Defense Acquisitions: Reduced Threat Not Reflected in Antiarmor Weapon
Acquisitions (Letter Report, 07/22/1999, GAO/NSIAD-99-105).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of
Defense's (DOD) antiarmor master plan, focusing on: (1) changes in
armored threats from 1990 to 1997; (2) comparing the number and makeup
of the 1990 antiarmor weapon inventory with those of the 1998 inventory;
and (3) funding trends of past and future antiarmor procurements.

GAO noted that: (1) the number of potential enemy armored targets U.S.
forces expect to face has decreased considerably since 1990; (2) during
the Cold War, the services considered the greatest threat to be a
massive land attack spearheaded by thousands of armored vehicles in
Central Europe; (3) today's conditions, however, are significantly
different, and military planners consider smaller regional conflicts as
the threat basis when developing war-fighting plans and requirements;
(4) according to the Defense Intelligence Agency's latest biannual
Outyear Threat Report, issued in 1997, the number of armored targets is
less than 20 percent of the number considered in 1990; (5) the overall
size of DOD's antiarmor weapons inventory is approximately the same as
during the Cold War, and inventories of the more sophisticated and
lethal antiarmor weapons have actually increased; (6) there are 35
different types of antiarmor weapons in the inventory and 10 other types
in production; (7) while today's inventory weapons have similar
capabilities to those in the 1990 inventory, the 10 new weapons are
expected to provide improved targeting, lethality, and survivability
capabilities developed in response to the anticipated future tank
threat; (8) the services continue to invest in antiarmor weapons and are
planning funding increases; (9) they estimate they will spend $11.1
billion in total procurement funding to acquire the 10 antiarmor weapons
in production, which includes $4.2 billion for fiscal years 2000 through
2003; (10) in addition, DOD is developing 9 new antiarmor weapons at an
estimated cost of $3.5 billion; (11) the procurement costs for six of
the nine new programs have not yet been determined, but the remaining
three have an estimated procurement cost of about $4.7 billion; and (12)
plans to acquire large quantities of new and improved antiarmor weapons
do not appear consistent with the reduced size of the armored threat and
the existing large and capable inventory of antiarmor weapons.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-99-105
     TITLE:  Defense Acquisitions: Reduced Threat Not Reflected in
	     Antiarmor Weapon Acquisitions
      DATE:  07/22/1999
   SUBJECT:  Defense procurement
	     Weapons systems
	     Defense capabilities
	     Weapons research and development
	     Defense contingency planning
	     Comparative analysis
	     Military land vehicles
IDENTIFIER:  Cold War
	     Warsaw Pact
	     DIA Outyear Threat Report
	     Soviet Union
	     Iraq
	     North Korea
	     DOD Antiarmor Master Plan
	     Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided Missile
	     Multiple Launch Rocket System
	     Joint Standoff Weapon
	     Sensor Fused Weapon
	     M60 Tank
	     M61 Tank
	     Abrams Tank
	     Army Tactical Missile System
	     Brilliant Anti-Armor Submunition
	     Line-of-Sight Antitank Weapon
	     Multipurpose Individual Munition
	     Sense and Destroy Armor

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NS99105 A Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense,
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives

GAO/NSIAD-99-105

July 1999 DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS

Reduced Threat Not Reflected in Antiarmor Weapon Acquisitions

National Security and International Affairs Division

B-280327 Letter July 22, 1999 The Honorable Jerry Lewis Chairman,
Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations House of
Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman: In its report on the Fiscal Year 1999 Defense
Appropriations Bill, the House Committee on Appropriations
expressed concern with the Cold War mindset of the services, which
are continuing to develop and procure an increasing number of
tank- killing weapons. The Committee questioned whether current
antiarmor acquisition plans are appropriate at a time when
potential adversaries have smaller armored forces than during the
Cold War. Accordingly, the Committee directed the Secretary of
Defense to develop an antiarmor master plan to be submitted with
the fiscal year 2000

budget. The plan is to identify the projected armored threat and
the quantity of all antiarmor weapons, with the purpose of
eliminating excess antiarmor weapon capabilities. The last master
plan was prepared in September 1990.

You requested that we independently review and comment on the
master plan. Specifically, you asked that we evaluate the plan's
findings and conclusions, its underlying data and analyses, and
its key assumptions, as well as overall antiarmor funding trends.
As of June 30, 1999, the Secretary of Defense had not submitted
the plan. As agreed with your office, we are therefore providing
information we have gathered that addresses the parts of your
request that we could complete without the Department of Defense's
(DOD) plan. For this report, we (1) identified changes in armored
threats from 1990 to 1997, (2) compared the number and makeup of
the

1990 antiarmor weapon inventory with those of the 1998 inventory,
and (3) identified the funding trends of past and future antiarmor
procurements. When the master plan is issued, we will review it
and issue our final report to you.

Results in Brief The number of potential enemy armored targets U.
S. forces expect to face has decreased considerably since 1990.
During the Cold War, the services

considered the greatest threat to be a massive land attack
spearheaded by

thousands of armored vehicles in Central Europe. Today's
conditions, however, are significantly different, and military
planners consider smaller regional conflicts as the threat basis
when developing war- fighting plans and requirements. According to
the Defense Intelligence Agency's latest biannual Outyear Threat
Report, issued in 1997, the number of armored targets is less than
20 percent of the number considered in 1990.

The overall size of DOD's current antiarmor weapons inventory is
approximately the same as during the Cold War, and inventories of
the more sophisticated and lethal antiarmor weapons have actually
increased. Currently, there are 35 different types of antiarmor
weapons in the inventory and 10 other types in production. While
today's inventory weapons have similar capabilities to those in
the 1990 inventory, the 10 new weapons are expected to provide
improved targeting, lethality, and survivability capabilities
developed in response to the anticipated future tank threat.

The services continue to invest in antiarmor weapons and are
planning funding increases. They estimate they will spend $11.1
billion in total procurement funding to acquire the 10 antiarmor
weapons currently in production, which includes $4.2 billion for
fiscal years 2000 through 2003.

In addition, DOD is developing nine new antiarmor weapons at an
estimated cost of $3.5 billion. The procurement costs for six of
the nine new programs have not yet been determined, but the
remaining three have an estimated procurement cost of about $4. 7
billion. Plans to acquire large quantities of new and improved
antiarmor weapons do not appear consistent with the reduced size
of the armored threat and the existing large and capable inventory
of antiarmor weapons.

Background Antiarmor weapons are capable of destroying targets
such as tanks, armored combat vehicles, and/ or artillery. To
determine weapon

requirements, the services use the Defense Intelligence Agency's
latest biannual Outyear Threat Report estimates. The current
report modeled a scenario in which U. S. forces would fight two
major regional conflicts. In October 1998, the administration
issued A National Security Strategy for a New Century, which
describes the new and different threats facing the United States
since the end of the Cold War. Similarly, the Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition and Technology) testified in October 1998
that the military needs to change the way it fights, the weapons
it uses, and the way it acquires weapons to successfully meet the
new anticipated

threats. According to the Under Secretary, the most likely future
combat scenarios include information warfare, urban combat,
chemical/ biological attack, terrorism, and nuclear attack. He
noted that the dilemma the military faces is how to fund competing
demands to develop weapons to achieve the goals of the early 21 st
century and meet current readiness

needs. The Under Secretary stressed that the military needs to
shift away from traditional weapons designed to counter a Cold War
threat. He specifically stated that one required action is to
reduce the number of traditional weapons now in acquisition to
fund the required newer

weapons. This, he said, would enable the military to reallocate
resources to top- priority modernization programs for
communications, sensors, space- based reconnaissance, and computer
systems. DOD's 1990 antiarmor master plan was a single integrated
document describing the development and acquisition of weapons
capable of defeating armored threats. Prior to 1990, antiarmor
requirements were primarily justified according to the potential
threat of a Central European conflict. A principle component of
this threat was the very large Soviet and

Warsaw Pact inventories of armored vehicles. While the 1990 plan
still concluded that the Soviet Union would retain major
conventional and strategic forces and would remain the major
concern of defense planning, it recognized that the Warsaw Pact
was no longer a credible military alliance.

In 1993, we reported that DOD had not sufficiently reexamined its
antiarmor needs since the decline of the Warsaw Pact. 1 DOD
reported that the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation had
plans to conduct a

2- year study of the antiarmor mission. However, according to a
Program Analysis and Evaluation official, the Office terminated
the study before it was completed, and no reportable results were
obtained. Armored Threat

DOD reports as well as testimony by top Defense officials show
that the Substantially Reduced

armored threat facing the United States has dropped substantially since 1990. A comparison of the armored targets in the 1990 antiarmor master plan with those in the 1997 Defense Intelligence Agency Outyear Threat Report shows that the number of armored targets U. S. forces expect to face has dropped significantly during the period. Figure 1 shows the number of 1 Antiarmor Weapons Acquisitions: Assessments Needed to Support Continued Need and Long- term Affordability (

GAO/NSIAD-93-49
, Mar. 4, 1993).
armored threat facing the United States has dropped substantially
since 1990. A comparison of the armored targets in the 1990
antiarmor master plan with those in the 1997 Defense Intelligence
Agency Outyear Threat Report shows that the number of armored
targets U. S. forces expect to face has dropped significantly
during the period. Figure 1 shows the number of 1 Antiarmor
Weapons Acquisitions: Assessments Needed to Support Continued Need
and Long- term Affordability (  GAO/NSIAD-93-49 , Mar. 4, 1993).

enemy tanks and armored combat vehicles in the 1997 Outyear Threat
Report is less than 20 percent of the number in 1990 antiarmor
master plan.

Figure 1: Comparison of Enemy Tanks and Armored Combat Vehicles,
1990 Soviet Union and 1997 Regional Conflict

Armored combat vehicles

Tanks 0 20 40 60 80

100

1997 as a percent of 1990

1990 Soviet Union 1997 Regional conflict

This decline reflects the changes in threats since the collapse of
the Soviet Union in 1991. In 1987, we reported that the Soviet
inventory totaled approximately 52, 000 tanks, including about
29,000 in Europe. 2 About 26, 000 of the tanks in the inventory
were produced after 1978 (including the T64B, T72M1, and T80). The
technical sophistication and the sheer numbers of these armored
vehicles were far greater than the armored threat associated with
any other war- fighting contingency, either then or now. However,
the collapse of the Warsaw Pact significantly reduced the

likelihood that the United States would have to face an opponent
with such technically sophisticated armored weapons. Consequently,
the armored threat as projected in the 1997 Outyear Threat Report
is not nearly as capable as that of the former Soviet Union in
terms of quantity and quality.

In January 1998, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
reported to Congress that threats had diminished substantially,
that the United States was unlikely to face a global military
threat similar to the former Soviet Union for at least two
decades, and that ground forces throughout

the world were being reduced. Further, he said many developing
nations 2 Antitank Weapons: Current and Future Capabilities
(GAO/PEMD-87-22, Sept. 17, 1987).

had outdated equipment that was either not operational or in
serious disrepair. Developed countries were in various stages of
modernization, but ground forces were a low priority. The Defense
Intelligence Agency's 1997 Outyear Threat Report used two regional
conflict scenarios as the threat estimate for determining
requirements. Iraq and North Korea are currently the most likely
opponents the United States would face. The number of armored
vehicles currently maintained by Iraq and North Korea represents
only a small fraction of the Cold War threat. In addition, the
Central Intelligence Agency Director testified before the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence in January 1998 that the United
Nations sanctions and arms embargo implemented

after the Persian Gulf War limit Iraq's opportunity to procure
additional weapons and have had a devastating effect on its
economy. Further, North Korea's overall military readiness
continues to erode along with its worsening economic situation.

Antiarmor Weapon The overall size of the antiarmor weapon
inventory has remained fairly Inventory Remains at

constant since 1990. At the same time, weapons have become more
sophisticated, lethal, and effective. These more highly
sophisticated Cold War Levels While

weapons, some of which are capable of killing multiple targets,
were New and Improved developed to defeat the anticipated future
Soviet tank threat. Weapons Are Added

The 1990 antiarmor master plan divided the inventory and
procurement of antiarmor weapons into five different categories:
infantry/ helicopter, indirect fire support, fixed- wing, tank
rounds, and mines. Figure 2 compares the number of all types of
antiarmor weapons in 1990 and 1998 within these five categories.
There are various types of antiarmor weapons within each category.
The various types of antiarmor weapons are described in appendix
I.

Figure 2: Comparison of Antiarmor Munitions, 1990 and 1998 1998 as
a percent of 1990

140

128 119

120

100 96.6 100 100

100 100

100 100

100

80

80

67.7

60 40 20

0 Infantry

Indirect Fixed Tank

Mines Total /helicopters

fire wing

rounds 1990 1998

The 1998 inventory of infantry/ helicopter antiarmor weapons is
slightly smaller than in 1990, but it contains inventories of
three additional weapons with improved capabilities the Javelin,
the Hellfire II missile, and the Longbow Hellfire missile. The
1998 inventory of indirect fire weapons increased from 1990
levels. The biggest contributors were the higher number of
Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) rockets and the

recently produced Sense and Destroy Armor (SADARM) submunition.
The 1998 inventory of fixed- wing antiarmor weapons also grew over
the 1990 level. It included two additional weapons capable of
killing multiple armored targets the Joint Stand- Off Weapon
(JSOW) and the Sensor Fused Weapon. The 1998 inventory of tank
rounds shrank significantly. However, the drop was in the number
of tank rounds for the older M60 and

M61 tanks. Rounds for the M- 1 Abrams main battle tank currently
in use

increased by 425 percent. These rounds are more lethal against
modern armored targets. The 1998 inventory of mines also shrank
from 1990, but quantities of two new mines that provide increased
performance and lethality were added. Detailed comparisons of the
1990 and 1998 inventories are in appendix II.

U. S. antiarmor weapons proved very capable during Operation
Desert Storm. The United States and its allies destroyed or forced
abandonment of 2,633 tanks during the air and ground assault
against Iraqi ground forces. According to a 1992 House Committee
on Armed Services report, technology gave U. S. forces the edge,
and the equipment performed above the most optimistic
expectations. 3

DOD Continues to In 1998, the services had 35 different types of
weapons in inventory capable of performing today's antiarmor
mission and had spent a total of Invest in Antiarmor

$20.2 billion (in then- year dollars) to acquire these weapons. 4
They had also Weapon Capability spent a total of $3.6 billion
through fiscal year 1998 to procure 10 additional antiarmor
weapons and estimated they would spend another $7. 4 billion to
complete procurement of these new weapons. The

procurement funding requests for the 10 antiarmor weapons in
production are in appendix III.

In addition, the services are currently developing nine new
weapons with varying levels of antiarmor capability for a total
estimated development cost of almost $3.5 billion, $2. 6 billion
of which has already been spent.

Some of the weapons such as the Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition
and the Line- of- Sight Antitank (LOSAT) are primary antitank
weapons. Others such as the Multipurpose Individual Munition
(MPIM) engage a variety of

targets, including buildings, bunkers, and light armor. The guided
MLRS can engage personnel, light armor, or heavy armor, depending
on the payload selected. At this time, only three of the weapons
are approaching a procurement decision. Their estimated future
procurement funding is about $4. 7 billion. Table 1 shows the
development and projected procurement costs for the nine weapons.

3 Defense for a New Era, Lessons of the Persian Gulf War, House
Committee on Armed Services (1992). 4 Inventory quantities and
costs are defined as what was on contract through fiscal year
1998, not necessarily what was on hand at the end of the fiscal
year. For some older Army munitions, inventory was based on on-
hand data because original procurement data was unavailable.

Table 1: Antiarmor Development Weapons Then- year dollars in
millions

Total Development

Estimated development

cost to procurement cost

complete cost

Brilliant antiarmor submunition a $1, 020 $ 34 $1, 864 Improved
brilliant antiarmor submunition a 334 206 Undetermined Line- of-
sight antitank 387 220 Undetermined Multipurpose individual
munition 61 42 Undetermined Improved sense and destroy armor 988
36 Undetermined Guided multiple launch rocket system 96 78
Undetermined Tank round M829E3 255 193 Undetermined Joint stand-
off weapon BLU- 108 245 47 2, 369 Predator 139 25 492

Total $3, 525 $881 $4, 725

a Does not include the cost to develop and procure the Army
Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) needed to deliver the submunition
to the target area. Source: President's Fiscal Year 1999 Budget.
In addition, the Army has spent almost $178 million to develop the

Enhanced Fiber Optics Guided Missile antiarmor weapon. The future
of this weapon is uncertain. No funding was requested in the
President's Fiscal Year 2000 Budget, and procurement funds for
fiscal years 1998 and 1999 were rescinded and eliminated. Table 2
shows the projected yearly procurement funding requests through
fiscal year 2003 for the 10 weapons in production and the 3
nearing production.

Table 2: Antiarmor Procurement Funding Requests Then- year dollars
in millions

Fiscal year Weapons 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 To complete

In production $784 $964 $1,154 $1, 087 $1, 121 $814 $1, 975
Nearing

122 267 478 448 480 2, 930 production Total $784 $1, 086 $1,421
$1, 565 $1, 569 $1,294 $4, 905

Source: President's Fiscal Year 1999 Budget.

Procurement funding for antiarmor weapons fell steadily between
1986 and 1996. According to the Institute for Defense Analysis,
antiarmor funding fell from $2.5 billion in 1986 to $770 million
in 1996. 5 However, future funding

demands for the 10 weapons in production and the 3 in development
show a reverse in this trend. Fiscal year 1999 was the first year
to exceed $1 billion in antiarmor funding since fiscal year 1994.
Funding for these weapons is expected to increase each year
through fiscal year 2002.

Conclusions DOD has maintained the overall size of its antiarmor
weapon inventory at the same level as in 1990 while significantly
increasing its effectiveness. The lethality and accuracy of the
weapons in the current inventory are

superior to those available in 1990. At the same time, however,
the threat of a massive heavily armored attack by potential
enemies has greatly diminished, and war- fighting strategies have
been modified to reflect global changes in threats and priorities.
Nevertheless, DOD plans to increase its procurement of antiarmor
weapons. Plans to acquire large quantities of new and improved
antiarmor weapons do not appear consistent with the reduced size
of the armored threat and the existing large and capable inventory
of antiarmor weapons.

Agency Comments and In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD
partially concurred. DOD

Our Evaluation offered comments that were generally directed at
explaining and justifying the findings of this report. For
example, DOD noted that the report did not discuss or account for
the fact that many of the antiarmor weapons quantities are
leftover stockpile levels from the Cold War and the

technology in those weapons did not provide the levels of
precision, lethality, and survivability available today. As
discussed in our report, we plan to assess DOD's forthcoming
antiarmor master plan. The plan is expected to provide an updated
assessment of the current armored threat, current antiarmor
capabilities, and antiarmor weapons requirements. We plan to
assess the plan's findings and conclusions, its underlying data
and analyses, and its key assumptions.

5 Trends and Funding for Acquisition of Antiarmor Munitions, 1986-
2001, Institute for Defense Analysis (Jan. 1997).

Scope and To determine the change in threat from 1990 to 1997, we
compared the Methodology

threat contained in the 1990 antiarmor master plan with the threat
contained in the Defense Intelligence Agency's 1997 Outyear Threat
Report. We discussed threat information with representatives from
the Defense Intelligence Agency, Bolling Air Force Base, Maryland;
the U. S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida; and
the Commander of U. S. Forces Korea.

To determine the change in number and types of antiarmor weapons
between 1990 and 1998, we compared the inventory contained in the
1990 antiarmor master plan with data the individual services
provided on their 1998 antiarmor inventory. We discussed antiarmor
weapon inventories with representatives from the Army's Deputy
Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Washington, D. C.; the
Army's Concepts Analysis Agency, Bethesda, Maryland; the Air
Force's Director for Operational Requirements, Crystal City,
Virginia; the Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland;
and the Marine Corps' Combat Development Command, Quantico,
Virginia.

We identified past and future funding trends by obtaining data
from the 1997 Institute for Defense Analysis report on Trends and
Funding for Acquisition of Antiarmor Munitions, 1986- 2001 and
from fiscal year 1999

and 2000 budgetary documents. We conducted our review from June
1998 to May 1999 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable William S.
Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Louis Caldera,
Secretary of the Army; the Honorable F. Whitten Peters, Acting
Secretary of the Air Force; the Honorable Richard Danzig,
Secretary of the Navy; General James L. Jones, Commandant of the
Marine Corps; Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of Management and
Budget; and other interested parties. We will also make

copies available to others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512- 4841 or William Graveline at (256)
650- 1400, if you or your staff have any questions concerning this
report. The major contributors to this report are listed in
appendix V.

Sincerely yours, ,

James F. Wiggins Associate Director Defense Acquisitions Issues

Letter 1 Appendix I

14 U. S. Antiarmor Weapons

Appendix II 19

Comparison of Antiarmor Weapons in Inventory, 1990- 98

Appendix III 21

Current Production Weapon Funding Requests

Appendix IV 22

Comments From the Department of Defense

Appendix V 25

Major Contributors to This Report

Tables Table 1: Antiarmor Development Weapons 8 Table 2: Antiarmor
Procurement Funding Requests 8

Figures Figure 1: Comparison of Enemy Tanks and Armored Combat
Vehicles, 1990 Soviet Union and 1997 Regional Conflict 4

Figure 2: Comparison of Antiarmor Munitions, 1990 and 1998 6

Abbreviations

ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System BAT Brilliant Antiarmor
Submunition CEM Combined Effects Munition DOD Department of
Defense HEAA High Explosive Antiarmor JSOW Joint Stand- Off Weapon
LOSAT Line- of- Sight Antitank MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System
MOPMS Modular Pack Mine System MPIM Multipurpose Individual
Munition SADARM Sense and Destroy Armor SFW Sensor Fused Weapon
SLAP Saboted Light Armor Penetrator SMAW Shoulder- launched
Multipurpose Assault Weapon TOW Tube- launched, Optically Tracked,
Wire Command link Guided WAM Wide Area Munition WCMD Wind
Corrected Munitions Dispenser

Appendi I x U. S. Antiarmor Weapons Infantry/ Helicoper Weapons
Dragon The Dragon completed production in 1980. It is a shoulder-
fired,

lightweight, short- range antitank guided missile that only needs
one soldier to fire. The missile uses semiautomatic command line-
of- sight guidance with an infrared tracker. The Dragon has
limited antiarmor capability due to its 1, 000- meter range and
lack of fire- and- forget technology (allowing personnel to fire
the weapon and take cover rather than remaining exposed while
guiding the weapon to its target).

Hellfire The Hellfire air- to- ground missile is the primary
antitank armament of the Army's Apache, Kiowa Warrior, and special
operations helicopters; the Marine Corps' Super Cobra helicopter;
and the Navy's Sea Hawk helicopter. The Hellfire uses semi- active
laser terminal guidance. Beginning in 1990, the missile was
reconfigured with an interim warhead to improve lethality against
near- term threat reactive armor. Hellfire II includes
improvements to defeat all known electro- optical countermeasures
and advanced reactive armors.

High Explosive Antiarmor The High Explosive Antiarmor (HEAA)
rocket is an antitank weapon designed to defeat targets at ranges
up to 500 meters. It is effective against current tanks without
additional armor. The rocket is launched from the shoulder-
launched multipurpose assault weapon (SMAW). When the HEAA

completed development in 1988, it transformed the SMAW into a
multipurpose weapon suitable for close- in antiarmor urban
fighting. Javelin The Javelin is a portable antitank weapon used
by the Army and the Marine Corps. The weapon weighs 48.5 pounds
and has a maximum range of

2,500 meters. It provides high lethality against conventional and
reactive armor and will replace the Dragon. The weapon has a high
kill rate against all known armored threats at extended ranges
under day/ night, adverse

weather, and battlefield obscurants. Its key feature is fire- and-
forget technology. The Javelin is hardened against countermeasures
and does not require extensive training for effective employment.

Line- of- Sight Antitank The Line- of- Sight Antitank (LOSAT)
weapon consists of a kinetic energy missile and launcher mounted
on a High Mobility Multi- purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). LOSAT
is being developed as a mobile, direct fire, antitank weapon that
provides lethality at long ranges.

Longbow Hellfire The Longbow Hellfire air- to- ground missile is
designed to defeat individual armored targets and enhance the
survivability of the Longbow Apache Helicopter. Longbow uses radio
frequency guidance. It can be used both day and night, in adverse
weather, and with battlefield obscurants. Longbow Hellfire
complements the semi- active Laser Hellfire II with fire- and-
forget capability, maximizing the ability of the Apache.

Predator Multipurpose Predator is designed to be a lightweight
shoulder- fired weapon capable of Individual Munition

defeating reactive armor. The weapon is designed with a modular
warhead. The Marine Corps uses a warhead that can defeat tanks
with reactive armor. The Army has modified the Predator with an
alternative warhead, the Multipurpose Individual Munition (MPIM).
The MPIM provides infantry with a fire- and- forget weapon capable
of defeating enemy forces in buildings, bunkers, and lightly
armored vehicles.

Saboted Light Armor Saboted Light Armor Penetrator (SLAP) is a 50-
caliber ammunition

Penetrator effective against light armor with a maximum effective
range of approximately 1,500 meters. It is a reduced caliber
munition wrapped in plastic. The lighter weight allows the
velocity to be significantly and safely increased in an unmodified
machine gun.

Tube- launched, Optically The Tube- launched, Optically Tracked,
Wire Command- link Guided (TOW)

Tracked, Wire missile is an antitank weapon designed to fulfill
the heavy assault Command- link Guided

requirement for close combat maneuver forces. The TOW can be fired
from a ground tripod or from specifically adapted vehicles such as
Bradleys and HMMWVs or from Cobra helicopters. The weapon includes
a thermal sight for operations at night, in reduced visibility,
and in countermeasures.

Several upgraded variants of the missile are in inventory,
including ones that can counter reactive armor. However, the TOW
is not a fire- and- forget weapon.

Indirect Fire Weapons Brilliant Antiarmor

The Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition (BAT) is a guided submunition
that Submunition

searches and destroys moving armored targets using acoustic and
infrared seekers. The Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Block
II can carry the BAT to ranges beyond 100 kilometers. The
preplanned product improvement (P3I) BAT uses millimeter wave,
infrared, and acoustic seekers to also attack cold stationary or
dug- in targets like Surface- to- Surface Missile Transporter-
Erector Launchers and Heavy Multiple Rocket Launchers. The ATACMS
Block IIA missile will carry the P3I BAT to ranges of 300
kilometers.

Copperhead The Copperhead is a laser- guided projectile fired from
standard 155- millimeter howitzers. Its production was completed
in the 1980s. The projectile's semi- active laser seeker searches
for a target illuminated by a

forward ground- or aircraft- based observer using a laser. The
minimum range of the Copperhead is 3 kilometers and its maximum
range is 15. 5 kilometers. The warhead can penetrate every tank
now in service. The

Copperhead has been modified with a time- delay fuse, which
permits the warhead to penetrate reactive armor without detonating
it. Multiple Launch Rocket

The Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) has been in production
since System

the 1980s. The MLRS basic rocket is a free- flight unguided
tactical rocket with a warhead containing 644 Dual Purpose
Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM) submunitions. The DPICM can
penetrate light armor. The Extended Range MLRS (ER- MLRS) began
production in fiscal year 1996. The new rocket added enhanced
capability through improvements in range, accuracy, effectiveness,
and maneuver force safety. The extended range rocket has a range
of 45 kilometers and contains 518 DPICM submunitions. Starting in
fiscal year 2002, the guided MLRS will integrate a guidance
control package into the ER- MLRS resulting in reduced mission
time and increased survivability.

Sense and Destroy Armor The Sense and Destroy Armor (SADARM) is a
fire- and- forget sensor- fused submunition delivered by 155-
millimeter artillery projectiles or by the MLRS. It is designed to
detect and destroy light armored vehicles, primarily self-
propelled artillery. Once dispensed over the target area, it
detects individual targets using millimeter wave and infrared
sensors and fires an

explosively formed penetrator through the top of the target. The
155- millimeter projectile carries two SADARMs per round and has a
range of 22.5 kilometers. The MLRS carries six SADARMS per rocket
and has a range of 30 kilometers. According to the Department of
Defense (DOD), the Army's MLRS- delivered SADARM program is
currently not funded.

Fixed- Wing Weapons Combined Effects Munition The Combined Effects
Munition (CEM) is a multipurpose cluster bomb for

ground support and is used against light armor, personnel, and
artillery. The CEM weighs approximately 950 pounds and dispenses
202 bomb units. The CEM entered production in 1985. Because of its
inaccuracy when dropped from higher altitudes, the Air Force is
fitting CEM with a wind corrected munitions dispenser (WCMD) kit.
The kit will provide inertial navigation to correct for the
effects of the wind.

Joint Stand- Off Weapon The Joint Stand- Off Weapon (JSOW) is a
Navy- led joint program with the Air Force. JSOW is an air- to-
ground weapon capable of attacking a variety of targets from
outside enemy point defenses during day/ night and adverse weather
conditions. There are currently three configurations of the JSOW:
JSOW baseline for soft and area targets, JSOW BLU- 108 for massed
land combat vehicles, and JSOW Unitary for harder/ point targets
and increased kill effectiveness.

Maverick The Maverick is a rocket propelled, air- to- surface,
precision guided tactical missile with fire- and- forget
capability designed for use against tanks and a

variety of hardened targets. The pilot has to visually acquire a
target. When the missile is engaged, a video picture instantly
appears on the cockpit display. The pilot then lines up the target
with the gunsight. When the

missile is released, it finds the target automatically.

Rockeye The Rockeye is an air- launched dispenser weapon. It is
one of the older, best known, and most widely used dispensers. The
bomblet is designed primarily as an antiarmor weapon for use
against tanks, armored carriers, and gun emplacements. The Rockeye
II carries 247 dual- purpose antiarmor bomblets and has a nose-
mounted fuse to control the opening of the dispenser at
predetermined altitudes.

Sensor Fused Weapon The Sensor Fused Weapon (SFW) is a cluster
weapon designed for use against land combat vehicles. It consists
of a tactical weapon dispenser containing 10 submunitions. Each
submunition contains four warheads. The warheads are released in a
horizontal trajectory and are activated through a small infrared
sensor contained in the warhead. This weapon provides multiple
kills per pass capability. The Air Force is fitting SFW with the
WCMD kit, which will provide inertial navigation to correct for
the

effects of the wind. Tank Rounds The 120- millimeter tank round is
fired from the M1A1 and M1A2 tanks.

There are four basic cartridge types: (1) Kinetic Energy; (2)
Armor Piercing, Fin Stabilized, and Discarding Sabot- Tracer; (3)
Chemical Energy High Explosive; and (4) training rounds for each
of the tactical cartridges. The Armaments Enhancement Initiative
program provides upgrades to the 120- millimeter round capability
to defeat Soviet- built armored vehicles of the 1990s and later.

Antiarmor Mines Antiarmor mines in inventory include several non-
self- destructing and self- destructing mines. The inventory
includes the M15, M19, and M21 non- self- destructing mine and a
family of mixed munitions that includes the

Modular Pack Mine System (MOPMS), Volcano, and Gator. MOPMS
contains 21 individual antitank and antipersonnel mines. It is
used as a protective minefield, for obstacle enhancement, or to
close gaps in other

larger minefields. Volcano contains six antitank mines and is
designed for quick emplacement. The Gator system has a total of 94
mines (72 antitank and 22 antipersonnel) and was developed to
place mine fields on the ground using high- speed tactical
aircraft. DOD has one mine in production, the Wide Area Munition
(WAM). The WAM is a first- generation smart weapon. It recognizes
armor and autonomously aims and launches its submunition against
the target. It offers increased performance and lethality over
current mines in inventory.

Comparison of Antiarmor Weapons in Appendi I I x Inventory, 1990-
98 The 1990 antiarmor master plan contained a total of 34
antiarmor weapons in inventory or procurement. Comparisons of the
weapons by category shows that more sophisticated lethal weapons
have been added since then. 1

In the infantry/ helicopter weapon category, the 1998 inventory
stood at 97 percent of the 1990 inventory. The 1990 inventory
contained five weapons: the Dragon, the Light Assault Weapon, the
Lightweight Multipurpose Weapon (AT- 4), the TOW missile, and the
Hellfire. The 1998 inventory included these five weapons and three
additional ones with improved capabilities: the shoulder- fired
Javelin, the Hellfire II missile, and

the Longbow Hellfire missile. In the infantry/ helicopter
category, the inventory quantities of shoulder- fired weapons were
95 percent of 1990 levels. The 1998 inventory included the
Javelin, which provides fire- and- forget technology and enhanced
lethality over the Dragon. The 1998 inventory of TOW missiles was
about 81 percent of the 1990 inventory. Although the number of TOW
missiles has declined, the 1998 inventory contained more modern
variants, which provide more lethality and longer range. The 1998
inventory of helicopter air- to- ground missiles was well above
its 1990 level and included

over 20, 000 Hellfire II and Longbow Hellfire missiles, which
provide improved lethality and survivability over the basic
Hellfire missile.

The 1998 inventory for the indirect fire support weapons category
was 128 percent of the 1990 inventory. This category is composed
of artillery shells and rockets. The biggest contributors to the
larger 1998 inventory were the increased numbers of the MLRS
rocket and the inclusion of some recently produced SADARM
submunitions. The SADARM was developed to improve the ability of
the artillery projectile to accurately locate targets.

The 1998 inventory in the fixed- wing category of antiarmor
weapons was 119 percent of the 1990 inventory. The fixed- wing
1990 inventory contained the Maverick air- to- ground missile and
the Rockeye and CEM cluster weapons. In the 1998 inventory, the
Maverick was 104 percent, the Rockeye 107 percent, and the CEM 164
percent of the 1990 inventory. The 1998 inventory included two
additional antiarmor area weapons capable of 1 We did not include
four weapons (25- millimeter and 30- millimeter munitions) in the
comparison

because their quantities were extremely large compared with the
other weapons in the same categories.

killing multiple armored targets: the JSOW air- to- ground missile
and the SFW. In the tank rounds category, the 1998 inventory stood
at 68 percent of the 1990 inventory. This category contained 105-
millimeter and 120- millimeter tank rounds. While the 1998
inventory of tank rounds was significantly smaller than the total
1990 inventory, most of the rounds in 1990 were 105- millimeter
M60 or M61 tank rounds. However, the main battle tank currently in
use is the M- 1 Abrams, which uses the 120- millimeter round

shell. A comparison of the 120- millimeter inventory shows that
the 1998 inventory was 425 percent of the 1990 inventory. The 120-
millimeter tank rounds have increased lethality against modern
armored weapons. Some of the newer kinetic energy rounds were
designed to defeat the newer Soviet- built tanks.

In the mines inventory category, the 1998 inventory was 80 percent
of the 1990 inventory. The 1998 inventory contained two newer
mines, the Volcano and the WAM. Both provide increased performance
and lethality over the mines contained in the 1990 inventory.

Current Production Weapon Funding Appendi I I I x Requests Then-
year dollars in millions

Total quantity to be Cost through fiscal

Cost fiscal year 1999 Weapon Service procured Total cost year 1998
to completion

WCMD on CEM Air Force 30,000 $500 $112 $388 WCMD on Gator Air
Force 5,000 82 19 63 Javelin Army 24,403 3,012 945 2, 067 Javelin
Marine Corps 2,553 287 96 191 Longbow Hellfire Army 12,905 2,092
704 1, 388 MLRS- extended range Army 6,102 245 109 136 SADARM Army
50,000 1,978 235 1, 743 SFW Air Force 5,000 2,066 912 1, 154 Tank
round M829A2 Army 144,000 614 470 144 WAM Army 3,165 214 40 174

Total $11,090 $3, 642 $7, 448

Source: Service budgetary data.

Appendi V I x Comments From the Department of Defense

Appendi V x Major Contributors to This Report National Security
and William Gillies International Affairs

Roy Karadbil Division, Washington, D. C.

Atlanta Field Office Laura Durland Beverly Breen

GAO United States General Accounting Office

GAO/NSIAD-99-105

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions United States General
Accounting Office

Washington, D. C. 20548

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Contents

Contents Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions

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Appendix I

Appendix I U. S. Antiarmor Weapons

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Appendix I U. S. Antiarmor Weapons

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Appendix I U. S. Antiarmor Weapons

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Appendix I U. S. Antiarmor Weapons

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Appendix II

Appendix II Comparison of Antiarmor Weapons in Inventory, 1990- 98

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Appendix III

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Appendix IV

Appendix IV Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix IV Comments From the Department of Defense

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Appendix V

(707356) Let t er

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