Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear
(Letter Report, 05/21/1999, GAO/NSIAD-99-110).

The Defense Department (DOD) recently approved the creation of 10
National Guard response teams to help state and local authorities deal
with terrorists attacks involving weapons of mass destruction. GAO found
differing views on the role and the use of these response teams and how
they will fit into state and federal plans to respond to weapons of mass
destruction. Army officials believe that the teams can be a valuable
asset to federal authorities. They also believe that the teams will be a
critical part of the state and local response. However, officials with
the FBI and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which are
responsible for managing the federal response to terrorist attacks, do
not see a role for the teams in the federal response. Instead, they
foresee the National Guard providing its traditional assistance in
emergencies. Differing views also exist at the state level. Many state,
local, and federal groups can do the work that the teams would perform.
For example, more than 600 state and local hazardous materials teams in
the United States deal with incidents involving highly toxic industrial
chemicals and other hazardous materials. GAO's discussions with state,
local, and federal officials and its own analysis found several concerns
that could affect the teams' abilities to meet their mission and
responsibilities. These concerns centered on recruiting and retention,
training, and operational issues. GAO summarized this report in
testimony before Congress; see: Combating Terrorism: Use of National
Guard Response Teams Is Unclear, by Mark E. Gebicke, Director of
National Security Preparedness Issues, before the Subcommittee on
National Security, Veterans' Affairs, and International Relations, House
Committee on Government Reform. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184, June 23 (10 pages).

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-99-110
     TITLE:  Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams
	     Is Unclear
      DATE:  05/21/1999
   SUBJECT:  Defense contingency planning
	     National defense operations
	     Redundancy
	     Emergency preparedness
	     Federal/state relations
	     Terrorism
	     Interagency relations
IDENTIFIER:  National Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection
	     FEMA Federal Response Plan

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    United States General Accounting Office GAO                 Report
    to Congressional Requesters May 1999            COMBATING
    TERRORISM Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 United States General Accounting Office
    National Security and Washington, D.C. 20548
    Letter                                               International
    Affairs Division B-282299
    Letter May 21, 1999 The Honorable Christopher Shays Chairman,
    Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans' Affairs, and
    International Relations Committee on Government Reform House of
    Representatives The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking Minority Member
    Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives The Honorable
    Bob Barr House of Representatives In September 1997, we reported
    that many federal agencies had duplicative or overlapping
    capabilities and missions in combating acts of terrorism,1
    including incidents involving the use of weapons of mass
    destruction (WMD).2 Recently, the Department of Defense (DOD)
    approved the creation of 10 National Guard Rapid Assessment and
    Initial Detection (RAID) teams to assist local and state
    authorities in assessing the situation surrounding a WMD
    emergency; advise these authorities regarding appropriate actions;
    and facilitate requests for assistance to expedite the arrival of
    additional state and federal military assets. As requested, we (1)
    obtained the views of federal, state, and local officials
    regarding the role of RAID teams in response plans; (2) determined
    whether there are other federal, state, or local government
    entities that can perform similar functions to the RAID teams; and
    (3) evaluated the RAID teams' roles and responsibilities and how
    the teams plan to meet these responsibilities. 1Combating
    Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy
    and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997). 2For purposes of
    this report, WMD are defined as biological, chemical, or
    radiological weapons. Letter           Page 1
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 Results in Brief
    We have previously reported that the many and increasing number of
    participants and programs in the evolving terrorism area across
    the federal government pose a difficult management and
    coordination challenge to avoid program duplication,
    fragmentation, and gaps. While DOD has defined the specific
    mission for the RAID teams, the plans for the teams and their
    implementation continue to evolve. We found that there are
    differing views on the role and use of the RAID teams and how they
    will fit into state and federal plans to respond to weapons of
    mass destruction. Army officials believe the teams can be a
    valuable asset to federal authorities, if needed, as part of the
    federal response plan. They also believe that the teams will be a
    critical and integral part of the state and local response to such
    weapons. Officials with the two agencies responsible for managing
    the federal response to terrorist incidents-the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation and the Federal Emergency Management Agency-do not
    see a role for the RAID teams in the federal response. Instead,
    they see the National Guard, whether in state or federal status,
    providing its traditional assistance in emergencies. Differing
    views also exist at the state level. Officials in states without a
    RAID team do not see how the teams can benefit their states'
    response capabilities because of the time it takes the RAID teams
    to respond. However, one state official does see the RAID team
    bringing some expertise that could be useful. Officials in
    Pennsylvania, a state with a RAID team, plan not only to fully
    integrate its team into the state's weapons of mass destruction
    response plan, but also use it to respond to more common hazardous
    materials emergencies. There are numerous local, state, and
    federal organizations that can perform similar functions to the
    RAID teams. For example, there are over 600 local and state
    hazardous materials teams in the United States that daily have to
    assess and take appropriate actions in incidents involving highly
    toxic industrial chemicals and other hazardous materials. In
    addition, there are numerous military and federal civilian
    organizations that can help local incident commanders deal with
    weapons of mass destruction incidents by providing advice,
    technical experts, and equipment. Our discussions with local,
    state, and federal officials and our analysis surfaced a number of
    concerns that could impact the teams' abilities to meet their
    mission and responsibilities. These concerns centered on
    recruiting and retention, training, and operational issues. Letter
    Page 2                                      GAO/NSIAD-99-110
    Combating Terrorism B-282299 These issues further point to the
    need for a more focused and coordinated approach to the U.S.
    response to attacks involving weapons of mass destruction-an
    approach that capitalizes on existing capabilities, minimizes
    unnecessary duplication of activities and programs, and focuses
    funding on the highest priority requirements. Because of the
    differing views on the role and use of the RAID teams, the
    numerous organizations that can perform similar functions, and the
    potential operational issues that could impact the teams, we are
    recommending that the appropriate federal agencies determine the
    need for the teams. If it is determined that the teams are needed,
    we further recommend that the RAID team concept be tested to
    determine how the teams can effectively perform their functions.
    If they are not needed, we recommend that they be inactivated. In
    light of differing views regarding a reassessment of the need for
    the RAID teams, Congress may wish to consider restricting the use
    of appropriated funds for any additional teams until the
    reassessment we recommended is complete. We have included a matter
    for congressional consideration in this report. Background
    Operationally, federal efforts to combat terrorism are organized
    along a lead agency concept. The Department of Justice, through
    the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), is responsible for
    crisis management of domestic terrorist incidents and for
    pursuing, arresting, and prosecuting the terrorists. State
    governments have primary responsibility for managing the
    consequences of domestic disasters, including major terrorist
    incidents; however, the federal government can support state and
    local authorities if they lack the capabilities to respond
    adequately. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) manages
    this federal support through a generic disaster contingency plan
    known as the Federal Response Plan, which outlines the roles,
    responsibilities, and emergency support functions of various
    federal agencies, including DOD, for consequence management. The
    National Security Council's National Coordinator for Security,
    Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism, created in May
    1998 by Presidential Decision Directive 62, oversees the broad
    variety of relevant policies and programs, including such areas as
    counter-terrorism, preparedness, and consequence management for
    WMD. According to intelligence agencies, conventional explosives
    and firearms continue to be the weapons of choice for terrorists.
    Many familiar with industrial chemicals, such as officials from
    the FBI, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Coast
    Guard, and local hazardous materials (HAZMAT) teams, believe that
    industrial chemicals may also be a weapon of choice in terrorist
    attacks because they can be easily obtained and Page 3
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 dispersed.
    Terrorists are less likely to use chemical and biological weapons
    than conventional explosives, at least partly because these
    materials are more difficult to weaponize and the results are
    unpredictable. Agency officials have noted that terrorists' use of
    nuclear weapons is the least likely scenario, although the
    consequences could be disastrous. According to the FBI, the threat
    from chemical and biological weapons is low, but some groups and
    individuals of concern are beginning to show interest in such
    weapons. Our September 1997 report stated that more than 40
    federal departments, agencies, and bureaus have some role in
    combating terrorism and that many of these organizations have
    duplicative or overlapping capabilities and missions. In a
    December 1997 report3 and an April 1998 testimony,4 we reported
    that the many and increasing number of participants and programs
    in the terrorism area across the federal government pose a
    difficult management and coordination challenge to avoid program
    duplication, fragmentation, and gaps. We also discussed the need
    for threat and risk assessments to help the government make
    decisions about how to target investments and set priorities for
    combating terrorism. 5 We recommended that the National Security
    Council's National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure
    Protection, and Counter-Terrorism, review and guide the growing
    number of federal terrorism response elements to ensure that
    agencies' separate efforts leverage existing state and local
    emergency management systems and are coordinated, unduplicated,
    and focused toward achieving a clearly defined end state. In
    November 1997, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed that DOD
    develop a plan to integrate the National Guard and Reserves into
    the DOD response to WMD attacks. The result was the Department of
    Defense Plan for Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component
    Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction,
    issued January 1998. It outlined the capabilities the U.S.
    military might be called on to provide in support of civil
    authorities during a WMD attack, the capabilities 3Combating
    Terrorism: Spending on Government-wide Programs Requires Better
    Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997).
    4Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues (GAO/T-
    NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23, 1998). 5A threat and risk assessment would
    begin by identifying and evaluating each threat on the basis of
    various factors, such as its capability and intent to attack an
    asset, the likelihood of a successful attack, and its lethality.
    This information would be part of a deliberate process of
    understanding the risk, or likelihood, that a threat will harm an
    asset with some severity of consequences. Page 4
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 that existed in the
    military, and the gaps in DOD's capability to respond. The plan
    led to the creation of the RAID teams. According to Army National
    Guard officials, the RAID team concept is a Secretary of Defense
    initiative. The Army Guard is responsible for implementing the
    concept and has developed the plans for organizing, staffing,
    training, and equipping the teams for their mission. Since this is
    a new concept, the plans and their implementation continue to
    evolve. Funding for the teams will be through the Army Guard and
    includes personnel costs for the full-time positions, as well as
    training, equipment, and maintenance costs. DOD allocated about
    $19.9 million from the fiscal year 1999 Defense Appropriations Act
    for the first year of the program, which covered the startup costs
    for the first 10 teams. An omnibus supplemental appropriation
    followed, from which DOD allocated an additional $19.2 million for
    RAID team equipment and $13 million to establish RAID (Light)
    teams in states that do not have a full RAID team. The DOD budget
    request for fiscal year 2000 includes about $37.2 million to
    support the 10 existing RAID teams and create 5 more. It also
    includes about $0.5 million to support the RAID (Light) teams.
    According to Army officials, the Secretary of Defense plans that
    the RAID teams will be dedicated forces for domestic incidents.
    The initial 10 teams are located in Washington, California,
    Colorado, Texas, Illinois, Missouri, Georgia, Pennsylvania, New
    York, and Massachusetts. Each of these states is within a defined
    FEMA region and was selected based on demographics of the state,
    proximity to Air National Guard units that could provide airlift,
    presence of other federal/military assets, transportation
    networks, and other criteria. (See app. I for a map showing the
    FEMA regions and the RAID team locations.) Consideration was also
    given to the level of congressional interest in the locations of
    the teams. State National Guard organizations receiving the teams
    have started hiring and training personnel in their individual
    skills. The 10 RAID teams are scheduled to be operational in
    January 2000. Currently, the team is an asset of the state in
    which it is located, but can be deployed as a regional asset to
    other states. The DOD plan suggested that there eventually should
    be a RAID team in each state, territory, and the District of
    Columbia, for a total of 54 teams. Until this occurs, the Army
    Guard is establishing RAID (Light) teams in the other 44 locations
    to provide limited chemical/biological response capabilities. Page
    5                                      GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating
    Terrorism B-282299 Officials Have Differing  There are differing
    views on the role and use of the National Guard RAID Views on the
    Role and  teams and how they will fit into plans to respond to
    incidents involving WMD. Army officials believe the teams can be a
    valuable asset to federal Use of National Guard  authorities, if
    needed, as part of the Federal Response Plan. They also see Raid
    Teams in                     the teams as a critical part of the
    local and state response to such incidents. Response Plans
    Federal officials most involved in managing the Federal Response
    Plan during a WMD incident did not see a role for the National
    Guard RAID teams. Local and state officials also have differing
    views. Local officials with robust HAZMAT capabilities saw the
    RAID teams benefiting those jurisdictions with lesser HAZMAT
    capabilities. Officials from states without a RAID team do not see
    the use of the team in their WMD response efforts because of the
    time it takes the RAID team to respond. One state official does
    see the team bringing some useful expertise. Officials from
    Pennsylvania, one of the states to receive a RAID team, plan to
    fully integrate their team into the state's response plan. Army
    Officials See the RAID  The DOD team that worked on the January
    1998 plan reviewed the Federal Teams as Critical to WMD
    Response Plan to determine the emergency support functions and
    vital Response Efforts                  tasks that DOD would
    likely be asked to support. The team requested the military
    services to assess their capabilities to perform these tasks and
    consolidated the responses to identify existing gaps in the DOD
    capability to respond to a WMD event. The team also reviewed other
    DOD-sanctioned studies on terrorism and command response plans. In
    designing the RAID teams, Army officials stated they tried to
    create a capability that would fill the greatest shortfall
    identified in the study-the ability to detect and identify WMD.
    This capability is critical to any effective response effort and,
    according to these officials, was missing from most local and
    state response units. The RAID team focus will be WMD and, as
    such, the team would be subject matter experts, instead of HAZMAT
    experts with an awareness of WMD. According to these officials,
    having the RAID team in the National Guard gives the state
    governor an asset that can be rapidly deployed to provide this
    initial WMD detection and identification support, as well as
    technical advice on handling WMD incidents, to the local incident
    commander. Also, according to these officials, it is less
    expensive to have one state asset trained and equipped to deploy
    with this capability than to train and equip every HAZMAT team in
    the state. According to Army officials, the RAID teams will also
    provide advantages that are not presently available at the local,
    state, or federal levels. For example, the teams will serve as a
    model for state and local WMD response Page 6
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 organizations and
    will provide both DOD and industry a place to identify
    requirements and test new concepts and equipment in WMD detection
    and identification. The teams will also provide a liaison between
    the local and state responders and the manufacturers of equipment
    to ensure that the responders have knowledge of state-of-the-art
    equipment to manage WMD incidents. According to the officials, the
    RAID teams will also fill a very important force protection role
    for the National Guard. Once other Guard units are deployed to the
    incident, they will need to know which areas are not contaminated
    so they can carry out their duties safely. The RAID team will be
    able to communicate this information to other Guard units, as well
    as provide advice to the Guard commander regarding operating in a
    WMD environment. Officials Question Role of     Officials from the
    FBI and FEMA are concerned about the RAID team RAID Teams in
    Federal          concept and how the teams would fit into any
    federal WMD response. They Response Structure             question
    the need for the RAID teams because of the federal structure
    already available to respond to WMD incidents. The FBI officials
    are concerned about a conflict between the RAID teams and their
    own Hazardous Materials Response Unit or other federal assets, if
    all arrive with the same capabilities and try to give advice to
    the incident commander. FEMA officials are also concerned about
    the duplication of capabilities between the RAID teams and the
    local and state HAZMAT teams. They can see the RAID teams perhaps
    disrupting the relationship that already exists between the local,
    state, and federal responders. Federal, state, and local officials
    generally agree that a WMD incident involving chemical agents
    would look like a major HAZMAT emergency. In such scenarios, the
    local HAZMAT team would be the first to respond and the local fire
    chief would usually be the incident commander. If the local
    responders are unable to manage the situation or are overwhelmed,
    the protocol is for the incident commander to contact nearby
    communities and the state emergency management office for
    assistance. The RAID team could be requested at that point.
    However, the local commander also has access to federal assets
    through the National Response System hotline, discussed later in
    this report. According to officials from the International
    Association of Fire Chiefs, the hotline is well publicized and
    known within the first responder community. If the incident
    commander suspects that the event is a WMD incident, a similar
    hotline can be used to get information or assistance. The Domestic
    Preparedness Program directed that the U.S. Army, as executive
    agent, Page 7                                     GAO/NSIAD-99-110
    Combating Terrorism B-282299 create this Chemical and Biological
    Hotline to report suspected or confirmed WMD incidents.6 The Army
    contracted with the Coast Guard to manage this hotline through the
    same center the National Response System uses, which links the
    caller to both the Army's Soldier and Biological Chemical Command
    for advice and the FBI to begin the federal response. The incident
    commander can also call the local office of the FBI, which would
    trigger the federal response. According to FBI officials, the
    local FBI offices try to work with local and state emergency
    responders to plan responses for WMD incidents. The RAID teams are
    not part of the Federal Response Plan and would not be notified
    through the National Response System. The Federal Response Plan
    provides for a Defense Coordinating Officer, who is the single
    point of contact for Federal Response Plan agencies regarding
    military assistance in a disaster.7 The Officer is responsible for
    validating those agencies' requests for military assistance,
    identifying and deploying active and reserve units for the
    mission, and for operational control of the units that are
    deployed. According to the Defense Coordinating Officer we spoke
    with, the RAID team would duplicate the Officers' role of
    identifying the units that could provide military assistance in a
    WMD event. The request for assistance would have to be made
    through the Defense Coordinating Officers because they have call
    up and deployment authority for units (other than National Guard
    units in state status) and the RAID teams do not have that
    authority. According to Army officials, the RAID team's WMD focus
    would be invaluable to the Defense Coordinating Officers in their
    responsibilities under the Federal Response Plan, because of the
    team's knowledge of other military assets with a WMD response
    capability. The incident commander may request assistance for a
    particular task without knowing what military units are available
    to accomplish the task. According to the officials, the RAID team
    could translate that request into a specific type of military unit
    that would provide the most effective assistance to meet the
    incident commander's needs and provide the Defense Coordinating
    Officer information regarding the type and locations of that type
    of unit. 6See our report Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to
    Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency
    (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998) for a discussion of this program.
    7There are officers assigned to each state, territory, and the
    District of Columbia. Page 8
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 Differing Views of
    the RAID  Because the RAID teams are just getting established,
    there is not much Team Role Exist at State           information
    about the teams at the state and local levels. Therefore, we and
    Local Levels                   contacted only a few states,
    including Pennsylvania, which has a RAID team, and local
    jurisdictions to obtain their opinion on the RAID team concept.
    Most local and state officials we spoke with do not see a role for
    the RAID teams in their response framework. However, officials
    from Pennsylvania, one of the states to receive a RAID team, are
    enthusiastic about the concept. Officials from larger
    jurisdictions usually have very robust HAZMAT capabilities. Many
    of the officials we spoke with stated that they see no use for the
    RAID teams because their own experienced technicians can not only
    perform sufficient detection and identification to begin to handle
    the situation, but also work in the stressful, dangerous
    environment. They also did not see the RAID team providing advice
    on situation assessment and management, which is another of the
    RAID team missions. These officials consider themselves very
    experienced in managing HAZMAT emergencies and did not believe the
    RAID team could suggest anything they did not already practice
    every day. However, some of the officials did state that perhaps
    the RAID teams could be a useful asset for those locations with
    little or no HAZMAT capability. One state official stated that the
    RAID team could bring certain capabilities to a WMD event, such as
    expertise on military agents. Officials from Utah's Division of
    Comprehensive Emergency Management stated that a RAID team would
    not respond to a WMD emergency in time to be of much help. Since a
    detachment of the Army's Technical Escort Unit is already
    stationed in the state and the state emergency management
    officials have a relationship with the Unit, officials believe the
    RAID team capability would not be effective for their state. An
    official from the Virginia Department of Emergency Services
    believes the RAID team, as a regional asset, would not arrive in
    time to be an effective response asset, especially since the RAID
    team would not operate routinely with Virginia's existing
    coordinated and integrated response program. Virginia has 13
    HAZMAT response teams that operate as local teams until called
    upon to assist another jurisdiction under the state mutual aid
    agreement. It also has hundreds of highly trained technicians on
    other HAZMAT teams that can perform the basic detection and
    identification tasks that allow them to begin to handle a WMD
    emergency. The official also expressed concern about how the RAID
    team would interact with the HAZMAT teams already on the scene and
    what they would do to assist if they arrived too late to provide
    the expertise for which they were trained. Page 9
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 However, he does
    believe that the RAID teams could bring certain capabilities to a
    WMD event, such as specific expertise concerning military agents,
    and acting as liaison between the civilian response and the
    military assets brought in to assist. He also believes that a RAID
    team could add materially to Virginia's preparedness and response
    capabilities, if it was properly trained and equipped and had a
    well-defined mission consistent with and integrated into
    Virginia's overall Terrorism Consequence Management concept. The
    state and federal officials stated that the National Guard, in its
    traditional assist role, would be necessary and invaluable in a
    WMD emergency as in natural disasters and other emergencies. They,
    as well as officials from the International Association of Fire
    Chiefs, agreed that the detection and identification capabilities
    in the RAID teams would be better placed in the local responder
    community, since the local responders will be on the scene first
    and need information quicker than the RAID team, or any federal
    assets, could get there to provide it. According to some
    officials, an investment in more sophisticated detection and
    identification equipment and advanced training for HAZMAT teams
    would benefit the teams' response to all HAZMAT emergencies, not
    just WMD incidents. As we discussed in our November 1998 report,
    the Domestic Preparedness Program is providing the largest 120
    cities in the United States with the opportunity to expand their
    WMD capabilities; however, there are concerns about some aspects
    of the program. Pennsylvania State Emergency Management Agency
    officials are very enthusiastic about the concept. Even though
    there are state certified HAZMAT teams in 42 of the 67 counties in
    the state, the officials are modifying their state response plans
    to include the RAID team as the primary state asset to deploy in a
    WMD chemical emergency. They also plan to have the RAID team
    operate in non-WMD HAZMAT emergencies. They believe this not only
    gives the team a chance to gain operational experience and learn
    to operate as a team in the stressful HAZMAT environment, it also
    gives the state an additional HAZMAT asset to deploy. The
    officials dismissed the idea of relying on federal assets because
    of concerns about their availability and responsiveness if the
    state ever needed them. Page 10
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 Similar Capabilities
    The RAID teams are to assist local and state authorities in
    assessing a WMD Exist at Local, State,     event; advise these
    authorities regarding appropriate actions; and facilitate requests
    for assistance to expedite arrival of additional state and federal
    and Federal Levels         military assets. The January 1998 DOD
    plan that led to the creation of the RAID teams focused on some of
    the military assets with similar capabilities available to support
    local authorities in a WMD event. It did not consider over 600
    state and local HAZMAT teams that have to assess and take
    appropriate actions in incidents involving highly toxic industrial
    chemicals and other hazardous materials. Some of these local teams
    are receiving training and equipment through the federal Domestic
    Preparedness Program that will give them the capability to respond
    to WMD events. The plan also did not discuss many of the civilian
    federal organizations that can provide advice or respond with
    personnel and equipment to help mitigate the effects of a WMD.
    Finally, the plan was developed without the benefit of an
    analytically sound threat and risk assessment. We have said in
    prior reports and testimonies that such assessments can help
    decisionmakers in targeting investments, setting priorities, and
    minimizing program duplication. Local and State
    According to local, state, and federal officials, a chemical
    terrorism event Governments Have           will likely look like
    any major HAZMAT emergency and HAZMAT teams will Substantial
    HAZMAT         be the first to reach the scene. HAZMAT technicians
    are trained to detect Capabilities               the presence of
    highly toxic industrial chemicals and can use basic identification
    techniques and equipment to give them sufficient information to
    begin to assess and respond to the situation. For example, the
    chemical agent sarin is from the same organophosphate compound
    family of chemicals as pesticides. HAZMAT technicians can identify
    this chemical family using readily available kits. The technicians
    are trained and experienced in the protocols used to handle this
    chemical family and can begin to mitigate the chemical
    immediately. The identification of biological agents requires a
    complex process performed in a lab and cannot, as yet, be done on
    scene by any unit, including the RAID teams. However, it is likely
    that detecting and identifying an actual biological agent will
    involve the medical community over a period of days rather than
    the HAZMAT community or the RAID teams over a matter of hours.
    According to the International Association of Fire Chiefs, there
    are over 600 local and state HAZMAT teams that will be the first
    to respond to an event involving hazardous materials, whether it
    is a WMD agent, industrial chemical, or other material. Although
    these teams vary in capability, Page 11
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 ranging from basic
    to robust, they all have the basic capability to detect and
    identify industrial chemicals and mitigate the effects of a
    chemical emergency, either on their own or with help from nearby
    jurisdictions, private contractors, or federal organizations. Some
    areas have small teams with little HAZMAT equipment. For example,
    Utah currently has five Utah Highway Patrol troopers trained to
    the level of HAZMAT technician who are responsible for managing
    hazardous material emergencies throughout the state. They have
    basic chemical identification kits and laptop computers in their
    patrol cars that allow them to identify the family of chemicals
    they are faced with and provide information on how to mitigate the
    effects. Beyond the troopers, the state relies on a network of
    amateur radio operators, city HAZMAT teams, volunteers with a
    level of awareness in chemicals, oil company teams, and a
    detachment of the Army's Technical Escort Unit stationed in the
    state to handle large emergencies. The state is planning to expand
    its HAZMAT capability with enough trained volunteers to staff six
    regional teams, available on an as-needed basis. According to
    officials from Utah's Division of Comprehensive Emergency
    Management, this capability, with some awareness training for
    those involved, will be sufficient to begin to manage the
    consequences of a WMD event involving chemical agents. Local
    jurisdictions such as Chicago, Illinois; Fairfax County, Virginia;
    and Montgomery County, Maryland have more robust HAZMAT units.
    These units can handle large HAZMAT situations involving the most
    toxic industrial chemicals with little or no help because of
    investments in equipment, training, and staff. The units have more
    sophisticated detection and identification equipment that allows
    them to know what chemical is present. They are usually outfitted
    with a higher level of equipment, including personal protection
    suits with self-contained breathing mechanisms that allow them to
    enter the "hot zone" area of most intense contamination to quickly
    begin to manage the situation. The largest cities in the United
    States, usually the ones with the more robust HAZMAT capabilities,
    are included in the 120 cities scheduled to receive WMD training,
    assistance, and equipment through the Domestic Preparedness
    Program. In our November 1998 report, we reported that the
    training and equipment that DOD is providing to cities through the
    program have clearly increased cities' awareness of and should
    better prepare them to deal with a chemical or biological
    terrorist incident. State, local, and federal officials agree that
    the capability for managing a WMD event should be in the hands of
    the people who will have to deal with the situation first Page 12
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 and who most need
    it-the first responder community. According to these officials, it
    would be far more effective to improve the capabilities in the
    first responder community than to create additional capabilities
    to assist them. Military Assets Available to  There are 89 Air
    National Guard civil engineering units spread throughout Assist
    First Responders            the 50 states, Guam, Puerto Rico, and
    the District of Columbia, that the state governors or federal
    officials can access to help in a WMD event. These civil
    engineering units-Prime Base Engineering Emergency Forces, known
    as "Prime BEEF" units-have the wartime mission of supporting
    sustained air operations with equipment and personnel to ensure
    capabilities for operating and surviving in a WMD attack and
    mitigating the consequences of an attack. Their functions include
    monitoring chemical plumes, detecting and identifying chemical
    agents and radioactivity, controlling contamination,
    decontaminating equipment and personnel, assessing the situation,
    and building temporary shelters. The Air Guard also has 78 Prime
    BEEF fire fighting units that are trained in handling hazardous
    materials, such as jet fuel and hydrazine, related to aircraft
    maintenance and operations and cleaning up spills. In addition,
    the Air Guard has 10 Explosive Ordnance Disposal units that are
    capable of handling WMD devices and plans to increase the number
    of these units to 44 in the next 5 years. According to Air Guard
    officials, these skilled units could be of great use to local
    incident commanders in a WMD attack on civilian targets, if their
    equipment and training were upgraded to allow "hot zone" entry and
    they trained with the local first responders. This would allow
    these units to be available to the states, not only in a WMD
    event, but also in a major HAZMAT emergency. There are highly
    specialized military assets to deal with the full range of WMD.
    These include the Army's Technical Escort Unit, with three
    detachments stationed across the United States; the U.S. Marine
    Corps' Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force stationed at
    Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; the Army's 52nd Explosive Ordnance
    Disposal teams, stationed across the United States; military
    laboratories, such as the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of
    Infectious Diseases; and other assets, such as the Mobile
    Analytical Response System from the Edgewood Research, Development
    and Engineering Center. Many of these units have the capability to
    detect and identify WMD as well as perform other WMD-related
    tasks, such as locate and render safe WMD devices or decontaminate
    victims. Many of these units have been positioned at large Page 13
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 events such as the
    Atlanta Summer Olympic Games, economic summits, and presidential
    inaugurations in case of a terrorist attack. The military
    services, both active and reserve, have units that could be used
    in a WMD emergency. For example, the U.S. Army Reserve has 63
    percent of the chemical units in the U.S. Army, including 100
    chemical reconnaissance/decontamination elements stationed across
    the United States that can perform basic detection and
    identification of chemical agents as well as decontamination
    operations. The U.S. Army Reserve also has two chemical companies
    that are specifically designed for nuclear, chemical, and
    biological reconnaissance. The U.S. Army Reserve contains the only
    biological detection company in the Army today that is ready to
    deploy and also has many soldiers with command and control
    expertise and chemical specialties that can be deployed as
    individual experts to a WMD situation. Under the authority of Army
    Regulation 500-60, a Reserve commander can respond to an emergency
    in the local area when there is imminent danger of loss of life or
    critical infrastructure. Accordingly, the local authorities could
    request assistance from the local Reserve commander in a WMD
    emergency without an official deployment of the military. Federal
    Civilian Assets       Some civilian federal agencies have assets
    that can assist first responders Available to Assist First     in
    a WMD emergency. This assistance can be in the form of information
    or Responders                    response teams. The National
    Response System, which has been in operation for over 30 years,
    provides 24-hour telephone hotline access to federal agencies.
    Although the system is primarily to report emergencies involving
    chemical or oil spills, it could also alert federal authorities to
    what could turn out to be a WMD event. EPA is responsible for
    preparing for and responding to emergencies involving oil and
    hazardous substances, including radiological substances, for all
    natural and manmade incidents, including those caused by
    terrorism. The U.S. Coast Guard is responsible for the same kinds
    of incidents as they impact the U.S. coastal waters. When a local
    or state responder calls via the National Response System for EPA
    or Coast Guard assistance, the call is immediately relayed to
    either agency's on-scene coordinator. These coordinators have the
    authority to manage all response efforts at the scene of an
    incident. The EPA has about 270 on-scene coordinators across the
    United States and the Coast Guard has 44 Marine Safety Officers,
    who are coordinators. Most coordinators try to deploy within a
    half-hour of notice. The coordinators have HAZMAT training, can
    assist with situational Page 14
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 assessment, and are
    the point of contact for the coordination of federal HAZMAT
    efforts with the local and state responders. If the state asks for
    assistance, the coordinator can bring both contractor and federal
    assets to the scene. Both EPA and the Coast Guard have other
    assets that respond to HAZMAT emergencies. The EPA has two
    Environmental Response Teams, stationed in New Jersey and Ohio,
    that can respond to a HAZMAT emergency. These teams can bring to
    the scene analytical and monitoring equipment for detecting and
    identifying materials, including chemical weapons. They also have
    decontamination and risk assessment capability, as well as other
    expertise. The teams have the capability to perform "hot zone"
    entry with the highest level of personal protective equipment. EPA
    also has 10 Superfund Technical Assessment and Response Teams, 1
    in each EPA region, that have similar HAZMAT capabilities and
    access to contractor support.8 EPA's National Enforcement
    Investigations Center is the technical support center for EPA
    enforcement and compliance assurance programs, providing
    environmental forensic evidence collection, sampling, and analysis
    and can also assist the FBI with these activities. EPA has 12 labs
    that provide analytical support, field monitoring, and other
    environmental program support. Five of these labs have deployable
    mobile units that can provide chemical and biological analysis.
    Finally, the EPA has radiological response capabilities to handle
    some aspects of nuclear/ radiological incidents. The Coast Guard's
    National Strike Force has three teams, located in New Jersey,
    Alabama, and California. These teams each have 36 members trained
    to the HAZMAT technician level, as well as trained members in the
    Coast Guard Reserve, and are equipped to handle major oil and
    chemical spills in coastal waters, but can also respond to other
    environmental HAZMAT emergencies. These teams have the capability
    to perform the highest level "hot zone" entry to detect and
    identify materials, provide site assessments, perform site clean
    up, and provide other technical assistance. According to Coast
    Guard officials, it would take about $3 million to upgrade these
    strike teams' skills and equipment to respond to WMD incidents and
    give the federal government another asset to manage the
    consequences of a WMD. 8The EPA regions include the same states as
    the FEMA regions. See app. I for the FEMA regional structure. Page
    15                                                GAO/NSIAD-99-110
    Combating Terrorism B-282299 As discussed previously, the FBI has
    the responsibility for crisis management in a WMD event. Its
    Hazardous Materials Response Unit is responsible for providing
    laboratory, scientific, and technical assistance to FBI
    investigations involving hazardous materials, including WMD, and
    environmental crimes. It also provides training, acts as an
    advisory group for HAZMAT crime scenes, and does WMD/HAZMAT
    research and development. The unit is trained and equipped to
    respond to all HAZMAT emergencies, including WMD, at the highest
    level of entry capability. It can detect and identify WMD or other
    hazardous materials using a mobile lab containing sophisticated,
    highly technical equipment that provides the level of evidence the
    FBI needs to apprehend and convict the perpetrator. In support of
    both the FBI and the local incident commander, the unit can also
    sample, package, and transport hazardous material to labs for
    further analysis, provide decontamination capability and
    situational assessment, and assist with technical scientific
    support and advice. The unit can mobilize within 4 hours and has
    access to FBI aircraft if the emergency is too far to drive to.
    The unit can be activated through the National Response System
    when it is thought that a crime has been committed in an
    environmental HAZMAT emergency or a HAZMAT emergency that may be a
    WMD event. The FBI has a new initiative to put operational HAZMAT
    teams in 15 of its 56 field offices by June 1999. Each team will
    have 10 special agents trained at the HAZMAT technician level.
    Although these agents will not function as full-time HAZMAT
    technicians, they will be available as a quick response asset for
    gathering evidence in environmental crimes and WMD events. The
    team will be equipped to perform detection, monitoring, sampling,
    and decontamination. By the end of 1999, the FBI plans to have 4-
    person teams in the remainder of the field offices, trained to the
    HAZMAT technician level, but with very little equipment. Eight of
    the larger FBI teams will be in states that also have the National
    Guard RAID teams. Concerns About RAID  Our discussions with local,
    state, and federal officials and our analysis of Teams' Ability to
    Fully  the information regarding the RAID teams surfaced a number
    of concerns that the teams may not be able to meet their mission
    and responsibilities Meet Their                       because of
    recruiting and retention, training, and operational issues.
    Responsibilities Page 16
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 RAID Teams May Have
    In 1993, the Secretary of Defense announced a major restructuring
    of the Problems Recruiting and     Army National Guard and the
    Army Reserve. As a result of the Retaining Specialized
    restructuring, combat support and combat service support functions
    were Personnel                   concentrated in the Army Reserve
    and combat functions in the Army National Guard. According to the
    Army officer commanding one of the support brigades responsible
    for training and training evaluation of Army National Guard and
    Reserve units, most of the chemical and medical units are in the
    Army Reserve. As a result, there are few chemical and medical
    positions in the Army Guard outside the RAID teams for promotion
    opportunities. In his opinion, this would make it more difficult
    to retain team members once they had been trained and were looking
    for career advancement. He, as well as others, expressed concern
    that the Guard would not be able to maintain a "pipeline" of
    highly trained individuals to fill vacancies on the RAID teams,
    making it necessary for the teams to operate at less than full
    capability when vacancies occur. For example, it may be difficult
    to find the highly trained personnel with the necessary education
    and skills required to operate the sophisticated equipment planned
    for the RAID teams, such as the mass spectrometer. Maintaining
    Proficiency     National Guard training plans for RAID team
    members include both Could Be a Problem          individual and
    team training. Members will initially attend military training
    programs such as the U.S. Army Chemical School at Fort McClellan,
    Alabama, to give them basic specialty training in handling
    military nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. They will also
    receive other military training, including operational radiation
    safety and chemical/biological countermeasures. The Guard also
    plans to send team members to the same types of civilian training
    programs that local responders from HAZMAT teams attend. In
    addition, team members will receive training on the highly
    technical equipment being purchased for detection and
    identification of WMD. Team training will include participating in
    exercises with other DOD response units, as well as local and
    state responders. The team will also plan and conduct training to
    learn how to operate as a RAID team. The National Guard plans to
    work with local responders to arrange for the RAID team to
    participate in their training programs and, at some future date,
    to respond to actual HAZMAT emergencies with the local teams.
    According to local and federal HAZMAT team leaders, it may be
    difficult for the RAID team members to maintain their proficiency
    after they receive their training. For example, the teams will
    have a mobile lab with very sophisticated, technical
    identification equipment. Many local HAZMAT team leaders stated
    that they would not have some of this equipment in Page 17
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 their inventory,
    particularly the mass spectrometer, because it requires highly
    trained personnel to use and maintain it effectively. The federal
    HAZMAT team leaders stated that, while some of them have a mass
    spectrometer, it takes almost daily use to maintain competency and
    accuracy, which the RAID team may not get. All of the HAZMAT team
    leaders expressed concern that the RAID team members would lose
    their HAZMAT expertise and become bored if they did not have
    opportunities to continually practice their skills in more than
    just a simulated environment. All of the leaders stated that this
    on-the-job training is also critical to effective team operation.
    The stressful situation of an actual HAZMAT emergency cannot be
    replicated in a classroom or exercise, and team members need to
    know that everyone on the team can operate in that environment.
    The Pennsylvania Guard officer responsible for developing that
    state's RAID team stated that the Guard was concerned about this
    and realized the need to create these on-the-job opportunities,
    not only to maintain proficiency but to keep the team members from
    leaving to work on local HAZMAT teams. He added that the Guard was
    working with local HAZMAT teams so that the RAID team could
    participate in local training exercises and, at some later point,
    perhaps respond with the local teams on actual HAZMAT emergencies.
    RAID Teams May Not Be     The goal for the RAID team, either in
    part or as a whole, is to be able to Available if Needed
    deploy to a WMD incident within 4 hours of notice. All local,
    state, and federal officials we met with expressed concern that
    this time frame would get the team there too late to be useful.
    They stated that, for the incident commander to benefit from the
    information they could produce, the RAID team would be needed at
    the scene within the first 1 to 2 hours. After that time, the
    local/state HAZMAT teams could have the basic detection and
    identification information that would allow them to begin to
    handle the situation. Then, the incident commander would either be
    in control of the situation and not need additional assessment
    input from the RAID team or so completely overwhelmed by the
    enormity of the situation that the FBI and FEMA already would have
    been notified, and in coordination with the state, federal assets
    already would be on their way to the scene. The RAID teams will
    have dedicated vehicles to transport them and their equipment to
    the incident. The teams will also have access to Army National
    Guard helicopters and small, fixed-wing aircraft that could carry
    some team members with hand-held equipment. The remainder of the
    team and equipment would then follow in the vehicles. To transport
    the entire team to a distant location within the state or region,
    with all its equipment Page 18
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 and vehicles, would
    require military airlift, like C-130 aircraft. However, there are
    no plans to dedicate ground crews, flight crews, or aircraft for
    on-call, immediate response to a RAID team deployment. If Air
    National Guard or Air Force aircraft were required to transport
    the RAID teams, authorization would have to be obtained from the
    U.S. Transportation Command. The lack of dedicated airlift for the
    RAID teams adds to the concern about the delayed arrival. Some
    federal assets, including the FBI's Hazardous Materials Response
    Unit, have immediate access to aircraft and flight crews. The EPA
    and Coast Guard On-Scene Coordinators have the ability to contract
    for civilian aircraft to get their assets, as well as contractor
    assets, to a scene quickly. Each RAID team is to be staffed with
    22 full-time National Guard members organized into 6 functions:
    command, operations, administration and logistics, communication,
    medical, and survey. (See app. II for an organization and staffing
    chart.) Members are to be on call 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.
    All but the survey function have a primary mission of RAID team
    support. For example, the medical unit provides medical support to
    RAID personnel, as well as guidance to the incident commander on
    the medical implications of a WMD event and coordination with
    health care facilities for follow-on support requirements. Each
    function will have personnel trained to perform their particular
    mission. The two survey units have the mission of conducting
    search, survey, surveillance, and sampling of a WMD incident site
    and advising the incident commander of appropriate response
    protocols. The survey units are to be capable of working in the
    "hot zone" at the highest HAZMAT level of entry. Members are to be
    cross-trained so that a full unit can be fielded at any one time.
    All of the HAZMAT team leaders discussed the need to have
    sufficient team members cross trained in each position to be able
    to field a complete team when an emergency arises. For example,
    the Army's Technical Escort Unit; the FBI's Hazardous Materials
    Response Unit; and the Fairfax County, Virginia, HAZMAT team have
    sufficient personnel to field multiple units. This allows the
    units to rotate between on duty, off duty, and training status. If
    members from the unit on duty are unable to make their shift, the
    unit leader can call on an equivalent replacement from training or
    off duty to fill the void. This process also alleviates the
    concern of having the entire team on call 24 hours a day, 365 days
    a year, which could cause significant hardships for the team
    members as they try to maintain normal lives. The RAID team survey
    function is the only part of the team that has multiple Page 19
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 individuals
    performing the same job. All other members of the RAID team who
    could not respond to a deployment call would create a loss of
    capability for the team. Also, the RAID team will have only one
    set of equipment for both training and deployment, which could
    make it difficult to both train on the equipment and be
    operationally ready to deploy. Conclusions        The FBI and FEMA
    are the lead federal agencies for WMD crisis management and
    consequence management, respectively. The National Security
    Council position of National Coordinator for Security,
    Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism oversees the
    broad variety of policies and programs related to
    counterterrorism, preparedness, and consequence management. We
    believe that the National Coordinator, in conjunction with the
    lead federal agencies and DOD, should determine whether the
    National Guard RAID teams are needed. Local, state, and federal
    officials responsible for implementing emergency response plans
    have differing views regarding the role for the RAID teams in
    those plans. The RAID teams have capabilities similar to those
    found in local, state, and federal emergency response teams. Many
    of these teams were not considered when the RAID team concept was
    created, which may have led to an unnecessary duplication of
    assets. Concerns about recruiting and retention, training, and
    operational issues may impact the RAID teams in their ability to
    meet their responsibilities and mission. Recommendations    We
    recommend that the National Coordinator for Security,
    Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism, in consultation
    with the Attorney General, the Director, FEMA, and the Secretary
    of Defense, reassess the need for the RAID teams in light of the
    numerous local, state, and federal organizations that can provide
    similar functions and submit the results of this reassessment to
    Congress. If the teams are needed, we recommend that the National
    Coordinator direct a test of the RAID team concept in the initial
    10 states to determine how the teams can best fit into coordinated
    state and federal response plans and whether the teams can
    effectively perform their functions. If the RAID teams are not
    needed, we further recommend that they be inactivated. Page 20
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 Matter for
    Congress may wish to consider restricting the use of appropriated
    funds for Congressional                  additional RAID teams
    until the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure
    Protection, and Counter-Terrorism completes the Consideration
    reassessment we have recommended. Agency Comments and  DOD and
    FEMA provided written comments on a draft of this report. Our
    Evaluation                 The FBI and other Department of Justice
    organizations provided oral comments. DOD stated that some of our
    findings and recommendations are useful as it establishes the RAID
    teams; however, many are not because much of our information was
    not current nor was it gathered from knowledgeable sources. FEMA
    and the FBI are the two lead federal agencies for WMD management.
    FEMA concurred with the thrust of the report and its
    recommendations. The Department of Justice, including the FBI,
    concurred with the substance of the report. Comments by DOD and
    FEMA are included as appendix III and IV, respectively. We also
    provided a draft of this report to the National Security Council,
    which did not provide comments. We revised the report to reflect
    technical comments provided by DOD, FEMA, Department of Justice,
    and other organizations, as appropriate. FEMA stated that the
    report makes three important points. First, and foremost, for an
    incident of chemical terrorism, local responders-not a National
    Guard or federal team that arrives hours later-will perform the
    most immediate life-saving response tasks. Second, there are
    federal assets that can assist state and local officials with
    follow-on response tasks for chemical terrorism. New chemical
    capabilities for the Guard may not be necessary to support federal
    operations. Third, apparently there also is a difference of
    opinion among states regarding the need for new National Guard
    teams to support state operations. DOD stated that many of our
    findings are not useful because they are based on data, opinions,
    and analysis that preceded the October 17, 1998, congressional
    direction to create 10 RAID teams. DOD also said that our report
    and the views expressed therein are based on the Department's
    plans, not on its implementation of the RAID team concept.
    Moreover, it stated that the report takes into account only a
    select portion of DOD's capacity to respond to terrorist use of
    WMD on domestic targets and makes reference to interviews with
    both civilian and military responders who have neither the
    knowledge of the DOD program nor of the ongoing coordination
    between DOD and other organizations. Also, DOD said that Page 21
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 several states have
    submitted a request for or expressed interest in fielding their
    own RAID teams, including Virginia and Utah. In commenting on our
    first recommendation, DOD said that the FBI, FEMA, the National
    Security Council, and the Office of Management and Budget had
    reviewed and concurred with its plan to create the RAID teams. DOD
    said that it is already implementing our second recommendation,
    which calls for a test of the RAID concept in the first 10 states.
    DOD's position on the third recommendation is that the RAID teams
    are needed and should not be inactivated. With respect to the
    scope of our work, we conducted our review through March 1999 and
    included the most up-to-date information available at that time.
    We reviewed DOD's plans for the RAID teams and the implementation
    of those plans. For example, we discussed Pennsylvania's progress
    in fielding its RAID team and incorporating the team's
    capabilities into the state's WMD response plan. Although DOD
    states that the RAID teams were created by congressional direction
    on October 17, 1998, the teams were a DOD initiative and Congress,
    in passing the fiscal year 1999 Defense Appropriations Act on that
    date, funded DOD's initiative. Our focus was on the RAID teams and
    not DOD's total capacity to respond to WMD incidents. We assessed
    the teams against their stated roles and responsibilities, not
    against DOD's total support requirements. Therefore, we believe
    our assessment is valid. While we agree that the FBI, FEMA, the
    National Security Council, and the Office of Management and Budget
    reviewed the plans for the RAID teams, our discussions with
    officials from the FBI and FEMA and these agencies' comments on
    our report show that differing views continue to exist. With
    respect to DOD's list of states requesting RAID teams, it is
    reasonable to expect that many states might express an interest in
    receiving a trained and equipped RAID team that could respond both
    to WMD events and HAZMAT emergencies since its cost would be borne
    by the federal government. The officials with whom we discussed
    the RAID teams' roles and responsibilities were recommended by
    their federal agencies or state and local entities as being most
    knowledgeable of WMD response plans and the implementation of
    those plans. All of these were aware of the RAID team concept,
    most had been briefed on the concept, and many had provided
    comments to DOD on it. We continue to believe that our
    recommendations are valid and that the need for the RAID teams
    should be reassessed. We do not believe that the RAID teams were
    created based on careful consideration of Page 22
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 governmentwide
    priorities, an analysis of the program in relation to those
    priorities, and an allocation of resources based on priorities and
    an analytical assessment of the threat and risk of a WMD attack. A
    reassessment at this juncture is important because DOD has
    requested funds for five additional RAID teams in the fiscal year
    2000 budget request. If it is determined that the RAID teams are
    needed, as DOD states in its comments, we believe it is premature
    to expand the RAID concept beyond the original 10 locations until
    it is determined how the teams can best fit into coordinated state
    and federal response plans, and whether the teams can effectively
    perform their functions. In light of differing views among DOD,
    FEMA, and the FBI regarding whether a reassessment of the RAID
    teams is needed and the fact that the National Coordinator did not
    provide comments on our report, Congress may wish to consider
    restricting the use of appropriated funds for any additional RAID
    teams until the reassessment we recommended is complete.
    Accordingly, we have included a matter for congressional
    consideration in our report. Scope and      To determine what
    federal entities have capabilities similar to the RAID Methodology
    teams, we interviewed officials and reviewed documents from the
    FBI; FEMA; EPA; U.S. Coast Guard; U.S. Army Soldier and Biological
    Chemical Command; U.S. Air National Guard; U.S. Army 15th Support
    Brigade; and U.S. Army Reserve. To determine what local and state
    assets have similar capabilities, we interviewed officials from
    Fairfax County, Virginia; Montgomery County, Maryland; Chicago,
    Illinois; and the states of Utah, Virginia, and Pennsylvania. We
    also reviewed documents from Utah, Virginia, and Pennsylvania.
    These locations were selected to provide a range of perspectives,
    which includes states with and without a RAID team, states with
    major population centers and with more rural areas, and states
    with robust HAZMAT capabilities at the state level and those with
    less capability. To determine how the RAID teams would be
    integrated into local, state, and federal response plans, we
    interviewed officials and reviewed documents from the FBI; FEMA;
    U.S. Army 15th Support Brigade; Fairfax County, Virginia;
    Montgomery County, Maryland; Chicago, Illinois; the states of
    Utah, Virginia, and Pennsylvania; and the International
    Association of Fire Chiefs. We reviewed the Department of Defense
    Plan for Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support
    for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction to
    determine how the concept of the RAID Page 23
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism B-282299 teams was developed.
    We also reviewed pertinent legislation and funding for the RAID
    teams. We interviewed officials and reviewed documents from DOD's
    Consequence Management Program Integration Office, the Army
    National Guard, Pennsylvania, and the Pennsylvania National Guard
    to determine design, implementation, and planned use of the RAID
    teams. We also discussed the RAID team concept and the
    implementation of that concept with all of the officials listed
    above. We conducted our work from July 1998 through March 1999 in
    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
    Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no
    further distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue
    date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to
    appropriate congressional committees; the Honorable William Cohen,
    Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Janet Reno, Attorney General;
    the Honorable Rodney Slater, Secretary of Transportation; the
    Honorable James Lee Witt, Director, Federal Emergency Management
    Agency; and the Honorable Carol Browner, Administrator,
    Environmental Protection Agency. We will make copies available to
    other interested parties upon request. If you have any questions
    about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-5140. Robert
    Pelletier and Ann Borseth were major contributors to this report.
    Mark E. Gebicke Director, National Security Preparedness Issues
    Page 24                                     GAO/NSIAD-99-110
    Combating Terrorism Contents Letter
    1 Appendix I
    26 RAID Team Locations Within FEMA Regions Appendix II
    27 RAID Team Organization and Staffing Appendix III
    28 Comments From the Department of Defense Appendix IV
    45 Comments From the Federal Emergency Management Agency Related
    GAO Products
    48 Abbreviations DOD              Department of Defense EPA
    Environmental Protection Agency FBI              Federal Bureau of
    Investigation FEMA             Federal Emergency Management Agency
    HMRU             Hazardous Materials Response Unit HAZMAT
    hazardous materials RAID             Rapid Assessment and Initial
    Detection WMD              weapons of mass destruction Page 25
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix I RAID Team
    Locations Within FEMA Regions Appendix I States with RAID teams
    Page 26    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix II RAID
    Team Organization and Staffing
    Appendix I I Commander and Deputy Commander and Deputy Unit
    Commander Unit Commander Deputy/Operations Officer
    Deputy/Operations Officer Operations Team
    Medical Team Operations Team Assistant Operations Officer
    Administration and                          Communications Team
    Medical Team Physicians' Assistant Assistant Operations Officer
    Administration and Senior Operations NCO                 Logistics
    Team                              Communications Team Team Chief
    Physicians' Assistant Medical Operations Officer Senior Operations
    NCO                 Logistics Team Operations NCO-Modeling
    Logistics NCO                                     Team Chief
    Information Systems Operator             Medical Operations
    Officer Environmental Science Officer Operations NCO-Modeling
    Logistics NCO Assistant Operations NCO              Administrative
    NCO                        Information Systems Operator
    Environmental Science Officer Medical NCO Assistant Operations NCO
    Administrative NCO
    Medical NCO Survey Teams Survey Teams Leader Leader NBC
    Reconnaissance NCO NBC Reconnaissance NCO Survey Team
    Survey Team Survey Team 3 Assistant NBC
    Survey Team 3 Assistant NBC 3 Assistant NBC Reconnaissance NCOs
    3 Assistant NBC Reconnaissance NCOs Reconnaissance NCOs
    Reconnaissance NCOs Legend NCO=Noncommissioned officer
    NBC=Nuclear, biological, chemical Page 27
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From
    the Department of Defense AppendIIix I Note:  GAO's comments
    supplementing those in the report text appear at the end of this
    appendix. See comment 1. Page 28    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating
    Terrorism Appendix III Comments From the Department of Defense See
    comment 2. See comment 3. Page 29
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From
    the Department of Defense See comment 4. Page 30
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From
    the Department of Defense See comment 5. Page 31
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From
    the Department of Defense See comment 6. Page 32
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From
    the Department of Defense See comment 7. See comment 8. Letter
    Page 33                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-110
    Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From the Department of
    Defense See comment 9. Page 34
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From
    the Department of Defense Page 35
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From
    the Department of Defense See comment 10. Page 36
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From
    the Department of Defense See comment 11. See pp. 22-23. Page 37
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From
    the Department of Defense See pp. 22-23. Page 38
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From
    the Department of Defense Page 39
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From
    the Department of Defense Following are our comments on the
    Department of Defense's (DOD) April 30, 1999, letter. GAO Comments
    1.  During the time of our review, the plans for the Rapid
    Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams evolved and we
    continuously met with Army officials to obtain the most up-to-date
    information on those plans.  As we met with various organizations,
    we discussed our latest understanding of those plans.  Although
    the plans for the teams have changed over time, the mission has
    not.  As stated in the report, the various officials we met with
    expressed concerns with the mission and the time it would take the
    RAID team to respond to a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) event.
    2.  We have done extensive work in the area of WMD consequence
    management, which involves the complex federal response system and
    its requirements, and have gained considerable understanding of
    that system. We have included a partial list of our recent
    products on WMD consequence management at the end of this report.
    For this assignment, we have also discussed the federal response
    system and its requirements to mitigate the effects of a WMD
    attack with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the
    Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which are the lead agencies
    for the federal response system, and other agencies intimately
    involved as part of the federal response system. 3.  Our focus was
    on the RAID teams and not DOD's total capacity to respond to WMD.
    We discussed the RAID teams' roles and responsibilities with
    officials who were recommended by their federal agencies or state
    and local entities as being most knowledgeable of WMD response
    plans and the implementation of those plans.  All of these
    officials were aware of the RAID team concept, most had been
    briefed on the concept, and several had provided comments to DOD
    on that concept.  We agree with DOD that a complete, current, and
    accurate assessment of the roles and mission of the RAID teams is
    needed to validate the requirement for these teams and the
    contributions they can make in support of the nation's first
    responder community.  DOD's position is consistent with our
    recommendations. 4.  We have clarified the report to reflect that
    DOD has articulated the specific mission of the RAID teams.
    However, officials from FEMA and the FBI, as well as other federal
    officials who are intimately involved in the complex WMD federal
    response system, questioned the need for the RAID teams because of
    the federal structure already available to respond to WMD
    incidents.  They also expressed concern about the RAID teams' Page
    40                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating
    Terrorism Appendix III Comments From the Department of Defense
    impact on first responders, if the teams do not arrive for several
    hours after the incident occurs.  As we state in the report, we
    found differing views of the RAID team role at the state and local
    levels.  For example, Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency
    officials are integrating the state's RAID team into the state's
    WMD response plans.  However, the other states we talked to
    without RAID teams did not mention any efforts to include the
    regional team into their plans. 5.  As mentioned in comment 3, our
    focus was on the RAID teams, not DOD's total response capability.
    We did not portray the RAID teams as meeting all the support
    requirements expected from DOD as DOD implies in its comments.  We
    assessed the teams against their stated roles and responsibilities
    and not against DOD's total support requirements. Therefore, we
    believe our assessment is valid. 6.  We agree that the solution to
    the WMD response mission requires a military and civilian
    partnership and existing capabilities must be leveraged.  However,
    it appears that DOD is not taking full advantage of leveraging
    existing capabilities.  For example, DOD is creating RAID teams in
    the Army National Guard when considerable capability already
    exists in the Air National Guard and, with some upgrading of
    skills and equipment, could perform comparable missions.  Also,
    DOD is creating teams to perform functions that can be performed
    by numerous local, state, and federal organizations.  As stated in
    our report, if governmentwide priorities have not been established
    and funding requirements have not been validated based on an
    analytically sound threat and risk assessment, there is no
    reasonable assurance that funds are being spent on the right
    programs in the right amounts and that unnecessary program and
    funding duplication, overlap, misallocation, fragmentation, and
    gaps have not occurred. 7.  DOD has a significant support role in
    domestic WMD response.  If a WMD event occurs, DOD will likely be
    called on to support the federal response just as it has done in
    other national emergencies.  As we state in the report, both the
    FBI and FEMA questioned the use of the RAID teams in a federal
    response, and there are differing views on how the teams can be
    used in a state role.  Therefore, we suggest that the key federal
    agencies determine if the RAID teams are needed for the numerous
    reasons cited in the report.  The DOD response did not address one
    of the major issues surrounding the role and use of the RAID
    teams-that of response time. Many of the concerns expressed by
    federal, state, and local officials center on the length of time
    it may take the RAID team to arrive at a WMD Page 41
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From
    the Department of Defense emergency.  According to these
    officials, there are other federal assets with similar
    capabilities or access to contractors with similar capabilities
    that could respond as quickly or quicker than the RAID team. 8.
    According to FBI officials, the primary role of the FBI's
    Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU) is to support criminal
    investigations. However, it can assist incident commanders with
    the same types of information that the RAID teams would provide.
    Also, although it is a unique national asset, it can respond
    quickly by air or ground to wherever it is needed. Moreover, there
    are many federal units beyond the FBI's HMRU that can provide
    similar capabilities to the RAID team, but were not considered
    when the RAID teams were created and not mentioned in DOD's
    comments on this report. Local hazardous materials (HAZMAT) teams
    do not routinely deal with militarized chemical agents, but as we
    state in the report, they can use basic identification techniques
    and equipment to begin to assess and respond to the incident.
    Federal, state, and local HAZMAT teams are experienced in
    identifying and handling very toxic industrial chemicals in the
    same family as the military agents.  DOD does not address the
    statements made by HAZMAT officials that their teams do not need
    the type of sophisticated equipment that the RAID team will have
    to begin to handle the event. According to local, state, and
    federal officials, a biological incident would likely play out
    through the medical community, not the HAZMAT response system,
    unless the terrorists immediately announced the action.  Even with
    knowledge of a possible biological agent present, someone
    operating the sophisticated equipment the RAID team brings to a
    scene will be able to detect that a biological agent has been
    released, but will not be able to positively identify the agent.
    According to Army officials, the primary mission of the RAID
    team's medical unit is to provide medical assistance to the RAID
    team members and, secondarily, to provide medical advice to first
    responders.  There are many other federal entities that can also
    provide this advice, either on scene or by telephone, to the
    incident commander. Army Reserve chemical companies can detect
    chemical and biological agents.  According to U.S. Army Reserve
    officials, the units discussed in the report can be used in more
    than a wartime situation and, in fact, can be prepositioned at
    events, such as the Olympic games, or used in a WMD emergency
    along with other federal and military assets. Page 42
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From
    the Department of Defense 9.  We discuss the states' requests for
    RAID teams on page 22 of this report. Although DOD said that
    HAZMAT teams do not have the "basic capability to detect and
    identify industrial chemicals and mitigate the effects of a
    chemical emergency", this is exactly what they are trained to do.
    The statement by the president of the International Association of
    Fire Chiefs before the Research and Development Subcommittee of
    the House National Security Committee in March 1998 cited in DOD's
    comments must be considered in context.  In outlining first
    responder shortfalls in equipment and training, he was referring
    to the handling of WMD incidents, not industrial chemicals, which
    the Domestic Preparedness Program is set up to overcome.  And,
    even though some first responders may lack WMD response
    capabilities, International Association of Fire Chiefs officials,
    as well as the local HAZMAT team members and federal response team
    officials we spoke with, reinforced the fact that many HAZMAT
    teams have the basic skills to begin to mitigate a chemical WMD
    attack.  We do not state that these teams may not need outside
    support to mitigate the effects of a catastrophic WMD event. The
    individuals we spoke with, including the Chief of Hazardous
    Materials for the Chicago Fire Department, recognized that the
    National Guard is invaluable in its traditional role, providing
    support such as transportation and area security.  However, he and
    others reinforced the fact that the capability for initial
    detection and identification of a WMD needs to be in the first
    responder community, not in a team that may not respond for hours.
    10.  We do not state or imply in the report that maintaining the
    strength of Active Guard and Reserve positions is a "problem."
    Our report discussed the potential problem of finding and
    retaining people with the high level of skill or education needed
    to handle the sophisticated equipment the RAID teams will have and
    those with the appropriate skills to staff the medical team.
    Specifically, the RAID teams are to receive highly specialized
    training, which is well beyond the training received by
    individuals in military chemical units and the National Guard RAID
    (Light) units.  Also, some functions will require individuals with
    the necessary education and skills to operate sophisticated
    equipment.  Replacing these individuals when vacancies occur might
    take time, which could affect the teams' capabilities. Page 43
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix III Comments From
    the Department of Defense 11.  Both Army and Pennsylvania National
    Guard officials stated their concerns to us regarding the need for
    RAID team members to maintain skill proficiency.  Our report
    recognizes that the National Guard plans to work with local
    responders to arrange for the RAID teams to participate in their
    training programs and that the Pennsylvania National Guard is
    working with local and state HAZMAT teams to create training
    opportunities. Page 44
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix IV Comments From the
    Federal Emergency Management Agency
    Appendix I V Note: GAO's comment supplementing those in the report
    text appear at the end of this appendix. See comment 1. Page 45
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Appendix IV Comments From the
    Federal Emergency Management Agency The following is GAO's comment
    on FEMA's letter dated April 30, 1999. GAO Comment    1.  Based
    upon the written technical comments supplied by FEMA, we have
    revised the report as appropriate. Page 46
    GAO/NSIAD-99-110 Combating Terrorism Page 47    GAO/NSIAD-99-110
    Combating Terrorism Related GAO Products Combating Terrorism:
    Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public Health Initiatives
    (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112, Mar. 16, 1999). Combating Terrorism:
    Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism (GAO/T-
    NSIAD/GGD-99-107, Mar. 11, 1999). Combating Terrorism:  FBI's Use
    of Federal Funds for Counterterrorism- Related Activities (Fiscal
    years 1995-98) (GAO/GGD-99-7, Nov. 20, 1998). Combating Terrorism:
    Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and
    Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998). Combating Terrorism:
    Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness
    Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, Oct. 2, 1998). Combating Terrorism:
    Observations on Crosscutting Issues (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23,
    1998). Combating Terrorism:  Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help
    Prioritize and Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr.
    9, 1998). Combating Terrorism:  Spending on Governmentwide
    Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-
    98-39, Dec. 1, 1997). Combating Terrorism:  Federal Agencies'
    Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-
    254, Sept. 26, 1997). (701146)    Letter    Page 48
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