Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear
(Letter Report, 05/21/1999, GAO/NSIAD-99-110).
The Defense Department (DOD) recently approved the creation of 10
National Guard response teams to help state and local authorities deal
with terrorists attacks involving weapons of mass destruction. GAO found
differing views on the role and the use of these response teams and how
they will fit into state and federal plans to respond to weapons of mass
destruction. Army officials believe that the teams can be a valuable
asset to federal authorities. They also believe that the teams will be a
critical part of the state and local response. However, officials with
the FBI and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which are
responsible for managing the federal response to terrorist attacks, do
not see a role for the teams in the federal response. Instead, they
foresee the National Guard providing its traditional assistance in
emergencies. Differing views also exist at the state level. Many state,
local, and federal groups can do the work that the teams would perform.
For example, more than 600 state and local hazardous materials teams in
the United States deal with incidents involving highly toxic industrial
chemicals and other hazardous materials. GAO's discussions with state,
local, and federal officials and its own analysis found several concerns
that could affect the teams' abilities to meet their mission and
responsibilities. These concerns centered on recruiting and retention,
training, and operational issues. GAO summarized this report in
testimony before Congress; see: Combating Terrorism: Use of National
Guard Response Teams Is Unclear, by Mark E. Gebicke, Director of
National Security Preparedness Issues, before the Subcommittee on
National Security, Veterans' Affairs, and International Relations, House
Committee on Government Reform. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184, June 23 (10 pages).
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-99-110
TITLE: Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams
Is Unclear
DATE: 05/21/1999
SUBJECT: Defense contingency planning
National defense operations
Redundancy
Emergency preparedness
Federal/state relations
Terrorism
Interagency relations
IDENTIFIER: National Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection
FEMA Federal Response Plan
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United States General Accounting Office GAO Report
to Congressional Requesters May 1999 COMBATING
TERRORISM Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 United States General Accounting Office
National Security and Washington, D.C. 20548
Letter International
Affairs Division B-282299
Letter May 21, 1999 The Honorable Christopher Shays Chairman,
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans' Affairs, and
International Relations Committee on Government Reform House of
Representatives The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives The Honorable
Bob Barr House of Representatives In September 1997, we reported
that many federal agencies had duplicative or overlapping
capabilities and missions in combating acts of terrorism,1
including incidents involving the use of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD).2 Recently, the Department of Defense (DOD)
approved the creation of 10 National Guard Rapid Assessment and
Initial Detection (RAID) teams to assist local and state
authorities in assessing the situation surrounding a WMD
emergency; advise these authorities regarding appropriate actions;
and facilitate requests for assistance to expedite the arrival of
additional state and federal military assets. As requested, we (1)
obtained the views of federal, state, and local officials
regarding the role of RAID teams in response plans; (2) determined
whether there are other federal, state, or local government
entities that can perform similar functions to the RAID teams; and
(3) evaluated the RAID teams' roles and responsibilities and how
the teams plan to meet these responsibilities. 1Combating
Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy
and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997). 2For purposes of
this report, WMD are defined as biological, chemical, or
radiological weapons. Letter Page 1
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 Results in Brief
We have previously reported that the many and increasing number of
participants and programs in the evolving terrorism area across
the federal government pose a difficult management and
coordination challenge to avoid program duplication,
fragmentation, and gaps. While DOD has defined the specific
mission for the RAID teams, the plans for the teams and their
implementation continue to evolve. We found that there are
differing views on the role and use of the RAID teams and how they
will fit into state and federal plans to respond to weapons of
mass destruction. Army officials believe the teams can be a
valuable asset to federal authorities, if needed, as part of the
federal response plan. They also believe that the teams will be a
critical and integral part of the state and local response to such
weapons. Officials with the two agencies responsible for managing
the federal response to terrorist incidents-the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Federal Emergency Management Agency-do not
see a role for the RAID teams in the federal response. Instead,
they see the National Guard, whether in state or federal status,
providing its traditional assistance in emergencies. Differing
views also exist at the state level. Officials in states without a
RAID team do not see how the teams can benefit their states'
response capabilities because of the time it takes the RAID teams
to respond. However, one state official does see the RAID team
bringing some expertise that could be useful. Officials in
Pennsylvania, a state with a RAID team, plan not only to fully
integrate its team into the state's weapons of mass destruction
response plan, but also use it to respond to more common hazardous
materials emergencies. There are numerous local, state, and
federal organizations that can perform similar functions to the
RAID teams. For example, there are over 600 local and state
hazardous materials teams in the United States that daily have to
assess and take appropriate actions in incidents involving highly
toxic industrial chemicals and other hazardous materials. In
addition, there are numerous military and federal civilian
organizations that can help local incident commanders deal with
weapons of mass destruction incidents by providing advice,
technical experts, and equipment. Our discussions with local,
state, and federal officials and our analysis surfaced a number of
concerns that could impact the teams' abilities to meet their
mission and responsibilities. These concerns centered on
recruiting and retention, training, and operational issues. Letter
Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-99-110
Combating Terrorism B-282299 These issues further point to the
need for a more focused and coordinated approach to the U.S.
response to attacks involving weapons of mass destruction-an
approach that capitalizes on existing capabilities, minimizes
unnecessary duplication of activities and programs, and focuses
funding on the highest priority requirements. Because of the
differing views on the role and use of the RAID teams, the
numerous organizations that can perform similar functions, and the
potential operational issues that could impact the teams, we are
recommending that the appropriate federal agencies determine the
need for the teams. If it is determined that the teams are needed,
we further recommend that the RAID team concept be tested to
determine how the teams can effectively perform their functions.
If they are not needed, we recommend that they be inactivated. In
light of differing views regarding a reassessment of the need for
the RAID teams, Congress may wish to consider restricting the use
of appropriated funds for any additional teams until the
reassessment we recommended is complete. We have included a matter
for congressional consideration in this report. Background
Operationally, federal efforts to combat terrorism are organized
along a lead agency concept. The Department of Justice, through
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), is responsible for
crisis management of domestic terrorist incidents and for
pursuing, arresting, and prosecuting the terrorists. State
governments have primary responsibility for managing the
consequences of domestic disasters, including major terrorist
incidents; however, the federal government can support state and
local authorities if they lack the capabilities to respond
adequately. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) manages
this federal support through a generic disaster contingency plan
known as the Federal Response Plan, which outlines the roles,
responsibilities, and emergency support functions of various
federal agencies, including DOD, for consequence management. The
National Security Council's National Coordinator for Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism, created in May
1998 by Presidential Decision Directive 62, oversees the broad
variety of relevant policies and programs, including such areas as
counter-terrorism, preparedness, and consequence management for
WMD. According to intelligence agencies, conventional explosives
and firearms continue to be the weapons of choice for terrorists.
Many familiar with industrial chemicals, such as officials from
the FBI, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Coast
Guard, and local hazardous materials (HAZMAT) teams, believe that
industrial chemicals may also be a weapon of choice in terrorist
attacks because they can be easily obtained and Page 3
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 dispersed.
Terrorists are less likely to use chemical and biological weapons
than conventional explosives, at least partly because these
materials are more difficult to weaponize and the results are
unpredictable. Agency officials have noted that terrorists' use of
nuclear weapons is the least likely scenario, although the
consequences could be disastrous. According to the FBI, the threat
from chemical and biological weapons is low, but some groups and
individuals of concern are beginning to show interest in such
weapons. Our September 1997 report stated that more than 40
federal departments, agencies, and bureaus have some role in
combating terrorism and that many of these organizations have
duplicative or overlapping capabilities and missions. In a
December 1997 report3 and an April 1998 testimony,4 we reported
that the many and increasing number of participants and programs
in the terrorism area across the federal government pose a
difficult management and coordination challenge to avoid program
duplication, fragmentation, and gaps. We also discussed the need
for threat and risk assessments to help the government make
decisions about how to target investments and set priorities for
combating terrorism. 5 We recommended that the National Security
Council's National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure
Protection, and Counter-Terrorism, review and guide the growing
number of federal terrorism response elements to ensure that
agencies' separate efforts leverage existing state and local
emergency management systems and are coordinated, unduplicated,
and focused toward achieving a clearly defined end state. In
November 1997, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed that DOD
develop a plan to integrate the National Guard and Reserves into
the DOD response to WMD attacks. The result was the Department of
Defense Plan for Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component
Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction,
issued January 1998. It outlined the capabilities the U.S.
military might be called on to provide in support of civil
authorities during a WMD attack, the capabilities 3Combating
Terrorism: Spending on Government-wide Programs Requires Better
Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997).
4Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues (GAO/T-
NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23, 1998). 5A threat and risk assessment would
begin by identifying and evaluating each threat on the basis of
various factors, such as its capability and intent to attack an
asset, the likelihood of a successful attack, and its lethality.
This information would be part of a deliberate process of
understanding the risk, or likelihood, that a threat will harm an
asset with some severity of consequences. Page 4
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 that existed in the
military, and the gaps in DOD's capability to respond. The plan
led to the creation of the RAID teams. According to Army National
Guard officials, the RAID team concept is a Secretary of Defense
initiative. The Army Guard is responsible for implementing the
concept and has developed the plans for organizing, staffing,
training, and equipping the teams for their mission. Since this is
a new concept, the plans and their implementation continue to
evolve. Funding for the teams will be through the Army Guard and
includes personnel costs for the full-time positions, as well as
training, equipment, and maintenance costs. DOD allocated about
$19.9 million from the fiscal year 1999 Defense Appropriations Act
for the first year of the program, which covered the startup costs
for the first 10 teams. An omnibus supplemental appropriation
followed, from which DOD allocated an additional $19.2 million for
RAID team equipment and $13 million to establish RAID (Light)
teams in states that do not have a full RAID team. The DOD budget
request for fiscal year 2000 includes about $37.2 million to
support the 10 existing RAID teams and create 5 more. It also
includes about $0.5 million to support the RAID (Light) teams.
According to Army officials, the Secretary of Defense plans that
the RAID teams will be dedicated forces for domestic incidents.
The initial 10 teams are located in Washington, California,
Colorado, Texas, Illinois, Missouri, Georgia, Pennsylvania, New
York, and Massachusetts. Each of these states is within a defined
FEMA region and was selected based on demographics of the state,
proximity to Air National Guard units that could provide airlift,
presence of other federal/military assets, transportation
networks, and other criteria. (See app. I for a map showing the
FEMA regions and the RAID team locations.) Consideration was also
given to the level of congressional interest in the locations of
the teams. State National Guard organizations receiving the teams
have started hiring and training personnel in their individual
skills. The 10 RAID teams are scheduled to be operational in
January 2000. Currently, the team is an asset of the state in
which it is located, but can be deployed as a regional asset to
other states. The DOD plan suggested that there eventually should
be a RAID team in each state, territory, and the District of
Columbia, for a total of 54 teams. Until this occurs, the Army
Guard is establishing RAID (Light) teams in the other 44 locations
to provide limited chemical/biological response capabilities. Page
5 GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating
Terrorism B-282299 Officials Have Differing There are differing
views on the role and use of the National Guard RAID Views on the
Role and teams and how they will fit into plans to respond to
incidents involving WMD. Army officials believe the teams can be a
valuable asset to federal Use of National Guard authorities, if
needed, as part of the Federal Response Plan. They also see Raid
Teams in the teams as a critical part of the
local and state response to such incidents. Response Plans
Federal officials most involved in managing the Federal Response
Plan during a WMD incident did not see a role for the National
Guard RAID teams. Local and state officials also have differing
views. Local officials with robust HAZMAT capabilities saw the
RAID teams benefiting those jurisdictions with lesser HAZMAT
capabilities. Officials from states without a RAID team do not see
the use of the team in their WMD response efforts because of the
time it takes the RAID team to respond. One state official does
see the team bringing some useful expertise. Officials from
Pennsylvania, one of the states to receive a RAID team, plan to
fully integrate their team into the state's response plan. Army
Officials See the RAID The DOD team that worked on the January
1998 plan reviewed the Federal Teams as Critical to WMD
Response Plan to determine the emergency support functions and
vital Response Efforts tasks that DOD would
likely be asked to support. The team requested the military
services to assess their capabilities to perform these tasks and
consolidated the responses to identify existing gaps in the DOD
capability to respond to a WMD event. The team also reviewed other
DOD-sanctioned studies on terrorism and command response plans. In
designing the RAID teams, Army officials stated they tried to
create a capability that would fill the greatest shortfall
identified in the study-the ability to detect and identify WMD.
This capability is critical to any effective response effort and,
according to these officials, was missing from most local and
state response units. The RAID team focus will be WMD and, as
such, the team would be subject matter experts, instead of HAZMAT
experts with an awareness of WMD. According to these officials,
having the RAID team in the National Guard gives the state
governor an asset that can be rapidly deployed to provide this
initial WMD detection and identification support, as well as
technical advice on handling WMD incidents, to the local incident
commander. Also, according to these officials, it is less
expensive to have one state asset trained and equipped to deploy
with this capability than to train and equip every HAZMAT team in
the state. According to Army officials, the RAID teams will also
provide advantages that are not presently available at the local,
state, or federal levels. For example, the teams will serve as a
model for state and local WMD response Page 6
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 organizations and
will provide both DOD and industry a place to identify
requirements and test new concepts and equipment in WMD detection
and identification. The teams will also provide a liaison between
the local and state responders and the manufacturers of equipment
to ensure that the responders have knowledge of state-of-the-art
equipment to manage WMD incidents. According to the officials, the
RAID teams will also fill a very important force protection role
for the National Guard. Once other Guard units are deployed to the
incident, they will need to know which areas are not contaminated
so they can carry out their duties safely. The RAID team will be
able to communicate this information to other Guard units, as well
as provide advice to the Guard commander regarding operating in a
WMD environment. Officials Question Role of Officials from the
FBI and FEMA are concerned about the RAID team RAID Teams in
Federal concept and how the teams would fit into any
federal WMD response. They Response Structure question
the need for the RAID teams because of the federal structure
already available to respond to WMD incidents. The FBI officials
are concerned about a conflict between the RAID teams and their
own Hazardous Materials Response Unit or other federal assets, if
all arrive with the same capabilities and try to give advice to
the incident commander. FEMA officials are also concerned about
the duplication of capabilities between the RAID teams and the
local and state HAZMAT teams. They can see the RAID teams perhaps
disrupting the relationship that already exists between the local,
state, and federal responders. Federal, state, and local officials
generally agree that a WMD incident involving chemical agents
would look like a major HAZMAT emergency. In such scenarios, the
local HAZMAT team would be the first to respond and the local fire
chief would usually be the incident commander. If the local
responders are unable to manage the situation or are overwhelmed,
the protocol is for the incident commander to contact nearby
communities and the state emergency management office for
assistance. The RAID team could be requested at that point.
However, the local commander also has access to federal assets
through the National Response System hotline, discussed later in
this report. According to officials from the International
Association of Fire Chiefs, the hotline is well publicized and
known within the first responder community. If the incident
commander suspects that the event is a WMD incident, a similar
hotline can be used to get information or assistance. The Domestic
Preparedness Program directed that the U.S. Army, as executive
agent, Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-110
Combating Terrorism B-282299 create this Chemical and Biological
Hotline to report suspected or confirmed WMD incidents.6 The Army
contracted with the Coast Guard to manage this hotline through the
same center the National Response System uses, which links the
caller to both the Army's Soldier and Biological Chemical Command
for advice and the FBI to begin the federal response. The incident
commander can also call the local office of the FBI, which would
trigger the federal response. According to FBI officials, the
local FBI offices try to work with local and state emergency
responders to plan responses for WMD incidents. The RAID teams are
not part of the Federal Response Plan and would not be notified
through the National Response System. The Federal Response Plan
provides for a Defense Coordinating Officer, who is the single
point of contact for Federal Response Plan agencies regarding
military assistance in a disaster.7 The Officer is responsible for
validating those agencies' requests for military assistance,
identifying and deploying active and reserve units for the
mission, and for operational control of the units that are
deployed. According to the Defense Coordinating Officer we spoke
with, the RAID team would duplicate the Officers' role of
identifying the units that could provide military assistance in a
WMD event. The request for assistance would have to be made
through the Defense Coordinating Officers because they have call
up and deployment authority for units (other than National Guard
units in state status) and the RAID teams do not have that
authority. According to Army officials, the RAID team's WMD focus
would be invaluable to the Defense Coordinating Officers in their
responsibilities under the Federal Response Plan, because of the
team's knowledge of other military assets with a WMD response
capability. The incident commander may request assistance for a
particular task without knowing what military units are available
to accomplish the task. According to the officials, the RAID team
could translate that request into a specific type of military unit
that would provide the most effective assistance to meet the
incident commander's needs and provide the Defense Coordinating
Officer information regarding the type and locations of that type
of unit. 6See our report Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to
Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency
(GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998) for a discussion of this program.
7There are officers assigned to each state, territory, and the
District of Columbia. Page 8
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 Differing Views of
the RAID Because the RAID teams are just getting established,
there is not much Team Role Exist at State information
about the teams at the state and local levels. Therefore, we and
Local Levels contacted only a few states,
including Pennsylvania, which has a RAID team, and local
jurisdictions to obtain their opinion on the RAID team concept.
Most local and state officials we spoke with do not see a role for
the RAID teams in their response framework. However, officials
from Pennsylvania, one of the states to receive a RAID team, are
enthusiastic about the concept. Officials from larger
jurisdictions usually have very robust HAZMAT capabilities. Many
of the officials we spoke with stated that they see no use for the
RAID teams because their own experienced technicians can not only
perform sufficient detection and identification to begin to handle
the situation, but also work in the stressful, dangerous
environment. They also did not see the RAID team providing advice
on situation assessment and management, which is another of the
RAID team missions. These officials consider themselves very
experienced in managing HAZMAT emergencies and did not believe the
RAID team could suggest anything they did not already practice
every day. However, some of the officials did state that perhaps
the RAID teams could be a useful asset for those locations with
little or no HAZMAT capability. One state official stated that the
RAID team could bring certain capabilities to a WMD event, such as
expertise on military agents. Officials from Utah's Division of
Comprehensive Emergency Management stated that a RAID team would
not respond to a WMD emergency in time to be of much help. Since a
detachment of the Army's Technical Escort Unit is already
stationed in the state and the state emergency management
officials have a relationship with the Unit, officials believe the
RAID team capability would not be effective for their state. An
official from the Virginia Department of Emergency Services
believes the RAID team, as a regional asset, would not arrive in
time to be an effective response asset, especially since the RAID
team would not operate routinely with Virginia's existing
coordinated and integrated response program. Virginia has 13
HAZMAT response teams that operate as local teams until called
upon to assist another jurisdiction under the state mutual aid
agreement. It also has hundreds of highly trained technicians on
other HAZMAT teams that can perform the basic detection and
identification tasks that allow them to begin to handle a WMD
emergency. The official also expressed concern about how the RAID
team would interact with the HAZMAT teams already on the scene and
what they would do to assist if they arrived too late to provide
the expertise for which they were trained. Page 9
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 However, he does
believe that the RAID teams could bring certain capabilities to a
WMD event, such as specific expertise concerning military agents,
and acting as liaison between the civilian response and the
military assets brought in to assist. He also believes that a RAID
team could add materially to Virginia's preparedness and response
capabilities, if it was properly trained and equipped and had a
well-defined mission consistent with and integrated into
Virginia's overall Terrorism Consequence Management concept. The
state and federal officials stated that the National Guard, in its
traditional assist role, would be necessary and invaluable in a
WMD emergency as in natural disasters and other emergencies. They,
as well as officials from the International Association of Fire
Chiefs, agreed that the detection and identification capabilities
in the RAID teams would be better placed in the local responder
community, since the local responders will be on the scene first
and need information quicker than the RAID team, or any federal
assets, could get there to provide it. According to some
officials, an investment in more sophisticated detection and
identification equipment and advanced training for HAZMAT teams
would benefit the teams' response to all HAZMAT emergencies, not
just WMD incidents. As we discussed in our November 1998 report,
the Domestic Preparedness Program is providing the largest 120
cities in the United States with the opportunity to expand their
WMD capabilities; however, there are concerns about some aspects
of the program. Pennsylvania State Emergency Management Agency
officials are very enthusiastic about the concept. Even though
there are state certified HAZMAT teams in 42 of the 67 counties in
the state, the officials are modifying their state response plans
to include the RAID team as the primary state asset to deploy in a
WMD chemical emergency. They also plan to have the RAID team
operate in non-WMD HAZMAT emergencies. They believe this not only
gives the team a chance to gain operational experience and learn
to operate as a team in the stressful HAZMAT environment, it also
gives the state an additional HAZMAT asset to deploy. The
officials dismissed the idea of relying on federal assets because
of concerns about their availability and responsiveness if the
state ever needed them. Page 10
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 Similar Capabilities
The RAID teams are to assist local and state authorities in
assessing a WMD Exist at Local, State, event; advise these
authorities regarding appropriate actions; and facilitate requests
for assistance to expedite arrival of additional state and federal
and Federal Levels military assets. The January 1998 DOD
plan that led to the creation of the RAID teams focused on some of
the military assets with similar capabilities available to support
local authorities in a WMD event. It did not consider over 600
state and local HAZMAT teams that have to assess and take
appropriate actions in incidents involving highly toxic industrial
chemicals and other hazardous materials. Some of these local teams
are receiving training and equipment through the federal Domestic
Preparedness Program that will give them the capability to respond
to WMD events. The plan also did not discuss many of the civilian
federal organizations that can provide advice or respond with
personnel and equipment to help mitigate the effects of a WMD.
Finally, the plan was developed without the benefit of an
analytically sound threat and risk assessment. We have said in
prior reports and testimonies that such assessments can help
decisionmakers in targeting investments, setting priorities, and
minimizing program duplication. Local and State
According to local, state, and federal officials, a chemical
terrorism event Governments Have will likely look like
any major HAZMAT emergency and HAZMAT teams will Substantial
HAZMAT be the first to reach the scene. HAZMAT technicians
are trained to detect Capabilities the presence of
highly toxic industrial chemicals and can use basic identification
techniques and equipment to give them sufficient information to
begin to assess and respond to the situation. For example, the
chemical agent sarin is from the same organophosphate compound
family of chemicals as pesticides. HAZMAT technicians can identify
this chemical family using readily available kits. The technicians
are trained and experienced in the protocols used to handle this
chemical family and can begin to mitigate the chemical
immediately. The identification of biological agents requires a
complex process performed in a lab and cannot, as yet, be done on
scene by any unit, including the RAID teams. However, it is likely
that detecting and identifying an actual biological agent will
involve the medical community over a period of days rather than
the HAZMAT community or the RAID teams over a matter of hours.
According to the International Association of Fire Chiefs, there
are over 600 local and state HAZMAT teams that will be the first
to respond to an event involving hazardous materials, whether it
is a WMD agent, industrial chemical, or other material. Although
these teams vary in capability, Page 11
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 ranging from basic
to robust, they all have the basic capability to detect and
identify industrial chemicals and mitigate the effects of a
chemical emergency, either on their own or with help from nearby
jurisdictions, private contractors, or federal organizations. Some
areas have small teams with little HAZMAT equipment. For example,
Utah currently has five Utah Highway Patrol troopers trained to
the level of HAZMAT technician who are responsible for managing
hazardous material emergencies throughout the state. They have
basic chemical identification kits and laptop computers in their
patrol cars that allow them to identify the family of chemicals
they are faced with and provide information on how to mitigate the
effects. Beyond the troopers, the state relies on a network of
amateur radio operators, city HAZMAT teams, volunteers with a
level of awareness in chemicals, oil company teams, and a
detachment of the Army's Technical Escort Unit stationed in the
state to handle large emergencies. The state is planning to expand
its HAZMAT capability with enough trained volunteers to staff six
regional teams, available on an as-needed basis. According to
officials from Utah's Division of Comprehensive Emergency
Management, this capability, with some awareness training for
those involved, will be sufficient to begin to manage the
consequences of a WMD event involving chemical agents. Local
jurisdictions such as Chicago, Illinois; Fairfax County, Virginia;
and Montgomery County, Maryland have more robust HAZMAT units.
These units can handle large HAZMAT situations involving the most
toxic industrial chemicals with little or no help because of
investments in equipment, training, and staff. The units have more
sophisticated detection and identification equipment that allows
them to know what chemical is present. They are usually outfitted
with a higher level of equipment, including personal protection
suits with self-contained breathing mechanisms that allow them to
enter the "hot zone" area of most intense contamination to quickly
begin to manage the situation. The largest cities in the United
States, usually the ones with the more robust HAZMAT capabilities,
are included in the 120 cities scheduled to receive WMD training,
assistance, and equipment through the Domestic Preparedness
Program. In our November 1998 report, we reported that the
training and equipment that DOD is providing to cities through the
program have clearly increased cities' awareness of and should
better prepare them to deal with a chemical or biological
terrorist incident. State, local, and federal officials agree that
the capability for managing a WMD event should be in the hands of
the people who will have to deal with the situation first Page 12
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 and who most need
it-the first responder community. According to these officials, it
would be far more effective to improve the capabilities in the
first responder community than to create additional capabilities
to assist them. Military Assets Available to There are 89 Air
National Guard civil engineering units spread throughout Assist
First Responders the 50 states, Guam, Puerto Rico, and
the District of Columbia, that the state governors or federal
officials can access to help in a WMD event. These civil
engineering units-Prime Base Engineering Emergency Forces, known
as "Prime BEEF" units-have the wartime mission of supporting
sustained air operations with equipment and personnel to ensure
capabilities for operating and surviving in a WMD attack and
mitigating the consequences of an attack. Their functions include
monitoring chemical plumes, detecting and identifying chemical
agents and radioactivity, controlling contamination,
decontaminating equipment and personnel, assessing the situation,
and building temporary shelters. The Air Guard also has 78 Prime
BEEF fire fighting units that are trained in handling hazardous
materials, such as jet fuel and hydrazine, related to aircraft
maintenance and operations and cleaning up spills. In addition,
the Air Guard has 10 Explosive Ordnance Disposal units that are
capable of handling WMD devices and plans to increase the number
of these units to 44 in the next 5 years. According to Air Guard
officials, these skilled units could be of great use to local
incident commanders in a WMD attack on civilian targets, if their
equipment and training were upgraded to allow "hot zone" entry and
they trained with the local first responders. This would allow
these units to be available to the states, not only in a WMD
event, but also in a major HAZMAT emergency. There are highly
specialized military assets to deal with the full range of WMD.
These include the Army's Technical Escort Unit, with three
detachments stationed across the United States; the U.S. Marine
Corps' Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force stationed at
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; the Army's 52nd Explosive Ordnance
Disposal teams, stationed across the United States; military
laboratories, such as the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases; and other assets, such as the Mobile
Analytical Response System from the Edgewood Research, Development
and Engineering Center. Many of these units have the capability to
detect and identify WMD as well as perform other WMD-related
tasks, such as locate and render safe WMD devices or decontaminate
victims. Many of these units have been positioned at large Page 13
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 events such as the
Atlanta Summer Olympic Games, economic summits, and presidential
inaugurations in case of a terrorist attack. The military
services, both active and reserve, have units that could be used
in a WMD emergency. For example, the U.S. Army Reserve has 63
percent of the chemical units in the U.S. Army, including 100
chemical reconnaissance/decontamination elements stationed across
the United States that can perform basic detection and
identification of chemical agents as well as decontamination
operations. The U.S. Army Reserve also has two chemical companies
that are specifically designed for nuclear, chemical, and
biological reconnaissance. The U.S. Army Reserve contains the only
biological detection company in the Army today that is ready to
deploy and also has many soldiers with command and control
expertise and chemical specialties that can be deployed as
individual experts to a WMD situation. Under the authority of Army
Regulation 500-60, a Reserve commander can respond to an emergency
in the local area when there is imminent danger of loss of life or
critical infrastructure. Accordingly, the local authorities could
request assistance from the local Reserve commander in a WMD
emergency without an official deployment of the military. Federal
Civilian Assets Some civilian federal agencies have assets
that can assist first responders Available to Assist First in
a WMD emergency. This assistance can be in the form of information
or Responders response teams. The National
Response System, which has been in operation for over 30 years,
provides 24-hour telephone hotline access to federal agencies.
Although the system is primarily to report emergencies involving
chemical or oil spills, it could also alert federal authorities to
what could turn out to be a WMD event. EPA is responsible for
preparing for and responding to emergencies involving oil and
hazardous substances, including radiological substances, for all
natural and manmade incidents, including those caused by
terrorism. The U.S. Coast Guard is responsible for the same kinds
of incidents as they impact the U.S. coastal waters. When a local
or state responder calls via the National Response System for EPA
or Coast Guard assistance, the call is immediately relayed to
either agency's on-scene coordinator. These coordinators have the
authority to manage all response efforts at the scene of an
incident. The EPA has about 270 on-scene coordinators across the
United States and the Coast Guard has 44 Marine Safety Officers,
who are coordinators. Most coordinators try to deploy within a
half-hour of notice. The coordinators have HAZMAT training, can
assist with situational Page 14
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 assessment, and are
the point of contact for the coordination of federal HAZMAT
efforts with the local and state responders. If the state asks for
assistance, the coordinator can bring both contractor and federal
assets to the scene. Both EPA and the Coast Guard have other
assets that respond to HAZMAT emergencies. The EPA has two
Environmental Response Teams, stationed in New Jersey and Ohio,
that can respond to a HAZMAT emergency. These teams can bring to
the scene analytical and monitoring equipment for detecting and
identifying materials, including chemical weapons. They also have
decontamination and risk assessment capability, as well as other
expertise. The teams have the capability to perform "hot zone"
entry with the highest level of personal protective equipment. EPA
also has 10 Superfund Technical Assessment and Response Teams, 1
in each EPA region, that have similar HAZMAT capabilities and
access to contractor support.8 EPA's National Enforcement
Investigations Center is the technical support center for EPA
enforcement and compliance assurance programs, providing
environmental forensic evidence collection, sampling, and analysis
and can also assist the FBI with these activities. EPA has 12 labs
that provide analytical support, field monitoring, and other
environmental program support. Five of these labs have deployable
mobile units that can provide chemical and biological analysis.
Finally, the EPA has radiological response capabilities to handle
some aspects of nuclear/ radiological incidents. The Coast Guard's
National Strike Force has three teams, located in New Jersey,
Alabama, and California. These teams each have 36 members trained
to the HAZMAT technician level, as well as trained members in the
Coast Guard Reserve, and are equipped to handle major oil and
chemical spills in coastal waters, but can also respond to other
environmental HAZMAT emergencies. These teams have the capability
to perform the highest level "hot zone" entry to detect and
identify materials, provide site assessments, perform site clean
up, and provide other technical assistance. According to Coast
Guard officials, it would take about $3 million to upgrade these
strike teams' skills and equipment to respond to WMD incidents and
give the federal government another asset to manage the
consequences of a WMD. 8The EPA regions include the same states as
the FEMA regions. See app. I for the FEMA regional structure. Page
15 GAO/NSIAD-99-110
Combating Terrorism B-282299 As discussed previously, the FBI has
the responsibility for crisis management in a WMD event. Its
Hazardous Materials Response Unit is responsible for providing
laboratory, scientific, and technical assistance to FBI
investigations involving hazardous materials, including WMD, and
environmental crimes. It also provides training, acts as an
advisory group for HAZMAT crime scenes, and does WMD/HAZMAT
research and development. The unit is trained and equipped to
respond to all HAZMAT emergencies, including WMD, at the highest
level of entry capability. It can detect and identify WMD or other
hazardous materials using a mobile lab containing sophisticated,
highly technical equipment that provides the level of evidence the
FBI needs to apprehend and convict the perpetrator. In support of
both the FBI and the local incident commander, the unit can also
sample, package, and transport hazardous material to labs for
further analysis, provide decontamination capability and
situational assessment, and assist with technical scientific
support and advice. The unit can mobilize within 4 hours and has
access to FBI aircraft if the emergency is too far to drive to.
The unit can be activated through the National Response System
when it is thought that a crime has been committed in an
environmental HAZMAT emergency or a HAZMAT emergency that may be a
WMD event. The FBI has a new initiative to put operational HAZMAT
teams in 15 of its 56 field offices by June 1999. Each team will
have 10 special agents trained at the HAZMAT technician level.
Although these agents will not function as full-time HAZMAT
technicians, they will be available as a quick response asset for
gathering evidence in environmental crimes and WMD events. The
team will be equipped to perform detection, monitoring, sampling,
and decontamination. By the end of 1999, the FBI plans to have 4-
person teams in the remainder of the field offices, trained to the
HAZMAT technician level, but with very little equipment. Eight of
the larger FBI teams will be in states that also have the National
Guard RAID teams. Concerns About RAID Our discussions with local,
state, and federal officials and our analysis of Teams' Ability to
Fully the information regarding the RAID teams surfaced a number
of concerns that the teams may not be able to meet their mission
and responsibilities Meet Their because of
recruiting and retention, training, and operational issues.
Responsibilities Page 16
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 RAID Teams May Have
In 1993, the Secretary of Defense announced a major restructuring
of the Problems Recruiting and Army National Guard and the
Army Reserve. As a result of the Retaining Specialized
restructuring, combat support and combat service support functions
were Personnel concentrated in the Army Reserve
and combat functions in the Army National Guard. According to the
Army officer commanding one of the support brigades responsible
for training and training evaluation of Army National Guard and
Reserve units, most of the chemical and medical units are in the
Army Reserve. As a result, there are few chemical and medical
positions in the Army Guard outside the RAID teams for promotion
opportunities. In his opinion, this would make it more difficult
to retain team members once they had been trained and were looking
for career advancement. He, as well as others, expressed concern
that the Guard would not be able to maintain a "pipeline" of
highly trained individuals to fill vacancies on the RAID teams,
making it necessary for the teams to operate at less than full
capability when vacancies occur. For example, it may be difficult
to find the highly trained personnel with the necessary education
and skills required to operate the sophisticated equipment planned
for the RAID teams, such as the mass spectrometer. Maintaining
Proficiency National Guard training plans for RAID team
members include both Could Be a Problem individual and
team training. Members will initially attend military training
programs such as the U.S. Army Chemical School at Fort McClellan,
Alabama, to give them basic specialty training in handling
military nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. They will also
receive other military training, including operational radiation
safety and chemical/biological countermeasures. The Guard also
plans to send team members to the same types of civilian training
programs that local responders from HAZMAT teams attend. In
addition, team members will receive training on the highly
technical equipment being purchased for detection and
identification of WMD. Team training will include participating in
exercises with other DOD response units, as well as local and
state responders. The team will also plan and conduct training to
learn how to operate as a RAID team. The National Guard plans to
work with local responders to arrange for the RAID team to
participate in their training programs and, at some future date,
to respond to actual HAZMAT emergencies with the local teams.
According to local and federal HAZMAT team leaders, it may be
difficult for the RAID team members to maintain their proficiency
after they receive their training. For example, the teams will
have a mobile lab with very sophisticated, technical
identification equipment. Many local HAZMAT team leaders stated
that they would not have some of this equipment in Page 17
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 their inventory,
particularly the mass spectrometer, because it requires highly
trained personnel to use and maintain it effectively. The federal
HAZMAT team leaders stated that, while some of them have a mass
spectrometer, it takes almost daily use to maintain competency and
accuracy, which the RAID team may not get. All of the HAZMAT team
leaders expressed concern that the RAID team members would lose
their HAZMAT expertise and become bored if they did not have
opportunities to continually practice their skills in more than
just a simulated environment. All of the leaders stated that this
on-the-job training is also critical to effective team operation.
The stressful situation of an actual HAZMAT emergency cannot be
replicated in a classroom or exercise, and team members need to
know that everyone on the team can operate in that environment.
The Pennsylvania Guard officer responsible for developing that
state's RAID team stated that the Guard was concerned about this
and realized the need to create these on-the-job opportunities,
not only to maintain proficiency but to keep the team members from
leaving to work on local HAZMAT teams. He added that the Guard was
working with local HAZMAT teams so that the RAID team could
participate in local training exercises and, at some later point,
perhaps respond with the local teams on actual HAZMAT emergencies.
RAID Teams May Not Be The goal for the RAID team, either in
part or as a whole, is to be able to Available if Needed
deploy to a WMD incident within 4 hours of notice. All local,
state, and federal officials we met with expressed concern that
this time frame would get the team there too late to be useful.
They stated that, for the incident commander to benefit from the
information they could produce, the RAID team would be needed at
the scene within the first 1 to 2 hours. After that time, the
local/state HAZMAT teams could have the basic detection and
identification information that would allow them to begin to
handle the situation. Then, the incident commander would either be
in control of the situation and not need additional assessment
input from the RAID team or so completely overwhelmed by the
enormity of the situation that the FBI and FEMA already would have
been notified, and in coordination with the state, federal assets
already would be on their way to the scene. The RAID teams will
have dedicated vehicles to transport them and their equipment to
the incident. The teams will also have access to Army National
Guard helicopters and small, fixed-wing aircraft that could carry
some team members with hand-held equipment. The remainder of the
team and equipment would then follow in the vehicles. To transport
the entire team to a distant location within the state or region,
with all its equipment Page 18
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 and vehicles, would
require military airlift, like C-130 aircraft. However, there are
no plans to dedicate ground crews, flight crews, or aircraft for
on-call, immediate response to a RAID team deployment. If Air
National Guard or Air Force aircraft were required to transport
the RAID teams, authorization would have to be obtained from the
U.S. Transportation Command. The lack of dedicated airlift for the
RAID teams adds to the concern about the delayed arrival. Some
federal assets, including the FBI's Hazardous Materials Response
Unit, have immediate access to aircraft and flight crews. The EPA
and Coast Guard On-Scene Coordinators have the ability to contract
for civilian aircraft to get their assets, as well as contractor
assets, to a scene quickly. Each RAID team is to be staffed with
22 full-time National Guard members organized into 6 functions:
command, operations, administration and logistics, communication,
medical, and survey. (See app. II for an organization and staffing
chart.) Members are to be on call 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.
All but the survey function have a primary mission of RAID team
support. For example, the medical unit provides medical support to
RAID personnel, as well as guidance to the incident commander on
the medical implications of a WMD event and coordination with
health care facilities for follow-on support requirements. Each
function will have personnel trained to perform their particular
mission. The two survey units have the mission of conducting
search, survey, surveillance, and sampling of a WMD incident site
and advising the incident commander of appropriate response
protocols. The survey units are to be capable of working in the
"hot zone" at the highest HAZMAT level of entry. Members are to be
cross-trained so that a full unit can be fielded at any one time.
All of the HAZMAT team leaders discussed the need to have
sufficient team members cross trained in each position to be able
to field a complete team when an emergency arises. For example,
the Army's Technical Escort Unit; the FBI's Hazardous Materials
Response Unit; and the Fairfax County, Virginia, HAZMAT team have
sufficient personnel to field multiple units. This allows the
units to rotate between on duty, off duty, and training status. If
members from the unit on duty are unable to make their shift, the
unit leader can call on an equivalent replacement from training or
off duty to fill the void. This process also alleviates the
concern of having the entire team on call 24 hours a day, 365 days
a year, which could cause significant hardships for the team
members as they try to maintain normal lives. The RAID team survey
function is the only part of the team that has multiple Page 19
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 individuals
performing the same job. All other members of the RAID team who
could not respond to a deployment call would create a loss of
capability for the team. Also, the RAID team will have only one
set of equipment for both training and deployment, which could
make it difficult to both train on the equipment and be
operationally ready to deploy. Conclusions The FBI and FEMA
are the lead federal agencies for WMD crisis management and
consequence management, respectively. The National Security
Council position of National Coordinator for Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism oversees the
broad variety of policies and programs related to
counterterrorism, preparedness, and consequence management. We
believe that the National Coordinator, in conjunction with the
lead federal agencies and DOD, should determine whether the
National Guard RAID teams are needed. Local, state, and federal
officials responsible for implementing emergency response plans
have differing views regarding the role for the RAID teams in
those plans. The RAID teams have capabilities similar to those
found in local, state, and federal emergency response teams. Many
of these teams were not considered when the RAID team concept was
created, which may have led to an unnecessary duplication of
assets. Concerns about recruiting and retention, training, and
operational issues may impact the RAID teams in their ability to
meet their responsibilities and mission. Recommendations We
recommend that the National Coordinator for Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism, in consultation
with the Attorney General, the Director, FEMA, and the Secretary
of Defense, reassess the need for the RAID teams in light of the
numerous local, state, and federal organizations that can provide
similar functions and submit the results of this reassessment to
Congress. If the teams are needed, we recommend that the National
Coordinator direct a test of the RAID team concept in the initial
10 states to determine how the teams can best fit into coordinated
state and federal response plans and whether the teams can
effectively perform their functions. If the RAID teams are not
needed, we further recommend that they be inactivated. Page 20
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 Matter for
Congress may wish to consider restricting the use of appropriated
funds for Congressional additional RAID teams
until the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure
Protection, and Counter-Terrorism completes the Consideration
reassessment we have recommended. Agency Comments and DOD and
FEMA provided written comments on a draft of this report. Our
Evaluation The FBI and other Department of Justice
organizations provided oral comments. DOD stated that some of our
findings and recommendations are useful as it establishes the RAID
teams; however, many are not because much of our information was
not current nor was it gathered from knowledgeable sources. FEMA
and the FBI are the two lead federal agencies for WMD management.
FEMA concurred with the thrust of the report and its
recommendations. The Department of Justice, including the FBI,
concurred with the substance of the report. Comments by DOD and
FEMA are included as appendix III and IV, respectively. We also
provided a draft of this report to the National Security Council,
which did not provide comments. We revised the report to reflect
technical comments provided by DOD, FEMA, Department of Justice,
and other organizations, as appropriate. FEMA stated that the
report makes three important points. First, and foremost, for an
incident of chemical terrorism, local responders-not a National
Guard or federal team that arrives hours later-will perform the
most immediate life-saving response tasks. Second, there are
federal assets that can assist state and local officials with
follow-on response tasks for chemical terrorism. New chemical
capabilities for the Guard may not be necessary to support federal
operations. Third, apparently there also is a difference of
opinion among states regarding the need for new National Guard
teams to support state operations. DOD stated that many of our
findings are not useful because they are based on data, opinions,
and analysis that preceded the October 17, 1998, congressional
direction to create 10 RAID teams. DOD also said that our report
and the views expressed therein are based on the Department's
plans, not on its implementation of the RAID team concept.
Moreover, it stated that the report takes into account only a
select portion of DOD's capacity to respond to terrorist use of
WMD on domestic targets and makes reference to interviews with
both civilian and military responders who have neither the
knowledge of the DOD program nor of the ongoing coordination
between DOD and other organizations. Also, DOD said that Page 21
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 several states have
submitted a request for or expressed interest in fielding their
own RAID teams, including Virginia and Utah. In commenting on our
first recommendation, DOD said that the FBI, FEMA, the National
Security Council, and the Office of Management and Budget had
reviewed and concurred with its plan to create the RAID teams. DOD
said that it is already implementing our second recommendation,
which calls for a test of the RAID concept in the first 10 states.
DOD's position on the third recommendation is that the RAID teams
are needed and should not be inactivated. With respect to the
scope of our work, we conducted our review through March 1999 and
included the most up-to-date information available at that time.
We reviewed DOD's plans for the RAID teams and the implementation
of those plans. For example, we discussed Pennsylvania's progress
in fielding its RAID team and incorporating the team's
capabilities into the state's WMD response plan. Although DOD
states that the RAID teams were created by congressional direction
on October 17, 1998, the teams were a DOD initiative and Congress,
in passing the fiscal year 1999 Defense Appropriations Act on that
date, funded DOD's initiative. Our focus was on the RAID teams and
not DOD's total capacity to respond to WMD incidents. We assessed
the teams against their stated roles and responsibilities, not
against DOD's total support requirements. Therefore, we believe
our assessment is valid. While we agree that the FBI, FEMA, the
National Security Council, and the Office of Management and Budget
reviewed the plans for the RAID teams, our discussions with
officials from the FBI and FEMA and these agencies' comments on
our report show that differing views continue to exist. With
respect to DOD's list of states requesting RAID teams, it is
reasonable to expect that many states might express an interest in
receiving a trained and equipped RAID team that could respond both
to WMD events and HAZMAT emergencies since its cost would be borne
by the federal government. The officials with whom we discussed
the RAID teams' roles and responsibilities were recommended by
their federal agencies or state and local entities as being most
knowledgeable of WMD response plans and the implementation of
those plans. All of these were aware of the RAID team concept,
most had been briefed on the concept, and many had provided
comments to DOD on it. We continue to believe that our
recommendations are valid and that the need for the RAID teams
should be reassessed. We do not believe that the RAID teams were
created based on careful consideration of Page 22
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 governmentwide
priorities, an analysis of the program in relation to those
priorities, and an allocation of resources based on priorities and
an analytical assessment of the threat and risk of a WMD attack. A
reassessment at this juncture is important because DOD has
requested funds for five additional RAID teams in the fiscal year
2000 budget request. If it is determined that the RAID teams are
needed, as DOD states in its comments, we believe it is premature
to expand the RAID concept beyond the original 10 locations until
it is determined how the teams can best fit into coordinated state
and federal response plans, and whether the teams can effectively
perform their functions. In light of differing views among DOD,
FEMA, and the FBI regarding whether a reassessment of the RAID
teams is needed and the fact that the National Coordinator did not
provide comments on our report, Congress may wish to consider
restricting the use of appropriated funds for any additional RAID
teams until the reassessment we recommended is complete.
Accordingly, we have included a matter for congressional
consideration in our report. Scope and To determine what
federal entities have capabilities similar to the RAID Methodology
teams, we interviewed officials and reviewed documents from the
FBI; FEMA; EPA; U.S. Coast Guard; U.S. Army Soldier and Biological
Chemical Command; U.S. Air National Guard; U.S. Army 15th Support
Brigade; and U.S. Army Reserve. To determine what local and state
assets have similar capabilities, we interviewed officials from
Fairfax County, Virginia; Montgomery County, Maryland; Chicago,
Illinois; and the states of Utah, Virginia, and Pennsylvania. We
also reviewed documents from Utah, Virginia, and Pennsylvania.
These locations were selected to provide a range of perspectives,
which includes states with and without a RAID team, states with
major population centers and with more rural areas, and states
with robust HAZMAT capabilities at the state level and those with
less capability. To determine how the RAID teams would be
integrated into local, state, and federal response plans, we
interviewed officials and reviewed documents from the FBI; FEMA;
U.S. Army 15th Support Brigade; Fairfax County, Virginia;
Montgomery County, Maryland; Chicago, Illinois; the states of
Utah, Virginia, and Pennsylvania; and the International
Association of Fire Chiefs. We reviewed the Department of Defense
Plan for Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support
for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction to
determine how the concept of the RAID Page 23
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 teams was developed.
We also reviewed pertinent legislation and funding for the RAID
teams. We interviewed officials and reviewed documents from DOD's
Consequence Management Program Integration Office, the Army
National Guard, Pennsylvania, and the Pennsylvania National Guard
to determine design, implementation, and planned use of the RAID
teams. We also discussed the RAID team concept and the
implementation of that concept with all of the officials listed
above. We conducted our work from July 1998 through March 1999 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no
further distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue
date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to
appropriate congressional committees; the Honorable William Cohen,
Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Janet Reno, Attorney General;
the Honorable Rodney Slater, Secretary of Transportation; the
Honorable James Lee Witt, Director, Federal Emergency Management
Agency; and the Honorable Carol Browner, Administrator,
Environmental Protection Agency. We will make copies available to
other interested parties upon request. If you have any questions
about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-5140. Robert
Pelletier and Ann Borseth were major contributors to this report.
Mark E. Gebicke Director, National Security Preparedness Issues
Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-110
Combating Terrorism Contents Letter
1 Appendix I
26 RAID Team Locations Within FEMA Regions Appendix II
27 RAID Team Organization and Staffing Appendix III
28 Comments From the Department of Defense Appendix IV
45 Comments From the Federal Emergency Management Agency Related
GAO Products
48 Abbreviations DOD Department of Defense EPA
Environmental Protection Agency FBI Federal Bureau of
Investigation FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
HMRU Hazardous Materials Response Unit HAZMAT
hazardous materials RAID Rapid Assessment and Initial
Detection WMD weapons of mass destruction Page 25
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix I RAID Team
Locations Within FEMA Regions Appendix I States with RAID teams
Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix II RAID
Team Organization and Staffing
Appendix I I Commander and Deputy Commander and Deputy Unit
Commander Unit Commander Deputy/Operations Officer
Deputy/Operations Officer Operations Team
Medical Team Operations Team Assistant Operations Officer
Administration and Communications Team
Medical Team Physicians' Assistant Assistant Operations Officer
Administration and Senior Operations NCO Logistics
Team Communications Team Team Chief
Physicians' Assistant Medical Operations Officer Senior Operations
NCO Logistics Team Operations NCO-Modeling
Logistics NCO Team Chief
Information Systems Operator Medical Operations
Officer Environmental Science Officer Operations NCO-Modeling
Logistics NCO Assistant Operations NCO Administrative
NCO Information Systems Operator
Environmental Science Officer Medical NCO Assistant Operations NCO
Administrative NCO
Medical NCO Survey Teams Survey Teams Leader Leader NBC
Reconnaissance NCO NBC Reconnaissance NCO Survey Team
Survey Team Survey Team 3 Assistant NBC
Survey Team 3 Assistant NBC 3 Assistant NBC Reconnaissance NCOs
3 Assistant NBC Reconnaissance NCOs Reconnaissance NCOs
Reconnaissance NCOs Legend NCO=Noncommissioned officer
NBC=Nuclear, biological, chemical Page 27
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From
the Department of Defense AppendIIix I Note: GAO's comments
supplementing those in the report text appear at the end of this
appendix. See comment 1. Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating
Terrorism Appendix III Comments From the Department of Defense See
comment 2. See comment 3. Page 29
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From
the Department of Defense See comment 4. Page 30
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From
the Department of Defense See comment 5. Page 31
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From
the Department of Defense See comment 6. Page 32
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From
the Department of Defense See comment 7. See comment 8. Letter
Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-99-110
Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From the Department of
Defense See comment 9. Page 34
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From
the Department of Defense Page 35
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From
the Department of Defense See comment 10. Page 36
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From
the Department of Defense See comment 11. See pp. 22-23. Page 37
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From
the Department of Defense See pp. 22-23. Page 38
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From
the Department of Defense Page 39
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From
the Department of Defense Following are our comments on the
Department of Defense's (DOD) April 30, 1999, letter. GAO Comments
1. During the time of our review, the plans for the Rapid
Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams evolved and we
continuously met with Army officials to obtain the most up-to-date
information on those plans. As we met with various organizations,
we discussed our latest understanding of those plans. Although
the plans for the teams have changed over time, the mission has
not. As stated in the report, the various officials we met with
expressed concerns with the mission and the time it would take the
RAID team to respond to a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) event.
2. We have done extensive work in the area of WMD consequence
management, which involves the complex federal response system and
its requirements, and have gained considerable understanding of
that system. We have included a partial list of our recent
products on WMD consequence management at the end of this report.
For this assignment, we have also discussed the federal response
system and its requirements to mitigate the effects of a WMD
attack with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which are the lead agencies
for the federal response system, and other agencies intimately
involved as part of the federal response system. 3. Our focus was
on the RAID teams and not DOD's total capacity to respond to WMD.
We discussed the RAID teams' roles and responsibilities with
officials who were recommended by their federal agencies or state
and local entities as being most knowledgeable of WMD response
plans and the implementation of those plans. All of these
officials were aware of the RAID team concept, most had been
briefed on the concept, and several had provided comments to DOD
on that concept. We agree with DOD that a complete, current, and
accurate assessment of the roles and mission of the RAID teams is
needed to validate the requirement for these teams and the
contributions they can make in support of the nation's first
responder community. DOD's position is consistent with our
recommendations. 4. We have clarified the report to reflect that
DOD has articulated the specific mission of the RAID teams.
However, officials from FEMA and the FBI, as well as other federal
officials who are intimately involved in the complex WMD federal
response system, questioned the need for the RAID teams because of
the federal structure already available to respond to WMD
incidents. They also expressed concern about the RAID teams' Page
40 GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating
Terrorism Appendix III Comments From the Department of Defense
impact on first responders, if the teams do not arrive for several
hours after the incident occurs. As we state in the report, we
found differing views of the RAID team role at the state and local
levels. For example, Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency
officials are integrating the state's RAID team into the state's
WMD response plans. However, the other states we talked to
without RAID teams did not mention any efforts to include the
regional team into their plans. 5. As mentioned in comment 3, our
focus was on the RAID teams, not DOD's total response capability.
We did not portray the RAID teams as meeting all the support
requirements expected from DOD as DOD implies in its comments. We
assessed the teams against their stated roles and responsibilities
and not against DOD's total support requirements. Therefore, we
believe our assessment is valid. 6. We agree that the solution to
the WMD response mission requires a military and civilian
partnership and existing capabilities must be leveraged. However,
it appears that DOD is not taking full advantage of leveraging
existing capabilities. For example, DOD is creating RAID teams in
the Army National Guard when considerable capability already
exists in the Air National Guard and, with some upgrading of
skills and equipment, could perform comparable missions. Also,
DOD is creating teams to perform functions that can be performed
by numerous local, state, and federal organizations. As stated in
our report, if governmentwide priorities have not been established
and funding requirements have not been validated based on an
analytically sound threat and risk assessment, there is no
reasonable assurance that funds are being spent on the right
programs in the right amounts and that unnecessary program and
funding duplication, overlap, misallocation, fragmentation, and
gaps have not occurred. 7. DOD has a significant support role in
domestic WMD response. If a WMD event occurs, DOD will likely be
called on to support the federal response just as it has done in
other national emergencies. As we state in the report, both the
FBI and FEMA questioned the use of the RAID teams in a federal
response, and there are differing views on how the teams can be
used in a state role. Therefore, we suggest that the key federal
agencies determine if the RAID teams are needed for the numerous
reasons cited in the report. The DOD response did not address one
of the major issues surrounding the role and use of the RAID
teams-that of response time. Many of the concerns expressed by
federal, state, and local officials center on the length of time
it may take the RAID team to arrive at a WMD Page 41
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From
the Department of Defense emergency. According to these
officials, there are other federal assets with similar
capabilities or access to contractors with similar capabilities
that could respond as quickly or quicker than the RAID team. 8.
According to FBI officials, the primary role of the FBI's
Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU) is to support criminal
investigations. However, it can assist incident commanders with
the same types of information that the RAID teams would provide.
Also, although it is a unique national asset, it can respond
quickly by air or ground to wherever it is needed. Moreover, there
are many federal units beyond the FBI's HMRU that can provide
similar capabilities to the RAID team, but were not considered
when the RAID teams were created and not mentioned in DOD's
comments on this report. Local hazardous materials (HAZMAT) teams
do not routinely deal with militarized chemical agents, but as we
state in the report, they can use basic identification techniques
and equipment to begin to assess and respond to the incident.
Federal, state, and local HAZMAT teams are experienced in
identifying and handling very toxic industrial chemicals in the
same family as the military agents. DOD does not address the
statements made by HAZMAT officials that their teams do not need
the type of sophisticated equipment that the RAID team will have
to begin to handle the event. According to local, state, and
federal officials, a biological incident would likely play out
through the medical community, not the HAZMAT response system,
unless the terrorists immediately announced the action. Even with
knowledge of a possible biological agent present, someone
operating the sophisticated equipment the RAID team brings to a
scene will be able to detect that a biological agent has been
released, but will not be able to positively identify the agent.
According to Army officials, the primary mission of the RAID
team's medical unit is to provide medical assistance to the RAID
team members and, secondarily, to provide medical advice to first
responders. There are many other federal entities that can also
provide this advice, either on scene or by telephone, to the
incident commander. Army Reserve chemical companies can detect
chemical and biological agents. According to U.S. Army Reserve
officials, the units discussed in the report can be used in more
than a wartime situation and, in fact, can be prepositioned at
events, such as the Olympic games, or used in a WMD emergency
along with other federal and military assets. Page 42
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From
the Department of Defense 9. We discuss the states' requests for
RAID teams on page 22 of this report. Although DOD said that
HAZMAT teams do not have the "basic capability to detect and
identify industrial chemicals and mitigate the effects of a
chemical emergency", this is exactly what they are trained to do.
The statement by the president of the International Association of
Fire Chiefs before the Research and Development Subcommittee of
the House National Security Committee in March 1998 cited in DOD's
comments must be considered in context. In outlining first
responder shortfalls in equipment and training, he was referring
to the handling of WMD incidents, not industrial chemicals, which
the Domestic Preparedness Program is set up to overcome. And,
even though some first responders may lack WMD response
capabilities, International Association of Fire Chiefs officials,
as well as the local HAZMAT team members and federal response team
officials we spoke with, reinforced the fact that many HAZMAT
teams have the basic skills to begin to mitigate a chemical WMD
attack. We do not state that these teams may not need outside
support to mitigate the effects of a catastrophic WMD event. The
individuals we spoke with, including the Chief of Hazardous
Materials for the Chicago Fire Department, recognized that the
National Guard is invaluable in its traditional role, providing
support such as transportation and area security. However, he and
others reinforced the fact that the capability for initial
detection and identification of a WMD needs to be in the first
responder community, not in a team that may not respond for hours.
10. We do not state or imply in the report that maintaining the
strength of Active Guard and Reserve positions is a "problem."
Our report discussed the potential problem of finding and
retaining people with the high level of skill or education needed
to handle the sophisticated equipment the RAID teams will have and
those with the appropriate skills to staff the medical team.
Specifically, the RAID teams are to receive highly specialized
training, which is well beyond the training received by
individuals in military chemical units and the National Guard RAID
(Light) units. Also, some functions will require individuals with
the necessary education and skills to operate sophisticated
equipment. Replacing these individuals when vacancies occur might
take time, which could affect the teams' capabilities. Page 43
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From
the Department of Defense 11. Both Army and Pennsylvania National
Guard officials stated their concerns to us regarding the need for
RAID team members to maintain skill proficiency. Our report
recognizes that the National Guard plans to work with local
responders to arrange for the RAID teams to participate in their
training programs and that the Pennsylvania National Guard is
working with local and state HAZMAT teams to create training
opportunities. Page 44
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix IV Comments From the
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Appendix I V Note: GAO's comment supplementing those in the report
text appear at the end of this appendix. See comment 1. Page 45
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix IV Comments From the
Federal Emergency Management Agency The following is GAO's comment
on FEMA's letter dated April 30, 1999. GAO Comment 1. Based
upon the written technical comments supplied by FEMA, we have
revised the report as appropriate. Page 46
GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-99-110
Combating Terrorism Related GAO Products Combating Terrorism:
Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public Health Initiatives
(GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112, Mar. 16, 1999). Combating Terrorism:
Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism (GAO/T-
NSIAD/GGD-99-107, Mar. 11, 1999). Combating Terrorism: FBI's Use
of Federal Funds for Counterterrorism- Related Activities (Fiscal
years 1995-98) (GAO/GGD-99-7, Nov. 20, 1998). Combating Terrorism:
Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and
Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998). Combating Terrorism:
Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness
Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, Oct. 2, 1998). Combating Terrorism:
Observations on Crosscutting Issues (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23,
1998). Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help
Prioritize and Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr.
9, 1998). Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide
Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-
98-39, Dec. 1, 1997). Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies'
Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-
254, Sept. 26, 1997). (701146) Letter Page 48
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