Military Readiness: Readiness Reports Do Not Provide a Clear Assessment
of Army Equipment (Letter Report, 06/16/1999, GAO/NSIAD-99-119).

Members of Congress have raised concerns about the combat readiness of
U.S. military forces because of reductions in force size and the
expanding demands of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance
operations. GAO found that, although the details are classified, a high
percentage of active duty Army units have the major equipment items they
need to do their wartime jobs. Moreover, Army information shows that
units are maintaining the bulk of their equipment in a fully
mission-capable condition. Despite these positive indications of
readiness, current readiness reporting systems are not comprehensive
enough to reveal all readiness weaknesses. Two factors suggest that the
Army could have difficulty sustaining equipment in the event of two
nearly simultaneous wars. First, there is a significant shortage of
maintenance personnel with the right skills and tenure. As a result,
unit maintenance personnel are working longer and harder to keep
equipment in a fully mission-capable condition. Second, Army officials
are concerned that shortages of war reserve repair parts could seriously
affect the operational availability of many of the Army's primary weapon
systems. Army officials said that they have started to fund critical
shortages. GAO makes recommendations to improve the reporting of (1)
auxiliary equipment shortages in unit status reports and (2) equipment
conditions in congressional readiness reports.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-99-119
     TITLE:  Military Readiness: Readiness Reports Do Not Provide a
	     Clear Assessment of Army Equipment
      DATE:  06/16/1999
   SUBJECT:  Combat readiness
	     Logistics
	     Defense contingency planning
	     Spare parts
	     Defense capabilities
	     Human resources utilization
	     Equipment maintenance
	     Equipment inventories
	     Army supplies
	     Reporting requirements
IDENTIFIER:  DOD Unit Status and Identity Report
	     DOD Status of Resources and Training System
	     JCS National Military Strategy

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    United States General Accounting Office GAO                 Report
    to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness, Committee on
    Armed Services, House of Representatives June 1999
    MILITARY READINESS Readiness Reports Do Not Provide a Clear
    Assessment of Army Equipment GAO/NSIAD-99-119 United States
    General Accounting Office
    National Security and Washington, D.C. 20548
    Letter                                   International Affairs
    Division B-282327
    Letter June 16, 1999 The Honorable Herbert H. Bateman Chairman,
    Subcommittee on Military Readiness Committee on Armed Services
    House of Representatives Dear Mr. Chairman: On the basis of your
    concerns about the combat readiness of U.S. military forces as the
    individual services deal with reductions in force size and the
    expanding demands of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance
    operations, we reviewed the equipment readiness in active duty
    Army units. As requested, this report addresses whether active
    duty units (1) have the equipment required to conduct their
    wartime missions, (2) are keeping their equipment in good
    condition, and (3) can sustain the equipment in a two major
    theater war as required by the National Military Strategy. Results
    in Brief                    While details are classified, a high
    percentage of active duty Army units have the major equipment
    items they need for their wartime mission. Moreover, Army
    information shows that units are maintaining the bulk of their
    equipment in a fully mission capable condition. Despite these
    positive indications of readiness, current readiness reporting
    systems are not comprehensive enough to reveal all readiness
    weaknesses. For example, they do not show operational limitations
    that have been caused by extensive shortages of support equipment
    essential to effective, sustained use of major equipment items.
    Units could deploy without this equipment and could perform their
    basic combat missions, but they would be limited in their
    capability, flexibility, or sustainability. Additionally, the Army
    has stated that its equipment is aging and becoming increasingly
    difficult to maintain and maintenance managers at units we visited
    told us that their mechanics are devoting increasing amounts of
    time to keep equipment operating. These problems are not reflected
    in readiness data, which show units are able to keep their
    equipment serviceable. We have reported that serviceability rates
    do not provide a good assessment of equipment condition because
    equipment that is old, unreliable, and difficult to maintain may
    still be reported serviceable. While maintenance problems may
    exist, the Army does not have data that clearly shows either what
    its equipment problems are or how units are affected. Letter
    Page 1                                         GAO/NSIAD-99-119
    Military Readiness B-282327 Two factors suggest that the Army
    could have difficulty sustaining equipment in the event of two
    nearly simultaneous military operations. First, there is a
    significant shortage of maintenance personnel with the right
    skills and tenure. As a result, unit maintenance personnel are
    working longer and harder to keep equipment in a fully mission
    capable condition. Second, Army officials are concerned that
    shortages of war reserve repair parts could seriously affect the
    operational availability of many of the Army's primary weapon
    systems. Army officials report they have started efforts to fund
    critical shortages. We are making recommendations intended to
    improve the reporting of (1) auxiliary equipment shortages in Unit
    Status Reports and (2) equipment condition in congressional
    readiness reports. Background              The Army's system for
    reporting the current status of Army units to the National Command
    Authority, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
    Headquarters, Department of the Army, is the Unit Status Reporting
    System. Each month, or more frequently when changes occur, over
    1,400 active duty Army units provide information on their status
    in four measured resource areas: personnel, equipment on hand,
    equipment serviceability, and training. A unit's overall status is
    measured by a "C" rating, which ranges from C-1 (best) to C-5
    (worst). Units also provide narrative remarks to support and
    clarify data. The Unit Status Report data feed into the Department
    of Defense's (DOD) system for reporting readiness to the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff, the Status of Resources and Training System
    (SORTS). Equipment readiness is indicated in two Unit Status
    Report resource areas; equipment on hand status and equipment
    serviceability status. Equipment on hand indicates whether units
    have their principal weapon systems and major equipment items
    compared to their wartime requirements. Principal weapon systems
    and equipment are identified in a unit's Table of Organization and
    Equipment1 by an equipment readiness code of P or A. Items coded P
    are central to an organization's ability to perform its doctrinal
    mission and are known as pacing items (e.g., tanks in a tank
    battalion). The majority of units have two pacing items, and at
    most a unit would have four pacing items. In total, the Army has
    categorized about 1A Table of Organization and Equipment
    prescribes the normal mission, organizational structure, and
    personnel and equipment requirements for a tactical military unit.
    Letter    Page 2
    GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 120 separate weapon
    systems and equipment items as pacing items. A unit's equipment
    inventory on-hand status is reflected in an S-level that ranges
    from S-1 (best-having most or all its equipment) to S-4 (worst-
    missing significant amounts of equipment). Units also report how
    much auxiliary equipment they have compared to their wartime
    requirement, but this information is not considered in determining
    a unit's equipment on-hand status. Auxiliary equipment is
    essential to support principal weapon systems and provide mission
    sustainment support.2 It includes items or systems required for
    transporting, maintaining, supplying, servicing, protecting,
    enhancing, or backing up principal weapon systems, such as unit
    maintenance equipment; nuclear, biological, and chemical defense
    equipment; support vehicles; mess equipment; and camouflage nets.
    Units identify the number of auxiliary equipment items in their
    Table of Organization and Equipment and determine a status rating
    for each item in accordance with Army Regulation 220-1. For
    example, a unit reports a status rating of S-1 if it has 90
    percent or more of its requirement for a specific auxiliary
    equipment item; S-2 if it has 80-89 percent of its requirement; S-
    3 if it has 65-79 percent of its requirement; and S-4 if it has
    less than 65 percent of its requirement. The unit then identifies
    the number of equipment items at each S-level in the Unit Status
    Report remarks. To illustrate, if a unit is required to have six
    radios, six sets of night vision goggles, and six aircraft tool
    kits and has five radios, five sets of night vision goggles, and
    four tool kits on-hand, it would be S-2 for radios (5/6=83
    percent), S-2 for night vision goggles (5/6=83 percent), and S-3
    for tool kits (4/6=67 percent). In its Unit Status Report, the
    unit would report that two equipment items are at S-2 and one
    equipment item is at S-3. It would not report the specific types
    or amounts of equipment missing. However, the commander is
    expected to narratively report any mission limitation that is
    caused by shortages of auxiliary equipment in the remarks section
    of the Unit Status Report and reflect this limitation in his
    mission accomplishment estimate. The mission accomplishment
    estimate is the commander's subjective assessment of the unit's
    ability to execute that portion of the wartime mission it would be
    expected to perform if alerted or committed within 72 hours of the
    date of the report.3 2The term auxiliary equipment as used in this
    report includes both auxiliary and auxiliary support equipment.
    3See Army Regulation 220-1, Sept. 1, 1997, ch.  8. Page 3
    GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 Equipment
    serviceability indicates how well units are maintaining their on-
    hand reportable equipment. On-hand reportable equipment consists
    of the unit's pacing items and any other equipment systems or
    individual items controlled by materiel condition status reports.
    In total, about 570 equipment systems and items are controlled by
    materiel condition status reports (comprising about 8 percent of
    the total equipment in the Army's inventory).4  The serviceability
    rate is a percentage based on the number of days reportable
    equipment is available to the organization and fully able to do
    its mission compared to the number of days it could have been
    available. A rate is calculated for (1) each pacing item and (2)
    all pacing items and reportable equipment in aggregate. A unit's
    overall status is the lower of the two serviceability rates.
    Pacing items again receive special emphasis because of their major
    importance to a unit. The unit's equipment serviceability status
    is reflected in an R-level that ranges from R-1 (best--equipment
    other than aircraft are fully mission capable and available to the
    unit 90 percent or more of the days in the period or aircraft are
    fully mission capable 75 percent or more of the days in the
    period) to R-4 (worst--equipment other than aircraft are fully
    mission capable less than 60 percent of the days in the period, or
    aircraft are fully mission capable less than 50 percent of the
    days in the period).5 In its fourth quarter, fiscal year 1998
    Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress, DOD also reported on a
    number of other equipment condition indicators. These indicators
    include (1) the percentage of equipment reported out of service
    due to maintenance or supply problems (not mission capable
    maintenance and not mission capable supply) for 16 major Army
    systems, (2) average equipment age for 15 major Army systems, and
    (3) depot maintenance requirements for 10 systems. 4The Army's
    reportable equipment items are identified in Army Regulation 700-
    138, app. B. 5See Army Regulation 220-1, Sept. 1, 1997, para. 6.5.
    Page 4
    GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 Most Active Duty Army
    A review of Unit Status Report data for September 1998 showed that
    a large Units Have Their Major  percentage of active duty Army
    units had their principal weapon systems and major equipment
    items.6 Status levels for this equipment have Equipment but Lack
    increased notably over the past few years. However, many units do
    not Essential Support                have all the auxiliary
    equipment needed to support their major equipment Equipment
    and provide mission sustainment support. Army officials believe
    shortages can be made up before deployment but acknowledge that in
    two nearly simultaneous conflicts  some later deploying units may
    have to deploy without all of their authorized auxiliary
    equipment. Units without all authorized auxiliary equipment would
    still be able to perform their basic mission, but they may suffer
    limitations in their capability, flexibility, and sustainability.
    Units Have Their Principal       We reviewed the equipment on-hand
    status of 1,483 active duty units as Weapon Systems and Major
    reported in September 1998 and found that most units reported
    either an Equipment Items                  S-1 or S-2 status for
    on-hand equipment. A unit reporting an S-1 status has the
    equipment needed to accomplish all missions for which it was
    designed with no additional resources. S-2 units have the
    equipment needed to undertake most of the full mission for which
    they were designed but may experience isolated decreases in
    flexibility for mission accomplishment. These units will require
    little, if any, assistance to compensate for deficiencies. S-3
    units will require significant equipment to compensate for
    deficiencies but can undertake many portions, but not all, of the
    full mission for which they were designed. S-4 units need
    significant additional equipment to accomplish their assigned
    wartime mission. Data for the past 7 years also show that
    equipment on-hand status levels have increased notably in active
    duty units for this time period. Since 1992 the number of units
    reporting equipment on-hand status levels below S-2 has decreased
    significantly. This seems logical given the downsizing of the
    force from 18 divisions to 10 divisions and the flow of excess
    equipment to remaining units. Under the Army's first to fight,
    first equipped strategy, priority for equipment available from
    downsizing would generally go to units scheduled to deploy early
    in a conflict. We did not identify any aggregate Army data systems
    that would allow us to corroborate the reliability of equipment
    on-hand data in unit status reports. 6Precise numbers are
    classified. Page 5
    GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 However, we reviewed
    and compared unit property records at three brigade-sized commands
    in the continental United Status to the equipment on-hand data in
    their Units' Status Reports.7 We found that the property book
    records generally supported the reported equipment on-hand status.
    Units Do Not Have All Their  Our analysis of Unit Status Report
    data for September 1998 showed a large Required Auxiliary
    percentage of active duty units had significant shortages of
    auxiliary Equipment                          equipment. Some of
    the significant auxiliary equipment shortages are identified in
    table 1. Applying the Army's equipment on-hand criteria to
    auxiliary equipment, over 62 percent of the units reporting
    auxiliary equipment would have an S-3 or S-4 status. Table 1:
    Examples of Auxiliary Equipment Shortages in U.S. Forces Command
    Units Item                                  Units reporting
    shortages              Number of items short Telephone cable
    335                              6,481 Night vision goggles
    214                              8,835 Binoculars
    174                              1,129 Generator set
    148                                493 Global positioning system
    136                              1,246 Chemical agent monitor
    114                                521 Battery charger
    38                                112 Note: Shortage computations
    include substitute items. Source: U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM),
    June 1999. Officials from the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of
    Staff for Logistics said that the shortages exist for a number of
    reasons, including recent increases in requirements for some
    items, slowed procurement funding, and units' use of operations
    and maintenance funds for higher priorities. Many auxiliary
    equipment items, for example, must be purchased with operations
    and maintenance funds. Officials said that units tend to delay
    purchasing items they may not consider critical when their funding
    is insufficient. This appeared to be the case at the three
    brigades we visited where items that were purchased with
    operations and maintenance funds comprised 28 to 53 percent of the
    missing auxiliary equipment. The high percentage of missing items
    that must be purchased in this way does not conclusively prove
    that inadequate funding is the cause. For example, some 7The
    number of units visited was not sufficient to meet the
    requirements for a statistically valid sample. Page 6
    GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 items may not have
    been available through the supply system. Equipment managers at
    the Army's Tank and Automotive Command also said that reductions
    in procurement funding particularly affect auxiliary equipment
    because funding priority generally goes to principal weapon
    systems and major equipment. The Army's Unit Status Report
    regulation states that a unit commander that lacks equipment,
    including auxiliary equipment, that he deems combat essential
    should address the shortages in the narrative remarks section of
    the report and consider the effect of these shortages, among other
    factors, in formulating the mission accomplishment estimate.8
    However, our review of the September 1998 Unit Status Reports
    found that commanders rarely identified impacts related to
    auxiliary equipment shortages even in cases where our analysis
    showed significant amounts of equipment were missing. For example,
    74 units that we identified as S-4 for auxiliary equipment also
    reported an overall unit status of C-1 (the unit could perform its
    full wartime mission).  As mentioned previously, units do not
    identify the specific auxiliary equipment they are missing so we
    could not question the commanders' subjective assessment.
    Shortages of some auxiliary equipment are likely to have little
    effect on unit operations. For example, sign painting kits and
    wristwatches are auxiliary equipment that would not likely affect
    mission accomplishment. Other auxiliary equipment may be needed
    only in certain operating environments. For example, winterization
    kits for UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters may not be needed in
    Southwest Asia, and electrical distribution equipment may not be
    needed by units moving into large, preestablished bases. Other
    auxiliary equipment, such as battery chargers, generators, and
    mine detectors, however, may limit a unit's capability,
    flexibility, or sustainability. FORSCOM officials generally
    discount the effect of auxiliary equipment shortages on mission
    accomplishment. They report that units with auxiliary equipment
    shortages would still be able to perform their basic warfighting
    mission. Additionally, they said they carefully review unit
    equipment before deployments and make up any equipment shortages
    deemed necessary for the mission. For example, during Operations
    Desert Shield/Desert Storm, to rectify shortages, FORSCOM
    officials said that they extensively transferred equipment between
    units and bought equipment such as generators, cellular phones,
    facsimiles, secure telephones, and 8 See AR 220-1, Sept. 1, 1997,
    paras. 5-13c(2), 8-1, and 8-3. Page 7
    GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 other electronic
    devices from the commercial market prior to deployment. Although
    FORSCOM plans to continue this general approach in rectifying
    shortages, no definitive plans exist specifying how this will take
    place. Given the magnitude of the shortages, transferring
    equipment between units may be problematic. The Army's description
    of auxiliary equipment as either essential to support principal
    weapon systems or provide unit sustainment support seems to be
    contradicted by the large amounts of equipment missing and the
    absence of any reported effect by Army units.9 It is
    understandable that units can and do function without all required
    equipment items. However, at some point the synergy built into a
    unit begins to be reduced when large amounts of equipment are
    missing. Shortages of maintenance equipment, in particular, create
    questions about a unit's ability to sustain its primary weapon
    systems at a wartime pace of operations. Given the number of units
    with shortages, one would expect to see some acknowledgment of a
    capability, flexibility, or sustainment limitation in at least
    some units. The absence of any recognized effect demonstrates
    either that the equipment is not essential or that commanders are
    not appropriately considering potential limitations to their
    units. Additionally, in February 1993, we reported on the impact
    of equipment shortages during the Gulf War mobilization.10 During
    that conflict the Army transferred equipment between units to
    rectify shortages but found that filling shortages became more
    difficult as the operation progressed and more units were
    mobilized. As equipment became scarcer, some equipment shortages
    could not be filled, and as a result, some units were deployed
    without all of their equipment. Our report stated a number of
    instances in which units were hampered in their ability to perform
    their required mission by the equipment shortages. Army Data Do
    Not                  Despite the Unit Status Reports for September
    1998 that showed that Provide a Clear Picture  equipment
    serviceability rates were high, the Army reported in its Quarterly
    Readiness Report to the Congress for the fourth quarter of fiscal
    of Equipment                      year 1998 its concern that its
    equipment is aging and becoming increasingly Condition
    difficult to maintain. Maintenance managers at units we visited
    also said that their mechanics are working harder to keep
    equipment operating. 9See AR 220-1, Sept. 1, 1997, App. B.
    10Reserve Forces: Aspects of the Army's Equipping Strategy Hamper
    Reserve Readiness (GAO/NSIAD-93-11, Feb. 18, 1993). Page 8
    GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 However, these
    problems are not reflected in high equipment readiness rates. We
    have previously reported that serviceability rates do not provide
    a good assessment of equipment condition because equipment that is
    old, unreliable, and difficult to maintain may be reported
    serviceable.11 However, we could not determine the extent to which
    Army units are affected by equipment problems because the Army
    does not have data that identifies either its unreliable equipment
    or how units are affected. Serviceability Data Show     In
    addition to showing quantities on hand, the Unit Status Reports
    measure Units Are Maintaining        equipment readiness by how
    well units maintain their on-hand reportable Equipment
    equipment. The Army's goal is that 90 percent or more of ground
    equipment be in a fully mission capable status, which means the
    equipment can perform all of its combat missions without
    endangering the lives of crew or operators.12 Aircraft units have
    a goal of 75 percent or higher fully mission capable. Unit Status
    Report data for September 1998 showed that the majority of the
    1,483 active duty Army units reporting were achieving the Army's
    goals.13 According to commanders at the units we visited, meeting
    the Army's serviceability goals is a command priority and the
    condition of pacing items and other reportable equipment is
    closely monitored at all command levels. Historical Unit Status
    Report data also show that units have generally maintained their
    major equipment at the fully mission capable goals over time. For
    example, table 2 shows the quarterly mission capable rates for 16
    major Army equipment items that were being maintained at 90- and
    75-percent rates from October 1994 through August 1998. Mission
    capable rates for some equipment occasionally fell below the
    goals. However, we see no pattern that would suggest an increasing
    problem. 11Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Develop a More
    Comprehensive Measurement System (GAO/NSIAD-95-29, Oct. 27, 1994).
    12 See AR 220-1, Sept. 1, 1997, Glossary, Section II, Terms; and
    AR 700-138, Sept. 16, 1997,  para. 1-6. 13Precise numbers are
    classified. Page 9
    GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 Table 2:  Mission
    Capable Rates for 16 Major Equipment Items Oct.            Mar.
    Oct.         Mar.          Oct.         Mar.          Oct.
    Mar.    Aug. Equipment item                    1994       1995
    1995          1996         1996         1997          1997
    1998         1998 Aircraft systems: Availability goal 75 percent
    CH-47D Chinook cargo helicopter                          75
    78        74           75            76           73            77
    73      75 AH-64 Apache attack helicopter
    78             82        83           80            82
    84            86              83      81 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior
    helicopter                          83             76        79
    84            82           85            87              87
    87 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter                          78
    73        78           78            81           81            82
    85      79 Ground systems: Availability goal 90 percent M 1 A 1 A
    b r a m s t a n k              N / AN / AN / A9 39 29 29 29 39 0 M
    1 A 2 A b r a m s t a n k              N / AN / A 02 88 49 58 49
    09 2 M2 Bradley Fighting V e h i c l e
    9 19 49 49 59 59 59 49 59 2 M3 Armored Cavalry scout v e h i c l e
    9 19 39 39 49 29 19 39 19 4 M109 Self-propelled howitzer
    95             95        95           96            96
    96            97              96      97 M198 Towed howitzer
    95             95        90           93            94
    94            91              94      93 HEMTT [Heavy expanded
    mobility tactical truck]            89             89        90
    88            89           89            90              89
    88 HMMWV [High mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle]
    94             94        95           94            95
    94            95              94      93 MLRS [Multiple launch r o
    c k e t s y s t e m ]                    9 49 39 49 49 59 69 59 49
    5 TOW2 HMMW [High mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle]
    97             97        97           98            96
    96            97              96      98 Patriot missile system
    97             97        96           95            96
    92            94              95      92 Avenger ground to air m i
    s s i l e s y s t e m                    N / A9 99 89 99 69 89 89
    79 8 Source: Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress, 4th
    quarter, fiscal year 1998. Serviceability Data Do Not
    Although overall serviceability rates are high as shown in table
    2, Provide a Good Assessment  serviceability data do not provide a
    complete assessment of equipment of Equipment Condition
    condition. Our 1994 report on the ability of DOD's readiness
    reporting system to provide a comprehensive assessment of overall
    readiness stated that C-ratings represent a snapshot of readiness
    in time but by design do not address long-term readiness or signal
    impending changes in the status Page 10
    GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 of resources and for
    equipment, this continues to be the case. Specifically, equipment
    that is old, unreliable, and difficult to maintain may be reported
    serviceable. For example, Army officials told us that the Armored
    Vehicle Launched Bridge and the Armored Combat Earthmover are
    examples of systems that are complex, difficult to maintain,
    and/or aging in the Army inventory. The Army is in the process of
    replacing the Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge with the Wolverine
    Heavy Assault Bridge. Despite these problems, serviceability rates
    for these systems generally are in the 86- to 92-percent range.
    While the Army's goal is for units to maintain ground equipment
    above 90-percent availability, slight decreases below this goal do
    not by themselves indicate problems. For example, as shown in
    table 2, the M1A2 Abrams tank's rates were below the goal during
    four quarters, even though the Abrams is among the Army's newest
    and most modern weapons. Maintenance managers told us that they
    can maintain high serviceability rates, even for problem
    equipment, through intense investments of time. However, the
    effort required to keep equipment serviceable is not reflected in
    readiness reports. Other Army Equipment              Our review of
    other Army equipment condition indicators, including the Condition
    Indicators Do Not  expanded equipment condition indicators
    recently provided in DOD's Support Reliability or
    Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress, revealed that the
    indicators Maintenance Problems              do not effectively
    identify and highlight the Army's equipment problems. To the
    contrary, most of the indicators show few equipment problems. The
    Army maintains that its equipment is becoming increasingly
    difficult to maintain. If units are experiencing problems with
    unreliable equipment, the problems should be reflected in
    increasing amounts of equipment reported as "not mission capable-
    maintenance." "Not mission capable-maintenance" is reported when
    equipment cannot perform its mission because of maintenance
    underway or needed. Units report equipment out of service for
    maintenance through the Unit Level Logistics System, and the Army
    aggregates and stores this data at the Army Materiel Command's
    Logistics Support Activity (LOGSA). As shown in table 3, Army data
    from October 1994 through August 1998 for 16 key Army systems show
    no increase in the percent of equipment not mission capable and no
    downward trends that would indicate worsening conditions.
    Officials at the units we visited explained that the data might
    not be a good indicator of reliability problems because available
    personnel work not only their regular schedules but also evenings
    and weekends to keep maintenance backlogs low. However, the Army
    does not collect workload data for individual equipment systems
    that would illustrate increasing workloads. Page 11
    GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 Table 3:  Percent of
    Equipment Not Mission Capable Maintenance Oct.       Mar.
    Oct.         Mar.          Oct.         Mar.          Oct.
    Mar.    Aug. Equipment item                 1994       1995
    1995          1996         1996         1997          1997
    1998         1998 CH-47D Chinook cargo helicopter
    22        19            23           21            21           24
    20              23      23 AH-64D Apache attack helicopter
    17        14            14           13            14           13
    12              13      16 OH-58D Kiowa warrior helicopter
    11        15            13           14            16           12
    11              11      11 UH-60D Blackhawk helicopter
    16        22            18           18            15           15
    15              12      19 M 1 A 1 A b r a m s t a n k
    N / A N / A N / A123124 M1A2 Abrams tank                 N/A
    N/A            50           70             8             3
    8               5       4 M2 Bradley Fghting Vehicle         3
    1            1             1            1             1
    1               1       3 M3 Armored Cavalry scout v e h i c l e
    322111142 M109 Self-propelled h o w i t z e r
    211211110 M 1 9 8 T o w e d h o w i t z e r          237233245 H E
    M T T 433434356 H M M W V                           222222134 M L
    R S 342332233 T O W 2 H M M W V                    111121221 P a t
    r i o t m i s s i l e s y s t e m              322422233 Avenger
    ground to air missile system                   N/A          0
    1             1            2             0            1
    1       0 Source: Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress, 4th
    quarter, fiscal year 1998. We also analyzed data in the Army Cost
    and Economic Analysis Center's Operating and Support Management
    Information System (OSMIS) for indications of equipment
    reliability problems. The OSMIS database is the Army's source of
    historical operating and support cost information for more than
    350 systems that are in tactical units-Active, Guard, and Reserve.
    Generally, increasing operating and support costs should be an
    indicator of growing reliability problems. However, our analysis
    of operating and support cost data shows few problems with
    increasing operating and support costs. For example, we compared
    fiscal year 1992 repair parts costs (consumables and net
    reparables) per hour flown or mile driven for 20 active duty
    aviation, tactical wheeled vehicle, artillery and missile, and
    combat systems (tanks and infantry fighting vehicles) to the
    fiscal year 1996 repair parts costs. We found that costs decreased
    for Page 12
    GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 15 systems (75
    percent), increased for 4 systems (20 percent), and remained
    stable for 1 system (5 percent).  A comparison of fiscal year 1993
    and 1996 repair parts costs for the same 20 systems similarly
    showed that 14 systems (70 percent) had lower repair parts costs
    while 6 (30 percent) had higher. We also compared annual repair
    parts costs for another 9 systems where usage data were not
    available, such as communications and engineering equipment, and
    artillery systems. Without usage data, annual repair parts costs
    are a less precise measure of reliability but generally show how
    much the equipment is being repaired. Repair parts costs decreased
    between fiscal year 1992 and 1996 for seven systems and increased
    for two. A comparison of fiscal year 1993 and 1996 repair parts
    costs for the same nine systems showed that five systems had lower
    repair parts costs while four  had higher. Army officials told us
    that OSMIS data might not support possible reliability problems
    because there is not a direct correlation between equipment
    operation and repair parts usage. However, they agree that if
    equipment is being repaired more frequently, it should be
    indicated by the data. They speculated that repairs might be down
    because some equipment is being used less. Our analysis of
    historical data from October 1994 through August 1998 for the
    Army's top 16 systems shows some variance in equipment out of
    service while awaiting repair parts, but overall the data does not
    indicate increasing problems in repair parts availability. Page 13
    GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 Table 4:  Percent of
    Equipment Not Mission Capable Supply Oct.       Mar.          Oct.
    Mar.          Oct.         Mar.          Oct.             Mar.
    Aug. Equipment item                  1994       1995         1995
    1996         1996         1997          1997         1998
    1998 CH-47D Chinook cargo h e l i c o p t e r
    333433342 AH-64D Apache attack h e l i c o p t e r
    543743243 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior h e l i c o p t e r
    698223222 UH-60D Blackhawk h e l i c o p t e r
    654444332 M 1 A 1 A b r a m s t a n k              N / A N / A N /
    A665756 M1A2 Abrams tank                 N/A        N/A
    50             2            8             2            8
    5       4 M2 Bradley Fighting V e h i c l e
    655444545 M3 Armored Cavalry scout v e h i c l e
    655578654 M109 Self-propelled h o w i t z e r
    344233233 M 1 9 8 T o w e d h o w i t z e r          323533722 H E
    M T T 787887766 H M M W V 443434433 M L R S 334322332 T O W 2 H M
    M W V                    222123121 P a t r i o t m i s s i l e s y
    s t e m              012126425 Avenger ground to air missile
    system                   N/A           1            1
    0            2             2            1               2       2
    Source: Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress, 4th quarter,
    fiscal year 1998. Maintenance officers at two units we visited
    told us that they had not experienced problems with the
    availability of repair parts. However, at the 7th Transportation
    Group maintenance officers reported difficulties obtaining parts
    for some older ships in their fleet. The 7th Transportation Group
    has several boat companies that transport cargo, troops, and
    vehicles between ship and shore, or from one port to another port.
    Additionally, although units were reducing the number of repair
    parts in their inventories, unit supply managers' told us they
    were not having any more difficulty obtaining spare parts than in
    the past. Nonetheless, units visited reported that they
    occasionally obtained parts by removing them from other equipment
    items rather than waiting for the supply system to provide them. A
    FORSCOM official, however, told us that he believes that the
    practice of "controlled substitution" has not increased notably.
    Page 14
    GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 We also analyzed
    equipment age because keeping equipment past its useful life may
    lead to unacceptable operating and support costs and a decrease in
    wartime operational effectiveness. As shown in table 5, the
    equipment ages for 15 major systems reported in the expanded
    Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress shows that most major
    systems are within their estimated service life. Table 5:
    Average Age of the Army's Top 15 Systems Estimated        Average
    Equipment item
    service life          age M1A1 Abrams tank
    20                9.3 M1A2 Abrams tank
    20                1.5 M2/M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle
    20               11.2 M109 Self-propelled howitzer
    N/A                 6 M198 Towed howitzer
    N/A                12 MLRS N/A
    9.2 Patriot missile system
    N/A               10.5 Avenger ground-to-air missile system
    N/A                8.7 HEMTT
    20 years               11.5 HMMWV
    14 years                8.1 TOW2 HMMWV
    14 years          11.8 AH-64 Apache attack helicopter
    20          11.2 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopter
    20                8.2 CH-47D Chinook cargo helicopter
    20          10.8 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter
    20          11.6 Sources: Estimated service life data were
    obtained from FORSCOM and Army Materiel Command officials. Average
    age data were obtained from the Quarterly Readiness Report to the
    Congress, 4th quarter, fiscal year 1998. N/A indicates data were
    not available. Another indicator of aging equipment is the Army's
    equipment recapitalization program that extends the service life
    of equipment through depot rebuild or technology insertion.
    Extending the service life of equipment is sometimes necessary
    when production and fielding rates for new equipment are
    insufficient to prevent fleet aging from becoming a chronic
    problem. Some of the recapitalization programs we identified that
    address problems with aging equipment include engineer support
    equipment, construction equipment, Paladin M109 Howitzer,  UH-60A
    Blackhawk helicopter, UH-1 Iroquois utility helicopter, HEMTT,
    HMMWV, 2 1/2-ton truck,  5-ton truck, line-haul tractors, engineer
    tractors, and materiel handling equipment. Page 15
    GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 Army officials
    acknowledge that serviceability rates and other condition
    indicators currently reported provide a limited picture of
    equipment condition. However, identifying predictive condition
    indicators for the large variety of equipment in the Army is
    complex. They said that Army commands independently monitor
    numerous additional information sources to supplement data
    reported in Unit Status Reports. These sources include reports
    from Logistics Assistance Offices at all installations and item
    managers at the commodity commands. This information is generally
    not reported to higher commands. They report that this information
    is sufficient to provide assurance on current readiness issues but
    acknowledge its weakness for identifying longer term equipment
    condition problems. The Army May                    The Army may
    have difficulty sustaining its equipment in the event of two
    Experience Problems  nearly simultaneous military operations, the
    most demanding scenario, because of significant shortages of
    maintenance personnel and war reserve Sustaining Its
    repair parts stocks. The war reserve repair parts stocks are
    intended to Equipment                       support Army units
    during wartime until logistics supply lines can be established
    from the United States. The amount of repair parts that should be
    stocked is based on the Army's most demanding scenario, two nearly
    simultaneous theater wars, and considers repair part utilization
    rates for major equipment items, on-hand general issue stocks, on-
    hand war reserve stocks, and the amounts industry can provide.
    Units Are Short Some            Unit commanders we visited
    reported the availability of maintenance Maintenance Skills
    personnel with the right skills and tenure was the units' most
    significant equipment readiness problem. Army-wide shortages of
    personnel, frequent deployments to peacekeeping missions, and the
    assignment of personnel to tasks outside their military specialty
    were the primary reasons cited. These shortages create risks in
    the Army's ability to sustain its equipment in the event of two
    nearly simultaneous theater wars. Page 16
    GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 The units we visited
    had 97 to 99 percent of their authorized enlisted personnel at the
    time of our visits. However, high unit manning rates do not fully
    reflect the extent of maintenance personnel shortages in the units
    or the impact of these shortages on the units' ability to
    accomplish critical wartime tasks. Further, high manning rates do
    not capture the rank (enlisted versus noncommissioned officers),
    skill, and experience imbalances that affect their maintenance
    operations. FORSCOM data shown in table 6 show that these
    imbalances are prevalent. Page 17
    GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 Table 6:   Personnel
    authorized and assigned by grade for a sample of occupations
    Senior noncommissioned Enlisted Noncommissioned officers
    officers (E-1 through E-4)         (E-5 through E6)            (E-
    7 through E-9) Military occupational specialty
    (auth/assigned)          (auth/assigned)
    (auth/assigned) 44B Metal worker
    361/386                   112/93 107%                      83%
    Not applicable 44E Machinist
    105/96                   104/87                           3/2 91%
    84%                          67% 45B Small arms/artillery
    repairman                                  213/206
    47/37 97%                      79%                 Not applicable
    45D Self-propelled field artillery turret
    49/80                    62/21 mechanic
    163%                      34%                 Not applicable 45E
    Abrams tank turret mechanic
    264/330                    85/68 125%                      80%
    Not applicable 45K Armament repairman
    297/227                  192/158                        67/61 76%
    83%                          91% 45T Bradley Fighting Vehicle
    system turret                          142/262
    113/58 mechanic
    185%                      51%                 Not applicable 52C
    Utilities equipment repairman
    533/474                  229/226 89%                      99%
    Not applicable 52D Power generation equipment
    1389/1208                  505/471 repairman
    87%                      93%                 Not applicable 62B
    Construction equipment repairman
    651/635                  398/351                        81/98 98%
    88%                         121% 63B Light wheel vehicle repairman
    3234/2844                1867/1748                      593/521
    88%                      94%                          88% 63D
    Self-propelled field artillery system
    224/177                  145/149                        50/47
    mechanic
    79%                     103%                          94% 63E M1
    Abrams tank system mechanic
    390/580                  381/251                      136/140 149%
    66%                         103% 63G Fuel/electrical system
    repairman                                191/198
    45/48 104%                     107%                 Not applicable
    63H Tracked vehicle repairman
    666/764                  643/475                      474/464 115%
    74%                          98% 63S Heavy wheel vehicle mechanic
    1189/1003                  398/369 84%                      93%
    Not applicable 63T Bradley Fighting Vehicle system
    980/1161                  616/439                      127/134
    mechanic
    119%                      71%                         106% 63W
    Wheel Vehicle repairman
    1582/1488                  361/364 94%                     101%
    Not applicable 63Y Track vehicle mechanic
    269/277                  127/105 103%                      83%
    Not applicable Source: FORSCOM, February 1999. Page 18
    GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 Commanders of units
    visited reported similar personnel shortages. Some of the
    significant shortages reported follow. *A t t h e 3 rd Brigade of
    the 2nd Infantry Division, only 2 of 8 Bradley Fighting Vehicle
    turret mechanics (25 percent), and 5 of 10 Abrams tank systems
    mechanics (50 percent) were assigned. The brigade also had only 28
    of 44 motor transport operators (64 percent) assigned. *A t t h e
    7 th Transportation Group, only 10 of 15 light wheel vehicle
    supervisors (67 percent) were assigned. The group also had only 20
    of 30 authorized motor transport operators (67 percent). * At the
    18th Aviation Brigade, 17 of 25 authorized light wheel vehicle
    mechanics (68 percent) were assigned. A CH-47 Chinook helicopter
    company within the brigade had 37 helicopter repairman assigned of
    38 authorized but, according to unit officials, 8 repairman could
    not work because of medical problems. The company also had all
    three authorized aircraft powertrain repairmen, but we were told
    that all three were fresh from school and lacked experience. Army
    officials told us of several other issues that compound their
    personnel shortage problems. First, over the past few years the
    amount of training provided in Army schools had been reduced and
    units are expected to provide more of the skills-oriented
    training. Additionally, many occupational specialties have been
    combined and individual soldiers are responsible for knowing how
    to repair more types of equipment than previously. These changes
    have significantly increased the supervisory and training workload
    for unit noncommissioned officers. Second, the burden of
    peacekeeping operations, along with the assignment of personnel to
    tasks outside their military specialties, has also added to
    noncommissioned officers' workloads. For example, the 7th
    Transportation Group provided one battalion per month to the post
    for base support activities. Army officers told us that reductions
    in base operating support funding left them with no choice but to
    use soldiers for these tasks. The result, however, has been that
    the maintenance workload tends to focus on a few key individuals
    who must work long and hard to maintain unit equipment readiness
    status. Readiness reporting does not capture this increase in work
    tempo. Prepositioned War Reserve  Sustaining Army equipment in two
    nearly simultaneous major theater wars Repair Parts May Limit
    may also present risks due to shortages of war reserve repair
    parts. Equipment Sustainability         According to a contractor
    study, the operational availability of many of the Army's major
    weapon systems will decrease significantly by the 60th day of an
    overlapping two-theater war because of a repair part shortage. For
    Page 19                                           GAO/NSIAD-99-119
    Military Readiness B-282327 example, the operational availability
    of the AH-64 Apache is forecast to fall to 44 percent by day 60 of
    a conflict and the operational availability of the OH-58D Kiowa is
    forecast to fall to 52 percent. Conflicts requiring fewer forces
    than assumed in the study would result in higher operational
    availabilities. Army officials report they have started efforts to
    fund critical shortages. Table 7 shows the Army's estimated
    equipment availability in a two-war scenario. Table 7:
    Availability of Selected Equipment in a Two-War Scenario; 30 Days
    between Wars Numbers in percent Availability of selected equipment
    Two major theater wars (30 day periods) 30             60
    90          120         150 Abrams tank
    89             83           61            49          46 AH-64
    Apache                           56             44           37
    31          26 Avenger                                84
    82           64            46          39 Bradley Fighting Vehicle
    76             79           53            44          41 CH-47
    Chinook                          70             64           57
    50          45 Heavy equipment transporter
    75             54           41            33          29 HMMWV
    82             83           61            60          58 HEMTT
    84             80           77            58          51 Howitzer
    69             52           31            26          24 M113
    86             84           66            50          44 MLRS
    87             75           40            26          20 Mobile
    subscriber equipment                              72
    34           35            33          32 OH-58D, Kiowa
    65             52           35            25          22
    Palletized load system                 81             71
    45            36          34 SinCgars 89
    71           65            52          46 UH-60 Blackhawk
    helicopter                             65             62
    57            53          52 Source: Army War Reserve Secondary
    Items, Final Report  Phase II, Coopers & Lybrand, June 1998. Page
    20                                                GAO/NSIAD-99-119
    Military Readiness B-282327 Conclusions        The Army's current
    equipment readiness indicators provide valuable information, but
    they do not provide a comprehensive assessment of equipment. In
    particular, the equipment on-hand indicator does not effectively
    characterize unit conditions as they relate to capability,
    flexibility, and sustainment. Shortages of some auxiliary
    equipment may have little impact on units, while others, such as
    camouflage nets, night vision goggles, and communications
    equipment, give Army forces a combat edge over their possible
    foes. Current guidance does not emphasize the need to assess how
    auxiliary equipment shortages may affect their wartime operations.
    Over 60 percent of reporting units had significant shortages of
    auxiliary equipment that would likely continue in the early stages
    of a deployment. The Army's equipment condition indicators
    similarly do not support or refute the Army's position that its
    equipment is aging and becoming increasingly difficult to
    maintain. Army units' equipment serviceability status remains high
    and stable, and other indicators recently provided by the Army in
    its Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress similarly show few
    equipment problems. The amount of time that equipment is not
    mission capable because of maintenance or supply problems remains
    low and stable, seemingly refuting assertions that equipment is
    becoming less reliable or is plagued by supply problems. Further,
    age data on major systems indicate that most equipment is within
    its estimated service life. This disparity illustrates the
    limitation of the Army's equipment condition assessment. Finding
    the right set of equipment condition indicators is complex. Given
    the large variety of equipment items in the Army's inventory, no
    one common set of indicators is likely to provide a comprehensive
    assessment of equipment condition for all items. Further,
    expanding the number of equipment items that the Army provides
    information on threatens to be burdensome with no assurance that
    problem systems will be reflected. The best alternative may be a
    report that specifically identifies equipment problems, details
    the readiness impact, and proposes solutions. This would enable
    the Army to succinctly focus on its equipment problems so they can
    be addressed by Army, DOD, and the Congress and provide assurance
    that it knows the true status of its equipment. Recommendations
    We recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the Deputy
    Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations to reemphasize to Army
    commanders the Page 21
    GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 requirement to
    identify the operational impact of essential auxiliary equipment
    shortages in the narrative remarks section of the Unit Status
    Report and to properly consider shortages of auxiliary equipment
    when formulating their mission accomplishment estimates. The
    Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations should instruct
    commanders to focus more broadly on unit capability, flexibility,
    and sustainability issues in formulating their overall unit status
    and mission accomplishment estimate. To improve equipment
    condition reporting, we recommend that the Secretary of  the Army
    direct the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics to submit a
    periodic report to the Congress that highlights the Army's top
    equipment problems. This report should address more than just the
    16 reportable SORTS systems and should identify major equipment
    readiness concerns and planned corrective actions. Agency Comments
    and  DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report and
    they are Our Evaluation                 included in their entirety
    in appendix II. DOD concurred with our recommendation that the
    Secretary of the Army should reemphasize to Army commanders the
    requirement to identify the operational impact of auxiliary
    equipment shortages. DOD also concurred with our recommendation
    that the Army periodically report to the Congress on their top
    equipment problems. We used the term periodically to give the Army
    the discretion to report as often as it believed necessary to keep
    the Congress informed. However, it was our intention that a report
    be submitted at least annually. Additionally, in its response to
    this recommendation DOD stated that it believes a report is an
    appropriate process to highlight auxiliary equipment problems. We
    did not intend this report to be limited to auxiliary equipment
    problems. Scope and                      To determine if units
    have the equipment necessary to conduct their Methodology
    wartime missions, we obtained summary-level information on the
    Army's equipment on-hand posture as of September 1998 from DOD's
    SORTS. We also obtained equipment on-hand data for three brigade
    sized units and visited those units to determine if the SORTS data
    accurately reflected actual unit conditions by reviewing and
    comparing unit property book records to the reported SORTS data.
    These units were the 7th Transportation Group, Fort Eustis,
    Virginia; 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, Fort Lewis,
    Washington; and, 18th Aviation Brigade, Fort Bragg, North
    Carolina. We also used SORTS data to calculate the equipment on-
    Page 22                                        GAO/NSIAD-99-119
    Military Readiness B-282327 hand status for lower priority
    equipment for all reporting active duty units as of September
    1998. We then discussed our findings with Army officials in the
    Offices of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Deputy Chief
    of Staff for Operations and Plans, and FORSCOM. To determine the
    condition of the Army's equipment, we analyzed summary equipment
    serviceability data for all reporting active duty Army units as of
    September 1998 and equipment serviceability data for three
    brigade-sized units from SORTS. These units were the same units
    discussed above. We then visited those units to inspect the
    equipment and maintenance records to determine if the SORTS data
    accurately reflected actual field conditions. At the units we met
    with unit commanders, maintenance supervisors, and maintainers to
    discuss problems they may have in supporting the equipment. We
    also met with personnel responsible for maintaining the units'
    inventories of repair parts. At Fort Eustis, we met with the
    Directorate for Logistics, who was responsible for providing the
    7th Transportation Group's direct support maintenance. At Fort
    Lewis, we met with I Corps officials, and at Fort Bragg we met
    with 1st Corps Support Command officials responsible for
    supporting their respective brigades' equipment to discuss
    equipment conditions and support problems. To gather information
    on Army-wide equipment conditions, we met with officials from
    LOGSA at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, who provided data on readiness
    trends for reportable equipment and age data for Army equipment.
    Officials from the U.S. Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center,
    Falls Church, Virginia, discussed how they track operating and
    support costs for Army equipment with us and provided us data for
    350 Army systems. Officials from the Army Materiel Support
    Analysis Activity, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland, discussed
    their ongoing effort to gather mean utilization between failure
    data for Army equipment. We also met with officials from the U.S.
    Army's Tank and Automotive Command, Warren, Michigan, to discuss
    information they possess on equipment condition. After analyzing
    the data, we discussed our conclusions with officials from the
    Offices of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Army
    Deputy Chief of Staff or Operations and Plans, DOD Under Secretary
    of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and FORSCOM. Our
    information on equipment sustainment was derived from interviews
    with unit commanders at the three bases visited as well as data on
    specific maintenance skill shortages in the respective units. We
    followed up on the data with FORSCOM officials. We obtained our
    information on repair parts Page 23
    GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 war reserves from the
    Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and the U.S.
    Army Materiel Support Analysis Activity. We conducted our review
    from June 1998 to February 1999 in accordance with generally
    accepted government auditing standards. We are sending copies of
    this report to other interested committees. We are also sending
    copies of this report to the Honorable William Cohen, Secretary of
    Defense and the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army.
    Copies will also be made available to others upon request. Please
    contact me at (202) 512-5140 should you or your staff have any
    questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this
    report are listed in appendix II. Sincerely yours, Mark E. Gebicke
    Director, National Security and Preparedness Page 24
    GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 Page 25
    GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness Contents Letter
    1 Appendix I
    28 DOD Comments Appendix II
    30 Major Contributors to This Report Tables
    Table1: Examples of Auxiliary Equipment
    6 Shortages in U.S. Forces Command Units Table 2: Mission Capable
    Rates for
    10 16 Major Equipment Items Table 3: Percent of Equipment Not
    12 Mission Capable Maintenance Table 4: Percent of Equipment Not
    14 Mission Capable Supply Table 5: Median Age of the Army's Top 15
    Systems                                                       15
    Table 6: Personnel Authorized and Assigned by
    18 Grade for a Sample of Occupations Table 7: Availability of
    Selected Equipment in a
    20 Two-War Scenario Abbreviations DOD             Department of
    Defense FORSCOM U.S. Forces Command LOGSA           Logistics
    Support Activity OSMIS           Operating and Support Management
    Information System SORTS           Status of Resources and
    Training System SORTS           Status of Resources and Training
    System Page 26
    GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness Page 27    GAO/NSIAD-99-119
    Military Readiness Appendix I Comments From the Department of
    Defense Appendix I Page 28            GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military
    Readiness Appendix I Comments From the Department of Defense
    Letter    Page 29                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-
    119 Military Readiness Appendix II Major Contributors to This
    Report Major Contributors to This Report
    Append Iix I National Security and  Carol R. Schuster, Associate
    Director International Affairs         William C. Meredith,
    Assistant Director Glenn D. Furbish, Evaluator in Charge Division,
    Washington, D.C. Norfolk Field Office          Lawrence E. Dixon,
    Senior Evaluator Linda H. Koetter, Senior Evaluator James E.
    Lewis, Senior Evaluator (703238)        Letter        Page 30
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