Military Readiness: Readiness Reports Do Not Provide a Clear Assessment
of Army Equipment (Letter Report, 06/16/1999, GAO/NSIAD-99-119).
Members of Congress have raised concerns about the combat readiness of
U.S. military forces because of reductions in force size and the
expanding demands of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance
operations. GAO found that, although the details are classified, a high
percentage of active duty Army units have the major equipment items they
need to do their wartime jobs. Moreover, Army information shows that
units are maintaining the bulk of their equipment in a fully
mission-capable condition. Despite these positive indications of
readiness, current readiness reporting systems are not comprehensive
enough to reveal all readiness weaknesses. Two factors suggest that the
Army could have difficulty sustaining equipment in the event of two
nearly simultaneous wars. First, there is a significant shortage of
maintenance personnel with the right skills and tenure. As a result,
unit maintenance personnel are working longer and harder to keep
equipment in a fully mission-capable condition. Second, Army officials
are concerned that shortages of war reserve repair parts could seriously
affect the operational availability of many of the Army's primary weapon
systems. Army officials said that they have started to fund critical
shortages. GAO makes recommendations to improve the reporting of (1)
auxiliary equipment shortages in unit status reports and (2) equipment
conditions in congressional readiness reports.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-99-119
TITLE: Military Readiness: Readiness Reports Do Not Provide a
Clear Assessment of Army Equipment
DATE: 06/16/1999
SUBJECT: Combat readiness
Logistics
Defense contingency planning
Spare parts
Defense capabilities
Human resources utilization
Equipment maintenance
Equipment inventories
Army supplies
Reporting requirements
IDENTIFIER: DOD Unit Status and Identity Report
DOD Status of Resources and Training System
JCS National Military Strategy
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United States General Accounting Office GAO Report
to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives June 1999
MILITARY READINESS Readiness Reports Do Not Provide a Clear
Assessment of Army Equipment GAO/NSIAD-99-119 United States
General Accounting Office
National Security and Washington, D.C. 20548
Letter International Affairs
Division B-282327
Letter June 16, 1999 The Honorable Herbert H. Bateman Chairman,
Subcommittee on Military Readiness Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives Dear Mr. Chairman: On the basis of your
concerns about the combat readiness of U.S. military forces as the
individual services deal with reductions in force size and the
expanding demands of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance
operations, we reviewed the equipment readiness in active duty
Army units. As requested, this report addresses whether active
duty units (1) have the equipment required to conduct their
wartime missions, (2) are keeping their equipment in good
condition, and (3) can sustain the equipment in a two major
theater war as required by the National Military Strategy. Results
in Brief While details are classified, a high
percentage of active duty Army units have the major equipment
items they need for their wartime mission. Moreover, Army
information shows that units are maintaining the bulk of their
equipment in a fully mission capable condition. Despite these
positive indications of readiness, current readiness reporting
systems are not comprehensive enough to reveal all readiness
weaknesses. For example, they do not show operational limitations
that have been caused by extensive shortages of support equipment
essential to effective, sustained use of major equipment items.
Units could deploy without this equipment and could perform their
basic combat missions, but they would be limited in their
capability, flexibility, or sustainability. Additionally, the Army
has stated that its equipment is aging and becoming increasingly
difficult to maintain and maintenance managers at units we visited
told us that their mechanics are devoting increasing amounts of
time to keep equipment operating. These problems are not reflected
in readiness data, which show units are able to keep their
equipment serviceable. We have reported that serviceability rates
do not provide a good assessment of equipment condition because
equipment that is old, unreliable, and difficult to maintain may
still be reported serviceable. While maintenance problems may
exist, the Army does not have data that clearly shows either what
its equipment problems are or how units are affected. Letter
Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-119
Military Readiness B-282327 Two factors suggest that the Army
could have difficulty sustaining equipment in the event of two
nearly simultaneous military operations. First, there is a
significant shortage of maintenance personnel with the right
skills and tenure. As a result, unit maintenance personnel are
working longer and harder to keep equipment in a fully mission
capable condition. Second, Army officials are concerned that
shortages of war reserve repair parts could seriously affect the
operational availability of many of the Army's primary weapon
systems. Army officials report they have started efforts to fund
critical shortages. We are making recommendations intended to
improve the reporting of (1) auxiliary equipment shortages in Unit
Status Reports and (2) equipment condition in congressional
readiness reports. Background The Army's system for
reporting the current status of Army units to the National Command
Authority, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
Headquarters, Department of the Army, is the Unit Status Reporting
System. Each month, or more frequently when changes occur, over
1,400 active duty Army units provide information on their status
in four measured resource areas: personnel, equipment on hand,
equipment serviceability, and training. A unit's overall status is
measured by a "C" rating, which ranges from C-1 (best) to C-5
(worst). Units also provide narrative remarks to support and
clarify data. The Unit Status Report data feed into the Department
of Defense's (DOD) system for reporting readiness to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Status of Resources and Training System
(SORTS). Equipment readiness is indicated in two Unit Status
Report resource areas; equipment on hand status and equipment
serviceability status. Equipment on hand indicates whether units
have their principal weapon systems and major equipment items
compared to their wartime requirements. Principal weapon systems
and equipment are identified in a unit's Table of Organization and
Equipment1 by an equipment readiness code of P or A. Items coded P
are central to an organization's ability to perform its doctrinal
mission and are known as pacing items (e.g., tanks in a tank
battalion). The majority of units have two pacing items, and at
most a unit would have four pacing items. In total, the Army has
categorized about 1A Table of Organization and Equipment
prescribes the normal mission, organizational structure, and
personnel and equipment requirements for a tactical military unit.
Letter Page 2
GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 120 separate weapon
systems and equipment items as pacing items. A unit's equipment
inventory on-hand status is reflected in an S-level that ranges
from S-1 (best-having most or all its equipment) to S-4 (worst-
missing significant amounts of equipment). Units also report how
much auxiliary equipment they have compared to their wartime
requirement, but this information is not considered in determining
a unit's equipment on-hand status. Auxiliary equipment is
essential to support principal weapon systems and provide mission
sustainment support.2 It includes items or systems required for
transporting, maintaining, supplying, servicing, protecting,
enhancing, or backing up principal weapon systems, such as unit
maintenance equipment; nuclear, biological, and chemical defense
equipment; support vehicles; mess equipment; and camouflage nets.
Units identify the number of auxiliary equipment items in their
Table of Organization and Equipment and determine a status rating
for each item in accordance with Army Regulation 220-1. For
example, a unit reports a status rating of S-1 if it has 90
percent or more of its requirement for a specific auxiliary
equipment item; S-2 if it has 80-89 percent of its requirement; S-
3 if it has 65-79 percent of its requirement; and S-4 if it has
less than 65 percent of its requirement. The unit then identifies
the number of equipment items at each S-level in the Unit Status
Report remarks. To illustrate, if a unit is required to have six
radios, six sets of night vision goggles, and six aircraft tool
kits and has five radios, five sets of night vision goggles, and
four tool kits on-hand, it would be S-2 for radios (5/6=83
percent), S-2 for night vision goggles (5/6=83 percent), and S-3
for tool kits (4/6=67 percent). In its Unit Status Report, the
unit would report that two equipment items are at S-2 and one
equipment item is at S-3. It would not report the specific types
or amounts of equipment missing. However, the commander is
expected to narratively report any mission limitation that is
caused by shortages of auxiliary equipment in the remarks section
of the Unit Status Report and reflect this limitation in his
mission accomplishment estimate. The mission accomplishment
estimate is the commander's subjective assessment of the unit's
ability to execute that portion of the wartime mission it would be
expected to perform if alerted or committed within 72 hours of the
date of the report.3 2The term auxiliary equipment as used in this
report includes both auxiliary and auxiliary support equipment.
3See Army Regulation 220-1, Sept. 1, 1997, ch. 8. Page 3
GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 Equipment
serviceability indicates how well units are maintaining their on-
hand reportable equipment. On-hand reportable equipment consists
of the unit's pacing items and any other equipment systems or
individual items controlled by materiel condition status reports.
In total, about 570 equipment systems and items are controlled by
materiel condition status reports (comprising about 8 percent of
the total equipment in the Army's inventory).4 The serviceability
rate is a percentage based on the number of days reportable
equipment is available to the organization and fully able to do
its mission compared to the number of days it could have been
available. A rate is calculated for (1) each pacing item and (2)
all pacing items and reportable equipment in aggregate. A unit's
overall status is the lower of the two serviceability rates.
Pacing items again receive special emphasis because of their major
importance to a unit. The unit's equipment serviceability status
is reflected in an R-level that ranges from R-1 (best--equipment
other than aircraft are fully mission capable and available to the
unit 90 percent or more of the days in the period or aircraft are
fully mission capable 75 percent or more of the days in the
period) to R-4 (worst--equipment other than aircraft are fully
mission capable less than 60 percent of the days in the period, or
aircraft are fully mission capable less than 50 percent of the
days in the period).5 In its fourth quarter, fiscal year 1998
Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress, DOD also reported on a
number of other equipment condition indicators. These indicators
include (1) the percentage of equipment reported out of service
due to maintenance or supply problems (not mission capable
maintenance and not mission capable supply) for 16 major Army
systems, (2) average equipment age for 15 major Army systems, and
(3) depot maintenance requirements for 10 systems. 4The Army's
reportable equipment items are identified in Army Regulation 700-
138, app. B. 5See Army Regulation 220-1, Sept. 1, 1997, para. 6.5.
Page 4
GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 Most Active Duty Army
A review of Unit Status Report data for September 1998 showed that
a large Units Have Their Major percentage of active duty Army
units had their principal weapon systems and major equipment
items.6 Status levels for this equipment have Equipment but Lack
increased notably over the past few years. However, many units do
not Essential Support have all the auxiliary
equipment needed to support their major equipment Equipment
and provide mission sustainment support. Army officials believe
shortages can be made up before deployment but acknowledge that in
two nearly simultaneous conflicts some later deploying units may
have to deploy without all of their authorized auxiliary
equipment. Units without all authorized auxiliary equipment would
still be able to perform their basic mission, but they may suffer
limitations in their capability, flexibility, and sustainability.
Units Have Their Principal We reviewed the equipment on-hand
status of 1,483 active duty units as Weapon Systems and Major
reported in September 1998 and found that most units reported
either an Equipment Items S-1 or S-2 status for
on-hand equipment. A unit reporting an S-1 status has the
equipment needed to accomplish all missions for which it was
designed with no additional resources. S-2 units have the
equipment needed to undertake most of the full mission for which
they were designed but may experience isolated decreases in
flexibility for mission accomplishment. These units will require
little, if any, assistance to compensate for deficiencies. S-3
units will require significant equipment to compensate for
deficiencies but can undertake many portions, but not all, of the
full mission for which they were designed. S-4 units need
significant additional equipment to accomplish their assigned
wartime mission. Data for the past 7 years also show that
equipment on-hand status levels have increased notably in active
duty units for this time period. Since 1992 the number of units
reporting equipment on-hand status levels below S-2 has decreased
significantly. This seems logical given the downsizing of the
force from 18 divisions to 10 divisions and the flow of excess
equipment to remaining units. Under the Army's first to fight,
first equipped strategy, priority for equipment available from
downsizing would generally go to units scheduled to deploy early
in a conflict. We did not identify any aggregate Army data systems
that would allow us to corroborate the reliability of equipment
on-hand data in unit status reports. 6Precise numbers are
classified. Page 5
GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 However, we reviewed
and compared unit property records at three brigade-sized commands
in the continental United Status to the equipment on-hand data in
their Units' Status Reports.7 We found that the property book
records generally supported the reported equipment on-hand status.
Units Do Not Have All Their Our analysis of Unit Status Report
data for September 1998 showed a large Required Auxiliary
percentage of active duty units had significant shortages of
auxiliary Equipment equipment. Some of
the significant auxiliary equipment shortages are identified in
table 1. Applying the Army's equipment on-hand criteria to
auxiliary equipment, over 62 percent of the units reporting
auxiliary equipment would have an S-3 or S-4 status. Table 1:
Examples of Auxiliary Equipment Shortages in U.S. Forces Command
Units Item Units reporting
shortages Number of items short Telephone cable
335 6,481 Night vision goggles
214 8,835 Binoculars
174 1,129 Generator set
148 493 Global positioning system
136 1,246 Chemical agent monitor
114 521 Battery charger
38 112 Note: Shortage computations
include substitute items. Source: U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM),
June 1999. Officials from the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of
Staff for Logistics said that the shortages exist for a number of
reasons, including recent increases in requirements for some
items, slowed procurement funding, and units' use of operations
and maintenance funds for higher priorities. Many auxiliary
equipment items, for example, must be purchased with operations
and maintenance funds. Officials said that units tend to delay
purchasing items they may not consider critical when their funding
is insufficient. This appeared to be the case at the three
brigades we visited where items that were purchased with
operations and maintenance funds comprised 28 to 53 percent of the
missing auxiliary equipment. The high percentage of missing items
that must be purchased in this way does not conclusively prove
that inadequate funding is the cause. For example, some 7The
number of units visited was not sufficient to meet the
requirements for a statistically valid sample. Page 6
GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 items may not have
been available through the supply system. Equipment managers at
the Army's Tank and Automotive Command also said that reductions
in procurement funding particularly affect auxiliary equipment
because funding priority generally goes to principal weapon
systems and major equipment. The Army's Unit Status Report
regulation states that a unit commander that lacks equipment,
including auxiliary equipment, that he deems combat essential
should address the shortages in the narrative remarks section of
the report and consider the effect of these shortages, among other
factors, in formulating the mission accomplishment estimate.8
However, our review of the September 1998 Unit Status Reports
found that commanders rarely identified impacts related to
auxiliary equipment shortages even in cases where our analysis
showed significant amounts of equipment were missing. For example,
74 units that we identified as S-4 for auxiliary equipment also
reported an overall unit status of C-1 (the unit could perform its
full wartime mission). As mentioned previously, units do not
identify the specific auxiliary equipment they are missing so we
could not question the commanders' subjective assessment.
Shortages of some auxiliary equipment are likely to have little
effect on unit operations. For example, sign painting kits and
wristwatches are auxiliary equipment that would not likely affect
mission accomplishment. Other auxiliary equipment may be needed
only in certain operating environments. For example, winterization
kits for UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters may not be needed in
Southwest Asia, and electrical distribution equipment may not be
needed by units moving into large, preestablished bases. Other
auxiliary equipment, such as battery chargers, generators, and
mine detectors, however, may limit a unit's capability,
flexibility, or sustainability. FORSCOM officials generally
discount the effect of auxiliary equipment shortages on mission
accomplishment. They report that units with auxiliary equipment
shortages would still be able to perform their basic warfighting
mission. Additionally, they said they carefully review unit
equipment before deployments and make up any equipment shortages
deemed necessary for the mission. For example, during Operations
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, to rectify shortages, FORSCOM
officials said that they extensively transferred equipment between
units and bought equipment such as generators, cellular phones,
facsimiles, secure telephones, and 8 See AR 220-1, Sept. 1, 1997,
paras. 5-13c(2), 8-1, and 8-3. Page 7
GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 other electronic
devices from the commercial market prior to deployment. Although
FORSCOM plans to continue this general approach in rectifying
shortages, no definitive plans exist specifying how this will take
place. Given the magnitude of the shortages, transferring
equipment between units may be problematic. The Army's description
of auxiliary equipment as either essential to support principal
weapon systems or provide unit sustainment support seems to be
contradicted by the large amounts of equipment missing and the
absence of any reported effect by Army units.9 It is
understandable that units can and do function without all required
equipment items. However, at some point the synergy built into a
unit begins to be reduced when large amounts of equipment are
missing. Shortages of maintenance equipment, in particular, create
questions about a unit's ability to sustain its primary weapon
systems at a wartime pace of operations. Given the number of units
with shortages, one would expect to see some acknowledgment of a
capability, flexibility, or sustainment limitation in at least
some units. The absence of any recognized effect demonstrates
either that the equipment is not essential or that commanders are
not appropriately considering potential limitations to their
units. Additionally, in February 1993, we reported on the impact
of equipment shortages during the Gulf War mobilization.10 During
that conflict the Army transferred equipment between units to
rectify shortages but found that filling shortages became more
difficult as the operation progressed and more units were
mobilized. As equipment became scarcer, some equipment shortages
could not be filled, and as a result, some units were deployed
without all of their equipment. Our report stated a number of
instances in which units were hampered in their ability to perform
their required mission by the equipment shortages. Army Data Do
Not Despite the Unit Status Reports for September
1998 that showed that Provide a Clear Picture equipment
serviceability rates were high, the Army reported in its Quarterly
Readiness Report to the Congress for the fourth quarter of fiscal
of Equipment year 1998 its concern that its
equipment is aging and becoming increasingly Condition
difficult to maintain. Maintenance managers at units we visited
also said that their mechanics are working harder to keep
equipment operating. 9See AR 220-1, Sept. 1, 1997, App. B.
10Reserve Forces: Aspects of the Army's Equipping Strategy Hamper
Reserve Readiness (GAO/NSIAD-93-11, Feb. 18, 1993). Page 8
GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 However, these
problems are not reflected in high equipment readiness rates. We
have previously reported that serviceability rates do not provide
a good assessment of equipment condition because equipment that is
old, unreliable, and difficult to maintain may be reported
serviceable.11 However, we could not determine the extent to which
Army units are affected by equipment problems because the Army
does not have data that identifies either its unreliable equipment
or how units are affected. Serviceability Data Show In
addition to showing quantities on hand, the Unit Status Reports
measure Units Are Maintaining equipment readiness by how
well units maintain their on-hand reportable Equipment
equipment. The Army's goal is that 90 percent or more of ground
equipment be in a fully mission capable status, which means the
equipment can perform all of its combat missions without
endangering the lives of crew or operators.12 Aircraft units have
a goal of 75 percent or higher fully mission capable. Unit Status
Report data for September 1998 showed that the majority of the
1,483 active duty Army units reporting were achieving the Army's
goals.13 According to commanders at the units we visited, meeting
the Army's serviceability goals is a command priority and the
condition of pacing items and other reportable equipment is
closely monitored at all command levels. Historical Unit Status
Report data also show that units have generally maintained their
major equipment at the fully mission capable goals over time. For
example, table 2 shows the quarterly mission capable rates for 16
major Army equipment items that were being maintained at 90- and
75-percent rates from October 1994 through August 1998. Mission
capable rates for some equipment occasionally fell below the
goals. However, we see no pattern that would suggest an increasing
problem. 11Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Develop a More
Comprehensive Measurement System (GAO/NSIAD-95-29, Oct. 27, 1994).
12 See AR 220-1, Sept. 1, 1997, Glossary, Section II, Terms; and
AR 700-138, Sept. 16, 1997, para. 1-6. 13Precise numbers are
classified. Page 9
GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 Table 2: Mission
Capable Rates for 16 Major Equipment Items Oct. Mar.
Oct. Mar. Oct. Mar. Oct.
Mar. Aug. Equipment item 1994 1995
1995 1996 1996 1997 1997
1998 1998 Aircraft systems: Availability goal 75 percent
CH-47D Chinook cargo helicopter 75
78 74 75 76 73 77
73 75 AH-64 Apache attack helicopter
78 82 83 80 82
84 86 83 81 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior
helicopter 83 76 79
84 82 85 87 87
87 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter 78
73 78 78 81 81 82
85 79 Ground systems: Availability goal 90 percent M 1 A 1 A
b r a m s t a n k N / AN / AN / A9 39 29 29 29 39 0 M
1 A 2 A b r a m s t a n k N / AN / A 02 88 49 58 49
09 2 M2 Bradley Fighting V e h i c l e
9 19 49 49 59 59 59 49 59 2 M3 Armored Cavalry scout v e h i c l e
9 19 39 39 49 29 19 39 19 4 M109 Self-propelled howitzer
95 95 95 96 96
96 97 96 97 M198 Towed howitzer
95 95 90 93 94
94 91 94 93 HEMTT [Heavy expanded
mobility tactical truck] 89 89 90
88 89 89 90 89
88 HMMWV [High mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle]
94 94 95 94 95
94 95 94 93 MLRS [Multiple launch r o
c k e t s y s t e m ] 9 49 39 49 49 59 69 59 49
5 TOW2 HMMW [High mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle]
97 97 97 98 96
96 97 96 98 Patriot missile system
97 97 96 95 96
92 94 95 92 Avenger ground to air m i
s s i l e s y s t e m N / A9 99 89 99 69 89 89
79 8 Source: Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress, 4th
quarter, fiscal year 1998. Serviceability Data Do Not
Although overall serviceability rates are high as shown in table
2, Provide a Good Assessment serviceability data do not provide a
complete assessment of equipment of Equipment Condition
condition. Our 1994 report on the ability of DOD's readiness
reporting system to provide a comprehensive assessment of overall
readiness stated that C-ratings represent a snapshot of readiness
in time but by design do not address long-term readiness or signal
impending changes in the status Page 10
GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 of resources and for
equipment, this continues to be the case. Specifically, equipment
that is old, unreliable, and difficult to maintain may be reported
serviceable. For example, Army officials told us that the Armored
Vehicle Launched Bridge and the Armored Combat Earthmover are
examples of systems that are complex, difficult to maintain,
and/or aging in the Army inventory. The Army is in the process of
replacing the Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge with the Wolverine
Heavy Assault Bridge. Despite these problems, serviceability rates
for these systems generally are in the 86- to 92-percent range.
While the Army's goal is for units to maintain ground equipment
above 90-percent availability, slight decreases below this goal do
not by themselves indicate problems. For example, as shown in
table 2, the M1A2 Abrams tank's rates were below the goal during
four quarters, even though the Abrams is among the Army's newest
and most modern weapons. Maintenance managers told us that they
can maintain high serviceability rates, even for problem
equipment, through intense investments of time. However, the
effort required to keep equipment serviceable is not reflected in
readiness reports. Other Army Equipment Our review of
other Army equipment condition indicators, including the Condition
Indicators Do Not expanded equipment condition indicators
recently provided in DOD's Support Reliability or
Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress, revealed that the
indicators Maintenance Problems do not effectively
identify and highlight the Army's equipment problems. To the
contrary, most of the indicators show few equipment problems. The
Army maintains that its equipment is becoming increasingly
difficult to maintain. If units are experiencing problems with
unreliable equipment, the problems should be reflected in
increasing amounts of equipment reported as "not mission capable-
maintenance." "Not mission capable-maintenance" is reported when
equipment cannot perform its mission because of maintenance
underway or needed. Units report equipment out of service for
maintenance through the Unit Level Logistics System, and the Army
aggregates and stores this data at the Army Materiel Command's
Logistics Support Activity (LOGSA). As shown in table 3, Army data
from October 1994 through August 1998 for 16 key Army systems show
no increase in the percent of equipment not mission capable and no
downward trends that would indicate worsening conditions.
Officials at the units we visited explained that the data might
not be a good indicator of reliability problems because available
personnel work not only their regular schedules but also evenings
and weekends to keep maintenance backlogs low. However, the Army
does not collect workload data for individual equipment systems
that would illustrate increasing workloads. Page 11
GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 Table 3: Percent of
Equipment Not Mission Capable Maintenance Oct. Mar.
Oct. Mar. Oct. Mar. Oct.
Mar. Aug. Equipment item 1994 1995
1995 1996 1996 1997 1997
1998 1998 CH-47D Chinook cargo helicopter
22 19 23 21 21 24
20 23 23 AH-64D Apache attack helicopter
17 14 14 13 14 13
12 13 16 OH-58D Kiowa warrior helicopter
11 15 13 14 16 12
11 11 11 UH-60D Blackhawk helicopter
16 22 18 18 15 15
15 12 19 M 1 A 1 A b r a m s t a n k
N / A N / A N / A123124 M1A2 Abrams tank N/A
N/A 50 70 8 3
8 5 4 M2 Bradley Fghting Vehicle 3
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 3 M3 Armored Cavalry scout v e h i c l e
322111142 M109 Self-propelled h o w i t z e r
211211110 M 1 9 8 T o w e d h o w i t z e r 237233245 H E
M T T 433434356 H M M W V 222222134 M L
R S 342332233 T O W 2 H M M W V 111121221 P a t
r i o t m i s s i l e s y s t e m 322422233 Avenger
ground to air missile system N/A 0
1 1 2 0 1
1 0 Source: Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress, 4th
quarter, fiscal year 1998. We also analyzed data in the Army Cost
and Economic Analysis Center's Operating and Support Management
Information System (OSMIS) for indications of equipment
reliability problems. The OSMIS database is the Army's source of
historical operating and support cost information for more than
350 systems that are in tactical units-Active, Guard, and Reserve.
Generally, increasing operating and support costs should be an
indicator of growing reliability problems. However, our analysis
of operating and support cost data shows few problems with
increasing operating and support costs. For example, we compared
fiscal year 1992 repair parts costs (consumables and net
reparables) per hour flown or mile driven for 20 active duty
aviation, tactical wheeled vehicle, artillery and missile, and
combat systems (tanks and infantry fighting vehicles) to the
fiscal year 1996 repair parts costs. We found that costs decreased
for Page 12
GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 15 systems (75
percent), increased for 4 systems (20 percent), and remained
stable for 1 system (5 percent). A comparison of fiscal year 1993
and 1996 repair parts costs for the same 20 systems similarly
showed that 14 systems (70 percent) had lower repair parts costs
while 6 (30 percent) had higher. We also compared annual repair
parts costs for another 9 systems where usage data were not
available, such as communications and engineering equipment, and
artillery systems. Without usage data, annual repair parts costs
are a less precise measure of reliability but generally show how
much the equipment is being repaired. Repair parts costs decreased
between fiscal year 1992 and 1996 for seven systems and increased
for two. A comparison of fiscal year 1993 and 1996 repair parts
costs for the same nine systems showed that five systems had lower
repair parts costs while four had higher. Army officials told us
that OSMIS data might not support possible reliability problems
because there is not a direct correlation between equipment
operation and repair parts usage. However, they agree that if
equipment is being repaired more frequently, it should be
indicated by the data. They speculated that repairs might be down
because some equipment is being used less. Our analysis of
historical data from October 1994 through August 1998 for the
Army's top 16 systems shows some variance in equipment out of
service while awaiting repair parts, but overall the data does not
indicate increasing problems in repair parts availability. Page 13
GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 Table 4: Percent of
Equipment Not Mission Capable Supply Oct. Mar. Oct.
Mar. Oct. Mar. Oct. Mar.
Aug. Equipment item 1994 1995 1995
1996 1996 1997 1997 1998
1998 CH-47D Chinook cargo h e l i c o p t e r
333433342 AH-64D Apache attack h e l i c o p t e r
543743243 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior h e l i c o p t e r
698223222 UH-60D Blackhawk h e l i c o p t e r
654444332 M 1 A 1 A b r a m s t a n k N / A N / A N /
A665756 M1A2 Abrams tank N/A N/A
50 2 8 2 8
5 4 M2 Bradley Fighting V e h i c l e
655444545 M3 Armored Cavalry scout v e h i c l e
655578654 M109 Self-propelled h o w i t z e r
344233233 M 1 9 8 T o w e d h o w i t z e r 323533722 H E
M T T 787887766 H M M W V 443434433 M L R S 334322332 T O W 2 H M
M W V 222123121 P a t r i o t m i s s i l e s y
s t e m 012126425 Avenger ground to air missile
system N/A 1 1
0 2 2 1 2 2
Source: Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress, 4th quarter,
fiscal year 1998. Maintenance officers at two units we visited
told us that they had not experienced problems with the
availability of repair parts. However, at the 7th Transportation
Group maintenance officers reported difficulties obtaining parts
for some older ships in their fleet. The 7th Transportation Group
has several boat companies that transport cargo, troops, and
vehicles between ship and shore, or from one port to another port.
Additionally, although units were reducing the number of repair
parts in their inventories, unit supply managers' told us they
were not having any more difficulty obtaining spare parts than in
the past. Nonetheless, units visited reported that they
occasionally obtained parts by removing them from other equipment
items rather than waiting for the supply system to provide them. A
FORSCOM official, however, told us that he believes that the
practice of "controlled substitution" has not increased notably.
Page 14
GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 We also analyzed
equipment age because keeping equipment past its useful life may
lead to unacceptable operating and support costs and a decrease in
wartime operational effectiveness. As shown in table 5, the
equipment ages for 15 major systems reported in the expanded
Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress shows that most major
systems are within their estimated service life. Table 5:
Average Age of the Army's Top 15 Systems Estimated Average
Equipment item
service life age M1A1 Abrams tank
20 9.3 M1A2 Abrams tank
20 1.5 M2/M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle
20 11.2 M109 Self-propelled howitzer
N/A 6 M198 Towed howitzer
N/A 12 MLRS N/A
9.2 Patriot missile system
N/A 10.5 Avenger ground-to-air missile system
N/A 8.7 HEMTT
20 years 11.5 HMMWV
14 years 8.1 TOW2 HMMWV
14 years 11.8 AH-64 Apache attack helicopter
20 11.2 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopter
20 8.2 CH-47D Chinook cargo helicopter
20 10.8 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter
20 11.6 Sources: Estimated service life data were
obtained from FORSCOM and Army Materiel Command officials. Average
age data were obtained from the Quarterly Readiness Report to the
Congress, 4th quarter, fiscal year 1998. N/A indicates data were
not available. Another indicator of aging equipment is the Army's
equipment recapitalization program that extends the service life
of equipment through depot rebuild or technology insertion.
Extending the service life of equipment is sometimes necessary
when production and fielding rates for new equipment are
insufficient to prevent fleet aging from becoming a chronic
problem. Some of the recapitalization programs we identified that
address problems with aging equipment include engineer support
equipment, construction equipment, Paladin M109 Howitzer, UH-60A
Blackhawk helicopter, UH-1 Iroquois utility helicopter, HEMTT,
HMMWV, 2 1/2-ton truck, 5-ton truck, line-haul tractors, engineer
tractors, and materiel handling equipment. Page 15
GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 Army officials
acknowledge that serviceability rates and other condition
indicators currently reported provide a limited picture of
equipment condition. However, identifying predictive condition
indicators for the large variety of equipment in the Army is
complex. They said that Army commands independently monitor
numerous additional information sources to supplement data
reported in Unit Status Reports. These sources include reports
from Logistics Assistance Offices at all installations and item
managers at the commodity commands. This information is generally
not reported to higher commands. They report that this information
is sufficient to provide assurance on current readiness issues but
acknowledge its weakness for identifying longer term equipment
condition problems. The Army May The Army may
have difficulty sustaining its equipment in the event of two
Experience Problems nearly simultaneous military operations, the
most demanding scenario, because of significant shortages of
maintenance personnel and war reserve Sustaining Its
repair parts stocks. The war reserve repair parts stocks are
intended to Equipment support Army units
during wartime until logistics supply lines can be established
from the United States. The amount of repair parts that should be
stocked is based on the Army's most demanding scenario, two nearly
simultaneous theater wars, and considers repair part utilization
rates for major equipment items, on-hand general issue stocks, on-
hand war reserve stocks, and the amounts industry can provide.
Units Are Short Some Unit commanders we visited
reported the availability of maintenance Maintenance Skills
personnel with the right skills and tenure was the units' most
significant equipment readiness problem. Army-wide shortages of
personnel, frequent deployments to peacekeeping missions, and the
assignment of personnel to tasks outside their military specialty
were the primary reasons cited. These shortages create risks in
the Army's ability to sustain its equipment in the event of two
nearly simultaneous theater wars. Page 16
GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 The units we visited
had 97 to 99 percent of their authorized enlisted personnel at the
time of our visits. However, high unit manning rates do not fully
reflect the extent of maintenance personnel shortages in the units
or the impact of these shortages on the units' ability to
accomplish critical wartime tasks. Further, high manning rates do
not capture the rank (enlisted versus noncommissioned officers),
skill, and experience imbalances that affect their maintenance
operations. FORSCOM data shown in table 6 show that these
imbalances are prevalent. Page 17
GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 Table 6: Personnel
authorized and assigned by grade for a sample of occupations
Senior noncommissioned Enlisted Noncommissioned officers
officers (E-1 through E-4) (E-5 through E6) (E-
7 through E-9) Military occupational specialty
(auth/assigned) (auth/assigned)
(auth/assigned) 44B Metal worker
361/386 112/93 107% 83%
Not applicable 44E Machinist
105/96 104/87 3/2 91%
84% 67% 45B Small arms/artillery
repairman 213/206
47/37 97% 79% Not applicable
45D Self-propelled field artillery turret
49/80 62/21 mechanic
163% 34% Not applicable 45E
Abrams tank turret mechanic
264/330 85/68 125% 80%
Not applicable 45K Armament repairman
297/227 192/158 67/61 76%
83% 91% 45T Bradley Fighting Vehicle
system turret 142/262
113/58 mechanic
185% 51% Not applicable 52C
Utilities equipment repairman
533/474 229/226 89% 99%
Not applicable 52D Power generation equipment
1389/1208 505/471 repairman
87% 93% Not applicable 62B
Construction equipment repairman
651/635 398/351 81/98 98%
88% 121% 63B Light wheel vehicle repairman
3234/2844 1867/1748 593/521
88% 94% 88% 63D
Self-propelled field artillery system
224/177 145/149 50/47
mechanic
79% 103% 94% 63E M1
Abrams tank system mechanic
390/580 381/251 136/140 149%
66% 103% 63G Fuel/electrical system
repairman 191/198
45/48 104% 107% Not applicable
63H Tracked vehicle repairman
666/764 643/475 474/464 115%
74% 98% 63S Heavy wheel vehicle mechanic
1189/1003 398/369 84% 93%
Not applicable 63T Bradley Fighting Vehicle system
980/1161 616/439 127/134
mechanic
119% 71% 106% 63W
Wheel Vehicle repairman
1582/1488 361/364 94% 101%
Not applicable 63Y Track vehicle mechanic
269/277 127/105 103% 83%
Not applicable Source: FORSCOM, February 1999. Page 18
GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 Commanders of units
visited reported similar personnel shortages. Some of the
significant shortages reported follow. *A t t h e 3 rd Brigade of
the 2nd Infantry Division, only 2 of 8 Bradley Fighting Vehicle
turret mechanics (25 percent), and 5 of 10 Abrams tank systems
mechanics (50 percent) were assigned. The brigade also had only 28
of 44 motor transport operators (64 percent) assigned. *A t t h e
7 th Transportation Group, only 10 of 15 light wheel vehicle
supervisors (67 percent) were assigned. The group also had only 20
of 30 authorized motor transport operators (67 percent). * At the
18th Aviation Brigade, 17 of 25 authorized light wheel vehicle
mechanics (68 percent) were assigned. A CH-47 Chinook helicopter
company within the brigade had 37 helicopter repairman assigned of
38 authorized but, according to unit officials, 8 repairman could
not work because of medical problems. The company also had all
three authorized aircraft powertrain repairmen, but we were told
that all three were fresh from school and lacked experience. Army
officials told us of several other issues that compound their
personnel shortage problems. First, over the past few years the
amount of training provided in Army schools had been reduced and
units are expected to provide more of the skills-oriented
training. Additionally, many occupational specialties have been
combined and individual soldiers are responsible for knowing how
to repair more types of equipment than previously. These changes
have significantly increased the supervisory and training workload
for unit noncommissioned officers. Second, the burden of
peacekeeping operations, along with the assignment of personnel to
tasks outside their military specialties, has also added to
noncommissioned officers' workloads. For example, the 7th
Transportation Group provided one battalion per month to the post
for base support activities. Army officers told us that reductions
in base operating support funding left them with no choice but to
use soldiers for these tasks. The result, however, has been that
the maintenance workload tends to focus on a few key individuals
who must work long and hard to maintain unit equipment readiness
status. Readiness reporting does not capture this increase in work
tempo. Prepositioned War Reserve Sustaining Army equipment in two
nearly simultaneous major theater wars Repair Parts May Limit
may also present risks due to shortages of war reserve repair
parts. Equipment Sustainability According to a contractor
study, the operational availability of many of the Army's major
weapon systems will decrease significantly by the 60th day of an
overlapping two-theater war because of a repair part shortage. For
Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-119
Military Readiness B-282327 example, the operational availability
of the AH-64 Apache is forecast to fall to 44 percent by day 60 of
a conflict and the operational availability of the OH-58D Kiowa is
forecast to fall to 52 percent. Conflicts requiring fewer forces
than assumed in the study would result in higher operational
availabilities. Army officials report they have started efforts to
fund critical shortages. Table 7 shows the Army's estimated
equipment availability in a two-war scenario. Table 7:
Availability of Selected Equipment in a Two-War Scenario; 30 Days
between Wars Numbers in percent Availability of selected equipment
Two major theater wars (30 day periods) 30 60
90 120 150 Abrams tank
89 83 61 49 46 AH-64
Apache 56 44 37
31 26 Avenger 84
82 64 46 39 Bradley Fighting Vehicle
76 79 53 44 41 CH-47
Chinook 70 64 57
50 45 Heavy equipment transporter
75 54 41 33 29 HMMWV
82 83 61 60 58 HEMTT
84 80 77 58 51 Howitzer
69 52 31 26 24 M113
86 84 66 50 44 MLRS
87 75 40 26 20 Mobile
subscriber equipment 72
34 35 33 32 OH-58D, Kiowa
65 52 35 25 22
Palletized load system 81 71
45 36 34 SinCgars 89
71 65 52 46 UH-60 Blackhawk
helicopter 65 62
57 53 52 Source: Army War Reserve Secondary
Items, Final Report Phase II, Coopers & Lybrand, June 1998. Page
20 GAO/NSIAD-99-119
Military Readiness B-282327 Conclusions The Army's current
equipment readiness indicators provide valuable information, but
they do not provide a comprehensive assessment of equipment. In
particular, the equipment on-hand indicator does not effectively
characterize unit conditions as they relate to capability,
flexibility, and sustainment. Shortages of some auxiliary
equipment may have little impact on units, while others, such as
camouflage nets, night vision goggles, and communications
equipment, give Army forces a combat edge over their possible
foes. Current guidance does not emphasize the need to assess how
auxiliary equipment shortages may affect their wartime operations.
Over 60 percent of reporting units had significant shortages of
auxiliary equipment that would likely continue in the early stages
of a deployment. The Army's equipment condition indicators
similarly do not support or refute the Army's position that its
equipment is aging and becoming increasingly difficult to
maintain. Army units' equipment serviceability status remains high
and stable, and other indicators recently provided by the Army in
its Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress similarly show few
equipment problems. The amount of time that equipment is not
mission capable because of maintenance or supply problems remains
low and stable, seemingly refuting assertions that equipment is
becoming less reliable or is plagued by supply problems. Further,
age data on major systems indicate that most equipment is within
its estimated service life. This disparity illustrates the
limitation of the Army's equipment condition assessment. Finding
the right set of equipment condition indicators is complex. Given
the large variety of equipment items in the Army's inventory, no
one common set of indicators is likely to provide a comprehensive
assessment of equipment condition for all items. Further,
expanding the number of equipment items that the Army provides
information on threatens to be burdensome with no assurance that
problem systems will be reflected. The best alternative may be a
report that specifically identifies equipment problems, details
the readiness impact, and proposes solutions. This would enable
the Army to succinctly focus on its equipment problems so they can
be addressed by Army, DOD, and the Congress and provide assurance
that it knows the true status of its equipment. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations to reemphasize to Army
commanders the Page 21
GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 requirement to
identify the operational impact of essential auxiliary equipment
shortages in the narrative remarks section of the Unit Status
Report and to properly consider shortages of auxiliary equipment
when formulating their mission accomplishment estimates. The
Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations should instruct
commanders to focus more broadly on unit capability, flexibility,
and sustainability issues in formulating their overall unit status
and mission accomplishment estimate. To improve equipment
condition reporting, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army
direct the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics to submit a
periodic report to the Congress that highlights the Army's top
equipment problems. This report should address more than just the
16 reportable SORTS systems and should identify major equipment
readiness concerns and planned corrective actions. Agency Comments
and DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report and
they are Our Evaluation included in their entirety
in appendix II. DOD concurred with our recommendation that the
Secretary of the Army should reemphasize to Army commanders the
requirement to identify the operational impact of auxiliary
equipment shortages. DOD also concurred with our recommendation
that the Army periodically report to the Congress on their top
equipment problems. We used the term periodically to give the Army
the discretion to report as often as it believed necessary to keep
the Congress informed. However, it was our intention that a report
be submitted at least annually. Additionally, in its response to
this recommendation DOD stated that it believes a report is an
appropriate process to highlight auxiliary equipment problems. We
did not intend this report to be limited to auxiliary equipment
problems. Scope and To determine if units
have the equipment necessary to conduct their Methodology
wartime missions, we obtained summary-level information on the
Army's equipment on-hand posture as of September 1998 from DOD's
SORTS. We also obtained equipment on-hand data for three brigade
sized units and visited those units to determine if the SORTS data
accurately reflected actual unit conditions by reviewing and
comparing unit property book records to the reported SORTS data.
These units were the 7th Transportation Group, Fort Eustis,
Virginia; 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, Fort Lewis,
Washington; and, 18th Aviation Brigade, Fort Bragg, North
Carolina. We also used SORTS data to calculate the equipment on-
Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-119
Military Readiness B-282327 hand status for lower priority
equipment for all reporting active duty units as of September
1998. We then discussed our findings with Army officials in the
Offices of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Deputy Chief
of Staff for Operations and Plans, and FORSCOM. To determine the
condition of the Army's equipment, we analyzed summary equipment
serviceability data for all reporting active duty Army units as of
September 1998 and equipment serviceability data for three
brigade-sized units from SORTS. These units were the same units
discussed above. We then visited those units to inspect the
equipment and maintenance records to determine if the SORTS data
accurately reflected actual field conditions. At the units we met
with unit commanders, maintenance supervisors, and maintainers to
discuss problems they may have in supporting the equipment. We
also met with personnel responsible for maintaining the units'
inventories of repair parts. At Fort Eustis, we met with the
Directorate for Logistics, who was responsible for providing the
7th Transportation Group's direct support maintenance. At Fort
Lewis, we met with I Corps officials, and at Fort Bragg we met
with 1st Corps Support Command officials responsible for
supporting their respective brigades' equipment to discuss
equipment conditions and support problems. To gather information
on Army-wide equipment conditions, we met with officials from
LOGSA at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, who provided data on readiness
trends for reportable equipment and age data for Army equipment.
Officials from the U.S. Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center,
Falls Church, Virginia, discussed how they track operating and
support costs for Army equipment with us and provided us data for
350 Army systems. Officials from the Army Materiel Support
Analysis Activity, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland, discussed
their ongoing effort to gather mean utilization between failure
data for Army equipment. We also met with officials from the U.S.
Army's Tank and Automotive Command, Warren, Michigan, to discuss
information they possess on equipment condition. After analyzing
the data, we discussed our conclusions with officials from the
Offices of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Army
Deputy Chief of Staff or Operations and Plans, DOD Under Secretary
of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and FORSCOM. Our
information on equipment sustainment was derived from interviews
with unit commanders at the three bases visited as well as data on
specific maintenance skill shortages in the respective units. We
followed up on the data with FORSCOM officials. We obtained our
information on repair parts Page 23
GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 war reserves from the
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and the U.S.
Army Materiel Support Analysis Activity. We conducted our review
from June 1998 to February 1999 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. We are sending copies of
this report to other interested committees. We are also sending
copies of this report to the Honorable William Cohen, Secretary of
Defense and the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army.
Copies will also be made available to others upon request. Please
contact me at (202) 512-5140 should you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this
report are listed in appendix II. Sincerely yours, Mark E. Gebicke
Director, National Security and Preparedness Page 24
GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness B-282327 Page 25
GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness Contents Letter
1 Appendix I
28 DOD Comments Appendix II
30 Major Contributors to This Report Tables
Table1: Examples of Auxiliary Equipment
6 Shortages in U.S. Forces Command Units Table 2: Mission Capable
Rates for
10 16 Major Equipment Items Table 3: Percent of Equipment Not
12 Mission Capable Maintenance Table 4: Percent of Equipment Not
14 Mission Capable Supply Table 5: Median Age of the Army's Top 15
Systems 15
Table 6: Personnel Authorized and Assigned by
18 Grade for a Sample of Occupations Table 7: Availability of
Selected Equipment in a
20 Two-War Scenario Abbreviations DOD Department of
Defense FORSCOM U.S. Forces Command LOGSA Logistics
Support Activity OSMIS Operating and Support Management
Information System SORTS Status of Resources and
Training System SORTS Status of Resources and Training
System Page 26
GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-119
Military Readiness Appendix I Comments From the Department of
Defense Appendix I Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military
Readiness Appendix I Comments From the Department of Defense
Letter Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-99-
119 Military Readiness Appendix II Major Contributors to This
Report Major Contributors to This Report
Append Iix I National Security and Carol R. Schuster, Associate
Director International Affairs William C. Meredith,
Assistant Director Glenn D. Furbish, Evaluator in Charge Division,
Washington, D.C. Norfolk Field Office Lawrence E. Dixon,
Senior Evaluator Linda H. Koetter, Senior Evaluator James E.
Lewis, Senior Evaluator (703238) Letter Page 30
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