Food Security: Factors That Could Affect Progress Toward Meeting World
Food Summit Goals (Letter Report, 03/22/99, GAO/NSIAD-99-15).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the
outcome of the 1996 World Food Summit, focusing on factors that could
affect progress toward meeting world food security goals.
GAO noted that: (1) the 1996 World Food Summit brought together
officials from 185 countries and the European Community to discuss the
problem of food insecurity and produced a plan to guide participants'
efforts in working toward a common goal of reducing undernutrition; (2)
to reach this goal, they approved an action plan, the focus of which is
to assist developing countries to become more self-reliant in meeting
their food needs by promoting broad-based economic, political, and
social reforms at local, national, regional, and international levels;
(3) the participants endorsed various actions but did not enter into any
binding commitments; (4) they also agreed to review and revise national
plans, programs, and strategies, where appropriate, so as to achieve
food security consistent with the summit action plan; (5) according to
U.S. officials, a willingness on the part of food-insecure countries to
undertake broad-based policy reforms is a key factor affecting whether
such countries will achieve the summit goal; (6) other important factors
that could affect progress toward achieving the summit goal are: (a) the
effects of trade reform; (b) the prevalence of conflict and its effect
on food security; (c) the sufficiency of agricultural production; and
(d) the availability of food aid and financial resources; (7) also
needed are actions to monitor progress, such as the ability and
willingness of the participant countries to develop information systems
on the status of food security and to coordinate, monitor, and evaluate
progress in implementing the summit's plan; (8) given the complexity of
the problems in each of these areas, participants acknowledged that
progress will be difficult; (9) the Food and Agriculture Organization's
(FAO) Committee on World Food Security requested that countries report
to the FAO Secretariat on their progress in meeting the summit's goal in
1998, but many countries did not respond in a timely fashion; (10) in
addition, some reports were more descriptive than analytical, and some
reported only on certain aspects of food security actions; (11) thus,
the Secretariat was unable to draw general substantive conclusions on
progress made to reduce food insecurity; and (12) the Agency for
International Development said that the level of effort by both donor
and developing countries will probably fall short of achieving the
summit's goal of reducing chronic global hunger by one-half.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-99-15
TITLE: Food Security: Factors That Could Affect Progress Toward
Meeting World Food Summit Goals
DATE: 03/22/99
SUBJECT: International food programs
Food supply
Developing countries
Foreign economic assistance
International cooperation
Agricultural assistance
Agricultural production
IDENTIFIER: 1996 World Food Summit
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Requesters
March 1999
FOOD SECURITY - FACTORS THAT COULD
AFFECT PROGRESS TOWARD MEETING
WORLD FOOD SUMMIT GOALS
GAO/NSIAD-99-15
Global Food Security
(711350)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
ACC - Administrative Coordination Committee of the United Nations
CFS - Committee on World Food Security
DAC - Development Assistance Committee
DES - daily energy supply
ERS - Economic Research Service
FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization
IFPRI - International Food Policy Research Institute
NGO - nongovernmental organization
ODA - official development assistance
ODF - official development finance
OECD - Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
UR - Uruguay Round
URA - Uruguay Round Trade Agreements
USAID - U.S. Agency for International Development
USDA - U.S. Department of Agriculture
WTO - World Trade Organization
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-280276
March 22, 1999
The Honorable Russell D. Feingold
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on African Affairs
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
The Honorable John Ashcroft
United States Senate
The Honorable Tony P. Hall
House of Representatives
In November 1996, a world summit was held in Rome, Italy, to address
a global commitment to ensure that all people have access to
sufficient food to meet their needs, referred to as "food security."
Participants set a new interim goal of reducing undernourishment by
50 percent by 2015. Previous world food conferences and
international summits have fallen considerably short of their targets
for reducing or eliminating food insecurity.\1
As you requested, we reviewed the outcome of the summit and
identified key factors that could affect the progress of developing
countries toward achieving the summit's goal. Appendix XI describes
our specific scope and methodology.
--------------------
\1 Countries that attended the 1974 World Food Conference set a goal
of eliminating hunger within
10 years. The 1979 World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural
Development agreed to eliminate severe undernutrition in the quickest
possible time and certainly before the end of the century. The 1992
International Conference on Nutrition pledged to make all efforts to
eliminate famine and famine-related deaths and to substantially
reduce starvation and widespread hunger before the year 2000.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO),\2 the U.S. government,
and others define food security to exist when all people at all times
have physical and economic access to sufficient food to meet their
dietary needs for a productive and healthy life. Food insecurity
exists when the availability of nutritionally adequate and safe
foods, or the ability to acquire acceptable foods in socially
acceptable ways, is limited or uncertain.
Although it is generally agreed that the problem of food insecurity
is widespread in the developing world, the total number of
undernourished people is unknown, and estimates vary widely. For
example, estimates for 58 low-income, food-deficit countries range
from 576 million people to 1.1 billion people. Appendix I provides
further information about these estimates.
--------------------
\2 FAO is a specialized agency within the U.N. system. Founded in
1945, FAO has mandates to raise levels of nutrition and standards of
living, to improve agricultural productivity, and to better the
conditions of rural populations. It comprises 175 member nations
plus the European Community (member organization).
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
The 1996 World Food Summit brought together officials from 185
countries and the European Community to discuss the problem of food
insecurity and produced a plan\3 to guide participants' efforts in
working toward a common goal of reducing undernutrition. To reach
this goal, they approved an action plan, the focus of which is to
assist developing countries to become more self-reliant in meeting
their food needs by promoting broad-based economic, political, and
social reforms at local, national, regional, and international
levels. The participants endorsed various actions but did not enter
into any binding commitments. They also agreed to review and revise
national plans, programs, and strategies, where appropriate, so as to
achieve food security consistent with the summit action plan.
Summit participants agreed that achieving food security is largely an
economic development problem, and according to U.S. officials, a
willingness on the part of food-insecure countries to undertake
broad-based policy reforms is a key factor affecting whether such
countries will achieve the summit goal. Other important factors that
could affect progress toward achieving the summit goal are (1) the
effects of trade reform, (2) the prevalence of conflict and its
effect on food security, (3) the sufficiency of agricultural
production, and (4) the availability of food aid and financial
resources. Also needed are actions to monitor progress, such as the
ability and willingness of the participant countries to develop
information systems on the status of food security and to coordinate,
monitor, and evaluate progress in implementing the summit's plan.
Given the complexity of the problems in each of these areas, summit
participants acknowledged that progress will be slow and difficult.
FAO's Committee on World Food Security (CFS)\4 requested that
countries report to the FAO Secretariat in 1998 on their progress in
meeting the summit's goals, but many countries did not respond in a
timely fashion. In addition, some reports were more descriptive than
analytical, and some reported only on certain aspects of food
security actions. Thus, the Secretariat was unable to draw general
substantive conclusions on progress made to reduce food insecurity.
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) said that the
level of effort by both donor and developing countries will probably
fall short of achieving the summit's goal of reducing chronic global
hunger by one-half.
--------------------
\3 Rome Declaration on World Food Security and World Food Summit Plan
of Action, World Food Summit (Rome: FAO, Nov. 13-17, 1996).
\4 Among other things, the CFS is responsible for monitoring
implementation of the summit's action plan, reviewing worldwide
demand and supply for foodstuffs, and recommending policy actions
necessary to remedy any difficulty in ensuring adequate cereal
supplies. Its membership is open to any country that is a member of
FAO or the United Nations.
SUMMIT OUTCOMES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
The summit resulted in an action plan for reducing undernourishment.
Included in the plan were a variety of measures for promoting
economic, political, and social reforms in developing countries.
SUMMIT PRODUCED A PLAN OF
ACTION TO ACHIEVE GOAL
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1
To reach their goal, summit participants approved an action plan that
included 7 broadly stated commitments, 27 objectives, and 181
specific actions (see app. II). Among other things, the plan
highlighted the need to reduce poverty and resolve conflicts
peacefully. While recognizing that food aid may be a necessary
interim approach, the plan encouraged developing countries to become
more self-reliant by increasing sustainable agricultural production
and their ability to engage in international trade, and by developing
or improving social welfare and public works programs to help address
the needs of food-insecure people. The plan further noted that
governments should work closely with others in their societies, such
as nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and the private sector.
Although the summit action plan is not binding,\5 countries also
agreed to (1) review and revise as appropriate national plans,
programs, and strategies with a view to achieving food security; (2)
establish or improve national mechanisms to set priorities and
develop and implement the components of the summit action plan within
designated time frames, based on both national and local needs, and
provide the necessary resources; and (3) cooperate regionally and
internationally in order to reach collective solutions to global
issues of food insecurity. They also agreed to monitor
implementation of the summit plan, including periodically reporting
on their individual progress in meeting the plan's objectives.
--------------------
\5 The plan is a statement of political intent whose implementation
depends upon the goodwill of all the countries and numerous
international agencies that expressed support for it when the summit
was held. Each country's national government will decide how to
apply the summit's objectives within its borders.
SUMMIT CALLED FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES TO IMPLEMENT
BROAD-BASED REFORMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2
The summit placed considerable emphasis on the need for broad-based
political, economic, and social reforms to improve food security.
For example, summit countries called for the pursuit of democracy,
poverty eradication, land reform, gender equality, access to
education and health care for all, and development of well-targeted
welfare and nutrition safety nets. Other international conferences
have suggested that major policy reforms were needed in connection
with food security issues. For example, countries that attended the
1974 World Food Conference and the 1979 World Conference on Agrarian
Reform and Rural Development said they would undertake major
economic, social, and political reforms. According to some
observers, the most important challenge of food security today is how
to bring about major socio-institutional change in food-insecure
countries, since previous efforts have met with limited success.
According to other observers, there is a growing acceptance on the
part of developing countries that policy reform must be addressed if
food security is to be achieved. However, reports on progress toward
implementing summit objectives that many countries provided to FAO in
early 1998 did not contain much information on the extent to which
countries have incorporated policy reforms into specific plans for
implementing summit objectives.
As defined by the summit and others, achieving improved world food
security by 2015 is largely an economic development problem; however,
the summit did not estimate the total resources needed by developing
countries to achieve the level of development necessary to cut in
half their undernutrition by 2015, much less assess their ability to
finance the process themselves. Many developed countries that
attended the summit agreed to try to strengthen their individual
efforts toward fulfilling a long-standing U.N. target to provide
official development assistance equivalent to 0.7 percent of the
gross national product each year. However, the countries did not
make a firm commitment to this goal,\6 and the United States declined
to endorse this target. Assistance from the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD)\7 Development
Assistance Committee members\8 has been declining in recent
years--from about $66.5 billion in 1991 to $52.7 billion in 1997
(measured in 1996 dollars). Total official development assistance
from these countries in 1997 represented 0.22 percent of their
combined gross national product, compared to 0.32 percent during
1990-94.\9
Many developed countries believe that the private sector is a key to
resolving the resources problem. Whether the private sector will
choose to become more involved in low-income, food-deficit countries
may depend on the extent to which developing countries embrace policy
reform measures. Private sector resources provided to the developing
world have grown dramatically during the 1990s, and by 1997 the
private sector accounted for about 75 percent of net resource flows
to the developing world, compared to about 34 percent in 1990.
However, according to the OECD, due to a number of factors, most of
the poorest countries in the developing world have not benefited much
from the trend and will need to rely principally on official
development assistance for some time to come. (See app. III for
additional analysis on official and private sector resource flows to
the developing countries.)
--------------------
\6 An agreement to hold the summit included an understanding that the
conference would not seek pledges from donor countries for increased
levels of assistance.
\7 The OECD was established in 1961 to promote economic and social
welfare in member countries and to harmonize efforts on behalf of
developing countries. OECD members include Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the
Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
\8 The Committee, which includes most OECD countries, deals with
development cooperation matters. It seeks to expand the aggregate
volume of resources made available to developing countries and to
improve the effectiveness of the aid.
\9 U.S. official development assistance in 1997 was the lowest for
all OECD countries, at less than 0.1 percent of gross national
product. In terms of actual dollars, the United States was the
fourth largest provider of official development assistance in 1997.
The United States has not agreed to the OECD target on the grounds
that the United States provides substantial resources for world
security, whereas the other countries provide relatively lesser
amounts.
FACTORS AFFECTING SUMMIT GOAL
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
Among factors that may affect whether the summit's goal is realized
are trade reforms, conflicts, agricultural production, and safety net
programs and food aid.
TRADE REFORM
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1
Summit participants generally believed that developing countries
should increasingly rely on trade liberalization to promote greater
food security, and in support of this belief, the summit plan called
for full implementation of the 1994 Uruguay Round Trade Agreements
(URA).\10 The participants also recognized that trade liberalization
may result in some price volatility that could adversely affect the
food security situation of poor countries. To help offset these
possible adverse effects, the participants endorsed the full
implementation of a Uruguay Round decision on measures to mitigate
possible negative effects.\11
The summit participants generally acknowledged that the URAs have the
potential to strengthen global food security by encouraging more
efficient food production and a more market-oriented agricultural
trading system. Reforms that enable farmers in developing countries
to grow and sell more food can help promote increased rural
development and improve food security. Trade reforms that increase
the competitiveness of developing countries in nonagricultural
sectors can also lead to increased income and, in turn, a greater
ability to pay for commercial food imports. However, trade reforms
may also adversely affect food security, especially during the
near-term transitional period, if such reforms result in an increase
in the cost of food or a reduced amount of food available to poor and
undernourished people. Reforms may also have adverse impacts if they
are accompanied by low levels of grain stocks and increased price
volatility in world grain markets.\12
The summit plan acknowledged that world price and supply fluctuations
were of special concern to vulnerable groups in developing countries.
As part of the plan, food exporting countries said they would (1) act
as reliable sources of supplies to their trading partners and give
due consideration to the food security of importing countries,
especially low-income, food-deficit countries; (2) reduce subsidies
on food exports in conformity with the URA and in the context of an
ongoing process of agricultural reform; and (3) administer all
export-related trade policies and programs responsibly to avoid
disruptions in world food agriculture and export markets.
Also, to mitigate the possible adverse effects of trade reforms on
food security situations, the summit plan called for full
implementation of a Uruguay Round ministerial decision made in
Marrakesh, Morocco, in 1994. Under this decision, signatory nations
to the URA agreed to ensure that implementing the trade reforms would
not adversely affect the availability of sufficient food aid to
assist in meeting the food needs of developing countries, especially
the poorest, net food-importing countries. To date, however,
agreement has not been reached about the criteria that should be used
in evaluating the food aid needs of the countries and whether trade
reforms have adversely affected the ability of the countries to
obtain adequate supplies of food.
While trade liberalization by developing countries was especially
encouraged by summit participants, some observers believe that
developed countries have been slow in removing their trade barriers
and that this may inhibit developing countries from achieving further
trade liberalization. For example, according to reports by the
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)\13 and the World
Bank,\14
member countries of the OECD continue to maintain barriers to free
trade that are adversely affecting the means and willingness of
developing nations to further liberalize their own markets and to
support additional trade liberalization. According to the World
Bank, without an open trading environment and access to developed
country markets, developing countries cannot benefit fully from
producing those goods for which they have a comparative advantage.
Without improved demand for developing countries' agricultural
products, for example, the agricultural growth needed to generate
employment and reduce poverty in rural areas will not be achieved,
the Bank report said. This is critical to food security. If
developing countries are to adopt an open-economy agriculture and
food policy, they must be assured of access to international markets
over the long term, particularly those of the developed nations,
according to the Bank.\15 (For a more detailed discussion of these
issues, see app. IV.)
Officials of the Department of State and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA), however, said that the problem of developed
countries' trade barriers against developing countries is not as
severe as portrayed by IFPRI and the World Bank. State acknowledged
that there are still some significant barriers to trade but said most
barriers are being progressively removed because of the Uruguay
Round. In addition, it said, the United States has a number of
preferential areas and regimes that favor developing countries and
allow most agricultural imports. State said the European Union has
similar arrangements. USDA officials generally agreed that it is
important for developed countries to remove trade barriers but said
it is equally important for developing countries to eliminate
domestic policies and restrictions on trade that have adversely
affected their own economic growth.
The price volatility of world food commodities, particularly grains,
and its relationship to the level of food reserves, is a key issue
related to trade liberalization and a significant problem for
food-insecure countries. Views differ over the level of global grain
reserves needed to safeguard world food security, the future outlook
for price volatility, and the desirability of holding grain reserves.
The summit observed that maintaining grain reserves was one of
several instruments that countries could use to strengthen food
security; however, the summit did not identify a minimum level of
global grain reserves needed to ensure food security nor did it
recommend any action by countries individually or in concert.\16
Instead, the summit participants agreed to monitor the availability
and adequacy of their individual reserve stocks, and FAO agreed to
continue its practice of monitoring and informing member nations of
developments in world food prices and stocks.
FAO, IFPRI, and the World Bank have observed that agricultural
markets are likely to be more volatile as the levels of world grain
reserves are reduced, an outcome expected as trade reforms are
implemented. However, they and other observers have also noted that
as a result of trade market reforms, agricultural producers may
respond more quickly to rising prices in times of tightening markets,
the private sector may hold more reserves than it did when
governments were holding large reserves (though not in an amount that
would fully replace government stocks), and the increased trade in
grains among all nations will help offset a lower level of world
grain reserves. Some observers believe that most countries,
including food-insecure developing countries, are better off keeping
only enough reserves to tide them over until they can obtain
increased supplies from international markets,\17 since it is costly
to hold stocks for emergency purposes on a regular basis and other
methods might be available for coping with volatile markets. Others
support the view that ensuring world food security requires
maintaining some minimum level of global grain reserves\18 and that
developed countries have a special responsibility to establish and
hold reserves for this purpose. Some have also suggested examination
of the feasibility of establishing an international grain reserve.\19
The U.S. position is that governments should pursue at local and
national levels, as appropriate, adequate, cost-effective food
reserve policies and programs. The United States has opposed
creation of international food reserves because of the difficulties
that would arise in deciding how to finance, hold, and trigger the
use of such reserves. (See app. IV for additional analysis on grain
reserves.)
--------------------
\10 The Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations were finalized
in 1994 with a series of agreements and ministerial decisions and
declarations that were annexed to the Marrakesh Agreement, which
established the World Trade Organization (WTO).
\11 The Uruguay Round Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible
Negative Effects of the Reform Program on Least-Developed and Net
Food-Importing Developing Countries.
\12 See also World Food Summit Technical Background Documents, vol.
3 (Rome, Italy: FAO, 1996).
\13 Per Pinstrup-Andersen, et al., The World Food Situation: Recent
Developments, Emerging Issues, and Long-Term Prospects (Washington,
D.C.: IFPRI, Dec. 1997).
\14 Rural Development: From Vision to Action (Washington, D.C.: the
World Bank, Oct. 1997).
\15 Rural Development: From Vision to Action.
\16 At the time of the summit, FAO was conducting a study to review
whether a stocks-to-use ratio of 17 to 18 percent--previously set by
an intergovernmental group on grains--was a reasonable standard for
judging the minimum safe level of global grain stocks in light of
changes in national and global food policies and improved transport
and logistics infrastructure. In January 1997, FAO reported that the
standard was still reasonable.
\17 Luther G. Tweeten, "Food Security," Promoting Third-World
Development and Food Security, eds. Luther G. Tweeten and Donald G.
McClelland (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997).
\18 Assessment of the World Food Security Situation (Rome, Italy:
Committee on World Food Security, Apr. 1998).
\19 See Testimony of Leland H. Swenson, President National Farmers
Union, Before the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
Committee, July 29, 1997; Hunger in a Global Economy (Silver Spring,
Md: Bread for the World Institute, 1997); and NGO Recommendations
for U.S. Action Plan on Food Security (Washington, D.C.: Coalition
for Food Aid, Nov. 12, 1997).
ACTIONS TO REDUCE CONFLICT
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2
The summit countries concluded that conflict and terrorism contribute
significantly to food insecurity and declared a need to establish a
durable, peaceful environment in which conflicts are prevented or
resolved peacefully. According to FAO, many of the countries that
had low food security 30 years ago and failed to make progress or
even experienced further declines since then have suffered severe
disruptions caused by war and political disturbances. Our analysis
of data on civil war, interstate war, and genocide in 88 countries
between 1960 and 1989 shows a relationship between the incidence of
these disturbances and food insecurity at the national level. A
sharp rise in international emergency food aid deliveries during the
early 1990s has been largely attributed to an increasing number of
armed conflicts in different parts of the world.\20
Summit countries pledged that they would, in partnership with civil
society\21 and in cooperation with the international community,
encourage and reinforce peace by developing conflict prevention
mechanisms, by settling disputes through peaceful means, and by
promoting tolerance and nonviolence. They also pledged to strengthen
existing rules and mechanisms in international and regional
organizations, in accordance with the U.N. Charter, for preventing
and resolving conflicts that cause or exacerbate food insecurity and
for settling disputes by peaceful means. The FAO Secretariat
analyzed progress reports submitted to FAO by member countries in
1998 and cited several examples of country efforts to support
peaceful resolution of domestic and international conflicts.
However, the analysis did not provide any overall results on the
extent to which countries had made progress in ending already
existing violent conflicts and in peacefully resolving or preventing
other conflicts. (See app. VI for our analysis on the relationship
between conflict and food security.)
--------------------
\20 Canadian International Development Agency, Netherlands Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, and Norway Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Evaluation of the World Food Program Final Report (Bergen, Norway:
Chr. Michelesen Institute, Dec. 1993).
\21 "Civil society" is a term used by U.N. and other international
organizations to refer to the nongovernmental side of society,
including both organizations and its citizens more generally.
Distinctions are made between NGOs that are not-for-profit actors and
the private (for-profit) sector. However, the usage of these terms
is not always exact. For example, officials and other interested
parties sometimes use NGOs to refer to both. See also appendix X.
INCREASING AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCTION
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3
One objective of the summit was to increase agricultural production
and rural development in the developing world, especially in
low-income, food-deficit countries. FAO estimates show that
achieving the required production increases will require unusually
high growth rates in the more food-insecure countries and, in turn,
greater investments, especially in the worst-off countries.
World Bank officials have said that the Bank is committed to
emphasizing rural agricultural development in countries that receive
its assistance. Its plan calls for country assistance strategies
that treat agriculture comprehensively and include well-defined,
coherent, rural strategy components. Despite public statements by
the World Bank, there are still differences of opinion within the
Bank and among its partners as to the priority that should be given
to the rural sector. These opinions range from recognizing a
positive role for agricultural growth in an overall development
strategy, to benign neglect, to a strong urban bias.
Achieving needed agricultural production increases will also require
other major changes in the rural and agricultural sector and in
society more generally. For example, according to the U.S. mission
to FAO, the most critical factor affecting progress toward achieving
the summit goal is the willingness of food-insecure countries to
undertake the kind of economic policies that encourage rather than
discourage domestic production in the agricultural sector and their
willingness to open their borders to international trade in
agricultural products. There must be an "enabling environment," the
mission said, that favors domestic investment and production in the
agricultural sector. Moreover, the mission said, these policies are
under the control of the food-insecure countries themselves and can
have a far greater impact on domestic food security than
international assistance.
Another issue involving increased agricultural production concerns
promotion of modern farming methods, such as chemicals to protect
crops, fertilizers, and improved seeds. Agriculture production in
developing countries can be substantially improved if such methods
are adopted and properly implemented. However, some groups strongly
oppose the introduction of such methods because of concerns about the
environment.\22 (See app. VII for additional information on this
issue.)
--------------------
\22 See, for example, Norman Borlaug, "Technological and
Environmental Dimensions of Rural Well-Being," in Rural Well-Being:
From Vision to Action, eds. Ismail Serageldin and David Steeds
(Washington, D.C.: the World Bank, 1997).
SAFETY NET PROGRAMS AND FOOD
AID
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.4
The summit's long-term focus is on creating conditions where people
have the capability to produce or purchase the food they need, but
summit participants noted that food aid--both emergency and
nonemergency--could be used to help promote food security. The
summit plan called upon governments of all countries to develop
within their available resources well-targeted social welfare and
nutrition safety nets to meet the needs of their food-insecure people
and to implement cost-effective public works programs for the
unemployed and underemployed in regions of food insecurity.
With regard to emergency food aid, the summit plan stated the
international community should maintain an adequate capacity to
provide such assistance. Nevertheless, this goal has been difficult
to implement and, since the summit, some emergency food aid needs
have not been met. For example, according to the World Food Program,
which distributes about 70 percent of global emergency food aid,
approximately 6 percent of its declared emergency needs and 7 percent
of its protracted relief operations\23 needs were not satisfied in
1997. Also, donors direct their contributions to emergency appeals
on a case-by-case basis, and some emergencies are underfunded or not
funded at all. In addition, according to the World Food Program,
lengthy delays between appeals and contributions, as well as donors'
practice of attaching specific restrictions to contributions, make it
difficult for the World Food Program to ensure a regular supply of
food for its operations. In 1998, the program's emergency and
protracted relief operations were underfunded by 18 percent of total
needs. Other problems affecting the delivery of emergency food aid
include government restrictions on countries to which the food aid
can be sent and civil strife and war within such countries. Notable
recent examples of countries that have not received sufficient
assistance, according to the World Food Program, include North Korea
and Sudan, where both situations involve complex political issues
that go well beyond the food shortage condition itself.\24 (See app.
V for additional information on food aid.)
--------------------
\23 As discussed in appendix V, protracted relief operations food aid
falls under the broad category of emergency food aid.
\24 On June 11, 1998, the World Food Program reported that (1) it
lacked sufficient funds and food for Sudan; (2) it was starting to
see the emergence of famine zones in parts of Sudan; and (3) while it
could firmly state that more food aid had to be rapidly delivered to
affected areas, it would not be possible unless it received a quick,
massive injection of food and cash. On July 27, the program's
Executive Director said: "We will need a great deal of help from the
donor community if we are to prevent an all-out famine in Sudan. I
ask donors to search for any means to help us save these people." In
September 1998, the program reported that its operations in the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea had also suffered from resource
gaps during the year and, as a result, the program had been forced to
limit its activities there. See "WFP Seeks to Expand Food Aid
Operation in Sudan," World Food Program Press Release (Rome, Italy:
June 11, 1998); "WFP Issues Urgent Appeal for Funds to Expand
Emergency Food Aid to Needy Sudanese," World Food Program Press
Release (Rome, Italy: July 27, 1998); and 1998 Estimated Food Needs
and Shortfalls, World Food Program (Rome, Italy: September 1998).
ACTIONS NEEDED TO MONITOR
PROGRESS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
Summit participants agreed that an improved food security information
system, coordination of efforts, and monitoring and evaluation are
actions needed to make and assess progress toward achieving the
summit's goal.
NEED TO DEVELOP A FOOD
SECURITY INFORMATION SYSTEM
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1
Many countries participating in the summit acknowledged that they do
not have adequate information on the status of their people's food
security. Consequently, participants agreed that it would be
necessary to (1) collect information on the nutritional status of all
members of their communities (especially the poor, women, children,
and members of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups) to enable
monitoring of their situation; (2) establish a process for developing
targets and verifiable indicators of food security where they do not
exist; (3) encourage relevant U.N. agencies to initiate
consultations on how to craft a food insecurity and vulnerability
information and mapping system; and (4) draw on the results of the
system, once established, to report to CFS on their implementation of
the summit's plan.
According to FAO and U.S. officials, improvement in data collection
and analysis is necessary if countries are to have reasonably
accurate data to design policies and programs to address the problem.
However, not much progress has been made in this regard over the past
20 years, and serious challenges remain.
A major shortcoming is that agreement has not yet been reached on the
indicators to be used in establishing national food insecurity
information systems. Following the 1996 summit, an international
interagency working group was created to discuss how to create such a
system. As of November 1998, the working group had not yet decided
on or begun to debate which indicators of food insecurity should be
used, and the working group is not scheduled to meet again before the
mid-1999 CFS meeting. FAO Secretariat officials told us that a
proposal will be ready for the 1999 CFS meeting. Thus far, only a
few developed and not many more developing countries have
participated. (See app. VIII for additional analysis of this
issue.)
COORDINATION IS CONSIDERED
ESSENTIAL
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.2
The summit's action plan incorporates several objectives and actions
for improved coordination among all the relevant players. For
example, it calls upon FAO and other relevant U.N. agencies,
international finance and trade institutions, and other international
and regional technical assistance organizations to facilitate a
coherent and coordinated follow-up to the summit at the field level,
through the U.N.'s resident coordinators,\25 in full consultation
with governments, and in coordination with international
institutions. In addition, the plan calls on governments,
cooperating among themselves and with international institutions, to
encourage relevant agencies to coordinate within the U.N. system to
develop a food-insecurity monitoring system, and requested the U.N.
Secretary General to ensure appropriate interagency coordination.
Since the summit, the United Nations, FAO, the World Bank, and others
have endorsed various actions designed to promote better
coordination.
In April 1997, the United States and others expressed concern to FAO
about problems related to FAO efforts to help developing countries
create strategies for improving their food security. Donor countries
noted that nongovernmental groups had not been involved in the
preparation of the strategies, even though the summit plan stressed
the importance of their active participation. In June 1997, the
European Union expressed concern about the uncoordinated nature of
food aid, noting that responsibilities were scattered among a number
of international organizations and other forums, each with different
representatives and agendas. And in October 1997, the World Bank
reported that many agricultural projects had failed due to inadequate
coordination among the donors and multilateral financial
institutions. (See app. IX for additional information on the
coordination issue.)
--------------------
\25 The principal officer of the U.N. Development Program in each
developing country also serves as the U.N. resident coordinator.
The coordinator seeks to ensure effective integration of assistance
provided by the U.N. system of agencies and consistency of the U.N.
system's operational activities with the plans, priorities, and
strategies of the country. For further information, see
International Organizations: U.S. Participation in the United
Nations Development Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-8, Apr. 17, 1997).
NEED TO MONITOR AND EVALUATE
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.3
The summit participants acknowledged the need to actively monitor the
implementation of the summit plan. To this end, governments of the
countries agreed to establish, through CFS, a timetable, procedures,
and standardized reporting formats for monitoring progress on the
national, subregional, and regional implementation of the plan. CFS
was directed to monitor the implementation of the plan, using reports
from national governments, the U.N. system of agencies, and other
relevant international institutions, and to provide regular reports
on the results to the FAO Council. As previously noted, as of
November 1998, a monitoring and evaluation system had not yet been
developed to provide reasonably accurate data on the number,
location, and extent of undernourished peoples. In addition, a
system had not been created to assess implementation of the various
components of the summit's action plan (that is, 7 broad commitments,
27 major supporting objectives, and 181 supporting actions).\26
Many of these involve multiple activities and complex variables that
are not easily defined or measured. In addition, CFS has requested
that the information provided allow for analysis of which actions are
or are not successful in promoting summit goals.
In April 1997, CFS decided that the first progress reports should
cover activities through the end of 1997 and be submitted to the FAO
Secretariat by January 31, 1998. Countries and relevant
international agencies were to report on actions taken toward
achieving the specific objectives under each of the seven statements
of commitment. As of March 31, 1998, only 68 of 175 country reports
had been received. The Secretariat analyzed the information in the
68 reports and summarized the results in a report to the CFS for its
June 1998 session. The Secretariat reported it was unable to draw
general substantive conclusions because (1) all countries, to varying
degrees, were selective in providing the information they considered
of most relevance for their reporting; (2) varied emphasis was given
to reporting on past plans and programs, ongoing programs, and future
plans to improve food security; and (3) the reports did not always
focus on the issues involved. Furthermore, some countries chose to
provide a report that was more descriptive than analytical, and some
countries reported only on certain aspects of food security action,
such as food stocks or reserve policies.
CFS had not stipulated or suggested any common standards for
measuring the baseline status and progress with respect to actions,
objectives, or commitments prior to the preparation of the progress
reports. In the absence of common standards, the Secretariat is
likely to experience difficulty in analyzing relationships and
drawing conclusions about the progress of more than 100 countries.
In addition, CFS did not ask countries and agencies to report on
planned targets and milestones for achieving actions, objectives, or
commitments or on estimated costs to fulfill summit commitments and
plans for financing such expenditures.
The Secretariat provided the June 1998 CFS session with a proposal
for improving the analytical format for future progress reports. CFS
did not debate the essential points that should be covered in future
reports and instead directed the Secretariat to prepare another
proposal for later consideration. Given the complexity of the action
plan and other difficulties, CFS also decided that countries will not
prepare the next progress report until the year 2000 and will address
only half of the plan's objectives. A progress report on the
remaining objectives will be made in 2002. Thus, the second report
will not be completed until 6 years after the summit. A third set of
progress reports is to be prepared in 2004 and 2006.
Under the summit plan, countries also agreed to encourage effective
participation of relevant civil society actors in the monitoring
process, including those at the CFS level.\27 In April 1997, CFS
decided to examine this issue in detail in 1998. However, the issue
was not included in the provisional agenda for the June 1998 session.
Detailed discussion of proposals by Canada and the United States on
the issue was postponed until the next CFS session in 1999. The
postponement occurred as a result of opposition by many developing
country governments to an increased role for NGOs in CFS. (See app.
X for additional analysis of this issue.)
--------------------
\26 CFS' approach to monitoring and evaluation does not include a
review or assessment of individual country action plans for
implementing summit statements of commitment. An FAO official said
the Secretariat does not have sufficient staff to evaluate the action
plans of all members.
\27 The U.N. Economic and Social Council has stressed the importance
of involving civil society in the U.N.'s follow-up to all major
international conferences and summits more generally.
AGENCY COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
The Department of State, USDA, FAO, and the World Food Program
provided oral comments and USAID provided written comments on a draft
of this report. They generally agreed with the contents of the
report. State emphasized the important role that broad-based policy
reforms play in helping developing countries address food insecurity
and suggested that our report further highlight this factor. We
agree with State on this matter, and have reemphasized the need for
developing countries to initiate appropriate policy reforms as a
prelude to addressing food security issues. State and USDA officials
also commented that in their opinion, the World Bank and IFPRI
overstated the effect of developed countries' trade barriers on the
food insecurity of least-developed countries. We have modified the
report to reflect State's and USDA's views on this matter more fully.
USAID said that, although an unfortunate circumstance, it believes
the level of effort by donor and developing countries will probably
fall short of achieving the summit's goal of reducing chronic global
hunger by one-half. While we cannot quantify the extent to which
developing countries may fall short, we tend to agree with USAID's
observation. USAID's comments are reprinted in appendix XII.
FAO officials said the report's general tone of skepticism was
justified based on the past record and reiterated that reducing by
one-half the number of undernourished people by 2015 requires a
change in priorities by countries along the lines spelled out in the
summit action plan. They also said that work was underway to further
investigate the extent to which the target is feasible at the
national level in those countries facing political instability or
with a high proportion of undernourished people. FAO officials said
that our discussion in appendix IX of coordination issues concerning
FAO's Special Program for Food Security and a Telefood promotion did
not reflect FAO members' support for these initiatives. We provided
additional information on the initiatives to reflect FAO's views (see
app. IX). World Food Program officials said food aid for
nonemergency and developmental purposes is more effective than is
suggested by the discussion in our report. However, the officials
did not identify any studies or analysis to support the Program's
position that food constitutes an efficient use of assistance
resources. The World Food Program said that it has acted on
recommendations for improving its operations, and we modified the
report to reflect the World Food Program's views. However, it is
important to note that a recent USAID study on the use of food aid in
contributing to sustainable development concluded that while food aid
may be effective, it is less efficient than financial assistance,
although the report pointed out that financial aid is often not
available. World Food Program officials acknowledged that important
issues remain unresolved concerning establishment of an international
database on food insecurity.
All of the above agencies and the Department of Health and Human
Services also provided technical comments that were incorporated into
the report where appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.1
We are sending copies of this report to Senator Joseph R. Biden,
Senator Robert C. Byrd, Senator Pete V. Domenici, Senator Jesse
Helms, Senator Frank R. Lautenberg, Senator Patrick J. Leahy,
Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, Senator Mitch McConnell, Senator Ted
Stevens, and Senator Fred Thompson, and to Representative Dan Burton,
Representative Sonny Callahan, Representative Sam Gejdenson,
Representative Benjamin A. Gilman, Representative John R. Kasich,
Representative David Obey, Representative Nancy Pelosi,
Representative John M. Spratt, Representative Henry A. Waxman, and
Representative C. W. Bill Young. We are also sending copies of
this report to the Honorable Dan Glickman, Secretary of Agriculture;
the Honorable William M. Daley, Secretary of Commerce; the Honorable
William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Donna E.
Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services; the Honorable
Madeline K. Albright, Secretary of State; the Honorable Robert E.
Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury; the Honorable J. Brian Atwood,
Administrator, Agency for International Development; the Honorable
Carol M. Browner, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency;
the Honorable George J. Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence
Agency; the Honorable Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of Management
and Budget; the Honorable Samuel R. Berger, National Security
Adviser to the President; and the Honorable Charlene Barshefsky, U.S.
Trade Representative. Copies will also be made available to others
upon request.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4128. The major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix XIII.
Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director
International Relations and Trade Issues
CURRENT STATUS OF GLOBAL FOOD
SECURITY
=========================================================== Appendix I
Although the problem of food insecurity is widespread in the
developing world, the total number of undernourished people is
unknown, and estimates vary widely. An accurate assessment of the
number of people with inadequate access to food would require data
from national sample surveys designed to measure both the food
consumption and the food requirements of individuals. Such studies
may include a dietary survey and a clinical survey that involves
anthropometric, or body, measurements,\1 and biochemical analyses.
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), clinical
and anthropometric examinations are the most practical and sound
means of determining the nutritional status of any particular group
of individuals in most developing countries in Africa, Asia, and
Latin America because the countries lack vital statistics, accurate
figures on agricultural production, and laboratories where
biochemical tests can be performed. However, clinical examinations
have often been given a low priority by developing countries, and
studies of anthropometric measurements have been undertaken very
infrequently. National dietary intake surveys are costly and
time-consuming and have also been undertaken in very few countries.
As a result, there are no internationally comparable, comprehensive
survey data for tracking changes in undernutrition for individuals
and population groups within countries, according to FAO.\2
--------------------
\1 Measurements of the body, such as height and weight, are made and
compared to population norms. For example, chronic undernourishment
in children may result in stunting (low height for age), underweight
(low weight for age), and wasting (low weight for height).
\2 See Michael C. Latham, Human Nutrition in the Developing World
(Rome, Italy: FAO, 1997) and The Sixth World Food Survey (Rome,
Italy: FAO, 1996).
FAO'S METHOD FOR ESTIMATING
UNDERNOURISHMENT
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1
For many years FAO has employed a method to estimate the prevalence
of chronic undernourishment at the country level that is subject to a
number of weaknesses. Nevertheless, FAO estimates are frequently
cited in the absence of better estimates. FAO uses (1) food balance
sheets that estimate the amount of food available to each country
over a 3-year period and (2) estimates of each country's total
population to calculate the average available per capita daily supply
of calories during that period. FAO then estimates the minimum
average per capita dietary requirements for the country's population,
allowing for only light physical activity. Then, in combination with
an estimate of inequality in the distribution of food among
households in the country, it derives the percentage distribution of
the population by per capita calorie consumption classes. On the
basis of this distribution and a cutoff point for food inadequacy
based on the estimate of the minimum average per capita dietary
energy requirements, the proportion of undernourished is estimated.
This is then multiplied by an estimate of the size of the population
to obtain the absolute number of undernourished .
According to FAO, a minimum level of energy requirements is one that
allows for only light physical activity. Depending on the country,
FAO says, the minimum level of energy requirements for the average
person ranges from 1,720 to 1,960 calories per day. Depending on
data availability, FAO's assessment of equitable food distribution
for a country is based on survey data on household food energy
intake, food expenditure, total income or expenditure, and/or the
weighted average of estimates for neighboring countries.
FAO's method has a number of weaknesses, and the validity of its
estimates has not been established. For example, FAO's food supply
figures are based on 3-year averages, and population estimates are
for the midpoint of the reference period used. As a result, FAO's
estimates of the prevalence of undernutrition do not reflect the
short-term, seasonal variations in food production or availability in
countries. In addition, FAO's method relies on total calories
available from food supplies and ignores dietary deficiencies that
can occur due to the lack of adequate amounts of protein and
essential micronutrients (for example, vitamins essential in minute
amounts for growth and well- being). FAO's method for measuring
inequality in food distribution or access is ideally based on food
consumption data from household surveys, but the number of developing
countries for which such data are available is limited, and the
surveys may not be national in scope or may have been done
infrequently. FAO uses these data to estimate parameters for
countries for which data are not available.
FAO acknowledges that the quality and reliability of data relating to
food production, trade, and population vary from country to country
and that for many developing countries the data are either inaccurate
or incomplete. According to one critic of FAO's method, FAO's
estimates are unreliable indicators of the scope of the
undernutrition problem and erroneously find chronic undernutrition to
be most prevalent in Africa. The main reasons for the latter finding
are systematic bias in methods used by African countries to estimate
food production and, to a lesser extent, certain minor food items
that are not completely covered in FAO's food balance sheets. The
author concludes that anthropometric measurements, based as they are
on measurements of individuals, would be a more promising method for
future estimates of undernourishment than estimates based on FAO's
aggregate approach.\3
FAO's method does not provide information on the effects of chronic
undernourishment (for example, the prevalence of growth retardation
and specific nutritional deficiencies), does not specify where the
chronically undernourished live within a country, and does not
identify the principal causes of their undernutrition. According to
FAO and other experts, such information is needed to develop
effective policies and programs for reducing undernourishment. In
addition, FAO does not provide estimates for developed countries and
does not provide estimates of chronic undernutrition of less than 1
percent.
Overall, according to FAO, its estimates of food availability and/or
the prevalence of undernutrition for many countries are subject to
errors of unknown magnitude and direction. Nonetheless, FAO believes
that its estimates permit one to know generally in which countries
undernutrition is most acute. According to FAO, the consensus of a
group of experts that it consulted in March 1997 was that (1) despite
the deficiencies of its method, FAO had no current substitute for
assessing chronic undernutrition than its food balance sheets based
on per capita food availability and distribution; (2) FAO's approach
tends to underestimate consistently per capita food availability in
African countries because of its inadequate coverage of noncereal
crops; (3) attention needs to be given not just to indications of
severe malnutrition but also to mild and moderate malnutrition; and
(4) more subregional information is needed on malnutrition and on
local levels of food stocks and trade, wages and market conditions,
and household perceptions of medium-term food insecurity. It was
also argued that about 67 percent of child deaths are associated with
nonclinically malnourished children.
In analyses for the World Food Summit, FAO estimated that about 840
million people in 93 developing countries were chronically
undernourished during 1990-92.\4 These countries represented about
98.5 percent of the population in all developing countries.
According to the FAO estimates, a relatively small number of
countries account for most of the chronically undernourished in the
93 countries (see table I.1). For example, during 1990-92, China and
India were estimated to have about 189 million and 185 million
chronically undernourished, respectively; collectively, they had
nearly 45 percent of the total for all 93 countries. Five
countries--Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Nigeria, and
Pakistan--accounted for between 20 million and 43 million chronically
undernourished each. The next 13 countries represented between about
6 million and 17 million of the chronically undernourished.
Altogether, the 20 countries accounted for about 679 million, or
nearly 81 percent, of the undernourished in the 93 countries.
Table I.1
FAO Estimates of Chronically
Undernourished People in 93 Developing
Countries, 1990-92
Number of
undernourish
ed as
percent of
total number
Number of of
undernourish undernourish
ed ed for all Cumulative
Country (millions) countries\ percent
---------------------------- ------------ ------------ ------------
China 188.9 22.5 22.5
India 184.5 22.0 44.5
Nigeria 42.9 5.1 49.6
Bangladesh 39.4 4.7 54.3
Ethiopia 33.2 4.0 58.3
Indonesia 22.1 2.6 60.9
Pakistan 20.5 2.4 63.4
Vietnam 17.2 2.1 65.4
Zaire 14.9 1.8 67.2
Thailand 14.4 1.7 68.9
Philippines 13.1 1.6 70.5
Afghanistan 12.9 1.5 72.0
Kenya 11.3 1.3 73.4
Peru 10.7 1.3 74.6
Tanzania 10.3 1.2 75.9
Sudan 9.7 1.2 77.0
Brazil 9.7 1.2 78.2
Mozambique 9.6 1.1 79.3
Mexico 7.2 0.9 80.2
Somalia 6.4 0.8 80.9
======================================================================
Subtotal 678.9 80.9 80.9
Second 20 countries\a 91.0 10.8 91.8
Third 20 countries 49.8 5.9 97.7
Fourth 20 countries 16.6 2.0 99.7
Last 13 countries 2.4 0.3 100.0
======================================================================
Total 838.7 100.0 100.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Countries are ranked in descending order based on the number
of undernourished.
\a Aggregate number of undernourished people for the next 20
countries with the largest number of undernourished people.
Source: Our analysis of FAO data.
As table I.2 shows, great variation also characterizes the extent to
which chronic undernutrition is a problem within countries.
According to FAO figures, a majority of the countries were estimated
to have chronically undernourished people at a rate ranging between
11 and 40 percent in 1990-92, and 19 had rates ranging between 41 and
73 percent.
Table I.2
Distribution of Chronically
Undernourished, 1990-92
Total number of
chronically
Percent of country's population Number of undernourished
chronically undernourished countries (millions)
---------------------------------- ---------------- ----------------
1 -10 18 40
11 -20 17 255
21 -30 24 267
31 -40 15 146
41 -50 9 50
51 -60 3 9
61 -70 5 53
71 -73 2 19
======================================================================
Total 93 839
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Our analysis of FAO data.
Table I.3 provides estimates of the number of undernourished people
in developing country regions of the world between 1969-71 and
1994-96. (The figures include FAO revised estimates for the periods
prior to 1994-96.\5 As a result, the total for 1990-92 is slightly
lower than that shown in
tables I.1 and I.2.) FAO's estimates indicate that the developing
world as a whole made considerable progress in reducing the level of
chronic undernourishment between 1969-71 and 1990-92, from an
estimated
37 percent of the total population to 20 percent. However, the
absolute number of undernourished was reduced by only 14.3 percent
during the period--from 959 million to about 822 million--because the
total population of the developing world increased by nearly 1.5
billion people during that time. Also, a large number of states did
so poorly that their chronically undernourished people increased both
absolutely and as a percentage of their total population. Between
1990-92 and 1994-96, the proportion of undernourished people in the
developing world declined another 1 percent, but the number of
undernourished increased by about 6 million people.
Table I.3
Estimates of Incidence of Chronic
Undernourishment in Developing Countries
by Regions of the World, 1969-71 to
1994-96
Undernourished
--------------------
Total
populatio
Year (3- n Percentage Persons
year (millions of total (million
averages) ) population s)
Region --------- --------- ---------- --------
Sub-Saharan Africa 1969-71 268 40 108
1979-81 352 41 145
1990-92 484 40 196
1994-96 543 39 211
Near East and North Africa 1969-71 182 28 51
1979-81 239 12 29
1990-92 325 11 34
1994-96 360 12 42
East and Southeast Asia 1969-71 1,166 43 506
1979-81 1,418 29 413
1990-92 1,688 17 289
1994-96 1,773 15 258
South Asia 1969-71 711 33 238
1979-81 892 34 302
1990-92 1,137 21 237
1994-96 1,223 21 254
Latin America and the 1969-71 279 20 55
Caribbean
1979-81 354 14 48
1990-92 440 15 64
1994-96 470 13 63
======================================================================
Totals 1969-71 2,609 37 959
======================================================================
1979-81 3,259 29 938
1990-92 4,078 20 822\a
======================================================================
1 994-96 4 ,374 1 9 8 28
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a In May 1998, FAO provided revised estimates of the number and
percentage of undernourished people by regions of the world for
1969-71, 1979-81, and 1990-92 and for the first time provided
estimates for 1994-96. According to FAO, the revised numbers reflect
the reestimation of historical population figures by the U.N.
Population Division. (As examples of the changes, FAO previously
estimated the number of undernourished people for all developing
regions at 917 million in 1969-71, 905 million in 1979-81, and 839
million in 1990-92.) However, FAO did not release data on a
country-by-country basis for either its revised or new estimates. As
a result, other tables in this report that are based on individual
country data use FAO's previous estimates.
Source: FAO.
Although the percentage of chronically undernourished people in the
developing world was considerably reduced between 1969-71 and
1994-96, sub-Saharan Africa's reduction was very small. According to
FAO's estimates, in 1994-96 the proportion of sub-Saharan Africa's
population that was undernourished greatly exceeded that of the other
regions of the world. However, in absolute numbers, the most
undernourished persons were still found in East and Southeast Asia
and in South Asia.
--------------------
\3 Peter Svedberg, "841 Million Undernourished? On the Tyranny of
Deriving a Number," Seminar Paper No. 656 (Stockholm, Sweden:
Institute for International Economic Studies, Oct. 1998).
\4 FAO reported a revised number in 1998 but not on an individual
country basis. See table I.3 and the accompanying discussion.
\5 See footnote in table I.3.
USDA ESTIMATE OF UNDERNUTRITION
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2
A 1997 U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Economic Research
Service (ERS) study employed an alternative indirect method for
estimating the amount of undernutrition at the country level that is
similar to FAO's method in some respects.\6 Like FAO, ERS estimates
food availability within a country. It also adopts a minimum daily
caloric intake standard necessary to sustain life with minimum
food-gathering activities. However, the standard is higher than that
used by FAO (for light physical activity)--ranging between about
2,000 and 2,200 calories per day, depending on the country.
According to ERS, its standard is comparable to the activity level
for a refugee; it does not allow for play, work, or any activity
other than food gathering. ERS estimates how inequality affects the
distribution of available food supplies based on consumption or
income distribution data for five different groups of the population.
Like FAO's estimate, ERS' estimate is highly dependent on the
availability and quality of national-level data.
In 1997, ERS used its method to estimate the number of undernourished
in 58 of the 93 developing countries regularly reported on by FAO.
ERS estimated that during 1990-92, about 1.038 billion people could
not meet their nutritional requirements--nearly 200 million more than
FAO's estimate of 839 million people for 93 countries. FAO's data
for the same 58 countries indicates 574 million chronically
undernourished, about 45 percent less than USDA's estimate. One
reason for the much larger estimates resulting from the USDA approach
are the higher standards used for minimum energy requirements that
were previously noted .\7
--------------------
\6 Food Security Assessment, USDA/ERS (Washington, D.C.: USDA,
November 1997).
\7 In estimating per capita food supply availability, ERS limited its
analysis to grains and root crops. These two food commodity groups
account for as much as 80 percent of all calories consumed in the
countries. ERS adjusted its minimum caloric requirements to reflect
the total share of grains and root crops in the diet of each country.
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
UNDERNOURISHMENT ESTIMATES
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3
Another important source of data on the status of food security in
the developing world is the World Health Organization's global
database on growth in children under age 5. Since 1986, the World
Health Organization has sought to assemble and systematize the
results of representative anthropometric surveys conducted in
different parts of the world. The data indicate that about 2 out of
5 children in the developing world are stunted (low height for age),
1 out of 3 underweight (low weight for age), and 1 out of 11 wasted
(low weight for height). In absolute numbers, the estimates for 1990
are 230 million stunted children, 193 million underweight, and 50
million wasted under the age of 5.\8 According to the U.N.
Children's Fund, more than 6 million children in developing countries
die each year from causes either directly or indirectly tied to
malnutrition.
--------------------
\8 The results were based on nationally representative surveys
conducted in 79 developing countries between 1980 and 1992. The
World Health Organization estimated the number of underweight,
stunted, and wasted children for 1990 by applying prevalence
estimates to the population of under 5 year olds in 1990.
WORLD FOOD SUMMIT'S COMMITMENTS,
OBJECTIVES, AND SELECT ACTIONS FOR
PROMOTING FOOD SECURITY
========================================================== Appendix II
The 185 countries that attended the World Food Summit pledged their
actions and support to implement a plan of action for reducing food
insecurity. The plan includes 7 major commitments, 27 subordinate
objectives, and 181 specific actions. The commitments, subordinate
objectives, and 24 of the specific actions relating to a variety of
objectives are summarized in table II.1.\1
Table II.1
Commitments, Objectives, and Select
Examples of Actions in the World Food
Summit's Plan of Action
Commitment,
objective, and
action Summary
------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------
1 Ensure an enabling political, social, and economic
environment designed to create the best conditions for the
eradication of poverty and for durable peace, based on full
and equal participation of men and women.
1.1 Prevent and resolve conflicts peacefully and create a stable
political environment through respect for all human rights
and fundamental freedoms, democracy, a transparent and
effective legal system, transparent and accountable
governance and administration in all public and private
national and international institutions, and effective and
equal participation of all people in decisions and actions
that affect their food security.
1.2 Ensure stable economic conditions and implement development
strategies that encourage the full potential of private and
public initiatives for sustainable, equitable, economic, and
social development that also integrate population and
environmental concerns.
1.2 (b) Establish legal and other mechanisms that advance land
reform and promote the sustainable use of natural resources.
1.3 Ensure gender equality and empowerment of women.
1.3 (b) Promote women's full and equal participation in the economy.
1.4 Encourage national solidarity and provide equal
opportunities for all in social, economic, and political
life, particularly vulnerable and disadvantaged people.
1.4 (a) Support investment in human resource development, such as
health, education, and other skills essential to sustainable
development.
2 Implement policies aimed at eradicating poverty and
inequality and improving physical and economic access by
all.
2.1 Pursue poverty eradication and food sustainability for all
as a policy priority and promote employment and equal access
to resources, such as land, water, and credit, to maximize
incomes of the poor.
2.1 (f) Promote farmers' access to genetic resources for
agriculture.
2.2 Enable the food insecure to meet their food and nutritional
requirements and seek to assist those unable to do so.
2.2 (a) Develop national information and mapping systems to identify
localized areas of food insecurity and vulnerability.
2.2 (b) Implement cost-effective public works programs for the
underemployed.
2.2 (c) Develop targeted welfare and nutrition safety nets.
2.3 Ensure that food supplies are safe, physically and
economically accessible, appropriate, and adequate to meet
the needs of the food insecure.
2.4 Promote access to education and health care for all.
3 Pursue participatory and sustainable food, agriculture,
fisheries, forestry, and rural development policies and
practices, in areas with low as well as high potential, that
are essential for adequate and reliable food supplies at the
household, national, regional, and global levels and combat
pests, drought, and desertification.
3.1 Pursue, through participatory means, sustainable,
intensified, and diversified food production, and increased
productivity and efficiency and reduced losses, taking into
account the need to sustain resources.
3.2 Combat environmental threats to food security, in particular
droughts and desertification, pests, and erosion of
biological diversity, and restore the natural resource base,
including watersheds, to achieve greater production.
3.3 Promote sound policies and programs on the transfer and use
of technologies, skills development, and training for food
security needs.
3.4 Strengthen and broaden research and scientific cooperation
on agriculture, fisheries, and forestry to support policy
and international, national, and local actions to increase
productive potential and maintain the natural resource base
in agriculture, fisheries, and forestry and in support of
efforts to eradicate poverty and promote food security.
3.5 Formulate and implement integrated rural development
strategies, in high and low potential areas, that promote
employment, skills, infrastructure, institutions, and
services in support of food security.
3.5 (b) Strengthen local government institutions in rural areas and
provide them with adequate resources, decision-making
authority, and mechanisms for grassroots participation.
3.5 (h) Promote the development of rural banking, credit, and
savings schemes, including equal access to credit for men
and women, microcredit for the poor, and adequate insurance
mechanisms.
4 Strive to ensure that food, trade, and overall trade
policies are conducive to fostering food security for all
through a fair and market-oriented world trade system.
4.1 Use the opportunities arising from the international trade
framework established in recent global and regional trade
negotiations.
4.1 (a) Establish well-functioning internal marketing and
transportation systems to facilitate local, national, and
international trade.
4.2 Meet essential food import needs in all countries,
considering world price and supply fluctuations and taking
into account food consumption levels of vulnerable groups in
developing countries.
4.2 (b) Food-exporting countries should act as reliable sources of
supplies to their trading partners and give due
consideration to the food security of importing countries.
4.2 (c) Reduce subsidies on food exports in conformity with the
Uruguay Round Agreements.
4.3 Support the continuation of the reform process in conformity
with the Uruguay Round Agreements.
5 Endeavor to prevent and be prepared for natural disasters
and man-made emergencies and meet transitory and emergency
food requirements in ways that encourage recovery,
rehabilitation, and development of a capacity to satisfy
future needs.
5.1 Reduce demands for emergency food assistance through efforts
to prevent and resolve man-made emergencies, particularly
international, national, and local conflicts.
5.2 Establish as quickly as possible prevention and preparedness
strategies for low-income, food-deficit countries and areas
vulnerable to emergencies.
5.3 Improve or develop efficient and effective emergency
response mechanisms at international, regional, national,
and local levels.
5.4 Strengthen links between relief operations and development
programs to facilitate the transition from relief to
development.
6 Promote optimal allocation and use of public and private
investments to foster human resources, sustainable food and
agricultural systems, and rural development.
6.1 Create the policy framework and conditions that encourage
optimal public and private investments in the equitable and
sustainable development of food systems, rural development,
and human resources necessary to contribute to food
security.
6.2 Endeavor to mobilize and optimize the use of technical and
financial resources from all sources, including debt relief,
to raise investment in sustainable food production in
developing countries.
6.2 (a) Raise sufficient and stable funding from private, public,
domestic, and international sources to achieve and sustain
food security.
6.2 (e) Strengthen efforts towards the fulfillment of the agreed
official development assistance target of 0.7 percent of the
gross national product.
6.2 (f) Focus official development assistance (ODA) toward countries
that have a real need for it, especially low-income
countries.
6.2 (g) Explore ways of mobilizing public and private financial
resources for food security through the appropriate
reduction of excessive military expenditures.
7 Implement, monitor, and follow up the summit plan of action
at all levels in cooperation with the international
community.
7.1 Adopt actions within each country's national framework to
enhance food security and enable implementation of the
commitments of the World Food Summit plan of action.
7.1 (a) Review and revise, as appropriate, national plans, programs,
and strategies to achieve food security consistent with
summit commitments.
7.1 (b) Establish or improve national mechanisms to set priorities
and develop, implement, and monitor the components of action
for food security within designated time frames.
7.1 (c) In collaboration with civil society, formulate and launch
national food-for-all campaigns to mobilize all stakeholders
and their resources in support of the summit plan of action.
7.1 (d) Actively encourage a greater role for, and alliance with,
civil society.
7.2 Improve subregional, regional, and international cooperation
and mobilize and optimize the use of available resources to
support national efforts for the earliest achievement of
sustainable food security.
7.2 (d) Continue the coordinated follow-up by the U.N. system to the
major U.N. conferences and summits since 1990; reduce
duplication and fill in gaps in coverage, making concrete
proposals for strengthening and improving coordination with
governments.
7.2 (i) Relevant international organizations are invited, on
request, to assist countries in reviewing and formulating
national plans of action, including targets, goals, and
timetables for achieving food security.
7.3 Actively monitor the implementation of the summit plan of
action.
7.3 (a) Establish, through FAO's Committee on Food Security, a
timetable, procedures, and standardized reporting formats,
on the national and regional implementation of the summit
plan of action.
7.3 (e) Monitor, through the Committee on Food Security,
implementation of the summit action.plan.
7.4 Clarify the right to adequate food and the fundamental right
of everyone to be free from hunger, as stated in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights and other relevant international and regional
instruments.
7.5 Share responsibilities for achieving food security for all
so that implementation of the summit plan of action takes
place at the lowest possible level at which its purpose is
best achieved.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Rome Declaration on World Food Security and World Food
Summit Plan of Action (Rome, Italy: FAO, Nov. 13, 1996).
--------------------
\1 Commitments are denoted by a whole number, objectives by a decimal
number, and actions by a decimal number and a letter. We selected 24
actions to further illustrate the depth and specificity of the
summit's plan. Including all of the actions would have considerably
expanded the length of the table.
RESOURCES FOR FINANCING FOOD
SECURITY
========================================================= Appendix III
As defined by the countries at the summit, achieving improved world
food security by 2015 is largely a development problem, the primary
responsibility for attaining food security rests with individual
countries, ODA\1 could be of critical importance to countries and
sectors left aside by other external sources of finance, and
developing country governments should adopt policies that promote
foreign and direct investment and effective use of ODA.
There is a growing body of evidence that foreign financial aid works
well in a good policy environment. For example, according to a
recent World Bank report,\2 financial assistance leads to faster
growth, poverty reduction, and gains in social indicators with sound
economic management. With sound country management, the report said,
1 percent of gross domestic product in assistance translates into a 1
percent decline in poverty and a similar decline in infant mortality.
The report concluded that improvements in economic institutions and
policies in the developing world are the key to a quantum leap in
poverty reduction and that effective financial aid complements
private investment . Conversely, financial aid has much less impact
in a weak policy environment.
The report's conclusions are consistent with the approach espoused by
the summit. For example, according to the summit countries, a sound
policy environment in which food-related investment can fulfill its
potential is essential. More specifically, summit participants said
governments should provide an economic and legal framework that
promotes efficient markets that encourage private sector mobilization
of savings, investment, and capital formation. In addition, the
participants said that the international community has a role to play
in supporting the adoption of appropriate national policies and,
where necessary and appropriate, in providing technical and financial
assistance to assist developing countries in fostering food security
.
Table III.1 shows, as could be expected, that a majority of the more
food-insecure countries are low-income countries and many of them are
also least developed. Of 93 developing countries reported on in the
table, 72 had inadequate food supplies in 1990-92. Forty-six of the
countries were low income (that is, they had a gross national product
per capita of less than $766), and 34 of the 46 countries were
designated as "least developed," meaning they were the poorest
countries in the world. Together, the 46 countries accounted for
more than 700 million of the chronically undernourished people in
developing countries in 1990-92.
Table III.1
Relationship Between Income Levels of
Developing Countries and Food Security
Income level\b (number of countries)
----------------------------------------------
Average
daily
calorie Least Lower Upper
s per developed, Other low middle middle
capita\ low income income income income Total
a ----------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ==========
Inadequ Less than 16 3 3 0 22
ate\c 2,100
2,100 to 15 8 9 1 33
2,400
2,400 to 3 1 8 5 17
2,700
================================================================================
Subtotal 34 12 20 6 72
Adequat Greater 0 2 11 8 21
e\c than 2,700
34 14 31 14 93
Total
number
of
countr
ies
Number 212 508 90 29 839
of
chroni
cally
undern
ourish
ed
people
(in
millio
ns)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: Data on average per capita calories and number of chronically
undernourished people are for 1990-92. Data on income levels are for
1995.
\a Average is based on available food supply at the country level.
\b The U.N. General Assembly designates countries as "least
developed" on the basis of several criteria; they are the poorest
countries in the world. Other country designations are, according to
the World Bank classification of 1995, gross national product per
capita: low income--less than $766; lower middle income--between
$766 and $3,035; upper middle income--between $3,036 and $9,385;
high-income--above $9,385.
\c We designated countries as having inadequate or adequate daily per
capita energy supplies based on an FAO analysis of the relationship
between average per capita daily energy supplies and chronic
undernutrition. According to FAO, for countries having an average
daily per capita undernutrition threshold ranging between 1,750
calories and 1,900 calories and a moderate level of unequal food
distribution, between 21 percent and 33 percent of the population
will be below the undernutrition threshold if the average per capita
daily energy supply is 2,100 calories. If the average per capita
daily energy supply is 2,400 calories, 7 to 13 percent of the
population will be undernourished. At 2,700 calories, 2 to 4 percent
of the population will be undernourished. If food is distributed
more equitably, the percentage of the population that is
undernourished decreases, and vice versa.
Source: Our analysis of FAO and U.N. data.
Table III.2 shows that between 1990 and 1997, Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance
Committee countries' allocation of ODA averaged $60.9 billion (1996
prices and exchange rates). However, ODA has been steadily
declining, from a high of $66.5 billion in 1991 to $52.7 billion in
1997.
Table III.2
Total Net Resource Flows from OECD
Development Assistance Committee
Countries and Multilateral Agencies to
Aid Recipient Countries, 1990-97
(Dollars in billions (1996 prices and
exchange rates))
Net resource 1997\
flows 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 a Mean
---------------- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ------
Official $91.7 $98.2 $85.7 $93.5 $92.3 $87.1 $78.1 $75.4 $87.8
development
finance
ODA\b 60.6 66.5 63.8 62.5 64.5 58.4 57.9 52.7 60.9
Other ODF 31.0 31.7 21.9 31.0 27.8 28.8 20.2 22.6 26.9
Total export 11.4 0.7 1.1 -3.3 6.7 5.5 4.0 -4.7 2.7
credits
Private flows 52.4 58.8 84.2 91.4 135.5 164.2 286.3 222.0 136.8
================================================================================
Total $155. $157. $171. $181. $234. $256. $368. $292. $227.3
4 7 0 5 5 9 4 6
Percent of total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Official 59 62 50 52 39 34 21 26 39
development
finance
ODA\b 39 42 37 34 28 23 16 18 27
Other ODF 20 20 13 17 12 11 5 8 12
================================================================================
Total export 7 0 1 -2 3 2 1 -2 1
credits
Private flows 34 37 49 50 58 64 78 76 60
================================================================================
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Official development finance--ODF.
\a Provisional.
\b Excluding forgiveness of nonofficial development assistance debt
for the years 1990-92.
Source: GAO calculation using OECD data.
For many years, OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has
supported a target of providing ODA equivalent to 0.7 percent of the
gross national product.\3 This goal was reaffirmed by most DAC
countries at the World Food Summit. As table III.3 shows, since the
early 1980s ODA as a percent of the gross national product has
declined for most DAC countries, including the five largest providers
(France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United
States).\4 Only four countries met the ODA target in 1997 (Denmark,
Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden), and they represent a small
amount of the ODA provided by the DAC countries. For the DAC
countries in total, ODA represented 0.34 percent of their combined
gross national product during 1980-84 and only 0.22 percent in 1997.
Most countries' ODA in 1997 ranged between only 0.22 percent and 0.36
percent of their gross national product. The United States was the
lowest, contributing only 0.08 percent of its gross national product,
or about one-ninth of the DAC target.
Table III.3
ODA Performance of OECD DAC Countries,
1980-97
ODA as a percent of gross national
product 1997 ODA in dollars (billions)
-------------------------------------- --------------------------------
Target Shortfall\
amount of \b
0.7 relative
Countr 1980/84 1985/89 1990/94 1995/97 percent of to target
y average average average average Actual GNP\a goal
------ -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- ---------- ----------
Austra 0.48 0.42 0.36 0.31 $1.08 $2.65 $1.57
lia
Austri 0.29 0.23 0.30 0.28 0.53 1.44 0.91
a
Belgiu 0.56 0.46 0.39 0.34 0.76 1.72 0.96
m
Canada 0.45 0.47 0.45 0.35 2.15 4.19 2.04
Denmar 0.76 0.89 1.00 0.99 1.64 1.18 -0.46
k
Finlan 0.29 0.54 0.57 0.33 0.38 0.81 0.43
d
France 0.53 0.59 0.62 0.50 6.35 9.80 3.45
German 0.46 0.41 0.38 0.31 5.91 14.58 8.67
y
Irelan 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.30 0.19 0.42 0.23
d
Italy 0.20 0.37 0.31 0.15 1.23 8.02 6.79
Japan 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.23 9.36 29.72 20.36
Luxemb 0.20 0.18 0.31 0.43 0.09 0.12 0.03
ourg
Nether 1.01 0.97 0.85 0.81 2.95 2.56 -0.39
lands
New 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.14 0.41 0.26
Zeala
nd
Norway 0.97 1.09 1.10 0.86 1.31 1.06 -0.24
Portug 0.03 0.16 0.31 0.24 0.25 0.71 0.46
al
Spain 0.09 0.10 0.25 0.23 1.23 3.72 2.49
Sweden 0.85 0.89 0.96 0.79 1.67 1.53 -0.14
Switze 0.27 0.31 0.36 0.33 0.84 1.85 1.01
rland
United 0.37 0.31 0.30 0.27 3.37 9.16 5.78
Kingd
om
United 0.24 0.20 0.18 0.10 6.17 56.42 50.25
State
s\c
================================================================================
Total 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.25 $47.58\ $152.06 $104.48
DAC
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Actual and shortfall numbers may not exactly total to the target
amount due to rounding.
\b A negative number means the country's ODA exceeded the 0.7 percent
of gross national product (GNP) target.
\c The United States has never approved the ODA target. According to
U.S. government officials, the government has no plans to try to
meet the target.
Source: Our analysis of OECD data.
Apart from ODA, the United States devotes substantial resources to
promoting global peace through its participation in a variety of
strategic alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
and maintenance of the world's most sophisticated defense forces.
U.S. expenditures on ODA and defense combined in 1995 represented
3.9 percent of the U.S. gross national product--a higher percentage
than that for any other DAC country. (The average for all other DAC
countries was 2.4 percent, with a range from 1.1 percent for
Luxembourg to 3.6 percent for France.)
According to the OECD, reasons for the decline include the end of the
Cold War, which removed a traditional and well-understood security
rationale for development assistance, preoccupation with domestic
issues and budgetary pressures in some donor countries, and fiscal
restraint policies that have included disproportionate cuts in
development assistance budgets. In June 1998, the OECD reported that
fiscal restraint programs had succeeded in reducing OECD public
deficits from 4.3 percent of combined gross domestic product in 1993
to 1.3 percent in 1997. The OECD said that the continuing decline in
ODA ran counter to the widespread improvements in the economic and
budgetary situations of the DAC member countries and to their clearly
stated policy goals for increasing ODA.
According to a June 1998 report by FAO (based on information provided
by only some of the DAC countries), Ireland plans to increase its ODA
to 0.45 percent of its gross national product by 2002 (compared to
0.31 percent in 1997); Switzerland plans to increase its ODA to 0.45
percent of its gross national product (from 0.32 percent in 1997 ),
but the year for reaching this level was not cited; and Norway seeks
to raise its assistance to 1 percent of gross national product by the
year 2000 (compared to 0.86 percent in 1995).
--------------------
\1 ODA includes grants or loans to developing countries at
concessional financial terms (if a loan, having a grant element of at
least 25 percent), with the promotion of economic development and
welfare as the main objective. Technical cooperation is included in
aid. Grants, loans, and credits for military purposes are excluded.
Official development finance includes (1) bilateral ODA, (2) grants
and concessional and nonconcessional development lending by
multilateral financial institutions, and (3) other official financing
that is considered developmental (including refinancing loans) but
the grant element is too low to qualify as ODA.
\2 David Dollar and Lant Pritchett, Assessing Aid (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1998).
\3 The target was established by the United Nations in 1970 as an
appropriate level for ODA.
\4 The OECD's figures on ODA for the United States do not fully agree
with U.S. figures, since OECD data are reported on a calendar year
basis while U.S. figures are reported for fiscal years. In
addition, the OECD's definition for ODA differs somewhat from the
definition the United States uses in its reports.
PRIVATE SECTOR RESOURCE FLOWS
TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:1
As table III.2 shows, private sector resource flows applied to the
developing world have grown dramatically during the 1990s, from $52.4
billion in 1990 to about $286 billion in 1996 (1996 prices and
exchange rates), although private flows declined in 1997 to an
estimated $222 billion. Although the flow of private resources has
increased considerably, the vast majority of the world's poorest
countries continue to rely heavily on official development
financing.\5 According to the OECD and the World Bank, with some
exceptions, these countries are as yet unable to tap significant,
sustainable amounts of private capital; without official assistance,
these countries' progress toward financial independence will be slow
and difficult.
One measure of the difficulty of attracting private investment to the
most food-insecure countries and peoples is shown in table III.4.
The table relates creditworthiness ratings of the risk of investing
in 92 developing countries to the level of their food security. The
ratings are from Euromoney, a leading international publication, that
assigns ratings as a weighted average of indicators of economic
performance, political risk, debt, credit, and access to bank
finance, short-term trade finance, and capital. Ratings can range
between a possible low of 0 points (poorest rating) to a possible
high of 100 points (most favorable rating). As shown in the table,
we grouped countries into four category ranges--0 to 25, 26 to 50, 51
to 75, and 76 to 100 points. The large majority of countries with
inadequate average daily calories per capita had a creditworthiness
rating of less than 51 points.\6 Only 2 of the 71 countries with
inadequate food availability received a creditworthiness rating of
more than 75 points. As the table also shows, 358 million
chronically undernourished people lived in countries that received a
creditworthiness rating of less than 51 points, and another 459
million undernourished people lived in countries that received
ratings between 51 and 75 points.
Table III.4
Creditworthiness Ratings and Level of
Food Security in Developing Countries
(Number of countries)
Investor ratings
--------------------------------------------------
Av
er
ag
e
da
il
y
ca
lo
ri
es
pe
r
ca
pi 26-50 51-75 76-100
ta 0-25 points points points points Total
\a ------------ ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ==========
In Less than 8 13 0 0 21
a 2,100
d
e
q
u
a
t
e
\
b
2,100 to 4 24 4 1 33
2,400
2,400 to 1 11 4 1 17
2,700
================================================================================
Subtotal 13 48 8 2 71
Ad Greater than 3 7 9 2 21
e 2,700
q
u
a
t
e
\
b
T
o
t
a
l
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
Nu 75 283 459 19 836\c
m
b
e
r
o
f
c
h
r
o
n
i
c
a
l
l
y
u
n
d
e
r
n
o
u
r
i
s
h
e
d
p
e
o
p
l
e
(
i
n
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: Data on average per capita calories are for 1990-92. Data on
investor ratings are based on Euromoney country risk ratings for
1996.
\a Average based on available food supply at the country level.
\b We designated countries as having inadequate or adequate daily per
capita energy supplies based on an FAO analysis of the relationship
between average per capita daily energy supplies and chronic
undernutrition. According to FAO, for countries having an average
daily per capita undernutrition threshold ranging between 1,750
calories and 1,900 calories and a moderate level of unequal food
distribution, between 21 percent and 33 percent of the population
will be below the undernutrition threshold if the average per capita
daily energy supply is 2,100 calories. If the average per capita
daily energy supply is 2,400 calories, 7 to 13 percent of the
population will be undernourished. At 2,700 calories, 2 to 4 percent
of the population will be undernourished. If food is distributed
more equitably, the percentage of the population that is
undernourished decreases, and vice versa.
\c Burundi, with an estimated chronically undernourished population
of 2.9 million, was not included in the analysis, since it did not
have a credit rating from Euromoney.
Source: Our analysis of FAO food security data and Euromoney
creditworthiness data.
--------------------
\5 In 1995, the world's poorest countries attracted almost no foreign
direct investment or loans from international banks. They have very
limited access to foreign portfolio debt or equity finance. Many
lack the financial market structures to handle such financing, a gap
that also impairs their ability to mobilize domestic financial
resources.
\6 For the rating period shown in the table, Afghanistan received the
lowest score, 3.9 points, and South Korea the highest rating, 84.3
points.
TRADE, FOOD PRICES, AND GRAIN
RESERVES
========================================================== Appendix IV
The World Food Summit identified trade as a key element for improving
world food security and urged countries to meet the challenges of and
seize opportunities arising from the 1994 Uruguay Round Trade
Agreements (URA). According to the summit plan of action, the
progressive implementation of the URA as a whole will generate
increasing opportunities for trade expansion and economic growth to
the benefit of all participants. The summit action plan encouraged
developing countries to establish well-functioning internal marketing
and transportation systems to facilitate better links within and
between domestic, regional, and world markets and to further
diversify their trade. The ability of developing countries to do so
depends partly on steps taken by developed countries to further open
their domestic markets. Food-insecure countries have concerns about
possible adverse effects of trade reforms on their food security and
about price volatility in global food markets, particularly in staple
commodities such as grains.
EFFECTS OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION
ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' FOOD
SECURITY
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1
Trade liberalization can positively affect food security in several
ways. It allows food consumption to exceed food production in those
countries where conditions for expanding output are limited. Food
trade has an important role to play in stabilizing domestic supplies
and prices; without trade, domestic production fluctuations would
have to be borne by adjustments in consumption and/or stocks. Trade
allows consumption fluctuations to be reduced and relieves countries
of part of the burden of stockholding. Over time, more liberal trade
policies can contribute to economic growth and broaden the range and
variety of foods available domestically.\1
However, during the negotiations leading up to the URAs and since
then, concerns have been raised about possible adverse impacts of
trade liberalization on developing countries' food security,
especially low-income, food-deficit countries. These concerns relate
to impacts on food prices, the ability of the developing countries to
access developed countries' markets, food aid levels, and global
grain reserves. For example, FAO said that future levels of food aid
might be adversely affected, since historically food aid volumes had
been closely linked to the level of surplus stocks, and future
surplus stocks could be low. FAO also expressed concern that if
grain stocks fell to low levels, trade liberalization measures might
be less effective in stabilizing world cereal market prices.
In 1995, FAO estimated that the effects of the URAs would likely
cause a sizable increase in the food import bills of developing
countries. For the low-income, food-deficit countries as a whole,
FAO projected the food import bill would be 14 percent higher in the
year 2000 (about $3.6 billion) as a result of the URAs.\2 However, a
World Bank study, issued at about the same time, estimated very
modest price increases for most major traded commodities and
concluded the changes would have a very minor impact on the welfare
of the developing countries.\3 Some more recent studies have also
indicated that the impact of the URAs on international food and
agricultural prices will be very limited.\4
The authors of one study estimated that grains and livestock product
prices will increase by only about 2 to 5 percent by 2005 and
concluded that the small increases are not expected to offset a
long-term declining trend in food prices.\5
Table IV.1 reports the results of two models\6 that estimated the
income effects resulting from reforms in the agricultural sector
alone and economywide.\7 Despite the delicate nature of modeling
complex trade agreements, both models projected positive economy-wide
benefits (from 0.29 percent to 0.38 percent of the base gross
domestic product for developing countries as a whole). For
agricultural reform alone, one model projected negative benefits and
the other positive benefits for developing countries as a whole.
Both models projected that Africa and the Near East would experience
negative benefits from agricultural reform alone. The study that
cited the results concluded that further work was needed to reconcile
differences between the various assessments before firm policy
recommendations could be made. Elsewhere, FAO commented that studies
modeling the impact of the URAs typically cover only the parts of the
agreement that are more amenable for quantification. In FAO's view,
estimates of the URA trade and income gains from the increase in
market access for goods underestimate the full benefits of the
agreement on world trade and income.
Table IV.1
Estimated Effects of the URAs' Reforms
on Income in the Developing and
Developed World
(Dollars in millions)
Estimated effects on 1992 gross domestic product if UR reforms had
been in effect
------------------------------------------------------------------
MRT model base scenario\a FMN model base scenario\a
--------------------------------- -------------------------------
Economy- Economy-
wide reform wide
Regions and as percent reform as
select of base percent of
countries Agricultu Economy- gross Agricultu Economy- base gross
and trade ral wide domestic ral wide domestic
groups reform reform\b product reform reform product
------------ --------- --------- ----------- --------- -------- ----------
================================================================================
Developing $9.21 $17.65 0.38 $-0.21 $10.29 0.29
countries
Africa -0.29 -0.42 -0.24 -0.40 1.81 0.24
East Asia 8.04 12.30 0.86 0.17 7.19 0.50
South Asia 0.10 3.29 0.99 -0.22 1.23 0.37
Near East\ -0.45 -0.39 -0.07 \c \c \c
Latin 2.07 3.30 0.27 0.24 0.06 0.01
America
================================================================================
Developed $49.10 $75.21 0.41 $ 4.33 $ 26.86 0.14
countries
Australia 1.11 1.52 0.45 0.59 0.29 0.09
and New
Zealand
Japan 15.23 16.69 0.47 -0.50 1.26 0.04
Canada 0.24 1.16 0.22 0.74 0.72 0.13
United 1.66 12.84 0.22 0.10 10.07 0.17
States
European 28.54 38.85 0.58 4.79 14.56 0.22
Union -12
European 2.41 4.15 0.35 -0.64 0.27 0.03
Free Trade
Association
\d
Eastern -0.25 -0.42 -0.05 -0.75 -0.31 -0.04
Europe and
former
Soviet
Union
================================================================================
Rest of \e \e \e 0.52 2.49 0.98
world
================================================================================
Total $58.3 $92.9 0.41% $4.6 $39.6 0.17%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legend
UR = Uruguay Round
Note: Income effects were estimated relative to 1992 baseline
conditions.
\a The Multi-Regional Trade (MRT) model by G. Harrison, T.
Rutherford, and D. Tarr and the Francois, McDonald, and Nordstrom
(FMN) model by J. Francois, B. McDonald, and
H. Nordstrom.
\b Full reforms simulated agricultural sector reforms plus reforms in
nonagricultural sectors and the phasing out of the multifiber
arrangement.
\c In FMN, the Near East region is covered under Africa.
\d Members include Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland.
Austria, Finland, and Sweden left the association in January 1995.
\e Not applicable.
Source: Ramesh Sharma, Panos Konandreas, and Jim Greenfield, "An
Overview of Assessments of the Impact of the Uruguay Round on
Agricultural Prices and Incomes," Food Policy, vol. 21,
No. 4/5 (1996).
--------------------
\1 See, for example, Technical background documents 12-15, World Food
Summit (Rome, Italy: FAO, 1996).
\2 According to FAO analyses released at the time of the summit,
low-income, food-deficit countries continued to worry about their
losses in trade preferences as a result of the URAs, greater
constraints in taking advantage of new trade opportunities, and the
possibility of higher import bills.
\3 I. Goldin, O. Knudsen, and D. van der Mensbrugghe, Trade
Liberalization: Global Economic Implications (Washington, D.C.:
OECD and the World Bank, 1995).
\4 The World Food Situation.
\5 See Kym Anderson, et al., "Asia--Pacific Food Markets and Trade in
2005: A Global, Economy-wide Perspective," The Australian Journal of
Agricultural and Resource Economics, No. 41:1 (1997).
\6 See J. Francois, B. McDonald, and H. Nordstrom, "Assessing the
Uruguay Round," The Uruguay Round and the Developing Economies, eds.
W. Martin and L. Winters, World Bank Discussion Paper No. 307
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1995). See also G. Harrison, T.
Rutherford, and D. Tarr, "Quantifying the Uruguay Round," The
Uruguay Round and the Developing Economies.
\7 The analysis included reforms in the agricultural sector, market
access reforms in manufactured and industrial products, and the
phasing out of a multifiber arrangement.
IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY ROUND
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:2
According to some observers, the most important thing that developed
countries can do to help food-insecure countries is to open their own
markets to developing country exports. Market access is important
not only in primary commodities but also in clothing, textiles,
footwear, processed foods, and other products into which developing
countries may diversify as development progresses.\8 Yet, according
to the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the
World Bank, the way developed countries are implementing the URAs is
adversely affecting the ability of developing countries to improve
their food security and may jeopardize their support for further
trade liberalization. U.S. government officials state, however,
that because of the URAs, most of the relatively few remaining
barriers are being progressively eliminated. A State Department
official further noted that the United States and the European Union
have a number of preferential arrangements that favor developing
countries and allow most agricultural imports.
One study, by IFPRI, concluded that a large number of developing
countries have liberalized foreign trade in food and agricultural
commodities in response to structural adjustment programs and the
recent URAs, but OECD countries have not matched their actions.
While specific quantities of certain commodities from developing
countries still receive preferential treatment, OECD countries have
been reluctant to open their domestic markets to developing
countries' exports of high-value commodities such as beef, sugar, and
dairy products. In IFPRI's view, this reduces benefits to developing
countries and may make continued market liberalization unviable for
them. IFPRI recommended that the next round of World Trade
Organization (WTO) negotiations emphasize the opening of OECD
domestic markets to commodities from developing countries.
According to a World Bank report, without an open trading environment
and access to OECD country markets, developing countries cannot fully
benefit from the goods they produce that give them a comparative
advantage. Without improved demand for developing countries'
agricultural products, the agricultural growth needed to generate
employment and reduce poverty in rural areas will not occur. Under
the Uruguay Round (UR) Agreement on Agriculture, countries generally
agreed to eliminate import restrictions, including quotas. However,
according to the World Bank, the elimination of agricultural import
restrictions through tariffication resulted in tariff levels that in
many cases were set much higher than previously existing tariff
levels. If developing countries are to adopt an open-economy
agricultural and food policy, they must be assured of stable,
long-term access to international markets--including those of the
OECD, the Bank said. Yet during 1995-96, when international grain
prices were soaring, the European Union restricted cereal exports
from member countries (by imposing a tax on exports) to protect their
domestic customers. An export tax was also applied during a few
weeks in 1997.
--------------------
\8 Tweeten, "Food Security."
TRADE LIBERALIZATION, FOOD AID,
AND THE MARRAKESH DECISION
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:3
The 1994 URAs included a ministerial decision reached by trade
ministers in Marrakesh, Morocco, that recognized that implementation
of the UR agricultural trade reforms might adversely affect the
least-developed and net food-importing countries. The concern was
that as a result of the reforms, these countries might not have
available to them adequate supplies of basic foodstuffs from external
sources on reasonable terms and conditions and might face short-term
difficulties in financing normal levels of commercial imports. To
obviate this situation, the decision included, among others,
agreements to
-- review the level of food aid established periodically by the
Committee on Food Aid under the Food Aid Convention of 1986 and
to initiate negotiations in an "appropriate forum" to establish
food aid commitments sufficient to meet the legitimate food aid
needs of the developing countries during the reform program;
-- adopt guidelines to ensure that an increasing proportion of
basic foodstuffs is provided to least-developed countries and
net food-importing countries in fully grant form and/or on
appropriate concessional terms in line with the 1986 Food Aid
Convention; and
-- have the WTO's Committee on Agriculture monitor, as appropriate,
follow-up actions.
The decision specifically targeted developing countries whose food
aid needs may be adversely affected as a result of the UR
agricultural trade reforms.\9 It did not establish or propose
criteria for assessing whether trade reforms had adversely affected
the availability of and terms and conditions for accessing basic
foodstuffs. (Methodologically, it could be difficult to separate the
effects of the URAs' reforms from other factors affecting the ability
to access food from external sources.) Nor did the decision establish
what criteria would be used in determining the "legitimate needs" of
different developing countries. For example, would "legitimate
needs" be based on a country's current overall food aid needs, the
amount of food aid it received prior to completion of the URAs, the
amount of food aid adversely affected by the agreements, or something
else? In addition, the decision did not establish any timetable for
resolving these issues. Finally, the decision did not clearly
identify what would be the appropriate forum for establishing a level
of sufficient food aid commitments.
In March 1996, the WTO's Committee on Agriculture established a list
of eligible countries covered by the decision with an understanding
that being listed did not confer automatic benefits.\10 During
country negotiations over the content of the proposed World Food
Summit action plan in the fall of 1996, there was considerable debate
about the ministerial decision. Developing countries attributed
recent high world grain prices to UR agricultural reforms and wanted
the plan to commit countries to prompt and full implementation of the
decision. U.S. negotiators disagreed. They recognized that the
high market prices for grain had adversely affected the
least-developed and net food-importing countries but said that the
reforms were just beginning to be implemented and it was thus too
early for the reforms to have had any measurable adverse effects.
The summit plan that was finally approved by all countries, in
November 1996, states that the ministerial decision should be fully
implemented. To date, however, decisions still have not been made
about criteria that should be used for judging and quantifying the
legitimate food aid needs of developing countries. In addition, no
decisions have been made about an appropriate forum or criteria for
assessing whether the Uruguay Round trade reforms have adversely
affected the availability of and terms and conditions for accessing
basic foodstuffs. Consequently, no findings have been made as to
whether adverse impacts have already occurred.
In December 1996, the WTO ministerial meeting in Singapore agreed
that the London-based Food Aid Committee, in renegotiating the Food
Aid Convention (scheduled to expire in June 1998), should develop
recommendations for establishing a level of food aid commitments,
covering as wide a range of donors and donatable foodstuffs as
possible, sufficient to meet the legitimate needs of developing
countries during implementation of the Uruguay Round reform
program.\11 In January 1997, Food Aid Committee members indicated
they would do so, with an understanding that the committee would
direct its recommendations to the WTO and reflect its recommendations
in the provisions of a new food aid convention. Agreement on a new
convention has not yet been reached. The existing agreement was
re-extended and is scheduled to expire in June 1999. According to a
U.S. official, if ongoing efforts to negotiate a new agreement are
successful, the document should go some distance in assuring
food-deficit, low-income countries that the Uruguay Round trade
liberalization will not drastically reduce food aid. According to
the official, the United States, Australia, Canada, and Japan are
pressing hard for conclusion of the negotiations . In January 1998,
the FAO Secretariat advised the WTO Committee on Agriculture that
there was little it could do in its analyses to isolate the effect of
the Uruguay Round from other factors influencing commodity prices.
--------------------
\9 Appendix V provides additional information on food aid apart from
the issue of trade reforms.
\10 The list included the least-developed countries as recognized by
the U.N. Economic and Social Council, as well as 15 developing
country WTO members that asked to be listed and submitted relevant
statistical data regarding their status as net-importers of basic
foodstuffs. The committee reviews the list annually .
\11 Members also agreed to encourage relevant institutions to
consider establishing or enhancing facilities for developing
countries experiencing URA-related difficulties in financing normal
commercial imports. The World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund reported that they were in a position to meet requests with
existing facilities. The Fund reported that in 1997, one purchase
was made through its Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility.
TRADE, PRICE VOLATILITY, AND
GLOBAL GRAIN RESERVES
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:4
As countries rely more on trade to meet their food needs, they become
more vulnerable to possible volatility in world food prices. Price
volatility of basic food commodities, especially grains, can be a
significant problem for food-insecure countries. Many poor people
spend more than half their income on food.\12 FAO and others have
suggested that sufficient grain stocks be held to help contain
excessive price increases during times of acute food shortages and
thus provide support to the most vulnerable countries. However,
views differ over the level of global reserves needed to safeguard
world food security, the future outlook for price volatility, and the
desirability of governments' holding grain reserves.
In response to the world grain crisis of the early 1970s, the 1974
World Food Conference endorsed several principles regarding grain
stock-holding policies: (1) governments should adopt policies that
take into account the policies of other countries and would result in
maintaining a minimum safe level of basic grain stocks for the world
as a whole; (2) governments should take actions to ensure that grain
stocks are replenished as soon as feasible when they drop below
minimum levels to meet food shortages; and (3) in periods of acute
food shortages, nations holding stocks exceeding minimum safe levels
to meet domestic needs and emergencies should make such supplies
available for export at reasonable prices. Subsequently, the
Intergovernmental Group on Grains established a stocks-to-consumption
ratio of 17 to 18 percent as an indicator of a minimum safe global
food security situation.
As table IV.2 shows, the world grain stocks-to-use ratio reached and
exceeded the minimum level in 1976-77 and remained at or above that
level for the next 18 years. In the year before the November 1996
World Food Summit, the ratio fell to 14 percent, the lowest level in
the previous 25 years. During 1995-96, world grain prices rose
significantly. The price of wheat increased from $151 per ton in
April 1995 and reached a peak of $258 in May 1996, a rise of 71
percent. Corn prices rose continuously from $113 in May 1995 to a
record $204 in May 1996, an increase of 81 percent. The world price
increases were accompanied by high grain prices in many developing
countries. In some cases, the latter prices exceeded the world price
increases because of simultaneous depreciation of developing
countries' currencies. According to the World Bank, the price
increases were a result of a poor U.S. grain harvest in 1995,
combined with unusually low world grain stockpiles. Another factor
was China's entry into world grain markets, with a purchase of 5
million tons in 1995 (after exporting nearly 11 million tons of grain
in 1993-94).
Table IV.2
World Carryover Cereal Stocks, 1971-72
to 1998-99
(Tons in millions)
Total
carryover
Government stocks as
carryover a percent
Governme stocks as of world
Private nt percent of grain
carryove carryove total consumptio
Year r stocks r stocks Total stocks n
------------------ -------- -------- ------ ---------- ----------
1971-72 \a \a 217 \a 18.1
1972-73 \a \a 175 \a 14.2
1973-74 \a \a 189 \a 15.4
1974-75 \a \a 176 \a 14.4
1975-76 \a \a 194 \a 15.1
1976-77 \a \a 256 \a 19.1
1977-78 \a \a 251 \a 17.7
1978-79 \a \a 287 \a 20.0
1979-80 115 161 276 58 18.9
1980-81 117 137 254 54 17.4
1981-82 122 179 301 59 19.9
1982-83 91 255 346 74 22.3
1983-84 101 186 286 65 17.9
1984-85 118 221 338 65 21.2
1985-86 194 232 426 54 25.8
1986-87 160 296 457 65 27.4
1987-88 162 240 401 60 24.3
1988-89 117 194 311 63 18.3
1989-90 127 181 308 59 17.9
1990-91 155 196 351 56 20.3
1991-92 145 191 336 57 19.3
1992-93 179 201 380 53 21.8
1993-94 143 195 338 58 19.3
1994-95 148 166 314 53 17.8
1995-96 \a \a 261 \a 14.0
1996-97 \a \a 297 \a 15.4
1997-98 \a \a 322\b \a 16.9\b
1998-99 \a \a 328\c \a 17.2\c
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Stocks include wheat, rice, and coarse grains. Data are based
on an aggregate of carryover levels at the end of national crop
years.
\a Not available.
\b Estimate by FAO in June 1998. In April 1998, FAO estimated total
stocks at 302 million tons and the stocks-to-use ratio at 15.9
percent.
\c Forecast by FAO in June 1998.
Source: FAO.
Although the high grain prices of 1996 have abated, estimates of the
stocks-to-use ratio remained at a low level through early 1998. As
recently as April 1998, FAO estimated the ratio would be 15.9 percent
for 1997-98. However, FAO revised its figures in June 1998,
estimating that the ratio might reach 16.9 percent for 1997-98 and
cross the 17-percent threshold in 1998-99. These revisions reflected
the expectation of a record grain crop in 1998 and lower feed demand
in China, the United States, and some countries affected by the Asian
financial crisis.
--------------------
\12 According to Tweeten, poor people typically spend 60 to 80
percent of their income on food.
SUMMIT'S ACTION ON RESERVES
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:5
World Food Summit participants said that reserves was one factor, in
combination with a number of others, that could be used to strengthen
food security. According to the summit action plan, it is up to
national governments, in partnership with all actors of civil
society, to pursue at local and national levels, as appropriate,
adequate and cost-effective emergency food security reserve policies
and programs. Summit countries agreed that governments should
monitor the availability and nutritional adequacy of their food
supplies and reserve stocks, particularly areas at high risk of food
insecurity, nutritionally vulnerable groups, and areas where seasonal
variations have important nutritional implications. In addition,
international organizations and particularly FAO were asked to
continue to monitor closely and inform member nations of developments
in world food prices and stocks. The summit did not identify a
minimum level of global grain reserves needed to ensure food security
nor recommend any action by countries individually or in concert to
achieve or maintain such a level.
VIEWS ABOUT FUTURE STOCK LEVELS
AND PRICE VOLATILITY
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:6
In 1996, FAO invited a group of experts to Rome to consider a number
of developments that directly or indirectly influence price
stability. These included, among others, production variability, the
URAs, and the role of cereal stocks. The group agreed that there was
little evidence to reach conclusions on whether production
variability at the global level would increase or decrease in the
future. Price instability caused by shifts in production between
countries that may occur because of the URAs was expected to be
slight. The group concurred that ongoing market liberalization
initiatives, including those under the URAs, regional trading
arrangements, and other unilateral initiatives, should as a whole
contribute to stability in international markets by inducing greater
adjustments to demand/supply shocks in domestic markets. However,
changes under the URAs were not considered to be drastic enough for
instability to decrease significantly, as many countries, especially
some larger trading countries, still retained instruments and
institutions (such as policies similar to variable levies and state
trading) that had impeded price transmission in the past.
The group agreed that a lack of transparency and consistency in
government stock-holding and trade policies had been a source of
instability in the past and that less involvement of governments in
stock management and a more transparent trade policy should
contribute to stability in the future. At the same time, there was
considerable doubt whether private stocks would increase to the
extent required to offset the shocks that previously were countered
by the public sector stocks.\13 The group concluded that increased
funds in international commodity markets were expected to influence
only within-year price volatility and were unlikely to affect annual
price levels in the longer run. In addition, there were
uncertainties regarding how fast China and countries of the former
Soviet Union would be fully integrated into the world agricultural
trading system.
Overall, the experts agreed that compared to the situation in the
past, future world commodity markets would likely retain lower levels
of overall stocks but should be less prone to instability due to
faster and more broad-based adjustments to production/demand shocks.
However, the path to a new market environment was seen as uncertain.
The group generally believed that price instability would be greater
during the transitional period than after the system had fully
adjusted.
According to an FAO study prepared for the summit, global stocks are
likely to remain relatively low compared with the previous decade,
and the chance of price spikes occurring is probably greater than in
the past.\14 According to a World Bank study, grain stocks are not
likely to return to the high levels of the 1980s, given the current
focus on reducing government involvement in agriculture, and with
smaller grain stocks, prices could be more volatile than in the
past.\15 According to IFPRI, policy changes in North America and
Europe could result in a permanent lowering of grain stocks and thus
increase future price fluctuations because of a lack of stocks to
buffer price variations. IFPRI noted that the moderating or
cushioning impact on world price instability that once was exercised
by varying world grain stocks has been reduced by the substantial
decline in grain stocks in recent years. As a result, IFPRI said,
international price instability, if fully transmitted to domestic
markets, especially to low-income, food-deficit countries, may raise
domestic price instability in these countries.\16
--------------------
\13 An FAO simulation of the impact of a 5-percent production
shortfall of grains in 1999 indicated the URAs would have almost no
effect in stabilizing grain market prices in the year 2000. One
reason is that global stocks were not expected to be large in the
year 2000, at just around 17 percent of consumption, compared with
what was often over 20 percent in the 1980s and early 1990s.
\14 Technical Background Documents 12-15.
\15 Rural Development: From Vision to Action.
\16 In a more recent study, IFPRI noted that it is not certain that
surplus stocks will continue at a low level. It noted a European
Commission study that projected a gradual rebuilding of large
European Union grain stocks between 2001 and 2006. The projected
increases could be even greater if the European Union is enlarged to
include East European countries and these countries are permitted to
obtain the benefits of existing common agricultural policies. See
The World Food Situation.
VIEWS ON ACTIONS TO INCREASE
STOCKS AND HOLD EMERGENCY
RESERVES
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:7
Views differ over whether governments should take action to hold
and/or increase grain reserves. Among the views expressed against
increasing or maintaining large government-held reserves are the
following:
-- Reserves are expensive to accumulate, store, manage, and
release.\17 An annual cost of 25 percent to 40 percent of the
value of the reserves is not unusual. Developing countries
cannot afford such costs; it is cheaper for them to deal with
periodic price increases. They should hold only enough stocks
to tide them over until replacement supplies can be obtained
from international markets.
-- It is much cheaper for most countries to rely on trade, using
financial reserves or international loans to make up shortfalls.
-- If reserves are to be held, it is more efficient and cheaper to
hold reserves in money than in physical stock.
-- Governments, including the U.S. government, have not been good
at managing stocks.
-- Stocks are not the only measures available for coping with price
volatility.
-- As a result of market and trade liberalization measures, markets
can respond more quickly to shocks, which will lead to much
briefer price cycles than those in the past. Free trade permits
stocks to be shifted, thereby reducing the need to maintain
large amounts of domestic stocks.
-- World food supplies have been adequate since the Second World
War. Good and bad weather conditions for growing crops tend to
balance out across countries. In addition, some crops and food
products can be substituted for others, depending on the
weather.
-- The problem is not one of supply but of buying power, including
when prices rise to high levels. Other measures are needed,
such as policy reforms, that increase economic development and
enable people to buy the food they need.
Among views advanced for governments' taking action to increase and
maintain emergency reserve levels (some of the views pertain
specifically to the United States; others apply to countries more
generally) are the following:
-- It is good government policy to store grain during prosperous
years in order to survive lean years.
-- Private companies will not hold many reserve stocks, since it is
expensive to do so and governments may limit price increases in
times of short supply, thus affecting companies' ability to
recoup the added cost of holding emergency reserves.
-- Even if governments do not excel at managing reserves, the
social costs of their not doing so may be greater.
-- The use of emergency food reserves to respond quickly to
periodic food shortages in developing countries is the most
unobtrusive way for governments to intervene in the market.
-- Responsible trade requires that wealthier countries establish
and maintain essential grain reserves as a supply safety net
(available to other countries when the need arises) and thus to
encourage and compensate poorer countries for relying on
increased trade liberalization.
-- If a tight U.S. grains supply situation occurs and export
customers perceive that a unilateral U.S. export embargo is
plausible, they will intensify their food self-sufficiency goals
and seek grain commitments from other exporters.
--------------------
\17 According to the June 1996 experts' group that advised FAO, the
previous use of stocks as an instrument for price stability often
suffered from several problems, including poor management practices
and lack of clear-cut operational rules. However, in cases where
such stocks were managed correctly, they played an important role in
stabilizing domestic markets. The group considered that maintaining
moderate levels of food stocks at the national level, with clear food
security objectives for their use, was a desirable option for
countries to pursue and consistent with the URA.
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO
RESERVES FOR COPING WITH PRICE
VOLATILITY
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:8
A 1996 FAO study\18 identified several possible alternatives for
mitigating price volatility problems, including national and
international measures. However, it is not clear to what extent
developing countries, particularly low-income, food-deficit
countries, are capable of establishing such measures or the costs and
benefits of such measures relative to one another and to grain
reserves.
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture limits the use of quotas
and variable levies, two measures traditionally employed to deal with
price instability. According to the FAO study, a country may adopt a
sliding scale of tariffs related inversely to the level of import
prices and keep the maximum rate of duty at a level no higher than
its agreed rate of duty in the WTO. If the agreed rate of tariffs is
fairly high, which is commonly the case, developing countries may
offset variations in import prices by reducing tariffs when prices
rise and raising them when prices fall. In addition, at times of
sharply rising world prices or sharply rising demand from a
neighboring country, it may be possible for a country to limit
exports, provided it has taken other countries' food security into
account. (See URA on Agriculture, Article 12.)
Commodity exchanges, futures contracts, and options could be used to
reduce uncertainty associated with price and income instability.
However, not all countries could make use of existing exchanges
because of lack of knowledge, lack of economies of scale, and/or
higher transaction costs. To ease such constraints, the experts
suggested establishing nongovernmental institutions to allow a large
number of small entities to pool their risks.
Countries with sufficient food reserves or cash to purchase food
could seek to mitigate the effect of price spikes by providing food
aid to meet the unmet food needs of urban and rural poor. Food aid
from international donors could be used to help mitigate the
consequences of high increases in the price of imported food.
However, with reduced surpluses and budgetary constraints in donor
countries, it is not clear how much additional aid would be available
when needed.
The International Monetary Fund's Compensatory and Contingency
Financing Facility can be used by members to obtain credit if they
are experiencing balance of payment difficulties arising from
shortfalls in export receipts (that is, foreign exchange) or
increases in the costs of grain imports--provided these are temporary
and largely attributable to conditions outside the control of the
countries. However, partly because of the conditions and interest
costs associated with drawings from the facility and the availability
of alternative facilities that are more favorable, countries have not
used the facility very frequently over the past 15 years. (The
International Monetary Fund believes that price spikes have not been
sufficiently frequent since the facility's inception to warrant its
use.) The European Union also has a financing mechanism for certain
countries, but the financing is limited to covering shortfalls in
export earnings (high food import bills are not covered), and the
mechanism lacks the funding and concessional terms (below-market
interest rates) necessary for wider use by poorer countries.
Finally, according to the FAO report, an international insurance
scheme could be devised for financing food imports by low-income,
food-deficit countries during periods of price instability.
Beneficiary countries could finance the system with premium payments.
Ideally, such a scheme would operate without conditions. However,
according to the FAO study, in practice only a few countries could
afford to pay the premiums by themselves. Thus, for countries
requiring assistance from developed countries, setting conditions for
the use of withdrawals from the insurance facility might be
necessary.
Following the large increase in grains prices during 1995-96, FAO
surveyed the governments of 47 developing countries to determine
whether their domestic retail and wholesale prices of grains rose
and, if so, how they responded. FAO found that domestic market
prices increased considerably in most countries but usually not as
much as the world price. (In some countries, prices did not increase
or they even fell because of favorable domestic harvests.) Many
countries mitigated the price effects by annulling or reducing import
duties. Some countries mitigated price effects by further
subsidizing already regulated prices of grain products.
--------------------
\18 Report of a Meeting of Experts on Agricultural Price Instability
(Rome, Italy: FAO, 1996).
EMERGENCY AND NONEMERGENCY FOOD
AID
=========================================================== Appendix V
At the World Food Summit, countries said they would try to prevent
and be prepared for natural disasters and man-made emergencies that
create food insecurity and to meet transitory and emergency food
requirements in ways that encourage recovery, rehabilitation,
development, and a capacity to satisfy future needs. The summit's
action plan said that food assistance can also be provided to help
ease the plight of the long-term undernourished, but concluded that
food aid is not a long-term solution to the underlying causes of food
insecurity.\1 The plan called upon countries' governments to
implement cost-effective public works programs for the unemployed and
underemployed in regions of food insecurity and to develop within
their available resources well-targeted social welfare and nutrition
safety net programs to meet the needs of their food insecure. The
summit did not recommend an increase in development assistance for
the specific purpose of helping countries to establish or improve
such programs. However, donor countries generally agreed to
strengthen their individual efforts toward providing official
development assistance equivalent to 0.7 percent of gross national
product each year.\2
--------------------
\1 The summit's position on food aid differed significantly from that
adopted by the 1974 World Food Conference. That conference
established a target for donor countries to provide at least 10
million tons of food aid annually to developing countries in the form
of grain (or the cash equivalent) suitable for human consumption.
Under the Food Aid Convention of 1986, signatory nations agreed to
contribute a minimum amount of grains each year toward achieving the
World Food Conference target. Members said that they would provide,
in aggregate, at least 7.5 million tons of grains aid annually--the
highest minimum amount ever approved by the convention.
Periodically, members meet to review their commitments and decide
whether to extend the agreement. In 1995, the convention's
commitment was substantially reduced, to 5.4 million tons. The
convention is scheduled for renewal in June 1999.
\2 The United States, in an interpretative statement for the record,
noted that it has not agreed to an ODA target.
TRENDS IN FOOD AID
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1
Over the past several decades, food aid has helped meet some of the
emergency and nonemergency food needs of many food-insecure
countries. In recent years, food aid has declined significantly. As
table V.1 shows, world grain aid shipments increased from 6.8 million
tons in 1975-76 to a peak of 15.2 million tons in 1992-93. Shipments
in 1997 were 5.9 million tons, about 40 percent of the peak value and
about 60 percent of the former World Food Conference target. FAO
estimates that shipments in 1997-98 were at about the same level as
in 1996-97 (that is, at about 5.3 million tons). According to FAO,
grain shipments in 1996-97 were at the lowest level since the start
of food aid programs in the 1950s. Table V.1 also shows a
substantial decline in the proportion of food aid provided for
program purposes and a steady increase in the proportion of food aid
allocated for emergency purposes.\3 In absolute terms, in 1997
project food aid equaled about 54 percent of its peak level
(1986-87), emergency food aid was about 55 percent of its peak level
(1992), and program aid was about 17 percent of its peak level
(1993). Program and project aid combined peaked in 1993 at 11.3
million tons. The combined total for 1997 was 3.5 million tons or 31
percent of the peak-year total.
Table V.1
World Grains Food Aid Shipments and
Their Use, 1976-97
Type of aid (percent)
------------------------------
Nonemergency
------------------
All donors
(million
Year\a tons) Program Project Emergency
-------------------------- ---------- -------- -------- ----------
1975-76 6.8 71 19 10
1976-77 9.0 77 17 6
1977-78 9.2 71 19 10
1978-79 9.5 72 18 10
1979-80 8.9 70 20 10
1980-81 8.9 60 26 14
1981-82 9.1 52 27 21
1982-83 9.2 62 26 12
1983-84 9.8 57 28 15
1984-85 12.5 53 21 25
1985-86 10.9 46 24 30
1986-87 12.6 55 29 17
1987-88 13.5 54 27 19
1988-89 10.2 54 25 21
1989-90 11.3 58 21 20
1990-91 12.4 56 21 23
1991-92 13.1 52 19 29
1992-93 15.2 57 15 28\
1993 15.1 60 15 25
1994 10.7 44 22 34
1995 8.4 42 24 34
1996 6.2 41 24 35
1997\b 5.9 25 34 41
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The first series of data reported is for overlapping years; the
second series is calendar year data.
\b Provisional.
Sources: Our analysis of World Food Program data.
According to a recent FAO forecast,\4 cereal food aid shipments are
expected to increase substantially in 1998-99, after 4 years of
decline, and reach 9 million tons. FAO attributed the increase to a
greater availability of grain supplies in donor countries and higher
food aid needs, particularly in Asia. According to FAO, food aid
availabilities have been growing in recent months, triggered by
relatively low international grain prices and accumulating grain
stocks, mostly in the European Union and the United States. (The
United States announced in July 1998 that it would increase its wheat
donations by up to 2.5 million tons, most of which has been
allocated.) On the demand side, financial and economic turmoil has
affected the economies of many food import-dependent countries,
raising the need for food aid. Although grain prices have declined,
countries experiencing severe food emergencies will not necessarily
be able to increase commercial cereal imports, FAO said. And, the
slower growth of the world economy, combined with falling cash crop
prices and export earnings, could force some developing countries to
sharply cut back on their imports of essential foods.
Table V.2 shows how food aid trends have affected the low-income,
food-deficit countries (for total food aid, not just grains). Food
aid received in 1995-96 was at the lowest level since 1975-76 and
represented about 50-55 percent of previous peak-year deliveries.
During the 1990s, food aid provided to low-income, food-deficit
countries has averaged about 78 percent of food aid deliveries to all
developing countries; by way of comparison, between 1983-84 and
1986-87, low-income, food-deficit countries averaged more than 92
percent of deliveries. In 1995-96, the proportion of these
countries' food imports covered by food aid fell to 8 percent, the
lowest level in more than 20 years.
Table V.2
Share of Food Aid Reaching Low-Income,
Food-Deficit Countries, 1976-96
Food aid as
Food aid to percent of
low-income, Food aid as low-income,
food-deficit percent of food-deficit
countries global food countries'
Year (million tons) aid food imports
---------------------- -------------- -------------- --------------
1975-76 5.3 78 20
1976-77 7.1 79 27
1977-78 7.1 77 23
1978-79 7.7 81 19
1979-80 7.6 85 18
1980-81 7.3 82 15
1981-82 7.7 85 15
1982-83 8.2 89 15
1983-84 9.3 95 18
1984-85 11.5 92 23
1985-86 10.2 94 22
1986-87 11.4 90 24
1987-88 12.0 89 21
1988-89 8.7 85 15
1989-90 8.2 73 14
1990-91 9.7 78 18
1991-92 11.0 84 15
1992-93 11.1 73 16
1993-94 8.2 65 12
1994-95\a 7.4 88 10
1995-96\a 6.0 79 8
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Estimate.
Source: Our analysis of World Food Program data.
--------------------
\3 Program and project food aid are nonemergency aid, are generally
provided to achieve a developmental purpose, and could be considered
a substitute for financial aid. Program food aid does not target
specific beneficiary groups. It is mainly provided on a bilateral
basis to support recipient governments' budgets (for stabilization,
adjustment, and economic reform) or reduce balance of payments
deficits. Project food aid is provided to selected beneficiary
groups to support specific development objectives. Emergency food
aid is targeted to victims of natural or man-made disasters.
Emergency and project food aid are always provided to recipient
countries on a grant basis, while program food aid is also provided
under concessional terms.
\4 FAO, "Food Aid," Food Outlook (November 1998).
COSTS TO FEED THE LONG-TERM
UNDERNOURISHED
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:2
In 1996, FAO estimated that it would take an additional 30 million
tons of grain and over 20 million tons (grain equivalent) of other
foods simply to bring 800 million chronically undernourished people
up to "minimum nutritional standards" (assuming perfect targeting of
food assistance and local absorptive capacity).\5 FAO estimated the
value of the additional required food at about $13 per person per
year (in 1994 dollars), or about $10.4 billion. According to FAO,
the world produces enough food to meet the needs of all people,\6 but
hundreds of millions remain chronically undernourished because they
are too poor to afford all the food they need. In addition, others
are undernourished because they are otherwise unable to provide for
themselves (for example, because of humanitarian crises), because not
enough food assistance has been provided, or because the assistance
has not been sufficiently effective.
The provision of food aid costing $10.4 billion would require a large
commitment compared to recent expenditures on foreign assistance more
generally. For example, during 1996 and 1997, net disbursements of
ODA by the Development Assistance Committee members of the OECD
averaged about $55 billion (1996 prices and exchange rates).
--------------------
\5 According to Evaluation of the World Food Program Final Report, a
trebling of food aid from the 1993 level of 15 million tons could, if
distribution problems were solvable, enable 700 million-800 million
chronically undernourished people to reach minimum dietary standards.
\6 FAO estimated world cereals production in 1996 at 1,873 million
tons (including rice in milled terms). The 30-million tons of grain
needed for 800 million chronically undernourished people represented
less than 2 percent of the grains production.
EFFECTIVENESS OF FOOD AID FOR
NONEMERGENCY PURPOSES
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:3
Several studies have questioned whether food aid is an efficient
means of satisfying nonemergency, chronic food shortage needs. A
joint 1991 study by the World Bank and the World Food Program on food
aid for Africa\7 reported that food aid may in some cases be a
second-best solution and there are problems in its implementation.
The study concluded, however, that it is unlikely that an equal
amount of financial aid would be available if the food aid is not
provided. The study included a number of specific recommendations
for improving the effectiveness of food aid and concluded that food
aid contributes substantially to growth, long-term food security, and
the reduction of poverty and that its use should continue.
A 1993 evaluation of the World Food Program found that while
emergency food aid was quite effective, food aid for development had
a number of weaknesses.\8 There was little evidence that country
strategies seriously addressed the use of food aid to support
national priorities. At the project level, many weaknesses were
found: the targeting of food aid on the poorest areas and the
poorest people was often unsatisfactory, the technical content of
projects often left much to be desired, and the phasing out of
projects was often not planned. The study made several
recommendations to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the
food aid development program.
In addition, a 1996 study prepared for European Union member states
evaluated food aid commodities that were provided directly to a
recipient government or its agent for sale on local markets.\9 Such
aid was intended to provide some combination of balance of payments
support (by replacing commercial imports) and budgetary support
(through governments' use of counterpart funds generated from the
sale of the commodities). This study noted the following:
-- The impacts of the food aid on food security were marginally
positive, but transaction costs were very high, suggesting the
need for radical changes to improve effectiveness and
efficiency.
-- Minor, short-term negative impacts on local food production were
common. Food aid was still being used, though to a decreasing
extent, to support subsidized food sales, which in some
countries favored food-insecure and poor households and, in
others, urban middle-class and public sector groups. The little
available evidence suggested that the food aid had modest
positive impacts on the nutritional status of vulnerable groups.
-- The European Commission and the member states should consider
(1) either phasing out such assistance, especially in the case
of donors with smaller programs or (2) making radical changes in
policies and procedures to increase effectiveness and reduce
transaction costs to acceptable levels.
A group of experts meeting at FAO in June 1996 opposed food aid as a
regular instrument to deal with market instability because of its
market displacement and disincentive effects. A 1997 report prepared
for the Australian government recommended that Australia considerably
reduce its food aid commitment to the Food Aid Convention and in the
future use food aid primarily for emergency relief. \10
In October 1998, USAID reported on the results of a 2-year study that
it conducted to assess the role of U.S. food aid in contributing to
sustainable development during the past 40 years. It examined 6 case
studies.\11 The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
concluded that U.S. food aid had at times been successfully used to
leverage or support a sound economic policy environment and thus
promote sustainable development. At other times, however, U.S. food
aid had hampered sustainable development by permitting governments to
postpone needed economic policy adjustments and, at still other
times, had no discernible effect on a country's economic policy
environment. USAID found that providing large quantities of food aid
for sale on the open market at the wrong time has at times been a
disincentive to domestic food production. However, targeting food
aid to those who lack purchasing power and are unable to buy food has
at other times increased food consumption and incomes without
adversely affecting domestic food production. In addition, USAID
concluded that it is normally more efficient to transfer resources as
financial aid rather than as food aid, but in practice this is a moot
point because generally the choice is between U.S. food aid or no
aid.\12
--------------------
\7 Food Aid in Africa: An Agenda for the 1990s (Washington, D.C.
and Rome, Italy: The World Bank and the World Food Program, Aug.
1991).
\8 Evaluation of the World Food Program.
\9 Edward Clay, Sanjay Dhiri, and Charlotte Benson, Joint Evaluation
of European Union Program Food Aid: Synthesis Report (London:
Overseas Development Institute, Oct. 1996).
\10 Report of the Committee of Review, The Australian Overseas Aid
Program (1997).
\11 The case studies included five countries (Bangladesh, Ethiopia,
Ghana, Honduras, and Indonesia) and the Sahel region of Africa. (The
Sahel consists of 9 countries: Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, the
Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal.) The
examination included field work in the 5 countries and a desk study
of the 9 countries in the Sahel. See: Donald G. McClelland, U.S.
Food Aid and Sustainable Development (Washington, D.C.: USAID, Oct.
1998).
\12 For additional results, see U.S. Food Aid and Sustainable
Development.
PROVISION OF EMERGENCY FOOD AID
SINCE THE SUMMIT
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:4
According to the World Food Program, which distributes about 70
percent of global emergency food aid,\13 some of its emergency relief
projects tend to be underfunded or not funded at all because donors
direct their contributions to the program's emergency appeals on a
case-by-case basis. In addition, the program has problems in
ensuring a regular supply of food to its operations more generally
because of lengthy delays between its appeals and donor contributions
and donors' practice of attaching specific restrictions to their
contributions.
In 1997, about 6 percent of the program's declared emergency needs
were unmet and 7 percent of its protracted relief operations needs
were not satisfied. Table V.3 shows the program's resource shortfall
for emergency food aid, including emergency operations and protracted
relief operations,\14 for 1998. As the table shows, 33 operations
were underfunded and 18 percent of total 1998 needs were not covered.
Table V.3
1998 World Food Program Emergency and
Protracted Relief Assistance
Net 1998 needs\a
----------------------
Number of
people to Resource
Recipien be Metric Dollars shortfall
t Project title assisted tons (millions) (percent\b
-------- -------------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ------------
Asia and Commonwealth of Independent States
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Afghanis Afghan relief 1,140,000 17,497 $8.0 0
tan rehabilitation
Albania Assistance to 24,000 1,000 0.4 100
destitute victims
Albania Assistance to 42,000 1,991 0.7 0
victims of Kosovo
crisis
Armenia Vulnerable groups, 220,000 17,643 9.1 47
refugees, others
Azerbiaj Internally displaced 215,000 7,227 3.7 16
an persons
Banglade Assistance to 21,000 4,415 1.9 0
sh Myanmar refugees
Banglade Assistance to flood 19,121,500 333,313 84.2 36
sh victims
Cambodia Rehabilitation 1,710,000 28,000 15.8 0
program
China Assistance to flood 5,786,900 239,721 65.7 25
victims
Former Refugees, returnees, 650,000 82,371 46.0 49
Yugosla internally
via displaced persons,
war victims
Georgia Displaced persons 200,000 7,541 3.3 18
and vulnerable
groups
Indonesi Displaced persons 4,600,000 354,000 138.4 9
a and vulnerable
groups
Iran Food assistance for 88,000 13,790 4.4 0
Afghan refugees
Korea, Vulnerable groups 6,700,000 602,000 346.0 0
Democra
tic
Peoples
Republi
c
Kosovo Food assistance to 420,000 37,800 19.4 34
Crisis refugees,
returnees,
internally
displaced persons
Laos Flood victims 210,000 12,999 6.4 23
Nepal Bhutanese refugees 93,500 18,859 7.7 0
Nepal Victims of crop 10,500 685 0.1 0
losses
Pakistan Afghan refugees 28,000 4,119 1.9 100
Sri Displaced persons 50,000 8,667 3.2 1
Lanka
Tajikist Vulnerable groups 500,000 24,761 8.8 36
an
Thailand Assistance to 90,000 12,349 1.6 10
Cambodian refugees
Vietnam Assistance to 35,000 420 0.2 0
drought victims
================================================================================
Subtotal 41,955,400 1,831,168 776.9 16
Latin America and Caribbean
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Central Victims of Hurricane 1,125,000 60,000 30.1 60
America Mitch
Cuba Drought victims 615,195 19,853 40.6 70
Dominica Hurricane Georges 225,000 3,662 2.1 0
n
Republi
c
Ecuador Victims of "El Nio" 112,060 0 0 0
Guatemal Victims of Hurricane 40,000 283 0.2 0
a Mitch
Honduras Victims of Hurricane 101,000 450 0.2 0
Mitch
Nicaragu Central America 323,000 18,764 9.0 14
a regional "El Nio"
Nicaragu Crop failure caused 65,500 399 0.2 0
a by drought ("El
Nio")
Nicaragu Victims of Hurricane 63,000 401 0.2 0
a Mitch
St. Hurricane Georges 3,000 35 0.2 0
Kitts-
Nevis
================================================================================
Subtotal 2,672,755 103,847 82.8 51
Middle East and North Africa
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Algeria Assistance to 80,000 10,909 5.1 0
Western Sahara
refugees
Yemen, Food assistance for 10,000 2,339 1.2 1
Rep. of Somali refugees
Iraq Assistance to the 943,000 61,896 35.0 91
destitute/
vulnerable
================================================================================
Subtotal 1,033,000 75,144 41.3 75
Sub-Saharan Africa
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Angola Displaced & war 539,500 46,848 30.7 0
affected
Cameroon Locust infestation 60,000 540 0.2 0
Cameroon Locust infestation 210,000 5,518 1.5 31
and crop losses
Chad Sudanese refugees 12,500 845 0.8 0
Chad Crop failure 122,000 473 0.2 0
Democrat Flood victims in 13,000 168 0.2 0
ic Kisingani
Republi
c Congo
Democrat Angolan refugees 46,000 4,825 3.4 100
ic
Republi
c Congo
Djibouti Ethiopia, Somalia, 22,000 1,134 0.6 0
Djibouti refugees
Ethiopia Somalia, Sudanese, 336,000 30,093 15.6 0
Djibouti, Kenya
refugees
Ethiopia Assistance to 96,000 15,804 6.4 0
returnees
Ethiopia Victims of Meher 800,000 60,000 23.7 0
crop failure
Guinea Sierra Leone 200,000 17,645 9.4 13
refugees
Guinea War victims 330,000 28,370 17.5 30
Bissau
Guinea Assistance to 25,000 392 0.2 0
Bissau displaced/conflict
affected
Kenya Somalia, Ethiopia, 178,000 41,700 26.9 0
Sudanese refugees
Kenya Floods 587,400 31,823 18.5 48
Lesotho Feeding for schools 30,727 245 0.2 0
affected by unrest
Liberia Internally displaced 1,717,000 62,312 41.5 0
persons & returning
Sierra Leone
refugees
Madagasc Mitigation of locust 32,527 674 0.2 0
ar invasion
Malawi Targeted safety net 185,000 6,550 2.7 0
Mali Malian returnees/ 112,500 10,025 7.8 0
affected persons
Mauritan Assistance to 95,000 705 0.2 0
ia drought-affected
populations
Mozambiq Food Assistance to 70,000 4,297 1.5 8
ue flood victims
Namibia Drought victims 25,000 926 0.6 100
Rwanda/ Victims of conflict 1,399,817 104,927 64.5 15
Burundi
Senegal Early drought 1,500,000 6,072 3.3 100
Reg. response
Sierra Internally displaced 97,840 46,019 33.6 0
Leone persons & returning
Sierra Leone
refugees
Somalia Flood victims 657,500 9,847 13.0 0
Somalia Rehabilitation and 829,340 16,885 13.0 19
reconstruction
Sudan Eritrean & Ethiopian 138,000 30,000 13.7 0
refugees
Sudan War and drought 2,600,000 115,426 125.1 12
victims
Sudan Floods 113,000 4,577 2.0 100
Tanzania Drought victims 1,400,000 5,253 1.9 0
Uganda Sudanese, Zaire, 165,000 52,000 29.3 0
Rwanda refugees
Uganda Displaced.persons in 347,000 28,622 17.4 40
North Uganda
Uganda Drought victims 126,000 4,077 1.6 0
Zambia Angola, Zaire 25,200 1,302 2.2 0
refugees
Zambia Flood victims in 22,200 306 0.2 0
Luapula Province
Zambia Drought victims 692,035 25,000 8.2 60
================================================================================
Subtotal 15,958,086 822,225 539.6 13
================================================================================
Total 61,619,241 2,832,384 $1,440.6 18%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Numbers may not total due to rounding.
\a Food needs for the entire year, as reported in January 1999,
excluding carryover stocks from 1997.
\b Tons needed minus contributions as a percent of needs.
Source: World Food Program.
--------------------
\13 The program distributes more than 95 percent of global
multilateral food aid and about 40 percent of all food aid.
\14 An emergency operation provides emergency food aid for victims of
sudden disasters or abnormal droughts and initial assistance for the
first 12 months to refugees and displaced persons. Protracted relief
operations provide food aid to refugees and displaced persons beyond
an initial 12-month period when, for reasons beyond the control of
the host government, it has not been possible to achieve any form of
durable solution to enable the people to achieve self-sufficiency in
their locations of temporary residence.
CONFLICTS' CONTRIBUTION TO FOOD
INSECURITY
========================================================== Appendix VI
The countries attending the World Food Summit acknowledged a clear
relationship between conflict and food insecurity and agreed that an
environment in which conflicts are prevented or resolved peacefully
is essential to improving food security. They also noted that
conflicts can cause or exacerbate food insecurity.
Table VI.1 presents the results of an analysis in which we examined
the relationship between four different types of conflict (genocide,
civil war, interstate war, and revolution) and the level of food
security in 88 developing countries. In general, the table shows an
association between countries experiencing conflict and food
inadequacy. For example, countries with low levels of average daily
calories per capita generally experienced more involvement in
conflict proportionately than did countries with higher levels of
average daily calories per capita. In terms of types of conflict,
for each of the 3 decades shown, all countries that experienced
genocide had an inadequate level of food security. For 2 out of the
3 decades (that is, the 1960s and the 1980s), countries that
experienced civil war were more likely to have experienced food
inadequacy.\1 Similarly, for 2 out of the 3 decades (the 1960s and
the 1970s), countries that experienced interstate war on their own
territory were more likely to have been food insecure. In the case
of revolution, the relationship is more in the other direction; for 2
out of the 3 decades, food-secure countries were more likely to have
experienced revolution than food-inadequate countries.
Table VI.1
Relationship Between Incidence of
Conflict and Level of Food Security in
Developing Countries, 1960-89
Proportion of countries
Average daily calories Number of countries in conflict for each
per capita\a involved in conflict food security level\b
----------------------- ---------------------- ------------------------
Type 1960 1970 1980 1960 1970 1980
of to to to Tota to to to
confl 1969 1979 1989 l 1969 1979 1989 Total
ict ---------- ----------- ---- ---- ---- ==== ---- ---- ---- ======
Genoc Inadequate Less than 5 4 3 12 13% 13% 14% 13%
ide \c 2,100
2,100 to 3 5 5 13 8 16 14 12
2,400
2,400 to 1 1 0 2 13 5 0 4
2,700
Subtotal 9 10 8 27 11 12 11 11
Adequate Greater 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
than 2,700
Civil Inadequate Less than 10 8 9 27 26 27 41 30
war \c 2,100
2,100 to 5 12 13 30 13 38 37 28
2,400
2,400 to 0 1 7 8 0 5 44 18
2,700
================================================================================
Subtotal 15 21 29 65 18 25 40 27
Adequate Greater 0 2 3 5 0 40 20 22
than 2,700
Inter Inadequate Less than 4 3 1 8 11 10 5 9
state \c 2,100
war
on
coun
try'
s
terr
itor
y
2,100 to 2 0 2 4 5 0 6 4
2,400
2,400 to 1 1 0 2 13 5 0 4
2,700
================================================================================
Subtotal 7 4 3 14 8 5 4 6
Adequate Greater 0 0 2 2 0 0 13 9
than 2,700
Revol Inadequate Less than 1 9 6 16 3 30 27 18
ution \c 2,100
2,100 to 9 7 6 22 23 22 17 21
2,400
2,400 to 0 5 1 6 0 24 6 13
2,700
Subtotal 10 21 13 44 12 25 18 18
Adequate Greater 1 1 4 6 33 20 27 26
than 2,700
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The unit of analysis is countries grouped together by a
specific level of food security, time period, and type of conflict.
For each group, countries were classified by whether they were or
were not involved in at least one conflict during the time period.
Conflict data were reported by decade. Data on conflict and food
security were obtained for 88 of 93 developing countries that were
analyzed elsewhere in this report. Data were not available for Cuba,
Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Saudi Arabia.
\a Average is based on available food supply at the country level.
Averages were calculated from annual data for the decades shown.
\b We calculated the proportion of countries in conflict as the ratio
of the number of countries that were involved in an indicated type of
conflict to the total number of countries belonging to the group of
countries for an indicated food security level and time period. For
example, for the decade 1960-69, there were 38 countries whose
average daily calories per capita were less than 2,100. Of these, 5
countries experienced genocide, 10 experienced civil war, 4
experienced interstate war, and 1 experienced revolution. For these
groups, the rate of incidence of genocide was 13 percent (5 out of
38), the rate of incidence of civil war was 26 percent (10 out of
38), the rate of incidence of interstate war on a country's territory
was 11 percent (4 out of 38), the rate of incidence of revolution was
3 percent (1 out of 38).
\c We designated countries as having inadequate or adequate daily
calories per capita based on an FAO analysis of the relationship
between average daily calories per capita and chronic undernutrition.
According to FAO, for countries having an average daily per capita
undernutrition threshold ranging between 1,750 calories and 1,900
calories and a moderate level of unequal food distribution, between
21 percent and 33 percent of the population will be below the
undernutrition threshold if the average per capita daily energy
supply is 2,100 calories. If the average per capita daily energy
supply is 2,400 calories, 7 percent to 13 percent of the population
will be undernourished. At 2,700 calories, 2 to 4 percent of the
population will be undernourished. If food is distributed more
equitably, the percentage of the population that is undernourished
decreases and vice versa. See also the discussion in appendix II.
Source: Our analysis of country data on per capita calories as
reported by FAO and on conflict data as reported by William Easterly
and Ross Levine in "Africa's Growth Tragedy," The Quarterly Journal
of Economics Vol. CXII, No. 4 (Nov. 1997).
--------------------
\1 The percentages reported in the table for countries with adequate
average daily calories per capita (that is, greater then 2,700
calories) should be interpreted cautiously, given the relatively
small number of countries in this category. For example, during the
1960s, only 3 countries were classified as food secure; 5 countries
during the 1970s; and 15 countries during the 1980s.
INCREASING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
========================================================= Appendix VII
The summit's policy declaration and action plan stress the importance
of promoting sustainable agricultural development in developing
countries. In an analysis prepared for the summit, FAO concluded
that it was technically possible for the more food-insecure
developing countries to increase their agricultural production by
substantial amounts and in so doing to contribute significantly to
the summit's goal of halving the number of their undernourished
people by 2015.\1 According to a U.S. official, the FAO analysis was
an important basis underlying the agreement of summit countries to
try to halve undernutrition by 2015. At issue is whether the
developing countries will be able to achieve the kind of production
increases indicated by the FAO study.
Table VII.1 shows the key results of the FAO analysis. FAO
differentiated between three levels of food-insecure countries: (1)
countries with an estimated average per capita daily energy supply
(DES) of less than
1,900 calories, (2) countries with an estimated average per capita
DES of
2,300 calories, and (3) countries with an estimated average per
capita DES of more than 2,700 calories. As the table shows, the
proposed goal for 17 group 1 countries is to raise their DES to at
least 2,300 and if possible
2,500 calories by 2010. The normative goal for 38 group 2 countries
is to raise their DES to at least 2,500 calories and, if possible, to
2,700 calories by 2010. The normative goal for 38 group 3 countries
is to maintain DES above
2,700 calories and to achieve a more equitable distribution of food
supplies among their citizenry.
Table VII.1
FAO Analysis of Daily Per Capita Calorie
Levels, Grain Production Growth Rates,
and Millions of Undernourished to 2010
for 93 Developing Countries
Average per Grains production
capita daily growth rate (percent Number of undernourished
calories per year) (millions)
-------------- ---------------------- ------------------------
1990/92-2010 2010
-------------- ----------------
FAO FAO
Number 1995 1995
Countr of 2010 study study
y countr 1990- summit 1970- estima Summit 1990- estima Summit
group ies 92 goal\a 1992 te\a goal 92 te\a goal
------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ --------
1 17 1,860 2,300- 1.7 3.2 3.8 160 188 95
2,500
2 38 2,300 2,500- 3.0 2.3 2.5 384 359 210
2,700
3 38 2,780 More 3.2 2.0 2.0 295 133 133
than2,
700
================================================================================
Total 93 2,520 \b 3.0 2.1 2.3 840 680 438
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a World Agriculture: Towards 2010, ed. Nikos Alexandratos (New
York: FAO and John Wiley & Sons, 1995). The study sought to assess
the future as it is likely to be in 2010 rather than as it ought to
be from a normative or goal perspective.
\b Not available.
Source: Technical background documents 12-15.
According to FAO's analysis, if the normative goals were achieved,
additional production would deliver 60 percent of the developing
countries' additional needed food for consumption. The balance would
have to be covered by net imports, which would increase from the 24
million tons in 1990-92 to 70 million tons in 2010 (instead of the 50
million tons projected by a 1995 FAO study). FAO estimated that the
additional export supply was within the bounds of possibility for the
main grain exporting countries.
--------------------
\1 According to the World Bank, no developing country has had a
sustained impact on reducing poverty without continuing positive
economic growth, and for most developing countries, agricultural
growth has been essential to economic growth. Most of the developing
countries that grew rapidly during the 1980s had experienced rapid
agricultural growth in the preceding years. Such growth stimulates
economic growth in nonagricultural sectors, which results in
increased employment and reduced poverty. Fostering rural growth
also helps the urban poor.
PRODUCTION INCREASES ARE NOT
LIKELY TO BE EASY
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix VII:1
Achieving the production increases previously discussed is not likely
to be easy because it requires unusually high growth rates in the
more food-insecure countries and, in turn, higher amounts of
investments, especially in the worst-off countries. In addition, it
requires numerous major changes in these countries, particularly in
the rural and agricultural sector.
According to FAO, aggregate production must increase rapidly in
countries with too-low daily caloric levels and must also contribute
to development and generate incomes for the poor. As table VII.1
shows, the group 1 countries would have to more than double their
aggregate agricultural production growth rate during 1970-92, from
1.7 percent to 3.8 percent per year. FAO considered 3.2 percent the
most likely production increase. For several group 1 countries,
production increases of 4 to 6 percent annually are implied,
according to FAO. For group 2 countries, the goal is to slow an
expected decline in the agricultural production growth rate per year
relative to the 3 percent rate during 1970-92. FAO estimated the
most likely production increase for these countries at 2.3 percent
but said the rate would need to be at least 2.5 percent to achieve
the summit goal of halving the number of food insecure by 2010.
FAO based its normative targets on fairly optimistic assumptions
about expanding domestic production and access to imports, including
food aid.\2 In fact, FAO said, extraordinary measures would have to
be taken to realize the normative goals. FAO offered the following
rationale to justify the targets. Previously, some of the countries
had already achieved average per capita daily caloric levels above
the proposed minimum of
2,300 calories. For most of the countries, daily caloric levels were
at the minimum or near the minimum recorded for them during the
previous
30 years. There was a marked correlation between these low levels
and the prevalence of unsettled political conditions, which suggested
that progress could be made during a recovery period if more peaceful
conditions prevailed. Finally, FAO said, the historical record
showed that periods of 10-20 years of fairly fast growth in
production and consumption had not been uncommon--mostly during
periods of recovery (usually from troughs associated with war,
drought, or bad policies). Thus, if conditions were created for the
onset of a period of recovery, policies and efforts to achieve the
required high growth rates could bear fruit.
According to one expert, most low-income developing countries and
countries of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe
have large, unexploited gaps in agricultural yields.\3
He estimated that yields can be increased by 50-100 percent in most
countries of South and Southeast Asia, Latin America, the former
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and by 100-200 percent in most of
sub-Saharan Africa. According to the expert, it is technically
possible for the world population to meet growing food demands during
the next few decades, but it is becoming increasingly difficult
because of groups that are opposed to technology, whether it be
developed from biotechnology or more conventional methods of
agricultural science.\4 The expert has expressed particular concern
about the effect of these groups on the ability of small-scale
farmers in developing countries to obtain access to the improved
seeds, fertilizers, and crop protection chemicals that have allowed
affluent nations plentiful and inexpensive foodstuffs.
--------------------
\2 FAO did not break down its estimates in terms of what proportion
of the increased exports would be covered by commercial imports and
food aid.
\3 See Norman Borlaug, "Technological and Environmental Dimensions of
Rural Well-Being."
\4 Borlaug notes that sophisticated molecular genetics and
biotechnology hold great promise for increasing agricultural yields
but doubts they will transform agricultural production in low-income,
food-deficit countries in the next 2 decades, since these
technologies will be confined primarily to more affluent nations.
Instead, he believes that more widespread and better application of
conventional technology can accomplish the task. He cites
experiences over the past 10 years in eight sub-Saharan countries,
indicating that great strides can be made in improving the
nutritional and economic well-being of their desperately poor
populations if Africa maintains political stability and develops
effective marketing and seed and fertilizer supply systems.
ADDITIONAL AMOUNT OF NEEDED
INVESTMENT NOT CLEAR
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix VII:1.1
Under its scenario of the most likely increase in agricultural
production in developing countries by 2010, FAO roughly estimated, in
a presummit analysis, that gross investment in primary agricultural
production\5 in the developing countries would require an increase
from $77 billion annually in the early 1990s to $86 billion annually
during 1997-2010 (constant 1993 dollars). FAO estimated that another
$6 billion of investment would be needed to halve the number of
undernourished people in countries with low daily per capita caloric
levels. While the $6 billion increase represented only a 7-percent
rise, FAO noted that all of the additional investment would be
required in the lagging countries. Thus, group 1 countries (table
VII.1) would require a 30-percent annual increase in investment, and
group 2 countries a 17-percent increase. However, according to FAO,
the low-income, food-deficit countries will mostly continue to have
very low domestic savings and access to international credit. As a
result, both private and public sectors will have difficulty, at
least in the short and medium term, in raising the investment funds
needed to respond to new production opportunities, even when they
have a comparative economic advantage, and there will be a continuing
need for external assistance on grant or concessionary lending terms.
FAO's presummit analysis did not address, for countries with low
daily per capita caloric levels, added investment needs for (1)
post-production agriculture and improved rural infrastructure
(excluding irrigation), (2) public services to agriculture, and (3)
social support in rural areas. Consequently, the analysis may
understate the amount of additional investment required in those
countries to attain the normative production goals.\6 In addition,
there is no indication that bilateral or multilateral donors will
increase their assistance by the amounts indicated by the FAO study.
In fact, ODA for primary agriculture steadily declined from a peak of
$18.9 billion in 1986 (1990 constant prices) to $9.8 billion in 1994.
According to FAO, external assistance is almost the only source of
public investment in agriculture for many of the poorer developing
countries.\7
--------------------
\5 The estimate did not include agricultural investment needed for
the post-food production stage or public investment needed to improve
rural infrastructure (excluding irrigation), public services to
agriculture, and social support in rural areas.
\6 FAO estimated that gross fixed investment in the post-production
food chain in the developing countries would need to increase from
$33.5 billion annually in the early 1990s to $43 billion in the
projection period--to achieve the agricultural output reflected in
FAO's 1995 study, World Agriculture: Toward 2010. Similarly,
investment in the public sector and infrastructure (excluding
irrigation) was required to increase from $25 billion to $37 billion.
FAO did not estimate additional amounts needed to reach the normative
production goals for 2010 shown in table VII.1. Regarding public
sector investment in the developing countries, FAO projected a needed
increase in domestic public investment, from $19 billion per year
during the early 1990s to $26 billion per year in the projected
period; in multilateral investment, from $6.5 billion per year during
the early 1990s to more than $9.5 billion per year during the
projection period; and in bilateral ODA, from $3.5 billion during the
early 1990s to more than $5.5 billion during the projection period.
FAO did not estimate additional amounts needed in these categories to
reach the normative production goals.
\7 About 67 percent of such assistance is on concessional terms.
DESIRED STATE OF RURAL
DEVELOPMENT MAY BE DIFFICULT
TO ACHIEVE
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix VII:1.2
According to an October 1997 World Bank report,\8 several major
regions of the world and many countries that receive the Bank's
assistance are agricultural underperformers. These regions and
countries have institutions and agricultural policies that
discriminate against the rural sector, underinvest in technology
development, maintain inappropriate agrarian structures, use arable
land for low-productivity ranching, undervalue natural resources and
therefore waste them, seriously underinvest in the health and
education of their rural populations, discriminate against private
sector initiatives in food marketing, and fail to maintain existing
or invest in new rural infrastructure. Unless these policies,
institutions, and public expenditure patterns are corrected, the Bank
said, they will not have abundant food supplies.
In the Bank's view, rural areas have not been developed for three
reasons. First, countries are not politically committed to the broad
vision of rural development.\9
Second, for many reasons, international interest in agricultural and
rural matters has waned over the past decade.\10 Third, the Bank has
in the past been poorly committed to rural development, and its
performance on rural development projects has been weak. For
example, according to a Bank official, a 1993 review found that Bank
expenditures on agriculture and rural development had declined from
$6 billion to about $3 billion and that less than half of the Bank's
projects in the area were successful. Following the review, the Bank
conducted additional analyses and developed a vision statement for
its future work in the area. In September 1996, the Bank's President
announced that rural development would be one of six key Bank
objectives.
To tackle the issue of weak commitment at the country level, the Bank
is focusing on improving its strategies for country assistance.
According to the Bank, the strategies define the key issues for
development, analyze the current and future prospects for dealing
with the issues, and provide the overall context within which Bank
operations are undertaken. The Bank believes that the strategies are
crucial to renewing the commitment by countries and the Bank to rural
growth.\11 The Bank plans to build a comprehensive rural development
strategy into each of its overall country assistance strategies.
According to the Bank, no approach to rural development will work for
all countries, and developing and implementing rural strategies will
be complex for most countries.\12
The Bank believes that if country assistance strategies include
well-defined, coherent rural strategies and treat agriculture
comprehensively, the chances for a sustained and effective rural
sector program will be substantially improved. Even so, in October
1997, a Bank report acknowledged that there were still wide
differences of opinion within the Bank and among its partners as to
the priority that should be given the rural sector.
--------------------
\8 Rural Development: From Vision to Action.
\9 Partner countries of the Bank have frequently given a low priority
to agricultural growth and rural development because they view
agriculture as a declining sector. Many developing countries have
focused resources on the urban and industrial sectors, often at the
expense of the rural sector. They have failed to recognize the
critical importance of productivity improvements and growth in the
rural sector in the long transition from an agrarian to an
urban-industrial society. Falling real food prices over the last 2
decades led to complacency toward the agricultural sector (some of
the decline resulted from protectionist agricultural policies pursued
in OECD countries). The rural poor have little political power, and
urban elites pursue policies that disadvantage the agricultural
sector. In many countries, public institutions have dominated the
agricultural sector by controlling input and output markets, land
markets, and access to finance. They have often been highly
inefficient and unresponsive to changes in market conditions and
provided privileges and rents to a favored few. Resources have been
concentrated in the hands of a few. Designing and implementing
effective community-based systems for managing common property
resources is difficult and only just starting in many countries.
\10 Reasons include a decline in real grain prices, leading to
complacency, and a reduction of 50 percent in external assistance for
agriculture since 1986. During the 1980s, development assistance
increasingly diverted finance to projects in environmental protection
and natural resource management. Poverty alleviation programs were
increasingly disconnected from agricultural production.
\11 The Bank also recently adopted a sector investment approach to
development assistance that differs from its traditional project
approach. (According to the Bank, the project approach has had
limited impact in increasing rural incomes and reducing rural
poverty.) The new approach covers the entire sector or subsector, is
prepared by the country's local stakeholders, is implemented within
the country's institutional framework (no new project management
units are created), is supported by all of the active donors in the
sector, uses common implementation arrangements for all financiers to
the extent possible, and tailors long-term technical assistance to
meet demand. Since the sector investment approach is still new, its
success is not yet proved, according to the Bank.
\12 According to the Bank, it is crucial to improve the formulation
of rural strategies by improving the analytical base; identifying the
necessary changes in policies, institutions, and expenditure
allocations; clearly stating priorities; determining an appropriate
balance between lending and nonlending services; developing
partnership relationships with appropriate government ministries; and
involving members of civil society at all levels. It requires input
not only from agricultural experts but also from experts in
education, population, health, nutrition, infrastructure, the
environment, and economics at a minimum.
ESTABLISHING AN INFORMATION SYSTEM
FOR ASSESSING UNDERNUTRITION AND
FOOD INSECURITY
======================================================== Appendix VIII
Summit countries agreed to set out a process for developing targets
and verifiable indicators of national and global food security where
they do not exist, to establish a food insecurity and vulnerability
information and mapping system, and to report to the Committee on
World Food Security on the results produced by the system. On March
24-25, 1997, FAO convened a group of experts to discuss ways and
means of implementing such a system. This group recommended a series
of initial steps to take prior to the CFS meeting in June 1998.
Subsequently, an interagency working group was established to promote
development of the information and mapping system. (Membership
included 21 international agencies and organizations, including
bilateral donor agencies.) The working group met in December 1997 and
April 1998. The FAO Secretariat helps staff the work of the group
between meetings.
According to FAO, among some of the key tasks identified for
establishing the information and mapping system are the following:
-- Designate country focal points for all the information and
mapping system matters.
-- Develop an awareness and advocacy strategy for end-users of the
system; where key national policymakers are not fully aware of
the need for strong food insecurity and vulnerability
information systems, secure their commitment to provide adequate
and continuing support for the establishment and maintenance of
such systems.
-- Inventory available as well as planned data collection systems
at both the international and national levels, and evaluate the
quality and coverage of their data; at the national level,
identify and prioritize the information needs of key food
security decisionmakers and determine to what extent needs are
already met; define a priority set of information required by
national decisionmakers and a set of verifiable objectives; set
out a scheduled program of initiatives and activities to meet
those objectives.
-- Define the conceptual framework and scope of the information and
mapping system, including the indicators to be used at both
national and international levels for identifying (down to at
least the household level) people who are food insecure or at
risk of becoming food insecure, the degree of their
undernutrition or vulnerability, and the key factors or causes
for their food insecurity or vulnerability.
-- When agreement on system indicators is reached, complete and
issue guidelines for the establishment of the system at the
national level.
-- Inventory national systems to determine to what extent the
information and mapping system indicator needs are already met;
identify significant gaps and weaknesses; assess the cost and
time required to implement the information and mapping system
and to what extent, if any, countries require technical or
financial assistance; and set out a scheduled program of
initiatives and activities for establishing an effective system.
-- Identify and prepare a computerized system for compiling and
analyzing multisectoral data and an information system for
mapping, posting, and disseminating information accessible to
all users.
-- Ensure the exchange of information among international agencies
and organizations on all aspects related to food insecurity and
vulnerability information and mapping. Do the same at the
national level.
By the time of the June 1998 CFS meeting, none of these tasks was
complete. Two reports, based on the interagency working group's
work, were provided to CFS for its June 1998 meeting. The first was
a proposed plan for continuing and future work on the information and
mapping system. The plan included a long list of tasks, but the
items were not prioritized, and no schedule for completing them was
suggested. The second was a report providing background information
and principles that could be followed in establishing national
information and mapping systems. The report could be useful to
officials interested in how to go about developing an awareness and
advocacy strategy for end-users of the system within their countries,
including securing the support of national decisionmakers.
The interagency working group and FAO Secretariat had been taking an
inventory of available information for use in the information and
mapping system at the international level. However, no report on the
results was available for the June 1998 CFS. The Secretariat,
interagency working group, and member countries had not yet begun to
debate what indicators should be used for the system. At the June
1998 CFS meeting, a number of countries stressed the need for a
decision on what indicators to use so that member countries could
take steps toward measuring progress in achieving the overall summit
goal.
A March 1997 technical advisory group and the CFS have stressed the
need to involve FAO countries in the design of the information and
mapping system. However, the interagency working group has not asked
member countries to identify and prioritize their information needs,
determine the extent to which those needs have already been met, and
share the results with the interagency working group. Only a few
developing countries sent representatives to the first interagency
working group meeting. Fourteen developing countries were invited to
the second meeting, and 12 countries sent representatives. The
interagency working group met for the third time in November 1998.
No developing countries sent representatives to the meeting. There
was some discussion of indicators that might be used at the national
and international levels for a food insecurity and vulnerability
mapping system and of existing international data systems from which
some indicators could be drawn. However, no proposals were offered
and no attempt was made to reach agreement on a common set of
indicators for use at the national or international level. The group
is not scheduled to meet again before the next CFS meeting, which
will be held in June 1999.
Since agreement had not been reached on the information and mapping
system indicators, detailed technical guidance to countries on how to
develop information on the indicators and establish the system at the
national level also had not been developed. Similarly, member
countries had not been able to identify whether their existing
systems meet their needs or assess the time, financial resources, and
technical assistance required to establish national systems.
The interagency working group and the Secretariat have made progress
in identifying a computer system for compiling and analyzing data and
an information system for mapping, posting, and identifying the
information. However, the work is not yet complete.
A cooperative process is underway among U.N. and other international
agencies. For example, FAO and the International Fund for
Agricultural Development hosted the first and second meetings of the
interagency working group, respectively, and the World Bank hosted
the third meeting. Agreements have been reached for sharing
information among some of the agencies, for example, between FAO and
the World Food Program. However, FAO officials told us that problems
have arisen in the exchange of information and that the World Food
Program and the World Health Organization had not yet made important
data sets available.
As of mid-December 1998, only about 60 countries had identified focal
points.
In commenting on a draft of this report, FAO officials said
considerable progress has been made in addressing the key tasks for
establishing an information and mapping system, and implementation of
many of the tasks requires a longer period of time. In addition, FAO
said, many developing countries have difficulty in mobilizing the
required resources. According to FAO, only about 15 countries are
currently engaged in establishing national food insecurity and
vulnerability mapping systems, with or without international
assistance. FAO said that the interagency group is working on a
technical compendium, to be issued in mid-1999, which will provide
more detailed technical guidance to prospective users on technical
issues related to the selection of indicators, the cut-off points,
the analysis of data, and so forth.
World Food Program officials noted that their program is actively
involved in the interagency working group that is promoting
development of a food insecurity and vulnerability information
mapping system, cited several specific areas of cooperation that
involve the agency and FAO, and said the program recently made
available a data base on China that includes data at the provincial
and county level. At the same time, program officials said that the
November 1998 meeting of the interagency working group did not
resolve the issue of mechanisms to be used in the development of an
international food insecurity and vulnerability mapping system data
base as well as the possible technical composition of the data base.
Several different systems (FAO, World Bank, and the World Health
Organization) offer possible alternatives, the officials said. They
said the meeting discussed the issue of availability of data sets and
data-sharing, and all participants are aware that many complications
relate to data copyrights issues. Such issues will need to be
resolved at the political level, officials said, before free
data-sharing becomes a practical reality.
COORDINATION IN IMPLEMENTING
SUMMIT GOALS
========================================================== Appendix IX
The summit action plan stressed a need to improve coordination among
governments, international agencies, and civil society. Numerous
organizations are involved in food security issues, including FAO,
the World Health Organization, the U.N. Development Program, the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the WTO, regional
development banks, key donor countries, for-profit private sector
companies, and NGOs. Since the summit, international groups have
taken steps to promote better coordination, but problems still exist.
COORDINATION SINCE THE SUMMIT
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IX:1
In February 1997, FAO and the International Fund for Agricultural
Development proposed that the U.N. resident coordinator in each
country facilitate inter-U.N. coordination and that FAO headquarters
establish and manage a network among the U.N. and non-U.N.
agencies. The Administrative Coordination Committee of the United
Nations (ACC)\1
endorsed this proposal in April 1997 and authorized FAO to consult
with other U.N. agencies on detailed arrangements to establish the
network and a detailed work plan. The United States succeeded in
placing the issue of food security coordination on the agendas of the
1997 Group of Seven developed countries'\2 economic summit in Denver,
Colorado, and the 1997 U.S.-European Union Summit.
Despite these actions, coordination problems continued. For example,
at a June 1997 meeting of the Food Aid Forum, the European Union and
11 other countries attending the meeting expressed concern about the
uncoordinated nature of food aid in contributing to food security
goals.\3 The European Union and 11 of the other countries attending
the meeting said global food aid policy components were scattered
among a number of international organizations and other forums, each
with different representatives and agendas, and that they lacked
effective coordination. In addition, they said that systemic
coordination of food aid at the regional and national levels was
needed. To improve coordination and the effectiveness of food aid,
the European Union is drafting a proposed code of conduct for food
aid. The code of conduct is to include a statement of responsibility
for both food aid donors and recipients and stress the need to ensure
optimal use of food aid resources.
Another coordination problem concerned rural agricultural
development. In October 1997, the World Bank reported that in
virtually all of the countries it works with, many donors and
multilateral financial institutions are promoting often disjointed
projects. According to the Bank, these projects are launched when
the policy environment is not favorable and a coherent rural strategy
is lacking. Consequently, many of the projects fail to achieve their
development objectives and undermine local commitment and domestic
institutional capacity. Other examples of coordination problems
concern FAO's Special Program on Food Security, a telefood promotion
to raise money, efforts to assist developing countries develop food
security action plans for implementing summit commitments, FAO
coordination with NGOs, and FAO coordination with other U.N.
agencies.
--------------------
\1 The Administrative Coordination Committee, composed of the U.N.
Secretary-General and heads of specialized U.N. agencies, is
responsible for ensuring full coordination between all branches of
the U.N. system.
\2 The Group of Seven consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
\3 The Forum consists of 15 countries (including several European
nations, the United States, Japan, Australia, and Canada), the World
Bank, the Club du Sahel, and the European Union.
SPECIAL PROGRAM FOR FOOD
SECURITY
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IX:1.1
The intent of FAO's Special Program for Food Security, an initiative
of FAO's Director- General, is to provide technical assistance to
help low-income, food-deficit countries increase their agricultural
production. The program began in 1995 with a pilot phase involving
18 countries. At a spring 1997 meeting of the CFS, many developed
countries expressed concern about the program. For example, the
European Union representative said FAO was not sufficiently
emphasizing the need for policy reform, donor coordination, and rural
development, as called for by the summit, and was not developing the
program in a sufficiently participatory manner to allow recipient
countries to take ownership of the program. The United States and
other countries also complained about a lack of information on the
costs and results of the program and expressed concern that the
program was using FAO resources needed for summit implementation and
FAO's traditional normative work. According to a U.S. official, the
United States was concerned that FAO was using the special program to
become a development agency rather than an agency that sets standards
for countries to follow. The official also said that the FAO
Director-General had not been responsive to donor concerns about the
program.
In commenting on a draft of this report, FAO officials said that we
did not adequately reflect the views of developing countries that are
the main beneficiaries of the program, nor did we recognize that the
special program was an initiative of the Director-General that was
approved by the FAO membership. Moreover, FAO said that the special
program is now part of its regular Program of Work and Budget. USDA
officials advised us that our discussion of the April 1997 events was
correct, but that since then, the FAO Director-General had been
responsive to concerns expressed about the program. For example, FAO
has provided factual data on the program's activities, and that while
early discussions about the program had emphasized supporting large
capital projects that were questionable, the focus of the program has
since shifted to encourage many small projects.
TELEFOOD PROMOTION
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IX:1.2
In 1997, the FAO Director-General announced plans to put on a 48-hour
global television program to mobilize public opinion and financial
resources to pay for the Special Program and other food security
activities. Participating countries were to organize national
broadcasts, to be held on October 18 and 19, 1997, centered on World
Food Day, an annual event designed to raise awareness about food
security problems. According to the Director-General, the telecast
was an important way to raise money for FAO's Special Program in
light of declining aid levels from donor countries. The main purpose
originally was to raise public awareness of food problems and, only
as a secondary suggestion from member countries, to mobilize
resources for micro-projects providing direct support to small
farmers.
In general, donor countries did not initially support the telefood
initiative when it was discussed at the April 1997 CFS meeting. Some
key donor countries, such as the United States, Australia, and
Canada, announced they would not participate in the telecast, because
the proposal (1) had not been reviewed or approved by FAO members;
(2) lacked participation by civil society in each country; (3) was
designed to help fund the Special Program, which was viewed as not
fully reflecting World Food Summit commitments; and (4) would impinge
upon national NGO fundraising activities centered on World Food Day.
In November 1997 FAO indicated the operation was successful, and
invited FAO members to take all measures they deem appropriate to
promote Telefood in the future. According to FAO, 58 countries
participated in awareness-raising activities in the 1997 Telefood,
including 5 developed countries (France, Greece, Italy, Japan, and
Turkey). Twenty of the countries also engaged in fundraising,
including one developed country (Japan). For the 1998 Telefood, 45
countries participated in awareness activities and 35 of these
countries also engaged in fund-raising. Five developed countries
participated , including in both sets of activities (Italy, Japan,
Portugal, Spain, and Turkey).
In commenting on this report, FAO officials acknowledged that
concerns had been expressed about supporting events that might be
seen as competing with the activities of nongovernmental
organizations (NGO) but said that most Telefood supporters came from
civil society. USDA officials said that the United States was
critical of Telefood in spring 1997 but expressed support for the
program later in the year. They said that the United States now
recognizes that Telefood may be a significant activity for other
countries and that it can help in raising consciousness about food
insecurity.
COUNTRY STRATEGY PAPERS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IX:1.3
Shortly before the summit was held, the FAO Director-General ordered
that food security strategy papers be drafted for each member
country, including developed countries. (According to FAO officials,
papers for the developed countries would simply describe the food
security situation in each country and not include recommendations.)
The Director-General did so without advising or securing the approval
of at least some member countries, including the United States. The
strategies for the developing countries reportedly included
recommendations for improving food security that focused on the
agricultural sector. FAO officials told us that each paper cost
approximately $2,000 to produce and was drafted over a 2-week period.
Sixty strategy papers, prepared before the summit was held, were
reviewed jointly by FAO, the associated member country governments,
and the World Bank. By April 1997, about 90 papers had been drafted,
and parliaments in about 20 countries had approved the documents as
national action plans for implementing World Food Summit commitments,
according to FAO officials.
At the April 1997 CFS session, donor countries expressed concern that
civil societies of the countries had not been involved in preparation
of the strategies, even though the summit action plan stressed the
need for civil society to participate in planning, promoting, and
implementing measures for improving food security. Donors were also
concerned that the presummit strategies would not reflect the full
range of commitments and actions agreed upon by summit participants.
Also of concern was the short amount of time allotted for drafting
the papers. Several FAO officials indicated that 2 weeks was not
sufficient time to prepare sound country strategy papers. They noted
that prior FAO preparation of country strategies typically took about
6 months. FAO officials also acknowledged that FAO lacked expertise
in several key areas related to food security, such as macroeconomic
and political policy reform, that were emphasized by the summit. In
general, the donors were also displeased about FAO's funding of
country briefs for the developed countries. Countries had written
position papers on their individual approaches to food security
during preparations for the summit. Representatives from several
developed countries noted that neither FAO nor FAO contractors had
contacted their governments to obtain key data and information on the
status of country efforts to develop country action plans. The
European Union representative instructed FAO to stop preparing briefs
on the European Union's member states unless one of its countries
specifically requested that FAO do so.
FAO staff told us that the country strategies had been well received
by the developing countries, were not meant to substitute for action
plans developed by the civil society of each country, and were only a
starting point to stimulate discussion and debate. However, donor
country governments and other key groups were not invited to critique
the drafts. Moreover, completed strategy papers and briefs have not
been made available to other FAO members. According to FAO, as of
June 1998, FAO had provided assistance to 150 countries in preparing
strategy briefs.
FAO COORDINATION WITH OTHER
U.N. AGENCIES
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IX:1.4
The summit action plan said coordination and cooperation within the
U.N. system, including the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund, are vital to the summit follow-up. Governments agreed to
cooperate among themselves and with international agencies to
encourage relevant agencies within the U.N. system to initiate
consultations on the further elaboration and definition of a food
insecurity and vulnerability information and mapping system. As part
of an already existing effort by U.N. agencies to coordinate
follow-up with major U.N. conferences and summits since 1990, these
governments also agreed to seek to reduce duplications and fill gaps
in coverage, defining the tasks of each organization within its
mandate, making concrete proposals for their strengthening, for
improved coordination with governments, and for avoiding duplication
of work among relevant organizations.
The summit plan also requested that the ACC ensure appropriate
interagency coordination and, when considering who should chair any
mechanisms for interagency follow-up to the summit, recognize the
major role of FAO in the field of food security. In April 1997, the
ACC approved a proposal to establish a network on rural development
and food security as the mechanism for providing interagency
follow-up to the summit. At the country level, the network consists
of thematic groups established under the U.N. Resident Coordinator
System. According to FAO, these groups typically include U.N.
agencies, national institutions, bilateral donors, and civil society
representatives. At the headquarters level, the network includes 20
U.N. organizations that participate in and support the country-level
groups. The network is jointly coordinated and backstopped by FAO
and the International Fund for Agricultural Development, in close
cooperation with the World Food Program.
Despite these efforts, FAO, other U.N. agency officials, and U.S.
officials advised us that coordination problems continue. For
example, an FAO official said that in May 1998, the U.N. Economic
and Social Council\4 met to review a set of indicators for measuring
follow-up to the various U.N. conferences and summits. According to
the official, FAO had not been involved in the exercise to create the
indicators, and the proposed indicators did not adequately represent
food security issues. As discussed in appendix VIII, FAO officials
told us that although the World Food Program and World Health
Organization have been cooperating in establishing an information and
mapping system, FAO was still waiting to receive previously promised
data from the organizations. According to both FAO and U.N.
Children's Fund officials, their two agencies have had problems
coordinating with each other.
In commenting on a draft of our report, FAO officials noted that
coordination problems exist even at the national level among
ministries and agencies, and said that such problems cannot be absent
in the U.N. system of agencies. However, FAO said great efforts had
been made, particularly in the framework of the Administrative
Committee on Coordination, to improve the cooperation and synergy
among the different institutions. According to officials, the
network on rural development and food security is growing rapidly and
proceeding satisfactorily.
--------------------
\4 The Council is responsible for overseeing and coordinating the
economic and social work of the United Nations, including that of
U.N. specialized agencies. (As previously noted, FAO is one of the
specialized agencies.) The ACC reports to the Council on coordination
issues. The Council is seeking to strengthen its interaction with
the specialized agencies. According to the Council, the need to
establish institutional ties between the specialized agencies, and
between them and the Council, is a major issue. Since the
specialized agencies have their own governing structures and mandate,
the Council believes it also needs to improve its interaction with
the specialized agencies' governing bodies.
MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF THE
ACTION PLAN
=========================================================== Appendix X
The summit directed FAO's Committee on Food Security to monitor and
evaluate progress toward national, subregional, regional, and
international implementation of the action plan, using reports from
national governments, the U.N. system of agencies, and other
relevant international institutions. Governments are to provide
regular reports on progress made to the FAO Council and the U.N.
Economic and Social Council. The summit also directed that NGOs and
other interested parties should play an active role in this process,
at the national level and within CFS itself. Since the summit,
countries have provided their first progress report to CFS and the
FAO Secretariat, and planning has begun for a revised format for
future reports. NGOs have made some progress in increasing their
involvement in food security efforts, but not as much as they would
like.
PROGRESS REPORTS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix X:1
In April 1997, CFS decided that the first report would cover progress
through the end of 1997 and the reporting procedure would be
provisional. Reports would be prepared by national governments, U.N.
agencies, and other relevant international institutions and were to
be received by the FAO Secretariat by January 31, 1998. Countries
agreed to report on actions taken toward achieving the specific
objectives under each of the seven statements of commitment
(following the format of the summit plan of action) and include
information on the actors and, if available, results, including
quantitative assessments, under each of the objectives. CFS allowed
each country to decide whether to report on the specific actions
included in the summit's action plan. CFS emphasized that the
information should include some analysis on how national policies and
actions were geared toward, and effective in, achieving the food
security objective of reducing the number of undernourished. A more
detailed reporting format, proposed to CFS by the Secretariat, was
not approved.
CFS did not set any other requirements concerning the information to
be provided. A proposal by some delegates that countries provide
baseline information on actions taken to implement each of the seven
commitments was noted but not endorsed as a requirement. Countries
were not asked to provide baseline information on the number of their
undernourished, the extent of undernourishment, or the principal
causes of undernourishment. Nor were they asked to provide baseline
information regarding actions already underway or planned or
information on targets and milestone dates for implementing actions.
They were not asked to provide information on actual or planned
expenditures for implementing actions.
Although CFS did not ask for baseline or target information, in a
July 1997 letter to countries, FAO's Director-General said that the
first report after the World Food Summit was of the utmost importance
and would be of critical value in setting baselines and the
orientations that governments intend to pursue. He also said it was
expected that governments' reports would cover the contributions of
all relevant partners at the national level, including governmental
institutions, as well as nongovernmental and private sector actors.
In addition, he asked for a one-page summary of the major food
security issues that each country was facing and the priority targets
being addressed through implementation of the plan.
By the January 31, 1998, due date, only 5 countries had provided
progress reports to the Secretariat; as late as March 31, 1998, only
68 of 175 country reports had been received.\1 The Secretariat
analyzed and summarized the results in a report for the CFS' June
meeting but drew no overall substantive conclusions because (1)
information on policies and programs predominantly covered continuing
actions already taking place at the time of the summit, (2) the
Secretariat's analysis of country actions was limited to 68 reports,
(3) the countries only provided selective information rather than
focusing on all the issues involved, (4) some countries provided
descriptive rather than analytical information, and (5) some
countries reported only on certain aspects of food security action
such as food stocks or food reserve policies. The Secretariat said
future reports need to be oriented more toward providing a precise
analysis of selected situations, actions conducted over time to
address them, results obtained, and reasons for such results.
To date, CFS' approach to monitoring and evaluation of country
performance has focused on encouraging countries to report on actions
taken and the impact of the actions on food security. Under this
approach, the FAO Secretariat seeks to summarize the results across
all countries. CFS has not considered directly assessing the quality
of a country's overall action plan--including strategy, programs,
resources, targets, and milestones for achieving the summit
commitments, objectives, and actions.\2 Secretariat officials told us
that they lack sufficient staff to evaluate action plans for all CFS
members.
The Secretariat prepared a report for the June 1998 CFS session that
included a proposed standard format for reporting future progress in
implementing the plan. The proposal was considerably more structured
than that which CFS asked members to use for the provisional report
provided in 1998. The proposal included suggestions regarding
essential substantive points to be addressed in future reports.
Prior to convening on June 2, CFS held a 1-day working group meeting
on June 1 to examine the Secretariat's proposals and report on them
to CFS. However, the working group did not debate and CFS did not
reach any decisions on the essential points to be included in future
progress reports . CFS directed the Secretariat to collaborate with
member states and other concerned partners in the continuing
preparation of a set of indicators for measuring progress in
implementing the plan and said the work should be completed
sufficiently in advance to be used by CFS in preparing for its
session in the year 2000. CFS also directed the Secretariat to
further develop an analytical framework for preparing future reports
and assessing progress in implementing the summit action plan.
--------------------
\1 According to FAO, the total number of reports that eventually
reached the Secretariat was 101 from member countries, 33 from
international organizations, and 3 from NGOs .
\2 As part of the summit's action plan, countries agreed to review
and revise, as appropriate, their national plans, programs, and
strategies to promote achievement of the summit's commitments. They
also agreed to establish or improve national mechanisms to set
priorities, develop, implement, and monitor their food security
actions within designated time frames, based on national and local
needs, and to provide the necessary resources for their planning.
PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix X:2
The summit action plan directed that civil society be involved in
CFS' monitoring and that governments, in partnership with civil
society, report to CFS on national implementation of the plan. The
plan's directive is consistent with a growing interest in involving
civil society to help promote the objectives and work of
international agencies during the past decade in response to various
transformations within and across countries. For example, the
globalization of the economy has reduced the ability of individual
governments to control the direction of development. Structural
adjustment reforms have led to a redefinition of the role of the
state in many countries, reducing its function as a doer and provider
and leaving it to the private sector and citizen initiatives to take
on responsibilities for services it no longer provides. The demise
of authoritarian regimes in many countries has created opportunities
for groups and collective initiatives of many kinds to spring up and
make their voices heard.
Increasing the role of civil society in CFS is not easily
accomplished since FAO was created as an intergovernmental forum and
operates by consensus of all the members. Unless the members of CFS
agree to allow for NGO participation, this cannot occur. According
to several U.N. officials with whom we spoke, developing countries
are generally opposed to greater involvement by NGOs in U.N.
agencies, including FAO.
According to FAO and other participants, if CFS member countries
agree that civil society should have a greater role, a variety of
practical questions must be addressed. For example, how can FAO deal
effectively and equitably with the large number of civil society
organizations that would like to be heard, the variety and number of
conflicting views and interests that they express, the disparities in
their legitimacy and representativeness, and the difficulties many
NGOs in developing countries have in gaining access to information
and policy forums? In addition, given limited resources, where
should priorities lie in promoting policy dialogue, and how can links
between national and global levels be promoted? Some NGOs believe
that some of these issues could be addressed if NGOs were allowed to
hold separate meetings for developing consensus positions and
selecting a few NGOs to represent them in CFS meetings.
At the April 1997 CFS session, several delegates suggested that ways
be considered for strengthening or widening the participation of
civil society organizations in the work and deliberations of CFS.
CFS asked the Secretariat to take interim measures to broaden NGO
participation at the 1998 session of CFS and agreed to examine the
issue in greater detail at that time. In responding to the April
1997 CFS session, the Secretariat took several positive actions prior
to June 1998. It increased the number of NGOs invited to the June
1998 CFS meeting, made documents available on the FAO website about 1
month prior to the meeting, and provided FAO countries with a copy of
a proposal by a group of NGOs for enhanced civil society
participation. The proposal identified a number of specific actions
that could be taken to increase NGO opportunities for participation
before and around CFS meetings. NGOs expressed particular
disappointment about not being allowed to make prepared statements in
CFS meetings until after government delegates have spoken and said if
they were to make the effort of participation, they needed to be
assured of a say in decision-making and to know that NGO positions
could at least be reflected in CFS reports.\3
In addition to the actions by the Secretariat, the FAO
Director-General invited seven NGOs to a 2-day meeting at the end of
January 1998 to provide advice on redefining FAO's role during the
next decade. NGO representatives were asked to address what role FAO
should play in fostering an enabling environment for civil society
organizations and building dialogue with governments and how civil
society's views could be better taken into account given the
intergovernmental nature of FAO. The seven NGOs provided their views
in an information paper that was made available for the CFS June
meeting. In addition, the Secretariat drafted its own paper on how
the NGOs' role could be enhanced in CFS and invited the CFS Bureau to
approve the paper for use at the June 1998 meeting.
Notwithstanding the positive steps taken by the Secretariat and CFS'
April 1997 decision, CFS did not seriously consider the issue in
1998. For example, the CFS Bureau, a small executive committee, did
not approve the Secretariat's paper for use at the June 1998 CFS
session, and the issue was not included in the provisional agenda for
the meeting.
At the opening of the session, Canada, with support from the United
States, proposed that the provisional agenda be amended to include a
discussion of the role of civil society. However, rather than
permitting debate on the proposal, the CFS Chairman announced that he
had decided to seek to satisfy NGOs' interests by holding informal
discussions with them. Subsequently, the Chairman advised the NGOs\4
that he and the CFS Bureau would meet with representatives of five
NGOs. During the morning of the second day of the CFS meeting, the
United States again proposed that civil society participation be
added to the agenda and asked that it be addressed without further
delay. The Chairman agreed to add the item to the agenda but
postponed discussion until the end of the third day's meeting.
During the abbreviated discussion, various ideas for broadening civil
society participation were noted. However, some delegates, including
China, stressed that CFS is an intergovernmental forum and that any
measures taken to broaden participation would need to respect that
principle.
At the conclusion of the June session, CFS countries agreed to make
the issue of increased civil society participation in its activities
a main agenda item for the 1999 meeting. It asked the Secretariat to
prepare and circulate a discussion paper at least 6 months prior to
the next meeting to allow ample time for consultations between
governments and national civil society organizations. The
Secretariat was also asked to analyze the pros and cons of proposals,
including their legal, procedural, and financial implications.
According to a statement presented on behalf of NGOs that attended
the June 1998 CFS session, the involvement of civil society
organizations in preparing national reports on progress in
implementing the summit's action plan was varied. In some cases,
NGOs had written inputs; in other cases, NGOs gave their views orally
in meetings with government officials; and in numerous other cases,
civil society was not invited to participate in the drafting of the
national report.
--------------------
\3 Other NGO suggestions for increased involvement were to (1) allow
NGOs to collaborate with the Secretariat in the drafting of CFS
papers, (2) allow civil society representatives to meet separately
just prior to CFS meetings, (3) allow NGO discussions with the CFS
Bureau (a small executive committee) the day before the start of CFS
meetings to identify NGO concerns, (4) include two NGO
representatives in committees that draft CFS reports, (5) encourage
governments to invite NGOs to nominate one or two representatives to
join their national delegations, (6) increase the use of FAO trust
funds to facilitate participation of developing country NGOs in CFS
meetings, and (7) ensure NGO gender- and geographically balanced
representation.
\4 About 20 NGOs attended the CFS session. An FAO official advised
us that although it had broadened the list of NGOs invited to the
meeting, many NGOs did not send representatives--probably because
there was no assurance that they would be allowed to participate
meaningfully in the session.
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY
========================================================== Appendix XI
At the request of Senator Russell D. Feingold, Ranking Minority
Member of the Subcommittee on African Affairs, Senator John Ashcroft,
and Congressman Tony P. Hall, we reviewed the outcome of the 1996
World Food Summit and key factors that could affect progress toward
achieving the summit's goal. Our overall objective was to comment on
key issues and challenges related to developing countries' achieving
the summit's goal of reducing undernourishment by half by 2015. Our
overall approach was to analyze and synthesize information from a
wide variety of primary and secondary sources. To address the
current status of global food security, the summit's approach to
reducing food insecurity, and the summit's possible contribution to
reducing hunger and undernutrition, we did the following:
-- reviewed documents and studies by the FAO, the U.N. Children's
Fund, the World Health Organization, the World Bank, and the
World Food Program; the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development; the Consultative Group on International
Agricultural Research; IFPRI; USDA, USAID, the Department of
State, and the Department of Health and Human Services; and
various academics, NGOs, and private sector entities concerned
with past and possible future efforts to reduce poverty and
undernutrition;
-- discussed issues concerning the extent and causes of
undernutrition with national and international experts in food
security, including experts at FAO, the World Food Program, the
World Bank, IFPRI, USDA, USAID, the Department of State, various
NGOs, and universities and international food companies;
-- observed presummit negotiations over the text to be included in
the World Food Summit's policy declaration and plan of action,
the World Food Summit, and subsequent FAO follow-up meetings to
the summit (the latter include the April 1997 CFS meeting, the
November 1997 FAO Conference meeting, and the June 1998 CFS
meeting;
-- attended various other conferences and seminars where food
security and related issues were discussed; and
-- developed a database on country-level estimates of
undernutrition and various economic, political, and social
variables possibly associated with food insecurity.
We relied heavily on secondary sources of information, including data
on estimated past and future projections of the number of chronically
undernourished people in developing countries, world cereal stocks,
and world food aid deliveries. We used country and regional data on
the effects of the URA, conflicts, agricultural production, income
levels, official and private sector resource flows, and investors'
ratings of the risk associated with investing in countries. We did
not validate the reliability of these data.
To address the current status of global food security, more
specifically, we
-- reviewed methodological issues associated with efforts to
accurately identify and measure the extent of undernutrition;
-- reviewed FAO, USDA, and World Health Organization estimates of
the number of undernourished people or children in up to 93
developing countries that collectively account for about 98
percent of the population in the developing world;
-- used FAO estimates of the number of undernourished people in 93
developing countries to calculate and describe (1) the
distribution of the total number of undernourished people across
countries and (2) the variation across countries in the
proportion of population that is undernourished; and
-- compared FAO and USDA estimates of the number of undernourished
people in 58 low-income, food-deficit countries to show to what
extent the estimates differ.
To describe the summit's policy declaration and action plan for
reducing food insecurity, we reviewed both and prepared a table
summarizing the 7 major commitments, 27 supporting objectives, and 24
of the 181 supporting actions. The latter were selected to further
illustrate the depth and specificity of the summit's plan.
To provide perspective on the summit's goal of halving the number of
undernourished people by 2015, we reviewed and compared FAO and USDA
estimates on the number of undernourished people in developing
countries. In addition, we analyzed a variety of key issues
associated with the summit's proposed commitments, objectives, and
actions for halving undernutrition by no later than 2015. These
issues concern the ability and willingness of countries to reasonably
measure the prevalence of undernourishment and the possible effects
of trade liberalization, grain reserves, food aid, conflict,
increased agricultural production, policy reforms, resources,
coordination, and monitoring and evaluation of progress in reducing
food insecurity.
We related FAO country-level data on the number of undernourished
people to FAO estimates of the capability of the same countries to
reduce undernourishment by redistribution of available food supplies.
We reviewed and analyzed summary FAO data on past and projected
cereals production growth rates relative to food insecurity levels
and the aggregate number of undernourished people of the countries.
To assess the impact of trade liberalization on food security, we
reviewed various analyses of the subject, including two detailed
estimates of the projected income impacts of the URAs on major
regions of the world and several major trading countries. To provide
perspective on trends and issues associated with grain reserves and
food aid, we analyzed data on (1) world private and government grain
reserves and the ratio of total grain reserves to world cereal
consumption; (2) world and U.S. cereals shipments of food aid in
terms of total quantities and the proportion provided as program,
project, and emergency aid; and (3) total food aid deliveries to
low-income, food-deficit countries and as a percent of total global
food aid deliveries. We also
-- analyzed country-level data on average per capita caloric levels
and related this measure of food security to other country-level
variables, including (1) the incidence of civil war, war,
revolution and genocide during 1960-89; (2) the level of income;
and (3) creditworthiness ratings of the risk associated with
investing in these countries;
-- related country-level data on the number of undernourished
people to (1) income levels of developing countries, (2) total
official and private resources provided to these countries, and
(3) creditworthiness ratings of the risk associated with
investing in the countries; and
-- analyzed data on the role of official development assistance and
private sector investment in developing countries during
1990-97.
To comment on the issues of (1) improving coordination among
governments, international agencies, and civil society and (2)
monitoring and evaluating their progress in implementing the summit
action plan, we considered information that became available to us in
some of our previously discussed actions. For example, we relied
heavily on the FAO Secretariat's assessment of individual developing
and developed country progress reports that were provided to the
Secretariat during early 1998. We did not undertake a comprehensive
study of actions taken by governments, international agencies, and
civil society to improve coordination and monitor and evaluate
progress toward achieving summit commitments.
We conducted our review from February 1997 to September 1998 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix XII
COMMENTS FROM THE U.S. AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
========================================================== Appendix XI
(See figure in printed edition.)
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
======================================================== Appendix XIII
NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Phillip J. Thomas
Wayne H. Ferris
Gezahegne Bekele
Edward George
*** End of document. ***