Drug Control: Narcotics Threat From Colombia Continues to Grow (Letter
Report, 06/22/99, GAO/NSIAD-99-136).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the
narcotics threat from Colombia, focusing on: (1) the nature of the drug
threat from Colombia; (2) recent initiatives of the Colombian government
to address the threat, and obstacles it faces; and (3) the status of
U.S. efforts to assist the Colombian government in furthering its
counternarcotics activities and reducing the flow of illegal narcotics
to the United States.

GAO noted that: (1) despite the efforts of U.S. and Colombian
authorities, the illegal narcotics threat from Colombia has grown; (2)
Colombia remains the primary source country for cocaine products for the
U.S. market; (3) for the third year in a row, coca cultivation has
increased so that Colombia is now the world's leading cultivator of
coca; (4) more potent coca leaf is being grown within Colombia, which is
likely to lead to an estimated 50-percent increase in cocaine production
in the next 2 years; (5) Colombia is now the major supplier of heroin to
the eastern part of the United States; (6) the Colombian government has
lost a number of battles to insurgent groups who, along with
paramilitary groups, have increased their involvement in illicit
narcotics activities and gained greater control over large portions of
Colombia where drug-trafficking activities occur; (7) the government of
Colombia has undertaken a number of initiatives to address the narcotics
threat; (8) these include: (a) the initiation of peace talks with the
insurgents; (b) the development of a national drug control strategy; (c)
the establishment of a joint military-police task force to combat drug
traffickers; (d) the development of a new counternarcotics unit within
the Colombian army that will be fully screened for human rights abuses;
and (e) the implementation of legislative reforms on extradition, money
laundering, and asset forfeiture; (9) in 1998, these efforts led to the
seizure of record amounts of cocaine and arrests of drug traffickers;
(10) the government of Colombia faces a formidable challenge in
overcoming a number of significant obstacles in addressing the narcotics
problem; (11) the Colombian military has several institutional
weaknesses that have limited its capability to support counternarcotics
operations; (12) government corruption, budgetary constraints, and a
weak judicial system have hindered the Colombian government's ability to
reduce drug-trafficking activities; (13) the United States has had
limited success in achieving its primary objective of reducing the flow
of illegal drugs from Colombia; (14) despite 2 years of extensive
herbicide spraying, U.S. estimates show there has not been any net
reduction in coca cultivation--net coca cultivation actually increased
50 percent; and (15) the growing involvement and strength of insurgent
groups in the areas where coca and opium poppy are grown complicate U.S.
support for counternarcotics activities.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-99-136
     TITLE:  Drug Control: Narcotics Threat From Colombia Continues to
	     Grow
      DATE:  06/22/99
   SUBJECT:  Drug trafficking
	     Narcotics
	     Law enforcement
	     Foreign governments
	     Political corruption
	     International cooperation
	     Foreign policies
	     Federal aid to foreign countries
	     Organized crime
IDENTIFIER:  Colombia
	     Peru
	     Bolivia
	     National Drug Control Strategy

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NS99136 A Report to Congressional Requesters

GAO/NSIAD-99-136

June 1999 DRUG CONTROL Narcotics Threat From Colombia Continues to
Grow

National Security and International Affairs Division

B-280937 Letter June 22, 1999 The Honorable Charles E. Grassley
Chairman, Caucus on International

Narcotics Control United States Senate

The Honorable John L. Mica Chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice,

Drug Policy, and Human Resources Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives

In 1998, we reported on U. S. and Colombian efforts to address
illegal narcotics activities in Colombia. We pointed out that both
governments faced significant challenges in meeting the threat
posed by drug traffickers and insurgent groups that support them.
1 As you requested, this report updates the narcotics situation in
Colombia and highlights U. S. and

Colombian efforts to address drug- trafficking activities in
Colombia and the continuing challenges each government faces to
combat these activities. Specifically, we examined (1) the nature
of the drug threat from Colombia; (2) recent initiatives of the
Colombian government to address the threat, and obstacles it
faces; and (3) the status of U. S. efforts to assist the Colombian
government in furthering its counternarcotics activities and

reducing the flow of illegal narcotics to the United States. (A
list of related GAO products on drug control issues in Colombia is
at the end of the report.)

Results in Brief Despite the efforts of U. S. and Colombian
authorities, the illegal narcotics threat from Colombia has grown
since we reported last year. Today, Colombia remains the primary
source country for cocaine products for the

U. S. market.  For the third year in a row, coca cultivation has
increased so that Colombia is now the world's leading cultivator
of coca.

1 Drug Control: U. S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Face Continuing Challenges (

GAO/NSIAD-98-60
, Feb. 12, 1998).
1 Drug Control: U. S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Face
Continuing Challenges (  GAO/NSIAD-98-60 , Feb. 12, 1998).

 More potent coca leaf is being grown within Colombia, which is
likely to lead to an estimated 50- percent increase in cocaine
production in the next 2 years.

 Colombia is now the major supplier of heroin to the eastern part
of the United States.  In the past year, the Colombian government
has lost a number of battles

to insurgent groups who, along with paramilitary groups, have
increased their involvement in illicit narcotics activities and
gained greater control over large portions of Colombia where drug-
trafficking activities occur. The government of Colombia has
undertaken a number of initiatives to

address the narcotics threat. These include the initiation of
peace talks with the insurgents; the development of a national
drug control strategy; the establishment of a joint military-
police task force to combat drug traffickers; the development of a
new counternarcotics unit within the

Colombian army that will be fully screened for human rights
abuses; and the implementation of legislative reforms on
extradition, money laundering, and asset forfeiture. In 1998,
these efforts led to the seizure of record amounts of cocaine and
arrests of drug traffickers. However, illegal drugs from Colombia
remain readily available in the United States.

Despite these initiatives, the government of Colombia faces a
formidable challenge in overcoming a number of significant
obstacles in addressing the narcotics problem. The Colombian
military has several institutional weaknesses that have limited
its capability to support counternarcotics operations. In
addition, government corruption, budgetary constraints, and a weak
judicial system have hindered the Colombian government's ability
to reduce drug- trafficking activities. The United States has had
limited success in achieving its primary

objective of reducing the flow of illegal drugs from Colombia.
Despite 2 years of extensive herbicide spraying, U. S. estimates
show there has not been any net reduction in coca cultivation net
coca cultivation actually increased 50 percent. The United States
has also had difficulties supporting some counternarcotics
activities in Colombia due to U. S.

cutbacks in drug detection and monitoring support. Furthermore,
over the years the Colombian military has reportedly been involved
in abusing human rights, such as arbitrary detention, and as a
result, U. S. legislation has restricted the provision of U. S.
assistance to Colombian police and military units if there is
credible evidence of human rights violations. Finally, the growing
involvement and strength of insurgent groups in the areas where
coca and opium poppy are grown complicate U. S. support for

counternarcotics activities. For example, the sharing of
intelligence information with the Colombian military creates an
operational and policy dilemma for U. S. officials in drawing a
distinction between support for counternarcotics versus
counterinsurgency activities.

Background One of the goals of the U. S. National Drug Control
Strategy calls for a 15- percent reduction in the net flow of
illegal drugs from source countries,

including Colombia, by 2002. To achieve this goal, the United
States has provided substantial assistance to Colombia in order to
(1) disrupt and dismantle drug- trafficking organizations, (2)
reduce the availability of drugs through eradication and
enforcement efforts, and (3) strengthen Colombian institutions to
enable them to support a full range of counternarcotics
activities. This strategy recognizes the importance of the
government of Colombia's gaining control of the area where most
drug- trafficking activities occur and expanding counternarcotics
support to the Colombian military to enable it to improve its
counternarcotics capabilities.

Data provided by the Departments of State and Defense indicate
that between fiscal year 1990 and 1998, about $625 million in U.
S. counternarcotics assistance has been provided to the Colombian
National Police (CNP) and the Colombian military for equipment,
such as helicopters and fixed- wing aircraft, weapons and
ammunition, logistical support, and training. In October 1998, the
Congress authorized another

$2. 6 billion over a 3- year period to enhance international
eradication, interdiction, and crop substitution efforts. 2 Of
this amount, the Congress appropriated $690 million for fiscal
year 1999. According to the State Department, $173.2 million has
been earmarked to support CNP and

military counternarcotics initiatives. The funds will be used for
procuring six Black Hawk helicopters, ammunition, and weapons for
the CNP; upgrading the capabilities of CNP UH- 1H helicopters; and
enhancing the capabilities of the Colombian Air Force. According
to the State

Department, the CNP should begin receiving this assistance in mid-
1999. Last year we reported that Colombia was restricted from
receiving some counternarcotics assistance as a result of the
President's decisions to decertify Colombia in 1996 and 1997
because it was not fully cooperating 2 The Western Hemisphere Drug
Elimination Act (Title VIII of Division C of P. L. 105- 277).

with the United States in reducing drug trafficking. 3 This
restriction was lifted in 1998 when the President decertified
Colombia but granted a vital national interests waiver that
allowed Colombia to continue receiving counternarcotics
assistance. On February 26, 1999, the President certified

that Colombia was fully cooperating with the United States in its
counternarcotics efforts.

The Nature of the Drug The drug- trafficking threat from Colombia
has increased over the past Threat From Colombia

several years coca cultivation has increased by 50 percent since
1996, cocaine production is projected to rise by 50 percent, and
Colombia has become the primary supplier of heroin to the eastern
United States. The challenge of reducing drug- related activities
has become more difficult as two insurgent groups, the Colombian
Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) and the National Liberation Army
(ELN), have expanded their involvement in drug trafficking while
paramilitary groups have stepped up their illegal narcotics
operations.

In August 1998, the U. S. embassy in Colombia reported that
although the Colombian government continues to disrupt drug-
trafficking activities of the major drug cartels, there has not
been a net reduction in processing or

exporting refined cocaine from Colombia or in cocaine availability
within the United States. According to the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), several billion dollars flow into Colombia
each year from the cocaine trade alone. This vast amount of drug
money has made it possible for drug traffickers to gain
unprecedented economic, political, and social power and influence
in Colombia. Moreover, according to DEA, while two major groups
(the Medellin and Cali cartels) dominated drug- trafficking
activities during the late 1980s and early 1990s, today there are
hundreds of smaller and more decentralized organizations. These
groups are now

capable of producing black cocaine that hinders detection and are
3 Section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended
(22 U. S. C. 2291j), requires the President to certify by March 1
of each year which major drug- producing and transit countries
cooperated fully with the United States or took adequate steps on
their own to achieve full compliance during the previous year with
the goals and objectives established by the 1988 United Nations
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances. If a country does not meet the statutory
objectives, the President can either deny certification or grant a
vital national interests certification, which recognizes that the
requirement to use sanctions would threaten the vital national
interests of the United States.

improving their transportation capabilities by manufacturing boats
capable of carrying up to 2 tons of cocaine at high speeds. 4 In
March 1999, the State Department reported that Colombia remains
the source country for over three- quarters of the world's
cocaine. Moreover, DEA has recently reported that, in the past 4
years, there has been a dramatic shift in the U. S. heroin market
from Southeast Asian to Colombian heroin, especially in large East
Coast cities such as New York, Boston, Newark, Baltimore, and
Philadelphia. According to U. S. estimates, Colombia produces
about 6 metric tons of heroin annually. The State Department also
reported that total coca cultivation in the

Andean region has substantially declined in Peru and Bolivia since
1996. However, figure 1 shows that Colombia has now become the
primary source for coca cultivation, as drug traffickers have
increased their coca cultivation in the areas that are not under
governmental control.

4 Black cocaine is created by a new chemical process used by drug
traffickers to evade detection by drug- sniffing dogs and chemical
tests. The traffickers add charcoal and other chemicals to
cocaine, which transforms it into a black substance that has no
smell and does not react when subjected to the usual chemical
tests.

Figure 1: Trends in Andean Region Coca Cultivation, 1996- 98 1996
1997

32% 35%

41% 45%

23% 24%

1998 27%

53% 20%

Colombia Bolivia Peru Source: Department of State.

In just 3 years, Colombia has surpassed Peru and Bolivia as the
world's leader in coca cultivation. Gross coca cultivation
estimates in Colombia increased from 67,200 hectares in 1996 to
101,800 hectares in 1998, a rise of about 50 percent. Most of this
increase occurred in two areas Caqueta and Putumayo. In addition
to the expansion of cultivation in known cocagrowing areas in
southern Colombia, the United States has identified two new
growing areas in northern Colombia Norte de Santander and San
Lucas. The new growing areas are, for the most part, controlled by
the insurgents.

Increased Coca Yields May In February 1999, a U. S. interagency
report on Colombia concluded that Expand Cocaine Production

new fields of coca leaf, similar to the type typically found in
Bolivia and Peru, are now being grown in Colombia. The new coca is
believed to be more potent, as it has a substantially higher
cocaine alkaloid content than the type of coca most commonly found
in Colombia. The study noted that this new coca, coupled with
existing fields of coca, could increase potential

Colombian cocaine production estimates from 1998 levels of 165
metric tons to between 195 and 250 metric tons, or as much as 50
percent, over the next 2 years. According to DEA, the production
figure could be even greater if the cocaine- producing
laboratories are more efficient at producing cocaine from the new
coca leaf than their counterparts in Peru

and Bolivia. Greater Insurgent and

According to Department of Defense (DOD) and State Department
Paramilitary Involvement in officials, insurgent and paramilitary
organizations are increasingly Drug- trafficking Activities

becoming involved in drug- trafficking- related activities and are
controlling more territory. Active insurgent groups and their
growing involvement in drug- trafficking activities over the past
several years are complicating Colombia's ability to reduce drug
trafficking. The most active insurgent

groups are the FARC and the ELN. These two groups are estimated to
have as many as 20, 000 personnel. Additionally, the number of
municipalities in the rural areas of Colombia in which the FARC
has a presence has been increasing: the insurgents currently can
exercise some degree of control over 40 percent of Colombia's
territory, an area equal in size to Texas, east and south of the
Andes (see fig. 2).

Figure 2: Areas of Colombian Insurgent, Paramilitary, and Drug-
trafficking Activities

Caribbean Sea

activities and in storing and transporting cocaine within
Colombia; they also appear to be engaged in localized opiate
trafficking within Colombia. Although DOD has reported that the
insurgents probably earn between $500 million and $600 million
annually from these activities, State Department officials stated
that this estimate has not been confirmed. U. S. embassy officials
said that monies from the units involved in drugtrafficking
activities support insurgent activities throughout Colombia.

According to U. S. officials, the current alliance between the
insurgents and the drug traffickers poses a clear challenge to
Colombia's ability to conduct effective counterdrug operations.
The Colombian government has little or

no control over most of the areas where drug- trafficking
activities are occurring. DEA reported that the presence of FARC
units in Colombia's eastern lowlands and southeastern jungle areas
was especially troublesome. According to DEA, these areas include
most of the coca and opium poppy cultivation and most of the major
drug- trafficking production facilities.

Paramilitary groups emerged during the 1980s as self- defense
forces in response to insurgent violence. Current U. S. estimates
indicate that these groups have between 4,000 and 6,000 personnel.
In 1998, DEA reported that certain leaders of some groups have
become major drug traffickers. U. S. officials do not have
estimates on the amount of income that these groups derive from
illegal drug activities.

U. S. officials stated that the paramilitary groups operate with
relative impunity in parts of northern Colombia. According to the
U. S. embassy, paramilitary groups also appear to have established
a permanent base in a

major coca- growing area in southern Colombia where there is a
heavy concentration of insurgents.

Colombia's The Colombian government has taken a number of steps to
improve its Counternarcotics

counternarcotics efforts. It has entered into peace negotiations
with insurgent groups; issued a counternarcotics strategy;
developed a joint Efforts, and Obstacles military and CNP task
force and proposed the creation of a military Faced
counternarcotics battalion; achieved record cocaine seizures and
continued to arrest drug kingpins; and pursued efforts to
implement legislative reforms in extradition, money laundering,
and asset forfeiture. Despite these activities, the Colombian
government faces obstacles in attempting to reduce drug-
trafficking operations. These obstacles include

budgetary constraints, corruption, a military with limited
capability, and a weak judicial system.

Peace Negotiations After his 1998 election, in an effort to end
over 40 years of violence, Colombian President Pastrana initiated
peace negotiations with the FARC

and the ELN on November 7, 1998. To bring the insurgents into the
peace negotiations, the Colombian president established a
demilitarized zone for the FARC, covering about 42, 000 square
kilometers. The initial proposal placed the zone off limits to CNP
and Colombian military actions for a 90day

period, which was supposed to end on February 7, 1999. However, in
January 1999, the FARC broke off negotiations until April 1999
because paramilitary groups allegedly killed 130 inhabitants in a
village while negotiations were occurring. According to the State
Department, the

FARC demanded that the Colombian government take more aggressive
action against these paramilitary groups before further peace
talks can occur. In February 1999, the ELN also broke off
negotiations until a demilitarized zone in its primary area of
control was established. This zone would include the two new coca-
growing areas in northern Colombia. State Department officials
stated that the government of Colombia has not taken any action on
the ELN's request. Peace negotiations with the FARC resumed in
April 1999 and have resulted in an agreed- upon, 12- point agenda.
Moreover, the Colombian president extended the time frame for the
demilitarized zone.

According to the State Department, the United States supports a
process to achieve peace and break the linkage between the
insurgents and drug traffickers. This, according to the State
Department, should enable the CNP and the military to carry out
their counternarcotics programs more effectively in the long term.
However, U. S. officials have expressed

concerns about the peace process and its potential impact on
counternarcotics operations. According to U. S. officials, the
government of Colombia lacks a clearly defined negotiating
strategy. In addition, U. S. officials are concerned that U. S.
and Colombian counternarcotics efforts could be limited by an
indefinite extension of the 90- day cease- fire zone or by
expanding the area of the demilitarized zone to include other
drugtrafficking areas under insurgent control. State Department
and DOD officials informed us that to fulfill promises the
Colombian government made to the FARC, the governments of Colombia
and the United States

have agreed not to allow certain types of overflights, such as
surveying coca- growing areas, through the demilitarized zone.

Counternarcotics Strategy In September 1998, the State Department
reported that an important factor in U. S. and Colombian
counternarcotics cooperation would be the

development of an integrated national counternarcotics strategy.
The Colombian government issued an initial strategy, entitled An
Integrated Policy on Drugs for Peace, in October 1998. The
strategy addresses the implementation of alternative crop
development, eradication and interdiction efforts needed to reduce
illegal drug production, legislation and institutional reforms to
combat drug- trafficking organizations, demand- reduction programs
to control Colombian consumption of illicit drugs, environment
actions, and efforts to strengthen international cooperation in
dealing with illegal drug- trafficking activities.

According to the State Department, the strategy provides a good
framework because it closely parallels elements of the U. S.
counternarcotics strategy, lays out a solid foundation for
cooperation between various donors and the Colombian government,
clearly describes Colombia's legal framework for attacking illegal
drug- trafficking activities, and recognizes the social and
economic costs of the drug trade in Colombia. While the State
Department acknowledged that the strategy contained many positive
elements, it also contained a number of weaknesses. For example,

 the strategy's emphasis on alternative crop development programs
in the coca- growing areas of Colombia is based on the assumption
that independent peasant farmers grow the majority of coca in
small plots, rather than large- scale drug traffickers using hired
labor;  the strategy does not establish specific time lines or
measures of

effectiveness to evaluate the progress made in implementing
alternative development programs and reducing the supply of
illegal drugs;  the strategy does not precisely define the
military's role in reducing

drug- trafficking activities;  the strategy does not clearly
identify how the supply reduction activities will be funded or
what the funding requirements are for these activities; and  the
strategy does not develop a concept of coordination between law

enforcement and alternative development efforts. Moreover, DEA
officials stated that the strategy did not address the extradition
of Colombian nationals; improvements to prison security;
mechanisms for protecting judges, prosecutors, and witnesses; and
improvements to legislation covering asset forfeiture and money
laundering. According to the State Department, the Colombian

government is aware of these concerns and is in the process of
addressing them.

Colombian Military's The U. S. and Colombian counternarcotics
strategies recognize that the Counternarcotics Initiatives

Colombian military needs to become more involved in
counternarcotics operations, particularly in areas not under
government control, if the flow of illegal drugs from Colombia is
to be reduced. In response to military defeats in southern
Colombia, the Colombian government created a Joint Task Force in
March 1998 consisting of military and CNP units in the
southwestern area of Colombia to retake control of the territory
from the drug traffickers and insurgents. According to U. S.
officials, the task force has supported CNP counternarcotics
operations such as seizing cocaine laboratories.

Moreover, according to DOD, the Colombian government is in the
process of establishing a counternarcotics battalion with an
estimated strength of about 950 personnel. The battalion will be
dedicated to conducting its own

counternarcotics operations and supporting CNP operations.
Currently, one company of the battalion is operational and has
been fully screened by the State Department to ensure that there
is no credible evidence of human rights abuses. According to the
State Department, the battalion should be fully operational by
January 2000. The U. S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) estimates that
the battalion would require in excess of $70 million worth of
equipment and training to become fully operational. Of this
amount, approximately $60 million would be to provide helicopters.
DOD recently designated $3. 5 million to provide counternarcotics

equipment to the battalion, but it indicated that no decision had
been made on the total level of U. S. support that will be
provided.

Seizures and Arrests The Colombian government has continued to
make progress in seizing drugs and arresting key leaders of drug-
trafficking organizations. In March 1999, the State Department
reported that Colombia had seized a record amount of coca products
in 1998-- almost 57 metric tons and had also destroyed 185 cocaine
laboratories. Before that, the U. S. embassy

reported, in August 1998, that the CNP had captured the heads of a
number of key Colombian drug- trafficking organizations, including
major figures of a key cocaine- processing organization. The State
Department also

reported in March 1999 that the CNP special investigative units,
which conduct long- term investigations of drug- trafficking
organizations, were credited with 63 arrests.

Legislative Initiatives Over the past several years, the Colombian
government has enacted several major pieces of legislation
designed to reduce drug- trafficking activities. These include
extradition, anti- money laundering, and asset forfeiture
legislation. While Colombia's legislative actions represent
positive steps, their implementation has been slow. Extradition
Legislation In December 1997, the Colombian congress passed a bill
to repeal the 1991

constitutional ban on the extradition of Colombian nationals but
did not make it retroactive, thus blocking extradition for
offenses committed before December 17, 1997. The United States
wanted the law to be retroactive because it hoped to extradite to
the United States drug kingpins from the Medellin and Cali cartels
that were in prison on drug- related charges when the bill was
passed. In response to this concern, the prior Colombian president
filed a suit to remove this clause from the bill, but the
Colombian constitutional court voted to uphold the
nonretroactivity clause.

The United States made its first extradition request for a
Colombian national in December 1998; however, to date the
individual still has not been surrendered to the United States
because he is awaiting a court hearing. Furthermore, the United
States has requested the provisional arrest for extradition of
four more Colombian national drug traffickers. According to the
State Department, three of these individuals have been arrested
and are awaiting a judicial decision by Colombia's Supreme Court,
but the fourth remains at large.

Anti- money laundering Money laundering has been a criminal
offense in Colombia since 1995. In

Legislation February 1997, the Colombian government enacted
legislation that

increased penalties for money laundering connected with drug
trafficking. The statute includes penalties of up to $50,000 for
individuals and $2 million for institutions, and possible jail
sentences of 6 to 15 years. As a result of this legislation, the
Colombian banking system strengthened know your customer rules to
monitor large or suspicious transactions. Banks are now required
to maintain records and to regularly report currency transactions
exceeding $7,000 as well as any suspicious

transactions. For example, if multiple deposit transactions are
made below the reporting requirement over a short period of time,
they should be reported as suspicious. According to the State
Department, more than 20 Colombian banks were under investigation
for money- laundering activities in 1998; however, there

has been only one money- laundering arrest and no convictions. The
State Department also noted that the Colombian bank inspectors are
evaluating compliance with the reporting requirements. The United
States is providing courses on investigating and prosecuting
money- laundering

crimes to the various Colombian officials responsible for
implementing the anti- money laundering legislation and
regulations.

Asset Forfeiture Legislation In 1996, Colombia passed an asset
forfeiture law designed to seize assets from individuals involved
in illegal activities, including drug trafficking. In March 1999,
the State Department reported that multimillion- dollar seizures
had occurred against current and former major drug traffickers and
their relatives from the Medellin and Cali cartels. Furthermore,
over 40 forfeiture cases were pending against high- ranking drug
traffickers.

However, there has been only one case in which seized assets were
actually forfeited. According to the State Department, this dismal
performance can be attributed to several factors, including the
lack of political will on the part of the prior Samper
administration; the corrupting influence of the drug

kingpins trying to protect their assets; and Colombian government
efforts to define and refine the administrative, bureaucratic, and
legal procedures for the final forfeiture and disposition of
assets. At least five major and

several lesser government entities are involved in the process,
and coordination among them is inadequate. According to the State
Department, the current president has acknowledged the need to
reform the process.

Obstacles Facing the The Colombian government faces a number of
obstacles in reducing drugtrafficking

Colombian Government activities, including handling budgetary
constraints, overcoming

corruption, addressing military weaknesses, and strengthening its
judicial system. Budgetary Constraints Severe budgetary
constraints could limit the Colombian government's ability to
support counternarcotics initiatives. In March 1999, the State
Department reported that the Colombian government was unable to
increase its counternarcotics commitment because its national
budget was

facing its worst crisis in decades, with annual deficits
ballooning to 5 percent of gross domestic product. The report
concluded that the Colombian government will have a difficult time
funding counternarcotics

operations and controlling the areas where illicit crops grow in
1999.

Corruption Widespread corruption within all sectors of the
Colombian government is a major factor affecting counternarcotics
operations. In 1998, DEA reported that drug- related corruption
existed in all branches of the government, within the prison
system, and in the military. In March 1999, the State Department
reported that drug- related corruption in all branches of the
government continued to undermine Colombia's counternarcotics
effectiveness. The report noted, for example, that in November
1998, U. S. Customs and DEA personnel searched a Colombian Air
Force aircraft in Florida and found 415 kilograms of cocaine and 6
kilograms of heroin.

Several Air Force officers and enlisted personnel were arrested in
connection with the incident. Also, in March 1999, the State
Department reported that President Pastrana had made eliminating
corruption a major initiative of his government.

Military Capability The Colombian military is hard pressed to
provide security for key facilities throughout the country and
simultaneously engage insurgents, drug traffickers, and
paramilitary groups in rural areas. According to DOD, the
Colombian military lacks a long- term strategy and effective
leadership;

suffers from poor morale; and has inadequate equipment, logistics,
and training. In the past year, the Colombian military has
suffered major defeats from the insurgents, and insurgent groups
are moving into more of

the territory where drug- trafficking activities are primarily
occurring. Additionally, in October 1998, DOD officials at the U.
S. embassy reported that a Colombian Army unit responsible for
performing counternarcotics missions in southern Colombia did not
control land communication and had conceded the use of the road
network to the insurgents and drug traffickers. According to the
Director of the U. S. Office of National Drug

Control Policy, the recent offensives by the insurgents and the
resulting military defeats suggest that Colombian security forces
will be unable to conduct effective antidrug operations in regions
where guerrilla forces dominate and control the area.

Weak Judicial System According to the State Department, Colombia's
weak judicial system continues to adversely affect its
counternarcotics efforts. U. S. embassy personnel stated that less
than 3 percent of all cases, including drug- related ones, are
prosecuted in Colombia. These officials attributed Colombia's
dismal prosecution rate to various inefficiencies in the
investigative

process and court backlogs. As a result, any crime, including drug
trafficking, has a significant chance of going unpunished.

Challenges Facing U. S. A major goal of the U. S. counternarcotics
strategy for Colombia is to Counternarcotics reduce the
availability of drugs. To do this, the United States concentrates
its efforts on supporting eradication and interdiction activities
of the CNP

Efforts and the military. The United States faces several
challenges in trying to achieve its objectives, including
eradicating enough coca and opium poppy

to reduce Colombia's net cultivation, providing adequate resources
for detection and monitoring support, assuring that
counternarcotics aid is not provided to Colombian military and CNP
units where there is credible evidence that human rights abuses
have not been addressed, and

determining when it is appropriate to share information with the
Colombian military on insurgent activities for planning
counternarcotics operations. Eradication Efforts U. S. and
Colombian efforts to eradicate enough coca and opium poppy to
reduce the net cultivation of these crops have not succeeded to
date.

Figure 3 shows that, despite significant increases in spraying,
only about 30 percent, or 35,400 hectares, of coca crop were
eradicated out of 123,400 sprayed between 1996 and 1998.

Figure 3: Trends in Colombian Coca Cultivation and the
Effectiveness of Aerial Eradication Efforts, 1996- 98 Hectares

120,000 101,800 100,000

79, 500 80,000

67, 200 65, 930

60,000 41, 451 40,000

16, 053 19, 265

20,000 13, 650

2,500 0

1996 1997 1998 Net Cult iv at io n Reporte d S pr ay A c tiv ity
Coc a K ille d Source: U. S. government data.

Figure 4 shows that opium poppy cultivation in Colombia has
remained relatively stable.

Figure 4: Colombian Opium Poppy Cultivation and Eradication, 1996-
98 Hectares

14,000 13,572

12,328 12,000

10,000 8,996

8,000 6,972

6,600 6,300 6,028

6,100 6,000

4,000 2,896

2,000 0

1996 1997 1998 Total Cultiv ation A v ailable f or Harv es t
Eradic ated Source: U. S. government data.

Beginning in October 1996, the State Department decided to
significantly increase the U. S. level of support and
participation in aerial eradication operations against coca and
opium poppy. According to the State Department, the estimated
costs of supporting aerial spraying operations for fiscal year
1999 could be as high as $68 million, an increase of about 350

percent over the $19. 6 million actually spent in 1996. A
significant portion of U. S. assistance to this effort is carried
out by a U. S. contractor. Between 80 and 90 contractor personnel
are stationed in Colombia on either a

temporary or permanent basis. As a result of this effort, State
Department data shows that 107,381 hectares of coca were sprayed
during 1997- 98, exceeding its goal of 50,000 hectares for this
period. Since 1996, nearly all spray activities have been
conducted in two of the

three primary coca- growing areas in Colombia. U. S. embassy
officials stated that they would like to expand eradication
operations during 1999 into the third primary coca- growing area,
where U. S. estimates indicate that coca cultivation increased
from 19,000 hectares in 1997 to 30,100

hectares in 1998. However, the Colombian government has not
granted approval to begin spraying operations in this area.
According to U. S. embassy officials, the Colombian government is
hesitant to start a massive aerial eradication program without
having alternative crop development projects in the area due to
the potential economic impact that the loss of the coca crop would
have on the farmers. These officials stated that eradication
efforts could increase popular support for the FARC, which

already controls most of the territory. According to the State
Department, the United States will not support alternative
development programs in areas until they are under government
control. The U. S. embassy began a concentrated effort to spray
opium poppy in November 1998. The effort is designed to sustain
spraying operations over time so that growers will find it
uneconomical to continue cultivating opium poppy.

Reductions in Support for A second challenge facing the United
States is providing sufficient

Detection and Monitoring detection and monitoring resources to
support Colombian and U. S. counternarcotics operations in
southern Colombia. The U. S.

counternarcotics plan for Colombia includes efforts to increase
detection and monitoring support from SOUTHCOM and the U. S.
Customs Service. The support generally consists of providing
aircraft and radar.

SOUTHCOM data, however, shows that DOD and U. S. Customs have not
supplied the resources required to meet SOUTHCOM's detection and
monitoring plans for the source zone countries, including
Colombia, primarily because of competing demands to support higher
priority missions, such as support to Bosnia and Kosovo. According
to SOUTHCOM, the total hours devoted to drug detection and
monitoring declined by about 16 percent between 1997 and 1998.
Also, in 1998, U. S. Customs, for security reasons, withdrew two
aircraft that had been

stationed in Colombia over the past several years to track
suspected drugtrafficking aircraft. U. S. embassy officials stated
that, as a result of these shortfalls and reductions, it is now
more difficult to follow suspect drugtrafficking aircraft after
they are detected.

Moreover, SOUTHCOM officials stated that their ability to continue
providing existing levels of detection and monitoring support
could be further eroded with the closure of Howard Air Force Base
in Panama City, Panama, on May 1, 1999. To compensate for this,
the Secretary of Defense, on April 16, 1999, approved a plan to
open forward operating locations on

two Caribbean islands (Curacao and Aruba) and in Manta, Ecuador.
According to DOD, the forward operating location at Curacao and
Aruba is operational, and Manta is expected to become operational
by mid- June 1999. Balancing Human Rights

A third challenge facing U. S. counternarcotics efforts in
Colombia is the Concerns Against the

balancing of human rights concerns about abuses within the
Colombian Provision of

military against the provision of counternarcotics aid to the
Colombian Counternarcotics Aid to the

military. Over the years, human rights organizations and the State
Colombian Military Department have documented human rights abuses
by the Colombian

military, particularly by the Colombian Army. Human rights abuses
have included disappearances, arbitrary detentions, kidnappings,
and torture of civilians. According to U. S. legislation,
Colombia's security forces cannot receive U. S. counternarcotics
assistance if there is credible evidence that a Colombian unit has
committed gross violations of human rights unless the Secretary of
State determines that effective measures are being taken to bring
the responsible individual or individuals to justice. 5 The State
Department has established screening procedures to determine which
Colombian units meet the requirements of this policy before
providing U. S. counternarcotics assistance.

According to the State Department, all counternarcotics units of
the CNP and the Colombian Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps have
passed the screening process. However, only three of six army
brigades operating in the major drug trafficking areas have
passed. Of the three units, two are

actively involved in counternarcotics operations, and the other is
minimally involved. U. S. embassy personnel stated that unless
other army units pass the screening process, it will be difficult
to provide the level of Colombian military support that the CNP
needs to effectively reduce drug- trafficking activities.

Information Sharing With A fourth challenge facing U. S.
decisionmakers is the problem of when

the Colombian Military information regarding insurgents can be
shared with the Colombian

5 See the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act 1999 (Sec. 568 of sec. 101 (d),
Division A of P. L. 105- 277). The Congress also included similar
language in the Department of Defense Fiscal Year 1999
Appropriations Act ( Sec. 8130 of P. L. 105- 262).

military. U. S. guidance, initially issued in June 1998,
restricted the sharing of any information on insurgent
capabilities and activities unless it is directly related to an
approved counternarcotics operation. However,

within the area where most drug- trafficking activities occur, U.
S. embassy officials stated that the drug traffickers and the
insurgents have become virtually indistinguishable. As a result,
U. S. officials are faced with making a difficult decision
regarding when and if information on insurgent activities should
be provided to the Colombian military. The following two examples
demonstrate the dilemma that U. S. officials

face in deciding whether to share information.  In August 1998,
Colombian insurgents destroyed a joint military and CNP base that
was also used by U. S. contractor personnel for coca eradication
operations. The U. S. embassy did not know if it could share

information about the insurgents with either the CNP or the
Colombian military because the information was not directly
related to counternarcotics operations. The U. S. embassy
requested approval from U. S. agencies in Washington, D. C., but
by the time it had received approval, the information, according
to U. S. embassy officials, was

useless.  U. S. embassy officials have decided to routinely
provide intelligence

information related to the insurgents to Colombian units under
control of the Joint Task Force. According to these officials, the
information is being used to plan counternarcotics operations in
an area controlled by insurgents; however, they do not have a
system to ensure that it is not being used for other than
counternarcotics purposes. U. S. officials informed us that new
guidelines on information sharing were issued in March 1999.
According to these officials, these guidelines recognize the
increasing involvement of the insurgents in drug trafficking
activities and their demonstrated abilities to attack
counternarcotics operations, personnel, and infrastructure, and
establish a better means to facilitate the exchange of information
with the Colombian military on insurgent activities within the
drug- trafficking areas.

Conclusions The counternarcotics efforts of Colombia and the
United States have resulted in record seizures of illegal drugs
and the disruption of drug trafficking organizations. However,
there has been no reduction in the flow of cocaine or heroin from
Colombia. It appears that the cocaine threat from Colombia has
worsened since 1996 and could deteriorate even further

within the next 2 years. Not only are coca cultivation and
potential cocaine production likely to increase, but also Colombia
is now the primary provider of heroin to the eastern United
States. Moreover, insurgent and paramilitary organizations have
increased their involvement in drugtrafficking activities, which
has made it more difficult for the government of Colombia to
conduct counternarcotics operations in the areas under insurgent
and paramilitary control. Until the government of Colombia can

gain control over territory where drug- trafficking activities are
occurring, counterdrug operations will be difficult and dangerous,
and pose a formidable challenge to the United States and Colombia
in their attempts to reduce the flow of drugs from Colombia into
the United States.

Agency Comments DOD and State provided written comments on a draft
of this report. Additionally, we discussed the draft report with
DEA and the Office of National Drug Control Policy. DOD stated it
had no objection to the report. State stated that it considers the
report to be a good and balanced summary of the challenges facing
the United States' counternarcotics program in Colombia. The other
agencies agreed that the report accurately portrayed the narcotics
threat from Colombia, and U. S. and Colombian efforts to address
the threat. Each agency also provided technical comments which we
incorporated as appropriate.

Scope and To address the nature of the drug threat from Colombia,
we received Methodology briefings and analyzed documents from U.
S. law enforcement, intelligence,

and military officials and reviewed documentation such as cable
traffic, drug eradication and interdiction reports, and studies in
Washington, D. C.; at SOUTHCOM in Miami, Florida; and at the U. S.
embassy in Bogota, Colombia. To address Colombian and U. S.
counternarcotics efforts and the challenges faced by both
governments, we visited various agencies involved in antidrug
activities in Washington, D. C.; Miami, Florida; and

Bogota, Colombia. In Washington, D. C., we interviewed officials
and reviewed planning, implementation, and related documents and
reports concerning drug activities in Colombia at the Office of
National Drug Control Policy; the Departments of State, Defense,
the Treasury, and Justice; and other federal agencies. In Miami,
we interviewed U. S. officials at SOUTHCOM and reviewed documents
related to counternarcotics activities in Colombia. In Colombia,
we interviewed U. S. embassy officials, including the Ambassador,
and analyzed reports and documents of various agencies responsible
for implementing U. S. counternarcotics objectives in

Colombia. We also interviewed officials from the CNP and the U. N.
Drug Control Program. Officials from the Colombian Ministry of
Defense were not able to arrange a time to meet with us. The
information on Colombia's laws in this report does not reflect our
independent legal analysis but is based on interviews and
secondary sources.

We conducted our review between September 1998 and May 1999 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to other congressional
committees; the Honorable Madeleine K. Albright, the Secretary of
State; the Honorable William S. Cohen, the Secretary of Defense;
the Honorable Lawrence Summers, the Acting Secretary of the
Treasury; the Honorable Janet F. Reno, the U. S. Attorney General;
the Honorable Barry R. McCaffrey, the Director, U. S. Office of
National Drug Control Policy; the Honorable Thomas A. Constantine,
the Administrator, DEA; and the Honorable Louis Freeh, the
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Copies will also be

made available to other interested parties upon request. If you or
your staff have any questions concerning this report, please call
me at (202) 512- 4268. The major contributors to this report were
Ronald A. Kushner, Allen Fleener, Ronald Hughes, Anthony Padilla,
and Rona Mendelsohn.

Jess T. Ford, Associate Director, International Relations and
Trade Issues

Letter 1 Appendix I

26 Comments From the Department of State

Appendix II 27

Comments From the Department of Defense

Related GAO Products 31 Figures Figure 1: Trends in Andean Region
Coca Cultivation, 1996- 98 6

Figure 2: Areas of Colombian Insurgent, Paramilitary, and Drug-
trafficking Activities 8 Figure 3: Trends in Colombian Coca
Cultivation and the

Effectiveness of Aerial Eradication Efforts, 1996- 98 17 Figure 4:
Colombian Opium Poppy Cultivation and Eradication,

1996- 98 18

Abbreviations

CNP Colombian National Police DEA Drug Enforcement Administration
DOD Department of Defense ELN National Liberation Army FARC
Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces SOUTHCOM U. S. Southern
Command

Appendi I x Comments From the Department of State

Appendi I I x Comments From the Department of Defense

Related GAO Products Drug Control: Status of U. S. International
Counternarcotics Activities (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-116, Mar. 12, 1998).
Drug Control: Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Face Continuing
Challenges (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-60, Feb. 26, 1998). Drug Control: U. S.
Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Face Continuing Challenges
(GAO/NSIAD-98-60, Feb. 12, 1998). Drug Control: Delays in
Obtaining State Department Records Relating to Colombia (GAO/T-
NSIAD-97-202, July 9, 1997). Drug Control: Observations on
Elements of the Federal Drug Control Strategy (GAO/GGD-97-42, Mar.
14, 1977). Drug Control: Long- standing Problems Hinder U. S.
International Efforts (GAO/NSIAD-97-75, Feb. 27, 1997). Review of
Assistance to Colombia (GAO/NSIAD-96-62R, Dec. 12, 1995). Drug
War: Observations on U. S. International Drug Control Efforts
(GAO/T-NSIAD-95-194, Aug. 1, 1995).

The Drug War: Colombia Is Implementing Antidrug Efforts, but
Impact Is Uncertain (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-53, Oct. 5, 1993). The Drug
War: Colombia Is Undertaking Antidrug Programs, but Impact Is
Uncertain (GAO/NSIAD-93-158, Aug. 10, 1993). Drug Control:
Increased Interdiction and Its Contribution to the War on Drugs
(GAO/T-NSIAD-93-04, Feb. 25, 1993). The Drug War: Extent of
Problems in Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela (GAO/NSIAD-92-226, June
5, 1992). The Drug War: Counternarcotics Programs in Colombia and
Peru (GAO/T-NSIAD-92-9, Feb. 20, 1992).

The Drug War: Observations on Counternarcotics Programs in
Colombia and Peru (GAO/T-NSIAD-92-2, Oct. 23, 1991).

Drug War: Observations on Counternarcotics Aid to Colombia
(GAO/NSIAD-91-296, Sept. 30, 1991).

Drug Control: U. S.- Supported Efforts in Colombia and Bolivia
(GAO/NSIAD-89-24, Nov. 1, 1988).

Drug Control: U. S. International Narcotics Control Activities
(GAO/NSIAD-88-114, Mar. 1, 1988).

Status Report on GAO Review of the U. S. International Narcotics
Control Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-87-40, July 29, 1987). Drug Control:
International Narcotics Control Activities of the United States
(GAO/NSIAD-87-72BR, Jan. 30, 1987).

GAO United States General Accounting Office

GAO/NSIAD-99-136

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Appendix I

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