Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response Equipment
and Sustainment Costs (Letter Report, 06/09/1999, GAO/NSIAD-99-151).

The Defense Department and others are authorized to provide training,
equipment, and advice to civilian emergency response personnel to help
them respond to a possible terrorist attack involving chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons. GAO reported last year that some local
jurisdictions were buying equipment without the benefit of formal threat
and risk assessments based on valid threat data. In the absence of
defined requirements, this report determines the potential cost of
equipping and maintaining the capability of cities to respond to a
terrorist incident involving weapons of mass destruction. GAO (1)
provides the views of federal, state, and local officials on equipment
that they believed would be needed to respond to such an incident and
(2) determines the potential procurement and sustainment costs of these
items.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-99-151
     TITLE:  Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency
	     Response Equipment and Sustainment Costs
      DATE:  06/09/1999
   SUBJECT:  Terrorism
	     Explosives
	     Federal/state relations
	     Hazardous substances
	     Emergency preparedness
	     National defense operations
	     Technical assistance
	     Equipment maintenance
	     Government owned equipment
	     Contract costs
IDENTIFIER:  Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program

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    United States General Accounting Office GAO                 Report
    to Congressional Requesters June 1999           COMBATING
    TERRORISM Analysis of Potential Emergency Response Equipment and
    Sustainment Costs GAO/NSIAD-99-151 United States General
    Accounting Office
    National Security and Washington, D.C. 20548
    International Affairs Division B-282618
    Letter June 9, 1999 The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking Minority
    Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives The
    Honorable Christopher Shays Chairman, Subcommittee on National
    Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations Committee
    on Government Reform House of Representatives Under the Nunn-
    Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness program,1 the Department of
    Defense (DOD) and others provide training, equipment, and advice
    to enhance the capability of civilian emergency response personnel
    to respond to a possible terrorist incident involving a chemical,
    biological, radiological, or nuclear device (CBRN).  In 1998, we
    reported that some local jurisdictions were deciding on equipment
    purchases without the benefit of formal threat and risk
    assessments based on valid threat data.2 In the absence of defined
    requirements, you asked us to determine the potential cost of
    equipping and maintaining the capability of cities to respond to a
    terrorist incident involving CBRN.  Specifically, we (1) obtained
    the views of federal, state, and local officials on equipment they
    believed would provide various levels of capability to respond to
    a CBRN incident and (2) determined the potential procurement and
    sustainment costs of these items. To conduct our work, we
    developed a preliminary equipment list based on our prior work and
    discussions with DOD, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and local
    officials.  We then surveyed 36 federal, state, and local
    officials 1This program was authorized in the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (title XIV of P.L. 104-201,
    Sept. 23, 1996) and is commonly referred to by its sponsors'
    names, Senators Nunn, Lugar, and Domenici. 2Combating Terrorism:
    Observations on Crosscutting Issues (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23,
    1998); Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help
    Prioritize and Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr.
    9, 1998);  Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-
    Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, Oct. 2,
    1998); and Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic
    Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov.
    12, 1998). Page 1
    GAO/NSIAD-99-151  Combating Terrorism B-282618 with hazardous
    materials (HAZMAT) expertise-24 of whom responded-to determine the
    equipment they believed would provide various levels of response
    capability.  Based on the 24 responses, we revised the equipment
    list.  The list is for illustrative purposes, is not meant to
    represent a minimum or maximum of equipment needs for local
    jurisdictions, and may not reflect the actual equipment costs for
    a local jurisdiction.  Appendix I further describes our scope and
    methodology. Results in Brief    We identified over 200 equipment
    items that federal, state, and local officials believed would
    enhance their capability to respond to a CBRN incident.  These
    items ranged from standard items such as duct tape and gloves to
    more sophisticated devices such as mobile command posts and
    climate control systems.  The officials we surveyed categorized
    the items to represent different levels of capability-basic and
    modest, moderate, and high in comparison to the basic level.  A
    modest increase over basic HAZMAT would include additional
    detection and decontamination equipment.  A moderate increase
    would include a greater array of detection equipment than the
    modest level.  The high level of increased equipment capability
    would include additional and more expensive detection equipment.
    We estimated the potential cost of initially procuring and
    sustaining the equipment items over a 10-year period using a
    notional city of 500,000.  As table 1 shows, these costs ranged
    from a total of about $4.6 million for items considered to provide
    a basic capability to about $43 million for items considered to
    provide a high capability. Page 2
    GAO/NSIAD-99-151  Combating Terrorism B-282618 Table 1:  Possible
    Cost to Equip a Notional City of 500,000 to Respond to a CBRN
    Event Dollars in millions Equipment
    Initial    Sustainment cost                Total level
    procurement cost          over 10  years                cost Basic
    HAZMAT                         $1.3                  $3.3
    $4.6 Modest $5.2
    $13.1               $18.3 Moderate $8.3
    $20.9               $29.2 High $12.2
    $30.7               $42.9 This table represents a baseline and
    does not include some costs, such as those associated with
    equipment maintained as a stockpile, equipment training and
    certification, or some hospital and emergency medical response
    services. Background    According to the U.S. intelligence
    community, conventional explosives and firearms are the weapons of
    choice for terrorists at least partly because chemical and
    biological weapons are more difficult to weaponize and the results
    are unpredictable.  However, intelligence agencies state that
    terrorists' use of chemical and biological materials may increase
    over the next decade.  Despite differing views, Congress
    authorized and funded over $200 million in fiscal year 1999 for
    numerous training and equipment programs, including those offered
    by the Departments of Justice and Defense and the Federal
    Emergency Management Agency, to prepare local jurisdictions for a
    CBRN incident.  Some jurisdictions are deciding on equipment
    purchases without the benefit of formal threat and risk
    assessments using valid threat data.  As we have emphasized in our
    April 1998 report and testimony, a critical component of
    establishing and expanding programs to combat terrorism is an
    analytically sound threat and risk assessment using valid inputs
    from the intelligence community and other agencies.  Such an
    assessment is widely recognized as an effective decision support
    tool for prioritizing security investments and would help local
    jurisdictions select equipment that would provide the greatest
    benefit whether purchased with federal, state, or local funds.
    Page 3                                         GAO/NSIAD-99-151
    Combating Terrorism B-282618 While no valid set of equipment
    requirements has been defined or established for equipping a local
    jurisdiction to respond to a CBRN terrorist incident, the
    InterAgency Board3 for Equipment Standardization and
    InterOperability recently developed a list of standardized
    equipment.  The list can be used by emergency personnel as a
    guideline when acquiring CBRN response equipment and is intended
    to promote interoperability and standardization among the response
    community at the local, state, and federal levels.  Use of the
    list, however, is voluntary, and state or local jurisdictions
    decide the manufacturers, types, and quantities of the items to be
    selected to meet their perceived operational needs. No Defined
    There is no assessment that would provide a basis for clearly
    defined and Requirements and        prioritized equipment
    requirements based on threat and risk, and there is little
    consensus among federal, state, and local officials on the types
    of Little Consensus on     equipment needed for a city to prepare
    for a CBRN terrorist incident at Needed Equipment        various
    levels. Based on our previous work, the Board's list, and
    discussions with agency officials, we identified about 200
    equipment items that might be used to respond to a CBRN incident.
    We then surveyed 36 federal, state, and local officials on the
    equipment they believed would provide a basic HAZMAT equipment
    capability and various increments of increased equipment
    capabilities to respond to industrial chemical spills and/or CBRN
    terrorist events.  Twenty-four of these officials responded. The
    results of our survey identified additional protective, detection,
    decontamination, and communications equipment to illustrate
    incremental increases in equipment capability over basic HAZMAT.
    The modest increase in equipment capability included more
    detection, communications, and decontamination equipment, such as
    decontamination showers. The moderate increase in equipment
    capability included additional detection and decontamination
    items, such as gas chromatograph/mass spectrometers. The high
    level in equipment capability included more expensive detection
    equipment, such as perimeter sampling systems and a Fox vehicle.
    3The Board is an advisory board to the National Domestic
    Preparedness Office at the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
    consists of officials from local, state, and federal government
    organizations, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
    Department of Justice, and the Director of Military Support,
    Department of the Army.  Its charter is to establish, maintain,
    and update a standard equipment list that the interagency
    community could use to prepare for and respond to terrorism. Page
    4                                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-
    151  Combating Terrorism B-282618 All 24 survey respondents agreed
    that boundary marking tape was a basic HAZMAT item.  Respondents
    varied widely as to the level of capability other equipment could
    provide.  For example, six respondents designated a chemical agent
    water test kit4 as basic HAZMAT equipment, four indicated that it
    represented a modest increased capability above basic HAZMAT,
    three indicated that it represented a moderate level of increased
    capability, and seven indicated it represented a high level of
    increased capability. Four respondents did not place the kit in
    any category.  The thermal imaging camera also received a varied
    response.  For basic HAZMAT and modest, moderate, and high levels
    of increased capability over basic HAZMAT, the responses were
    eight, two, seven, and five, respectively. Two respondents did not
    place this item in any category. Procurement and      No one has
    created a validated list of equipment to provide a sound basis
    Sustainment Costs    for determining costs to initially equip and
    sustain various levels of equipment capability for a local
    jurisdiction to deal with a CBRN incident. However, using the
    weighted results of our survey to establish which equipment would
    go into which category, we estimated the potential costs to
    initially equip a notional city of 500,000 people.5  The notional
    city has 1,337 first responders, 112 of which are technically
    trained.6  As shown in figure 1, the estimated costs range from
    $1.3 million (basic HAZMAT) to $12.2 million (high level of
    increased equipment capability). 4A chemical agent water test kit
    evaluates any chemical warfare agent contamination in a water
    source. 5Because of the widely varying opinions on which equipment
    belonged in which category, we reconciled the results through
    weighting.  Based on how a respondent rated each item in our
    survey, we assigned a score to that response and then divided the
    total by the number of responses. 6The numbers of first
    responders, the size of response teams, and our equipment list
    were derived from assumptions discussed in our scope and
    methodology and are for estimating purposes only.  We do not
    intend to imply our concurrence with the appropriateness of such
    resources for responding to a CBRN incident, and our cost estimate
    is not to be considered a recommendation for how a city should be
    structured or equipped. Page 5
    GAO/NSIAD-99-151  Combating Terrorism B-282618 Figure 1:
    Estimated Procurement Costs Dollars in Millions 15 12.2 10 8.3 5.2
    5 1.3 0 Basic Level Modest Moderate High Level Level    Level
    Basic Modest Moderate High Source: Our analysis. Each local
    jurisdiction has its own perceived HAZMAT needs and opinions on
    what types of equipment it would need to respond to a CBRN
    incident. Depending on the types of equipment, the number of
    items, the manufacturer, and discounts for quantity purchases, the
    actual costs to equip a city to respond to a CBRN incident could
    vary greatly.  For example, a level A protective suit can cost
    between $600 and $2,000. As shown in figure 2, the estimated
    cumulative costs to sustain the equipment (in current year
    dollars) over a 10-year period range from $3.3 million for basic
    HAZMAT equipment to $30.7 million for a high level increased
    capability. Page 6
    GAO/NSIAD-99-151  Combating Terrorism B-282618 Figure 2:
    Estimated 10-Year Sustainment Costs Dollars in Millions 35 30.7 30
    25 20.9 20 15                        13.1 10 5        3.3 0 Basic
    Level Modest Moderate High Level Level      Level Basic Modest
    Moderate    High Source: Our analysis. Sustainment costs, however,
    can also vary because some items have an indefinite shelf life
    (e.g. traffic cones and hard hats) while others have a limited
    shelf life.  For example, level A protective suits have a shelf
    life of up to 5 years, while chlorine bleach, which is used for
    decontamination, has a shelf life of 6 months.  In addition, the
    environment and/or the frequency that items are used can affect
    their useful life.  For example, according to Los Angeles County
    Operational Terrorism Working Group officials, from mid-December
    1998 to mid-April 1999, first responders from the Los Angeles
    County operational area addressed approximately 60 chemical and
    biological threats that were hoaxes.  When responding to these
    hoaxes, first responders routinely wore hooded chemical resistant
    clothing or other appropriate clothing.  Some hooded chemical
    resistant clothing can be worn only one time.  As such, the county
    has had to replace Page 7
    GAO/NSIAD-99-151  Combating Terrorism B-282618 approximately 200
    of these items within the past 4 months.   Furthermore, technical
    equipment has to be calibrated periodically to ensure that it
    functions properly, and some equipment becomes obsolete and is
    replaced by improved models.  All of these factors can affect
    sustainment costs for items and equipment used to deal with a
    possible CBRN terrorist incident. The cost factor we used to
    estimate our sustainment costs included most of these issues,
    factoring in various assumptions about shelf life and usage. If an
    average inflation rate of 2.1 percent is included, the cumulative
    estimated sustainment costs range from $3.6 million for basic
    HAZMAT equipment to $34.2 million for the highest level of
    equipment capability (see fig. 3). Figure 3:  Estimated 10-Year
    Sustainment Costs Then-year Dollars in Millions 40 34.2 35 30 25
    23.2 20 14.5 15 10 5        3.6 0 Basic Level Modest Moderate High
    Level Level    Level Basic     Modest        Moderate     High
    Source: Our analysis. Page 8
    GAO/NSIAD-99-151  Combating Terrorism B-282618 Agency Comments
    In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred and
    noted the difficulties of developing procurement and sustainment
    costs for equipment needed to enhance the response capability of
    cities to respond to a terrorist incident involving CBRN.  DOD
    also noted that our report provided a good base for decision-
    making entities to work from.  DOD's comments are included as
    appendix V.  DOD provided technical comments, which we have
    addressed in our report where appropriate. As agreed with your
    offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report
    earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30
    days after its issue date.  At that time, we will send copies to
    the appropriate congressional committees; the Honorable Jacob J.
    Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Honorable
    Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; the
    Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable
    Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army; other federal agencies
    discussed in this report; and other interested parties. If you or
    your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me
    at (202) 5125140.  The major contributors to this report were
    Carol R. Schuster, Davi M. D'Agostino, James F. Reid, and Lisa
    M.Quinn. Mark E. Gebicke Director, National Security Preparedness
    Issues Page 9                                      GAO/NSIAD-99-
    151  Combating Terrorism Contents Letter
    1 Appendix I
    12 Scope and Methodology Appendix II
    14 Equipment List Sorted  Basic HAZMAT  Equipment Capability
    14 by Equipment                 Modest Increase in Equipment
    Capability                                       16 Moderate
    Increase in Equipment Capability
    18 Capability Level             High Level of Equipment Capability
    List                                       19 Appendix III
    20 Survey Respondents           Local Jurisdictions
    20 Federal Agencies 21 Associations 21 Contractor 21 Appendix IV
    22 Additional Offices           Local Jurisdictions
    22 Consulted for Our            Federal Agencies 22 Review
    Appendix V
    23 Comments From the Department of Defense Appendix VI
    27 Terrorism Related GAO Products Page 10
    GAO/NSIAD-99-151  Combating Terrorism Contents Tables     Table 1:
    Possible Cost to Equip a Notional City of 500,000 to Respond to a
    CBRN Event                                                     3
    Figures    Figure 1:  Estimated Procurement Costs
    6 Figure 2:  Estimated 10-Year Sustainment Costs
    7 Figure 3:  Estimated 10-Year Sustainment Costs
    8 Abbreviations CBRN        chemical, biological, radiological, or
    nuclear device DOD         Department of Defense HAZMAT hazardous
    materials Page 11                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-
    151  Combating Terrorism Appendix I Scope and Methodology
    Appendix I To estimate the procurement costs for equipment that
    might be required by a city responding to a chemical, biological,
    radiological, or nuclear device (CBRN) incident, we first
    developed a preliminary equipment list based on our previous work
    and input from the Army's Director of Military Support and its
    Technical Escort Unit, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
    Virginia's Fairfax County Hazardous Materials Unit.  This list
    formed the basis for our survey of city, state, and federal
    officials with expertise in the field of  hazardous materials
    (HAZMAT ) and/or CBRN response equipment. The survey requested an
    evaluation of equipment that represented the four levels of
    capability, defined on page 2, that we constructed to analyze and
    illustrate potential costs.  On the basis of our analysis of the
    survey responses, we compiled a master equipment list that
    reflected the different levels of capability.  Because of the
    varying opinions on which equipment belonged in which category, we
    reconciled the results through weighting.1 Appendix III contains a
    list of survey respondents and appendix IV contains a list of
    additional offices that we consulted for our review. We then
    determined the amount and types of items and equipment that could
    be used by choosing a notional city and identifying the number of
    first responders.  We chose a population size of 500,000 for a
    notional city, which is slightly above the median size of the 100
    most populous U.S. cities. Cleveland, Ohio, and New Orleans,
    Louisiana, are within about 5,000 people of the notional city
    population size; therefore, we included them in our analysis to
    obtain the number and types of first responders-including their
    levels of training-assigned to their respective jurisdictions.
    From this information, we derived an average number of first
    responders for the notional city.  We then consulted with local
    and federal officials, such as the Hazardous Materials
    Coordinators for the cities of Chicago, New York, and Baltimore
    and the Army's Director of Military Support, to identify the
    amount of equipment, at each level of capability, that could be
    used by first responders.  Our master equipment list, notional
    city size, and numbers of first responders are for illustrative
    purposes only and are not meant to imply that we agree with the
    appropriateness of such equipment or with how a city should be
    structured. 1Because of the widely varying opinions on which
    equipment belonged in which category, we reconciled the results
    through weighting.  Based on how a respondent rated each item in
    our survey, we assigned a score to that response and then divided
    the total by the number of responses. Page 12
    GAO/NSIAD-99-151  Combating Terrorism Appendix I Scope and
    Methodology We are aware that many items on our equipment list are
    being used in local jurisdictions for fire fighting and HAZMAT
    operations; however, for the purposes of identifying procurement
    costs, we assumed the notional city would have no preexisting
    HAZMAT capabilities.  We consulted with federal government
    officials to derive procurement costs.  As mentioned previously,
    our procurement costs are for operational equipment, do not
    reflect additional equipment that might be maintained as a
    stockpile, and may not reflect the actual prices a local
    jurisdiction might pay.  Differences might occur based on the
    equipment manufacturer, quantity discounts, or the use of
    alternative equipment to serve the same function. To calculate the
    equipment sustainment costs, we applied a factor of 25 percent of
    the initial procurement cost (in current-year and then-year
    dollars) to each item for every year of our analysis.  This factor
    was derived from discussions with local and federal officials, and
    it represents an average sustainment factor.  A heavy vehicle
    would actually require a higher relative sustainment cost than an
    article of clothing.  The average sustainment factor accounts for
    (1) general wear and tear, instrument calibration, and general
    maintenance costs of the equipment and (2) replacement costs for
    small-scale incidents and hoaxes.  For example, a small-scale
    incident would be in a localized area and would not include mass
    casualties.  Replacement costs due to a large-scale incident, such
    as the Oklahoma City bombing, were not considered.  We did not
    include training and certification costs in our sustainment
    estimates. Page 13                                    GAO/NSIAD-
    99-151  Combating Terrorism Appendix II Equipment List Sorted by
    Equipment Capability Level
    Appendix I I Basic HAZMAT            Level A fully encapsulated
    chemical resistant suit ensemble Equipment Capability    Hooded
    chemical resistant clothing Chemical resistant gloves (Butyl)
    Chemical resistant gloves (Nitrile) Inner gloves Hard-hat with
    face shield Safety glasses Duct tape Chemical resistant boots,
    steel or fiberglass toe and shank Outer booties Safety boots or
    shoes Two-way local communications, push to talk Personal alarm
    system to alert for downed personnel HAZMAT gear bag Surgical
    masks Appropriate air monitoring instruments Boundary marking
    tape: yellow-caution/red-danger Restricted access and caution
    warning signs Combination meter Combustible gas indicator pH paper
    and water finding test paper Radiation monitoring equipment Leak
    detectors (soap solution, ammonium hydroxide, etc.) pH meter or
    pen Water finding paste Gauging stick Squirt bottle Distilled
    water Ammonia for chlorine detection Drum thieves Grab sampling
    tubes Glass or plastic pipettes with aspiration bulb Tweezers,
    plastic Flags, wire stakes Wind socks Contaminated material
    disposal containers Traffic cones Brushes, long handle Garden hose
    with nozzles Polyethylene sheeting Containment basins, vehicle and
    personnel sized Page 14
    GAO/NSIAD-99-151  Combating Terrorism Appendix II Equipment List
    Sorted by Equipment Capability Level 5-gallon buckets 55-gallon
    plastic bags Disinfectant, detergent, bleach, and sodium
    bicarbonate Hand-operated diaphragm pumps with hoses Small garden
    sprayers Backless stools Folding tables, folding (6 foot) Trauma-
    type first aid kit Emergency eye wash Timer or stopwatch Safety
    harness with 150 foot dry line retrieval ropes, 9.5mm-10.5mm.
    Locking carabiners 20-lb. ABC fire extinguisher Hand lights,
    explosive proof Portable lights Air compressors and generators,
    8kw, 15kw, and 50kw Electric cord reels Copper grounding rods,   x
    4 feet (minimum length) Grounding cables, point-type clamps on
    both ends, 1/8  stainless steel (uninsulated) 50-foot minimum
    Traffic safety vests Megaphone/ public address system Overpacks:
    35, 55, and 85 gallon poly-drums Miscellaneous non-sparking tool
    kit, to include bun and spanner wrenches Small, medium, and large
    equipment bags Handheld illumination Cellular telephone (satellite
    capability is optimal) Facsimile, copier, computer printer, and
    scanner (combined or individual machines) Binoculars Camera, self-
    developing Computers (laptop, desktop, or docking station) with
    common data and word processing software for stand-alone, local,
    and wide area networks Office supply kit (notepads, pencils, etc)
    Personal Protective Equipment Selection Guide CHRIS Manual, 1993
    edition Merck Index, 12th edition Emergency Action Guides,
    Association of American Railroads Emergency Handling of Hazardous
    Materials in Surface Transportation Page 15
    GAO/NSIAD-99-151  Combating Terrorism Appendix II Equipment List
    Sorted by Equipment Capability Level Association of American
    Railroads, 1996 edition Farm Chemicals Handbook, Meister
    Publishing, 1997 edition First Responder's Guide to Agriculture
    Chemicals Accidents, Foden-Weddell, 1993 edition NIOSH Pocket
    Guide to Chemical Hazards, 1995 edition GATX Tank Car Manual, GATX
    6th edition Hawley's Condensed Chemical Dictionary, Sax & Lewis,
    13th edition Handbook of Toxic and Hazardous Chemicals and
    Carcinogens, Sittig, 3rd edition TLVs and BELs Guidebook, ACGIH,
    1996 edition Quick Selection Guide to Chemical Protective
    Clothing, Forsberg, 3rd edition Household Chemicals and Emergency
    First Aid, Foden-Weddell, 1993 Gardner's Chemical Synonyms and
    Trade Names, Ash, 10th edition Modest Increase in
    Personal cooling system; vest or full suit Equipment Capability
    Bio-pack rebreather (2-, 3-, or 4-hour supply, preferred) Self-
    contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) Chemical/biological resistant
    coveralls Spare ice packs for cooling systems Extraction gear
    Level A pressure test kit Full Face air purifying respirators with
    appropriate cartridges Emergency escape breathing apparatus (EEBA)
    Paper/disposable chemical/biological overgarments, including
    gloves and booties Hazard categorizing (HazCat) kit Air and liquid
    detector tube system Colormetric tube kit with additional tubes
    Photoionization detector (PID) Flame ionization detector (FID)
    Pesticide screening kit PCB test kits Petroleum finding paste
    Chemical spill classifier kit Waste water classifier kit Heat
    sensor, infrared Surface thermometer Page 16
    GAO/NSIAD-99-151  Combating Terrorism Appendix II Equipment List
    Sorted by Equipment Capability Level Plastic or brass scoops and
    trowels Sample jars:  8 oz. wide mouth, with Teflon lids, 16 oz.
    wide mouth with Teflon lids Thermal imaging camera Meteorological
    stations (temperature, wind, and humidity) Decontamination shower
    for individual and mass application Decontamination system
    supplies (secondary) Water bladder, decontamination shower waste
    collection Spill containment pillows and devices Contaminated
    water run-off and collection pools Water pumps, hoses, couplers,
    and nozzles (electric and manual) Emergency decontamination
    shelter Air inflatable tents Sodium hypochlorite powder (15 lb.
    buckets) 85 gallon poly over pak drums Disposable personal
    property bags Paper hospital gowns Colored/nonviewable cadaver
    bags (Center for Disease Control standard) HEPA (high-efficiency
    particulate air) vacuum for dry decontamination Ambu bag, chemical
    filtered Green line/red line battery activated marking system
    Class  D  fire extinguisher Ohm meter, intrinsically safe Ground
    resistance tester Explosive-proof exhaust fans Stretcher, litter
    decontamination mass casualty and field cart General purpose
    freezer/refrigerator Head area lighting system Portable area
    illumination Water trailers/source (potable and nonpotable) Heat
    stress monitor Hazardous material shipping containers Vehicle
    support Chlorine A (cylinder), B (1-ton cylinder), and C kit
    (railcar) w/appropriate tools Portable air cylinder carts Modular
    back packs Duty gear and modular load bearing systems/operational
    vests Medical/casualty bags Optics: day and limited visibility
    Page 17                                   GAO/NSIAD-99-151
    Combating Terrorism Appendix II Equipment List Sorted by Equipment
    Capability Level Multi-channel (UHF/VHF) encrypted, push to talk
    radios with chargers and two extra batteries and accessories and
    trickle chargers with field programming capability Micro-tape
    recorders with audio in/out feature Camera, 35mm with flash,
    telephoto lens Camera, digital Camera, video, VHS Light
    amplification lenses Standardized NBC/commercial chemical hazard
    software and response system Portable repeater Two-way pagers
    (secure preferred) Miscellaneous adapter cables and connectors
    Bull horns and portable sound system. Matheson Gas Data Book ,
    Matheson, 6th edition Effects of Exposure to Toxic Gases; First
    Aid and Medical Treatment, Matheson, 3rd edition Hazardous
    Material Injuries, Stutz, 3rd edition Emergency Care for Hazardous
    Materials Exposure, Bronstein, 2nd edition Clinical Toxicology of
    Commercial Products, Williams & Wilkens, 5th edition Joint
    Information Center (JIC) Manual Gloves Plus (computer program)
    Medical Management of Bio Casualty Book Medical Management of
    Chemical Casualty Book Moderate Increase in     Escape mask
    Equipment Capability     Tents, standard or air inflatable with
    climate control and chemical/ biological liners M-8 detection
    paper for chemical agent (weapons grade) detection M-9 detection
    paper (roll) for chemical agent (weapons grade) detection M-256
    detection kit for chemical agent (weapons grade) detection M-18
    series, chemical agent detector kit for surface and vapor chemical
    agent Point chemical agent detector and alarm Stand-off chemical
    detector, FTIR Hand-held chemical agent monitor with training set
    Chemical agent water test kit, M-272 Page 18
    GAO/NSIAD-99-151  Combating Terrorism Appendix II Equipment List
    Sorted by Equipment Capability Level Container, sample
    transfer/small infectious substance Gas chromatograph/mass
    spectrometer (GC/MS) JPO-BD immunoassay tickets Sampling kit with
    aerosol collector Aerosol samplers M-295 equipment decontamination
    kit for chemical warfare agents M-291 skin decontamination kit
    Cryogenic shipment containers Liquid nitrogen for cryogenic
    shipment containers Decontamination trailer, multi-water source,
    and prime mover High pressure hot water system Ultraviolet
    lighting Tents for contaminant containment| Vaporized hydrogen
    peroxide solution 2PAM chloride autoinjector Atropine 2mg/ml, 25ml
    vial Atropine autoinjector CANA (Diazepam) autoinjector Commercial
    vehicles with run-flat tires: vans, sport utility vehicles and
    trucks for personal transportation and equipment Mobile command
    post or chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incident
    response operations center Portable area climate control system
    Forward vehicle and equipment maintenance packages Solar battery
    chargers Vehicle-mounted communication systems for long-range,
    encrypted, voice, video, and data transmission capable of cross-
    band repeat Bi-direction amplifiers Secure telecomputer encryption
    High Level of                Automated perimeter sampling system
    (portal shield) Equipment Capability  Portal shield sampling kits
    Fox vehicle List Page 19
    GAO/NSIAD-99-151  Combating Terrorism Appendix III Survey
    Respondents
    Append IIix I Local Jurisdictions    Battalion Chief Downers Grove
    Fire Department Downers Grove, Ill. Department of Emergency
    Services Richmond, Va. District Chief Montgomery County Fire and
    Rescue Service Rockville, Md. Emergency Operations Bureau Los
    Angeles, Calif. Fire Station 39 Van Nuys, Calif. HAZMAT
    Coordinator Chicago, Ill. HAZMAT Coordinator Baltimore County Fire
    Department Towson, Md. Oahu Civil Defense Agency Honolulu, Hawaii
    Office of Emergency Management Denver, Colo. Office of Emergency
    Management New York, N.Y. Office of Emergency Management
    Philadelphia, Pa. Office of Emergency Management Seattle, Wash.
    Office of Emergency Preparedness New Orleans, La. Page 20
    GAO/NSIAD-99-151  Combating Terrorism Appendix III Survey
    Respondents Office of Public Safety Columbus, Ohio Terrorism
    Coordinator Los Angeles County Fire Department Los Angeles, Calif.
    Federal Agencies    Commander Soldier and Biological Chemical
    Command Department of Army Technical Escort Unit Soldier and
    Biological Chemical Command Department of Army Office of Emergency
    Response Department of Energy Office of the Emergency Coordinator
    Environmental Protection Agency Associations        International
    Association of Fire Chiefs1 International Association of Fire
    Fighters National Fire Protection Association National Institute
    for Occupational Safety and Health National Volunteer Fire Council
    Contractor          MKI Systems 1The HAZMAT Coordinator for
    Chicago, Illinois, and the International Association of Fire
    Chiefs submitted a joint response. Page 21
    GAO/NSIAD-99-151  Combating Terrorism Appendix IV Additional
    Offices Consulted for Our Review Appendix IV Local Jurisdictions
    Department of Public Safety Cleveland, Ohio HAZMAT Coordinator
    City of Baltimore Baltimore, Md. HAZMAT Unit Fairfax County Fire
    and Rescue Department Fairfax, Va. Federal Agencies       Director
    of Military Support Department of the Army Hazardous Materials
    Response Unit Federal Bureau of Investigation The National
    Domestic Preparedness Office Federal Bureau of Investigation
    Office of National Security Affairs Federal Emergency Management
    Agency Page 22                                GAO/NSIAD-99-151
    Combating Terrorism Appendix V Comments From the Department of
    Defense Appendix V Page 23           GAO/NSIAD-99-151  Combating
    Terrorism Appendix V Comments From the Department of Defense Page
    24                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-151  Combating
    Terrorism Appendix V Comments From the Department of Defense Page
    25                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-151  Combating
    Terrorism Appendix V Comments From the Department of Defense Page
    26                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-151  Combating
    Terrorism Appendix VI Terrorism Related GAO Products
    Appendix VI Combating Terrorism:  Use of National Guard Response
    Teams Is Unclear (GAO/NSIAD-99-110, May 21, 1999) Combating
    Terrorism:  Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorist
    Operations (GAO/NSIAD-99-135, May 13, 1999) Combating Terrorism:
    Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public Health Initiatives
    (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112, Mar. 16, 1999). Combating Terrorism:
    Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism (GAO/T-
    NSIAD/GGD-99-107, Mar. 11, 1999). Combating Terrorism:  FBI's Use
    of Federal Funds for Counterterrorism- Related Activities (Fiscal
    years 1995-98) (GAO/GGD-99-7, Nov. 20, 1998). Combating Terrorism:
    Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and
    Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998). Combating Terrorism:
    Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness
    Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, Oct. 2, 1998). Combating Terrorism:
    Observations on Crosscutting Issues (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23,
    1998). Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help
    Prioritize and Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr.
    9, 1998). Combating Terrorism:  Spending on Governmentwide
    Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-
    98-39, Dec. 1, 1997). Combating Terrorism:  Efforts to Protect
    U.S. Forces in Turkey and the Middle East (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44, Oct.
    28, 1997). Combating Terrorism:  Federal Agencies' Efforts to
    Implement National Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept.
    26, 1997). Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect
    Its Forces Overseas (GAO/NSIAD-97-207, July 21, 1997). Aviation
    Security:   FAA's Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices
    (GAO/RCED-97-111R, May 1, 1997). Letter    Page 27
    GAO/NSIAD-99-151  Combating Terrorism Appendix VI Terrorism
    Related GAO Products Aviation Security:  Commercially Available
    Advanced Explosives Detection Devices (GAO/RCED-97-119R, Apr. 24,
    1997). Terrorism and Drug Trafficking:  Responsibilities for
    Developing Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technologies
    (GAO/NSIAD-97-95, Apr. 15, 1997). Aviation Security:  Urgent
    Issues Need to Be Addressed (GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-151, Sept. 11,
    1996). Terrorism and Drug Trafficking:  Technologies for Detecting
    Explosives and Narcotics (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252, Sept. 4, 1996).
    Aviation Security:  Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security
    (GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237, Aug. 1, 1996). Terrorism and Drug
    Trafficking:   Threats and Roles of Explosives and Narcotics
    Detection Technology (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR, Mar. 27, 1996).
    (701149)    Letter    Page 28
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