United Nations: Status of Internal Oversight Services (Letter Report,
11/19/97, GAO/NSIAD-98-9).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the operations of the
United Nations (U.N.) Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS),
focusing on whether OIOS: (1) is operationally independent; (2) has the
necessary resources to carry out its mission; and (3) has written
policies and procedures in place for conducting its work, following up
on its recommendations, and providing confidentiality to informants and
protecting whistleblowers from possible reprisal. GAO noted that its
lack of direct audit authority resulted in certain limitations and
restricted its ability to fully address the review objectives.

GAO noted that: (1) OIOS is the internal oversight mechanism for the
U.N. Secretary General; (2) although OIOS had some start-up and early
operational problems, many of these seem to have been resolved; (3) this
was difficult to do in an organizational environment that operated
without effective internal oversight mechanisms for almost half a
century; (4) in less than 3 years, OIOS has assimilated four
preexisting, internal oversight units from the Office for Inspections
and Investigations and, for the first time, hired professional
investigators and provided other resources for an investigations unit in
the United Nations; (5) OIOS' mandate, the Secretary General's Bulletin
establishing OIOS, and OIOS' implementing procedures provide the
framework for an operationally independent, internal oversight mechanism
for the U.N. Secretariat; (6) however, without access to all its audit,
inspection, and investigation reports, working papers, and other records
and files related to OIOS work, GAO could not test whether OIOS
exercised its authority and implemented its procedures in an independent
manner; (7) one issue that may affect the appearance of OIOS'
independence involves how it has implemented its reporting mechanism;
(8) OIOS has provided only 39 of its 162 various reports to the
Secretary General and the General Assembly or its committees; (9)
initial concerns about inadequate budget and staff levels have been
addressed; (10) since its establishment, OIOS' regular U.N. budget has
increased from $12 million to $18.6 million (proposed for 1998-99), and
its authorized positions have increased by 18, to a total of 123; (11)
OIOS' audit division and the Investigations Section have developed
written auditing and investigative policies and procedures; (12)
however, the Central Monitoring and Inspection Unit and the Central
Evaluation Unit do not have comparable manuals; (13) each OIOS unit
tracks its recommendations and is responsible for determining when they
should be closed out; (14) in its 1995 and 1996 annual reports, the
Under Secretary General (USG) for Internal Oversight Services estimated
OIOS had identified $35.5 million in potential recoveries and realized
$19.8 million in savings and recoveries; (15) OIOS' Investigations
Section has established procedures and developed guidance, which it has
publicized throughout the United Nations, for ensuring informants'
confidentiality and protecting whistleblowers from reprisal; and (16) in
discussions with the USG for Internal Oversight Services, GAO suggested
several ways to enhance OIOS' future operations.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-98-9
     TITLE:  United Nations: Status of Internal Oversight Services
      DATE:  11/19/97
   SUBJECT:  International organizations
             Internal audits
             Auditing procedures
             Whistleblowers
             Internal controls
             Audit reports

             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Requesters

November 1997

UNITED NATIONS - STATUS OF
INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES

GAO/NSIAD-98-9

United Nations

(711257)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  IG - Inspector General
  OIOS - Office of Oversight Services
  USG - Under Secretary General

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-278082

November 19, 1997

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate

The Honorable Rod Grams
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Operations
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate

In July 1994, the General Assembly passed a resolution creating the
Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) within the United
Nations' Secretariat.\1 The office was formally established on
September 7, 1994,\2 to promote effective program management by
identifying, reporting on, and proposing remedies for problems of
waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement within the United Nations. 

An independent oversight office has been the centerpiece of U.S. 
efforts to improve U.N.  management and its accountability to the
member states.  In 1994, to emphasize the importance of establishing
such an office, legislation was enacted that required certain funds
to be withheld from the United Nations until the President certified
that it had an independent office to conduct and supervise objective
audits, investigations, and inspections relating to the programs and
operations of the United Nations.  Over concerns that OIOS may have
been unable to carry out its mandate due to resource and other
constraints, the Congress required a similar certification for fiscal
year 1997.\3

This report responds to your request concerning the operations of
OIOS.  Specifically, our objectives were to determine whether OIOS
(1) is operationally independent; (2) has the necessary resources to
carry out its mission; and (3) has written policies and procedures in
place for conducting its work, following up on its recommendations,
and providing confidentiality to informants and protecting
whistleblowers from possible reprisal.  OIOS' functions and
responsibilities are similar in some respects to U.S.  inspector
general offices and, where appropriate, we provide information on
U.S.  inspectors general for comparison.  However, these comparisons
are not intended as criteria for assessing OIOS' operations. 

Because we are an agency of the United States, we do not have direct
audit authority to review the operations of international
organizations, including the United Nations.\4 This lack of direct
audit authority resulted in certain limitations being placed on the
scope of our work and restricted our ability to fully address our
review objectives.  Although U.N.  officials consented to our study
and OIOS and other Secretariat staff were helpful and forthcoming in
interviews, OIOS declined to provide us access to completed reports
that had not been forwarded to the Secretary General and General
Assembly; its working papers supporting any of its reports; and other
records and files related to specific audits, investigations, or
inspections.  These restrictions prevented us from (1) testing
whether OIOS was exercising its authority in an independent manner
and (2) determining whether OIOS was adhering to its stated policies
and procedures and its analyses were adequate to support its reported
findings and recommendations. 


--------------------
\1 OIOS' mandate is described in General Assembly Resolution 48/218B,
July 29, 1994. 

\2 Secretary General's Bulletin ST/SGB/273, September 7, 1994. 

\3 In accordance with P.L.  104-208 and section 401(b) of P.L. 
103-236.  Pending legislation contains a similar provision for fiscal
year 1998.  See the United Nations Reform Act of 1997 (S.  903, sec. 
2101). 

\4 Pending legislation contains a provision calling for the United
Nations to provide us access to U.N.  financial data for nationally
mandated reviews.  See the United Nations Reform Act of 1997 (S. 
903,
sec.  2231(b)(6)). 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

Effective oversight is a key management tool.  The United Nations has
both internal and external accountability and oversight mechanisms. 
Internal oversight units usually report directly to the executive
heads of organizations, while external oversight mechanisms generally
report to the governing bodies of organizations.  Appendix I provides
an overview of the external oversight mechanisms in the U.N.  system. 

Until 1993, the major internal oversight functions of the Secretariat
were carried out by units within the Department of Administration and
Management, but they were not considered very effective because they
lacked independence and were often disregarded by managers.  In
August 1993, the Secretary General formed the Office for Inspections
and Investigations under an Assistant Secretary General.  This office
was not part of the Department of Administration and Management and
carried more authority than the individual units because it reported
to the Secretary General.  In July 1994, the General Assembly created
an oversight body with even more independence and authority--OIOS--to
supersede the Office for Inspections and Investigations. 

OIOS is considered by the United Nations and its member states to be
an internal oversight office and, therefore, part of the executive
function of the United Nations.  OIOS is mandated to exercise its
oversight functions throughout the U.N.  Secretariat, which covers
the staff and resources of the Secretariat, including peacekeeping
missions.  For 1996-97, OIOS had oversight authority over $7
billion.\5 In addition, OIOS has been asked to provide audit coverage
for some independent entities, such as the U.N.  Joint Staff Pension
Fund. 

For the current biennium (1996-97), OIOS has 123 authorized positions
and a $21.6 million budget, of which $15 million comes from the
regular U.N.  budget and $6.6 million comes from extrabudgetary
resources.\6 Of the 123 positions, 10 are vacant, 36 are funded by
extrabudgetary contributions, and 6 are resident auditors with U.N. 
peacekeeping missions.\7 OIOS also has one staff member on
nonreimbursable loan from a member state.  It has 88 staff in New
York, 21 in Geneva, and 8 in Nairobi. 

OIOS has four operational units--the Audit and Management Consulting
Division, the Investigations Section, the Central Monitoring and
Inspection Unit, and the Central Evaluation Unit.  Investigation was
a new oversight activity introduced in February 1994, and inspections
were also a new function assigned to the Office for Inspections and
Investigations.  The functions of the other units had been performed
within the Department of Administration and Management for years. 
The Under Secretary General (USG) for Internal Oversight Services
provides overall management of OIOS' activities and monitors the
status of implementation of OIOS recommendations.  Appendix II
provides an organization chart of OIOS and a description of each
unit's functions, budget, and staffing. 

OIOS' oversight does not extend to U.N.  specialized agencies, such
as the World Health Organization, the International Labor
Organization, and the Food and Agriculture Organization, or the
International Atomic Energy Agency.  Specialized agencies are not
under the authority of the Secretary General or funded through the
regular U.N.  budget; rather, they are autonomous bodies with their
own governing boards, resources, and oversight mechanisms.  According
to OIOS officials, they regularly exchange views with the agencies'
oversight offices in order to coordinate and strengthen oversight on
a U.N.-wide basis. 


--------------------
\5 The United Nations budgets for 2-year cycles, or bienniums.  The
budget figures presented in this report are for 2-year periods
beginning January 1 of even-numbered years and ending December 31 of
odd-numbered years. 

\6 In addition to its regular budget, OIOS receives payments from
various departments and organizations not funded through the regular
U.N.  budget for specific oversight services.  These funds are
considered "extrabudgetary," and OIOS has used them primarily to pay
for personnel. 

\7 These budget numbers and authorized positions do not include audit
coverage for organizations that have their own internal audit units,
such as the U.N.  Development Program, but they do include audit
coverage for the U.N.  High Commissioner for Refugees, which receives
audit and other services from OIOS. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

OIOS is the internal oversight mechanism for the U.N.  Secretary
General.  Although OIOS had some start-up and early operational
problems, many of these seem to have been resolved.  This was
difficult to do in an organizational environment that operated
without effective internal oversight mechanisms for almost half a
century.  In less than 3 years, OIOS has assimilated four
preexisting, internal oversight units from the Office for Inspections
and Investigations and, for the first time, hired professional
investigators and provided other resources for an investigations unit
in the United Nations. 

OIOS' mandate, the Secretary General's Bulletin establishing OIOS,
and OIOS' implementing procedures provide the framework for an
operationally independent, internal oversight mechanism for the U.N. 
Secretariat.  However, without access to all its audit, inspection,
and investigation reports; working papers; and other records and
files related to OIOS' work, we could not test whether OIOS exercised
its authority and implemented its procedures in an independent
manner.  One issue that may affect the appearance of OIOS'
independence involves how it has implemented its reporting mechanism. 
OIOS' mandate calls for it to submit reports that "provide insight
into the effective utilization and management of resources and the
protection of assets" to the Secretary General and General Assembly. 
Yet, OIOS had provided only 39 of its 162 various reports to the
Secretary General and the General Assembly or its committees. 

Initial concerns about inadequate budget and staff levels have been
addressed.  Since its establishment, OIOS' regular U.N.  budget has
increased from $12 million to $18.6 million (proposed for 1998-99),
and its authorized positions have increased by 18, to a total of 123. 
According to OIOS, it will have sufficient resources to carry out its
mandate if the proposed 1998-99 budget is approved. 

OIOS' audit division and the Investigations Section have developed
written auditing and investigative policies and procedures.  These
are detailed in audit and investigations manuals, respectively. 
However, the Central Monitoring and Inspection Unit and the Central
Evaluation Unit do not have comparable manuals. 

Each OIOS unit tracks its recommendations and is responsible for
determining when they should be closed out.  This information is
maintained in a central, automated database in the Office of the USG
for Internal Oversight Services.  In its 1995 and 1996 annual
reports, the USG for Internal Oversight Services estimated OIOS had
identified $35.5 million in potential recoveries and realized $19.8
million in savings and recoveries. 

OIOS' Investigations Section has established procedures and developed
guidance, which it has publicized throughout the United Nations, for
ensuring informants' confidentiality and protecting whistleblowers
from reprisal. 

In discussions with the USG for Internal Oversight Services, we
suggested several ways to enhance OIOS' future operations.  In
response, he said he is considering certain changes in OIOS policies
and procedures, but stated that he does not plan to change his
criteria for submitting reports to the Secretary General and the
General Assembly. 


   OIOS' MANDATE PROVIDES A
   FRAMEWORK FOR OPERATIONAL
   INDEPENDENCE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

To judge an organization's operational independence, one must
determine whether (1) the organization's mandate and procedures
establish conditions under which it can be operationally independent
and (2) the organization exercises its authority and prerogatives in
an independent manner.  While our examination of the U.N.  resolution
creating OIOS, the Secretary General's Bulletin establishing OIOS,
and OIOS' operating procedures showed that OIOS is in a position to
be operationally independent,\8 we could not test whether OIOS
exercised its authority and implemented its procedures in an
independent manner because OIOS would not provide us access to
certain audit and investigation reports and its working papers. 
Unrestricted access to OIOS' records and files and such reviews and
tests that we could have conducted would have served as indicators of
how OIOS was exercising its independence. 


--------------------
\8 In 1994, 1996, and 1997, the Secretary of State certified on
behalf of the President of the United States that, among other
things, OIOS is set up as an independent office and has access to
necessary records and officials. 


      OIOS' U.N.  FRAMEWORK
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1

A primary characteristic of an effective internal oversight office is
its operational independence; however, the term is not easily defined
and even harder to measure in practice.  Operational independence is
a concept rather than a discrete set of factors that can be tracked
over time.  Among other things, operational independence includes
insulating the unit head from arbitrary removal from office;
organizationally separating the unit from the programs it examines;
and ensuring the unit has full and free access to relevant records,
the authority to carry out work it sees fit, and the ability to
report its findings without interference from the executive or the
legislature.  It is also important that the oversight unit's mandate
and independent status be well understood among the community it
oversees.\9 OIOS has many of these characteristics, as noted below. 

  -- The USG for Internal Oversight Services is appointed by the
     Secretary General, following consultations with member states,
     for a fixed 5-year term but must be approved by the General
     Assembly and may be removed by the Secretary General only for
     cause and with the General Assembly's approval. 

  -- OIOS recently established an administrative unit within the
     USG's office.  As a result, OIOS no longer has to rely on the
     Department of Administration and Management for basic
     administrative services. 

  -- OIOS' staffing administration is handled by the Office of Human
     Resources Management.  OIOS is subject to U.N.  geographical and
     gender diversity requirements and, in some cases, special
     language requirements.  However, the USG for Internal Oversight
     Services is authorized to appoint, promote, and terminate
     staff--powers similar to those delegated by the Secretary
     General to the heads of separately administered U.N.  funds and
     programs but not to other USGs. 

  -- Like other departments, OIOS' budget is a separate line item in
     the overall U.N.  Secretariat's budget.  Unlike other
     departments within the Secretariat, the USG for Internal
     Oversight Services may directly inform the General Assembly
     about the adequacy of OIOS' budget and staffing levels.\10

  -- OIOS' mandate provides the authority to initiate, carry out, and
     report on any action that it considers necessary to fulfill its
     mandate and responsibilities.  OIOS may not be prohibited or
     hindered from carrying out any action within the purview of its
     mandate by the Secretary General or any other party. 


--------------------
\9 Independence for supreme audit institutions is described in
Auditing Standards, Auditing Standards Committee, International
Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (June 1992), pp.  24-30. 

\10 Pending legislation contains a provision calling for the United
Nations to established procedures that require the USG for Internal
Oversight Services to report directly to the Secretary General on the
adequacy of OIOS' resources.  See the United Nations Reform Act of
1997 (S.  903,
sec.  2101(c)(2)(A)(ii)). 


         OIOS' OVERSIGHT OF U.N. 
         FUNDS AND PROGRAMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1.1

Although the Secretary General's Bulletin states that the
responsibilities of OIOS extend to the "separately administered
organs," OIOS' role in providing internal oversight services for
separately administered U.N.  funds and programs has been questioned
by a few member states.\11 Funds and programs are funded either
completely or in part by voluntary contributions and have their own
executive boards or governing bodies.  According to OIOS officials,
OIOS has provided oversight services primarily for those areas for
which the funds and programs do not provide their own oversight
coverage.  For example, the U.N.  Development Program has its own
internal audit, but OIOS provides investigative services.  For the
U.N.  High Commissioner for Refugees, which does not have an internal
audit unit, OIOS provides both audit and some investigative services. 

However, in recent sessions of the U.N.  Committee on Administration
and Budget--commonly known as the Fifth Committee\12 --certain member
states have made it clear that they do not accept the authority of
the Secretary General to implement OIOS recommendations in the funds
and programs without explicit direction from the executive boards of
these entities.  If OIOS is required to seek the concurrence of the
various funds and programs executive boards before cognizant program
officials can implement its recommendations, OIOS' operational
independence would be compromised.  According to State officials, the
United States and several other delegations have made this point
clear.  They have emphasized that OIOS is an internal oversight
mechanism and part of the U.N.  Secretariat and, therefore, its
recommendations are not subject to the review or approval of the
General Assembly or the respective executive boards of the separately
administered funds and programs. 

As noted in its comments on this report, the State Department has
consistently taken the position that OIOS' jurisdiction extends to
the separately administered funds and programs.  State emphasized
that the U.N.  Legal Advisor confirmed this understanding of the
relationship in July 1994.  Additionally, at the request of the USG
for Internal Oversight Services, the U.N.  Legal Counsel specifically
ruled in October 1997 that OIOS can make recommendations to program
managers within the U.N.  Secretariat, including the funds and
programs, without the endorsement or approval of the General
Assembly.  While this decision did not explicitly refer to the funds
and programs executive boards, the situation is analogous. 

At the time of this report, OIOS was continuing to provide internal
oversight services to the funds and programs and reporting to the
cognizant officials without seeking the approval of the respective
executive boards.  However, although U.S.  State Department officials
and the USG for Internal Oversight Services are confident that OIOS'
position will prevail, the issue of OIOS' relationship to funds and
programs will likely come before the Fifth Committee again. 


--------------------
\11 Pending legislation contains a provision calling for OIOS to
clarify its authority to audit every program, project, or activity
funded by the United Nations.  See the United Nations Reform Act of
1997 (S.  903 sec.  2101(c)(2)(B)). 

\12 The General Assembly has six committees.  The Fifth Committee
comprises all 185 member states and, as its more formal name implies,
deals with administrative and budgetary affairs. 


         AVAILABILITY OF OIOS
         REPORTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1.2

An area of concern is how OIOS has implemented its reporting
mechanism.  OIOS can provide its reports without interference to the
Secretary General and General Assembly.  Its mandate states that OIOS
"shall submit to the Secretary General reports that provide insight
into the effective utilization and management of resources and the
protection of assets" and that "all such reports are made available
to the General Assembly as submitted by the Office." The USG for
Internal Oversight Services determines which reports are provided to
the Secretary General, and we noted that OIOS has provided seven of
eight inspection reports to the Secretary General and the General
Assembly and that all six in-depth evaluation reports it has done
were provided to the Committee for Programme and Coordination--a
committee of the General Assembly.  However, we also noted that, as
of September 1997, only 13 of 107 audit reports\13 and 5 of 33
investigation reports were provided to the Secretary General and,
subsequently, the General Assembly.\14 This raises two questions: 

  -- If only 18 of 140 audit and investigation reports met the
     mandate's criteria for being provided to the Secretary General,
     are OIOS' resources directed at those areas that would provide
     insight into the operations of the United Nations? 

  -- On the other hand, if more OIOS reports actually provide the
     insight into U.N.  operations intended in the mandate, why were
     they not provided to the Secretary General and the General
     Assembly? 

We were not permitted to review the reports that had not been
provided to the Secretary General.  Consequently, we could not
address these questions.  In contrast, we note that all U.S. 
inspector general reports are provided to the head of the respective
inspector general's department or agency and many are also provided
to the U.S.  Congress. 

The USG for Internal Oversight Services acknowledged that few audit
and investigation reports had been forwarded to the Secretary General
and the General Assembly.  He told us that if he is satisfied with
the program officials' response to the report and is confident that
appropriate actions are being taken, he does not send the report to
the Secretary General.  He also noted that sending all OIOS reports
would place an additional paperwork burden on the General Assembly
and that producing enough reports for each member state would be
expensive.  The USG for Internal Oversight Services said that
beginning with the OIOS annual report due to be published in October
1997, he will list all OIOS reports and if a member state is
interested in a particular one, OIOS will brief its
representatives.\15 He also said that previous annual reports have
referred to the conclusions and findings in many of OIOS' reports and
he has been willing to brief member states on the topics addressed. 


--------------------
\13 All audit reports are provided to the U.N.  Board of Auditors,
which is one of several U.N.  external oversight mechanisms, but
OIOS' reports are not available to anyone else unless the USG for
Internal Oversight Services provides them to the Secretary General. 

\14 OIOS had also issued two annual reports, four special evaluation
reports, one program performance report, and one special report for
the Secretary General on funds and programs.  The total number of
OIOS products provided to the General Assembly or its committees is
39. 

\15 Some reports, especially reports of investigations, may be too
sensitive to list, but this will be decided on a case-by-case basis. 


         INFORMING U.N.  STAFF OF
         OIOS' INDEPENDENCE
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1.3

OIOS and the Department of Administration and Management have made
efforts to communicate the scope of OIOS' operational independence to
U.N.  staff. 

  -- In January 1995, the USG for Administration and Management
     issued to all U.N.  staff an administrative instruction
     providing guidance on the personnel arrangements for OIOS.  The
     instruction outlined the administrative arrangements and the
     authority of the USG for Internal Oversight Services in
     personnel matters. 

  -- In February 1996, the U.N.  Department of Public Information
     distributed a U.N.  publication describing OIOS' role and
     purpose.\16

  -- In April 1996, the USG for Administration and Management issued
     a note reminding Secretariat department heads that the General
     Assembly's resolution establishing OIOS makes it clear that OIOS
     shall have the authority necessary to carry out its functions. 
     The note provided detailed information regarding the procedures
     to be followed to ensure that OIOS is given immediate access to
     all files and records required to perform its important
     functions. 

  -- In early 1997, the Investigations Section published an
     investigations manual that is available to all U.N.  staff. 
     This manual contains information on the jurisdiction of the
     Investigations Section; hot-line procedures; investigative
     access to staff, records, sites, and materials of the United
     Nations; rights of persons subject to investigation; and
     protection for whistleblowers.  The manual is also on the U.N. 
     Secretariat's intranet. 


--------------------
\16 The Office of Internal Oversight Services of the United Nations: 
Its Genesis, Its Mission, Its Working Methods, Its Impact, the U.N. 
Department of Public Information (New York:  Feb.  1996). 


      COMPARISONS TO U.S. 
      INSPECTORS GENERAL
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2

Although OIOS is similar to U.S.  inspector general offices,
including the way it emphasizes operational independence and access
to relevant records and cognizant officials, it is different in many
respects.  For example, most U.S.  inspectors general are not
appointed for a fixed term and can be removed without approval of the
Congress.  Also, while U.S.  inspector general offices have the audit
and investigation functions specifically mandated like OIOS, the
inspections, monitoring, and evaluation roles are not.  See appendix
III for a more complete comparison of OIOS with U.S.  inspector
general offices. 


   OIOS' BUDGET AND STAFFING
   LEVELS HAVE INCREASED SINCE ITS
   INCEPTION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

In February 1997, the USG for Internal Oversight Services stated in a
memorandum to the USG for Administration and Management that OIOS
will have sufficient resources to carry out its functions if the
proposed 1998-99 budget is approved.  The head of each OIOS unit,
including the Investigations Section, which had been singled out by
OIOS officials as particularly hampered by the lack of trained staff,
concurred with this assessment.  Since the establishment of OIOS, its
regular U.N.  budget has increased by 55 percent and its authorized
positions have increased by 18.\17 However, this did not happen
without some difficulty. 

When OIOS was established in September 1994, it inherited the
resources budgeted for the units whose functions it absorbed.  In
early December 1994, the USG for Internal Oversight Services
described his vision for OIOS and the resource requirements necessary
before the U.N.  Fifth Committee and the Advisory Committee on
Administrative and Budgetary Questions.\18 He stated that he could
not measurably enhance the internal control mechanisms in the United
Nations without more resources.  In particular, he pointed to the
need to intensify the audit coverage and strengthen the new
investigation function. 

The General Assembly reacted favorably, and OIOS, which had a total
of 102 positions, was authorized 5 additional professional and 3 more
general service positions against the revised budget estimates for
1995, bringing OIOS' total number of positions to 110, including
extrabudgetary positions. 

Nevertheless, in early 1996, only 42 of 53 professional positions
within OIOS' audit division were filled--a vacancy rate of almost 21
percent.  OIOS also noted that the accumulated and new cases in the
Investigations Section constituted a workload that was too large for
the unit to clear.  Moreover, with the establishment of OIOS, the
Central Monitoring and Inspection Unit's responsibilities expanded to
address concerns of member states regarding the qualitative nature of
program performance reporting and the need to enhance program
management capability. 

At the beginning of the 1996-97 biennium and at the urging of some
member states, particularly the United States, cuts in the overall
U.N.  budget were mandated by the General Assembly.  While the OIOS
1996-97 budget included partial funding for an additional 12
positions, including
5 investigators, the USG for Administration and Management instructed
OIOS to stay within its regular U.N.  budget of $15 million, although
OIOS had estimated it would need $15.725 million to fully fund its
approved positions.  (This did not directly affect extrabudgetary
resources.) We were told by OIOS officials, and the USG for Internal
Oversight Services noted in OIOS' 1996 annual report, that OIOS
should not be totally exempt from overall U.N.  reductions.  The USG
for Internal Oversight Services said he took this position because it
would be "politically unwise" to suggest that OIOS be treated
differently than the rest of the organization. 

According to OIOS officials, because OIOS had to stay within its $15
million budget, it had to cut $725,000.  To do this, OIOS did not
fill its vacant positions for the first year of the biennium.  This
action saved about $603,000.  The office also cut back expenditures
for nonstaffing items for an additional savings of about $122,000. 

In January 1996, the General Assembly instituted a hiring freeze for
the entire U.N.  Secretariat.  In March 1996, OIOS was granted a
waiver as long as it followed through with its budget reductions.  In
February 1997, after the budgetary reductions had been achieved, OIOS
began announcing its vacancies, and the recruitment and hiring
process began. 

As part of U.N.  efforts to maintain a flat, no-growth budget, the
1998-99 budget outline set OIOS' regular budget at $15.1
million--about the same as the previous biennium.  With that budget,
OIOS could not have filled its vacancies.  But after negotiations
with the USG for Administration and Management, OIOS was granted an
additional $3.5 million, including $1 million for exchange rate
fluctuations and inflation, increasing OIOS' regular budget to $18.6
million.\19 According to OIOS, this increase will fully fund the 12
new positions approved by the General Assembly in 1995, a $127,300
(or 83 percent) increase in general operating expenses, and a
$236,500 (or 43 percent) increase for travel expenses.\20 In
addition, the Department for Administration and Management
"redeployed" one of its positions to OIOS to perform administrative
support functions.  The General Assembly still must approve the
1998-99 budget before it becomes final.  For a comparison of OIOS'
budget and staffing with other U.N.  Secretariat functions, see
appendix IV. 


--------------------
\17 Since its inception, OIOS has had staff position increases
totaling 20, but 3 positions were "redeployed" to the U.N.  Office of
Human Resources Management, and 1 position was "redeployed" to OIOS
from the Department of Administration and Management, for a net
increase of 18 positions. 

\18 The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
has 16 "experts" from member states and reports to the Fifth
Committee; it reviews the proposed U.N.  budget and addresses
financial questions. 

\19 During this period, various congressional members expressed
serious concerns about the adequacy of OIOS' budget.  According to
officials at the U.S.  Mission to the United Nations, the Assistant
Secretary of State for the Bureau of International Organization
Affairs intervened with the USG for Administration and Management on
behalf of OIOS to emphasize the importance of adequate funding for
OIOS.  We could not ascertain the bearing of this intervention on the
proposed funding decision. 

\20 To make more funds available for travel expenses, the U.N. 
Controller was asked to develop a plan for reimbursing OIOS for
travel costs associated with work at organizations outside of the
U.N.  Secretariat proper, such as for funds and programs.  One
proposal was that a revolving fund of about $300,000 could be
established for this purpose.  However, this matter had not been
resolved at the time we completed our study. 


   TWO OF THE FOUR OIOS REPORTING
   UNITS HAVE PROCEDURAL MANUALS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

Internal oversight offices must ensure that the information developed
in its audits, investigations, inspections, and evaluations is
complete, relevant, and accurate.  Clear guidelines or procedures can
help ensure that the information presented, the conclusions reached,
and the recommendations made can be relied upon as accurate, fair,
and balanced.  International auditing standards acknowledge that
audit organizations often carry out activities that, by strict
definition, do not qualify as audits.  According to these standards,
such organizations should establish a policy on which specific
standards should be followed in carrying out nonaudit work.\21
Although OIOS' mandate does not require its reporting units to adhere
to any particular quality assurance standards or, for that matter, to
develop procedural manuals, OIOS' audit division and the
Investigations Section have developed them. 

Before OIOS' audit division became part of OIOS, it developed
"Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing" based
on the auditing standards established by the Institute of Internal
Auditors.\22 These standards provide guidelines for maintaining
independence, planning and conducting audits, and reporting audit
findings and are incorporated into the audit division's internal
audit manual.  This manual is being updated to reflect certain
changes made since OIOS' establishment.  In addition, most of the
audit division's staff have advanced degrees and many are
accountants.  The staff have been trained in auditing techniques and
take continued education courses, including those sponsored by the
Institute of Internal Auditors and U.S.  government agencies,
including GAO. 

After OIOS was established and the Investigations Section head had
been appointed, the section began developing an investigations
manual, which includes standards for conducting its work.  This
manual is similar in many respects to those used by U.S.  law
enforcement agencies.  According to a former Department of State
employee who helped develop OIOS' investigation's manual, about a
dozen manuals from other organizations, including some U.S.  law
enforcement agencies, were used to develop the manual.  In addition,
most of the investigation staff are trained in investigative
techniques.  The head of the unit and the senior investigator also
have law degrees. 

The Central Monitoring and Inspection Unit and the Central Evaluation
Unit do not have comparable manuals.  The head of the Central
Monitoring and Inspection Unit told us that the unit does not have
written standards for conducting its work but employs a variety of
quality control processes.  These include requiring documentary
evidence for factual information in inspection reports and using a
newly implemented review process by OIOS unit heads to evaluate all
draft inspection reports before they are finalized.  The USG for
Internal Oversight Services told us, however, that he recently
directed that an inspections manual be developed.  As currently
planned, it would be completed in the spring of 1998. 

According to the head of the Central Evaluation Unit, the unit (1)
conducts in-depth evaluations of U.N.  programs as directed by a U.N. 
intergovernmental committee--the Committee for Programme and
Coordination--and (2) provides methodological guidance for other
departments to conduct self-evaluations.  For the in-depth
evaluations, he said the methodology is well known and each
evaluation is conducted according to generally accepted evaluation
methods and social science research techniques understood by the
intergovernmental committee.  In addition, he said, staff working in
the unit are trained in evaluation methods.  Regarding department
self-assessments, he said his unit is in the process of updating a
manual to help guide these evaluations, but he did not provide an
estimate of when this effort would be completed.\23

The lack of written guidance for conducting inspections may have led
several U.N.  officials to raise questions about two recent
inspections reports.  Specifically, they questioned certain facts and
were concerned that comments prepared by the inspected organizations
were not considered in preparing the final products.  These officials
alleged that both reports contained factual errors that OIOS neither
acknowledged nor corrected.  We could not validate these assertions
because we did not have access to the necessary working papers and
related documents and files; however, OIOS officials told us the
comments provided did not address the facts and were just a different
point of view. 

OIOS has no requirement to acknowledge that comments were received or
considered in finalizing its inspection reports.  OIOS officials also
noted that, because of U.N.  page limitations on published materials,
it would have been difficult to respond in detail to all the
comments, much less reproduce them in the report.  Nevertheless, in
an attempt to address these concerns, the USG for Internal Oversight
Services told us that for reports he sends to the Secretary General
he now requires program officials' comments and OIOS' response to be
sent to the Secretary General for his consideration.  While this may
help, systematically acknowledging in OIOS' reports that comments
were received, summarizing the sense of them or reproducing them as
part of the report, and describing how they were addressed by OIOS
would, in our opinion, provide a further basis for the reader to
judge the relevancy of the issues addressed and the recommendations
made. 

In June 1997, OIOS compiled a document summarizing the quality
assurance process used in OIOS for each of its reporting units.\24
While the sections for audit and investigations largely draw on their
respective manuals, quality assurance procedures for the other two
units were, for the first time, delineated.  However, we were not
permitted access to OIOS' documents to determine whether the
procedures in the audit and investigations manuals or the June 1997
document were being followed. 


--------------------
\21 Auditing Standards, pp.  12-13. 

\22 Various auditing standards have been promulgated for use by audit
organizations.  The Institute of Internal Auditors has issued
Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing
(Altamonte Springs, Fla.:  1978 (revised July 1997)).  U.S. 
inspectors general are required to conduct their audits in
conformance with GAO's Government Auditing Standards:  1994 Revision
(GAO/OCG-94-4, June 1994). 

\23 Pending legislation contains a provision calling for OIOS to
develop a standardized methodology for evaluating U.N.  programs,
including specific criteria for determining the continuing relevance
and effectiveness of the programs.  See the United Nations Reform Act
of 1997 (S.  903,
sec.  2231(b)(4)(B)(i)). 

\24 Quality Assurance and Client Consultation in Internal Oversight,
OIOS (New York:  June 1997). 


   OIOS HAS PROCEDURES FOR
   FOLLOWING UP ON RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

Since 1994, OIOS has made more than 3,000 recommendations.\25 The
Office of the USG for Internal Oversight Services maintains a
central, automated database that includes a summary of each
recommendation, the department responsible for implementing the
recommendation, the OIOS staff member assigned to follow up on
recommendations, and the status of implementation.  In addition to
the centralized database, each unit maintains a separate database to
monitor compliance with all of its recommendations. 

In February 1995, OIOS issued guidance that outlines steps to be
taken by OIOS staff and program managers from the completion of
fieldwork to implementation of recommendations.  According to OIOS
officials, the units' staff are responsible for tracking corrective
actions managers take in response to recommendations and for
determining when they have fully implemented recommendations. 
Program managers are responsible for implementing recommendations and
reporting to OIOS on a regular basis on the status of implementation. 

OIOS' mandate requires it to report semiannually to the Secretary
General on the status of its recommendations in audit, investigation,
and inspection reports.  OIOS also reports annually\26 to the
Secretary General and the General Assembly on its significant audit,
investigation, inspection, and evaluation recommendations for
corrective action and on instances where program managers have failed
to implement such recommendations.  In December 1996, OIOS reported
that managers had fully implemented about 68 percent of the audit
recommendations the office has issued since October 1994. 

According to OIOS officials, in some cases, the office's ability to
monitor implementation of recommendations has been limited because
some recommendations did not clearly state the cause of the problem
or the action required.  Our study of the few reports available to us
bears this out.  For example, a recommendation in one OIOS inspection
report stated that "compliance with audit recommendations should be
given the priority they deserve." While OIOS officials said that the
office does not want to be so prescriptive that program officials do
not have flexibility in implementing the recommendations, more
guidance is often needed.  OIOS officials said the office has begun
to focus on developing recommendations that are more specific to
facilitate the monitoring of their implementation.  In some cases,
when recommendations were unclear, OIOS has established benchmarks to
help program managers and OIOS staff assess progress toward achieving
implementation. 


--------------------
\25 The number of recommendations is as of September 1997.  Also,
because we did not have access to most of OIOS' reports or its
working papers and related files, we cannot judge whether this is an
appropriate number of recommendations for the amount of work done nor
can we comment on the substance of the recommendations. 

\26 OIOS is required to submit to the Secretary General for
transmittal to the General Assembly an annual analytical and summary
report on its activities.  As of September 1997, it had submitted two
such reports. 


   THE INVESTIGATIONS SECTION HAS
   PROCEDURES TO PROTECT
   CONFIDENTIALITY AND
   WHISTLEBLOWERS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

OIOS has established systems and special controls for providing
confidentiality to whistleblowers\27 and other informants who make
reports in good faith to the Investigations Section.  Such
individuals may provide valuable information about potential areas of
wrongdoing, but if they feel threatened by reprisals, they may not
come forward.  In OIOS, they are protected whether or not an
investigation subsequently substantiates the report.\28 The
Investigations Section's manual, which is available to all U.N. 
staff, provides information and guidance on specific requirements and
procedures for protecting the identity of staff members and others
making reports or suggestions and for safeguarding reports from
accidental, negligent, or willful disclosure.  For example, the
manual states that the investigator assigned to the case is
responsible and accountable for taking all appropriate measures for
the protection of the identity of the complainant, and the section
has established strict internal office procedures to avoid the
disclosure of the complainant's identity. 

In September 1994, the section began operating a "hotline" reporting
facility, which provides direct, confidential access for those making
complaints or suggestions by telephone, facsimile, or mail.  The
telephone hotline operates on a 24-hour, confidential basis.  Through
April 1997, 85 complaints and suggestions had been received through
the hotline reporting facility.  This amounted to about 15 percent of
the reports to the Investigations Section.  The hotline reporting
facility accepts anonymous reports.  However, according to the
section chief, the majority of those making complaints or suggestions
identify themselves.  If the information received through the hotline
proves to be accurate, the section uses it in such a way that the
source cannot be identified, except with permission, according to the
section's manual. 

OIOS has also established mechanisms to protect individuals against
possible reprisal for making reports, providing information, or
otherwise cooperating with the office.  The investigations manual
states the section will pay prompt and careful attention to cases
involving potential reprisals and will take interim steps, if
necessary, to protect the whistleblower.  The manual also notes that
disciplinary proceedings will be initiated and disciplinary action
taken against a staff member who is proven to have retaliated against
an individual providing information to the section.\29

Since 1994, U.N.  staff members and others have provided more than
500 tips or leads to the Investigations Section.  These reports
included allegations of serious crimes and noncriminal violations,
suggestions for improvements, cases involving personnel matters or
other grievances, and requests for investigations by officials.  Only
a few leads specifically categorized by OIOS as coming from a
whistleblower have resulted in investigative reports.  (OIOS would
not permit us to divulge how many.)

OIOS officials told us it has followed up in a number of instances
where reprisal was suspected but has taken disciplinary action in
only one instance to protect whistleblowers from reprisal.  According
to OIOS' second annual report, the section had initiated an
investigation based on allegations by staff, who publicly identified
themselves, that two senior staff were interfering with the
decision-making process of the local committee on contracts.  A
senior staff member retaliated against the staff by accusing them of
falsifying bid documents and recommending that charges be brought
against them.  The Investigations Section investigated the senior
staff member's allegations and found them to be false.  OIOS then
instituted charges against the senior staff member under the
provision in the office's mandate to provide for protection of those
supplying information. 


--------------------
\27 OIOS defines a whistleblower as a U.N.  staff member or other
individual who reports an alleged wrongdoing in good faith and may be
retaliated against as a direct result of the report. 

\28 According to the OIOS' mandate and the Investigations Section's
manual, individuals who report false or malicious allegations, with
knowledge of their falsity, will be considered guilty of misconduct
and dealt with in accordance with the Staff Regulations of the United
Nations and Staff Rules 100.1 to 112.8 (New York:  June 1, 1995). 

\29 Disciplinary proceedings refer to the internal U.N.  disciplinary
process. 


   CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

OIOS has established itself as the internal oversight mechanism for
the U.N.  Secretary General.  It is in position to be operationally
independent, has overcome certain start-up problems, and has
developed policies and procedures for much of its work.  However, it
can do more to help ensure that the information it presents, the
conclusions it reaches, and the recommendations it makes can be
relied upon as accurate, fair, and balanced.  To this end, we
discussed with the USG for Internal Oversight Services several ways
to enhance OIOS' future operations. 

First, we suggested that the USG for Internal Oversight Services
clarify the criteria for providing OIOS reports to the Secretary
General and the General Assembly.  In response, he said he will begin
publishing a listing of OIOS reports in his annual report and provide
briefings to member states on request.  While this will help
publicize OIOS reports, it may not satisfy OIOS' mandate to make
reports available to the Secretary General and the General Assembly
that "provide insight into the effective utilization and management
of resources and the protection of assets."

Second, we suggested that the USG for Internal Oversight Services
develop more formal written procedural guidance for the Central
Monitoring and Inspection Unit and the Central Evaluation Unit.  He
agreed that an inspections manual and evaluation manual for U.N. 
department self-evaluations would be helpful and has taken initial
steps to begin developing them.  However, he disagreed that
additional guidance is needed for the in-depth evaluations OIOS
conducts at the direction of the Committee for Programme and
Coordination. 

Third, we suggested that the USG for Internal Oversight Services
develop formal procedures for addressing program officials' comments
in each OIOS report.  The USG for Internal Oversight Services said he
is beginning to send program officials' comments and OIOS' analysis
of them to the Secretary General for reports forwarded to the
Secretary General and the General Assembly.  While this is a step in
the right direction, systematically addressing program officials'
comments in all OIOS reports would help the reader judge the
relevancy of the issues discussed and the recommendations made and
lend credibility to the reports. 


   RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9

Although OIOS has made considerable progress in resolving some
initial operational problems, the USG for Internal Oversight Services
can do more to help maintain OIOS' independence and establish the
office as the authoritative internal oversight mechanism the General
Assembly intended OIOS to be.  As previously noted, we suggested some
actions that could be taken by the USG for Internal Oversight
Services in this regard.  To help focus attention on these matters,
we recommend that the Secretary of State encourage the USG for
Internal Oversight Services to address the noted suggestions. 



   STATE AND OIOS COMMENTS
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :10

The Department of State and OIOS commented on a draft of this report. 
Their comments are reproduced in their entirety in appendixes V and
VI, respectively.  Both generally agreed with our overall conclusions
and observations about OIOS' first 3 years of operations. 

State also said it generally concurred with our suggestions to the
USG for Internal Oversight Services.  It noted that it has a vested
interest in implementing steps to ensure that OIOS functions
effectively through the provision of adequate resources and the
maintenance of a highly skilled and competent professional staff. 
State reiterated its position that effective oversight of U.N. 
programs is of primary importance to the United States and looks
forward to building on the significant progress that OIOS has made in
this area. 

The USG for Internal Oversight Services said that, while OIOS has
become an important and effective component of the U.N.  management
culture, its operations can be fine-tuned.  However, he disagreed
with our suggestions that OIOS revisit its criteria for sending
reports to the Secretary General and the General Assembly and that
OIOS should treat program officials' comments more formally in its
reports. 

With respect to OIOS report distribution, the USG for Internal
Oversight Services reiterated that OIOS only provides its reports to
the Secretary General and the General Assembly when the program
officials disagree with the recommendations.  As already stated, this
criteria does not seem to satisfy a strict reading of the mandate. 
We also believe such limited report distribution is counter to one of
OIOS' intended purposes, which is to provide more visibility over
management's use of U.N.  resources.  In its publication on OIOS, the
U.N.  Department of Public Information states that, OIOS supports the
need "for a more transparent assignment of responsibility and
accountability." It goes on to say that "OIOS puts great emphasis on
transparency of procedures and full consultation with management."\30
Making more reports available to the member states would help enhance
the desired transparency by publicizing reported problem areas, the
steps taken to resolve them, and who is accountable.  Such publicity,
in turn, may also help prevent similar problems from recurring. 

The USG for Internal Oversight Services also said that providing more
reports would only overload the General Assembly's agenda and be an
expensive burden.  We believe the General Assembly should be allowed
to judge for itself whether receiving a larger number of audit and
investigative reports would be too burdensome.  We also believe that
the costs of reproducing copies of reports can be kept to a minimum
by publicly announcing their availability, but only providing copies
to those member states that request them or by making reports
obtainable through the U.N.  intranet. 

With respect to the treatment of program officials' comments on OIOS
reports, the USG for Internal Oversight Services said that these
comments are transmitted to the Secretary General, but to reproduce
dissenting views that the Secretary General does not endorse would be
inappropriate.  We disagree.  We believe that treating program
officials' comments more openly and formally provides OIOS the
opportunity to demonstrate that it is fair and evenhanded and that
its conclusions and recommendations are appropriate.  To do less
leads to speculation and, perhaps, unwarranted criticism that program
officials' comments were not adequately considered and addressed in
the final report. 

Both State and OIOS provided technical comments that have been
incorporated in the report as appropriate. 


--------------------
\30 The Office of Internal Oversight Services of the United Nations,
pp.  1 and 18. 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :11

To determine whether OIOS is in position to be operationally
independent, we reviewed its mandate and procedures and related U.N. 
documents and met with the USG for Internal Oversight Services and
other OIOS officials to determine how OIOS has implemented these
provisions.  We also interviewed several U.S.  officials who helped
draft the resolution creating OIOS and the USG for Administration and
Management, who was involved in helping establish OIOS and providing
it with administrative services.  To compare OIOS operations with
those of U.S.  inspectors general, we reviewed the Inspector General
Act of 1978, as amended.  To help provide a frame of reference for
judging operational independence, we also reviewed the International
Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions' Auditing Standards. 
However, without access to OIOS' reports that had not been provided
to the Secretary General and the General Assembly and its working
papers, we could not take the additional step of testing whether OIOS
had exercised its authority and implemented its procedures in an
independent manner. 

To determine whether OIOS has the necessary resources to carry out
its mission, we reviewed the overall U.N.  budget, budget and
staffing documents for the Office for Inspections and Investigations
and OIOS, and OIOS annual reports.  We interviewed the USG for
Internal Oversight Services, his special assistant, and OIOS unit
chiefs.  We also met with the USG for Administration and Management
and officials in the U.N.  Program, Planning, and Budgeting Division
and the U.N.  Office of Human Resources Management to discuss their
roles in providing resources to OIOS. 

To determine whether OIOS had written policies and procedures in
place for conducting its work, following up on its recommendations,
and providing confidentiality to informants and protecting
whistleblowers from possible reprisal, we reviewed the audit and
investigations manuals and other written guidance made available to
us.  We discussed OIOS procedures and policies with the USG for
Internal Oversight Services and the OIOS unit chiefs.  However, as
previously noted, we were not provided access to OIOS working papers
or other records and files related to specific audits,
investigations, or inspections.  This restriction prevented us from
determining whether (1) OIOS was adhering to its stated policies and
procedures and (2) its analyses were adequate to support its reported
findings and recommendations. 

We also met with representatives of the U.N.  Board of Auditors, the
U.S.  Mission to the United Nations, and the U.S.  State Department
Bureau of International Organization Affairs.  We discussed with them
the origins of OIOS and their perceptions of its operations. 

We conducted our study from March to October 1997 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. 


--------------------------------------------------------- Letter :11.1

As you requested, we plan no further distribution of this report
until
15 days after its issue date.  At that time, we will send copies to
other appropriate congressional committees, the U.N.  USGs for
Internal Oversight Services and Administration and Management, and
the Secretary of State.  Copies will also be made available to other
interested parties upon request. 

This report was prepared under the direction of Benjamin F.  Nelson,
Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, who may be
reached on (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any questions. 
Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix VII. 

Henry L.  Hinton, Jr.
Assistant Comptroller General


UNITED NATIONS' EXTERNAL OVERSIGHT
MECHANISMS
=========================================================== Appendix I

This appendix provides a brief description of external oversight
bodies for the U.N.  system.  These bodies are considered external
oversight mechanisms because they generally report to the governing
bodies of organizations.\1 Unlike the Office of Internal Oversight
Services (OIOS), which is an internal oversight body and has
authority over the operations of the U.N.  Secretariat and separately
administered funds and programs, U.N.  systemwide external bodies
have oversight extending to all U.N.  operations and the specialized
agencies.  The U.N.  external oversight bodies have varying mandates,
extremely broad areas to cover, and modest resources.  The U.N. 
external oversight bodies are the General Assembly's Advisory
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, the Board of
Auditors, the Panel of External Auditors, the General Assembly and
the Economic and Social Council's Committee for Programme and
Coordination, the International Civil Service Commission, and the
Joint Inspection Unit.  (See table I.1 for an overview of the U.N. 
external oversight mechanisms.)

Each specialized agency, as well as the International Atomic Energy
Agency, has its own external auditor that is responsible for auditing
the finances of the organization and reporting to the governing
bodies.  The external auditors are selected from among member states'
supreme audit institutions and are members of the U.N.  Panel of
External Auditors.  For example, the external auditor for the
International Labor Organization is the Auditor General of the United
Kingdom. 



                                    Table I.1
                     
                       Overview of U.N. External Oversight
                                    Mechanisms

                        Year
                        establishe
Organization            d           Function
------------------  --  ----------  --------------------------------------------
Advisory Committee      1946        The Committee, with 16 members chosen by the
on Administrative                   General Assembly on the basis of broad
and Budgetary                       geographical representation, personal
Questions                           qualifications, and expertise, advises and
                                    reports to the General Assembly. The
                                    Chairman serves fulltime. The Committee
                                    examines the proposed U.N. program budget;
                                    administrative and budgetary matters
                                    referred to it, including the financing of
                                    peacekeeping operations and extrabudgetary
                                    activities; and the auditors' reports on the
                                    United Nations. The Committee meets
                                    extensively throughout the year and is
                                    assisted by a small secretariat in New York.

Board of Auditors       1946        The Board, consisting of three auditors
                                    general of member states, provides external
                                    audit oversight functions for the United
                                    Nations and separately administered funds
                                    and programs. Other auditors general serve
                                    as individual external auditors for each of
                                    the specialized agencies and the
                                    International Atomic Energy Agency.

Panel of External       1959        The Panel comprises the above appointed
Auditors                            auditors currently from the United Kingdom,
                                    Ghana, India, Germany, France, Switzerland,
                                    South Africa, and Canada. It meets at least
                                    annually to promote best accounting and
                                    auditing practices in the U.N. system and
                                    undertakes certain related initiatives that
                                    are communicated to governing bodies through
                                    the Advisory Committee on Administrative and
                                    Budgetary Questions and to administrations
                                    through the Administrative Committee on
                                    Coordination.

Committee for           1962        The Committee is the main subsidiary body of
Programme and                       the Economic and Social Council and the
Coordination                        General Assembly for planning, programming,
                                    and coordinating. It reviews U.N. programs
                                    and assists the Economic and Social Council
                                    in its coordination functions, including
                                    considering the activities and programs of
                                    agencies of the United Nations and the U.N.
                                    system, systemwide coherence and
                                    coordination, and the implementation of
                                    important legislative decisions. Its
                                    conclusions and recommendations play a role
                                    in the adoption of the U.N. program budget
                                    by the General Assembly. The Committee has
                                    34 elected members, is based in New York,
                                    and meets for 4 to 6 weeks per year.

International           1974        The Commission comprises 15 independent
Civil Service                       experts appointed in their personal
Commission                          capacities by the General Assembly. The
                                    Chairman and Vice Chairman serve full time.
                                    The Commission makes recommendations to the
                                    General Assembly for the regulation and
                                    coordination of conditions of service within
                                    the U.N. common system and has certain
                                    decision-making functions regarding
                                    salaries, allowances, and job classification
                                    standards. It meets twice yearly for about
                                    3 weeks each time and is serviced by a
                                    secretariat in New York.

Joint Inspection        1968        The Unit comprises 11 inspectors from
Unit                                different member states who serve in their
                                    personal capacities. They are chosen by the
                                    General Assembly on the basis of membership
                                    in national supervision or inspection bodies
                                    or similar competence. They review matters
                                    bearing on the efficiency of the services
                                    and proper use of funds and seek to improve
                                    management, methods, and coordination
                                    through inspection and evaluation. The Unit
                                    provides reports with recommendations to the
                                    United Nations and its funds and programs
                                    and specialized agencies.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------
\1 The organizations we describe here were identified as external
oversight mechanisms by the Joint Inspection Unit in its report
entitled Accountability, Management Improvement, and Oversight in the
United Nations System (Geneva:  Nov.  1995). 


OIOS ORGANIZATION AND UNIT
FUNCTIONS, BUDGET, AND STAFFING
========================================================== Appendix II

OIOS consists of four operational units--the Audit and Management
Consulting Division, the Investigations Section, the Central
Monitoring and Inspection Unit, and the Central Evaluation Unit.  It
also has an office of the Under Secretary General (USG) for Internal
Oversight Services.  The Audit and Management Consulting Division is
headed by a Director and a Deputy Director.  The other three OIOS
units are headed by section or unit chiefs who, like the Director of
the audit division, report directly to the USG for Internal Oversight
Services.  Figure II.1 shows the organizational structure for OIOS. 
Table II.1 provides an overview of each unit's function, its budget,
and staffing. 

   Figure II.1:  OIOS Organization
   Chart

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  The Office of Internal Oversight Services of the United
Nations, page 4. 



                                    Table II.1
                     
                     Overview of OIOS Functions, Budget, and
                                      Staff

                              (Dollars in millions)

                                                           1996-97 biennium
                                                      --------------------------
                                                      Budget
OIOS unit           Functions                             \a             Staff\b
------------------  --------------------------------  ------  ------------------
Office of the       The Office provides overall         $1.5      3 professional
 Under               direction, supervision, and                       4 support
 Secretary General   management of the activities of
                     OIOS. It is also responsible
                     for the planning and monitoring
                     of the work program of OIOS as
                     well as for providing
                     administrative support.
Audit and           The Division provides               $7.8     29 professional
 Management          comprehensive audit services                     11 support
 Consulting          for all U.N. activities for
 Division            which the Secretary General has
                     administrative responsibility.
                     These audits should promote
                     reliability of information;
                     compliance with policies,
                     regulations, rules, and
                     procedures; the safeguarding of
                     assets; the economical,
                     efficient, and effective use of
                     resources (value for money);
                     and the accomplishment of
                     established objectives and
                     goals for operations and
                     programs.
Investigations      The Section investigates reports    $2.6     12 professional
 Section             of violations of U.N.                             3 support
                     regulations, rules, and
                     pertinent administrative
                     issuances and transmits to the
                     Secretary General the results
                     of such investigations,
                     together with appropriate
                     recommendations, to guide the
                     Secretary General in deciding
                     on jurisdictional or
                     disciplinary action to be
                     taken.
Central Monitoring  The Unit's role is to (1)           $1.4      6 professional
 and Inspection      enhance and strengthen the                        3 support
 Unit                management of programs and
                     ensure that monitoring and
                     self-evaluation functions in
                     each organizational unit of the
                     Secretariat are viewed as an
                     integral part of management
                     oversight responsibility for
                     the efficiency and
                     effectiveness of program
                     performance; (2) provide
                     support to managers in
                     establishing a proper system of
                     program monitoring, including
                     the development of performance
                     indicators and the analytical
                     assessment of performance; (3)
                     provide necessary analytical
                     and transparent information on
                     actual program performance to
                     intergovernmental bodies; and
                     (4) undertake quick analyses
                     for the identification of
                     problems affecting the
                     efficient implementation of
                     programmed activities and
                     recommend corrective measures
                     as appropriate.
Central Evaluation  The Unit determines, as             $1.7      6 professional
 Unit                systematically and objectively                    4 support
                     as possible, the relevance,
                     efficiency, effectiveness, and
                     impact of U.N. activities in
                     relation to their objectives,
                     to enable the Secretariat and
                     member states to make informed
                     decisions about the
                     continuation of these
                     activities.
================================================================================
Total                                                  $15.0     56 professional
                                                                      25 support
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Excludes $6.6 million in extrabudgetary resources provided by
other departments or organizations for the audit division. 

\b Excludes 36 extrabudgetary positions and 6 resident auditors for
the audit division and 1 staff member on nonreimbursable loan. 

Sources:  The Office of Internal Oversight Services of the United
Nations, the proposed U.N.  budget for 1998-99, and OIOS officials. 


COMPARISON OF U.S.  INSPECTOR
GENERAL OFFICES AND OIOS
========================================================= Appendix III

Prior to the creation of OIOS in July 1994, the United States and
other member states, as well as the U.S.  Congress and GAO, had
expressed concern about the way the United Nations managed its
resources and criticized the inadequacies of preexisting internal
oversight mechanisms.  In response to these concerns, the Secretary
General established the Office for Inspections and Investigations in
August 1993 under the leadership of an Assistant Secretary General. 
However, member states--primarily the United States--wanted a more
autonomous oversight body with more authority. 

In November 1993, the U.S.  Permanent Representative to the United
Nations proposed the establishment of an "Office of the Inspector
General" to the General Assembly.  According to the proposal, the
office would support member states and the Secretary General by
providing independent advice based on an examination of all
activities carried out at all U.N.  headquarters and field locations
financed from the regular budget, peacekeeping budgets, and voluntary
contributions.  At the same time, the new office would have external
reporting responsibilities.  The office would be headed by an
"Inspector General" (IG) who, although an integral part of the
Secretariat, would carry out his/her responsibilities entirely
independent of the Secretariat and all U.N.  governing bodies. 

In April 1994, Congress enacted Public Law 103-236 (sec.  401(b))
which, among other things, emphasized the importance of establishing
such an office.  The legislation required certain funds to be
withheld from the United Nations until the President certified that
it had established an independent office to conduct and supervise
objective audits, investigations, and inspections relating to the
programs and operations of the United Nations.  The legislation
stated that the office should have (1) access to all records and
documents; (2) procedures to ensure compliance with recommendations
of the office; and (3) procedures to protect the identity of, and to
prevent reprisals against, any staff members making a complaint or
disclosing information, or cooperating in any investigation or
inspection by the office. 

After a series of negotiations among member states, including the
United States, a compromise was reached, and the General Assembly, in
July 1994, approved a resolution creating OIOS within the U.N. 
Secretariat.  OIOS' mandate reflects many of the characteristics of
U.S.  inspector general offices.  Table III.1 provides a comparison
of U.S.  offices of inspectors general and OIOS. 



                                   Table III.1
                     
                     Comparison of U.S. Offices of Inspectors
                                 General and OIOS

                    U.S. offices of inspectors     U.N. Office of Internal
                    general                        Oversight Services
Subject             -----------------------------  -----------------------------
Purpose             Provide a means for keeping    Assist the Secretary General
                    the head of the agency and     in fulfilling his internal
                    the Congress fully and         oversight responsibilities
                    currently informed about       relating to resources and
                    problems and deficiencies in   staff of the organization,
                    programs and operations.       including separately
                                                   administered organizations of
                                                   the United Nations.

Authority           Neither the head of the        Exercise operational
                    agency nor the officer next    independence to initiate,
                    in rank below the head shall   carry out, and report on any
                    prevent or prohibit the IG     action that OIOS considers
                    from initiating, carrying      necessary to fulfill its
                    out, or completing any audit   responsibilities. OIOS may
                    or investigation.              not be prohibited or hindered
                                                   from carrying out any action
                                                   within the purview of its
                                                   mandate.

                    Each IG is authorized to have  OIOS staff have the right of
                    access to all records,         access to all persons,
                    reports, audits, reviews,      records, documents, or other
                    documents, papers,             material assets and premises
                    recommendations, or other      and to obtain such
                    material that relate to        information and explanations
                    programs and operations.       they consider necessary to
                                                   fulfill their
                                                   responsibilities.

Office head         IGs, who report to and are     USG for Internal Oversight
                    under the general supervision  Services, who is under the
                    of the agency head.            authority of the Secretary
                                                   General.

Appointment         IGs are appointed solely on    The USG for Internal
                    the basis of integrity and     Oversight Services shall be
                    demonstrated ability in        an expert in the fields of
                    accounting, auditing,          accounting, auditing,
                    financial analysis, law,       financial analysis and
                    management analysis, public    investigations, management,
                    administration, or             law, or public
                    investigations.                administration.

                    The President appoints 27 IGs  The USG for Internal
                    with the advice and consent    Oversight Services shall be
                    of the Senate. Agency heads    appointed by the Secretary
                    appoint 30 IGs.                General, following
                                                   consultations with member
                                                   states, and approved by the
                                                   General Assembly.

                    IGs are appointed without      The Secretary General shall
                    regard to political            appoint the USG for Internal
                    affiliation.                   Oversight Services with due
                                                   regard for geographic
                                                   rotation.

                    Most IGs have no fixed term    The USG for Internal
                    of service.                    Oversight Services shall
                                                   serve for one fixed term of 5
                                                   years without possibility of
                                                   renewal.

Removal             An IG appointed by the         The USG for Internal
                    President and confirmed by     Oversight Services may be
                    the Senate may be removed      removed by the Secretary
                    from office by the President.  General only for cause and
                    Likewise, the agency heads     with the approval of the
                    who appoint IGs may also       General Assembly.
                    remove them. However, for all
                    IGs, the reasons for such
                    removal shall be communicated
                    to the Congress.

Budget              IGs appointed by the           OIOS budget proposals are
                    President have separate line   submitted to the Secretary
                    item accounts in their         General, who submits
                    agencies' budgets. Agency-     proposals to the General
                    appointed IGs' offices are     Assembly for its
                    financed with funds that are   consideration and approval,
                    available for other agency     taking into account the
                    activities.                    office's independence in the
                                                   exercise of its functions.
                                                   OIOS is a separate line item
                                                   in the U.N. Secretariat's
                                                   budget.

Coordination        Each IG gives particular       OIOS shall coordinate its
                    regard to the activities of    activities and provide the
                    the Comptroller General, with  Board of Auditors and the
                    a view toward avoiding         Joint Inspection Unit with
                    duplication and ensuring       OIOS reports that have been
                    effective coordination and     submitted to the Secretary
                    cooperation.                   General and the comments of
                                                   the Secretary General on
                                                   them.

Standards           Each IG shall comply with      There is no requirement that
                    audit standards established    OIOS establish guidelines and
                    by the Comptroller General.    standards appropriate to the
                    Also, the IGs have             United Nations for any of its
                    established quality standards  functions.
                    for investigations and
                    inspections.

Function

Audit               Create independent and         Examine, review, and appraise
                    objective units to conduct     the use of financial
                    and supervise audits and       resources. Ascertain
                    promote economy, efficiency,   compliance of program
                    and effectiveness of programs  managers with financial and
                    and operations.                administrative regulations
                                                   and rules. Undertake
                                                   management audits, reviews,
                                                   and surveys. Monitor the
                                                   effectiveness of internal
                                                   control systems.

Investigation       Create independent and         Investigate reports of
                    objective units to conduct     violations of U.N.
                    and supervise investigations   regulations, rules, and
                    of programs and operations.    administrative documents.
                    Prevent and detect fraud and   Assess the potential within
                    abuse in programs and          program areas for fraud and
                    operations.                    other violations through the
                                                   analysis of systems of
                                                   control.

Inspection          While inspection is not        Conduct inspections of
                    specifically mandated by law,  organizational units whenever
                    many IGs perform a similar     there are indications that
                    function.                      programs are not adequately
                                                   managed or executed and that
                                                   resources are not being
                                                   efficiently used.

Monitoring          While monitoring is not        Monitor program
                    specifically mandated by law,  implementation and ensure
                    many IGs perform a similar     that monitoring is viewed as
                    function.                      managerial responsibility.

Evaluation          While evaluation is not        Conduct evaluations of U.N.
                    specifically mandated by law,  programs to assess the
                    many IGs perform a similar     efficiency and effectiveness
                    function.                      of the implementation of
                                                   programs and legislative
                                                   mandates. Encourage self-
                                                   evaluation by program
                                                   managers and provide them
                                                   with methodological support.

Reporting

Reports on          Each IG is required to keep    OIOS shall submit reports
programs,           the head of the agency and     that provide insight into the
operations, or      the Congress fully and         effective use and management
utilization of      currently informed by means    of resources and the
resources           of reports and otherwise.      protection of assets to the
                    Written reports communicate    Secretary General, who shall
                    the results of audits to       ensure that all such reports
                    officials at all levels of     are made available to the
                    government and, unless         General Assembly as
                    restricted by law or           presented, together with any
                    regulation, copies should be   separate comments the
                    made available for public      Secretary General may deem
                    inspection.                    appropriate.

Reports on          Each IG shall prepare          OIOS shall submit an annual
activities of the   semiannual reports             analytical and summary report
office              summarizing the activities of  on OIOS activities to the
                    the IG's office during the     Secretary General, who shall
                    preceding 6-month period.      ensure that such reports are
                    These reports are furnished    made available to the General
                    to the agency head for         Assembly as presented,
                    transmittal to the Congress,   together with any separate
                    together with a report by the  comments the Secretary
                    agency head.                   General may deem appropriate.

Reports on          IGs prepare semiannual         OIOS shall report to the
recommendation      reports that include           Secretary General as
status              information on the status of   necessary, but at least twice
                    audit recommendations. These   yearly, on the implementation
                    reports are submitted to       of recommendations.
                    agency heads for transmittal
                    to the Congress.

Recommendation      Agency heads are responsible   The Secretary General shall
follow-up           for designating a top          facilitate the prompt and
                    management official to         effective implementation of
                    oversee audit follow-up,       OIOS recommendations and
                    including resolution and       inform the General Assembly
                    corrective action.             of actions taken in response
                                                   to recommendations.

                    IGs are responsible for        The USG for Internal
                    reviewing responses to audit   Oversight Services shall
                    reports and reporting          report to the Secretary
                    significant disagreements to   General for a final decision
                    the audit follow-up official.  on recommendations with which
                                                   the program managers
                                                   concerned do not agree.

Referrals           Each IG shall report           Disciplinary and/or
                    expeditiously to the Attorney  jurisdictional proceedings
                    General whenever the IG has    are initiated without undue
                    reasonable grounds to believe  delay in cases where the
                    a federal criminal law has     Secretary General considers
                    been violated.                 it justified.

Protection for      Unless the IG determines       The Secretary General is to
complainants        disclosure is unavoidable,     ensure that procedures are in
                    the IG shall not disclose the  place to provide for direct
                    identity of employees who      confidential access of staff
                    report possible violations of  members to OIOS, provide
                    law, gross waste of funds,     protection against
                    and abuse of authority         repercussions for staff
                    without consent. Also,         members who provide
                    employees are to be protected  information, and protect the
                    from reprisal for making a     anonymity of staff members.
                    complaint to the IG.

Additional          The "Inspectors General        OIOS may advise program
authorities         Vision Statement" states that  managers on the effective
                    IGs will work with agency      discharge of their
                    heads and the Congress to      responsibilities, provide
                    improve program management     assistance to program
                    and to build relationships     managers in implementing
                    with program managers based    recommendations, ascertain
                    on a shared commitment to      that program managers are
                    improving program operations   given methodological support,
                    and effectiveness.             and encourage self-
                                                   evaluation.

                    Each IG is authorized to       The USG for Internal
                    select, appoint, and employ    Oversight Services shall
                    such officers and employees    exercise the degree of
                    as may be necessary            latitude and control over
                                                   OIOS personnel and resources
                                                   that is necessary to achieve
                                                   the objectives of the office.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sources of information on U.S.  offices of inspectors general: 
Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended; Quality Standards for
Investigations, President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency,
(Washington, D.C.:  1985); Office of Management and Budget Circular
A-50, "Audit Follow-up," revised (Washington, D.C.:  Sept.  29,
1992); Quality Standards for Inspections, President's Council on
Integrity and Efficiency (Washington, D.C.:  Mar.  1993); Action
Needed to Strengthen OIGs at Designated Federal Entities
(GAO/AIMD-94-39, Nov.  30, 1993); Inspectors General Vision Statement
(Washington, D.C.:  Jan.  1994); Government Auditing Standards:  1994
Revision (GAO/OCG-94-4, June 1994). 

Sources of Information on the U.N.  Office of Internal Oversight
Services:  U.N.  General Assembly Resolution 48/218B, July 29, 1994;
U.N.  Secretary General's Bulletin ST/SGB/273, September 7, 1994. 


COMPARISON OF OIOS RESOURCES WITH
OTHER U.N.  SECRETARIAT FUNCTIONS
========================================================== Appendix IV

While the overall regular budget for the U.N.  Secretariat has
decreased since the 1994-95 biennium, OIOS' budget increased by 55
percent.  Five of the 12 other functions had budget decreases over
the period.  Concerning staffing, while several U.N.  Secretariat
functions had staffing increases from the 1994-95 to the 1996-97
biennium, all except OIOS experienced staff decreases in the proposed
1998-99 biennium budget.  Tables IV.1 and IV.2 provide a comparison
of OIOS' budget and staffing levels with other U.N.  Secretariat
functions, respectively. 



                               Table IV.1
                
                    OIOS' and Other U.N. Secretariat
                           Functions' Budgets

                         (Dollars in millions)

                                                     1996-97
                                          1994-95  Appropria   1998-99
U.N. Secretariat function                Adjusted        ted  Proposed
---------------------------------------  --------  ---------  --------
Overall policy-making, direction, and       $37.2      $35.9     $38.6
 coordination
Political affairs                           198.3      199.4     164.9
International justice and law                50.7       50.2      55.5
International cooperation for               301.0      294.3     302.3
 development
Regional cooperation for development        339.3      351.8     399.4
Human rights and humanitarian affairs       132.7      134.3     138.6
Public information                          131.4      134.3     140.3
Common support services                     903.0      938.2     904.2
======================================================================
Office of Internal Oversight Services        12.0       15.0      18.6
Special expenses                             60.1       68.8      60.0
Capital expenditures                         83.8       28.6      35.9
Staff assessment                            357.8      348.3     324.6
International Seabed Authority                0.8        4.0         0
======================================================================
Total                                    $2,608.1   $2,603.1  $2,582.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  U.N.  budget documents. 



                               Table IV.2
                
                    OIOS' and Other U.N. Secretariat
                Functions' Regular Budget Positions, by
                                Function

                                                       1996-
                                            1994-       1997     1998-
                                             1995  Appropria      1999
U.N. Secretariat function                Adjusted        ted  Proposed
---------------------------------------  --------  ---------  --------
Overall policy-making, direction and          120        122       117
 coordination
Political affairs                             767        729       641
International justice and law                 205        202       199
International cooperation for               1,329      1,324     1,209
 development
Regional cooperation for development        2,157      2,165     1,982
Human rights and humanitarian affairs         566        570       522
Public information                            837        822       740
Common support services                     3,997      3,933     3,347
======================================================================
Office of Internal Oversight Services        72\a         81        82
Special expenses                               65         64         0
Capital expenditures\b                          0          0         0
Staff assessment\b                              0          0         0
International Seabed Authority\b                0          0         0
======================================================================
Total                                      10,115     10,012     8,839
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a OIOS absorbed 64 positions from the Office for Inspections and
Investigations and was granted 8 new positions during the 1994-95
biennium. 

\b These functions do not have designated staff. 

Source:  U.N.  budget documents. 




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix V
COMMENTS FROM THE U.S.  DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
========================================================== Appendix IV



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix VI
COMMENTS FROM THE U.N.  OFFICE OF
INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES
========================================================== Appendix IV



(See figure in printed edition.)


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================= Appendix VII

NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Harold J.  Johnson, Jr.
A.H.  Huntington, III
Zina D.  Merritt
Sandra D.  Gove

ACCOUNTING AND INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT DIVISION, WASHINGTON,
D.C. 

Jackson W.  Hufnagle

OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS

Norman M.  Burrell

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL

Mark C.  Speight


*** End of document. ***