
in the 3-year period. These agencies generally exercise their
personnel and equipment through their participation in other
agencies' exercises. For example, State Department officials told
us that they leverage DOD-sponsored exercises to exercise their
counterterrorism responsibilities, including their lead agency
status. As discussed earlier, because some exercises were
sponsored by more than one agency, the number of exercises that
agencies led (204) slightly exceeded the 201 exercises conducted
in this period. Additional information on agencies leading and
participating in exercises is provided by the individual agencies
in the remainder of this section. For the agencies that led the
most exercises (DOD, USSS, FBI, and FEMA), the data is displayed
by exercises that each agency led. These agencies are presented in
descending order of the number of exercises they led. For the
other agencies, the data is displayed by exercises in which they
participated. These agencies are presented in descending order of
the number of exercises they participated in. Page 35
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
Individual Agencies Exercises Department of Defense
Counterterrorist Exercises DOD Leadership and Participation in
Exercises Type of Exercises That DOD Led
46 44 53 97 Exercises Led Participated Only
Field Exercises Tabletop Exercises Breakdown of DOD-
Led Exercises by Number of Participating Agencies
Type of Scenarios for Exercises That DOD Led 8 35 62 89 One or Two
Three or More Conventional
WMD Page 36
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
Individual Agencies Exercises DOD is not a lead federal agency for
response to terrorist incidents, but it provides significant and
unique capabilities to support other agencies in conducting their
responsibilities. DOD works with the State Department to support
its international crisis management role. DOD also supports the
domestic lead agencies, FBI and FEMA, and other agencies for
domestic crisis and consequence management. This support includes
not only tactical units but also logistics and technical units
trained to deal with all types of WMD. Examples of response units
include the Army's Technical Escort Unit and the Marine Corps'
Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force. During this
period, DOD participated in a wide variety of counterterrorist
exercises and sponsored major exercises with interagency
participation. DOD participated in the most exercises with a total
of 143, and it led 97 (68 percent) of these exercises. Of the DOD-
led exercises, 53 (55 percent) were tabletop and 44 (45 percent)
were field exercises. Most included WMD scenarios, primarily
chemical weapons, and 62 (66 percent) of the DOD-led exercises
included 3 or more federal agencies, many of which included State,
FBI, DOE, HHS, and EPA. DOD also sponsored the four exercises that
included foreign government participants, as well as three of the
four no-notice exercises. DOD sponsored a variety of major
interagency tabletop exercises and field exercises. DOD sponsored
the Domestic Preparedness Program exercises carried out in major
U.S. cities. This program also included major federal, state, and
local field exercises in Denver in 1997 and Philadelphia in 1998.
DOD also established the Interagency Terrorism Response Awareness
Program, which includes tabletop exercises that bring together
senior agency officials within the counterterrorism community to
coordinate policy issues. DOD schedules several interagency field
exercises, including the Eligible Receiver series, which are
sponsored by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
Ellipse series, which are field exercises conducted by one of the
geographic theatre commanders. These major exercises usually
include participation by other federal agencies. For example, in
June of 1998, DOD conducted a weeklong WMD crisis management
exercise, which included FBI, State, FEMA, DOE, and HHS. Page 37
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
Individual Agencies Exercises U.S. Secret Service Counterterrorist
Exercises Type of Exercises That USSS Led USSS Leadership and
Participation in Exercises
5 19 46 41 Exercises Led Participated Only
Field Exercises Tabletop Exercises Breakdown of
USSS-Led Exercises by Number of Participating Agencies
Type of Scenarios for Exercises That USSS Led 6 10 40
36 One or Two Three or More Conventional WMD Page
38 GAO/NSIAD-
99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III Individual
Agencies Exercises Among other responsibilities, USSS provides
protection to the President and other key officials. USSS
conducted exercises for its special agents related to its
protective mission. These exercises generally involved continuity
of operations at the White House or protecting the President and
other officials. Some of these exercises practiced the USSS role
in providing security at certain special events, such as national
political conventions, presidential inaugurations, and state of
the union addresses. USSS generally led field exercises with
conventional scenarios that had few other federal agencies
participating. USSS participated in a total of 65 exercises and
led 46 (71 percent) of these exercises. Forty-one (89 percent) of
the exercises led by USSS were field exercises and the other 5 (11
percent) were tabletop exercises. Of the 46 exercises that USSS
led, 40 (87 percent) of them had only the USSS or the USSS and 1
other agency participating and 6 (13 percent) of them had 3 or
more federal agencies. Of the exercises it led, 36 (78 percent)
had conventional scenarios and 10 (22 percent) had some type of
WMD threat in their scenarios. USSS-led exercises involve
protecting the President and other officials from attacks and are
held at a variety of locations, including the White House complex.
These exercises include some other federal agencies, such as DOD
(the White House Military Office), FEMA, and the U.S. Capitol
Police. The exercises that practice defense against attacks on the
President and other officials, such as during motorcades, are held
at the USSS training center and involve some other agencies as
participants or observers. Exercises have been performed with
other agencies before some special events, such as the
Presidential Inauguration in 1997 and the Summit of the Eight in
Denver in 1997. Page 39
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
Individual Agencies Exercises Federal Bureau of Investigation
Counterterrorist Exercises FBI Leadership and Participation in
Exercises Type of Exercises That
FBI Led 24 7 75
17 Exercises Led Participated Only
Field Exercises Tabletop Exercises Breakdown of
FBI-Led Exercises by Number of Participating Agencies
Type of Scenarios for Exercises That FBI 6
Led 11 13 18 One or Two Three or More
Conventional WMD Page 40
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
Individual Agencies Exercises The Department of Justice, including
the FBI, has many responsibilities related to terrorism, including
conducting criminal investigations, arresting individuals who
commit terrorist acts, and prosecuting them. The FBI has been
designated as the lead federal agency responsible for domestic
terrorism crisis management, including responding to terrorist
incidents. The FBI has a variety of operational capabilities that
it can deploy to respond to a crisis. Its Critical Incident
Response Group can deploy additional resources to assist field
offices in responding and is also responsible for sponsoring FBI
crisis management exercises. The FBI also can establish a Joint
Operations Center to provide for interagency participation in
managing a crisis. The FBI can also deploy an interagency DEST to
advise and assist the FBI special agent in charge. The FBI's
crisis management field exercises provide training in response
capabilities to FBI field personnel. The FBI participated in 99
exercises during the 3-year period and led 24 (24 percent) of
these exercises. Even though many FBI-led exercises focus on
training for FBI response units, the FBI also led some exercises
with participation by several other federal agencies. Of the 24
exercises that the FBI-led, 6 (25 percent) had 3 or more federal
agencies participating. The other 18 exercises (75 percent)
included only the FBI or the FBI and one other federal agency, as
well as some other Justice Department organizations. The exercises
also included some state and local organizations. FBI-led
exercises included 17 (71 percent) field exercises and 7 (29
percent) tabletop exercises. FBI's crisis management exercises had
a variety of scenarios and terrorist threats. Thirteen of the
scenarios (54 percent) were WMD and the other 11 (46 percent) were
conventional. The FBI's exercises were primarily crisis management
field training exercises that focused on training FBI's
operational response units, such as Special Weapons and Tactics
teams, and evaluating their response plans. FBI's field training
exercises are often held at locations where actual crises could
occur and include participants from FBI's field offices. These
exercises test command and control by establishing command posts
and tactical operations centers and include support, such as
equipment, communications, and logistics. The FBI exercises had a
variety of scenarios, including hostage barricades, aircraft
hijackings, terrorist attacks, conventional bombing attacks,
threat of WMD, kidnappings, and prison disturbances. The FBI was
also a significant player in some exercises that it did not lead.
For example, it played a major role in a June 1998 DOD-sponsored
exercise and established a Joint Operations Center with
representatives from other agencies, such as DOE, FEMA, and HHS.
Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR
Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III Individual Agencies
Exercises Federal Emergency Management Agency Counterterrorist
Exercises FEMA Leadership and Participation in Exercises
Type of Exercises That FEMA Led 0 16 60 16 Exercises Led
Participated Only Field Exercises
Tabletop Exercises Breakdown of FEMA-Led Exercises by
Type of Scenarios for Exercises That FEMA Number of Participating
Agencies Led 1
5 11 15 One or Two Three or More
Conventional WMD Page 42
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
Individual Agencies Exercises FEMA is the lead agency for
coordinating the federal response to manage the consequences of a
domestic terrorist attack. FEMA has various emergency response
responsibilities for disasters, including maintaining the Federal
Response Plan, which includes a counterterrorism annex. FEMA,
using the Federal Response Plan, would coordinate the federal
efforts to support state and local governments. The Stafford Act1
provides FEMA with authority to assign missions to any federal
agency in the event of a disaster or an emergency declared by the
President, including acts of terrorism. FEMA's counterterrorism
exercises focused on its consequence management role, and FEMA
also participated in crisis management field exercises led by
other agencies. The exercises that FEMA led have generally been
interagency tabletops centered on a variety of WMD threats and
scenarios. Of the 76 exercises that FEMA participated in, 16 (21
percent) were led by FEMA. Many of the exercises were interagency
with 11 of the 16 exercises that FEMA led (or 69 percent) having
three or more federal agencies participating. The other five
exercises (31 percent) included only FEMA or FEMA and one other
federal agency. The 16 exercises that FEMA led were all tabletop
exercises. FEMA's consequence management exercises were almost all
(94 percent) WMD and had a variety of scenarios and terrorist
threats. The exercises led by FEMA included some major interagency
exercises with WMD scenarios. The Ill Wind series of tabletop
exercises, which began in September 1996, focused on preparing
emergency management personnel to deal with the consequences of
terrorism incidents. The scenarios of the exercises involved the
use of WMD in the Washington, D.C., area. The FBI and several
other agencies provided briefings, and there were participants
from many other agencies. More recently, FEMA held consequence
management seminars and tabletop exercises for its personnel in
each of its 10 regions to highlight terrorism issues, and they
included FBI regional participants. The regions chose the
scenarios and seven included chemical agents and three included
nuclear threats. FEMA also participated in major field exercises
led by DOD and FBI to practice planning for consequence
management. 142 U.S.C. section 5121 et seq. Page 43
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
Individual Agencies Exercises Department of Health and Human
Services Counterterrorist Exercises HHS Leadership and
Participation in Exercises Type
of Exercises That HHS Participated In 3
13 65 55
Exercises Led Participated Only
Field Exercises Tabletop Exercises Breakdown of
Number of Agencies Type
of Scenarios for Exercises Participating in Exercises Including
HHS That HHS Participated In
2 3 65
66 One or Two Three or More
Conventional WMD Page 44
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
Individual Agencies Exercises HHS has a support role, related
primarily to consequence management, to provide the health and
medical response to a terrorist incident. HHS can provide a number
of services in a terrorist incident, including threat assessment,
consultation, agent identification, epidemiological investigation,
hazard detection and reduction, triage, treatment,
decontamination, pubic health support, medical support,
pharmaceutical support, overflow hospital capacity, mental health
services, and mortuary services. The Office of Emergency
Preparedness coordinates the overall HHS support. HHS could
activate a number of specialized resources that include the
National Disaster Medical System, Disaster Medical Assistance
Teams, National Medical Response Teams, and Disaster Mortuary
Teams. For biological agents, HHS can help identify the agent and
conduct epidemiological investigations through its network of
laboratories. HHS generally participated in tabletop exercises
with WMD scenarios that included several federal agencies. HHS led
3 (4 percent) of the 68 exercises it participated in. Of these
three HHS-led exercises, two (66 percent) were field exercises,
two (66 percent) involved three or more federal agencies, and all
had WMD scenarios. Of the 68 exercises that it participated in, 13
(19 percent) were field exercises, 65 (96 percent) involved three
or more agencies, and 66 (97 percent) had WMD scenarios. An
example of an exercise sponsored by HHS (also cosponsored by DOD
and VA) was "Consequence Management 98", which was conducted in
April 1998. This exercise included five HHS Disaster Medical
Assistance Teams, focused on the medical aspects of a WMD attack,
and included training to develop a field medical unit, perform
triage, decontaminate patients, and provide additional treatment.
The exercise had over 600 participants who practiced their
clinical skills in an emergency field setting. HHS officials also
stressed the importance of major special events (e.g.,
inaugurations and sporting events) in exercising their staff's
capabilities. Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-
99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III Individual
Agencies Exercises Environmental Protection Agency
Counterterrorist Exercises EPA Leadership and Participation in
Exercises Type of Exercises
That EPA Participated In 1
4 43 46 Field Exercises Tabletop Exercises
Exercises Led Participated Only Breakdown of
Number of Agencies Participating in Exercises Including EPA
Type of Scenarios for Exercises That EPA Participated In 1
0 46
47 Conventional WMD One or Two
Three or More Page 46
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
Individual Agencies Exercises EPA is a support agency for both
crisis management and consequence management in terrorist
incidents involving WMD. EPA provides expertise and technical
support for identification of contaminants, collection and
analysis of samples, monitoring of contaminants, on-site safety,
and decontamination. EPA also issues permits for the custody,
transportation, and transfer of hazardous chemical. The Office of
the Emergency and Deputy Emergency Coordinator would coordinate
overall EPA support in chemical and nuclear terrorist incidents.
Examples of EPA resources include an Environmental Response Team,
a Radiological Emergency Response Team, the Environmental
Radiation Ambient Monitoring System, and the National Enforcement
Investigations Center. EPA generally participated in tabletop
exercises with WMD scenarios that included several federal
agencies. EPA led 1 (2 percent) of the 47 exercises in which it
participated. The one EPA-led exercise was a tabletop exercise
that only involved EPA and used a WMD scenario. Of the total 47
exercises that EPA participated in, 4 (6 percent) were field
exercises, 46 (98 percent) involved three or more agencies, and
all had WMD scenarios. The exercise that EPA sponsored was
"Olympic Sparkler" in April 1996. This EPA-only tabletop exercise
used a scenario where terrorists dispersed radioactive material at
the Atlanta Olympics. The purpose of the exercise was to test EPA
plans and procedures to respond to a terrorist incident involving
radiation dispersal among a civilian population. Page 47
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
Individual Agencies Exercises Department of Energy
Counterterrorist Exercises DOE Leadership and Participation in
Exercises Type of Exercises That DOE
Participated In 5 13 23 31 Exercises Led Participated Only
Field Exercises Tabletop Exercises Breakdown
of Number of Agencies Participating in Exercises
Type of Scenarios for Exercises Including DOE
That DOE Participated In 6
3 30
33 One or Two Three or More
Conventional WMD Page 48
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
Individual Agencies Exercises DOE is a support agency in WMD
incidents for both crisis management and consequence management,
providing support and technical assistance related to nuclear
devices and radiological events. Specifically, DOE can provide
threat assessments, search operations, diagnostic and device
assessments, containment relocation and storage of special nuclear
material, and post-incident cleanup. DOE's Office of Emergency
Response generally provides coordination of the Department's
support. In the event of a nuclear terrorist threat or incident,
DOE could activate and/or deploy several teams, including a
Nuclear Incident Team, the Nuclear/Radiological Advisory Team, the
Nuclear Emergency Search Team, the Federal Radiological Monitoring
and Assessment Center, Accident Response Group, the Aerial
Measuring System, the Radiological Assistance Program, Atmospheric
Release Advisory Capability, and the Radiation Emergency
Assistance Center and Training Site. These response teams are
composed of DOE employees and contractors who work at DOE
facilities as weapon designers, engineers, and physicists. DOE
generally participated in a mixture of field and tabletop
exercises with WMD scenarios that included several federal
agencies. DOE led 5 (14 percent) of the 36 exercises it
participated in. Of the five DOE-led exercises, three (60 percent)
were field exercises, three (60 percent) involved three or more
federal agencies, and all had WMD scenarios. Of the total 36
exercises that DOE participated in, 13 (33 percent) were field
exercises, 30 (83 percent) involved three or more agencies, and 30
(83 percent) had WMD scenarios. The exercises that DOE led were
generally deployments (including one no-notice deployment) of
DOE's rapid response capabilities and included personnel and
equipment from other agencies as well. Most of them were field
exercises that focused on crisis management. Given DOE's role,
most of the exercises that DOE led or participated in had nuclear
or radiological scenarios. Page 49
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
Individual Agencies Exercises Department of State Counterterrorist
Exercises State Leadership and Participation in Exercises
Type of Exercises That State 1
Participated In 9 23
15 Exercises Led Participated Only Field
Exercises Tabletop Exercises Breakdown of Number of
Agencies Participating in Exercises
Type of Scenarios for Exercises That Including State
State Participated In 1
6 23 18 One
or Two Three or More
Conventional WMD Page 50
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
Individual Agencies Exercises The State Department is the lead
agency for international terrorist incidents for both crisis
management and consequence management. The State Department,
through its Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, leads
a FEST to provide advice and support to U.S. ambassadors,
Washington decision-makers, and host governments. The FEST is an
interagency team tailored to the specific terrorist incident that
could deploy at the request of the ambassador and with the
permission of the host country. The Department determines the
composition of the FEST, which could include FBI, DOD, DOE, HHS,
or EPA if the incident involved WMD. For consequence management, a
Consequence Management Advisory Team would deploy with the FEST to
assess the need for follow-on assets that would assist a host
government in planning for and managing the consequences of a WMD
incident overseas. The State Department generally participated in
field exercises with WMD scenarios that included several federal
agencies. The State Department sponsored 1 (4 percent) of the 24
exercises that it participated in. This was a field exercise with
participation by several federal agencies that used a conventional
scenario. Of the total 24 exercises that State participated in, 15
(63 percent) were field exercises, 23 (96 percent) involved three
or more agencies, and 18 (75 percent) had WMD scenarios. In
general, the State Department uses DOD- and DOE-led exercises to
practice its leadership role in international incidents. These
exercises test rapid and no-notice deployments of command elements
and tactical units to locations worldwide and frequently test the
FEST so deployments can be practiced by the full cadre of
interagency players. The one exercise that the State Department
sponsored-also cosponsored by DOD-was a bilateral exercise with
another friendly nation. This was a field exercise where personnel
and equipment deployed to a foreign country and worked with
embassy personnel to practice dealing with a conventional hostage
barricade situation. Page 51
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
Individual Agencies Exercises Department of Veterans Affairs
Counterterrorist Exercises Type of Exercises That VA Participated
In VA Leadership and Participation in Exercises 4 6
6 8 Exercises Led Participated Only
Field Exercises Tabletop Exercises Breakdown of
Number of Agencies Participatiing in Exercises
Type of Scenarios for Exercises That Including VA
VA Participated In 2 3 9
10 One or Two Three or More
Conventional WMD Page 52
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
Individual Agencies Exercises VA is a support agency that could
provide health and medical support for consequence management. VA
works with HHS and DOD to maintain the National Medical Disaster
System, a combination of private and government hospitals that
could provide health and medical support in a terrorist incident
involving mass casualties. Under PDD 62, VA works with HHS to
ensure that adequate stockpiles of antidotes and other necessary
pharmaceuticals are available for terrorist attacks nationwide.
HHS, in consultation with VA, will determine the makeup and size
of the pharmaceutical caches for such emergencies.2 In a terrorist
attack, VA could activate its Response Support Unit to manage the
agency's overall response and provide support to other agencies,
such as FEMA under the Federal Response Plan. VA also has two
response teams, the Emergency Medical Response Team and the
Medical Emergency Radiological Response Team. The later team
consists of physicians and nuclear physicists that could
supplement any federal response to a terrorist threat involving
nuclear material. VA generally participated in a mixture of field
and tabletop exercises with WMD scenarios that included several
federal agencies. VA led 4 (33 percent) of the 12 exercises it
participated in. Of these four exercises, all were field
exercises, two (50 percent) involved three or more federal
agencies, and all had WMD scenarios. Of the total 12 exercises
that VA participated in, 6 (50 percent) were field exercises, 9
(75 percent) involved 3 or more agencies, and 10 (83 percent) had
WMD scenarios. An example of a VA-sponsored exercise was "Radex
North" conducted in March 1997. VA sponsored this exercise in
conjunction with the state of Minnesota, which simulated a
terrorist attack on a federal building with explosives laced with
radioactive material, and the subsequent decontamination and
treatment of hundreds of casualties. One of the exercise's
objectives was to test the concept of operations for the VA's
Medical Emergency Radiological Response Team. The exercise had 500
participants and attempted to fully integrate the federal medical
response into the state and local responses, including local
hospitals. VA officials noted that they participated in numerous
other disaster-related exercises (which were outside the scope of
our review) to improve the Department's consequence management
capabilities. 2VA is not involved in the development of the
national stockpile of pharmaceuticals and vaccines. The
Pharmaceutical caches referred to in PDD 62 are for medical
response teams. Page 53
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
Individual Agencies Exercises Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms Counterterrorist Exercises Type of Exercises That ATF ATF
Leadership and Participation in Exercises
Participated In 1 4 6 9 Exercises Led Participated Only
Field Exercises Tabletop Exercises Breakdown of
Number of Agencies Participating in Exercises
Type of Scenarios for Exercises That Including ATF
ATF Participated In 3 3 7 7 Conventional WMD One or Two
Three or More Page 54
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
Individual Agencies Exercises ATF has a crisis response role and
investigation jurisdiction related to incidents involving
conventional bombings. ATF has a Critical Incident Management
Response Team that is a standardized deployable command
organizational structure for managing responses to incidents,
which include acts of terrorism. ATF also has teams that respond
and deploy to the crisis site. For example, there are Special
Response Teams that provide crisis response. ATF leads exercises
that test the crisis response capabilities of its Special Response
Teams. ATF participated in 10 exercises during the 3-year period,
including 4 exercises (40 percent) that it led. Of the 10
exercises that ATF participated in, 9 (90 percent) were field
exercises. Seven (70 percent) of the 10 exercises that ATF
participated in had less than three federal agencies participating
in them and had conventional scenarios, including all of the
exercises led by ATF; the other three (30 percent) had some type
of WMD in their scenario. ATF also participated in six other
exercises led by other agencies, including three that had three or
more federal agencies participating. During this period, ATF led
field exercises for its regional personnel that included the
Special Response Teams in each of the five ATF regions. These
exercises focused on developing ATF's internal crisis response
capabilities, lasted up to 1 week, and included both classroom
training and field exercises. The exercises also included ATF
tactical operations centers, response teams, hostage negotiators,
communications, and logistics. The exercises had scenarios that
generally included domestic antigovernment groups and hostage
situations. These exercises included conventional firearms and
explosives, not WMD. ATF officials said they have completed field
exercises in all ATF regions and are conducting tabletop exercises
in their 23 field divisions to update their staff on their new
Critical Incident Management System. Page 55
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Appendix I Major
Contributors to This Report
Appendix I Carol R. Schuster Stephen L. Caldwell Davi M.
D'Agostino Alan M. Byroade Lee Purdy Page 56
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Page 57 GAO/NSIAD-99-
157BR Combating Terrorism Page 58 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating
Terrorism Related GAO Products Combating Terrorism: Observations
on Growth in Federal Programs (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181, June 9, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response
Equipment and Sustainment Costs (GAO/NSIAD-99-151, June 9, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is
Unclear (GAO/NSIAD-99-110, May 21, 1999). Combating Terrorism:
Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorist Operations
(GAO/NSIAD-99-135, May 13, 1999). Weapons of Mass Destruction:
DOD Efforts to Reduce Russian Arsenals May Cost More and
Accomplish Less Than Expected (GAO/NSIAD-99-76, Apr. 13, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and
Public Health Initiatives (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112, Mar. 16, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat
Terrorism (GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107, Mar. 11, 1999). Combating
Terrorism: FBI's Use of Federal Funds for Counterterrorism-
Related Activities (FYs 1995-98) (GAO/GGD-99-7, Nov. 20, 1998).
Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic
Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov.
12, 1998). Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-
Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, Oct. 2,
1998). Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues
(GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23, 1998). Combating Terrorism: Threat
and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program
Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998). Combating Terrorism:
Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and
Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997). Combating Terrorism:
Efforts to Protect U.S. Forces in Turkey and the Middle East
(GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44, Oct. 28, 1997). Page 59
GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Related GAO Products
Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement
National Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997).
Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces
Overseas (GAO/NSIAD-97-207, July 21, 1997). (701164) Letter
Page 60 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating
Terrorism Ordering Information The first copy of each GAO report
and testimony is free. Additional copies are $2 each. Orders
should be sent to the following address, accompanied by a check or
money order made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when
necessary, VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also.
Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are
discounted 25 percent. Orders by mail: U.S. General Accounting
Office P.O. Box 37050 Washington, DC 20013 or visit: Room 1100
700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW) U.S. General
Accounting Office Washington, DC Orders may also be placed by
calling (202) 512-6000 or by using fax number (202) 512-6061, or
TDD (202) 512-2537. Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available
reports and testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily
list or any list from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000
using a touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information
on how to obtain these lists. For information on how to access GAO
reports on the INTERNET, send an e-mail message with "info" in the
body to: [email protected] or visit GAO's World Wide Web Home Page
at: http://www.gao.gov United States Bulk
Rate General Accounting Office Postage & Fees Paid
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001 GAO Permit No. GI00
Official Business Penalty for Private Use $300 Address Correction
Requested
*** End of document. ***