Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism
Operations (Letter Report, 05/13/1999, GAO/NSIAD-99-135).

During the past three years, federal agencies have conducted several
successful interagency operations overseas, including some in which
suspected terrorists have been returned to the United States to stand
trial. Some agencies have also deployed personnel and equipment to
prepare for special events, such as the Atlanta Olympic Games. However,
federal agencies have not completed interagency guidance or resolved
command and control issues. To improve their response to terrorist
attacks, federal agencies have conducted more than 200 exercises, half
of which included three or more federal agencies. About one-third
included state and local participants. However, the agencies have not
fully achieved the interagency counterterrorist exercise program
directed in a June 1995 Presidential directive. As a result, some
complex transfers of command and control between agencies have not
occurred. International field exercises, generally led by the Defense
Department (DOD), included the full range of interagency players in
demanding scenarios, some taking place with no notice. In contrast,
domestic counterterrorism exercises are less demanding. The FBI's crisis
management field exercises have provided good practice for its tactical
response units, but generally have not exercised the Bureau's
interagency leadership role and rapid deployments for no-warning
terrorist attacks. The Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA)
consequence management exercises have been limited to tabletop exercises
that do not fully test the government's ability to provide a rapid
interagency response in a realistic setting. DOD, the Department of
Energy, and FEMA have requirements and processes in place to capture
lessons learned from counterterrorist operations and exercises. These
agencies, however, did not capture lessons learned from all the
exercises they led or all the field exercises they participated in.
Other federal agencies have less rigorous requirements and processes for
capturing lessons learned. Establishing a process to record the lessons
learned from counterterrorism operations and exercises would be
beneficial and could improve future efforts.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-99-135
     TITLE:  Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve
	     Counterterrorism Operations
      DATE:  05/13/1999
   SUBJECT:  Emergency preparedness
	     Interagency relations
	     Terrorism
	     Crime prevention
	     National defense operations
IDENTIFIER:  Oklahoma City (OK)
	     Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program
	     JCS Unified Command Plan
	     FEMA Federal Response Plan

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    United States General Accounting Office GAO                 Report
    to Congressional Requesters May 1999            COMBATING
    TERRORISM Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism
    Operations GAO/NSIAD-99-135 United States General Accounting
    Office GAO                 Washington, D.C. 20548
    Letter National Security and International Affairs Division
    Letter B-282474
    Letter May 13, 1999 The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking Minority
    Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives The
    Honorable Christopher Shays Chairman, Subcommittee on National
    Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations Committee
    on Government Reform House of Representatives Terrorist attacks
    against U.S. personnel and interests domestically and abroad
    highlight the need for effective U.S. efforts to combat terrorism.
    As requested, we prepared this unclassified summary of our
    February 1999 classified report to you on interagency
    counterterrorist operations. Specifically, we examined how
    agencies worked together in counterterrorist operations and
    special events; strengths and weaknesses of international and
    domestic counterterrorist exercises; and agency and interagency
    processes to capture and share lessons learned. Results in Brief
    In the last 3 years, federal agencies have conducted several
    successful interagency operations overseas, including some in
    which suspected terrorists have been returned to the United States
    to stand trial. In addition, federal agencies have deployed
    personnel and equipment to prepare for many special events such as
    the Atlanta Olympic Games. However, federal agencies have not
    completed interagency guidance and resolved command and control
    issues. Proposed interagency Domestic Guidelines have not been
    completed, nor coordinated with all federal agencies with domestic
    counterterrorism roles. For example, the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation (FBI) has not coordinated the proposed Domestic
    Guidelines with the Department of the Treasury even though it
    could have a significant role in an actual terrorist incident.
    Furthermore, approval of proposed interagency International
    Guidelines has been delayed because the Department of State, the
    Department of Justice, and the FBI have not reached agreement on
    the level of State participation in highly sensitive missions to
    arrest suspected terrorists overseas. In addition, some
    interagency and intergovernmental command and control issues
    regarding domestic counterterrorist operations have not been fully
    resolved. Page 1                                      GAO/NSIAD-
    99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 To improve their preparedness
    to respond to terrorist incidents, federal agencies have conducted
    over 200 exercises, of which about half included three or more
    federal agencies and about one third included state and local
    participants. However, agencies have not fully achieved the
    interagency counterterrorist exercise program directed in a June
    1995 Presidential Directive because an interagency Exercise
    Subgroup has not prepared and submitted, and senior agency
    officials have not approved, an interagency program. As a result,
    some complex transfers of command and control between agencies
    have not been exercised. International counterterrorism exercises,
    sponsored for many years by the Department of Defense (DOD), are
    relatively comprehensive in that they include many federal
    agencies and test tactical units along with State Department's
    leadership role and DOD's command and control. In contrast,
    domestic exercises sponsored by the FBI and the Federal Emergency
    Management Agency (FEMA)--the lead federal agencies for domestic
    operations-are not as comprehensive. The FBI exercise program
    focuses on its regional and field offices' tactical capabilities
    to respond and generally has not included the Bureau's full
    interagency leadership role that is expected to be critical during
    a domestic terrorist incident. Recently, the FBI has made
    significant progress and taken steps to enhance its program in
    this regard. The FEMA counterterrorism exercise program consists
    of tabletop exercises and does not include field exercises that
    would deploy personnel and equipment, and practice roles and
    responsibilities in realistic settings. DOD, the Department of
    Energy (DOE), and FEMA have requirements and processes in place to
    capture lessons learned from counterterrorist operations and
    exercises. These agencies, however, did not capture lessons
    learned for all the exercises they led or all the field exercises
    they participated in. Other federal agencies had less rigorous
    requirements and processes for capturing lessons learned. There is
    also no requirement or process to capture lessons learned at the
    interagency level. Establishing a process to record and share the
    lessons learned of counterterrorism operations and exercises would
    be beneficial and could improve future operations. In our
    classified report, we made several recommendations to enhance
    interagency guidance, command and control, exercises, and
    processes to capture and share lessons learned. Page 2
    GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 Background
    The U.S. policy and strategy on combating terrorism have been
    evolving since the 1970s and are articulated in Presidential
    Directives and implementing guidance. These guidance documents
    divide activities to combat terrorism into three elements:
    preventing and deterring terrorism; responding to a terrorist
    crisis, and managing the consequences after a terrorist attack.
    One of the highest priorities in the federal government is to
    prevent and prepare for terrorist attacks that use weapons of mass
    destruction (WMD).1 Crisis management includes efforts to stop a
    terrorist attack, arrest terrorists, and gather evidence for
    criminal prosecution. Consequence management includes efforts to
    provide medical treatment and emergency services, evacuate people
    from dangerous areas, and restore government services. When
    terrorist attacks occur without adequate threat warning, crisis
    response and consequence management will be concurrent activities.
    U.S. Policy, Lead Agencies,     U.S. policy to combat terrorism
    was formalized in 1986 with the issuance of and Guidance
    National Security Decision Directive 207, which primarily focused
    on terrorist incidents overseas. After the bombing of a federal
    building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, the President issued
    Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 in June 1995, which
    enumerated responsibilities for federal agencies in combating
    terrorism, including domestic incidents. In May 1998, the
    President issued PDD 62 that reaffirmed PDD 39 and further
    articulated responsibilities for specific agencies. PDD 62 also
    established a National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure
    Protection, and Counterterrorism, within the National Security
    Council, to coordinate agencies' programs. These directives, and
    the guidelines and contingency plans that implement them, call for
    robust, tailored and rapidly deployable interagency teams to
    conduct well-coordinated and highly integrated operations. PDDs 39
    and 62 assigned or reaffirmed lead and supporting roles to various
    federal agencies and established interagency support teams. The
    State Department is the lead agency for international terrorist
    incidents. An interagency Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST)
    was established to provide advice and support to U.S. ambassadors,
    Washington decision- makers, and host governments. Similarly, the
    FBI is the lead federal agency 1For the purpose of this report,
    WMD are defined as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons or
    agents. Within the federal government, there is disagreement as to
    the precise definition, especially whether large conventional
    explosives should be included. Page 3
    GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 for domestic crisis
    response. An interagency Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST)
    was established to provide advice and support to FBI on- scene
    commanders. Both the FEST and DEST consist of rapidly deployable
    interagency teams tailored to the specific terrorist incident. For
    example, experts from DOD, DOE, the Department of Health and Human
    Services (HHS) or the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) might
    be part of the teams if the incident involved WMD. The State
    Department and the FBI determine the composition of the FEST and
    DEST, respectively. The PDDs also affirmed FEMA as the lead agency
    for coordinating consequence management in domestic incidents.
    Other agencies have important support roles in combating
    terrorism. For example, DOD could provide significant support to
    other agencies, both for international incidents and for domestic
    incidents involving WMD. DOE provides support and technical
    expertise related to nuclear devices and radiological events. EPA
    provides expertise and support in incidents involving certain
    hazardous chemicals. The U.S. Secret Service designs and
    implements operational security at designated special events to
    provide protection against terrorist attacks.2 Lead federal
    agencies drafted interagency guidance to provide operational
    details for implementing PDD 39. The State Department, as the lead
    federal agency for international incidents, drafted "Coordinating
    Subgroup Guidelines for the Mobilization, Deployment, and
    Employment of U.S. Government Elements in Response to an Overseas
    Terrorist Incident" (also known as the International Guidelines).
    The International Guidelines outline procedures for deploying the
    FEST and otherwise coordinating federal operations overseas. The
    FBI, as lead federal agency for domestic crisis response, drafted
    "Guidelines for the Mobilization, Deployment, and Employment of
    U.S. Government Agencies in Response to a Domestic Terrorist
    Threat or Incidence in Accordance With Presidential Decision
    Directive 39" (also known as the Domestic Guidelines) and the
    "United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept
    of Operations Plan" (also known as the CONPLAN). The Domestic
    Guidelines describe specific procedures and responsibilities of
    deploying the DEST, particularly in WMD incidents, while the
    CONPLAN provides overall guidance to federal, state, and local
    officials on how the federal government is structured to respond
    to a terrorist threat or incident in the United States. FEMA, the
    lead federal agency for domestic consequence management,
    coordinated and completed an interagency annex to the Federal
    Response 2For more detailed information on interagency
    coordination mechanisms and the roles and responsibilities of lead
    and supporting federal agencies, see our report entitled Combating
    Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy
    and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997). Page 4
    GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 Plan that discusses
    how the federal government would assist state and local
    authorities in managing the consequences of a terrorist attack in
    the United States. Support agencies developed their own guidance
    to be used to support an interagency terrorism response. For
    example, DOD developed a detailed contingency plan to guide its
    actions in deploying and responding to a terrorist incident and
    HHS developed a plan to deal with the health and medical
    consequences of terrorist attacks. Issues Identified Through
    In 1996, a congressional committee held hearings to provide
    oversight of Congressional Oversight       counterterrorism
    programs, highlighting interagency operational and and Legislation
    coordination challenges and issues. In 1996, the Nunn-Lugar
    hearings focused on the preparedness of the federal government to
    conduct counterterrorist operations at the agency, interagency,
    and intergovernmental levels (i.e., with state and local
    governments).3 Some of the issues highlighted in the hearings were
    as follows: * Domestic interagency counterterrorism exercises
    should be more comprehensive and held more often and should go
    beyond tabletop exercises to field exercises where personnel and
    equipment rapidly deploy to a location and practice their
    activities. * The FBI and FEMA needed to exercise their operations
    together when crisis response and consequence management was
    concurrent. * Domestic interagency counterterrorism exercises
    should include the full array of federal, state, and local
    agencies. * Individual agencies should capture lessons learned
    from counterterrorism exercises, disseminate such lessons both
    internally and externally, and track corrective actions. * There
    should be an interagency process to capture lessons learned and
    track corrective actions. Following the Nunn-Lugar hearings,
    Congress passed the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction
    Act of 1996 (commonly known as the Nunn- Lugar-Domenici Act).4 The
    act designated DOD as the lead agency to enhance domestic
    preparedness for WMD terrorism by providing federal, 3These
    hearings were sponsored by Senators Nunn and Lugar of the
    Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee
    on Governmental Affairs in March 1996. See Senate Hearing 104-422
    part III. 4See title XIV of the National Defense Authorization Act
    for Fiscal Year 1997 (P.L. 104-201, Sept. 23, 1996). Page 5
    GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 state, and local
    emergency response personnel with, among other things, training
    and advice. The legislation led to the creation of the Nunn-Lugar-
    Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program, which was intended to be
    an interagency and intergovernmental effort among key agencies
    with responsibilities for crisis and consequence management in the
    event of a terrorist incident. We reported separately on the
    implementation of this program.5 Agencies Operate
    We found that federal agencies worked together and generally
    coordinated Together But Need to              their
    counterterrorist activities. For example, federal agencies carried
    out several overseas operations and prepared for domestic special
    events. Resolve Key Issues                However, interagency
    guidance for coordinating federal operations-both overseas and
    domestically-has not been approved or fully coordinated. In
    addition, several command and control issues related to domestic
    operations have not been resolved. Agencies Successfully
    In the 3 years following PDD 39, federal agencies successfully
    participated Performed Operations and          in many
    counterterrorist activities. In actual operations and special
    events, Prepared for Special Events agencies generally coordinated
    their activities. For example, we examined several overseas
    counterterrorist operations and found that agencies generally
    followed the draft interagency International Guidelines. DOD, the
    FBI, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) performed their
    respective roles in military planning, law enforcement, and
    intelligence gathering under the oversight of the State Department
    (e.g., the ambassador). Minor interagency tensions or conflicts
    during these operations were resolved and did not appear to have
    posed risk to the missions. Examples of these overseas operations
    include several overseas arrests to bring suspected terrorists
    back to the United States for trial outside of normal extradition
    channels. Interagency teams consisting of the FBI, the State
    Department, DOD, and CIA conducted these missions. These arrests
    included those of Ayyad Najim in July 1995, Wahli Khan in December
    1995, Tsutomo Shirasaki in September 1996, Matwan Al-Safadi in
    November 1996, Mir Aimal Kansi in June 1997, and Mohamed Said
    Rasheed in June 1998.6 5See Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk
    Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments
    (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998) and Combating Terrorism:
    Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and
    Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998). 6Other successful
    overseas arrests just outside our scope (June 1995 to June 1998)
    included those of Ramzi Yousef in February 1995 and Mohamed Sadeck
    Odeh and Mohamed Rasheed Daoud Al Owhali in August 1998. Page 6
    GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 Key agencies have
    also prepared for and deployed personnel in advance to many
    special events. Special events are high visibility events in which
    federal agencies initiate contingency measures. For recent major
    special events, such as the 50th anniversary of the United Nations
    in 1995, the Atlanta Olympic Games in 1996, and the Presidential
    Inauguration in 1997, federal agencies prepared contingency plans
    for a possible terrorist attack and provided protection to the
    President and other dignitaries. For example, federal agencies
    sending advance or contingency teams to the Atlanta Olympics
    included Secret Service, the FBI, FEMA, DOD, DOE, HHS, EPA, CIA,
    the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the Bureau
    of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), the U.S. Customs Service,
    the Internal Revenue Service, and the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission (NRC). Federal agencies also exercised their personnel
    together in advance of these events against various
    counterterrorism scenarios. For example, before the Atlanta
    Olympics, federal agencies conducted eight exercises with
    scenarios specific to the games. Our review of these special
    events indicated that most agencies involved gained valuable
    experience in coordinating their activities. Agency officials
    cited special events as successful efforts to integrate personnel
    and assets across federal agencies. In preparing for such events,
    federal agencies also worked closely with state and local agencies
    and nongovernmental organizations. These operations and special
    events enhanced federal agencies' abilities to coordinate and
    integrate their activities. Interagency Guidance Not     With the
    exception of FEMA, lead federal agencies have not completed
    Approved or Fully            interagency guidance on
    counterterrorist operations more than 3  years Coordinated
    after PDD 39 directed them to do so. The FBI, which drafted the
    Domestic Guidelines and CONPLAN, coordinated drafts of these
    documents with five other federal agencies (FEMA, DOD, DOE, HHS,
    and EPA) that could have major operational roles in a domestic
    terrorist incident. These federal agencies have still not given
    their final approval to either document. Further, the FBI has not
    coordinated the Domestic Guidelines or the CONPLAN with other
    federal agencies that would have counterterrorist roles in certain
    circumstances, such as Treasury Department, the NRC, and the
    Departments of Transportation and Agriculture. Of the agencies
    omitted, the Treasury Department is the most significant, due to
    its special capabilities that have been called upon and could be
    needed in a variety of possible terrorist incidents. For example,
    the Secret Service protects the President and other designated
    protectees from terrorist attacks and plays Page 7
    GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 a key
    counterterrorist security role at major special events. The U.S.
    Customs Service provides aircraft at special events to detect and
    monitor aircraft activity and to perform interception if
    necessary. ATF supports FBI investigations of terrorist crimes
    involving explosives. In addition, the Treasury Department has
    numerous field personnel who could support FBI crisis management
    efforts. The NRC would provide expertise and technical support in
    a terrorist incident involving facilities, materials, and
    activities that it licenses (e.g., nuclear power plants). The
    Department of Transportation includes the Federal Aviation
    Administration, which has jurisdiction over aircraft hijackings in
    certain circumstances, and the Coast Guard, which has jurisdiction
    over hazardous materials (e.g., WMD) in U.S. waterways. The
    Department of Agriculture is responsible for providing emergency
    food assistance. Department of Agriculture officials said they
    would monitor and ensure the safety of the food supply where a WMD
    agent is released, potentially contaminating crops or livestock or
    food processing facilities. FBI officials said that they
    coordinated the Domestic Guidelines and CONPLAN with the five
    other agencies (FEMA, DOD, DOE, HHS and EPA) because those
    agencies were cited most prominently in PDD 39. However, PDD 39
    also cited Treasury as having an important role in
    counterterrorism. These officials told us that they plan to
    coordinate the Domestic Guidelines and CONPLAN with other agencies
    once the FBI and the five other agencies agree on the documents.
    FBI officials did not have an estimate on when the five agencies
    would approve either document or when these documents would be
    coordinated with other appropriate agencies. We believe that the
    FBI, as lead federal agency for crisis management in domestic
    terrorist incidents, would better serve that role by fully
    coordinating both documents with all federal agencies that have
    counterterrorist roles. The International Guidelines have also not
    been approved as final. These guidelines, which were drafted by
    the State Department and provide procedures for overseas incidents
    and operations, had not been approved because of differences among
    agencies about overseas arrests. Specifically, the Departments of
    State and Justice have not reached agreement on specific
    operational issues related to these missions. Since our classified
    report was issued, a State Department official told us the
    Department deleted procedures for these arrests from the
    International Guidelines to expedite their approval, but the
    different views on operational matters continue. He stated that
    the guidelines are in the final coordination stage. Page 8
    GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 Command and Control
    The FBI and the Secret Service were not always coordinating their
    Issues Require Resolution    command and control structures or
    contingency plans with each other in the period we reviewed. FBI
    and Secret Service officials acknowledged that the two agencies
    had not worked well together, and cited efforts underway to
    improve coordination and cooperation between the two agencies for
    special events. Specifically, the Directors of the FBI and Secret
    Service mutually agreed to a command and control plan and signed
    the agreement in October 1998. This agreement has been submitted
    to the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury for
    final approval. The two agencies also stated that they recently
    had conducted a joint tabletop exercise to test their command and
    control relationship. DOD needs to clarify its internal command
    and control structure for domestic operations. Although not a lead
    federal agency, DOD could have a major supporting role in any
    federal response to terrorist incidents in the United States,
    particularly those involving WMD. In reviewing DOD's participation
    in domestic support operations, special events, and exercises, we
    found several command and control issues where guidance was either
    confusing or conflicting. To resolve these issues, DOD is
    undertaking a high-level review of its support to civilian
    authorities, generally under the rubric of "homeland defense." The
    National Defense Panel recommended that DOD emphasize homeland
    defense more, and use military assets to assist law enforcement
    agencies in combating terrorism, and incorporate its forces into
    all levels of government to manage the consequences of a WMD-type
    attack.7 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has chartered a
    study called "UCP 21," which is reviewing these issues and may
    recommend changes to the Unified Command Plan-the overall command
    structure for military forces.8 There are also unresolved issues
    of intergovernmental command and control (i.e., whether the
    federal, state, or local government is in charge) in certain
    circumstances. For consequence management, federal guidance- the
    Federal Response Plan and its Terrorism Incident Annex-indicates
    7The National Defense Panel was an independent nonpartisan group
    of private sector experts, established by Congress to review the
    national security strategy. The panel issued a report,
    Transforming Defense, National Security in the 21st Century, in
    December 1997. 8By statute (10 U.S.C. 161), the Chairman, Joint
    Chiefs of Staff, conducts a biennial review of the Unified Command
    Plan and recommends revisions as appropriate. For more information
    on this process, see Unified Command Plan: Atlantic and Southern
    Command Participation in 1995 Review (GAO/NSIAD-97-41BR, Dec. 5,
    1996). Page 9
    GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 that state and local
    authorities are in overall charge of recovery efforts and that the
    federal government is in a support role. For crisis management,
    the overall leadership of the response at the incident site is not
    as clear. The FBI has recently taken some steps to work with state
    and local governments to better define their respective lead and
    support roles in managing a terrorist crisis. Strengths and
    PDD 39 required key federal agencies to ensure that their
    counterterrorist Weaknesses in               capabilities were
    well exercised. We found that federal agencies had conducted a
    number of counterterrorist exercises following PDD 39.
    Counterterrorist            However, while agencies were
    exercising together, there was no formal Exercises
    interagency program as envisioned in PDD 39. We also found that
    international crisis management exercises were more comprehensive
    than domestic crisis exercises, though neither included scenarios
    of no-warning terrorist attacks. Consequence management exercises
    sponsored by FEMA were not comprehensive, but other federal
    agencies were making progress exercising their capabilities.
    Agencies Conducted Many     Federal agencies conducted 201
    exercises to improve their preparedness Exercises Since PDD 39
    for counterterrorist operations in the past 3 years. In general,
    exercises test and validate policies and procedures, test the
    effectiveness of response capabilities, and increase the
    confidence and skill level of personnel. In addition, exercises
    identify strengths and weaknesses before they arise in an actual
    incident. Exercises further allow agencies to apply operational
    lessons learned from past exercises and actual deployments. In
    counterterrorism, where federal operations are inherently
    interagency matters, exercises also allow the various departments'
    and agencies' personnel to become familiar with each others'
    missions and procedures and learn to coordinate and operate
    together. Interagency exercises can help identify aspects of
    cooperation that work well and problems and conflicts that require
    interagency resolution. Table 1 shows the number of federal
    counterterrorism exercises that different agencies participated in
    and led. Page 10                                     GAO/NSIAD-99-
    135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 Table 1:  Agency Participation
    and Leadership in Federal Counterterrorism Exercises in the 3
    Years Following PDD 39 (June 1995 to June 1998) Total exercises
    Agency
    Participated in                     Led DOD
    143                     97 FBI
    99                    24 FEMA
    76                    16 HHS
    68                     3 Secret Service
    65                    46 EPA
    47                     1 DOE
    36                     5 State
    24                     1 CIA
    21                     0 Department of Veterans Affairs
    12                     4 AT F
    1 0                    4 Other
    36                     3 Note: When more than one agency sponsored
    an exercise, all sponsoring agencies were counted as the lead
    agency; thus, the column total exceeds 201 exercises. CIA noted
    that while it does not lead these types of exercises, it practices
    its support role through participation in other agencies'
    exercises. Other federal agencies include the Department of
    Transportation; U.S. Capitol Police; and 13 other agencies,
    offices, or bureaus. Source: Our analysis of agencies' data. The
    agencies conducted a mixture of tabletop exercises in which agency
    officials discuss scenarios around a table or other similar
    setting, and field exercises where agency leadership and
    operational units actually deploy to practice their skills and
    coordination in a realistic field setting. Of the total 201
    exercises, 85 (or 42 percent) were tabletop exercises and 116 (or
    58 percent) were field exercises. Counterterrorism exercises
    included both conventional and WMD scenarios to prepare federal
    agencies for a wide variety of possible situations. In many of the
    exercises, federal agencies gained experience working together. Of
    the 201 federal counterterrorist exercises, 140 (or 70 percent)
    were interagency exercises-involving more than one federal
    department or independent agency.9 Of these 140 interagency
    exercises, 96 were major interagency 9For the purpose of this
    report, we defined "interagency" as involving more than one
    federal department or independent agency. For example, DOD-led
    exercises that included both Army and Navy participation, or
    Justice-led exercises that included the FBI and Bureau of Prisons
    participation, were not considered interagency exercises. Page 11
    GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 exercises and
    included three or more departments or independent agencies. In
    some of the exercises, federal agencies also gained experience
    working with state and/or local authorities, and nongovernmental
    organizations. Specifically, 69 (or 34 percent) of the 201
    exercises were intergovernmental, and 18 (or 9 percent) included
    nongovernmental or other private organizations. Four exercises
    included foreign government participation to simulate federal
    agency integration in international incidents. Interagency
    Exercise              We found that there was no formal
    interagency exercise program as Program Has Not Been Fully
    envisioned in PDD 39. The National Security Council established an
    Achieved                          interagency Exercise Subgroup
    co-chaired by the State Department (for international exercises)
    and the FBI (for domestic exercises) that also included FEMA, DOD,
    HHS, DOE, EPA, CIA, NRC, and the Departments of Transportation and
    Agriculture as members. The purpose of the Exercise Subgroup is to
    promote interagency discussions of exercises, but it has not
    implemented PDD 39 requirements to prepare or receive approval for
    interagency exercise objectives and a schedule of exercises.
    Interagency field exercises occur when individual agencies,
    particularly DOD and DOE, invite other agencies to participate.
    Because individual agencies that sponsor or participate in
    exercises tend to focus on their own roles, some complex transfers
    of command and control between agencies have not been exercised,
    particularly in domestic scenarios. We believe that without
    interagency exercises objectives set by the Exercise Subgroup,
    agencies are not likely to exercise these key scenarios. As a
    result, the federal government will be less prepared to respond in
    a tailored, synchronized manner if an incident occurs. Officials
    from State, FBI, DOD, DOE, EPA, and HHS said that the Exercise
    Subgroup has fallen short of achieving its full objectives. These
    officials cited a number of obstacles to full implementation of
    the group as envisioned in PDD 39 and in the group's charter.
    Despite the incomplete implementation of an interagency exercise
    program as envisioned in PDD 39, in the 3 years since PDD 39,
    there were 96 counterterrorist field and tabletop exercises
    involving 3 or more agencies. These interagency exercises occurred
    because individual sponsoring agencies, such as DOD, invited other
    agencies to participate in their exercises. For example, DOD's
    Domestic Preparedness Program tabletop exercises form the core of
    interagency exercises with a focus on domestic consequence
    management and intergovernmental participation. Page 12
    GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 International Crisis
    International crisis management exercises are more comprehensive
    than Exercises More               domestic exercises. DOD's and
    DOE's well-developed international field Comprehensive Than
    exercise programs have enhanced the preparedness of the federal
    Domestic Crisis Exercises    government to conduct
    counterterrorist operations overseas. The State Department uses
    DOD-led and DOE-led exercises to practice its leadership role in
    international terrorist incidents. Each year, DOD and DOE sponsor
    several international interagency field exercises. Commanders and
    exercise planners take several steps to challenge participants in
    these exercises. For example, these exercises test rapid and no-
    notice deployment of command elements and tactical units to
    locations worldwide. In addition, these exercises also frequently
    test the FEST, so rapid and no-notice deployments also can be
    practiced by the full cadre of interagency players. While
    exercises do not guarantee success, they have resulted in a high
    degree of preparedness of federal agencies to operate overseas in
    a terrorist crisis. Domestic crisis response exercises are led by
    law enforcement agencies and primarily provide tactical training
    to their crisis response teams. Many of these exercises center
    around the response capabilities of the lead agency, rather than
    coordinating an interagency response and therefore do not include
    many of the federal, state, and local agencies that would be
    needed to effectively respond, or the entire range of activities
    required to respond to a terrorist crisis. The FBI's domestic
    crisis response program is well developed with regularly scheduled
    field exercises that test regional and field office capabilities
    at the tactical level.10 But the program generally does not
    exercise the broader interagency leadership role that the Bureau
    would play in a major terrorist incident. Some aspects of this
    leadership role have been tested in selected exercises, such as
    FBI-led exercises done in preparation for the Atlanta Olympics.
    The FBI has begun taking steps to enhance its program and it
    played a significant interagency leadership role in a June 1998
    exercise sponsored by DOD. FBI officials noted that the Bureau had
    increased this program's budget resources-which they had
    previously cited as an impediment to a more robust program. 10For
    the purpose of this report, the tactical level refers to the
    personnel and activities occurring at a specific site to eliminate
    or capture a terrorist or terrorists and to render safe and remove
    a conventional or unconventional weapon or device. Page 13
    GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 The Secret Service
    conducts a variety of counterterrorist exercises for its special
    agents related to its mission to protect the President. The
    exercises generally involve continuity of operations of the White
    House or protecting the President or other officials. Some of the
    exercises included other federal agencies (generally DOD), state
    and local police, and fire and rescue authorities. The Secret
    Service generally did not conduct exercises with the FBI, although
    the two agencies have overlapping responsibilities at special
    events.11 In the few cases in which both agencies participated in
    the same exercise, they did not exercise how they would interact
    in a terrorist incident. The Secret Service plans to increase the
    agency's counterterrorism exercise program to reflect its new role
    in certain special events. For example, in preparing for the World
    Energy Council in Houston in September 1998, the Secret Service
    conducted a tabletop exercise that included FBI and state and
    local authorities. In its comments on our classified report, the
    Secret Service stated that it planned to conduct the exercises
    with the FBI on scenarios where the two agencies need to work
    together. ATF conducts exercises that test its crisis response and
    investigation roles in terrorist bombings. These exercises do not
    involve tests of ATF's supporting role in an interagency response
    led by the FBI. ATF generally does not exercise with FBI, although
    the two agencies have potentially overlapping responsibilities,
    such as in cases where the sources of bombings are unknown.12 ATF
    is developing a crisis management exercise program similar to the
    FBI program. ATF exercises feature its Critical Incident
    Management Response Team and involve its regional Special Response
    Teams. FBI exercises feature its Critical Incident Response Group
    and involve its Hostage Rescue Team and regional Special Weapons
    and Tactics teams. The ATF and FBI scenarios that we reviewed were
    similar, and ATF officials were unable to make any distinction
    between their program and the FBI's program. Based upon our
    analysis of the ATF's program, it appears that ATF is exercising
    its lead in incidents in which the 11In addition to both agencies
    providing some type of security function at special events, their
    statutory authorities may result in potential overlap. Secret
    Service has the statutory mission to protect the President and
    other protectees (18 U.S.C. 3056), and also investigates any
    threatening criminal activity against the President pursuant to
    that authority. The FBI has the statutory mission to investigate
    attacks upon the President (18 U.S.C. 1751). 12FBI and ATF have a
    1973 Memorandum of Understanding on which agency has primary
    investigative jurisdiction in a bombing based upon such factors as
    the target of the bomb. If the perpetrator of the bombing is
    unclear, both agencies may claim jurisdiction. FBI and ATF
    officials have been meeting to resolve their differences on this
    issue. Page 14
    GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 FBI, not ATF, would
    lead. The lack of coordination on exercises between these two law
    enforcement agencies could reduce the effectiveness of the total
    federal response to a terrorist incident and lead to duplication
    of effort. In addition, crisis management exercises, both
    international and domestic, always end in the successful tactical
    resolution of the incidents and do not include more likely
    scenarios where terrorist attacks are successful, or occur without
    adequate threat warning. Thus, the full gamut of interagency
    crisis management activities is not tested. For example, in the 3
    years following PDD 39, the FBI did not conduct or participate in
    a field exercise that simulated the concurrence of crisis response
    and consequence management to deal with a major terrorist
    incident. Consequence Management     Domestic consequence
    management exercises are not well developed. Exercises Not
    PDD 39 designated FEMA as the lead federal agency for consequence
    Comprehensive              management in domestic terrorist
    events. In addition, the fiscal year 1995 Emergency Supplemental
    Appropriations tasked FEMA to develop exercises to focus on the
    consequences of terrorist incidents as part of its exercise
    program. In response to these taskings, FEMA sponsored a series of
    interagency counterterrorism tabletop exercises that focused on
    interagency and intergovernmental issues. However, FEMA has not
    planned or sponsored an interagency field exercise to test its
    consequence management leadership role. Tabletop exercises are
    useful to the extent they identify important policy and
    operational issues that need to be resolved. However, tabletop
    exercises are not a substitute for field exercises that test the
    federal government's ability to use and coordinate personnel and
    assets in a realistic setting. FEMA officials told us that they
    lack the resources to manage an interagency field exercise
    program. They also stated that they are reluctant to commit
    resources to field exercises because the Domestic Guidelines and
    CONPLAN are still not approved and that they do not want to
    exercise their staff using procedures that may not be correct
    because of additional changes in these guidance documents.
    Commenting on our classified report, FEMA noted that numerous
    other disaster-related operations (which were outside the scope of
    our review) significantly improved the federal government's
    overall response capabilities to conduct consequence management in
    terrorist incidents. Federal agencies or entities other than FEMA
    have sponsored some consequence management field exercises. The
    Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) sponsored four recent domestic
    field exercises that dealt with Page 15
    GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 the medical aspects
    of consequence management in a terrorist attack using WMD. For
    example, in March 1997, VA sponsored an exercise, in conjunction
    with the state of Minnesota, that simulated a terrorist attack on
    a federal building with explosives laced with radioactive
    material, and the subsequent decontamination and treatment of
    hundreds of casualties. Commenting on our classified report, VA
    stated that numerous other disaster-related exercises (which were
    outside the scope of our review) also improved VA's consequence
    management capabilities. DOD sponsored two recent domestic field
    exercises that also dealt with the medical aspects of consequence
    management in a terrorist attack using WMD. For example, in
    September 1997, DOD sponsored a field exercise (co-sponsored by
    VA) to practice providing medical care to victims of a terrorist
    WMD attack. That exercise, which had over 2,000 participants, also
    included state and local responders, and local community
    hospitals. In addition, some states and cities have sponsored
    field exercises on consequence management, some of them in
    conjunction with the DOD Domestic Preparedness Program. For
    example, in November 1997, New York City sponsored a field
    exercise based on a scenario where terrorists released chemical
    agents. The objectives of this exercise were to test first
    responder's ability to appropriately evaluate and respond to a
    chemical attack and fully integrate the city's incident command
    system. DOD, in conjunction with cities, plans to conduct more
    than 100 Domestic Preparedness Program field exercises in the next
    several years. Better Processes to               Lessons learned
    processes are practices that allow an agency to learn from Capture
    Lessons                   its successes and mistakes to improve
    its performance. We found that DOD, DOE, and FEMA had relatively
    good processes in place to capture Learned Could
    and share lessons learned, while other agencies had less rigorous
    Improve Future                    processes. There was also no
    interagency process in place to capture and Operations
    share lessons learned, but agencies were starting to implement a
    process at the end of our review. DOD, DOE, and FEMA Have  A key
    part of any lessons learned process is preparing an After Action
    Requirements and                  Report (AAR) or other evaluation
    that provides an official description of Processes to Capture
    the results of an operation, special event, or exercise. An AAR
    typically Lessons Learned                   includes a summary of
    objectives, operational limitations, major participants, a
    description of strengths and weaknesses, and recommended actions.
    Effective follow-up and validation also are important parts of a
    lessons learned process, as they are the only means to ensure that
    Page 16                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-135
    Combating Terrorism B-282474 problems have been corrected. Another
    important feature of a lessons learned process is the
    dissemination within an organization and, where appropriate, to
    other organizations, of aspects of operations that worked well and
    those that need further improvement or development. For
    counterterrorism operations, which are inherently interagency
    matters, the lessons learned process should also address the
    interaction between different agencies to highlight problems for
    resolution in interagency forums or by top national leadership.
    The DOD and DOE processes for capturing lessons learned had
    several positive characteristics in comparison to the other
    agencies' processes we reviewed. DOD and DOE had requirements to
    produce AARs and their officials or contractors wrote AARs, made
    specific recommendations, disseminated AARs to different
    organizational units, and produced AARs for some exercises and
    events led by other agencies. For example, we observed DOE
    contractors as they entered lessons learned data "real time"
    during a June 1998 exercise led by DOD. Some DOD field exercises
    included data evaluation plans in advance to ensure that lessons
    were learned on the specific exercise objectives. In addition, DOD
    and DOE officials included interagency issues in their AARs and
    sometimes disseminated them to other agencies. DOD and DOE
    officials cited the value of a sound AAR process to improving
    their performance and said that on the basis of issues identified
    in earlier AARs, they had improved operations. For example, DOD
    exercises helped determine and refine policy and procedures on the
    final disposition of WMD devices. Policy issues on this topic were
    identified in AARs going back to 1993. In the intervening years,
    DOD continued to include this issue in its tabletop exercises. In
    1996, a new policy was incorporated into a formal contingency
    plan. The new policy was further tested in tabletop exercises in
    1997 and finally in field exercises in 1998. While there are
    remaining issues to be resolved on the final disposition of a WMD
    device, DOD officials were able to track their progress on this
    issue. DOE reorganized its Nuclear Emergency Search Team on the
    basis of lessons learned from a series of exercises. We were able
    to track the evolution of the Nuclear Emergency Search Team
    through past evaluations and AARs written by DOE. Although the DOD
    and DOE lessons learned processes were good in comparison to the
    other agencies we reviewed, we did note some weaknesses in their
    processes. DOD and DOE did not write AARs for all of the
    counterterrorism operations, special events, or exercises that
    they Page 17                                     GAO/NSIAD-99-135
    Combating Terrorism B-282474 participated in. Both DOD and DOE
    officials stated that emerging crises or the tempo of operations
    did not always allow staff to write AARs. In addition,
    dissemination of lessons learned were sometimes limited because of
    security classifications. Finally, our prior report, which
    included a broader and more detailed review of DOD's lessons
    learned programs, discussed weaknesses in the collection,
    analysis, dissemination, and ultimate use of lessons learned.13
    FEMA also had relatively sound lessons learned requirements and
    processes as part of its Comprehensive Exercise Program for
    designing, conducting, and evaluating exercises. For several
    years, FEMA had been developing computer software to record
    lessons learned from exercises and monitor corrective actions.14
    FEMA produced AARs on the tabletop exercises it led but not for
    exercises led by other agencies. Contractors usually wrote AARs
    and FEMA officials reviewed and approved them. FEMA disseminated
    its AARs both internally and externally. FEMA's AARs generally
    included interagency issues for those exercises that included
    other agencies. For example, the AAR on FEMA's June 1996 "Cirrus
    Wind" exercise stressed the need for FEMA and FBI to work together
    to understand their responsibilities for consequence and crisis
    management. Other Agencies' Lessons           Federal agencies
    other than DOD, DOE, and FEMA had less rigorous Learned Processes
    Not Well  processes for capturing lessons learned and producing
    AARs. The other Developed                         agencies did not
    have a written policy that required that they produce AARs or a
    formal process to capture lessons learned. The production of AARs
    by some of these other agencies was sporadic, particularly for
    operations, special events, and exercises led by other agencies.
    In addition, few of these other agencies included discussions of
    interagency issues in their AARs. Finally, the dissemination of
    AARs was limited at many agencies, which minimized the benefits of
    lessons learned. These limitations make it more difficult for the
    agencies to capture the strengths and weaknesses shown in
    operations or exercises so they can continue or expand good
    practices or take corrective actions when necessary to improve
    future performance. Table 2 describes selected agencies' processes
    for capturing lessons learned and producing AARs. 13See Military
    Training: Potential to Use Lessons Learned to Avoid Past Mistakes
    is Largely Untapped (GAO/NSIAD-95-152, Aug. 9, 1995). While the
    review examined DOD lessons learned processes, it did not
    specifically focus on counterterrorist operations or exercises.
    14At the end of our review, FEMA officials told us they were
    testing software to implement this corrective action program
    throughout the agency. Page 18
    GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 Table 2:
    Characteristics of Federal Agencies' Processes to Capture Lessons
    Learned From Counterterrorist Operations, Special Events, and
    Exercises Agency policy and/or process to         Actual agency
    production of after  AAR discussion of interagency Agency
    capture lessons learned                 action reports
    issues and dissemination DOD               Policy requires AARs;
    formal process  Generally produces AARs for
    AARs generally discuss interagency is Joint Universal Lessons
    Learned      operations, special events, and              issues;
    AARs disseminated internally System.
    exercises, including those led by            and sometimes
    externally. other agencies. DOE               Policy requires
    AARs; formal process  Generally produces AARs for special  AARs
    generally discuss interagency is After Action Tracking System.
    events and exercises, including those  issues; AARs disseminated
    internally led by other agencies.                       and
    sometimes externally. FEMA              Policy requires AARs;
    formal process  Produces no AARs for special events;  AARs
    generally discuss interagency is Corrective Action Program.
    produces AARs for FEMA exercises,  issues; AARs disseminated
    internally but not those led by other agencies.         and
    sometimes externally. ATF               No formal policy or
    process.            Produces AARs for some operations;  AARs do
    not discuss interagency produces no AARs for special events;
    issues; AARs disseminated internally. produces AARs for ATF
    exercises, but not those led by other agencies. FBI
    No formal policy or process.            Produces no AARs for
    operations or  AARs generally do not discuss special events;
    generally produces           interagency issues; AARs AARs for FBI
    field exercises but not         disseminated internally to
    tabletop exercises or those led by           participating FBI
    offices, but not to other agencies.
    FBI Headquarters or externally. EPA               No formal policy
    or process.            Sometimes produces AARs for
    AARs generally discuss interagency special events and exercises,
    issues; AARs disseminated internally, including those led by other
    agencies. but not externally. Secret Service    No formal policy
    or process.            Generally produces AARs for special  AARs
    generally do not discuss events; produces no AARs for
    interagency issues; AARs not exercises led by Secret Service or
    disseminated internally or externally. other agencies. State
    No formal policy or process.            Rarely produces AARs for
    operations  Not applicable. and exercises, even if led by State.
    AARs rarely done. HHS               No formal policy or process.
    Rarely produces AARs for operations  Not applicable. or exercises,
    even if led by HHS.            AARs rarely done. Note: We did not
    include VA or CIA in this table because we did not conduct
    detailed reviews of their processes to capture lessons learned.
    Both agencies did write AARs for selected exercises. Source: Our
    analysis of agencies' data. Many agencies did not produce AARs
    even in cases where they led an exercise. Agencies lead exercises
    because they have specific objectives to achieve, and one purpose
    of exercises is to capture lessons that might improve future
    operations. Nevertheless, we found many cases where agencies
    devoted their resources to develop exercise objectives and conduct
    an exercise, yet did not write AARs. For example, the FBI has
    sponsored the Weapons of Mass Destruction Interagency Support
    Exercise Page 19
    GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 series, which
    includes numerous federal agencies and has the objective to
    advance interagency coordination for terrorist attacks. However,
    FBI has not produced AARs on any of the four tabletop exercises.
    Table 3 shows whether agencies produced AARs for the exercises
    they led. Table 3:  Production of After Action Reports by Selected
    Federal Agencies for the Counterterrorism Exercises They Led in
    the 3 Years Following PDD 39 (June 1995 to June 1998). Total
    exercises        AARs produced by Agency
    led by agency                 lead agency DOD
    97                  79 (81%) Secret Service
    47                            0 FBI
    22                  13 (59%) FEMA
    16                  14 (88%) DOE
    5                  5 (100%) ATF
    4                  4 (100%) VA
    4                   2 (50%) HHS
    3                            0 State
    1                            0 EPA
    1                  1 (100%) Other
    3                   1 (33%) Note: Includes both tabletop and field
    exercises the agency led. The Secret Service noted that its
    lessons learned are based on special events, not its exercise
    program. Other government agencies include the Department of
    Transportation, U.S. Capitol Police, and 13 other agencies,
    offices or bureaus. Source: Our analysis of agencies' data. Many
    agencies also did not produce AARs when they participated in a
    field exercise. Field exercises are very resource intensive
    because they require a great deal of advance planning and because
    agency personnel and equipment actually deploy to another
    location. Again, we found cases where agencies led or otherwise
    participated in field exercises but did not produce AARs. For
    example, in a recent DOD-sponsored field exercise, FEMA developed
    specific objectives and tasks to be accomplished and sent several
    staff to planning meetings and to the week-long exercise itself,
    yet it did not produce an AAR. Table 4 shows the extent to which
    agencies produced AARs for field exercises that they participated
    in. Page 20
    GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 Table 4:  Production
    of After Action Reports by Selected Federal Agencies for
    Counterterrorist Field Exercises That They Participated in for the
    3 Years Following PDD 39 (June 1995 to June 1998). Total field
    exercises         AARs produced for field Agency
    agency participated in               exercises by agency DOD
    72                          38 (53%) Secret Service
    52                                   0 FBI
    32                          18 (56%) FEMA
    16                                   0 State
    15                             1 (7%) DOE
    13                          10 (77%) HHS
    13                           2 (15%) ATF
    9                          4 (44%) VA
    6                          2 (33%) EPA
    4                          1 (25%) Other
    14                                   0 Note: Includes all field
    exercises, whether the agency led the exercise or not. Secret
    Service noted that its lessons learned are based on special
    events, not its exercise program. Other government agencies
    include the Department of Transportation, U.S. Capitol Police, and
    13 other agencies, offices, or bureaus. Source: Our analysis of
    agencies' data. Officials from these agencies generally cited a
    lack of dedicated staff or the tempo of ongoing operations or
    exercises as reasons they did not write AARs or otherwise capture
    lessons learned. In our view, agencies that devote the resources
    to lead exercises or to participate in other agencies' field
    exercises should also devote the resources to writing AARs to
    capture lessons learned. Some officials noted that they hold a
    "hotwash" (i.e., an oral AAR discussion) after an exercise which,
    they said, served the purpose of capturing lessons learned.
    Hotwashes are valuable because they are held immediately after
    exercises; however, their value is limited to the participants
    that attend. Written AARs, on the other hand, provide
    accountability because they identify and document problems or
    issues and can be used to track the progress of corrective action.
    By not producing written AARs, agencies are forfeiting many of the
    benefits of participating in exercises. In commenting on our
    classified report, several agencies cited efforts underway to
    develop or improve processes for capturing lessons learned at
    their individual agencies. Page 21
    GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 Interagency Lessons
    The 1996 Nunn-Lugar hearings highlighted that, although some
    agencies Learned Process Being     wrote AARs and made
    recommendations, there were recurrent interagency Developed
    problems because there was no central place where officials
    assembled and analyzed AARs together to discuss interagency
    problems. During our review, we also found no AAR or lessons
    learned process at the interagency level. The Exercise Subgroup
    charter included the discussion of lessons learned and AARs. While
    this interagency forum had been used to discuss specific
    exercises, there was no process to review individual agency AARs
    that raise interagency issues. For more than 2 years, the group
    has discussed developing a formal interagency process and has
    looked specifically at the processes being used by DOD and DOE.
    The State Department has been a repository for various agencies'
    AARs for international exercises, but Department officials there
    said they lacked the staff and standing to analyze them, separate
    out the interagency issues, and prepare related evaluations or
    make recommendations. At the time of our review, the FBI was in
    charge of developing an interagency AAR process, but no decisions
    had been made. In commenting on our classified report, several
    agencies noted that the Exercise Subgroup had recently adopted an
    interagency AAR process and was starting to implement it.
    Conclusions               During the last 3 years, federal
    agencies have worked together in many operations and special
    events and have generally coordinated their activities. However,
    issues of interagency guidance and command and control remain that
    need to be addressed to enhance the federal government's ability
    to effectively respond to terrorist incidents. Federal agencies
    have participated in many interagency counterterrorism exercises
    in the last 3 years. However, an interagency exercise program, as
    directed in PDD 39, has not been fully achieved, so exercises have
    not generally practiced key transfers of authority among
    responding federal agencies. International field exercises,
    generally led by DOD, include the full cadre of interagency
    players in demanding scenarios and some are done with no notice.
    In contrast, domestic counterterrorism exercises are not as
    demanding in testing the interagency ability to respond. The FBI's
    crisis management field exercises have provided good practice for
    its tactical response units but have generally not exercised the
    Bureau's interagency leadership role and rapid deployments for no-
    warning terrorist attacks. FEMA's consequence management exercises
    have been limited to tabletop exercises that do not fully test the
    federal government's ability to provide a rapid interagency
    response in a realistic exercise environment. Although agencies
    can benefit most from counterterrorism exercises if they produce
    Page 22                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-135
    Combating Terrorism B-282474 AARs and have a process to capture
    lessons learned, most of the agencies that we reviewed did not do
    so. Although counterterrorism is inherently an interagency
    response, there was also no interagency process to capture lessons
    learned. At the close of our review, agencies said they were
    adopting several measures to address these issues at both the
    agency and interagency level. Recommendations    This report makes
    no recommendations. However, in our classified report, we made
    several recommendations to enhance interagency guidance, command
    and control, exercises, and processes to capture and share lessons
    learned. DOD classified these recommendations as a result of its
    security review of our classified report. Agency Comments    We
    received written comments on our classified report from 15
    agencies, including the Departments of Justice, State, Treasury;
    DOD, DOE, HHS, VA; and FEMA, EPA, CIA, NRC, ATF, the Secret
    Service, U.S. Customs Service, and Internal Revenue Service. The
    National Security Council declined to provide official comments on
    the report. Many of the agencies concurred or partially concurred
    with the report and our recommendations and cited recent steps
    taken to implement them. For example, DOE stated that our report
    was an accurate assessment of both the progress and the lingering
    shortfalls within the interagency counterterrorist community. NRC
    stated that our recommendations will provide a blueprint for
    resolving many of the interagency difficulties outlined in the
    report. Other agencies did not concur with parts of our report and
    provided additional information about their programs or cited
    improvements underway. For example, the Department of Justice
    cited progress in interagency guidance, command and control
    relationships, exercise programs, and processes to capture lessons
    learned. We did not reproduce agency comments in this report due
    to security classification reasons. However, we incorporated their
    unclassified comments in this report as appropriate. Scope and
    We focused our examination on counterterrorist activities in the
    3-year Methodology        period following the issuance of PDD 39
    in June 1995. We obtained documents and interviewed officials at
    the Departments of Justice, State, Treasury (including the Secret
    Service and ATF), DOD, DOE, HHS, VA, CIA, EPA, FEMA, NRC, and the
    U.S. Capitol Police. We also obtained information on matters
    pertaining to intergovernmental counterterrorist Page 23
    GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 operations (e.g.,
    those involving federal, state, and local entities) from state and
    local officials and selected federal field offices in the course
    of our related work on DOD's Domestic Preparedness Program. We
    compiled a list of 230 counterterrorism activities that included
    operations, special events, and exercises that were conducted from
    June 1995 to June 1998. In some cases, we discussed
    counterterrorist activities before and after that period, but we
    did not include them in the statistics we compiled and analyzed.
    We did not review covert activities or law enforcement cases
    (e.g., criminal investigations and arrests of terrorists) except
    in the cases of overseas arrests, which are interagency
    operations. We also did not include aircraft hijackings or related
    exercises, where the Federal Aviation Administration is generally
    the lead federal agency. To ensure the accuracy of our list of
    activities, appropriate federal agencies reviewed it for
    completeness and accuracy. We also examined policy guidelines,
    contingency plans, AARs, and other documents from actual
    operations, special events, and exercises. Further, we attended
    and observed interagency meetings, planning sessions, and
    exercises. We performed our work in accordance with generally
    accepted government auditing standards between November 1997 and
    September 1998. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly
    announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further
    distribution of this report until 30 days after its issue date. At
    that time we will send copies to appropriate congressional
    committees, the federal agencies discussed in this report, and to
    the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. We also will
    make copies available to other interested parties upon request. If
    you have any questions about this report, please contact Mark
    Gebicke, Director for National Security Preparedness Issues, at
    (202) 512-5140. Other major contributors to this report were Davi
    M. D'Agostino, Stephen L. Caldwell, Alan M. Byroade, Lee Purdy,
    and Raymond J. Wyrsch. Henry L. Hinton, Jr. Assistant Comptroller
    General Page 24                                     GAO/NSIAD-99-
    135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 Page 25     GAO/NSIAD-99-135
    Combating Terrorism Related GAO Products Terrorism and Drug
    Trafficking: Testing Status and Views on Operational Viability of
    Pulsed Fast Nuetron Analysis Technology (GAO/GGD-99-54, Apr. 13,
    1999). Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism
    and Public Health Initiatives (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112, Mar. 16, 1999).
    Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat
    Terrorism (GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107, Mar. 11, 1999). Combating
    Terrorism: FBI's Use of Federal Funds for Counterterrorism-
    Related Activities (FYs 1995-98) (GAO/GGD-99-7, Nov. 20, 1998).
    Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic
    Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov.
    12, 1998). Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-
    Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, Oct. 2,
    1998). Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues
    (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23, 1998). Combating Terrorism: Threat
    and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program
    Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998). Combating Terrorism:
    Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and
    Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997). Combating Terrorism:
    Efforts to Protect U.S. Forces in Turkey and the Middle East
    (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44, Oct. 28, 1997). Combating Terrorism: Federal
    Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy
    (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997). Combating Terrorism: Status of
    DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces Overseas (GAO/NSIAD-97-207, July
    21, 1997). Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Changes Needed in the
    Management Structure of Emergency Preparedness Program (GAO/NSIAD-
    97-91, June 11, 1997). Page 26
    GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism Related GAO Products State
    Department: Efforts to Reduce Visa Fraud (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-167, May
    20, 1997). Aviation Security: FAA's Procurement of Explosives
    Detection Devices (GAO/RCED-97-111R, May 1, 1997). Aviation
    Security: Commercially Available Advanced Explosives Detection
    Devices (GAO/RCED-97-119R, Apr. 24, 1997). Terrorism and Drug
    Trafficking: Responsibilities for Developing Explosives and
    Narcotics Detection Technologies (GAO/NSIAD-97-95, Apr. 15, 1997).
    Federal Law Enforcement: Investigative Authority and Personnel at
    13 Agencies (GAO/GGD-96-154, Sept. 30, 1996). Aviation Security:
    Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed (GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-151, Sept.
    11, 1996). Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for
    Detecting Explosives and Narcotics (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252, Sept.
    4, 1996). Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve
    Security (GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237, Aug. 1, 1996). Terrorism and
    Drug Trafficking: Threats and Roles of Explosives and Narcotics
    Detection Technology (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR, Mar. 27, 1996).
    Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S. Efforts to Improve
    Nuclear Material Controls in Newly Independent States
    (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89, Mar. 8, 1996). Aviation Security:
    Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and International
    Challenges (GAO/RCED-94-38, Jan. 27, 1994). Nuclear Security:
    Improving Correction of Security Deficiencies at DOE's Weapons
    Facilities (GAO/RCED-93-10, Nov. 16, 1992). Nuclear Security: Weak
    Internal Controls Hamper Oversight of DOE's Security Program
    (GAO/RCED-92-146, June 29, 1992). Page 27
    GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism Related GAO Products
    Electricity Supply: Efforts Underway to Improve Federal Electrical
    Disruption Preparedness (GAO/RCED-92-125, Apr. 20, 1992). State
    Department: Management Weaknesses in the Security Construction
    Program (GAO/NSIAD-92-2, Nov. 29, 1991). Chemical Weapons:
    Physical Security for the U.S. Chemical Stockpile (GAO/NSIAD-91-
    200, May 15, 1991). State Department: Status of the Diplomatic
    Security Construction Program (GAO/NSIAD-91-143BR, Feb. 20, 1991).
    (701124/701163)    Letter    Page 28
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