Defense Acquisitions: Progress of the F/A-18E/F Engineering and
Manufacturing Development Program (Letter Report, 06/15/1999,
GAO/NSIAD-99-127).

The F/A-18E/F is meeting all performance requirements, according to the
Navy. GAO does not agree with this assessment. The Navy based its
assessment on the E model's performance and assumed some improvements to
the aircraft that have yet to be shown. Without that assumption, the F
model, which makes up more than half of the E/F planned buy, is not
meeting the interdiction range requirement--a primary justification for
the program. The Navy's schedule for operational test and evaluation,
combined with unresolved aircraft deficiencies, could cause the E/F to
fail that testing. Corrections of some deficiencies have been shifted to
later in the program. This will help the Navy stay within the
congressionally mandated cost cap for development; however, correcting
these shortcomings will increase the aircraft's development costs. GAO
recommends that the Defense Department defer multiyear funding for the
E/F program until all corrections of deficiencies have been incorporated
into the aircraft's design and successfully tested.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-99-127
     TITLE:  Defense Acquisitions: Progress of the F/A-18E/F
	     Engineering and Manufacturing Development Program
      DATE:  06/15/1999
   SUBJECT:  Operational testing
	     Defense capabilities
	     Fighter aircraft
	     Naval aircraft
	     Naval procurement
	     Military cost control
	     Military appropriations
	     Contract costs
	     Multiyear contracts
IDENTIFIER:  F/A-18E/F Aircraft
	     F/A-18C/D Aircraft
	     MK-83 Bomb
	     ALE-50 Towed Decoy System
	     ALR-67 Radar Warning Receiver
	     AIM-9X Missile

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    United States General Accounting Office GAO                 Report
    to Congressional Committees June 1999           DEFENSE
    ACQUISITIONS Progress of the F/A-18E/F Engineering and
    Manufacturing Development Program GAO/NSIAD-99-127 United States
    General Accounting Office
    National Security and Washington, D.C. 20548
    International Affairs Division B-281419
    Letter June 15, 1999 Congressional Committees As required by the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (P.L. 105-
    261), we reviewed the Navy's F/A-18E/F developmental and
    operational test program.  We presented the results of our review
    during testimony before the Subcommittee on Airland Forces, Senate
    Committee on Armed Services, on March 17, 1999.1 This report
    supplements that testimony by providing additional data on the
    aircraft deficiencies identified during the test program and
    discusses our conclusions regarding the E/F's progress toward
    achieving established performance, schedule, and cost goals.
    Specifically, we (1) determined the extent to which the aircraft
    is meeting performance requirements, (2) identified risks
    associated with proceeding into operational test and evaluation
    (OPEVAL) with unresolved deficiencies, and (3) identified
    potential cost increases and risks associated with approving the
    Navy's request for multiyear funding for the program.  The act
    also requires that we certify whether we had access to sufficient
    information to make informed judgments on the matters covered by
    this report. Public Law 105-261 requires us to conduct annual
    reviews of the F/A-18E/F until the aircraft enters full-rate
    production.  This report covers our first review under the act.
    During our next review, we will focus on determining whether
    beginning OPEVAL with a significant number of unresolved
    deficiencies will result in over reliance on modeling and
    simulation rather than actual flight testing.  We will also
    determine whether test restrictions on the aircraft configuration
    or missions flown could invalidate OPEVAL results. Results in
    Brief                    According to the Navy, the F/A-18E/F is
    meeting all performance requirements. We do not agree with the
    Navy's assessment.  The Navy based its assessment on the E model's
    performance and assumed some improvements to the aircraft that
    have not yet been demonstrated.  Without that assumption, the F
    model, which makes up over half of the E/F planned 1Defense
    Acquisitions: Progress of the F-22 and F/A-18E/F Engineering and
    Manufacturing Programs (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113, Mar. 17, 1999). Page 1
    GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions B-281419 buy, is not meeting
    the interdiction range requirement-a primary justification for the
    program. The Navy's OPEVAL schedule, combined with unresolved
    aircraft deficiencies, could cause the E/F to fail OPEVAL.  The
    Navy maintained its original schedule and started OPEVAL on May
    27, 1999, even though completion of the development effort slipped
    from November 1998 to April 1999.  Because the Navy is maintaining
    its original OPEVAL schedule, the contractor has insufficient time
    to correct some critical deficiencies in the aircraft that,
    according to Navy criteria, should be corrected prior to OPEVAL.
    Department of Defense (DOD), Navy, and contractor personnel have
    stated that there is a medium risk that OPEVAL might find the E/F
    not operationally effective and/or suitable.  Such a conclusion
    could result in a delay or postponement of the full-rate
    production decision and the need to conduct additional operational
    testing. Corrections of some deficiencies have been shifted to
    later in the program. This will help the Navy stay within the
    congressionally mandated developmental cost cap; however,
    correcting these deficiencies will increase the procurement costs
    of the aircraft.  Congress is considering the Navy's request for
    multiyear procurement of the F/A-18E/F.  A key criterion for
    obtaining congressional approval for multiyear procurement is
    design stability.  Correction of some E/F deficiencies could
    result in contract modifications and design changes to the
    aircraft, which increases the risk associated with Congress's
    approving the Navy's multiyear procurement request for the E/F at
    this time.  We recommend in this report that the Secretary of
    Defense defer multiyear funding for the E/F program until all
    corrections of deficiencies have been incorporated into the
    aircraft design and successfully tested. The Navy and the
    contractors gave us access to sufficient information to make
    informed judgments on the performance of the aircraft.  With
    respect to program costs, we requested estimates to correct the
    deficiencies identified during the test program; however, the
    contractor told us that such estimates are not available.  We also
    requested the procurement unit cost comparisons that the
    contractor and the Navy program office had prepared of procuring
    548 E/Fs to procuring 548 C/D model aircraft.  The program office
    declined to provide us those comparisons. Background    The F/A-
    18E/F program began in 1992 to increase the operational
    capabilities of the current fleet of F/A-18 aircraft.  The
    objectives of the Page 2
    GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions B-281419 program are to
    provide improved capabilities over current F/A-18s in five key
    areasrange, payload, carrier recovery payload, growth capacity,
    and survivability. Congress capped the development effort at $4.88
    billion (in fiscal year 1990 dollars) and directed that the E/F
    unit procurement cost not exceed 125 percent of current C/D model
    costs. The F/A-18E/F development flight test program began in
    February 1996. The Integrated Test Team, using five single-seat E
    models and two 2-seat F models, is conducting the tests.  Two
    early operational assessments of the E/F aircraft, using wind
    tunnel data and analytical models, were made in early 1996 and
    1997.  Two operational assessments of the E/F aircraft, based on
    data obtained during test flights using the engineering and
    manufacturing development aircraft, were conducted in November
    1997 (OT-IIA) and in June through August 1998 (OT-IIB).  The
    Navy's Operational Test and Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR) conducted
    these assessments. The Navy has contracted for 62 aircraft under
    three low-rate initial production contracts.  The first seven of
    these aircraft will be used to conduct the next operational flight
    test phase of the program.  That phase, OPEVAL, is to be conducted
    during MayNovember 1999.  The OPEVAL results will be used to
    determine whether the E/F program should proceed into full-rate
    production in March 2000. We reported in June 1996 that current
    F/A-18s are not as deficient as the Navy reported and that the
    F/A-18E/F would provide only a marginal improvement in capability
    over the older F/A-18s at a significantly greater cost.2  We
    recommended that DOD reconsider its plan to buy the E/F and
    instead buy additional F/A-18C/Ds.  DOD did not concur with our
    recommendation and continued to believe that procuring the E/F was
    the more cost-effective approach to modernizing the Navy's
    tactical aviation fleet. In March 1998 we reported that E/F flight
    test program officials had identified numerous deficiencies that
    if not corrected in time could affect the OPEVAL schedule or
    possibly cause the aircraft to have an unsuccessful operational
    test and evaluation.3  We recommended that the Navy not be allowed
    to procure any additional E/Fs beyond the 12 initially 2Navy
    Aviation:  F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal Operational Improvement
    at High Cost (GAO/NSIAD-96-98, June 18, 1996). 3Navy Aviation:
    F/A-18E/F Development and Production Issues  (GAO/NSIAD-98-61,
    Mar. 13, 1998). Page 3
    GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions B-281419 contracted for in
    March 1997 until the Navy demonstrated, through flight testing,
    that identified deficiencies had been corrected and incorporated
    into OPEVAL aircraft. DOD disagreed with that recommendation and
    stated that testing had not identified any specific deficiencies
    that would prevent the E/F from achieving an operationally
    effective level of performance. Extent to Which          The Navy
    is nearing completion of its F/A-18E/F development program. F/A-
    18E/F Is Meeting     The development flight test program began in
    February 1996 and was completed in April 1999.  During this phase
    of the program, the Navy Development              conducted both
    developmental and some limited operational testing using
    Performance              the aircraft produced under the
    engineering and manufacturing Requirements             development
    phase of the program.  Based on the results of that testing, the
    Navy reports that the E/F is meeting all performance parameters.
    The Navy's statements about the performance of the E/F reflect the
    performance of the single-seat E model aircraft, not the 2-seat F
    model. The second seat in the F model displaces fuel capacity,
    thereby reducing its range.  The Navy's assessment was also based
    on estimates of improved performance from anticipated changes to
    the aircraft, not all of which, according to the contractor, may
    come to fruition.  If these values are not included in the
    performance estimates, the F model aircraft will be 33 nautical
    miles short of meeting the development interdiction range
    requirement of 390 nautical miles.  This is significant because
    (1) the F model, which was originally planned to be used as a
    trainer aircraft and therefore made up only about 18 percent of
    the total buy, now will be used as an operational aircraft and
    makes up about 55 percent of the total buy and (2) increased range
    over the current C/D aircraft was critical to justifying the
    decision to buy the F/A-18E/F.  The Navy formally reports that the
    F/A-18E/F will have over 40 percent more range than F/A-18Cs.
    However, initial E/F range predictions have declined as actual
    flight data is gathered and incorporated into range prediction
    models. Test data currently projects that the E model will have a
    range of 434 nautical miles, or about 15 percent greater than the
    376 nautical mile range demonstrated by current F/A-18Cs. If the
    anticipated but not yet demonstrated range improvements are not
    included in the range estimates, the F/A-18E development
    interdiction range drops to 405 nautical miles, or about an 8-
    percent greater range than an F/A-18C. Also, the Navy's assessment
    of the E/F's performance does not consider the potential
    degradation of performance as a result of modifications to correct
    Page 4                                        GAO/NSIAD-99-127
    Defense Acquisitions B-281419 unresolved deficiencies identified
    during the developmental and operational flight test programs.
    These deficiencies and their potential negative impacts relate to
    the aircraft's combat range, payload, survivability, and ability
    to accommodate new, future systems.  All of these areas were cited
    as improvements by the Navy when it justified the E/F program.
    Combat Range    Potential solutions to problems found during the
    test program have resulted in a reduction in the E/F's combat
    range.  One of these problems, a condition described as "wing
    drop," was observed early in 1996 during F/A-18E/F development
    tests and was described as an unacceptable, uncommanded abrupt
    lateral roll that randomly occurred at the altitude and speed at
    which air-to-air combat maneuvers are expected to occur.  In
    October 1998, the OPEVAL Preparedness Team reported that the
    anticipated fix to the problem, replacing solid wing fold fairings
    with porous fairings, significantly reduced, but did not totally
    eliminate, the frequency and severity of wing drop.  However, the
    porous wing fold fairing has caused buffeting of the aircraft.
    The magnitude of the buffeting was described as severe enough to
    affect the pilots' voices and could also mask an aircraft
    malfunction, particularly for aircrews not accustomed to the
    sensation.  This buffeting was projected to reduce aircraft range.
    However, the actual range decrease is not yet known because
    resolution of the problem is still being worked on and program
    officials will not have a complete understanding of the impact of
    the wing drop design fix until operational testing is completed at
    the end of 1999.  According to program officials, the final
    production fixes to wing drop may involve something other than the
    porous wing fold fairing. Other range-related issues are
    associated with the Navy's attempts to resolve design problems
    that had resulted in bombs colliding with each other or with the
    aircraft.  To correct this problem, the Navy toed, or slanted, the
    inner wing pylons.  However, that fix increased the drag on the
    aircraft and resulted in air loads on the pylons where the 480-
    gallon tanks would be carried that significantly exceed the load
    limit designed into the E/F wings in this area.  If uncorrected,
    this deficiency would preclude the E/F from carrying 480-gallon
    external fuel tanks on each of the two inner wing stations
    specified for the interdiction mission and would prevent the
    aircraft from meeting its required range specification.  The Navy
    is studying options for redesigning the pylons and their
    attachment to the aircraft to correct this problem. Page 5
    GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions B-281419 Aircraft range will
    also be affected by the extent to which pilots use afterburner to
    compensate for deficiencies in the E/F's climb, turn, and
    acceleration rates.  Using afterburner to overcome these
    deficiencies will significantly increase fuel consumption and
    reduce mission range. Payload and Bringback     The F/A-18E/F
    reportedly carries a 22-percent greater payload than existing F/A-
    18s.  This increased payload is the result of the E/F's two
    additional wing stations.  However, development flight tests have
    revealed that the E/F experiences noise and vibration under the
    wings and at the wing tips that could damage air-to-air missiles
    carried by the aircraft. The Navy is determining whether a
    redesign of the missiles will be necessary for them to be carried
    on the E/F.  Additionally, excessive loads on the inner wing
    pylons have been caused by the closeness of these pylons to the
    aircraft fuselage and to the toeing of the pylons.  Current plans
    are to restrict what can be carried on these pylons during OPEVAL
    until a fix is designed and tested.  The restrictions would
    prohibit the E/F from carrying dual MK-83 (1,000 pound) bombs on
    these pylons during OPEVAL, which would reduce the payload
    capacity for the interdiction mission.  We were told that the
    aircraft could also have a problem landing on the carrier with
    unused weapons (bringback) because of the significant stress on
    these pylons.  The Navy is still studying this issue and has not
    yet identified a final fix. Survivability             The Navy
    planned to improve F/A-18E/F survivability relative to existing
    F/A-18s by reducing its susceptibility to detection and if
    detected the probability of being destroyed.  Initial operational
    tests cite concerns about E/F survivability systems.  While the
    specifics on E/F survivability are classified, the unclassified
    portions of the test reports identify concerns with the ALE-50
    towed decoy and the ALR-67 radar warning receiver.   The ALE-50
    towed decoy is designed to improve F/A-18E/F survivability by
    attracting enemy missiles to the decoy and away from the aircraft.
    The line that tows the decoy has been burning off when it crosses
    the heat path of the engine when the engine is in afterburner.
    The problems relative to the ALR-67 radar warning receiver involve
    the receiver's ability to provide accurate information on the
    direction of arrival of enemy threats.  The Procurement Executive
    Officer for Tactical Aircraft identified E/F survivability issues
    as the major challenges facing the E/F program. Growth Space
    In justifying the need for the F/A-18E/F, the Navy stated that it
    needed more space than was available on existing F/A-18s to
    accommodate additional Page 6
    GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions B-281419 new systems without
    having to remove existing capability.  The Navy reports that the
    F/A-18E/F will have 17 cubic feet of growth space. However,
    program documents show that only 5.46 cubic feet of that space
    will be usable for growth.  We reported in 1996 that growth space
    was available within the C/D.  The Navy's F/A-18 upgrade road map
    shows that most of the upgrades planned for the E/F are also
    planned for installation on C/Ds, which demonstrates that the C/Ds
    have growth space. Test Schedule and       The objective of OPEVAL
    is to field test the E/F under realistic combat Unresolved
    conditions to determine the aircraft's operational effectiveness
    and suitability for use in combat by typical military users
    against threat forces Deficiencies Cause      and targets.  For
    OPEVAL tests, the Navy plans to use production- Risks to
    Successful     representative aircraft that are being produced
    under the first low-rate OPEVAL                  initial
    production contract.  The OPEVAL results will be used to determine
    whether to proceed into full-rate production of the F/A-18E/F.
    Accordingly, the primary questions are whether the aircraft is
    ready to advance into OPEVAL and whether successful completion of
    that evaluation is highly probable.  Test results indicate that
    the Navy faces significant challenges regarding each of those
    questions. F/A-18E/F development was scheduled to be completed by
    November 1998, with OPEVAL beginning in May 1999.  That schedule
    would have provided time to correct deficiencies in the aircraft
    before their use during OPEVAL. However, additional test
    requirements, caused by the need to test corrections of
    deficiencies such as wing drop, have caused the completion of the
    development flight test program to slip to April 1999.  As a
    result of the development program delay and the Navy's decision to
    begin OPEVAL in May 1999 as originally scheduled, the contractor
    will not have time to correct some aircraft deficiencies that
    according to the Navy's criteria should be fixed before OPEVAL.
    In that regard, the OPEVAL Preparedness Team, which comprises DOD,
    Navy, and contractor personnel, meets periodically to determine
    whether the E/F is ready for OPEVAL.  On February 25, 1999, the
    team held its final meeting before the scheduled start of OPEVAL.
    At that meeting, the team concluded that 71 E/F deficiencies would
    not be corrected until after OPEVAL.  The Navy's criteria indicate
    that 23 of those deficiencies should be corrected prior to OPEVAL.
    These deficiencies consist of the problems associated with the
    ALE-50 towed decoy, the ALR-67 radar warning receiver, and the
    wing pylon loads.  In addition, they include such things as
    vibration that damages ordnance, delamination of the composite
    surface layers of the horizontal tail, and problems with the nose
    landing gear tires and wheels during Page 7
    GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions B-281419 catapult testing.
    The Preparedness Team concluded that there is a medium risk that
    the E/F will not successfully complete OPEVAL without first
    correcting these deficiencies.  The Preparedness Team's agreement
    to proceed into OPEVAL was based on the existence of correction
    plans to address these deficiencies. The Navy began OPEVAL on May
    27, 1999.  However, it plans to impose some operational limits on
    the aircraft during OPEVAL as a result of deficiencies that cannot
    be corrected prior to OPEVAL.  For example, as previously
    discussed, the E/F will not be permitted to carry dual MK-83 bombs
    because of the excessive air loads they put on the inner wing
    pylons. The E/F operational test team has completed two
    operational assessments, using aircraft produced during the EMD
    phase of the program, that relate to the potential for a
    successful OPEVAL.  Those assessments, referred to as OT-IIA and
    OT-IIB, were conducted in November 1997 and from June through
    August 1998, respectively.  Based on these assessments, the
    operational testers assigned a level of risk relative to a
    successful OPEVAL to each critical operational issue tested.
    Table 1 shows that the testers identified two operational
    effectiveness issues with significant risk (air-to-air weapons and
    survivability) and six with moderate risk. Table 1:  Critical
    Operational Issues Critical operational issue                 OT-
    IIA risk                OT-IIB risk Air-to-air weapons
    Not assessed               Significant Survivability
    Significant                Significant Fighter escort
    Moderate                   Moderate Combat air patrol
    Little or no risk          Moderate Air combat maneuvering
    Not assessed               Moderate Air-to-ground sensor
    performance           Moderate                   Moderate Air-to-
    ground weapons                      Moderate
    Moderate Air-to-air sensor performance              Moderate
    Moderate Source:  Navy operational test reports. The operational
    testers' OT-IIB assessment identified 29 major deficiencies in the
    E/F.  The deficiencies related to such things as the E/F's ability
    to accelerate, turn, climb, and roll.  Essentially, the E/F does
    not do as well in these areas as the F/A-18C aircraft.
    Additionally, the testers identified Page 8
    GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions B-281419 buffeting and
    lateral instability, or drift, as flying quality deficiencies.
    They also listed as major problems the ALE-50 towed decoy and the
    capability of the radar warning receiver to indicate the direction
    of oncoming threats. The specific deficiencies identified by the
    operational testers4 are as follows: * poor climb performance
    above 30,000 feet; * low acceleration; * airframe buffet; * high
    angle of attack and agility and controllability; * slow response
    to control inputs, slow loaded energy addition rate, and excessive
    speed loss during air combat maneuvering; * tactically ineffective
    sustained turn rate; * insufficient cooling capacity for seekers
    on air-to-air weapons; * improper indication of direction of
    arrival of oncoming threat systems; * damage to AIM-9 missile
    assemblies caused by wing tip environment; * ALE-50 tow line burn-
    off in afterburner; * difficulty maintaining lateral trim; *
    under-wing environment damages aircraft stores; * unsafe delivery
    of Rockeye bomb; * aircraft radar deficiency; * leading edge
    extension difficulties; * inconsistent brake effectiveness; *
    inadequate cooling capability of the fuel thermal management
    system; and * Targeting Forward Looking Infrared Radar resolution
    and magnification. Appendix I describes each of these deficiencies
    and discusses their potential impact on the E/F's ability to
    perform its missions. The operational testers recommended that the
    E/F continue to be developed.  They stated, however, that they
    based their recommendation on continued improvements in the E/F's
    current maneuvering performance and the development of follow-on
    systems that they considered essential to get the operational
    effectiveness projected for the E/F.  These improvements include
    such things as the Active Electronic Scanned Array radar, the
    Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System, the AIM-9X missile, and the
    Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasure System. 4Our list
    does not total 29 deficiencies because we combined closely related
    deficiencies. Page 9
    GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions B-281419 In addition to the
    risks to OPEVAL identified by the operational testers and the
    OPEVAL Preparedness Team, the Program Risk Advisory Board,
    comprising Navy and contractor personnel, in its January 1999
    assessment stated that there is a medium risk that OPEVAL might
    find the E/F not operationally effective and/or suitable, even if
    all development specification requirements are met.  The Board
    stated that the consequence of this type of conclusion from OPEVAL
    could result in a delay or postponement of the full-rate
    production decision and the need to conduct additional operational
    testing. F/A-18E/F Costs and               The Navy reports that
    the F/A-18E/F development effort will be completed Request for
    Multiyear  within the $4.88 billion (in fiscal year 1990 dollars)
    development cost ceiling established by Congress.  However, as of
    the end of February 1999, Funding                           71
    identified deficiencies had not been corrected.  Correction of
    these deficiencies will be accounted for as procurement, not
    development, costs. The contractor said that estimates of the
    costs of correcting these 71 deficiencies are not available.  In
    addition, Boeing has identified 99 deficiencies in the aircraft
    that it believes it is not required to correct under the
    development contract.  Estimates of the cost of correcting these
    deficiencies are also not available. The Navy's unit procurement
    cost estimate for the E/F assumes that it will accrue $1.3 billion
    of savings if Congress approves the Navy's request for multiyear
    funding as part of the fiscal year 2000 authorization and
    appropriation process.  Approval of such funding has historically
    depended on the ability to obtain significant savings, a stable
    system design, an adequately validated requirement, and a
    commitment to stable funding over the life of the contract.  The
    concerns raised within DOD about the uncertainty that the E/F will
    successfully complete OPEVAL and the number of unresolved issues,
    like the final solution to wing drop and buffeting and the inner
    wing pylon load concerns that could require design changes to the
    aircraft, increase the risk associated with congressional approval
    of the E/F multiyear funding request at this time. Conclusions and
    The F/A-18F model is not meeting its interdiction range
    requirementa Recommendation                    primary
    justification for the program.  The aircraft has some critical
    deficiencies that, notwithstanding Navy criteria to the contrary,
    will not be corrected until after OPEVAL.  Correcting these
    deficiencies later in the program will enable the Navy to remain
    within the development cost cap Page 10
    GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions B-281419 but will increase
    the unit procurement cost of the aircraft.  The impact of
    correcting these deficiencies on the cost and final design of the
    aircraft are factors critical to Congress' decision on whether to
    approve the Navy's pending request for multiyear procurement of
    the E/F aircraft. Given the uncertainty surrounding the F/A-
    18E/F's final design and the Navy's intention not to correct all
    deficiencies and test those corrections as part of OPEVAL, we
    recommend that the Secretary of Defense defer multiyear funding
    for the E/F program until all corrections of deficiencies have
    been incorporated into the aircraft design and successfully
    tested. Agency Comments and  In its written comments on our draft
    report DOD did not agree with our Our Evaluation
    recommendation.  DOD stated that no deficiencies have been
    identified that would require a major redesign of the aircraft or
    are serious enough to warrant not awarding a multiyear contract.
    To take this position, DOD is assuming that all major deficiencies
    will be corrected with minimum impact on aircraft design, cost, or
    schedule.  Specifically, DOD stated that although the aircraft
    will have 84 major deficiencies when it enters OPEVAL, 50 of them
    have a road map for solutions and funding.  This indicates that
    the Navy has a plan in place to correct the deficiencies, but the
    Navy did not specify the dates for incorporating and testing the
    corrections.  We continue to believe that the deficiencies should
    be corrected and validated through flight testing before the
    program is approved for multiyear funding.  Therefore, we reaffirm
    our recommendation. DOD also took issue with our statement that
    the F/A-18F is not meeting its interdiction range requirement.
    DOD stated that someone unfamiliar with the E/F program might
    assume this represents a serious deficiency in the program, which
    DOD said is not the case.  The purpose of our statement was to put
    into perspective Navy statements that the E/F program is meeting
    all performance requirements.  DOD's comments affirm that the F
    model is not meeting the interdiction range requirement, but by a
    tactically insignificant amount.  Thus, the issue has evolved into
    differing perspectives on the magnitude of the F model's range
    deficiency. We reported that the range of the two-seat F model
    aircraft is 33 nautical miles short of the interdiction range
    requirement, and DOD stated that the deficiency is only 3 nautical
    miles.  The essence of the difference between our conclusion and
    the Navy's relates to (1) whether projected but not yet
    demonstrated and approved range improvements are included in the
    Page 11                                     GAO/NSIAD-99-127
    Defense Acquisitions B-281419 projections and (2) what development
    engine is used to make the projections.  The interdiction range
    deficiency that we reported reflects data that Boeing provided us.
    The data identified various planned range improvement efforts.
    The planned improvements included reducing aircraft weight,
    increasing the amount of internal fuel, and using a more efficient
    engine.  Boeing officials stated that since these planned
    improvements had not yet been demonstrated and approved, they were
    not included in their range calculations.  For the same reason,
    the planned improvements and their potential effect on E/F range
    were not included in our reported range figures. The Navy range
    projections include the projected improvements and are based on a
    better performing engine than the one used in the contractor's
    estimates.  In its comments, DOD stated that while Boeing is
    required by the development contract to use minimum new engine
    performance in its calculations, the Navy elected to use the Full
    Performance Qualification (FPQ) engine in its projections.  The
    FPQ engine is a better performing, more efficient engine that will
    get greater range than the one used in Boeing's range
    calculations.  Using the FPQ engine, the Navy estimates the
    interdiction range shortfall of the F model aircraft to be 3
    nautical miles. Our concerns about the Navy's use of the FPQ
    engine in its range projections stem from the fact that while Navy
    officials said that the engine had successfully completed all
    demonstration, analysis, and testing required for full
    qualification, the FPQ report, dated December 28, 1998, identified
    a number of exceptions to full performance qualifications.
    Specifically, the report stated that a number of engine parts have
    not yet met life limits and redesign efforts are underway.  Other
    engine redesign efforts identified in the report include
    addressing the fact that the engine exceeds specified weight
    limits, is experiencing engine stalls, and has not demonstrated
    required reliability.  We did not attempt to update the status of
    the engine redesign efforts and their impact on the E/F's range to
    further reconcile the difference between our and the Navy's E/F
    range projections because such a reconciliation is not warranted
    at this stage of the E/F program.  OPEVAL of the F/A-18E/F began
    on May 27, 1999.  The flight demonstrated range of the E/F under
    realistic combat conditions will provide a more meaningful
    assessment of the aircraft's range than any mathematical
    calculations that either we or the Navy might make outside of
    OPEVAL. DOD disagreed with statements in our report that the
    number and type of F/A-18E/F deficiencies that testing has
    identified pose a significant risk to passing OPEVAL. DOD stated
    that the 84 unresolved major deficiencies Page 12
    GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions B-281419 that the E/F will
    have when it enters OPEVAL are significantly fewer than the number
    of unresolved deficiencies that the earlier F/A-18A/B model had
    when it entered OPEVAL and pose an acceptable level of risk to
    successfully completing OPEVAL.  We did not compare the number of
    unresolved F/A-18A/B deficiencies with unresolved E/F deficiencies
    because the F/A-18A/B aircraft was a new aircraft development
    program and the E/F is a modification program.  Given that
    distinction, it is understandable that the A/B aircraft program
    would have had more deficiencies.  However, the readiness of the
    aircraft to begin and successfully complete OPEVAL is not
    exclusively dependent upon the number of deficiencies, but rather
    on the significance of the deficiencies and the status of their
    resolution. Regarding the significance and status of the
    deficiencies, DOD stated that the Navy is following the deficiency
    resolution process defined in SECNAVINST 5000.2.  This Navy
    instruction provides the criteria that must be met for an aircraft
    to be certified as being ready for OPEVAL.  One of the criteria
    states that "for aircraft programs, there are no unresolved Board
    of Inspection and Survey Part I (*) or Part I (**) deficiencies.5"
    Further elaboration of this point is contained in the Board of
    Inspection and Survey's implementing instruction (INSURVINST
    13100.1E), which states that  "in general, systems with Part I
    (**) and Part I (*) deficiencies will not be recommended for
    OPEVAL."  We conservatively applied these criteria and included
    only those deficiencies identified as Part I (**) in our report.
    DOD's comments on our draft report did not segregate the 84 E/F
    major deficiencies into these deficiency categories.  In addition,
    the Navy considers 50 of the 84 deficiencies to be resolved based
    on the existence of a correction plan.  The remaining 34 major
    deficiencies apparently have not yet been resolved to that point.
    We believe DOD's comments validate the OPEVAL Preparedness Team's
    conclusion stated in our report that beginning OPEVAL without
    correcting these deficiencies results in a medium risk that the
    E/F will not successfully complete OPEVAL. Separate from DOD's
    comments, the Navy provided information on its efforts to  correct
    some of the major unresolved deficiencies identified during
    testing of the E/F aircraft.  Essentially, the Navy commented on
    its plans to incorporate corrections of these unresolved
    deficiencies. 5Part I (**) deficiencies are defined as those where
    there is a high probability that the deficiency will cause
    aircraft control loss, equipment destruction, or injury.  Part I
    (*) deficiencies are defined as those that would cause excessive
    operator compensation to accomplish the primary or alternate
    mission. Page 13
    GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions B-281419 However, those
    plans do not alter our position that multiyear funding should not
    be approved for the F/A-18E/F program until these corrections of
    deficiencies have been incorporated into the aircraft and
    successfully tested. We conducted our review from September 1998
    through June 1999 in accordance with generally accepted auditing
    standards.  Our objectives, scope, and methodology are included in
    appendix II.  DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix III. We are
    sending copies of this report to the Honorable William Cohen,
    Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Richard Danzig, Secretary of
    the Navy; and the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director, Office of
    Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to
    others on request. Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or
    your staff have any questions concerning this report.  The major
    contributors to this report were Steven Kuhta, Jerry Clark, Stacy
    Edwards, and Charles Burgess. Louis J. Rodrigues Director, Defense
    Acquisitions Issues Page 14
    GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions B-281419 List of
    Congressional Committees The Honorable John W. Warner Chairman The
    Honorable Carl Levin Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed
    Services United States Senate The Honorable Ted Stevens Chairman
    The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye Ranking Minority Member
    Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations United States
    Senate The Honorable Floyd D. Spence Chairman The Honorable Ike
    Skelton Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House
    of Representatives The Honorable Jerry Lewis Chairman The
    Honorable John P. Murtha Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on
    Defense Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives Page
    15                             GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense
    Acquisitions Contents Letter
    1 Appendix I
    18 Major F/A-18E/F Deficiencies Identified During OT-IIB Appendix
    II
    22 Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Appendix III
    24 Comments From the Department of Defense Tables
    Table 1:  Critical Operational Issues
    8 Abbreviations DOD          Department of Defense FPQ
    Full Performance Qualification OPEVAL   operational test and
    evaluation OPTEVFOR Operational Test and Evaluation Force Page 16
    GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions Page 17    GAO/NSIAD-99-127
    Defense Acquisitions Appendix I Major F/A-18E/F Deficiencies
    Identified During OT-IIB
    Appendix I The OT-IIB report listed 29 major deficiencies in the
    F/A-18E/F.  The following discusses the deficiencies and their
    impact on the aircraft's ability to perform its missions.  Our
    list does not total 29 deficiencies because we combined closely
    related deficiencies.  We extracted the information from
    unclassified deficiency reports prepared by the Integrated Test
    Team. Poor climb performance above 30,000 feet.  The F/A-18E/F's
    best climb performance was in the low 30,000-foot range, with
    intermediate power. Although higher altitudes may have been
    possible, the climb rate was too slow to be useful in most
    tactical scenarios.  Performance predictions indicate that combat
    and tactical ceilings for the newer F/A-18Cs (Lot XIX) are greater
    than that of the F/A-18Es when the aircraft are similarly loaded
    with weapons and fuel tanks. The E/Fs low tactical ceiling reduced
    the mission effectiveness of the aircraft when in the fighter
    escort configuration against high, fast-flying enemy aircraft by
    limiting the regions where the E/F could effectively launch its
    air-to-air missiles. Low acceleration.  The E/F's maximum level
    flight airspeed was determined to be less than both the F/A-18C
    and other threat aircraft in similar fighter configurations at all
    investigated altitudes.  This deficiency reduced the E/F's
    effectiveness against high, fast-flying aircraft and provided
    insufficient airspeed when the E/F was attempting to exit a combat
    situation. Airframe buffet.  The magnitude of buffet has been
    described as moderate to heavy.  At higher levels, the aircraft
    shakes to the extent that the heads- up displays appear to
    vibrate.  The displays remain readable but are blurred slightly
    and legibility is somewhat degraded. During some turns at subsonic
    speed and low altitude, buffet forces the pilot to divert
    significant attention to maintaining the desired flight path, and
    combat effectiveness decreases as a result.  During some landings,
    buffet has been heavy enough to be interpreted as an aircraft
    malfunction.  Heavy airframe buffet during catapult launches would
    result in dramatic increases in the required wind- over-deck for
    high gross weights, thereby restricting operational capability.
    Inadequate high angle of attack agility and controllability.  The
    time required to reverse the aircraft from a nose high to a nose
    low position took significantly longer than desired and prevented
    the aircraft from dominating aggressive positions during fights.
    The aircraft frequently gained the offensive advantage but lost
    the advantage during the reversal Page 18
    GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions Appendix I Major F/A-18E/F
    Deficiencies Identified During OT-IIB from nose high to nose low.
    As a result, mission effectiveness would be reduced and aircraft
    loss is possible. Slow response to control inputs, slow loaded
    energy addition rate, and excessive speed loss during air combat
    maneuvering.  Air combat maneuvering placed the aircraft in the
    high angle of attack/low airspeed flight regime.  To maintain a
    tactical advantage, the pilots tried to increase the airspeed by
    reducing the angle of attack.  Pilots noted that reducing the
    angle of attack to the desired level took an unacceptable amount
    of time in regaining airspeed.  As a result of the loss of
    airspeed, the pilots would lose the advantage during air combat
    maneuvering, resulting in reduced tactical utility and possible
    loss of aircraft and aircrew during actual air combat. Tactically
    ineffective sustained turn rate.  The current performance data
    indicate that the aircraft might not meet the F/A-18E
    specification requirement in this area.  This would result in a
    potential reduction in performance during combat turns.
    Insufficient cooling capacity for seekers on air-to-air weapons.
    The current nitrogen bottle will not cool the seekers on air-to-
    air weapons for the duration of a combat air patrol mission.  It
    is possible to delay cooling the missiles until the aircraft
    enters a threat area, but this is operationally unacceptable. The
    bottles will have to be changed after every flight because of
    their short life.  However, changing the bottles requires the
    E/F's wings to be unfolded on the carrier deck.  This would delay
    deck operations and the availability of the aircraft to conduct
    its next flight (carrier cycle time). Improper indication of
    direction of arrival of oncoming threat systems. The ALR-67 (V)3
    radar warning receiver's left/right discrimination is inadequate.
    While evaluating air-to-air tactics during one-on-one intercepts,
    the radar warning receiver angle of arrival at times significantly
    disagreed with actual target locations.  On a number of occasions,
    the actual target location was on one side of the aircraft nose,
    and the displayed direction of arrival was on the other side.  The
    difference was, at times, substantial.  Poor radar warning
    receiver direction of arrival information would result in
    degradation of situational awareness and poor aircrew defensive
    reaction.  This would lead to loss of tactical advantage and might
    result in loss of aircraft and aircrew. Damage to AIM-9 missile
    assemblies caused by wing tip environment. Structural failure of
    AIM-9 Sidewinder hanger on the wing tip stations Page 19
    GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions Appendix I Major F/A-18E/F
    Deficiencies Identified During OT-IIB could result in damage to
    the missile and launcher or an increase in required aircraft
    maintenance.  If undetected, the missile damage would result in
    hazardous separation and/or decreased missile effectiveness. AIM-9
    missile hanger failure might be the result of the F/A-18E/F's
    severe wing tip environment. ALE-50 tow line burn-off in
    afterburner.  During in-flight evaluation of the ALE-50, decoys
    and associated towlines were severed when engine afterburners were
    engaged.  Towlines typically failed within seconds of afterburner
    initiation, which will occur during missile defense and air combat
    maneuvering.  This deficiency would result in the loss of active
    electronic countermeasures protection and would directly increase
    the threat to aircraft and crew during enemy missile attacks.
    Difficulty in maintaining lateral trim.  The aircraft did not
    readily maintain lateral trim without frequent pilot inputs.  The
    failure of the airplane to maintain lateral trim was not
    associated with any particular maneuver but rather a variety of
    maneuvers throughout the flight envelope.  This condition would
    significantly increase the pilot's workload, distracting him/ her
    and severely degrading the performance of more critical mission
    tasks. Under-wing environment damages aircraft stores.  Damage has
    been discovered on numerous stores (attachments and ordnance)
    carried beneath the aircraft's wings.  The damage is the result of
    the noise and vibration beneath the wings.  Failure of items
    carried underneath the wings could result in loss of or damage to
    the aircraft and/or loss of mission capability. Unsafe delivery of
    Rockeye bomb.  Clearance was insufficient when the Rockeye bomb
    was carried on the inboard wing station and the Tactical Forward
    Looking Infrared Radar was carried on the aircraft's fuselage
    station.  This close proximity is not compatible with safe
    separation requirements. Aircraft radar deficiency.  The APG-73
    radar, new to the aircraft, was slow to lock onto a target during
    air combat maneuvering.  Delayed and unreliable radar acquisitions
    would result in lost first-shot opportunities and in delayed time
    to kill, which reduces tactical performance and survivability.
    Leading edge extension difficulties.  Footing on the leading edge
    extension was not secure during cockpit ingress/egress.  As a
    result of the small Page 20
    GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions Appendix I Major F/A-18E/F
    Deficiencies Identified During OT-IIB walkway and steep slope of
    the leading edge extension and inadequate traction, the aircrew or
    maintenance personnel could slip off the aircraft during cockpit
    ingress/egress and experience serious injury. Inconsistent brake
    effectiveness.  Braking performance was noticeably inadequate
    during landings by aircraft returning to the carrier without
    weapons.  The primary turnoff was missed and the secondary turnoff
    was narrowly made.  Poor, degraded, or unpredictable braking
    performance would result in longer landing rollout, turnoff
    overshoot, and decreased braking sensitivity for ground
    handling/positioning.  Inability to stop the aircraft reliably
    could result in an aborted landing attempt or injury to ground
    personnel during aircraft positioning on the flight line or flight
    deck. Inadequate cooling capability of the fuel thermal management
    system. During several missions flown on hot days, test aircraft
    experienced "FUEL HOT" cautions either shortly after takeoff or
    prior to mission completion. The "FUEL HOT" conditions resulted in
    the inability of the fuel to cool the aircraft's fluids that cool
    the radar and other aircraft systems.  In-flight "FUEL HOT"
    cautions could result in premature mission abort, degraded cooling
    of accessories such as the radar and hydraulics, and reduced
    reliability/life of engine management systems. Targeting Forward
    Looking Infrared Radar deficiencies.  Aircrew determined that as a
    result of resolution and magnification deficiencies with the
    aircraft's Targeting Forward Looking Infrared Radar, they could
    not classify air-to-air and air-to-ground targets.  Aircrew would
    have difficulty quickly and accurately designating a discrete
    target.  Additionally, target identification would require
    excessive head-down time, during which the weapon system operator
    would be unable to scan the electronic warfare display and look
    outside the aircraft for potential threats. Page 21
    GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions Appendix II Objectives,
    Scope, and Methodology
    Appendix I I Our objectives were to (1) determine the extent to
    which the F/A-18E/F is meeting performance requirements, (2)
    identify risks associated with proceeding into operational test
    and evaluation (OPEVAL) with unresolved deficiencies, and (3)
    identify potential cost increases and risks associated with
    approving the Navy's request for multiyear funding for the
    program. To determine whether the program was meeting performance
    requirements, we compared contractor and program management
    performance measurements and projections with the five key
    performance improvements over current F/A-18s that the F/A-18E/F
    was intended to provide.   We also reviewed contractor and Navy
    comparisons of the aircraft's current performance relative to the
    development contract specifications and to key performance
    parameters established in the Navy's F/A-18E/F Operational
    Requirements Document.  Additionally, we reviewed reports on the
    limited operational assessments conducted in November 1997 (OT-
    IIA) and from June through August 1998 (OT-IIB) to identify the
    measured performance of the F/A-18E/F relative to numerous
    critical operational issues and to existing F/A-18s. We also
    interviewed officials in the Navy's Operational Test and
    Evaluation Force responsible for conducting the operational
    assessments, including the test pilots who flew the operational
    tests, to obtain their assessment of the aircraft's current and
    potential performance as well as its performance compared to
    current F/A-18s. To identify risks associated with proceeding into
    OPEVAL with unresolved deficiencies, we reviewed documents
    prepared by the Program Risk Advisory Board and the OPEVAL
    Preparedness Team.  These documents and interviews identified
    operational performance deficiencies that the operational testers,
    the Advisory Board, and the OPEVAL Preparedness Team concluded
    could adversely affect the F/A-18E/F's probability of successfully
    completing OPEVAL, which is to be conducted from May through
    November 1999. To identify potential cost increases and risks
    associated with approving the Navy's request for multiyear funding
    for the program, we analyzed reports and other program documents
    prepared by contractor and Navy officials responsible for tracking
    program costs.  Regarding the multiyear funding request, we
    analyzed the Navy and the contractor lists of aircraft
    deficiencies and assessed their impact relative to the criteria
    that must be met to obtain multiyear funding-significant savings,
    a stable system Page 22
    GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions Appendix II Objectives,
    Scope, and Methodology design, an adequately validated
    requirement, and a commitment to stable funding over the life of
    the contract. Page 23
    GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions Appendix III Comments From
    the Department of Defense AppendIix II Note:  GAO's comment
    supplementing those in the report text appear at the end of this
    appendix. See comment 1. Page 24    GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense
    Acquisitions Appendix III Comments From the Department of Defense
    Page 25                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-127
    Defense Acquisitions Appendix III Comments From the Department of
    Defense Page 26                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-
    127 Defense Acquisitions Appendix III Comments From the Department
    of Defense The following is our comment on the Department of
    Defense's (DOD) letter dated May 12, 1999. GAO Comments
    1.  DOD's statement that a separate interdiction range requirement
    for the F/A-18F was never included in the Operational Requirements
    Document is not accurate.  An interdiction range requirement of
    390 nautical miles for both the E and F model aircraft was
    included in the final Operational Requirements Document dated
    April 1, 1997. (707373)    Letter    Page 27
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