Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism
Operations (Letter Report, 05/13/1999, GAO/NSIAD-99-135).
During the past three years, federal agencies have conducted several
successful interagency operations overseas, including some in which
suspected terrorists have been returned to the United States to stand
trial. Some agencies have also deployed personnel and equipment to
prepare for special events, such as the Atlanta Olympic Games. However,
federal agencies have not completed interagency guidance or resolved
command and control issues. To improve their response to terrorist
attacks, federal agencies have conducted more than 200 exercises, half
of which included three or more federal agencies. About one-third
included state and local participants. However, the agencies have not
fully achieved the interagency counterterrorist exercise program
directed in a June 1995 Presidential directive. As a result, some
complex transfers of command and control between agencies have not
occurred. International field exercises, generally led by the Defense
Department (DOD), included the full range of interagency players in
demanding scenarios, some taking place with no notice. In contrast,
domestic counterterrorism exercises are less demanding. The FBI's crisis
management field exercises have provided good practice for its tactical
response units, but generally have not exercised the Bureau's
interagency leadership role and rapid deployments for no-warning
terrorist attacks. The Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA)
consequence management exercises have been limited to tabletop exercises
that do not fully test the government's ability to provide a rapid
interagency response in a realistic setting. DOD, the Department of
Energy, and FEMA have requirements and processes in place to capture
lessons learned from counterterrorist operations and exercises. These
agencies, however, did not capture lessons learned from all the
exercises they led or all the field exercises they participated in.
Other federal agencies have less rigorous requirements and processes for
capturing lessons learned. Establishing a process to record the lessons
learned from counterterrorism operations and exercises would be
beneficial and could improve future efforts.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-99-135
TITLE: Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve
Counterterrorism Operations
DATE: 05/13/1999
SUBJECT: Emergency preparedness
Interagency relations
Terrorism
Crime prevention
National defense operations
IDENTIFIER: Oklahoma City (OK)
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program
JCS Unified Command Plan
FEMA Federal Response Plan
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United States General Accounting Office GAO Report
to Congressional Requesters May 1999 COMBATING
TERRORISM Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism
Operations GAO/NSIAD-99-135 United States General Accounting
Office GAO Washington, D.C. 20548
Letter National Security and International Affairs Division
Letter B-282474
Letter May 13, 1999 The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking Minority
Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives The
Honorable Christopher Shays Chairman, Subcommittee on National
Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations Committee
on Government Reform House of Representatives Terrorist attacks
against U.S. personnel and interests domestically and abroad
highlight the need for effective U.S. efforts to combat terrorism.
As requested, we prepared this unclassified summary of our
February 1999 classified report to you on interagency
counterterrorist operations. Specifically, we examined how
agencies worked together in counterterrorist operations and
special events; strengths and weaknesses of international and
domestic counterterrorist exercises; and agency and interagency
processes to capture and share lessons learned. Results in Brief
In the last 3 years, federal agencies have conducted several
successful interagency operations overseas, including some in
which suspected terrorists have been returned to the United States
to stand trial. In addition, federal agencies have deployed
personnel and equipment to prepare for many special events such as
the Atlanta Olympic Games. However, federal agencies have not
completed interagency guidance and resolved command and control
issues. Proposed interagency Domestic Guidelines have not been
completed, nor coordinated with all federal agencies with domestic
counterterrorism roles. For example, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) has not coordinated the proposed Domestic
Guidelines with the Department of the Treasury even though it
could have a significant role in an actual terrorist incident.
Furthermore, approval of proposed interagency International
Guidelines has been delayed because the Department of State, the
Department of Justice, and the FBI have not reached agreement on
the level of State participation in highly sensitive missions to
arrest suspected terrorists overseas. In addition, some
interagency and intergovernmental command and control issues
regarding domestic counterterrorist operations have not been fully
resolved. Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-
99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 To improve their preparedness
to respond to terrorist incidents, federal agencies have conducted
over 200 exercises, of which about half included three or more
federal agencies and about one third included state and local
participants. However, agencies have not fully achieved the
interagency counterterrorist exercise program directed in a June
1995 Presidential Directive because an interagency Exercise
Subgroup has not prepared and submitted, and senior agency
officials have not approved, an interagency program. As a result,
some complex transfers of command and control between agencies
have not been exercised. International counterterrorism exercises,
sponsored for many years by the Department of Defense (DOD), are
relatively comprehensive in that they include many federal
agencies and test tactical units along with State Department's
leadership role and DOD's command and control. In contrast,
domestic exercises sponsored by the FBI and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA)--the lead federal agencies for domestic
operations-are not as comprehensive. The FBI exercise program
focuses on its regional and field offices' tactical capabilities
to respond and generally has not included the Bureau's full
interagency leadership role that is expected to be critical during
a domestic terrorist incident. Recently, the FBI has made
significant progress and taken steps to enhance its program in
this regard. The FEMA counterterrorism exercise program consists
of tabletop exercises and does not include field exercises that
would deploy personnel and equipment, and practice roles and
responsibilities in realistic settings. DOD, the Department of
Energy (DOE), and FEMA have requirements and processes in place to
capture lessons learned from counterterrorist operations and
exercises. These agencies, however, did not capture lessons
learned for all the exercises they led or all the field exercises
they participated in. Other federal agencies had less rigorous
requirements and processes for capturing lessons learned. There is
also no requirement or process to capture lessons learned at the
interagency level. Establishing a process to record and share the
lessons learned of counterterrorism operations and exercises would
be beneficial and could improve future operations. In our
classified report, we made several recommendations to enhance
interagency guidance, command and control, exercises, and
processes to capture and share lessons learned. Page 2
GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 Background
The U.S. policy and strategy on combating terrorism have been
evolving since the 1970s and are articulated in Presidential
Directives and implementing guidance. These guidance documents
divide activities to combat terrorism into three elements:
preventing and deterring terrorism; responding to a terrorist
crisis, and managing the consequences after a terrorist attack.
One of the highest priorities in the federal government is to
prevent and prepare for terrorist attacks that use weapons of mass
destruction (WMD).1 Crisis management includes efforts to stop a
terrorist attack, arrest terrorists, and gather evidence for
criminal prosecution. Consequence management includes efforts to
provide medical treatment and emergency services, evacuate people
from dangerous areas, and restore government services. When
terrorist attacks occur without adequate threat warning, crisis
response and consequence management will be concurrent activities.
U.S. Policy, Lead Agencies, U.S. policy to combat terrorism
was formalized in 1986 with the issuance of and Guidance
National Security Decision Directive 207, which primarily focused
on terrorist incidents overseas. After the bombing of a federal
building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, the President issued
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 in June 1995, which
enumerated responsibilities for federal agencies in combating
terrorism, including domestic incidents. In May 1998, the
President issued PDD 62 that reaffirmed PDD 39 and further
articulated responsibilities for specific agencies. PDD 62 also
established a National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure
Protection, and Counterterrorism, within the National Security
Council, to coordinate agencies' programs. These directives, and
the guidelines and contingency plans that implement them, call for
robust, tailored and rapidly deployable interagency teams to
conduct well-coordinated and highly integrated operations. PDDs 39
and 62 assigned or reaffirmed lead and supporting roles to various
federal agencies and established interagency support teams. The
State Department is the lead agency for international terrorist
incidents. An interagency Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST)
was established to provide advice and support to U.S. ambassadors,
Washington decision- makers, and host governments. Similarly, the
FBI is the lead federal agency 1For the purpose of this report,
WMD are defined as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons or
agents. Within the federal government, there is disagreement as to
the precise definition, especially whether large conventional
explosives should be included. Page 3
GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 for domestic crisis
response. An interagency Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST)
was established to provide advice and support to FBI on- scene
commanders. Both the FEST and DEST consist of rapidly deployable
interagency teams tailored to the specific terrorist incident. For
example, experts from DOD, DOE, the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) or the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) might
be part of the teams if the incident involved WMD. The State
Department and the FBI determine the composition of the FEST and
DEST, respectively. The PDDs also affirmed FEMA as the lead agency
for coordinating consequence management in domestic incidents.
Other agencies have important support roles in combating
terrorism. For example, DOD could provide significant support to
other agencies, both for international incidents and for domestic
incidents involving WMD. DOE provides support and technical
expertise related to nuclear devices and radiological events. EPA
provides expertise and support in incidents involving certain
hazardous chemicals. The U.S. Secret Service designs and
implements operational security at designated special events to
provide protection against terrorist attacks.2 Lead federal
agencies drafted interagency guidance to provide operational
details for implementing PDD 39. The State Department, as the lead
federal agency for international incidents, drafted "Coordinating
Subgroup Guidelines for the Mobilization, Deployment, and
Employment of U.S. Government Elements in Response to an Overseas
Terrorist Incident" (also known as the International Guidelines).
The International Guidelines outline procedures for deploying the
FEST and otherwise coordinating federal operations overseas. The
FBI, as lead federal agency for domestic crisis response, drafted
"Guidelines for the Mobilization, Deployment, and Employment of
U.S. Government Agencies in Response to a Domestic Terrorist
Threat or Incidence in Accordance With Presidential Decision
Directive 39" (also known as the Domestic Guidelines) and the
"United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept
of Operations Plan" (also known as the CONPLAN). The Domestic
Guidelines describe specific procedures and responsibilities of
deploying the DEST, particularly in WMD incidents, while the
CONPLAN provides overall guidance to federal, state, and local
officials on how the federal government is structured to respond
to a terrorist threat or incident in the United States. FEMA, the
lead federal agency for domestic consequence management,
coordinated and completed an interagency annex to the Federal
Response 2For more detailed information on interagency
coordination mechanisms and the roles and responsibilities of lead
and supporting federal agencies, see our report entitled Combating
Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy
and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997). Page 4
GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 Plan that discusses
how the federal government would assist state and local
authorities in managing the consequences of a terrorist attack in
the United States. Support agencies developed their own guidance
to be used to support an interagency terrorism response. For
example, DOD developed a detailed contingency plan to guide its
actions in deploying and responding to a terrorist incident and
HHS developed a plan to deal with the health and medical
consequences of terrorist attacks. Issues Identified Through
In 1996, a congressional committee held hearings to provide
oversight of Congressional Oversight counterterrorism
programs, highlighting interagency operational and and Legislation
coordination challenges and issues. In 1996, the Nunn-Lugar
hearings focused on the preparedness of the federal government to
conduct counterterrorist operations at the agency, interagency,
and intergovernmental levels (i.e., with state and local
governments).3 Some of the issues highlighted in the hearings were
as follows: * Domestic interagency counterterrorism exercises
should be more comprehensive and held more often and should go
beyond tabletop exercises to field exercises where personnel and
equipment rapidly deploy to a location and practice their
activities. * The FBI and FEMA needed to exercise their operations
together when crisis response and consequence management was
concurrent. * Domestic interagency counterterrorism exercises
should include the full array of federal, state, and local
agencies. * Individual agencies should capture lessons learned
from counterterrorism exercises, disseminate such lessons both
internally and externally, and track corrective actions. * There
should be an interagency process to capture lessons learned and
track corrective actions. Following the Nunn-Lugar hearings,
Congress passed the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction
Act of 1996 (commonly known as the Nunn- Lugar-Domenici Act).4 The
act designated DOD as the lead agency to enhance domestic
preparedness for WMD terrorism by providing federal, 3These
hearings were sponsored by Senators Nunn and Lugar of the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee
on Governmental Affairs in March 1996. See Senate Hearing 104-422
part III. 4See title XIV of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1997 (P.L. 104-201, Sept. 23, 1996). Page 5
GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 state, and local
emergency response personnel with, among other things, training
and advice. The legislation led to the creation of the Nunn-Lugar-
Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program, which was intended to be
an interagency and intergovernmental effort among key agencies
with responsibilities for crisis and consequence management in the
event of a terrorist incident. We reported separately on the
implementation of this program.5 Agencies Operate
We found that federal agencies worked together and generally
coordinated Together But Need to their
counterterrorist activities. For example, federal agencies carried
out several overseas operations and prepared for domestic special
events. Resolve Key Issues However, interagency
guidance for coordinating federal operations-both overseas and
domestically-has not been approved or fully coordinated. In
addition, several command and control issues related to domestic
operations have not been resolved. Agencies Successfully
In the 3 years following PDD 39, federal agencies successfully
participated Performed Operations and in many
counterterrorist activities. In actual operations and special
events, Prepared for Special Events agencies generally coordinated
their activities. For example, we examined several overseas
counterterrorist operations and found that agencies generally
followed the draft interagency International Guidelines. DOD, the
FBI, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) performed their
respective roles in military planning, law enforcement, and
intelligence gathering under the oversight of the State Department
(e.g., the ambassador). Minor interagency tensions or conflicts
during these operations were resolved and did not appear to have
posed risk to the missions. Examples of these overseas operations
include several overseas arrests to bring suspected terrorists
back to the United States for trial outside of normal extradition
channels. Interagency teams consisting of the FBI, the State
Department, DOD, and CIA conducted these missions. These arrests
included those of Ayyad Najim in July 1995, Wahli Khan in December
1995, Tsutomo Shirasaki in September 1996, Matwan Al-Safadi in
November 1996, Mir Aimal Kansi in June 1997, and Mohamed Said
Rasheed in June 1998.6 5See Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk
Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments
(GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998) and Combating Terrorism:
Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and
Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998). 6Other successful
overseas arrests just outside our scope (June 1995 to June 1998)
included those of Ramzi Yousef in February 1995 and Mohamed Sadeck
Odeh and Mohamed Rasheed Daoud Al Owhali in August 1998. Page 6
GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 Key agencies have
also prepared for and deployed personnel in advance to many
special events. Special events are high visibility events in which
federal agencies initiate contingency measures. For recent major
special events, such as the 50th anniversary of the United Nations
in 1995, the Atlanta Olympic Games in 1996, and the Presidential
Inauguration in 1997, federal agencies prepared contingency plans
for a possible terrorist attack and provided protection to the
President and other dignitaries. For example, federal agencies
sending advance or contingency teams to the Atlanta Olympics
included Secret Service, the FBI, FEMA, DOD, DOE, HHS, EPA, CIA,
the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the Bureau
of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), the U.S. Customs Service,
the Internal Revenue Service, and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC). Federal agencies also exercised their personnel
together in advance of these events against various
counterterrorism scenarios. For example, before the Atlanta
Olympics, federal agencies conducted eight exercises with
scenarios specific to the games. Our review of these special
events indicated that most agencies involved gained valuable
experience in coordinating their activities. Agency officials
cited special events as successful efforts to integrate personnel
and assets across federal agencies. In preparing for such events,
federal agencies also worked closely with state and local agencies
and nongovernmental organizations. These operations and special
events enhanced federal agencies' abilities to coordinate and
integrate their activities. Interagency Guidance Not With the
exception of FEMA, lead federal agencies have not completed
Approved or Fully interagency guidance on
counterterrorist operations more than 3 years Coordinated
after PDD 39 directed them to do so. The FBI, which drafted the
Domestic Guidelines and CONPLAN, coordinated drafts of these
documents with five other federal agencies (FEMA, DOD, DOE, HHS,
and EPA) that could have major operational roles in a domestic
terrorist incident. These federal agencies have still not given
their final approval to either document. Further, the FBI has not
coordinated the Domestic Guidelines or the CONPLAN with other
federal agencies that would have counterterrorist roles in certain
circumstances, such as Treasury Department, the NRC, and the
Departments of Transportation and Agriculture. Of the agencies
omitted, the Treasury Department is the most significant, due to
its special capabilities that have been called upon and could be
needed in a variety of possible terrorist incidents. For example,
the Secret Service protects the President and other designated
protectees from terrorist attacks and plays Page 7
GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 a key
counterterrorist security role at major special events. The U.S.
Customs Service provides aircraft at special events to detect and
monitor aircraft activity and to perform interception if
necessary. ATF supports FBI investigations of terrorist crimes
involving explosives. In addition, the Treasury Department has
numerous field personnel who could support FBI crisis management
efforts. The NRC would provide expertise and technical support in
a terrorist incident involving facilities, materials, and
activities that it licenses (e.g., nuclear power plants). The
Department of Transportation includes the Federal Aviation
Administration, which has jurisdiction over aircraft hijackings in
certain circumstances, and the Coast Guard, which has jurisdiction
over hazardous materials (e.g., WMD) in U.S. waterways. The
Department of Agriculture is responsible for providing emergency
food assistance. Department of Agriculture officials said they
would monitor and ensure the safety of the food supply where a WMD
agent is released, potentially contaminating crops or livestock or
food processing facilities. FBI officials said that they
coordinated the Domestic Guidelines and CONPLAN with the five
other agencies (FEMA, DOD, DOE, HHS and EPA) because those
agencies were cited most prominently in PDD 39. However, PDD 39
also cited Treasury as having an important role in
counterterrorism. These officials told us that they plan to
coordinate the Domestic Guidelines and CONPLAN with other agencies
once the FBI and the five other agencies agree on the documents.
FBI officials did not have an estimate on when the five agencies
would approve either document or when these documents would be
coordinated with other appropriate agencies. We believe that the
FBI, as lead federal agency for crisis management in domestic
terrorist incidents, would better serve that role by fully
coordinating both documents with all federal agencies that have
counterterrorist roles. The International Guidelines have also not
been approved as final. These guidelines, which were drafted by
the State Department and provide procedures for overseas incidents
and operations, had not been approved because of differences among
agencies about overseas arrests. Specifically, the Departments of
State and Justice have not reached agreement on specific
operational issues related to these missions. Since our classified
report was issued, a State Department official told us the
Department deleted procedures for these arrests from the
International Guidelines to expedite their approval, but the
different views on operational matters continue. He stated that
the guidelines are in the final coordination stage. Page 8
GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 Command and Control
The FBI and the Secret Service were not always coordinating their
Issues Require Resolution command and control structures or
contingency plans with each other in the period we reviewed. FBI
and Secret Service officials acknowledged that the two agencies
had not worked well together, and cited efforts underway to
improve coordination and cooperation between the two agencies for
special events. Specifically, the Directors of the FBI and Secret
Service mutually agreed to a command and control plan and signed
the agreement in October 1998. This agreement has been submitted
to the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury for
final approval. The two agencies also stated that they recently
had conducted a joint tabletop exercise to test their command and
control relationship. DOD needs to clarify its internal command
and control structure for domestic operations. Although not a lead
federal agency, DOD could have a major supporting role in any
federal response to terrorist incidents in the United States,
particularly those involving WMD. In reviewing DOD's participation
in domestic support operations, special events, and exercises, we
found several command and control issues where guidance was either
confusing or conflicting. To resolve these issues, DOD is
undertaking a high-level review of its support to civilian
authorities, generally under the rubric of "homeland defense." The
National Defense Panel recommended that DOD emphasize homeland
defense more, and use military assets to assist law enforcement
agencies in combating terrorism, and incorporate its forces into
all levels of government to manage the consequences of a WMD-type
attack.7 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has chartered a
study called "UCP 21," which is reviewing these issues and may
recommend changes to the Unified Command Plan-the overall command
structure for military forces.8 There are also unresolved issues
of intergovernmental command and control (i.e., whether the
federal, state, or local government is in charge) in certain
circumstances. For consequence management, federal guidance- the
Federal Response Plan and its Terrorism Incident Annex-indicates
7The National Defense Panel was an independent nonpartisan group
of private sector experts, established by Congress to review the
national security strategy. The panel issued a report,
Transforming Defense, National Security in the 21st Century, in
December 1997. 8By statute (10 U.S.C. 161), the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, conducts a biennial review of the Unified Command
Plan and recommends revisions as appropriate. For more information
on this process, see Unified Command Plan: Atlantic and Southern
Command Participation in 1995 Review (GAO/NSIAD-97-41BR, Dec. 5,
1996). Page 9
GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 that state and local
authorities are in overall charge of recovery efforts and that the
federal government is in a support role. For crisis management,
the overall leadership of the response at the incident site is not
as clear. The FBI has recently taken some steps to work with state
and local governments to better define their respective lead and
support roles in managing a terrorist crisis. Strengths and
PDD 39 required key federal agencies to ensure that their
counterterrorist Weaknesses in capabilities were
well exercised. We found that federal agencies had conducted a
number of counterterrorist exercises following PDD 39.
Counterterrorist However, while agencies were
exercising together, there was no formal Exercises
interagency program as envisioned in PDD 39. We also found that
international crisis management exercises were more comprehensive
than domestic crisis exercises, though neither included scenarios
of no-warning terrorist attacks. Consequence management exercises
sponsored by FEMA were not comprehensive, but other federal
agencies were making progress exercising their capabilities.
Agencies Conducted Many Federal agencies conducted 201
exercises to improve their preparedness Exercises Since PDD 39
for counterterrorist operations in the past 3 years. In general,
exercises test and validate policies and procedures, test the
effectiveness of response capabilities, and increase the
confidence and skill level of personnel. In addition, exercises
identify strengths and weaknesses before they arise in an actual
incident. Exercises further allow agencies to apply operational
lessons learned from past exercises and actual deployments. In
counterterrorism, where federal operations are inherently
interagency matters, exercises also allow the various departments'
and agencies' personnel to become familiar with each others'
missions and procedures and learn to coordinate and operate
together. Interagency exercises can help identify aspects of
cooperation that work well and problems and conflicts that require
interagency resolution. Table 1 shows the number of federal
counterterrorism exercises that different agencies participated in
and led. Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-99-
135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 Table 1: Agency Participation
and Leadership in Federal Counterterrorism Exercises in the 3
Years Following PDD 39 (June 1995 to June 1998) Total exercises
Agency
Participated in Led DOD
143 97 FBI
99 24 FEMA
76 16 HHS
68 3 Secret Service
65 46 EPA
47 1 DOE
36 5 State
24 1 CIA
21 0 Department of Veterans Affairs
12 4 AT F
1 0 4 Other
36 3 Note: When more than one agency sponsored
an exercise, all sponsoring agencies were counted as the lead
agency; thus, the column total exceeds 201 exercises. CIA noted
that while it does not lead these types of exercises, it practices
its support role through participation in other agencies'
exercises. Other federal agencies include the Department of
Transportation; U.S. Capitol Police; and 13 other agencies,
offices, or bureaus. Source: Our analysis of agencies' data. The
agencies conducted a mixture of tabletop exercises in which agency
officials discuss scenarios around a table or other similar
setting, and field exercises where agency leadership and
operational units actually deploy to practice their skills and
coordination in a realistic field setting. Of the total 201
exercises, 85 (or 42 percent) were tabletop exercises and 116 (or
58 percent) were field exercises. Counterterrorism exercises
included both conventional and WMD scenarios to prepare federal
agencies for a wide variety of possible situations. In many of the
exercises, federal agencies gained experience working together. Of
the 201 federal counterterrorist exercises, 140 (or 70 percent)
were interagency exercises-involving more than one federal
department or independent agency.9 Of these 140 interagency
exercises, 96 were major interagency 9For the purpose of this
report, we defined "interagency" as involving more than one
federal department or independent agency. For example, DOD-led
exercises that included both Army and Navy participation, or
Justice-led exercises that included the FBI and Bureau of Prisons
participation, were not considered interagency exercises. Page 11
GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 exercises and
included three or more departments or independent agencies. In
some of the exercises, federal agencies also gained experience
working with state and/or local authorities, and nongovernmental
organizations. Specifically, 69 (or 34 percent) of the 201
exercises were intergovernmental, and 18 (or 9 percent) included
nongovernmental or other private organizations. Four exercises
included foreign government participation to simulate federal
agency integration in international incidents. Interagency
Exercise We found that there was no formal
interagency exercise program as Program Has Not Been Fully
envisioned in PDD 39. The National Security Council established an
Achieved interagency Exercise Subgroup
co-chaired by the State Department (for international exercises)
and the FBI (for domestic exercises) that also included FEMA, DOD,
HHS, DOE, EPA, CIA, NRC, and the Departments of Transportation and
Agriculture as members. The purpose of the Exercise Subgroup is to
promote interagency discussions of exercises, but it has not
implemented PDD 39 requirements to prepare or receive approval for
interagency exercise objectives and a schedule of exercises.
Interagency field exercises occur when individual agencies,
particularly DOD and DOE, invite other agencies to participate.
Because individual agencies that sponsor or participate in
exercises tend to focus on their own roles, some complex transfers
of command and control between agencies have not been exercised,
particularly in domestic scenarios. We believe that without
interagency exercises objectives set by the Exercise Subgroup,
agencies are not likely to exercise these key scenarios. As a
result, the federal government will be less prepared to respond in
a tailored, synchronized manner if an incident occurs. Officials
from State, FBI, DOD, DOE, EPA, and HHS said that the Exercise
Subgroup has fallen short of achieving its full objectives. These
officials cited a number of obstacles to full implementation of
the group as envisioned in PDD 39 and in the group's charter.
Despite the incomplete implementation of an interagency exercise
program as envisioned in PDD 39, in the 3 years since PDD 39,
there were 96 counterterrorist field and tabletop exercises
involving 3 or more agencies. These interagency exercises occurred
because individual sponsoring agencies, such as DOD, invited other
agencies to participate in their exercises. For example, DOD's
Domestic Preparedness Program tabletop exercises form the core of
interagency exercises with a focus on domestic consequence
management and intergovernmental participation. Page 12
GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 International Crisis
International crisis management exercises are more comprehensive
than Exercises More domestic exercises. DOD's and
DOE's well-developed international field Comprehensive Than
exercise programs have enhanced the preparedness of the federal
Domestic Crisis Exercises government to conduct
counterterrorist operations overseas. The State Department uses
DOD-led and DOE-led exercises to practice its leadership role in
international terrorist incidents. Each year, DOD and DOE sponsor
several international interagency field exercises. Commanders and
exercise planners take several steps to challenge participants in
these exercises. For example, these exercises test rapid and no-
notice deployment of command elements and tactical units to
locations worldwide. In addition, these exercises also frequently
test the FEST, so rapid and no-notice deployments also can be
practiced by the full cadre of interagency players. While
exercises do not guarantee success, they have resulted in a high
degree of preparedness of federal agencies to operate overseas in
a terrorist crisis. Domestic crisis response exercises are led by
law enforcement agencies and primarily provide tactical training
to their crisis response teams. Many of these exercises center
around the response capabilities of the lead agency, rather than
coordinating an interagency response and therefore do not include
many of the federal, state, and local agencies that would be
needed to effectively respond, or the entire range of activities
required to respond to a terrorist crisis. The FBI's domestic
crisis response program is well developed with regularly scheduled
field exercises that test regional and field office capabilities
at the tactical level.10 But the program generally does not
exercise the broader interagency leadership role that the Bureau
would play in a major terrorist incident. Some aspects of this
leadership role have been tested in selected exercises, such as
FBI-led exercises done in preparation for the Atlanta Olympics.
The FBI has begun taking steps to enhance its program and it
played a significant interagency leadership role in a June 1998
exercise sponsored by DOD. FBI officials noted that the Bureau had
increased this program's budget resources-which they had
previously cited as an impediment to a more robust program. 10For
the purpose of this report, the tactical level refers to the
personnel and activities occurring at a specific site to eliminate
or capture a terrorist or terrorists and to render safe and remove
a conventional or unconventional weapon or device. Page 13
GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 The Secret Service
conducts a variety of counterterrorist exercises for its special
agents related to its mission to protect the President. The
exercises generally involve continuity of operations of the White
House or protecting the President or other officials. Some of the
exercises included other federal agencies (generally DOD), state
and local police, and fire and rescue authorities. The Secret
Service generally did not conduct exercises with the FBI, although
the two agencies have overlapping responsibilities at special
events.11 In the few cases in which both agencies participated in
the same exercise, they did not exercise how they would interact
in a terrorist incident. The Secret Service plans to increase the
agency's counterterrorism exercise program to reflect its new role
in certain special events. For example, in preparing for the World
Energy Council in Houston in September 1998, the Secret Service
conducted a tabletop exercise that included FBI and state and
local authorities. In its comments on our classified report, the
Secret Service stated that it planned to conduct the exercises
with the FBI on scenarios where the two agencies need to work
together. ATF conducts exercises that test its crisis response and
investigation roles in terrorist bombings. These exercises do not
involve tests of ATF's supporting role in an interagency response
led by the FBI. ATF generally does not exercise with FBI, although
the two agencies have potentially overlapping responsibilities,
such as in cases where the sources of bombings are unknown.12 ATF
is developing a crisis management exercise program similar to the
FBI program. ATF exercises feature its Critical Incident
Management Response Team and involve its regional Special Response
Teams. FBI exercises feature its Critical Incident Response Group
and involve its Hostage Rescue Team and regional Special Weapons
and Tactics teams. The ATF and FBI scenarios that we reviewed were
similar, and ATF officials were unable to make any distinction
between their program and the FBI's program. Based upon our
analysis of the ATF's program, it appears that ATF is exercising
its lead in incidents in which the 11In addition to both agencies
providing some type of security function at special events, their
statutory authorities may result in potential overlap. Secret
Service has the statutory mission to protect the President and
other protectees (18 U.S.C. 3056), and also investigates any
threatening criminal activity against the President pursuant to
that authority. The FBI has the statutory mission to investigate
attacks upon the President (18 U.S.C. 1751). 12FBI and ATF have a
1973 Memorandum of Understanding on which agency has primary
investigative jurisdiction in a bombing based upon such factors as
the target of the bomb. If the perpetrator of the bombing is
unclear, both agencies may claim jurisdiction. FBI and ATF
officials have been meeting to resolve their differences on this
issue. Page 14
GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 FBI, not ATF, would
lead. The lack of coordination on exercises between these two law
enforcement agencies could reduce the effectiveness of the total
federal response to a terrorist incident and lead to duplication
of effort. In addition, crisis management exercises, both
international and domestic, always end in the successful tactical
resolution of the incidents and do not include more likely
scenarios where terrorist attacks are successful, or occur without
adequate threat warning. Thus, the full gamut of interagency
crisis management activities is not tested. For example, in the 3
years following PDD 39, the FBI did not conduct or participate in
a field exercise that simulated the concurrence of crisis response
and consequence management to deal with a major terrorist
incident. Consequence Management Domestic consequence
management exercises are not well developed. Exercises Not
PDD 39 designated FEMA as the lead federal agency for consequence
Comprehensive management in domestic terrorist
events. In addition, the fiscal year 1995 Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations tasked FEMA to develop exercises to focus on the
consequences of terrorist incidents as part of its exercise
program. In response to these taskings, FEMA sponsored a series of
interagency counterterrorism tabletop exercises that focused on
interagency and intergovernmental issues. However, FEMA has not
planned or sponsored an interagency field exercise to test its
consequence management leadership role. Tabletop exercises are
useful to the extent they identify important policy and
operational issues that need to be resolved. However, tabletop
exercises are not a substitute for field exercises that test the
federal government's ability to use and coordinate personnel and
assets in a realistic setting. FEMA officials told us that they
lack the resources to manage an interagency field exercise
program. They also stated that they are reluctant to commit
resources to field exercises because the Domestic Guidelines and
CONPLAN are still not approved and that they do not want to
exercise their staff using procedures that may not be correct
because of additional changes in these guidance documents.
Commenting on our classified report, FEMA noted that numerous
other disaster-related operations (which were outside the scope of
our review) significantly improved the federal government's
overall response capabilities to conduct consequence management in
terrorist incidents. Federal agencies or entities other than FEMA
have sponsored some consequence management field exercises. The
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) sponsored four recent domestic
field exercises that dealt with Page 15
GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 the medical aspects
of consequence management in a terrorist attack using WMD. For
example, in March 1997, VA sponsored an exercise, in conjunction
with the state of Minnesota, that simulated a terrorist attack on
a federal building with explosives laced with radioactive
material, and the subsequent decontamination and treatment of
hundreds of casualties. Commenting on our classified report, VA
stated that numerous other disaster-related exercises (which were
outside the scope of our review) also improved VA's consequence
management capabilities. DOD sponsored two recent domestic field
exercises that also dealt with the medical aspects of consequence
management in a terrorist attack using WMD. For example, in
September 1997, DOD sponsored a field exercise (co-sponsored by
VA) to practice providing medical care to victims of a terrorist
WMD attack. That exercise, which had over 2,000 participants, also
included state and local responders, and local community
hospitals. In addition, some states and cities have sponsored
field exercises on consequence management, some of them in
conjunction with the DOD Domestic Preparedness Program. For
example, in November 1997, New York City sponsored a field
exercise based on a scenario where terrorists released chemical
agents. The objectives of this exercise were to test first
responder's ability to appropriately evaluate and respond to a
chemical attack and fully integrate the city's incident command
system. DOD, in conjunction with cities, plans to conduct more
than 100 Domestic Preparedness Program field exercises in the next
several years. Better Processes to Lessons learned
processes are practices that allow an agency to learn from Capture
Lessons its successes and mistakes to improve
its performance. We found that DOD, DOE, and FEMA had relatively
good processes in place to capture Learned Could
and share lessons learned, while other agencies had less rigorous
Improve Future processes. There was also no
interagency process in place to capture and Operations
share lessons learned, but agencies were starting to implement a
process at the end of our review. DOD, DOE, and FEMA Have A key
part of any lessons learned process is preparing an After Action
Requirements and Report (AAR) or other evaluation
that provides an official description of Processes to Capture
the results of an operation, special event, or exercise. An AAR
typically Lessons Learned includes a summary of
objectives, operational limitations, major participants, a
description of strengths and weaknesses, and recommended actions.
Effective follow-up and validation also are important parts of a
lessons learned process, as they are the only means to ensure that
Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-135
Combating Terrorism B-282474 problems have been corrected. Another
important feature of a lessons learned process is the
dissemination within an organization and, where appropriate, to
other organizations, of aspects of operations that worked well and
those that need further improvement or development. For
counterterrorism operations, which are inherently interagency
matters, the lessons learned process should also address the
interaction between different agencies to highlight problems for
resolution in interagency forums or by top national leadership.
The DOD and DOE processes for capturing lessons learned had
several positive characteristics in comparison to the other
agencies' processes we reviewed. DOD and DOE had requirements to
produce AARs and their officials or contractors wrote AARs, made
specific recommendations, disseminated AARs to different
organizational units, and produced AARs for some exercises and
events led by other agencies. For example, we observed DOE
contractors as they entered lessons learned data "real time"
during a June 1998 exercise led by DOD. Some DOD field exercises
included data evaluation plans in advance to ensure that lessons
were learned on the specific exercise objectives. In addition, DOD
and DOE officials included interagency issues in their AARs and
sometimes disseminated them to other agencies. DOD and DOE
officials cited the value of a sound AAR process to improving
their performance and said that on the basis of issues identified
in earlier AARs, they had improved operations. For example, DOD
exercises helped determine and refine policy and procedures on the
final disposition of WMD devices. Policy issues on this topic were
identified in AARs going back to 1993. In the intervening years,
DOD continued to include this issue in its tabletop exercises. In
1996, a new policy was incorporated into a formal contingency
plan. The new policy was further tested in tabletop exercises in
1997 and finally in field exercises in 1998. While there are
remaining issues to be resolved on the final disposition of a WMD
device, DOD officials were able to track their progress on this
issue. DOE reorganized its Nuclear Emergency Search Team on the
basis of lessons learned from a series of exercises. We were able
to track the evolution of the Nuclear Emergency Search Team
through past evaluations and AARs written by DOE. Although the DOD
and DOE lessons learned processes were good in comparison to the
other agencies we reviewed, we did note some weaknesses in their
processes. DOD and DOE did not write AARs for all of the
counterterrorism operations, special events, or exercises that
they Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-135
Combating Terrorism B-282474 participated in. Both DOD and DOE
officials stated that emerging crises or the tempo of operations
did not always allow staff to write AARs. In addition,
dissemination of lessons learned were sometimes limited because of
security classifications. Finally, our prior report, which
included a broader and more detailed review of DOD's lessons
learned programs, discussed weaknesses in the collection,
analysis, dissemination, and ultimate use of lessons learned.13
FEMA also had relatively sound lessons learned requirements and
processes as part of its Comprehensive Exercise Program for
designing, conducting, and evaluating exercises. For several
years, FEMA had been developing computer software to record
lessons learned from exercises and monitor corrective actions.14
FEMA produced AARs on the tabletop exercises it led but not for
exercises led by other agencies. Contractors usually wrote AARs
and FEMA officials reviewed and approved them. FEMA disseminated
its AARs both internally and externally. FEMA's AARs generally
included interagency issues for those exercises that included
other agencies. For example, the AAR on FEMA's June 1996 "Cirrus
Wind" exercise stressed the need for FEMA and FBI to work together
to understand their responsibilities for consequence and crisis
management. Other Agencies' Lessons Federal agencies
other than DOD, DOE, and FEMA had less rigorous Learned Processes
Not Well processes for capturing lessons learned and producing
AARs. The other Developed agencies did not
have a written policy that required that they produce AARs or a
formal process to capture lessons learned. The production of AARs
by some of these other agencies was sporadic, particularly for
operations, special events, and exercises led by other agencies.
In addition, few of these other agencies included discussions of
interagency issues in their AARs. Finally, the dissemination of
AARs was limited at many agencies, which minimized the benefits of
lessons learned. These limitations make it more difficult for the
agencies to capture the strengths and weaknesses shown in
operations or exercises so they can continue or expand good
practices or take corrective actions when necessary to improve
future performance. Table 2 describes selected agencies' processes
for capturing lessons learned and producing AARs. 13See Military
Training: Potential to Use Lessons Learned to Avoid Past Mistakes
is Largely Untapped (GAO/NSIAD-95-152, Aug. 9, 1995). While the
review examined DOD lessons learned processes, it did not
specifically focus on counterterrorist operations or exercises.
14At the end of our review, FEMA officials told us they were
testing software to implement this corrective action program
throughout the agency. Page 18
GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 Table 2:
Characteristics of Federal Agencies' Processes to Capture Lessons
Learned From Counterterrorist Operations, Special Events, and
Exercises Agency policy and/or process to Actual agency
production of after AAR discussion of interagency Agency
capture lessons learned action reports
issues and dissemination DOD Policy requires AARs;
formal process Generally produces AARs for
AARs generally discuss interagency is Joint Universal Lessons
Learned operations, special events, and issues;
AARs disseminated internally System.
exercises, including those led by and sometimes
externally. other agencies. DOE Policy requires
AARs; formal process Generally produces AARs for special AARs
generally discuss interagency is After Action Tracking System.
events and exercises, including those issues; AARs disseminated
internally led by other agencies. and
sometimes externally. FEMA Policy requires AARs;
formal process Produces no AARs for special events; AARs
generally discuss interagency is Corrective Action Program.
produces AARs for FEMA exercises, issues; AARs disseminated
internally but not those led by other agencies. and
sometimes externally. ATF No formal policy or
process. Produces AARs for some operations; AARs do
not discuss interagency produces no AARs for special events;
issues; AARs disseminated internally. produces AARs for ATF
exercises, but not those led by other agencies. FBI
No formal policy or process. Produces no AARs for
operations or AARs generally do not discuss special events;
generally produces interagency issues; AARs AARs for FBI
field exercises but not disseminated internally to
tabletop exercises or those led by participating FBI
offices, but not to other agencies.
FBI Headquarters or externally. EPA No formal policy
or process. Sometimes produces AARs for
AARs generally discuss interagency special events and exercises,
issues; AARs disseminated internally, including those led by other
agencies. but not externally. Secret Service No formal policy
or process. Generally produces AARs for special AARs
generally do not discuss events; produces no AARs for
interagency issues; AARs not exercises led by Secret Service or
disseminated internally or externally. other agencies. State
No formal policy or process. Rarely produces AARs for
operations Not applicable. and exercises, even if led by State.
AARs rarely done. HHS No formal policy or process.
Rarely produces AARs for operations Not applicable. or exercises,
even if led by HHS. AARs rarely done. Note: We did not
include VA or CIA in this table because we did not conduct
detailed reviews of their processes to capture lessons learned.
Both agencies did write AARs for selected exercises. Source: Our
analysis of agencies' data. Many agencies did not produce AARs
even in cases where they led an exercise. Agencies lead exercises
because they have specific objectives to achieve, and one purpose
of exercises is to capture lessons that might improve future
operations. Nevertheless, we found many cases where agencies
devoted their resources to develop exercise objectives and conduct
an exercise, yet did not write AARs. For example, the FBI has
sponsored the Weapons of Mass Destruction Interagency Support
Exercise Page 19
GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 series, which
includes numerous federal agencies and has the objective to
advance interagency coordination for terrorist attacks. However,
FBI has not produced AARs on any of the four tabletop exercises.
Table 3 shows whether agencies produced AARs for the exercises
they led. Table 3: Production of After Action Reports by Selected
Federal Agencies for the Counterterrorism Exercises They Led in
the 3 Years Following PDD 39 (June 1995 to June 1998). Total
exercises AARs produced by Agency
led by agency lead agency DOD
97 79 (81%) Secret Service
47 0 FBI
22 13 (59%) FEMA
16 14 (88%) DOE
5 5 (100%) ATF
4 4 (100%) VA
4 2 (50%) HHS
3 0 State
1 0 EPA
1 1 (100%) Other
3 1 (33%) Note: Includes both tabletop and field
exercises the agency led. The Secret Service noted that its
lessons learned are based on special events, not its exercise
program. Other government agencies include the Department of
Transportation, U.S. Capitol Police, and 13 other agencies,
offices or bureaus. Source: Our analysis of agencies' data. Many
agencies also did not produce AARs when they participated in a
field exercise. Field exercises are very resource intensive
because they require a great deal of advance planning and because
agency personnel and equipment actually deploy to another
location. Again, we found cases where agencies led or otherwise
participated in field exercises but did not produce AARs. For
example, in a recent DOD-sponsored field exercise, FEMA developed
specific objectives and tasks to be accomplished and sent several
staff to planning meetings and to the week-long exercise itself,
yet it did not produce an AAR. Table 4 shows the extent to which
agencies produced AARs for field exercises that they participated
in. Page 20
GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 Table 4: Production
of After Action Reports by Selected Federal Agencies for
Counterterrorist Field Exercises That They Participated in for the
3 Years Following PDD 39 (June 1995 to June 1998). Total field
exercises AARs produced for field Agency
agency participated in exercises by agency DOD
72 38 (53%) Secret Service
52 0 FBI
32 18 (56%) FEMA
16 0 State
15 1 (7%) DOE
13 10 (77%) HHS
13 2 (15%) ATF
9 4 (44%) VA
6 2 (33%) EPA
4 1 (25%) Other
14 0 Note: Includes all field
exercises, whether the agency led the exercise or not. Secret
Service noted that its lessons learned are based on special
events, not its exercise program. Other government agencies
include the Department of Transportation, U.S. Capitol Police, and
13 other agencies, offices, or bureaus. Source: Our analysis of
agencies' data. Officials from these agencies generally cited a
lack of dedicated staff or the tempo of ongoing operations or
exercises as reasons they did not write AARs or otherwise capture
lessons learned. In our view, agencies that devote the resources
to lead exercises or to participate in other agencies' field
exercises should also devote the resources to writing AARs to
capture lessons learned. Some officials noted that they hold a
"hotwash" (i.e., an oral AAR discussion) after an exercise which,
they said, served the purpose of capturing lessons learned.
Hotwashes are valuable because they are held immediately after
exercises; however, their value is limited to the participants
that attend. Written AARs, on the other hand, provide
accountability because they identify and document problems or
issues and can be used to track the progress of corrective action.
By not producing written AARs, agencies are forfeiting many of the
benefits of participating in exercises. In commenting on our
classified report, several agencies cited efforts underway to
develop or improve processes for capturing lessons learned at
their individual agencies. Page 21
GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 Interagency Lessons
The 1996 Nunn-Lugar hearings highlighted that, although some
agencies Learned Process Being wrote AARs and made
recommendations, there were recurrent interagency Developed
problems because there was no central place where officials
assembled and analyzed AARs together to discuss interagency
problems. During our review, we also found no AAR or lessons
learned process at the interagency level. The Exercise Subgroup
charter included the discussion of lessons learned and AARs. While
this interagency forum had been used to discuss specific
exercises, there was no process to review individual agency AARs
that raise interagency issues. For more than 2 years, the group
has discussed developing a formal interagency process and has
looked specifically at the processes being used by DOD and DOE.
The State Department has been a repository for various agencies'
AARs for international exercises, but Department officials there
said they lacked the staff and standing to analyze them, separate
out the interagency issues, and prepare related evaluations or
make recommendations. At the time of our review, the FBI was in
charge of developing an interagency AAR process, but no decisions
had been made. In commenting on our classified report, several
agencies noted that the Exercise Subgroup had recently adopted an
interagency AAR process and was starting to implement it.
Conclusions During the last 3 years, federal
agencies have worked together in many operations and special
events and have generally coordinated their activities. However,
issues of interagency guidance and command and control remain that
need to be addressed to enhance the federal government's ability
to effectively respond to terrorist incidents. Federal agencies
have participated in many interagency counterterrorism exercises
in the last 3 years. However, an interagency exercise program, as
directed in PDD 39, has not been fully achieved, so exercises have
not generally practiced key transfers of authority among
responding federal agencies. International field exercises,
generally led by DOD, include the full cadre of interagency
players in demanding scenarios and some are done with no notice.
In contrast, domestic counterterrorism exercises are not as
demanding in testing the interagency ability to respond. The FBI's
crisis management field exercises have provided good practice for
its tactical response units but have generally not exercised the
Bureau's interagency leadership role and rapid deployments for no-
warning terrorist attacks. FEMA's consequence management exercises
have been limited to tabletop exercises that do not fully test the
federal government's ability to provide a rapid interagency
response in a realistic exercise environment. Although agencies
can benefit most from counterterrorism exercises if they produce
Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-135
Combating Terrorism B-282474 AARs and have a process to capture
lessons learned, most of the agencies that we reviewed did not do
so. Although counterterrorism is inherently an interagency
response, there was also no interagency process to capture lessons
learned. At the close of our review, agencies said they were
adopting several measures to address these issues at both the
agency and interagency level. Recommendations This report makes
no recommendations. However, in our classified report, we made
several recommendations to enhance interagency guidance, command
and control, exercises, and processes to capture and share lessons
learned. DOD classified these recommendations as a result of its
security review of our classified report. Agency Comments We
received written comments on our classified report from 15
agencies, including the Departments of Justice, State, Treasury;
DOD, DOE, HHS, VA; and FEMA, EPA, CIA, NRC, ATF, the Secret
Service, U.S. Customs Service, and Internal Revenue Service. The
National Security Council declined to provide official comments on
the report. Many of the agencies concurred or partially concurred
with the report and our recommendations and cited recent steps
taken to implement them. For example, DOE stated that our report
was an accurate assessment of both the progress and the lingering
shortfalls within the interagency counterterrorist community. NRC
stated that our recommendations will provide a blueprint for
resolving many of the interagency difficulties outlined in the
report. Other agencies did not concur with parts of our report and
provided additional information about their programs or cited
improvements underway. For example, the Department of Justice
cited progress in interagency guidance, command and control
relationships, exercise programs, and processes to capture lessons
learned. We did not reproduce agency comments in this report due
to security classification reasons. However, we incorporated their
unclassified comments in this report as appropriate. Scope and
We focused our examination on counterterrorist activities in the
3-year Methodology period following the issuance of PDD 39
in June 1995. We obtained documents and interviewed officials at
the Departments of Justice, State, Treasury (including the Secret
Service and ATF), DOD, DOE, HHS, VA, CIA, EPA, FEMA, NRC, and the
U.S. Capitol Police. We also obtained information on matters
pertaining to intergovernmental counterterrorist Page 23
GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 operations (e.g.,
those involving federal, state, and local entities) from state and
local officials and selected federal field offices in the course
of our related work on DOD's Domestic Preparedness Program. We
compiled a list of 230 counterterrorism activities that included
operations, special events, and exercises that were conducted from
June 1995 to June 1998. In some cases, we discussed
counterterrorist activities before and after that period, but we
did not include them in the statistics we compiled and analyzed.
We did not review covert activities or law enforcement cases
(e.g., criminal investigations and arrests of terrorists) except
in the cases of overseas arrests, which are interagency
operations. We also did not include aircraft hijackings or related
exercises, where the Federal Aviation Administration is generally
the lead federal agency. To ensure the accuracy of our list of
activities, appropriate federal agencies reviewed it for
completeness and accuracy. We also examined policy guidelines,
contingency plans, AARs, and other documents from actual
operations, special events, and exercises. Further, we attended
and observed interagency meetings, planning sessions, and
exercises. We performed our work in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards between November 1997 and
September 1998. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly
announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further
distribution of this report until 30 days after its issue date. At
that time we will send copies to appropriate congressional
committees, the federal agencies discussed in this report, and to
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. We also will
make copies available to other interested parties upon request. If
you have any questions about this report, please contact Mark
Gebicke, Director for National Security Preparedness Issues, at
(202) 512-5140. Other major contributors to this report were Davi
M. D'Agostino, Stephen L. Caldwell, Alan M. Byroade, Lee Purdy,
and Raymond J. Wyrsch. Henry L. Hinton, Jr. Assistant Comptroller
General Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-
135 Combating Terrorism B-282474 Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-135
Combating Terrorism Related GAO Products Terrorism and Drug
Trafficking: Testing Status and Views on Operational Viability of
Pulsed Fast Nuetron Analysis Technology (GAO/GGD-99-54, Apr. 13,
1999). Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism
and Public Health Initiatives (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112, Mar. 16, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat
Terrorism (GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107, Mar. 11, 1999). Combating
Terrorism: FBI's Use of Federal Funds for Counterterrorism-
Related Activities (FYs 1995-98) (GAO/GGD-99-7, Nov. 20, 1998).
Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic
Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov.
12, 1998). Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-
Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, Oct. 2,
1998). Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues
(GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23, 1998). Combating Terrorism: Threat
and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program
Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998). Combating Terrorism:
Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and
Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997). Combating Terrorism:
Efforts to Protect U.S. Forces in Turkey and the Middle East
(GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44, Oct. 28, 1997). Combating Terrorism: Federal
Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy
(GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997). Combating Terrorism: Status of
DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces Overseas (GAO/NSIAD-97-207, July
21, 1997). Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Changes Needed in the
Management Structure of Emergency Preparedness Program (GAO/NSIAD-
97-91, June 11, 1997). Page 26
GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism Related GAO Products State
Department: Efforts to Reduce Visa Fraud (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-167, May
20, 1997). Aviation Security: FAA's Procurement of Explosives
Detection Devices (GAO/RCED-97-111R, May 1, 1997). Aviation
Security: Commercially Available Advanced Explosives Detection
Devices (GAO/RCED-97-119R, Apr. 24, 1997). Terrorism and Drug
Trafficking: Responsibilities for Developing Explosives and
Narcotics Detection Technologies (GAO/NSIAD-97-95, Apr. 15, 1997).
Federal Law Enforcement: Investigative Authority and Personnel at
13 Agencies (GAO/GGD-96-154, Sept. 30, 1996). Aviation Security:
Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed (GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-151, Sept.
11, 1996). Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for
Detecting Explosives and Narcotics (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252, Sept.
4, 1996). Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve
Security (GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237, Aug. 1, 1996). Terrorism and
Drug Trafficking: Threats and Roles of Explosives and Narcotics
Detection Technology (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR, Mar. 27, 1996).
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S. Efforts to Improve
Nuclear Material Controls in Newly Independent States
(GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89, Mar. 8, 1996). Aviation Security:
Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and International
Challenges (GAO/RCED-94-38, Jan. 27, 1994). Nuclear Security:
Improving Correction of Security Deficiencies at DOE's Weapons
Facilities (GAO/RCED-93-10, Nov. 16, 1992). Nuclear Security: Weak
Internal Controls Hamper Oversight of DOE's Security Program
(GAO/RCED-92-146, June 29, 1992). Page 27
GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism Related GAO Products
Electricity Supply: Efforts Underway to Improve Federal Electrical
Disruption Preparedness (GAO/RCED-92-125, Apr. 20, 1992). State
Department: Management Weaknesses in the Security Construction
Program (GAO/NSIAD-92-2, Nov. 29, 1991). Chemical Weapons:
Physical Security for the U.S. Chemical Stockpile (GAO/NSIAD-91-
200, May 15, 1991). State Department: Status of the Diplomatic
Security Construction Program (GAO/NSIAD-91-143BR, Feb. 20, 1991).
(701124/701163) Letter Page 28
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