Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Federal Counterterrorist Exercises
(Briefing Report, 06/25/1999, GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR).

Terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel and interests domestically and
abroad underscore the need for effective U.S. efforts to combat
terrorism. U.S. policy and implementing guidelines call for robust,
tailored, and rapidly deployable interagency teams to conduct
well-coordinated and highly integrated operations. Federal agencies
enhance their ability to respond to terrorist attacks by conducting
exercises that train key personnel and test response teams. GAO recently
briefed congressional staff on the numbers, the scenarios, and the
participants involved in federal counterterrorism exercises done from
June 1995 to June 1998. This report summarizes those briefings.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-99-157BR
     TITLE:  Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Federal Counterterrorist
	     Exercises
      DATE:  06/25/1999
   SUBJECT:  Terrorism
	     Emergency preparedness
	     Explosives
	     National defense operations
	     Mobilization
	     Nuclear weapons
	     Interagency relations
	     Crime prevention
	     Training utilization
IDENTIFIER:  DOD Domestic Preparedness Program
	     FEMA Federal Response Plan

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    United States General Accounting Office GAO
    Briefing Report to Congressional Committees June 1999
    COMBATING TERRORISM Analysis of Federal Counterterrorist Exercises
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR United States General Accounting Office
    National Security and Washington, D.C. 20548
    International Affairs Division B-282723
    Letter June 25, 1999 The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking Minority
    Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives The
    Honorable Christopher Shays Chairman, Subcommittee on National
    Security, Veterans' Affairs, and International Relations Committee
    on Government Reform House of Representatives Terrorist attacks
    against U.S. personnel and interests domestically and abroad
    highlight the need for effective U.S. efforts to combat terrorism.
    U.S. policy and implementing guidelines call for robust, tailored,
    and rapidly deployable interagency teams to conduct well-
    coordinated and highly integrated operations. Federal agencies
    enhance their ability to respond to terrorist incidents by
    conducting exercises that train key personnel and test response
    plans. We recently briefed your staffs on our analysis of federal
    counterterrorist exercise data that we had gathered in producing
    our February 1999 classified report to you. This report summarizes
    the contents of those briefings. Our objective was to determine
    the numbers, types, scenarios, and participants involved in
    federal counterterrorism exercises conducted from June 1995 to
    June 1998. Background                          Presidential
    directives assign leadership and supporting roles to various
    federal agencies. Federal agencies' activities to combat terrorism
    include responding to a terrorist crisis and managing the
    consequences after a terrorist attack. Presidential Decision
    Directive (PDD) 39, issued in June 1995, required key federal
    agencies to ensure that their counterterrorist capabilities are
    well exercised. Counterterrorism exercises include tabletop
    exercises, in which agency officials discuss scenarios around a
    table or other similar setting, and field exercises, where agency
    leadership and operational units actually deploy to practice their
    skills and Letter           Page 1
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism B-282723 coordination in a
    realistic field setting. One of the highest priorities in the
    federal government is to prepare for terrorist attacks involving
    weapons of mass destruction (WMD).1 Results in Brief
    Federal agencies conducted 201 counterterrorism exercises in the 3
    years following PDD 39. The number of exercises per year more than
    tripled over the 3-year period, with the largest increase in the
    last year. Agencies used a variety of types of exercises and
    scenarios during this period. More than half of the exercises were
    field exercises (where command and response personnel actually
    deployed with their equipment), and the rest were tabletop
    exercises (where personnel discussed a particular scenario). Very
    few of the exercises included no-notice deployments of personnel
    and equipment. Over one-half of the exercises dealt with managing
    the immediate crisis resulting from a terrorist incident,
    including stopping a terrorist attack, while the others dealt with
    managing the consequences of the incident, such as caring for the
    injured. Until recently, very few exercises dealt with the likely
    situation of both crisis and consequence management occurring
    simultaneously. More than two-thirds of the exercises had WMD
    scenarios, while the others had more traditional and more likely
    terrorist scenarios involving conventional arms and explosives.
    Over half of the WMD exercises used scenarios that used chemical
    agents. There was a variety of participants in these exercises.
    More than two-thirds of the exercises included more than one
    federal agency and almost one-half of them included three or more
    federal agencies. Some exercises also included participants of
    organizations other than federal agencies. For example, one-third
    of the exercises included state and/or local government
    participants, almost one-tenth of them had nongovernmental
    participants, and a few had foreign government participants.
    Federal agencies played various roles in these exercises,
    depending on their roles and their level of participation. 1For
    the purpose of this report, we define WMD as chemical, biological,
    and nuclear weapons or agents. Within the federal government,
    there is disagreement as to the precise definition, especially
    whether large conventional explosives should be included. Letter
    Page 2                                                GAO/NSIAD-
    99-157BR Combating Terrorism B-282723 This report contains no
    recommendations. However, in our February 1999 classified report
    on interagency counterterrorist operations, we made five
    recommendations to several agencies to improve counterterrorist
    exercises.2 Agency Comments     We received oral comments from the
    Department of State, the Department of Defense (DOD), the U.S.
    Secret Service (USSS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
    the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of
    Health and Human Services (HHS), the Environmental Protection
    Agency (EPA), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of
    Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
    Firearms (ATF). In general, these agencies stated that the report
    was an accurate reflection of federal counterterrorist exercises
    conducted in the period we reviewed. Many of these agencies
    provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
    The FBI commented that the report was an accurate empirical survey
    of federal counterterrorist exercises. However, the FBI believed
    that clarification would be beneficial in four areas: tabletop
    exercises, state and local participation in exercises, no-notice
    exercises, and our methodology to collect and analyze exercises
    led by federal agencies. The FBI said that tabletop exercises can
    sometimes take months to prepare for and that it was sometimes
    difficult to get state and local officials to participate in
    federal exercises. We changed the text to reflect these comments.
    Regarding no-notice exercises, the FBI noted some of the
    difficulties involved in conducting these type of exercises in a
    domestic scenario. According to the FBI, no-notice exercises,
    especially those broad in scope, can be disruptive to an agency's
    normal functions and daily responsibilities. It noted that the
    FBI's ability to dedicate resources and personnel to no-notice
    exercises is limited by its primary mission to investigate
    violations of federal law. According to the FBI, the primary goal
    of the exercise program should be to train the participants in the
    crisis management process, not to test how fast they can respond
    to a no-notice exercise. PDD 39 and the guidelines and plans that
    implement it call for robust rapidly deployable interagency teams.
    Thus, we believe that it is also 2For an unclassified summary of
    this report, see Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to
    Improve Counterterrorist Operations (GAO/NSIAD-99-135, May 13,
    1999). This summary, however, does not contain our recommendations
    because they were classified. Letter    Page 3
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism B-282723 important to test
    how fast federal teams can respond to a no-notice event. Such
    exercises could lead to improvements in recall and deployment
    procedures to ensure that state and local first responders receive
    federal assistance as soon as possible. Along these lines, the
    Senate Committee on Appropriations recently directed the Attorney
    General to conduct no-notice exercises with domestic scenarios
    that include the participation of all key personnel who would
    participate in the consequence management of a major terrorist
    event involving the use of a chemical, biological, or cyber
    weapon. Regarding our methodology, the FBI commented that the
    number of FBI-sponsored exercises identified in our report was
    incomplete because we focused on national level exercises. The
    data included in the report was based on information that the FBI
    and other agencies provided to us during our review. We provided
    our list of exercises to FBI and other agencies to review for
    completeness and accuracy. To the extent the agencies, such as
    FBI, were not aware of counterterrorist exercises that their field
    offices led or participated in, we may not have included such
    exercises in our analysis. FBI also commented that our methodology
    consisted of a simple tally of conducted exercises rather than a
    more in-depth analysis of exercise scope, objectives, and number
    and type of participants. We did perform such an analysis in our
    February 1999 classified report, which included five
    recommendations to several agencies (including FBI) to improve
    counterterrorist exercises. Scope and                We focused
    our analysis on federal counterterrorism exercises in the 3-year
    Methodology              period following the issuance of PDD 39.
    To gather data on exercises, we obtained documents and interviewed
    officials at the Department of  State, DOD, USSS, FBI, FEMA, HHS,
    EPA, DOE, VA, and ATF. We compiled a list of 201 counterterrorism
    exercises that were conducted from June 1995 to June 1998. To
    ensure the accuracy of our list of exercises, appropriate federal
    agencies reviewed it for completeness and accuracy. We also
    observed interagency meetings, planning sessions, and exercises.
    We performed our analysis in accordance with generally accepted
    government auditing standards between March 1999 and May 1999 on
    data we gathered in 1997 and 1998. This report is organized into
    three briefing sections. Section I includes background
    information. Section II presents our analysis of all federal
    counterterrorist exercises, including their number, type, focus,
    scenarios, and participants. Section III presents similar
    information on individual Letter    Page 4
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism B-282723 agencies. For the
    four agencies that led most of the exercises, our data is
    presented in terms of the exercises that they led. For the other
    six agencies that participated in many exercises, but led
    relatively few, the data is presented in terms of the exercises in
    which they participated. As agreed with your offices, unless you
    publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no
    further distribution until 30 days after its issuance date. At
    that time we will send copies to appropriate congressional
    committees, the federal agencies discussed in this report, and to
    the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director of the Office of Management and
    Budget. We also will make copies available to other interested
    parties upon request. If you have any questions about this report,
    please contact me at (202) 512-5140. Major contributors to this
    report are listed in appendix I. Mark E. Gebicke Director,
    National Security Preparedness Issues Letter    Page 5
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Contents Letter
    1 Briefing Section I       Policy and Strategy on Combating
    Terrorism                                8 Background
    Counterterrorist Roles and Responsibilities
    10 Purpose and Types of Exercises
    12 Briefing Section II      Counterterrorist Exercises From June
    1995 to June 1998                   14 Federal Exercises
    Counterterrorist Exercises Field and Tabletop
    16 Overall                  Counterterrorist Exercises With Notice
    and No Notice                     18 Counterterrorist Exercises
    Crisis and/or Consequence Management          20 Counterterrorist
    Exercises Conventional and WMD                          22
    Counterterrorist Exercises Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear
    24 Counterterrorist Exercises Federal Agencies Participating
    26 Counterterrorist Exercises by Types of Participants
    28 Counterterrorist Exercises State and Local Participation
    30 Briefing Section III     Counterterrorist Exercises by Lead
    Agency                                32 Individual Agencies
    Counterterrorist Exercises Participation and Leadership by Agency
    34 Exercises                Department of Defense Counterterrorist
    Exercises                         36 U.S. Secret Service
    Counterterrorist Exercises                           38 Federal
    Bureau of Investigation Counterterrorist Exercises
    40 Federal Emergency Management Agency Counterterrorist Exercises
    42 Department of Health and Human Services Counterterrorist
    Exercises 44 Environmental Protection Agency Counterterrorist
    Exercises               46 Department of Energy Counterterrorist
    Exercises                          48 Department of State
    Counterterrorist Exercises                           50 Department
    of Veterans Affairs Counterterrorist Exercises                52
    Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Counterterrorist
    Exercises      54 Appendix I
    56 Major Contributors to This Report Related GAO Products
    59 Page 6                                GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR
    Combating Terrorism Contents Abbreviations ATF              Bureau
    of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms DEST Domestic Emergency Support
    Team DOD Department of Defense DOE Department of Energy EPA
    Environmental Protection Agency FBI              Federal Bureau of
    Investigation FEMA             Federal Emergency Management Agency
    FEST             Foreign Emergency Support Team HHS
    Department of Health and Human Services PDD
    Presidential Decision Directive USSS U.S. Secret Service VA
    Department of Veterans Affairs WMD              Weapons of Mass
    Destruction Page 7                         GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR
    Combating Terrorism Briefing Section I Background
    B irief ng Secti on I Policy and Strategy on Combating Terrorism *
    Presidential directives establish policy and strategy. * Strategy
    includes prevention, crisis management, and consequence
    management. * Priority is to prevent and respond to terrorist
    attacks involving weapons of mass destruction. Page 8
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section I
    Background In 1986, the President formalized U.S. policy to combat
    terrorism by signing National Security Decision Directive 207,
    which primarily focused on terrorist incidents overseas. After the
    bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, the
    President issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 in June
    1995, which enumerated responsibilities for federal agencies in
    combating terrorism, including domestic incidents. In May 1998,
    the President issued PDD 62 that reaffirmed PDD 39 and further
    articulated responsibilities for specific agencies. Federal
    agencies drafted agency and interagency guidance to implement
    these directives. These PDDs divide activities to combat terrorism
    into three elements: preventing and deterring terrorism,
    responding to a terrorist crisis, and managing the consequences
    after a terrorist attack.1 Crisis management includes efforts to
    stop a terrorist attack, arrest terrorists, and gather evidence
    for criminal prosecution. Consequence management includes efforts
    to provide medical treatment and emergency services, evacuate
    people from dangerous areas, and restore government services. When
    terrorist attacks occur without adequate threat warning, crisis
    management and consequence management will be concurrent
    activities. One of the highest priorities in the federal
    government is to prevent and prepare for terrorist attacks that
    use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). These attacks include
    terrorist use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or
    agents to cause mass casualties. The President (via PDD 39 and PDD
    62) and the Congress (via legislation and committee reports) have
    emphasized the importance of preparedness against this type of
    threat. 1Activities to prevent and deter terrorism were not
    included in the scope of this report. Page 9
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section I
    Background Counterterrorist Roles and Responsibilities State leads
    crisis management and consequence management overseas. FBI leads
    domestic crisis management. FEMA leads domestic consequence
    management. Supporting roles are assigned to other key agencies
    (e.g., DOD, DOE, EPA, and HHS). Page 10
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section I
    Background PDDs 39 and 62 assigned or reaffirmed lead and support
    roles to various federal agencies and established interagency
    support teams. The Department of State is the lead agency for both
    crisis management and consequence management for terrorist
    incidents overseas. The State Department would lead an interagency
    Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) to provide advice and
    support to U.S. ambassadors, Washington decision-makers, and host
    governments. For domestic terrorist incidents, the leadership of
    crisis management and consequence management is divided. The
    Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead federal agency
    for domestic crisis management and would lead an interagency
    Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) to provide advice and
    support to FBI on-scene commanders. The Federal Emergency
    Management Agency (FEMA) is the lead agency for consequence
    management of domestic terrorist incidents. Other federal agencies
    such as the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Energy
    (DOE), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the
    Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) are designated as
    support agencies that would assist the lead agencies in crisis and
    consequence management. Depending on the nature of the terrorist
    attack, these support agencies could be part of the interagency
    FEST or DEST. Briefing section III provides more detailed
    information on the lead and supporting roles of specific
    agencies.2 2In addition to briefing section III, our earlier
    report provides detailed information on the roles and
    responsibilities of lead and support agencies. See Combating
    Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy
    and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997). Page 11
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section I
    Background Purpose and Types of Exercises * PDD-39 directed key
    agencies to exercise their capabilities. * Exercises train agency
    personnel and test their response plans. * Interagency exercises
    enhance coordination and ability to work together. * Agencies use
    both field and tabletop exercises. PDD 39 required key federal
    agencies to maintain well-exercised counterterrorist capabilities.
    Exercises test and validate policies and procedures, test the
    effectiveness of response capabilities, and increase the
    confidence and skill levels of personnel. Because a federal
    counterterrorist response is inherently interagency, agencies also
    exercise together. These interagency exercises enhance
    coordination among agencies and help them work together. They also
    allow personnel to become familiar with other agencies' procedures
    and identify those areas needing further coordination. In the
    absence of actual operations, exercises are an Page 12
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section I
    Background important indicator of the preparedness of federal
    agencies to deal with a variety of terrorist incidents. Exercises
    fall into two general categories, tabletop and field exercises.3
    Tabletop exercises are performed around a table, a classroom, or a
    simulated command post as the players progress through a scenario
    or series of scenarios and discuss how their agency or unit might
    react to different situations. Tabletop exercises are used to
    emphasize higher level policy and procedural issues and frequently
    include more senior level agency officials. Tabletop exercises are
    limited to discussions only; there is no actual deployment of
    operational or tactical personnel or equipment. Thus, tabletop
    exercises do not test the government's ability to actually use and
    coordinate personnel and assets in a realistic setting. However,
    they are a relatively inexpensive and expeditious way to identify
    and resolve problems in policies and procedures. Given the
    relatively few logistical requirements, agencies can plan and
    conduct tabletop exercises within a few weeks or months. Field
    exercises are performed in the field under simulated operational
    conditions. Such exercises focus on performing tasks at the
    operational and tactical levels and typically include tactics,
    techniques, and procedures that would be used in a real incident.
    Field exercises test agency and interagency capabilities to
    actually deploy personnel and their equipment and coordinate them
    as they perform their tasks in a realistic setting. Field
    exercises are generally more expensive than tabletop exercises
    because they involve more players, increased transportation and
    other travel expenses, and added wear and tear on equipment.
    Depending on their scope, field exercises may require up to a year
    of advance planning to prepare detailed objectives, identify
    essential tasks, script the scenario, develop an evaluation plan,
    and schedule transportation and other logistic support. 3Different
    agencies use slightly different nomenclature to categorize types
    of exercises. Our definition of tabletop exercises includes
    "seminar" exercises, "command post" exercises, and "functional
    exercises." Our definition of field exercises includes "full
    field" exercises, "full-up" exercises, and "muddy boots"
    exercises. Page 13
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
    Exercises Overall
    Briefi ng Section II Counterterrorist Exercises From June 1995 to
    June 1998 116 53 32 June 1995 - June 1996     June 1996 - June
    1997      June 1997 - June 1998 Page 14
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
    Exercises Overall Federal agencies sponsored a large number of
    counterterrorism exercises in the 3-year period following the
    issuance of PDD 39. In total, federal agencies sponsored 201
    counterterrorism exercises to improve their preparedness for
    counterterrorist operations. Most of the exercises responded to a
    domestic terrorist attack and were conducted in the United States,
    while some addressed international attacks and were conducted
    overseas. The number of exercises increased from 32 to 116-an
    increase of 263 percent-over this 3-year period. The 1996 Defense
    Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, commonly known as the
    Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act, required DOD to enhance domestic
    preparedness by providing local emergency response personnel with
    training and advice. DOD's program to accomplish this, known as
    the Domestic Preparedness Program, had some impact on the overall
    increase in exercises. There were 26 Domestic Preparedness Program
    exercises conducted in the third year, which is 13 percent of all
    the exercises done over the 3-year period. While we did not
    collect data beyond June 1998, DOD has continued to sponsor these
    types of exercises in conjunction with local governments and other
    federal agencies. We reported earlier on this program.1 1See
    Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic
    Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov.
    12, 1998) and Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can
    Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74,
    Apr. 9, 1998). Page 15
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
    Exercises Overall Counterterrorist Exercises Field and Tabletop 70
    60 60
    56 50 40                                        37 30         23
    20                                                16 9 10 0 June
    1995 - June 1996          June 1996 - June 1997       June 1997 -
    June 1998 Field Exercises                       Tabletop Exercises
    Page 16                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR
    Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal Exercises Overall
    As discussed earlier, exercises are categorized as tabletop or
    field exercises. We found that federal agencies conducted a
    mixture of tabletop and field exercises. Of the total 201
    exercises in the 3-year period, 116 (58 percent) were field
    exercises and 85 (42 percent) were tabletop exercises. Although
    field exercises exceeded tabletop exercises overall, the number of
    tabletop exercises increased at a much faster rate (567 percent
    versus 143 percent). One factor in the increase in tabletop
    exercises was DOD's implementation of the Domestic Preparedness
    Program in the third year. This trend may reverse somewhat in
    future years as program exercises shift from tabletop to field
    exercises. Some agencies, such as FEMA, relied mostly on tabletop
    exercises, and others, such as the U.S. Secret Service (USSS),
    held mostly field exercises. DOD, FEMA, and FBI led the most
    tabletop exercises during this period and DOD, USSS, and FBI led
    the most field exercises. Page 17
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
    Exercises Overall Counterterrorist Exercises With Notice and No
    Notice No Notice - 4 With Notice - 197 Page 18
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
    Exercises Overall Very few of the counterterrorism exercises were
    conducted without advance notice to the participants. Such
    exercises, known as "no-notice" exercises, provide the highest
    degree of challenge and realism to federal counterterrorism teams.
    Only four (2 percent of the total) exercises had no-notice field
    deployments of federal personnel and equipment. All of the no-
    notice exercises had international scenarios and were sponsored by
    DOD or DOE. They included rapid deployments of command elements
    and tactical units to locations worldwide and included the FEST to
    practice supporting the ambassador at a post in a terrorist
    situation. Page 19                                 GAO/NSIAD-99-
    157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal Exercises
    Overall Counterterrorist Exercises Crisis and/or Consequence
    Management 60
    55 50 38 40 33 30
    28 30 20 13 10 2                                       2 0 0 June
    1995 - June 1996          June 1996 - June 1997      June 1997 -
    June 1998 Crisis Management                   Consequence
    Management             Both Page 20
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
    Exercises Overall Counterterrorist exercises generally focus on
    either crisis management or consequence management. While the
    number of both types of exercises increased, consequence
    management exercises rose dramatically. Crisis management
    exercises increased from 30 to 55 (83 percent), while consequence
    management exercises rose from 2 to 28 (1,400 percent) over the 3-
    year period. Initially, very few exercises focused on both crisis
    and consequence management as there were none in the first year
    and only two in the second year. In a major terrorist incident
    without adequate threat warning, crisis management and consequence
    management would need to occur simultaneously. By the third year,
    however, there were 33 exercises that included both crisis
    management and consequence management. Of these 33, most of them
    (26 exercises) were tabletop exercises sponsored by DOD under the
    Domestic Preparedness Program. Crisis management exercises include
    both international and domestic scenarios. Each year, DOD and DOE
    sponsor several international interagency field exercises. The
    State Department uses these exercises to practice its leadership
    role in international terrorist incidents. Domestic crisis
    management exercises are led by law enforcement agencies and
    primarily provide training to prepare for crisis response. The FBI
    and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) have crisis
    management exercise programs that periodically test crisis
    response teams and include field office personnel. The USSS
    conducts many field exercises related to its mission to protect
    the President and other key officials and to ensure continuity of
    operations at the White House. Consequence management exercises
    generally had domestic scenarios.2 FEMA sponsored a series of
    interagency tabletop exercises that focused on interagency and
    intergovernmental issues. Other federal agencies, such as DOD and
    the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), have also sponsored
    consequence management exercises. 2While there have been some DOD
    and State Department sponsored consequence management exercises
    with international scenarios, we did not include them in our
    review. Page 21
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
    Exercises Overall Counterterrorist Exercises Conventional and WMD
    90
    84 80 70 60 50 40
    32               32 30                 23                    21 20
    9 10 0 June 1995 - June 1996         June 1996 - June 1997
    June 1997 - June 1998 Conventional                  WMD Page 22
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
    Exercises Overall Federal counterterrorist exercises included both
    conventional and WMD scenarios to prepare their personnel for a
    wide variety of possible situations. Exercises with both
    conventional and WMD scenarios increased more than 250 percent
    over the 3-year period. The ratio of conventional scenarios to WMD
    scenarios was roughly the same (about 2.5) in the third year as in
    the first year.3 DOD, FEMA, FBI, and USSS led the most exercises
    that included WMD scenarios. All of the 26 Domestic Preparedness
    Program exercises that were conducted in the third year had WMD
    scenarios. Although the number of exercises with WMD is more than
    double those with conventional scenarios, conventional terrorist
    incidents are more likely to occur. According to intelligence
    agencies, conventional explosives and firearms continue to be the
    weapons of choice for terrorists. Terrorists are less likely to
    use WMD agents, in part, because they are more difficult to
    obtain, develop, and weaponize or otherwise disseminate. However,
    the likelihood that terrorists may use chemical and biological
    materials may increase over the next decade, according to
    intelligence agencies. DOD led the most WMD exercises (89
    exercises), and a high percentage (92 percent) of the exercises
    that it led had WMD scenarios. DOD officials said that they need
    to train against the most challenging threat (i.e., WMD) and that
    such training also prepares their personnel for less challenging
    conventional threats. Another factor in the relatively high number
    of exercises with WMD scenarios is the strong emphasis on WMD
    voiced by the President (in PDDs) and the Congress (in legislation
    and committee reports). 3To some extent the number of WMD
    scenarios is overstated because we classified exercises that had
    both WMD and conventional scenarios as WMD exercises. Page 23
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
    Exercises Overall Counterterrorist Exercises Chemical, Biological,
    and Nuclear 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% WMD - 139
    Chemical - 59 Biological - 18    Nuclear - 21 Multiple WMD - 41
    Page 24                              GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating
    Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal Exercises Overall Federal
    agencies had scenarios that used all three types of WMD (chemical,
    biological, and nuclear) in their counterterrorism exercieses
    during the 3-year period.  Chemical agents, such as sarin, were
    the most common and were included in 59 (42 percent) of the WMD
    exercises. All of the 26 Domestic Preparedness Program exercises
    included chemical agents. Biological agents, such as anthrax, were
    less common and were included in 18 (13 percent) of the WMD
    exercises. Nuclear threats (including radiological), such as
    uranium bombs and plutonium, were included in 21 (15 percent) of
    the exercises. In addition, of the 139 WMD exercises,  41 (29
    percent) including  more than 1 type of WMD in the scenario.4  An
    example of a multiple WMD scenario was a DOD exercise where
    terrorists teams were at two locations, one team with a chemical
    weapon and one team with a biological weapon. While DOD officials
    acknowledged that such a multiple WMD scenario was not likely,
    they said each individual team in the exercise focused on its
    individual  target,  so the training they received at the tactical
    level was the same as in a single WMD scenario. 4To some extent
    the number of multiple WMD scenarios is overstated because we
    included exercises in that  category if the data indicated they
    were WMD, but we could not  determine the exact type of agent in
    the scenario. Page 25
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
    Exercises Overall Counterterrorist Exercises Federal Agencies
    Participating 61 94 46 One Agency - 61 Two Agencies - 46 Three or
    More Agencies - 94 Page 26
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
    Exercises Overall The number of federal agencies participating in
    exercises ranged from a single agency to many agencies. Of the 201
    exercises, 61 exercises (30 percent) only included the agencies
    that led them. There were 140 exercises (70 percent) that were
    interagency exercises-they involved at least 2 federal departments
    or independent agencies.5  Ninety-six (47 percent of the total)
    exercises were major interagency exercises because they included
    three or more departments or independent agencies. DOD, FEMA, FBI,
    and USSS led the most major interagency exercises during this
    period. 5For the purpose of  this report, we define "interagency"
    as involving more than one federal department or independent
    agency. For example, DOD-led exercises that included both Army and
    Navy participation, or FBI-led exercises that included other
    Department of Justice participants (e.g., the Bureau of Prisons)
    were not considered interagency exercises. Page 27
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
    Exercises Overall Counterterrorist Exercises By Types of
    Participants 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Total
    Exercises - State and / or Local Non-government -       Foreign -
    4 201                 - 69               18 Page 28
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
    Exercises Overall In some of the 201 exercises, federal agencies
    gained experience working with state and local authorities,
    nongovernmental organizations, and foreign governments. Of the 201
    exercises, 69 (34 percent) had state and/or local government
    participation, such as police and fire departments. In addition,
    18 (9 percent) of the total exercises included nongovernmental or
    other private organizations. Examples of such organizations
    include disaster relief charities (e.g., the Red Cross), private
    firms (e.g., hospitals, airlines, and oil companies), and
    organizations set up for special events (e.g., the Atlanta
    Committee for the Olympic Games). Four of the exercises (2
    percent) included foreign government participation and simulated
    federal agency integration in international incidents. DOD led
    most of the exercises with state and local participation because
    of the intergovernmental nature of the Domestic Preparedness
    Program exercises. After DOD, FBI and FEMA led more exercises with
    state and local participation than the other agencies. Page 29
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
    Exercises Overall Counterterrorist Exercises State and Local
    Participation Federal, State and / or Local
    Federal, State and / or Local Field and Tabletop
    WMD Versus Conventional 9 20 49
    60 Field             Tabletop
    Conventional               WMD Page 30
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section II Federal
    Exercises Overall Federal counterterrorist exercises that included
    state and/or local participation tended to be tabletop exercises
    with WMD scenarios. Of the total 69 exercises, 49 (71 percent)
    were tabletops and 60 (87 percent) had WMD scenarios. The 26
    Domestic Preparedness Program exercises (which were all tabletops
    using WMD scenarios) accounted for 26 (38 percent) of the 69
    exercises that included state and/or local participation.
    According to the FBI, field exercises offer hands-on training that
    cannot be replicated by tabletop exercises and valuable
    opportunities to test interactions among federal, state, and local
    agencies. For this reason, the FBI views participation by state
    and local agencies in federally sponsored field exercises as a top
    priority as it continues to plan and execute counterterrorist
    exercises. However, staffing and budget considerations or
    restrictive union contracts sometimes hinder state and local
    participation in federal exercises, according to the FBI. The FBI
    noted that it is not budgeted to pay state or local overtime for
    participation in FBI-led exercises, and until this budget problem
    is resolved, there will never be extensive state and local
    participation in FBI-led exercises. The FBI stated that the
    Department of Justice's Office of Justice Programs may be able to
    provide funding for state and local participation in federally
    sponsored field exercises. Page 31
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
    Individual Agencies Exercises
    Briefi ng Secti on III Counterterrorist Exercises By Lead Agency
    FEMA - 16                      USSS - 46            HHS - 3 FBI -
    24                                                EPA - 1 DOE - 5
    State - 1 Other         VA - 4 ATF - 4 Other - 3 DOD - 97 Page 32
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR  Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
    Individual Agencies Exercises Federal counterterrorist exercises
    were generally led by one agency. The lead agency was responsible
    for planning the exercise, setting the objectives, scripting the
    scenario, coordinating the logistics, and evaluating the results.
    Thus, the lead agency usually expended the bulk of the personnel
    and resources to conduct an exercise. This is especially the case
    in field exercises, which are more resource intensive than
    tabletop exercises. The role of agencies that just participated
    varied by exercise and by agency. Some participating agencies were
    very involved in exercise planning and provided substantial
    resources to exercises led by other agencies. For example, in some
    field exercises, participating agencies attended numerous planning
    sessions and deployed several personnel and substantial equipment
    to the exercise location. In contrast, in some tabletop exercises,
    some participating agencies contributed one or two personnel just
    for the day of the exercise. Four agencies led more than 90
    percent of the counterterrorist exercises. These four agencies,
    and the number (and percentage) of federal exercises that they
    led, were DOD with 97 (48 percent), USSS with 46 (23 percent), the
    FBI with 24 (12 percent), and FEMA with 16 (8 percent). No other
    single agency led more than five (2 percent) of the total
    exercises over the 3-year period. For the few cases when more than
    one agency led an exercise, we counted all sponsoring agencies as
    a lead agency; thus, the total in our briefing slide (204)
    slightly exceeds the 201 exercises conducted during this period.
    (and Page 33                                 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR
    Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III Individual Agencies
    Exercises Counterterrorist Exercises Participation and Leadership
    by Agency 160 143 140
    Participated in Exercise Led Exercise 120 99 97 100 80
    76 68          65 60 46    47 40
    36 24
    24 20                                   16
    12     10 3                                       5 1
    1           44 0 DOD          FBI        FEMA        HHS
    USSS         EPA            DOE         State          VA     ATF
    Page 34
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR  Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
    Individual Agencies Exercises Some agencies (e.g., DOD, USSS, FBI,
    and FEMA) not only led many exercises but also participated in
    many exercises led by other agencies. Other agencies we reviewed
    led 5 or fewer exercises but participated in at least 10 exercises
    in the 3-year period. These agencies generally exercise their
    personnel and equipment through their participation in other
    agencies' exercises. For example, State Department officials told
    us that they leverage DOD-sponsored exercises to exercise their
    counterterrorism responsibilities, including their lead agency
    status. As discussed earlier, because some exercises were
    sponsored by more than one agency, the number of exercises that
    agencies led (204) slightly exceeded the 201 exercises conducted
    in this period. Additional information on agencies leading and
    participating in exercises is provided by the individual agencies
    in the remainder of this section. For the agencies that led the
    most exercises (DOD, USSS, FBI, and FEMA), the data is displayed
    by exercises that each agency led. These agencies are presented in
    descending order of the number of exercises they led. For the
    other agencies, the data is displayed by exercises in which they
    participated. These agencies are presented in descending order of
    the number of exercises they participated in. Page 35
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR  Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
    Individual Agencies Exercises Department of Defense
    Counterterrorist Exercises DOD Leadership and Participation in
    Exercises                          Type of Exercises That DOD Led
    46 44 53 97 Exercises Led     Participated Only
    Field Exercises               Tabletop Exercises Breakdown of DOD-
    Led Exercises by Number of Participating Agencies
    Type of Scenarios for Exercises That DOD Led 8 35 62 89 One or Two
    Three or More                                  Conventional
    WMD Page 36
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR  Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
    Individual Agencies Exercises DOD is not a lead federal agency for
    response to terrorist incidents, but it provides significant and
    unique capabilities to support other agencies in conducting their
    responsibilities. DOD works with the State Department to support
    its international crisis management role. DOD also supports the
    domestic lead agencies, FBI and FEMA, and other agencies for
    domestic crisis and consequence management. This support includes
    not only tactical units but also logistics and technical units
    trained to deal with all types of WMD. Examples of response units
    include the Army's Technical Escort Unit and the Marine Corps'
    Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force. During this
    period, DOD participated in a wide variety of counterterrorist
    exercises and sponsored major exercises with interagency
    participation. DOD participated in the most exercises with a total
    of 143, and it led 97 (68 percent) of these exercises. Of the DOD-
    led exercises, 53 (55 percent) were tabletop and 44 (45 percent)
    were field exercises. Most included WMD scenarios, primarily
    chemical weapons, and 62 (66 percent) of the DOD-led exercises
    included 3 or more federal agencies, many of which included State,
    FBI, DOE, HHS, and EPA. DOD also sponsored the four exercises that
    included foreign government participants, as well as three of the
    four no-notice exercises. DOD sponsored a variety of major
    interagency tabletop exercises and field exercises. DOD sponsored
    the Domestic Preparedness Program exercises carried out in major
    U.S. cities. This program also included major federal, state, and
    local field exercises in Denver in 1997 and Philadelphia in 1998.
    DOD also established the Interagency Terrorism Response Awareness
    Program, which includes tabletop exercises that bring together
    senior agency officials within the counterterrorism community to
    coordinate policy issues. DOD schedules several interagency field
    exercises, including the Eligible Receiver series, which are
    sponsored by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
    Ellipse series, which are field exercises conducted by one of the
    geographic theatre commanders. These major exercises usually
    include participation by other federal agencies. For example, in
    June of 1998, DOD conducted a weeklong WMD crisis management
    exercise, which included FBI, State, FEMA, DOE, and HHS. Page 37
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR  Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
    Individual Agencies Exercises U.S. Secret Service Counterterrorist
    Exercises Type of Exercises That USSS Led USSS Leadership and
    Participation in Exercises
    5 19 46 41 Exercises Led      Participated Only
    Field Exercises                    Tabletop Exercises Breakdown of
    USSS-Led Exercises by Number of Participating Agencies
    Type of Scenarios for Exercises That USSS Led 6 10 40
    36 One or Two              Three or More Conventional     WMD Page
    38                                                      GAO/NSIAD-
    99-157BR  Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III Individual
    Agencies Exercises Among other responsibilities, USSS provides
    protection to the President and other key officials. USSS
    conducted exercises for its special agents related to its
    protective mission. These exercises generally involved continuity
    of operations at the White House or protecting the President and
    other officials. Some of these exercises practiced the USSS role
    in providing security at certain special events, such as national
    political conventions, presidential inaugurations, and state of
    the union addresses. USSS generally led field exercises with
    conventional scenarios that had few other federal agencies
    participating. USSS participated in a total of 65 exercises and
    led 46 (71 percent) of these exercises. Forty-one (89 percent) of
    the exercises led by USSS were field exercises and the other 5 (11
    percent) were tabletop exercises. Of the 46 exercises that USSS
    led, 40 (87 percent) of them had only the USSS or the USSS and 1
    other agency participating and 6 (13 percent) of them had 3 or
    more federal agencies. Of the exercises it led, 36 (78 percent)
    had conventional scenarios and 10 (22 percent) had some type of
    WMD threat in their scenarios. USSS-led exercises involve
    protecting the President and other officials from attacks and are
    held at a variety of locations, including the White House complex.
    These exercises include some other federal agencies, such as DOD
    (the White House Military Office), FEMA, and the U.S. Capitol
    Police. The exercises that practice defense against attacks on the
    President and other officials, such as during motorcades, are held
    at the USSS training center and involve some other agencies as
    participants or observers. Exercises have been performed with
    other agencies before some special events, such as the
    Presidential Inauguration in 1997 and the Summit of the Eight in
    Denver in 1997. Page 39
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR  Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
    Individual Agencies Exercises Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Counterterrorist Exercises FBI Leadership and Participation in
    Exercises                                 Type of Exercises That
    FBI Led 24                7 75
    17 Exercises Led     Participated Only
    Field Exercises                    Tabletop Exercises Breakdown of
    FBI-Led Exercises by Number of Participating Agencies
    Type of Scenarios for Exercises That FBI 6
    Led 11 13 18 One or Two               Three or More
    Conventional        WMD Page 40
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR  Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
    Individual Agencies Exercises The Department of Justice, including
    the FBI, has many responsibilities related to terrorism, including
    conducting criminal investigations, arresting individuals who
    commit terrorist acts, and prosecuting them. The FBI has been
    designated as the lead federal agency responsible for domestic
    terrorism crisis management, including responding to terrorist
    incidents. The FBI has a variety of operational capabilities that
    it can deploy to respond to a crisis. Its Critical Incident
    Response Group can deploy additional resources to assist field
    offices in responding and is also responsible for sponsoring FBI
    crisis management exercises. The FBI also can establish a Joint
    Operations Center to provide for interagency participation in
    managing a crisis. The FBI can also deploy an interagency DEST to
    advise and assist the FBI special agent in charge. The FBI's
    crisis management field exercises provide training in response
    capabilities to FBI field personnel. The FBI participated in 99
    exercises during the 3-year period and led 24 (24 percent) of
    these exercises. Even though many FBI-led exercises focus on
    training for FBI response units, the FBI also led some exercises
    with participation by several other federal agencies. Of the 24
    exercises that the FBI-led, 6 (25 percent) had 3 or more federal
    agencies participating. The other 18 exercises (75 percent)
    included only the FBI or the FBI and one other federal agency, as
    well as some other Justice Department organizations. The exercises
    also included some state and local organizations. FBI-led
    exercises included 17 (71 percent) field exercises and 7 (29
    percent) tabletop exercises. FBI's crisis management exercises had
    a variety of scenarios and terrorist threats. Thirteen of the
    scenarios (54 percent) were WMD and the other 11 (46 percent) were
    conventional. The FBI's exercises were primarily crisis management
    field training exercises that focused on training FBI's
    operational response units, such as Special Weapons and Tactics
    teams, and evaluating their response plans. FBI's field training
    exercises are often held at locations where actual crises could
    occur and include participants from FBI's field offices. These
    exercises test command and control by establishing command posts
    and tactical operations centers and include support, such as
    equipment, communications, and logistics. The FBI exercises had a
    variety of scenarios, including hostage barricades, aircraft
    hijackings, terrorist attacks, conventional bombing attacks,
    threat of WMD, kidnappings, and prison disturbances. The FBI was
    also a significant player in some exercises that it did not lead.
    For example, it played a major role in a June 1998 DOD-sponsored
    exercise and established a Joint Operations Center with
    representatives from other agencies, such as DOE, FEMA, and HHS.
    Page 41                                 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR
    Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III Individual Agencies
    Exercises Federal Emergency Management Agency Counterterrorist
    Exercises FEMA Leadership and Participation in Exercises
    Type of Exercises That FEMA Led 0 16 60 16 Exercises Led
    Participated Only                           Field Exercises
    Tabletop Exercises Breakdown of FEMA-Led Exercises by
    Type of Scenarios for Exercises That FEMA Number of Participating
    Agencies                                                    Led 1
    5 11 15 One or Two           Three or More
    Conventional         WMD Page 42
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR  Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
    Individual Agencies Exercises FEMA is the lead agency for
    coordinating the federal response to manage the consequences of a
    domestic terrorist attack. FEMA has various emergency response
    responsibilities for disasters, including maintaining the Federal
    Response Plan, which includes a counterterrorism annex. FEMA,
    using the Federal Response Plan, would coordinate the federal
    efforts to support state and local governments. The Stafford Act1
    provides FEMA with authority to assign missions to any federal
    agency in the event of a disaster or an emergency declared by the
    President, including acts of terrorism. FEMA's counterterrorism
    exercises focused on its consequence management role, and FEMA
    also participated in crisis management field exercises led by
    other agencies. The exercises that FEMA led have generally been
    interagency tabletops centered on a variety of WMD threats and
    scenarios. Of the 76 exercises that FEMA participated in, 16 (21
    percent) were led by FEMA. Many of the exercises were interagency
    with 11 of the 16 exercises that FEMA led (or 69 percent) having
    three or more federal agencies participating. The other five
    exercises (31 percent) included only FEMA or FEMA and one other
    federal agency. The 16 exercises that FEMA led were all tabletop
    exercises. FEMA's consequence management exercises were almost all
    (94 percent) WMD and had a variety of scenarios and terrorist
    threats. The exercises led by FEMA included some major interagency
    exercises with WMD scenarios. The Ill Wind series of tabletop
    exercises, which began in September 1996, focused on preparing
    emergency management personnel to deal with the consequences of
    terrorism incidents. The scenarios of the exercises involved the
    use of WMD in the Washington, D.C., area. The FBI and several
    other agencies provided briefings, and there were participants
    from many other agencies. More recently, FEMA held consequence
    management seminars and tabletop exercises for its personnel in
    each of its 10 regions to highlight terrorism issues, and they
    included FBI regional participants. The regions chose the
    scenarios and seven included chemical agents and three included
    nuclear threats. FEMA also participated in major field exercises
    led by DOD and FBI to practice planning for consequence
    management. 142 U.S.C. section 5121 et seq. Page 43
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR  Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
    Individual Agencies Exercises Department of Health and Human
    Services Counterterrorist Exercises HHS Leadership and
    Participation in Exercises                                    Type
    of Exercises That HHS Participated In 3
    13 65                                                        55
    Exercises Led    Participated Only
    Field Exercises                  Tabletop Exercises Breakdown of
    Number of Agencies                                          Type
    of Scenarios for Exercises Participating in Exercises Including
    HHS                                       That HHS Participated In
    2 3 65
    66 One or Two                 Three or More
    Conventional                 WMD Page 44
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR  Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
    Individual Agencies Exercises HHS has a support role, related
    primarily to consequence management, to provide the health and
    medical response to a terrorist incident. HHS can provide a number
    of services in a terrorist incident, including threat assessment,
    consultation, agent identification, epidemiological investigation,
    hazard detection and reduction, triage, treatment,
    decontamination, pubic health support, medical support,
    pharmaceutical support, overflow hospital capacity, mental health
    services, and mortuary services. The Office of Emergency
    Preparedness coordinates the overall HHS support. HHS could
    activate a number of specialized resources that include the
    National Disaster Medical System, Disaster Medical Assistance
    Teams, National Medical Response Teams, and Disaster Mortuary
    Teams. For biological agents, HHS can help identify the agent and
    conduct epidemiological investigations through its network of
    laboratories. HHS generally participated in tabletop exercises
    with WMD scenarios that included several federal agencies. HHS led
    3 (4 percent) of the 68 exercises it participated in. Of these
    three HHS-led exercises, two (66 percent) were field exercises,
    two (66 percent) involved three or more federal agencies, and all
    had WMD scenarios. Of the 68 exercises that it participated in, 13
    (19 percent) were field exercises, 65 (96 percent) involved three
    or more agencies, and 66 (97 percent) had WMD scenarios. An
    example of an exercise sponsored by HHS (also cosponsored by DOD
    and VA) was "Consequence Management 98", which was conducted in
    April 1998. This exercise included five HHS Disaster Medical
    Assistance Teams, focused on the medical aspects of a WMD attack,
    and included training to develop a field medical unit, perform
    triage, decontaminate patients, and provide additional treatment.
    The exercise had over 600 participants who practiced their
    clinical skills in an emergency field setting. HHS officials also
    stressed the importance of major special events (e.g.,
    inaugurations and sporting events) in exercising their staff's
    capabilities. Page 45                                  GAO/NSIAD-
    99-157BR  Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III Individual
    Agencies Exercises Environmental Protection Agency
    Counterterrorist Exercises EPA Leadership and Participation in
    Exercises                                     Type of Exercises
    That EPA Participated In 1
    4 43 46 Field Exercises                       Tabletop Exercises
    Exercises Led                  Participated Only Breakdown of
    Number of Agencies Participating in Exercises Including EPA
    Type of Scenarios for Exercises That EPA Participated In 1
    0 46
    47 Conventional                         WMD One or Two
    Three or More Page 46
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR  Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
    Individual Agencies Exercises EPA is a support agency for both
    crisis management and consequence management in terrorist
    incidents involving WMD. EPA provides expertise and technical
    support for identification of contaminants, collection and
    analysis of samples, monitoring of contaminants, on-site safety,
    and decontamination. EPA also issues permits for the custody,
    transportation, and transfer of hazardous chemical. The Office of
    the Emergency and Deputy Emergency Coordinator would coordinate
    overall EPA support in chemical and nuclear terrorist incidents.
    Examples of EPA resources include an Environmental Response Team,
    a Radiological Emergency Response Team, the Environmental
    Radiation Ambient Monitoring System, and the National Enforcement
    Investigations Center. EPA generally participated in tabletop
    exercises with WMD scenarios that included several federal
    agencies. EPA led 1 (2 percent) of the 47 exercises in which it
    participated. The one EPA-led exercise was a tabletop exercise
    that only involved EPA and used a WMD scenario. Of the total 47
    exercises that EPA participated in, 4 (6 percent) were field
    exercises, 46 (98 percent) involved three or more agencies, and
    all had WMD scenarios. The exercise that EPA sponsored was
    "Olympic Sparkler" in April 1996. This EPA-only tabletop exercise
    used a scenario where terrorists dispersed radioactive material at
    the Atlanta Olympics. The purpose of the exercise was to test EPA
    plans and procedures to respond to a terrorist incident involving
    radiation dispersal among a civilian population. Page 47
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR  Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
    Individual Agencies Exercises Department of Energy
    Counterterrorist Exercises DOE Leadership and Participation in
    Exercises                            Type of Exercises That DOE
    Participated In 5 13 23 31 Exercises Led      Participated Only
    Field Exercises                      Tabletop Exercises Breakdown
    of Number of Agencies Participating in Exercises
    Type of Scenarios for Exercises Including DOE
    That DOE Participated In 6
    3 30
    33 One or Two               Three or More
    Conventional                        WMD Page 48
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR  Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
    Individual Agencies Exercises DOE is a support agency in WMD
    incidents for both crisis management and consequence management,
    providing support and technical assistance related to nuclear
    devices and radiological events. Specifically, DOE can provide
    threat assessments, search operations, diagnostic and device
    assessments, containment relocation and storage of special nuclear
    material, and post-incident cleanup. DOE's Office of Emergency
    Response generally provides coordination of the Department's
    support. In the event of a nuclear terrorist threat or incident,
    DOE could activate and/or deploy several teams, including a
    Nuclear Incident Team, the Nuclear/Radiological Advisory Team, the
    Nuclear Emergency Search Team, the Federal Radiological Monitoring
    and Assessment Center, Accident Response Group, the Aerial
    Measuring System, the Radiological Assistance Program, Atmospheric
    Release Advisory Capability, and the Radiation Emergency
    Assistance Center and Training Site. These response teams are
    composed of DOE employees and contractors who work at DOE
    facilities as weapon designers, engineers, and physicists. DOE
    generally participated in a mixture of field and tabletop
    exercises with WMD scenarios that included several federal
    agencies. DOE led 5 (14 percent) of the 36 exercises it
    participated in. Of the five DOE-led exercises, three (60 percent)
    were field exercises, three (60 percent) involved three or more
    federal agencies, and all had WMD scenarios. Of the total 36
    exercises that DOE participated in, 13 (33 percent) were field
    exercises, 30 (83 percent) involved three or more agencies, and 30
    (83 percent) had WMD scenarios. The exercises that DOE led were
    generally deployments (including one no-notice deployment) of
    DOE's rapid response capabilities and included personnel and
    equipment from other agencies as well. Most of them were field
    exercises that focused on crisis management. Given DOE's role,
    most of the exercises that DOE led or participated in had nuclear
    or radiological scenarios. Page 49
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR  Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
    Individual Agencies Exercises Department of State Counterterrorist
    Exercises State Leadership and Participation in Exercises
    Type of Exercises That State 1
    Participated In 9 23
    15 Exercises Led                      Participated Only Field
    Exercises              Tabletop Exercises Breakdown of Number of
    Agencies Participating in Exercises
    Type of Scenarios for Exercises That Including State
    State Participated In 1
    6 23                                                      18 One
    or Two                      Three or More
    Conventional                 WMD Page 50
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR  Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
    Individual Agencies Exercises The State Department is the lead
    agency for international terrorist incidents for both crisis
    management and consequence management. The State Department,
    through its Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, leads
    a FEST to provide advice and support to U.S. ambassadors,
    Washington decision-makers, and host governments. The FEST is an
    interagency team tailored to the specific terrorist incident that
    could deploy at the request of the ambassador and with the
    permission of the host country. The Department determines the
    composition of the FEST, which could include FBI, DOD, DOE, HHS,
    or EPA if the incident involved WMD. For consequence management, a
    Consequence Management Advisory Team would deploy with the FEST to
    assess the need for follow-on assets that would assist a host
    government in planning for and managing the consequences of a WMD
    incident overseas. The State Department generally participated in
    field exercises with WMD scenarios that included several federal
    agencies. The State Department sponsored 1 (4 percent) of the 24
    exercises that it participated in. This was a field exercise with
    participation by several federal agencies that used a conventional
    scenario. Of the total 24 exercises that State participated in, 15
    (63 percent) were field exercises, 23 (96 percent) involved three
    or more agencies, and 18 (75 percent) had WMD scenarios. In
    general, the State Department uses DOD- and DOE-led exercises to
    practice its leadership role in international incidents. These
    exercises test rapid and no-notice deployments of command elements
    and tactical units to locations worldwide and frequently test the
    FEST so deployments can be practiced by the full cadre of
    interagency players. The one exercise that the State Department
    sponsored-also cosponsored by DOD-was a bilateral exercise with
    another friendly nation. This was a field exercise where personnel
    and equipment deployed to a foreign country and worked with
    embassy personnel to practice dealing with a conventional hostage
    barricade situation. Page 51
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR  Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
    Individual Agencies Exercises Department of Veterans Affairs
    Counterterrorist Exercises Type of Exercises That VA Participated
    In VA Leadership and Participation in Exercises 4 6
    6 8 Exercises Led    Participated Only
    Field Exercises                  Tabletop Exercises Breakdown of
    Number  of Agencies Participatiing in Exercises
    Type of Scenarios for Exercises That Including VA
    VA Participated In 2 3 9
    10 One or Two               Three or More
    Conventional              WMD Page 52
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR  Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
    Individual Agencies Exercises VA is a support agency that could
    provide health and medical support for consequence management. VA
    works with HHS and DOD to maintain the National Medical Disaster
    System, a combination of private and government hospitals that
    could provide health and medical support in a terrorist incident
    involving mass casualties. Under PDD 62, VA works with HHS to
    ensure that adequate stockpiles of antidotes and other necessary
    pharmaceuticals are available for terrorist attacks nationwide.
    HHS, in consultation with VA, will determine the makeup and size
    of the pharmaceutical caches for such emergencies.2 In a terrorist
    attack, VA could activate its Response Support Unit to manage the
    agency's overall response and provide support to other agencies,
    such as FEMA under the Federal Response Plan. VA also has two
    response teams, the Emergency Medical Response Team and the
    Medical Emergency Radiological Response Team. The later team
    consists of physicians and nuclear physicists that could
    supplement any federal response to a terrorist threat involving
    nuclear material. VA generally participated in a mixture of field
    and tabletop exercises with WMD scenarios that included several
    federal agencies. VA led 4 (33 percent) of the 12 exercises it
    participated in. Of these four exercises, all were field
    exercises, two (50 percent) involved three or more federal
    agencies, and all had WMD scenarios. Of the total 12 exercises
    that VA participated in, 6 (50 percent) were field exercises, 9
    (75 percent) involved 3 or more agencies, and 10 (83 percent) had
    WMD scenarios. An example of a VA-sponsored exercise was "Radex
    North" conducted in March 1997. VA sponsored this exercise in
    conjunction with the state of Minnesota, which simulated a
    terrorist attack on a federal building with explosives laced with
    radioactive material, and the subsequent decontamination and
    treatment of hundreds of casualties. One of the exercise's
    objectives was to test the concept of operations for the VA's
    Medical Emergency Radiological Response Team. The exercise had 500
    participants and attempted to fully integrate the federal medical
    response into the state and local responses, including local
    hospitals. VA officials noted that they participated in numerous
    other disaster-related exercises (which were outside the scope of
    our review) to improve the Department's consequence management
    capabilities. 2VA is not involved in the development of the
    national stockpile of pharmaceuticals and vaccines. The
    Pharmaceutical caches referred to in PDD 62 are for medical
    response teams. Page 53
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR  Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
    Individual Agencies Exercises Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
    Firearms Counterterrorist Exercises Type of Exercises That ATF ATF
    Leadership and Participation in Exercises
    Participated In 1 4 6 9 Exercises Led      Participated Only
    Field Exercises                  Tabletop Exercises Breakdown of
    Number  of Agencies Participating in  Exercises
    Type of Scenarios for Exercises That Including  ATF
    ATF Participated In 3 3 7 7 Conventional          WMD One or Two
    Three or More Page 54
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR  Combating Terrorism Briefing Section III
    Individual Agencies Exercises ATF has a crisis response role and
    investigation jurisdiction related to incidents involving
    conventional bombings. ATF has a Critical Incident Management
    Response Team that is a standardized deployable command
    organizational structure for managing responses to incidents,
    which include acts of terrorism. ATF also has teams that respond
    and deploy to the crisis site. For example, there are Special
    Response Teams that provide crisis response. ATF leads exercises
    that test the crisis response capabilities of its Special Response
    Teams. ATF participated in 10 exercises during the 3-year period,
    including 4 exercises (40 percent) that it led. Of the 10
    exercises that ATF participated in, 9 (90 percent) were field
    exercises. Seven (70 percent) of the 10 exercises that ATF
    participated in had less than three federal agencies participating
    in them and had conventional scenarios, including all of the
    exercises led by ATF; the other three (30 percent) had some type
    of WMD in their scenario. ATF also participated in six other
    exercises led by other agencies, including three that had three or
    more federal agencies participating. During this period, ATF led
    field exercises for its regional personnel that included the
    Special Response Teams in each of the five ATF regions. These
    exercises focused on developing ATF's internal crisis response
    capabilities, lasted up to 1 week, and included both classroom
    training and field exercises. The exercises also included ATF
    tactical operations centers, response teams, hostage negotiators,
    communications, and logistics. The exercises had scenarios that
    generally included domestic antigovernment groups and hostage
    situations. These exercises included conventional firearms and
    explosives, not WMD. ATF officials said they have completed field
    exercises in all ATF regions and are conducting tabletop exercises
    in their 23 field divisions to update their staff on their new
    Critical Incident Management System. Page 55
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR  Combating Terrorism Appendix I Major
    Contributors to This Report
    Appendix I Carol R. Schuster Stephen L. Caldwell Davi M.
    D'Agostino Alan M. Byroade Lee Purdy Page 56
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Page 57    GAO/NSIAD-99-
    157BR Combating Terrorism Page 58    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating
    Terrorism Related GAO Products Combating Terrorism:  Observations
    on Growth in Federal Programs (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181, June 9, 1999).
    Combating Terrorism:  Analysis of Potential Emergency Response
    Equipment and Sustainment Costs (GAO/NSIAD-99-151, June 9, 1999).
    Combating Terrorism:  Use of National Guard Response Teams Is
    Unclear (GAO/NSIAD-99-110, May 21, 1999). Combating Terrorism:
    Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorist Operations
    (GAO/NSIAD-99-135, May 13, 1999). Weapons of Mass Destruction:
    DOD Efforts to Reduce Russian Arsenals May Cost More and
    Accomplish Less Than Expected (GAO/NSIAD-99-76, Apr. 13, 1999).
    Combating Terrorism:  Observations on Biological Terrorism and
    Public Health Initiatives (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112, Mar. 16, 1999).
    Combating Terrorism:  Observations on Federal Spending to Combat
    Terrorism  (GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107, Mar. 11, 1999). Combating
    Terrorism:  FBI's Use of Federal Funds for Counterterrorism-
    Related Activities (FYs 1995-98) (GAO/GGD-99-7, Nov. 20, 1998).
    Combating Terrorism:  Opportunities to Improve Domestic
    Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov.
    12, 1998). Combating Terrorism:  Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-
    Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, Oct. 2,
    1998). Combating Terrorism:  Observations on Crosscutting Issues
    (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23, 1998). Combating Terrorism:  Threat
    and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program
    Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998). Combating Terrorism:
    Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and
    Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997). Combating Terrorism:
    Efforts to Protect U.S. Forces in Turkey and the Middle East
    (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44, Oct. 28, 1997). Page 59
    GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism Related GAO Products
    Combating Terrorism:  Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement
    National Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997).
    Combating Terrorism:   Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces
    Overseas (GAO/NSIAD-97-207, July 21, 1997). (701164)    Letter
    Page 60                               GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating
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