Defense Acquisitions: Progress of the F/A-18E/F Engineering and
Manufacturing Development Program (Letter Report, 06/15/1999,
GAO/NSIAD-99-127).
The F/A-18E/F is meeting all performance requirements, according to the
Navy. GAO does not agree with this assessment. The Navy based its
assessment on the E model's performance and assumed some improvements to
the aircraft that have yet to be shown. Without that assumption, the F
model, which makes up more than half of the E/F planned buy, is not
meeting the interdiction range requirement--a primary justification for
the program. The Navy's schedule for operational test and evaluation,
combined with unresolved aircraft deficiencies, could cause the E/F to
fail that testing. Corrections of some deficiencies have been shifted to
later in the program. This will help the Navy stay within the
congressionally mandated cost cap for development; however, correcting
these shortcomings will increase the aircraft's development costs. GAO
recommends that the Defense Department defer multiyear funding for the
E/F program until all corrections of deficiencies have been incorporated
into the aircraft's design and successfully tested.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-99-127
TITLE: Defense Acquisitions: Progress of the F/A-18E/F
Engineering and Manufacturing Development Program
DATE: 06/15/1999
SUBJECT: Operational testing
Defense capabilities
Fighter aircraft
Naval aircraft
Naval procurement
Military cost control
Military appropriations
Contract costs
Multiyear contracts
IDENTIFIER: F/A-18E/F Aircraft
F/A-18C/D Aircraft
MK-83 Bomb
ALE-50 Towed Decoy System
ALR-67 Radar Warning Receiver
AIM-9X Missile
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United States General Accounting Office GAO Report
to Congressional Committees June 1999 DEFENSE
ACQUISITIONS Progress of the F/A-18E/F Engineering and
Manufacturing Development Program GAO/NSIAD-99-127 United States
General Accounting Office
National Security and Washington, D.C. 20548
International Affairs Division B-281419
Letter June 15, 1999 Congressional Committees As required by the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (P.L. 105-
261), we reviewed the Navy's F/A-18E/F developmental and
operational test program. We presented the results of our review
during testimony before the Subcommittee on Airland Forces, Senate
Committee on Armed Services, on March 17, 1999.1 This report
supplements that testimony by providing additional data on the
aircraft deficiencies identified during the test program and
discusses our conclusions regarding the E/F's progress toward
achieving established performance, schedule, and cost goals.
Specifically, we (1) determined the extent to which the aircraft
is meeting performance requirements, (2) identified risks
associated with proceeding into operational test and evaluation
(OPEVAL) with unresolved deficiencies, and (3) identified
potential cost increases and risks associated with approving the
Navy's request for multiyear funding for the program. The act
also requires that we certify whether we had access to sufficient
information to make informed judgments on the matters covered by
this report. Public Law 105-261 requires us to conduct annual
reviews of the F/A-18E/F until the aircraft enters full-rate
production. This report covers our first review under the act.
During our next review, we will focus on determining whether
beginning OPEVAL with a significant number of unresolved
deficiencies will result in over reliance on modeling and
simulation rather than actual flight testing. We will also
determine whether test restrictions on the aircraft configuration
or missions flown could invalidate OPEVAL results. Results in
Brief According to the Navy, the F/A-18E/F is
meeting all performance requirements. We do not agree with the
Navy's assessment. The Navy based its assessment on the E model's
performance and assumed some improvements to the aircraft that
have not yet been demonstrated. Without that assumption, the F
model, which makes up over half of the E/F planned 1Defense
Acquisitions: Progress of the F-22 and F/A-18E/F Engineering and
Manufacturing Programs (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113, Mar. 17, 1999). Page 1
GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions B-281419 buy, is not meeting
the interdiction range requirement-a primary justification for the
program. The Navy's OPEVAL schedule, combined with unresolved
aircraft deficiencies, could cause the E/F to fail OPEVAL. The
Navy maintained its original schedule and started OPEVAL on May
27, 1999, even though completion of the development effort slipped
from November 1998 to April 1999. Because the Navy is maintaining
its original OPEVAL schedule, the contractor has insufficient time
to correct some critical deficiencies in the aircraft that,
according to Navy criteria, should be corrected prior to OPEVAL.
Department of Defense (DOD), Navy, and contractor personnel have
stated that there is a medium risk that OPEVAL might find the E/F
not operationally effective and/or suitable. Such a conclusion
could result in a delay or postponement of the full-rate
production decision and the need to conduct additional operational
testing. Corrections of some deficiencies have been shifted to
later in the program. This will help the Navy stay within the
congressionally mandated developmental cost cap; however,
correcting these deficiencies will increase the procurement costs
of the aircraft. Congress is considering the Navy's request for
multiyear procurement of the F/A-18E/F. A key criterion for
obtaining congressional approval for multiyear procurement is
design stability. Correction of some E/F deficiencies could
result in contract modifications and design changes to the
aircraft, which increases the risk associated with Congress's
approving the Navy's multiyear procurement request for the E/F at
this time. We recommend in this report that the Secretary of
Defense defer multiyear funding for the E/F program until all
corrections of deficiencies have been incorporated into the
aircraft design and successfully tested. The Navy and the
contractors gave us access to sufficient information to make
informed judgments on the performance of the aircraft. With
respect to program costs, we requested estimates to correct the
deficiencies identified during the test program; however, the
contractor told us that such estimates are not available. We also
requested the procurement unit cost comparisons that the
contractor and the Navy program office had prepared of procuring
548 E/Fs to procuring 548 C/D model aircraft. The program office
declined to provide us those comparisons. Background The F/A-
18E/F program began in 1992 to increase the operational
capabilities of the current fleet of F/A-18 aircraft. The
objectives of the Page 2
GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions B-281419 program are to
provide improved capabilities over current F/A-18s in five key
areasrange, payload, carrier recovery payload, growth capacity,
and survivability. Congress capped the development effort at $4.88
billion (in fiscal year 1990 dollars) and directed that the E/F
unit procurement cost not exceed 125 percent of current C/D model
costs. The F/A-18E/F development flight test program began in
February 1996. The Integrated Test Team, using five single-seat E
models and two 2-seat F models, is conducting the tests. Two
early operational assessments of the E/F aircraft, using wind
tunnel data and analytical models, were made in early 1996 and
1997. Two operational assessments of the E/F aircraft, based on
data obtained during test flights using the engineering and
manufacturing development aircraft, were conducted in November
1997 (OT-IIA) and in June through August 1998 (OT-IIB). The
Navy's Operational Test and Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR) conducted
these assessments. The Navy has contracted for 62 aircraft under
three low-rate initial production contracts. The first seven of
these aircraft will be used to conduct the next operational flight
test phase of the program. That phase, OPEVAL, is to be conducted
during MayNovember 1999. The OPEVAL results will be used to
determine whether the E/F program should proceed into full-rate
production in March 2000. We reported in June 1996 that current
F/A-18s are not as deficient as the Navy reported and that the
F/A-18E/F would provide only a marginal improvement in capability
over the older F/A-18s at a significantly greater cost.2 We
recommended that DOD reconsider its plan to buy the E/F and
instead buy additional F/A-18C/Ds. DOD did not concur with our
recommendation and continued to believe that procuring the E/F was
the more cost-effective approach to modernizing the Navy's
tactical aviation fleet. In March 1998 we reported that E/F flight
test program officials had identified numerous deficiencies that
if not corrected in time could affect the OPEVAL schedule or
possibly cause the aircraft to have an unsuccessful operational
test and evaluation.3 We recommended that the Navy not be allowed
to procure any additional E/Fs beyond the 12 initially 2Navy
Aviation: F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal Operational Improvement
at High Cost (GAO/NSIAD-96-98, June 18, 1996). 3Navy Aviation:
F/A-18E/F Development and Production Issues (GAO/NSIAD-98-61,
Mar. 13, 1998). Page 3
GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions B-281419 contracted for in
March 1997 until the Navy demonstrated, through flight testing,
that identified deficiencies had been corrected and incorporated
into OPEVAL aircraft. DOD disagreed with that recommendation and
stated that testing had not identified any specific deficiencies
that would prevent the E/F from achieving an operationally
effective level of performance. Extent to Which The Navy
is nearing completion of its F/A-18E/F development program. F/A-
18E/F Is Meeting The development flight test program began in
February 1996 and was completed in April 1999. During this phase
of the program, the Navy Development conducted both
developmental and some limited operational testing using
Performance the aircraft produced under the
engineering and manufacturing Requirements development
phase of the program. Based on the results of that testing, the
Navy reports that the E/F is meeting all performance parameters.
The Navy's statements about the performance of the E/F reflect the
performance of the single-seat E model aircraft, not the 2-seat F
model. The second seat in the F model displaces fuel capacity,
thereby reducing its range. The Navy's assessment was also based
on estimates of improved performance from anticipated changes to
the aircraft, not all of which, according to the contractor, may
come to fruition. If these values are not included in the
performance estimates, the F model aircraft will be 33 nautical
miles short of meeting the development interdiction range
requirement of 390 nautical miles. This is significant because
(1) the F model, which was originally planned to be used as a
trainer aircraft and therefore made up only about 18 percent of
the total buy, now will be used as an operational aircraft and
makes up about 55 percent of the total buy and (2) increased range
over the current C/D aircraft was critical to justifying the
decision to buy the F/A-18E/F. The Navy formally reports that the
F/A-18E/F will have over 40 percent more range than F/A-18Cs.
However, initial E/F range predictions have declined as actual
flight data is gathered and incorporated into range prediction
models. Test data currently projects that the E model will have a
range of 434 nautical miles, or about 15 percent greater than the
376 nautical mile range demonstrated by current F/A-18Cs. If the
anticipated but not yet demonstrated range improvements are not
included in the range estimates, the F/A-18E development
interdiction range drops to 405 nautical miles, or about an 8-
percent greater range than an F/A-18C. Also, the Navy's assessment
of the E/F's performance does not consider the potential
degradation of performance as a result of modifications to correct
Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-99-127
Defense Acquisitions B-281419 unresolved deficiencies identified
during the developmental and operational flight test programs.
These deficiencies and their potential negative impacts relate to
the aircraft's combat range, payload, survivability, and ability
to accommodate new, future systems. All of these areas were cited
as improvements by the Navy when it justified the E/F program.
Combat Range Potential solutions to problems found during the
test program have resulted in a reduction in the E/F's combat
range. One of these problems, a condition described as "wing
drop," was observed early in 1996 during F/A-18E/F development
tests and was described as an unacceptable, uncommanded abrupt
lateral roll that randomly occurred at the altitude and speed at
which air-to-air combat maneuvers are expected to occur. In
October 1998, the OPEVAL Preparedness Team reported that the
anticipated fix to the problem, replacing solid wing fold fairings
with porous fairings, significantly reduced, but did not totally
eliminate, the frequency and severity of wing drop. However, the
porous wing fold fairing has caused buffeting of the aircraft.
The magnitude of the buffeting was described as severe enough to
affect the pilots' voices and could also mask an aircraft
malfunction, particularly for aircrews not accustomed to the
sensation. This buffeting was projected to reduce aircraft range.
However, the actual range decrease is not yet known because
resolution of the problem is still being worked on and program
officials will not have a complete understanding of the impact of
the wing drop design fix until operational testing is completed at
the end of 1999. According to program officials, the final
production fixes to wing drop may involve something other than the
porous wing fold fairing. Other range-related issues are
associated with the Navy's attempts to resolve design problems
that had resulted in bombs colliding with each other or with the
aircraft. To correct this problem, the Navy toed, or slanted, the
inner wing pylons. However, that fix increased the drag on the
aircraft and resulted in air loads on the pylons where the 480-
gallon tanks would be carried that significantly exceed the load
limit designed into the E/F wings in this area. If uncorrected,
this deficiency would preclude the E/F from carrying 480-gallon
external fuel tanks on each of the two inner wing stations
specified for the interdiction mission and would prevent the
aircraft from meeting its required range specification. The Navy
is studying options for redesigning the pylons and their
attachment to the aircraft to correct this problem. Page 5
GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions B-281419 Aircraft range will
also be affected by the extent to which pilots use afterburner to
compensate for deficiencies in the E/F's climb, turn, and
acceleration rates. Using afterburner to overcome these
deficiencies will significantly increase fuel consumption and
reduce mission range. Payload and Bringback The F/A-18E/F
reportedly carries a 22-percent greater payload than existing F/A-
18s. This increased payload is the result of the E/F's two
additional wing stations. However, development flight tests have
revealed that the E/F experiences noise and vibration under the
wings and at the wing tips that could damage air-to-air missiles
carried by the aircraft. The Navy is determining whether a
redesign of the missiles will be necessary for them to be carried
on the E/F. Additionally, excessive loads on the inner wing
pylons have been caused by the closeness of these pylons to the
aircraft fuselage and to the toeing of the pylons. Current plans
are to restrict what can be carried on these pylons during OPEVAL
until a fix is designed and tested. The restrictions would
prohibit the E/F from carrying dual MK-83 (1,000 pound) bombs on
these pylons during OPEVAL, which would reduce the payload
capacity for the interdiction mission. We were told that the
aircraft could also have a problem landing on the carrier with
unused weapons (bringback) because of the significant stress on
these pylons. The Navy is still studying this issue and has not
yet identified a final fix. Survivability The Navy
planned to improve F/A-18E/F survivability relative to existing
F/A-18s by reducing its susceptibility to detection and if
detected the probability of being destroyed. Initial operational
tests cite concerns about E/F survivability systems. While the
specifics on E/F survivability are classified, the unclassified
portions of the test reports identify concerns with the ALE-50
towed decoy and the ALR-67 radar warning receiver. The ALE-50
towed decoy is designed to improve F/A-18E/F survivability by
attracting enemy missiles to the decoy and away from the aircraft.
The line that tows the decoy has been burning off when it crosses
the heat path of the engine when the engine is in afterburner.
The problems relative to the ALR-67 radar warning receiver involve
the receiver's ability to provide accurate information on the
direction of arrival of enemy threats. The Procurement Executive
Officer for Tactical Aircraft identified E/F survivability issues
as the major challenges facing the E/F program. Growth Space
In justifying the need for the F/A-18E/F, the Navy stated that it
needed more space than was available on existing F/A-18s to
accommodate additional Page 6
GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions B-281419 new systems without
having to remove existing capability. The Navy reports that the
F/A-18E/F will have 17 cubic feet of growth space. However,
program documents show that only 5.46 cubic feet of that space
will be usable for growth. We reported in 1996 that growth space
was available within the C/D. The Navy's F/A-18 upgrade road map
shows that most of the upgrades planned for the E/F are also
planned for installation on C/Ds, which demonstrates that the C/Ds
have growth space. Test Schedule and The objective of OPEVAL
is to field test the E/F under realistic combat Unresolved
conditions to determine the aircraft's operational effectiveness
and suitability for use in combat by typical military users
against threat forces Deficiencies Cause and targets. For
OPEVAL tests, the Navy plans to use production- Risks to
Successful representative aircraft that are being produced
under the first low-rate OPEVAL initial
production contract. The OPEVAL results will be used to determine
whether to proceed into full-rate production of the F/A-18E/F.
Accordingly, the primary questions are whether the aircraft is
ready to advance into OPEVAL and whether successful completion of
that evaluation is highly probable. Test results indicate that
the Navy faces significant challenges regarding each of those
questions. F/A-18E/F development was scheduled to be completed by
November 1998, with OPEVAL beginning in May 1999. That schedule
would have provided time to correct deficiencies in the aircraft
before their use during OPEVAL. However, additional test
requirements, caused by the need to test corrections of
deficiencies such as wing drop, have caused the completion of the
development flight test program to slip to April 1999. As a
result of the development program delay and the Navy's decision to
begin OPEVAL in May 1999 as originally scheduled, the contractor
will not have time to correct some aircraft deficiencies that
according to the Navy's criteria should be fixed before OPEVAL.
In that regard, the OPEVAL Preparedness Team, which comprises DOD,
Navy, and contractor personnel, meets periodically to determine
whether the E/F is ready for OPEVAL. On February 25, 1999, the
team held its final meeting before the scheduled start of OPEVAL.
At that meeting, the team concluded that 71 E/F deficiencies would
not be corrected until after OPEVAL. The Navy's criteria indicate
that 23 of those deficiencies should be corrected prior to OPEVAL.
These deficiencies consist of the problems associated with the
ALE-50 towed decoy, the ALR-67 radar warning receiver, and the
wing pylon loads. In addition, they include such things as
vibration that damages ordnance, delamination of the composite
surface layers of the horizontal tail, and problems with the nose
landing gear tires and wheels during Page 7
GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions B-281419 catapult testing.
The Preparedness Team concluded that there is a medium risk that
the E/F will not successfully complete OPEVAL without first
correcting these deficiencies. The Preparedness Team's agreement
to proceed into OPEVAL was based on the existence of correction
plans to address these deficiencies. The Navy began OPEVAL on May
27, 1999. However, it plans to impose some operational limits on
the aircraft during OPEVAL as a result of deficiencies that cannot
be corrected prior to OPEVAL. For example, as previously
discussed, the E/F will not be permitted to carry dual MK-83 bombs
because of the excessive air loads they put on the inner wing
pylons. The E/F operational test team has completed two
operational assessments, using aircraft produced during the EMD
phase of the program, that relate to the potential for a
successful OPEVAL. Those assessments, referred to as OT-IIA and
OT-IIB, were conducted in November 1997 and from June through
August 1998, respectively. Based on these assessments, the
operational testers assigned a level of risk relative to a
successful OPEVAL to each critical operational issue tested.
Table 1 shows that the testers identified two operational
effectiveness issues with significant risk (air-to-air weapons and
survivability) and six with moderate risk. Table 1: Critical
Operational Issues Critical operational issue OT-
IIA risk OT-IIB risk Air-to-air weapons
Not assessed Significant Survivability
Significant Significant Fighter escort
Moderate Moderate Combat air patrol
Little or no risk Moderate Air combat maneuvering
Not assessed Moderate Air-to-ground sensor
performance Moderate Moderate Air-to-
ground weapons Moderate
Moderate Air-to-air sensor performance Moderate
Moderate Source: Navy operational test reports. The operational
testers' OT-IIB assessment identified 29 major deficiencies in the
E/F. The deficiencies related to such things as the E/F's ability
to accelerate, turn, climb, and roll. Essentially, the E/F does
not do as well in these areas as the F/A-18C aircraft.
Additionally, the testers identified Page 8
GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions B-281419 buffeting and
lateral instability, or drift, as flying quality deficiencies.
They also listed as major problems the ALE-50 towed decoy and the
capability of the radar warning receiver to indicate the direction
of oncoming threats. The specific deficiencies identified by the
operational testers4 are as follows: * poor climb performance
above 30,000 feet; * low acceleration; * airframe buffet; * high
angle of attack and agility and controllability; * slow response
to control inputs, slow loaded energy addition rate, and excessive
speed loss during air combat maneuvering; * tactically ineffective
sustained turn rate; * insufficient cooling capacity for seekers
on air-to-air weapons; * improper indication of direction of
arrival of oncoming threat systems; * damage to AIM-9 missile
assemblies caused by wing tip environment; * ALE-50 tow line burn-
off in afterburner; * difficulty maintaining lateral trim; *
under-wing environment damages aircraft stores; * unsafe delivery
of Rockeye bomb; * aircraft radar deficiency; * leading edge
extension difficulties; * inconsistent brake effectiveness; *
inadequate cooling capability of the fuel thermal management
system; and * Targeting Forward Looking Infrared Radar resolution
and magnification. Appendix I describes each of these deficiencies
and discusses their potential impact on the E/F's ability to
perform its missions. The operational testers recommended that the
E/F continue to be developed. They stated, however, that they
based their recommendation on continued improvements in the E/F's
current maneuvering performance and the development of follow-on
systems that they considered essential to get the operational
effectiveness projected for the E/F. These improvements include
such things as the Active Electronic Scanned Array radar, the
Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System, the AIM-9X missile, and the
Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasure System. 4Our list
does not total 29 deficiencies because we combined closely related
deficiencies. Page 9
GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions B-281419 In addition to the
risks to OPEVAL identified by the operational testers and the
OPEVAL Preparedness Team, the Program Risk Advisory Board,
comprising Navy and contractor personnel, in its January 1999
assessment stated that there is a medium risk that OPEVAL might
find the E/F not operationally effective and/or suitable, even if
all development specification requirements are met. The Board
stated that the consequence of this type of conclusion from OPEVAL
could result in a delay or postponement of the full-rate
production decision and the need to conduct additional operational
testing. F/A-18E/F Costs and The Navy reports that
the F/A-18E/F development effort will be completed Request for
Multiyear within the $4.88 billion (in fiscal year 1990 dollars)
development cost ceiling established by Congress. However, as of
the end of February 1999, Funding 71
identified deficiencies had not been corrected. Correction of
these deficiencies will be accounted for as procurement, not
development, costs. The contractor said that estimates of the
costs of correcting these 71 deficiencies are not available. In
addition, Boeing has identified 99 deficiencies in the aircraft
that it believes it is not required to correct under the
development contract. Estimates of the cost of correcting these
deficiencies are also not available. The Navy's unit procurement
cost estimate for the E/F assumes that it will accrue $1.3 billion
of savings if Congress approves the Navy's request for multiyear
funding as part of the fiscal year 2000 authorization and
appropriation process. Approval of such funding has historically
depended on the ability to obtain significant savings, a stable
system design, an adequately validated requirement, and a
commitment to stable funding over the life of the contract. The
concerns raised within DOD about the uncertainty that the E/F will
successfully complete OPEVAL and the number of unresolved issues,
like the final solution to wing drop and buffeting and the inner
wing pylon load concerns that could require design changes to the
aircraft, increase the risk associated with congressional approval
of the E/F multiyear funding request at this time. Conclusions and
The F/A-18F model is not meeting its interdiction range
requirementa Recommendation primary
justification for the program. The aircraft has some critical
deficiencies that, notwithstanding Navy criteria to the contrary,
will not be corrected until after OPEVAL. Correcting these
deficiencies later in the program will enable the Navy to remain
within the development cost cap Page 10
GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions B-281419 but will increase
the unit procurement cost of the aircraft. The impact of
correcting these deficiencies on the cost and final design of the
aircraft are factors critical to Congress' decision on whether to
approve the Navy's pending request for multiyear procurement of
the E/F aircraft. Given the uncertainty surrounding the F/A-
18E/F's final design and the Navy's intention not to correct all
deficiencies and test those corrections as part of OPEVAL, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense defer multiyear funding
for the E/F program until all corrections of deficiencies have
been incorporated into the aircraft design and successfully
tested. Agency Comments and In its written comments on our draft
report DOD did not agree with our Our Evaluation
recommendation. DOD stated that no deficiencies have been
identified that would require a major redesign of the aircraft or
are serious enough to warrant not awarding a multiyear contract.
To take this position, DOD is assuming that all major deficiencies
will be corrected with minimum impact on aircraft design, cost, or
schedule. Specifically, DOD stated that although the aircraft
will have 84 major deficiencies when it enters OPEVAL, 50 of them
have a road map for solutions and funding. This indicates that
the Navy has a plan in place to correct the deficiencies, but the
Navy did not specify the dates for incorporating and testing the
corrections. We continue to believe that the deficiencies should
be corrected and validated through flight testing before the
program is approved for multiyear funding. Therefore, we reaffirm
our recommendation. DOD also took issue with our statement that
the F/A-18F is not meeting its interdiction range requirement.
DOD stated that someone unfamiliar with the E/F program might
assume this represents a serious deficiency in the program, which
DOD said is not the case. The purpose of our statement was to put
into perspective Navy statements that the E/F program is meeting
all performance requirements. DOD's comments affirm that the F
model is not meeting the interdiction range requirement, but by a
tactically insignificant amount. Thus, the issue has evolved into
differing perspectives on the magnitude of the F model's range
deficiency. We reported that the range of the two-seat F model
aircraft is 33 nautical miles short of the interdiction range
requirement, and DOD stated that the deficiency is only 3 nautical
miles. The essence of the difference between our conclusion and
the Navy's relates to (1) whether projected but not yet
demonstrated and approved range improvements are included in the
Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-99-127
Defense Acquisitions B-281419 projections and (2) what development
engine is used to make the projections. The interdiction range
deficiency that we reported reflects data that Boeing provided us.
The data identified various planned range improvement efforts.
The planned improvements included reducing aircraft weight,
increasing the amount of internal fuel, and using a more efficient
engine. Boeing officials stated that since these planned
improvements had not yet been demonstrated and approved, they were
not included in their range calculations. For the same reason,
the planned improvements and their potential effect on E/F range
were not included in our reported range figures. The Navy range
projections include the projected improvements and are based on a
better performing engine than the one used in the contractor's
estimates. In its comments, DOD stated that while Boeing is
required by the development contract to use minimum new engine
performance in its calculations, the Navy elected to use the Full
Performance Qualification (FPQ) engine in its projections. The
FPQ engine is a better performing, more efficient engine that will
get greater range than the one used in Boeing's range
calculations. Using the FPQ engine, the Navy estimates the
interdiction range shortfall of the F model aircraft to be 3
nautical miles. Our concerns about the Navy's use of the FPQ
engine in its range projections stem from the fact that while Navy
officials said that the engine had successfully completed all
demonstration, analysis, and testing required for full
qualification, the FPQ report, dated December 28, 1998, identified
a number of exceptions to full performance qualifications.
Specifically, the report stated that a number of engine parts have
not yet met life limits and redesign efforts are underway. Other
engine redesign efforts identified in the report include
addressing the fact that the engine exceeds specified weight
limits, is experiencing engine stalls, and has not demonstrated
required reliability. We did not attempt to update the status of
the engine redesign efforts and their impact on the E/F's range to
further reconcile the difference between our and the Navy's E/F
range projections because such a reconciliation is not warranted
at this stage of the E/F program. OPEVAL of the F/A-18E/F began
on May 27, 1999. The flight demonstrated range of the E/F under
realistic combat conditions will provide a more meaningful
assessment of the aircraft's range than any mathematical
calculations that either we or the Navy might make outside of
OPEVAL. DOD disagreed with statements in our report that the
number and type of F/A-18E/F deficiencies that testing has
identified pose a significant risk to passing OPEVAL. DOD stated
that the 84 unresolved major deficiencies Page 12
GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions B-281419 that the E/F will
have when it enters OPEVAL are significantly fewer than the number
of unresolved deficiencies that the earlier F/A-18A/B model had
when it entered OPEVAL and pose an acceptable level of risk to
successfully completing OPEVAL. We did not compare the number of
unresolved F/A-18A/B deficiencies with unresolved E/F deficiencies
because the F/A-18A/B aircraft was a new aircraft development
program and the E/F is a modification program. Given that
distinction, it is understandable that the A/B aircraft program
would have had more deficiencies. However, the readiness of the
aircraft to begin and successfully complete OPEVAL is not
exclusively dependent upon the number of deficiencies, but rather
on the significance of the deficiencies and the status of their
resolution. Regarding the significance and status of the
deficiencies, DOD stated that the Navy is following the deficiency
resolution process defined in SECNAVINST 5000.2. This Navy
instruction provides the criteria that must be met for an aircraft
to be certified as being ready for OPEVAL. One of the criteria
states that "for aircraft programs, there are no unresolved Board
of Inspection and Survey Part I (*) or Part I (**) deficiencies.5"
Further elaboration of this point is contained in the Board of
Inspection and Survey's implementing instruction (INSURVINST
13100.1E), which states that "in general, systems with Part I
(**) and Part I (*) deficiencies will not be recommended for
OPEVAL." We conservatively applied these criteria and included
only those deficiencies identified as Part I (**) in our report.
DOD's comments on our draft report did not segregate the 84 E/F
major deficiencies into these deficiency categories. In addition,
the Navy considers 50 of the 84 deficiencies to be resolved based
on the existence of a correction plan. The remaining 34 major
deficiencies apparently have not yet been resolved to that point.
We believe DOD's comments validate the OPEVAL Preparedness Team's
conclusion stated in our report that beginning OPEVAL without
correcting these deficiencies results in a medium risk that the
E/F will not successfully complete OPEVAL. Separate from DOD's
comments, the Navy provided information on its efforts to correct
some of the major unresolved deficiencies identified during
testing of the E/F aircraft. Essentially, the Navy commented on
its plans to incorporate corrections of these unresolved
deficiencies. 5Part I (**) deficiencies are defined as those where
there is a high probability that the deficiency will cause
aircraft control loss, equipment destruction, or injury. Part I
(*) deficiencies are defined as those that would cause excessive
operator compensation to accomplish the primary or alternate
mission. Page 13
GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions B-281419 However, those
plans do not alter our position that multiyear funding should not
be approved for the F/A-18E/F program until these corrections of
deficiencies have been incorporated into the aircraft and
successfully tested. We conducted our review from September 1998
through June 1999 in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards. Our objectives, scope, and methodology are included in
appendix II. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix III. We are
sending copies of this report to the Honorable William Cohen,
Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Richard Danzig, Secretary of
the Navy; and the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director, Office of
Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to
others on request. Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or
your staff have any questions concerning this report. The major
contributors to this report were Steven Kuhta, Jerry Clark, Stacy
Edwards, and Charles Burgess. Louis J. Rodrigues Director, Defense
Acquisitions Issues Page 14
GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions B-281419 List of
Congressional Committees The Honorable John W. Warner Chairman The
Honorable Carl Levin Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed
Services United States Senate The Honorable Ted Stevens Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations United States
Senate The Honorable Floyd D. Spence Chairman The Honorable Ike
Skelton Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House
of Representatives The Honorable Jerry Lewis Chairman The
Honorable John P. Murtha Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on
Defense Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives Page
15 GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense
Acquisitions Contents Letter
1 Appendix I
18 Major F/A-18E/F Deficiencies Identified During OT-IIB Appendix
II
22 Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Appendix III
24 Comments From the Department of Defense Tables
Table 1: Critical Operational Issues
8 Abbreviations DOD Department of Defense FPQ
Full Performance Qualification OPEVAL operational test and
evaluation OPTEVFOR Operational Test and Evaluation Force Page 16
GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-127
Defense Acquisitions Appendix I Major F/A-18E/F Deficiencies
Identified During OT-IIB
Appendix I The OT-IIB report listed 29 major deficiencies in the
F/A-18E/F. The following discusses the deficiencies and their
impact on the aircraft's ability to perform its missions. Our
list does not total 29 deficiencies because we combined closely
related deficiencies. We extracted the information from
unclassified deficiency reports prepared by the Integrated Test
Team. Poor climb performance above 30,000 feet. The F/A-18E/F's
best climb performance was in the low 30,000-foot range, with
intermediate power. Although higher altitudes may have been
possible, the climb rate was too slow to be useful in most
tactical scenarios. Performance predictions indicate that combat
and tactical ceilings for the newer F/A-18Cs (Lot XIX) are greater
than that of the F/A-18Es when the aircraft are similarly loaded
with weapons and fuel tanks. The E/Fs low tactical ceiling reduced
the mission effectiveness of the aircraft when in the fighter
escort configuration against high, fast-flying enemy aircraft by
limiting the regions where the E/F could effectively launch its
air-to-air missiles. Low acceleration. The E/F's maximum level
flight airspeed was determined to be less than both the F/A-18C
and other threat aircraft in similar fighter configurations at all
investigated altitudes. This deficiency reduced the E/F's
effectiveness against high, fast-flying aircraft and provided
insufficient airspeed when the E/F was attempting to exit a combat
situation. Airframe buffet. The magnitude of buffet has been
described as moderate to heavy. At higher levels, the aircraft
shakes to the extent that the heads- up displays appear to
vibrate. The displays remain readable but are blurred slightly
and legibility is somewhat degraded. During some turns at subsonic
speed and low altitude, buffet forces the pilot to divert
significant attention to maintaining the desired flight path, and
combat effectiveness decreases as a result. During some landings,
buffet has been heavy enough to be interpreted as an aircraft
malfunction. Heavy airframe buffet during catapult launches would
result in dramatic increases in the required wind- over-deck for
high gross weights, thereby restricting operational capability.
Inadequate high angle of attack agility and controllability. The
time required to reverse the aircraft from a nose high to a nose
low position took significantly longer than desired and prevented
the aircraft from dominating aggressive positions during fights.
The aircraft frequently gained the offensive advantage but lost
the advantage during the reversal Page 18
GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions Appendix I Major F/A-18E/F
Deficiencies Identified During OT-IIB from nose high to nose low.
As a result, mission effectiveness would be reduced and aircraft
loss is possible. Slow response to control inputs, slow loaded
energy addition rate, and excessive speed loss during air combat
maneuvering. Air combat maneuvering placed the aircraft in the
high angle of attack/low airspeed flight regime. To maintain a
tactical advantage, the pilots tried to increase the airspeed by
reducing the angle of attack. Pilots noted that reducing the
angle of attack to the desired level took an unacceptable amount
of time in regaining airspeed. As a result of the loss of
airspeed, the pilots would lose the advantage during air combat
maneuvering, resulting in reduced tactical utility and possible
loss of aircraft and aircrew during actual air combat. Tactically
ineffective sustained turn rate. The current performance data
indicate that the aircraft might not meet the F/A-18E
specification requirement in this area. This would result in a
potential reduction in performance during combat turns.
Insufficient cooling capacity for seekers on air-to-air weapons.
The current nitrogen bottle will not cool the seekers on air-to-
air weapons for the duration of a combat air patrol mission. It
is possible to delay cooling the missiles until the aircraft
enters a threat area, but this is operationally unacceptable. The
bottles will have to be changed after every flight because of
their short life. However, changing the bottles requires the
E/F's wings to be unfolded on the carrier deck. This would delay
deck operations and the availability of the aircraft to conduct
its next flight (carrier cycle time). Improper indication of
direction of arrival of oncoming threat systems. The ALR-67 (V)3
radar warning receiver's left/right discrimination is inadequate.
While evaluating air-to-air tactics during one-on-one intercepts,
the radar warning receiver angle of arrival at times significantly
disagreed with actual target locations. On a number of occasions,
the actual target location was on one side of the aircraft nose,
and the displayed direction of arrival was on the other side. The
difference was, at times, substantial. Poor radar warning
receiver direction of arrival information would result in
degradation of situational awareness and poor aircrew defensive
reaction. This would lead to loss of tactical advantage and might
result in loss of aircraft and aircrew. Damage to AIM-9 missile
assemblies caused by wing tip environment. Structural failure of
AIM-9 Sidewinder hanger on the wing tip stations Page 19
GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions Appendix I Major F/A-18E/F
Deficiencies Identified During OT-IIB could result in damage to
the missile and launcher or an increase in required aircraft
maintenance. If undetected, the missile damage would result in
hazardous separation and/or decreased missile effectiveness. AIM-9
missile hanger failure might be the result of the F/A-18E/F's
severe wing tip environment. ALE-50 tow line burn-off in
afterburner. During in-flight evaluation of the ALE-50, decoys
and associated towlines were severed when engine afterburners were
engaged. Towlines typically failed within seconds of afterburner
initiation, which will occur during missile defense and air combat
maneuvering. This deficiency would result in the loss of active
electronic countermeasures protection and would directly increase
the threat to aircraft and crew during enemy missile attacks.
Difficulty in maintaining lateral trim. The aircraft did not
readily maintain lateral trim without frequent pilot inputs. The
failure of the airplane to maintain lateral trim was not
associated with any particular maneuver but rather a variety of
maneuvers throughout the flight envelope. This condition would
significantly increase the pilot's workload, distracting him/ her
and severely degrading the performance of more critical mission
tasks. Under-wing environment damages aircraft stores. Damage has
been discovered on numerous stores (attachments and ordnance)
carried beneath the aircraft's wings. The damage is the result of
the noise and vibration beneath the wings. Failure of items
carried underneath the wings could result in loss of or damage to
the aircraft and/or loss of mission capability. Unsafe delivery of
Rockeye bomb. Clearance was insufficient when the Rockeye bomb
was carried on the inboard wing station and the Tactical Forward
Looking Infrared Radar was carried on the aircraft's fuselage
station. This close proximity is not compatible with safe
separation requirements. Aircraft radar deficiency. The APG-73
radar, new to the aircraft, was slow to lock onto a target during
air combat maneuvering. Delayed and unreliable radar acquisitions
would result in lost first-shot opportunities and in delayed time
to kill, which reduces tactical performance and survivability.
Leading edge extension difficulties. Footing on the leading edge
extension was not secure during cockpit ingress/egress. As a
result of the small Page 20
GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions Appendix I Major F/A-18E/F
Deficiencies Identified During OT-IIB walkway and steep slope of
the leading edge extension and inadequate traction, the aircrew or
maintenance personnel could slip off the aircraft during cockpit
ingress/egress and experience serious injury. Inconsistent brake
effectiveness. Braking performance was noticeably inadequate
during landings by aircraft returning to the carrier without
weapons. The primary turnoff was missed and the secondary turnoff
was narrowly made. Poor, degraded, or unpredictable braking
performance would result in longer landing rollout, turnoff
overshoot, and decreased braking sensitivity for ground
handling/positioning. Inability to stop the aircraft reliably
could result in an aborted landing attempt or injury to ground
personnel during aircraft positioning on the flight line or flight
deck. Inadequate cooling capability of the fuel thermal management
system. During several missions flown on hot days, test aircraft
experienced "FUEL HOT" cautions either shortly after takeoff or
prior to mission completion. The "FUEL HOT" conditions resulted in
the inability of the fuel to cool the aircraft's fluids that cool
the radar and other aircraft systems. In-flight "FUEL HOT"
cautions could result in premature mission abort, degraded cooling
of accessories such as the radar and hydraulics, and reduced
reliability/life of engine management systems. Targeting Forward
Looking Infrared Radar deficiencies. Aircrew determined that as a
result of resolution and magnification deficiencies with the
aircraft's Targeting Forward Looking Infrared Radar, they could
not classify air-to-air and air-to-ground targets. Aircrew would
have difficulty quickly and accurately designating a discrete
target. Additionally, target identification would require
excessive head-down time, during which the weapon system operator
would be unable to scan the electronic warfare display and look
outside the aircraft for potential threats. Page 21
GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions Appendix II Objectives,
Scope, and Methodology
Appendix I I Our objectives were to (1) determine the extent to
which the F/A-18E/F is meeting performance requirements, (2)
identify risks associated with proceeding into operational test
and evaluation (OPEVAL) with unresolved deficiencies, and (3)
identify potential cost increases and risks associated with
approving the Navy's request for multiyear funding for the
program. To determine whether the program was meeting performance
requirements, we compared contractor and program management
performance measurements and projections with the five key
performance improvements over current F/A-18s that the F/A-18E/F
was intended to provide. We also reviewed contractor and Navy
comparisons of the aircraft's current performance relative to the
development contract specifications and to key performance
parameters established in the Navy's F/A-18E/F Operational
Requirements Document. Additionally, we reviewed reports on the
limited operational assessments conducted in November 1997 (OT-
IIA) and from June through August 1998 (OT-IIB) to identify the
measured performance of the F/A-18E/F relative to numerous
critical operational issues and to existing F/A-18s. We also
interviewed officials in the Navy's Operational Test and
Evaluation Force responsible for conducting the operational
assessments, including the test pilots who flew the operational
tests, to obtain their assessment of the aircraft's current and
potential performance as well as its performance compared to
current F/A-18s. To identify risks associated with proceeding into
OPEVAL with unresolved deficiencies, we reviewed documents
prepared by the Program Risk Advisory Board and the OPEVAL
Preparedness Team. These documents and interviews identified
operational performance deficiencies that the operational testers,
the Advisory Board, and the OPEVAL Preparedness Team concluded
could adversely affect the F/A-18E/F's probability of successfully
completing OPEVAL, which is to be conducted from May through
November 1999. To identify potential cost increases and risks
associated with approving the Navy's request for multiyear funding
for the program, we analyzed reports and other program documents
prepared by contractor and Navy officials responsible for tracking
program costs. Regarding the multiyear funding request, we
analyzed the Navy and the contractor lists of aircraft
deficiencies and assessed their impact relative to the criteria
that must be met to obtain multiyear funding-significant savings,
a stable system Page 22
GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions Appendix II Objectives,
Scope, and Methodology design, an adequately validated
requirement, and a commitment to stable funding over the life of
the contract. Page 23
GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense Acquisitions Appendix III Comments From
the Department of Defense AppendIix II Note: GAO's comment
supplementing those in the report text appear at the end of this
appendix. See comment 1. Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-127 Defense
Acquisitions Appendix III Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-127
Defense Acquisitions Appendix III Comments From the Department of
Defense Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-
127 Defense Acquisitions Appendix III Comments From the Department
of Defense The following is our comment on the Department of
Defense's (DOD) letter dated May 12, 1999. GAO Comments
1. DOD's statement that a separate interdiction range requirement
for the F/A-18F was never included in the Operational Requirements
Document is not accurate. An interdiction range requirement of
390 nautical miles for both the E and F model aircraft was
included in the final Operational Requirements Document dated
April 1, 1997. (707373) Letter Page 27
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