Bosnia: Operational Decisions Needed Before Estimating DOD's Costs
(Briefing Report, 02/11/98, GAO/NSIAD-98-77BR).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) the Department of
Defense's (DOD) incremental costs for its Bosnia operations; (2) whether
DOD's fiscal year (FY) 1998 appropriations for Bosnia are adequate to
cover the costs of planned operations; and (3) the nature and timing of
key decisions that could significantly affect the costs.

GAO noted that: (1) DOD's incremental costs for its operations in and
around Bosnia are expected to be $6.4 billion through June 1998; (2) DOD
reported $2.5 billion in costs for FY 1996 and $2.3 billion for FY 1997;
(3) for FY 1998, DOD is estimating costs of $1.6 billion for its Bosnia
operations; (4) DOD based its FY 1998 estimate on the then-current plan
to withdraw U.S. forces by June 1998 and consequently requested no funds
for Bosnia in the FY 1999 President's budget; (5) FY 1998 Bosnia funding
will not cover DOD's likely Bosnia costs if the President's tentative
decision to extend the mission beyond June 1998 is affirmed; (6)
operations costs for July-September 1998 are unbudgeted, as is a troop
rotation due in the summer to replace Army troops currently in Bosnia;
(7) therefore, executing commands, such as U.S. Army Europe, will
require additional funds for Bosnia or will need to reduce other planned
activities, such as training and equipment maintenance; (8) however,
funding requirements for these unanticipated tasks should be offset
somewhat by the availability of budgeted funds no longer required in FY
1998, such as funds for closing all base camps; (9) revised
budget-quality estimates for fiscal years 1998-1999 are not likely until
key decisions are made; (10) to be as accurate as possible, estimates
should be based on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and U.S.
decisions about the mission in Bosnia, the military tasks, force size,
force mix, operational tempo, and logistical and other factors; (11)
also, the military services are considering additional ways to reduce
costs, now that the Bosnia mission appears to have been extended; (12)
to meet Congress' legislative calendar, in March 1998, DOD plans to
amend its FY 1999 budget and request supplemental appropriations for FY
1998; and (13) however, if NATO and the United States have not decided
on the force size and other details by March, then budget-quality
estimates may not be possible at that time.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-98-77BR
     TITLE:  Bosnia: Operational Decisions Needed Before Estimating 
             DOD's Costs
      DATE:  02/11/98
   SUBJECT:  Military operations
             Presidential budgets
             International agreements
             Defense budgets
             Future budget projections
             Defense appropriations
             Armed forces abroad
             Cost analysis
             NATO military forces
IDENTIFIER:  Bosnia
             General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
             Herzegovina (Dayton Agreement)
             NATO
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Briefing Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S.  Senate

February 1998

BOSNIA - OPERATIONAL DECISIONS
NEEDED BEFORE ESTIMATING DOD'S
COSTS

GAO/NSIAD-98-77BR

DOD's Bosnia Costs

(701123)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DOD - Department of Defense
  NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
  SFOR - Stabilization Force

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-279183

February 11, 1998

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate

Dear Mr.  Chairman: 

As you know, we have reported extensively on contingency operations,
including the Department of Defense's (DOD) costs for military
operations in and around Bosnia and Herzegovina\1

and on the progress toward restoring peace in Bosnia (see page 24 for
a list of related GAO products).  As you requested, this report
reviews (1) DOD's incremental costs for its Bosnia operations, (2)
whether DOD's fiscal year 1998 appropriations for Bosnia are adequate
to cover the costs of planned operations, and (3) the nature and
timing of key decisions that could significantly affect the costs. 
We will be sending you shortly related reports on the progress made
toward achieving the Dayton Agreement's goals for Bosnia and on the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 


--------------------
\1 Hereafter, we have referred to Bosnia and Herzegovina as Bosnia. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

Since December 1995, the United States has deployed military forces
in and around Bosnia to assist in implementing the General Framework
Agreement (also known as the Dayton Agreement).  U.S.  forces are
part of a multilateral coalition under the command of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  From December 1995 to December
1996, the coalition was called the Implementation Force.  In December
1996, NATO authorized a new mission and renamed the coalition the
Stabilization Force (SFOR). 

On December 18, 1997, the President announced that in principle the
United States will participate in an international military presence
in Bosnia past June 1998, when SFOR's mandate expires.  According to
the President, the agreement in principle will become a commitment
only when he approves NATO's action plan for its military forces. 

In this report, the costs of operations in and around Bosnia exclude
the costs of Task Force Able Sentry in Macedonia ($11.7 million in
fiscal year 1997).  In its reports, DOD includes Macedonia costs as
Bosnia costs.  Also, we have used the term "budget-quality
estimates," by which we mean budget estimates based on known
operational and cost factors, rather than a rough guess or
willingness to pay. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

DOD's incremental costs for its operations in and around Bosnia are
expected to be $6.4 billion through June 1998.  DOD reported $2.5
billion in costs for fiscal year 1996 and $2.3 billion for fiscal
year 1997.  For fiscal year 1998, DOD is estimating costs of $1.6
billion for its Bosnia operations.  DOD based its fiscal year 1998
estimate on the then-current plan to withdraw U.S.  forces by June
1998 and consequently requested no funds for Bosnia in the fiscal
year 1999 President's budget. 

Fiscal year 1998 Bosnia funding will not cover DOD's likely Bosnia
costs if the President's tentative decision to extend the mission
beyond June 1998 is affirmed.  Operations costs for July-September
1998 are unbudgeted, as is a troop rotation due in the summer to
replace Army troops currently in Bosnia.  Therefore, executing
commands, such as U.S.  Army Europe, will require additional funds
for Bosnia or will need to reduce other planned activities, such as
training and equipment maintenance.  However, funding requirements
for these unanticipated tasks should be offset somewhat by the
availability of budgeted funds no longer required in fiscal year
1998, such as funds for closing all base camps. 

Revised budget-quality estimates for fiscal years 1998-99 are not
likely until key decisions are made.  To be as accurate as possible,
estimates should be based on NATO and U.S.  decisions about the
mission in Bosnia, the military tasks, force size, force mix,
operational tempo, and logistical and other factors.  Also, the
military services are considering additional ways to reduce costs,
now that the Bosnia mission appears to have been extended.  To meet
Congress' legislative calendar, in March 1998, DOD plans to amend its
fiscal year 1999 budget and request supplemental appropriations for
fiscal year 1998.  However, if NATO and the United States have not
decided on the force size and other details by March, then
budget-quality estimates may not be possible at that time. 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

To obtain prior-year costs for DOD's Bosnia operations, we used data
reported by DOD components to the Defense Finance and Accounting
Service's Denver Center.  To obtain current cost estimates and other
data, we interviewed officials and examined documents at the Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the offices of
the Assistant Secretaries (Financial Management and Comptroller) of
the military services.  To discuss fiscal year 1998 cost estimates,
current operations, and key decisions, we also visited the Air Combat
Command Headquarters, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; the U.S. 
European Command Headquarters, the U.S.  Air Forces in Europe
Headquarters, and the U.S.  Army Europe Headquarters, all in Germany;
and the U.S.  Mission to NATO, Brussels, Belgium.  We did not
independently verify the financial data DOD provided us.  Our past
work has shown that DOD's financial information is not always
reliable and that its financial management practices are sometimes
inadequate. 

We performed our review between October 1997 and January 1998 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  We
reviewed the information in this report with DOD officials and made
changes where appropriate.  DOD officials agreed with the facts in
this report. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1

We are providing copies of this report to other congressional
committees and to the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and
the Air Force, and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. 
This report will also be made available to others on request.  If you
or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me
at (202) 512-3504. 
Steven H.  Sternlieb, Assistant Director, and Douglas M.  Horner,
Senior Evaluator, prepared this report. 

Sincerely yours,

Richard Davis
Director, National Security
 Analysis


Briefing Section DOD'S BOSNIA
COSTS
============================================================== Letter 



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


   U.S.  MILITARY HAS MAJOR ROLE
   IN IMPLEMENTING DAYTON PEACE
   AGREEMENT
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4


Since December 1995, the United States has deployed military forces
in and around Bosnia to assist in implementing the General Framework
Agreement (also known as the Dayton Agreement).  U.S.  forces are
part of a multilateral coalition under the command of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  From December 1995 to December
1996, the coalition was called the Implementation Force.  In December
1996, NATO authorized a new mission and renamed the coalition the
Stabilization Force (SFOR). 

In Bosnia, the United States provides approximately 8,300
troops--about 25 percent--of SFOR's 31,000 troops.  In addition, the
United States supports SFOR with about 3,400 troops based in Italy,
Hungary, and Croatia.  These figures are approximate averages--actual
troop strengths vary over time.  For example, during 1997, U.S.  Army
personnel in and around Bosnia numbered about 11,400 in January,
declined to 8,800 in July, peaked at 14,400 in October, and dropped
to 9,100 in December. 

Americans hold key leadership positions.  SFOR is commanded by a U.S. 
Army general under the overall military authority of the Supreme
Allied Commander, Europe, also a U.S.  Army officer.  In addition,
another U.S.  Army general commands Multi-National Division-North,
one of the three military districts into which NATO divides Bosnia. 

On December 18, 1997, the President announced that in principle the
United States will participate in an international military presence
in Bosnia past June 1998, when SFOR's mandate expires.  According to
the President, the agreement in principle will become a commitment
only when he approves NATO's action plan for its military forces. 
NATO is currently developing options for the mission and size of
military forces in Bosnia after June 1998. 




   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


   MILITARY TASKS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5


Under the provisions of the Dayton Agreement, the primary military
objective for the NATO-led coalition is to prevent resumption of the
war that raged in Bosnia from 1992 to October 1995.  The military
tasks include separating the armed forces of the parties to the
Dayton Agreement, moving these forces and their heavy weapons into
approved sites, regularly inspecting these sites, confiscating and
destroying illegal weapons, patrolling the 1,400-kilometer (870-mile)
demilitarized boundary line, and monitoring the training and movement
of the parties.  In addition, NATO--including U.S.--aircraft have
enforced a "no fly" zone over Bosnia since April 1993.  During a
3-month period in 1997, 8,250 sorties were flown by combat aircraft
in support of the Bosnia mission.  Force protection is also an
important task for the military. 

The NATO-led military coalition also performs supporting tasks
"within the limits of its assigned principal tasks and available
resources." These tasks include providing increased security and
transporting ballots during elections, assisting with the movement of
humanitarian organizations, preventing interference with civilian
movement and refugee resettlement, and monitoring the clearing of
minefields and obstacles.  The military also assists the Office of
the High Representative and the United Nations with certain tasks,
such as monitoring and restructuring police.  For example, in
November 1997, SFOR confiscated the weapons of the Republika Srpska
Specialist Police Unit in Doboj and gave police officials direction
on the future role of the force. 



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


   $6.4 BILLION IN DOD COSTS ARE
   EXPECTED THROUGH JUNE 1998
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6


The Department of Defense's (DOD) incremental costs for its
operations in and around Bosnia are expected to be $6,389 million
through June 1998.  DOD reported $2,489 million in costs for fiscal
year 1996 and $2,271 million for fiscal year 1997, for a total of
$4,760 million.  In early December 1997, DOD estimated fiscal year
1998 costs at $1,629 million.  However, the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) prepared the estimate before the
President's December 18, 1997, decision to extend the U.S.  military
presence in Bosnia.  Therefore, the estimate assumed withdrawal of
U.S.  forces by June 1998. 

Incremental costs are additional costs to DOD that are directly
related to the Bosnia operation and would not otherwise have been
incurred.  In some cases, incremental costs are offset by avoiding
costs (such as training exercises) that would have occurred in the
absence of the operation. 



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


   FISCAL YEAR 1997 OPERATIONS
   WERE FULLY FUNDED
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7


In March 1997, DOD revised its fiscal year 1997 Bosnia budget
estimate to $2,510 million.  This revised estimate was $2 billion
more than the initial fiscal year 1997 request of $542 million that
was predicated on a withdrawal of U.S.  troops in December 1996,
because the President and NATO decided to extend the Bosnia mission
beyond that date. 

In December 1997, DOD reported $2,271 million in incremental Bosnia
costs for fiscal year 1997.\2 The Army incurred nearly 80 percent
($1,767 million) of these costs.  The Air Force had the next largest
share, $256 million, while the Navy and the Marine Corps had $77
million in costs.  The remaining $172 million were incurred by the
following DOD components:  the Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense
Information Systems Agency, Defense Logistics Agency, National
Imagery and Mapping Agency, Defense Health Program, the U.S.  Special
Operations Command, and the National Security Agency. 

Fiscal year 1997 Bosnia costs were financed by the Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997 (P.L.  104-208), and by the
June 1997 supplemental appropriations act (P.L.  105-18) that
provided additional funds for the Bosnia operation and for other
purposes.\3 However, the $1.9 billion appropriated to DOD in the
supplemental appropriations act was offset by rescissions of $1.9
billion in other previously appropriated DOD funds. 

In total, Congress appropriated $2,570 million for operation and
maintenance expenses of contingency operations in fiscal year 1997. 
These funds were appropriated to the Overseas Contingency Operations
Transfer Fund, and the funds not needed for Bosnia were applied to
other contingency operations, such as those in Southwest Asia,
according to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller).  The transfer fund is available to pay for overseas
contingency operations--as operations unfold during the year, DOD
transfers money from the fund to the military services' operation and
maintenance accounts. 




   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


--------------------
\2 The Defense Finance and Accounting Service reported $2,280 million
for fiscal year 1997 in its December 1997 contingency cost reports on
Bosnia.  In February 1998, the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller) told us that these costs should be reduced by
$17 million because of an error in recording Navy military personnel
costs, and should be increased by $8 million because of previously
unreported National Security Agency costs.  The net result of these
adjustments is fiscal year 1997 costs of $2,271 million. 

\3 P.L.  105-18 also funded recovery from natural disasters, created
a National Commission on the Cost of Higher Education, and modified
the Food Stamp Act of 1977. 


   FISCAL YEAR 1998 BUDGET REQUEST
   WAS $1.5 BILLION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

Note:Numbers may not add due to rounding. 


For fiscal year 1998, DOD requested and received from Congress $1,468
million for its Bosnia operations.  DOD's request assumed that U.S. 
forces would withdraw from Bosnia by June 1998.  Funds for the Army
were nearly 70 percent of the total request ($1,009 million).  The
Air Force had the next largest share, $313 million, while the Navy
and the Marine Corps were budgeted at $82 million for Bosnia.  DOD
also requested $64 million for the U.S.  Special Operations Command,
the Defense Health Program, and several defense agencies.  Congress
fully funded DOD's request for Bosnia in the fiscal year 1998 DOD
Appropriations Act (P.L.  105-56). 

Operation and maintenance funds comprise 85 percent of the total
request and are used for a wide variety of purposes, including
transportation of personnel, goods, and equipment; unit operational
tempo (fuel and repair parts); base operating support; clothing,
individual equipment, and personal demand items for troops; per diem;
facilities and headquarters costs; and intelligence, communications,
and logistics support. 

Military personnel funds are the remainder of the request.  Most of
these funds are for the pay and allowances of mobilized (mostly Army)
reservists.  Military personnel funds are also used for special
payments or allowances for all qualifying military personnel, such as
Imminent Danger Pay ($150 per month), Family Separation Allowance
($75 per month), and Foreign Duty Pay (an average of $15 per month
for enlisted personnel). 



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


   FISCAL YEAR 1998 COSTS HIGHER
   THAN BUDGETED
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9


In December 1997, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) estimated that DOD's Bosnia costs for fiscal year 1998
would be $1,629 million, or $161 million more than DOD's budget
request of $1,468 million. 

The Comptroller's staff estimates that program changes will increase
costs by $343 million over budget, including costs for sustainment,
unit operating tempo (fuel and parts), deployment to the theater, and
military pay.  DOD's budget assumed that 5,000 troops would be
deployed in and around Bosnia.  Instead, about 12,000 troops have
been deployed during the first quarter of the fiscal year. 
Furthermore, the Army has used more reservists than the budget
assumed, which has increased incremental Bosnia costs.  Under the
definition of incremental costs, all pay for reservists on active
duty is an incremental cost, while only special payments (such as
Imminent Danger Pay) that active duty personnel receive for deploying
to Bosnia are considered incremental costs. 

Other costs are projected to be $182 million lower than planned in
the budget, including travel, rents and leases, and
contractor-provided support in Bosnia and Hungary.  Contractors
provide a wide range of services, including base camp maintenance,
food, water, laundry service, snow and ice removal, road repair, and
waste management. 

However, the Comptroller's staff prepared this revised estimate
before the President announced his decision in principle to extend
DOD's mission in Bosnia beyond June 1998.  Extending the mission past
June 1998 will further increase fiscal year 1998 costs.  Operations
costs for July-September 1998 are unbudgeted, as is a troop rotation
due in the summer to replace Army troops currently in Bosnia. 
Therefore, executing commands, such as U.S.  Army Europe, will
require additional funds for Bosnia or will need to reduce other
planned activities, such as training and equipment maintenance. 

Funding requirements for these unanticipated tasks should be offset
somewhat by the availability of approximately $135 million in
budgeted funds no longer required in fiscal year 1998.  These offsets
include about $60 million for the Army to close base camps and
perform other activities; $10 million for the Navy to help close base
camps; and $65 million for the planned operation of the Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System, which DOD no longer
considers necessary for the mission. 




   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


   BUDGET-QUALITY ESTIMATES NOT
   LIKELY UNTIL KEY DECISIONS MADE
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :10


Budget-quality estimates for Bosnia costs in fiscal years 1998-99 are
not likely until several key decisions are made, according to the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the U.S. 
Army Europe Headquarters, and our analysis. 

The highest-order decision, whether the U.S.  military will remain in
Bosnia, appears to have been made.  On December 18, 1997, the
President announced that in principle the United States will
participate in an international military presence in Bosnia past June
1998.  As previously noted, this agreement will become a commitment
only when the President approves NATO's action plan for its military
forces.  NATO is currently developing options for the mission and
size of a NATO-led military presence in Bosnia after June 1998, when
SFOR's mandate expires.  NATO will review these options and select
one by March 1, 1998, according to U.S.  and NATO officials.  During
April-May 1998, NATO plans to review and approve an operational plan
and force commitments from participating nations, according to these
officials. 

Key decisions that are not yet made will drive costs.  Primarily,
these decisions concern the scope of the mission and its associated
tasks; the size of the force, including the U.S.  contribution; the
specific U.S.  units to be sent and their distance from Bosnia; the
frequency of troop rotation; and the number of reservists needed.  To
prepare budget-quality estimates, rather than a rough estimate,
budget officials need to know how these key factors will be decided. 
For example, if the United States decided to send significantly less
troops, then certain costs would decrease, such as special pay and
entitlement costs, operational tempo costs, and base operating
support costs. 

The duration of the new mission obviously affects the ultimate total
cost.  The President has set no new deadline for withdrawal.  The
decision to withdraw will now be based on achieving certain
conditions within Bosnia.  Therefore, budget estimates will have to
make an assumption about the length of the mission during each fiscal
year estimated. 




   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


   MILITARY SERVICES CONSIDERING
   WAYS TO REDUCE COSTS
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :11


Now that the Bosnia mission appears to have been extended past June
1998 without an end date, the military services are considering
additional ways to reduce costs.  The Army may be able to reduce or
close bases in Bosnia and Hungary.  After the closure of Camp Steel
Castle in October 1997, the Army maintains eight camps in Bosnia that
can serve about 10,000 personnel.\4 However, the Army currently has
fewer troops than camp capacity--about 8,000 troops in Bosnia.  In
addition, the Army is examining ways to reduce the $3.5 million per
month it spends on the Intermediate Staging Base in Taszar, Hungary,
which serves as a way-station for troops arriving in and departing
from Bosnia.  The Air Force is also exploring ways to lower costs in
Taszar by studying the feasibility of having the Hungarians provide
more base operating support at the air base. 

U.S.  Army Europe officials are analyzing the costs and
quality-of-life implications of switching from tents used in base
camps to transportable wood barracks (called SEAhuts).  The SEAhuts
are more fuel efficient and less damp than the canvas over wood frame
tents.  At a cost of
$6-$10 thousand apiece, the switch would save the Army money if the
huts were used for 3-5 years, according to officials. 

The Army is also analyzing whether to send military personnel to
Bosnia for a 1-year permanent change of station, rather than on a
temporary duty, and U.S.  Air Forces in Europe staff are assessing
permanent tours for Air Force personnel at the Tuzla air base. 
Employing a permanent change of station, as in Korea, saves per diem
and some troop rotation costs (because troops would rotate less
frequently), but could entitle soldiers and their dependents to
several travel and transportation allowances.  Such a change could
also have operational and force structure impacts, according to a
Department of the Army headquarters official. 

Lower costs may be possible by reducing redundant intelligence and
surveillance systems and infrastructure, increasing the Army's use of
prepositioned stocks, and relying more on other countries for support
or personnel. 




   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


--------------------
\4 The Army also maintains one camp in Croatia that can serve about
1,300 personnel and one camp complex in Hungary. 


   STATUS OF FUNDING
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :12


In December 1997, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) estimated that DOD's Bosnia costs for fiscal year 1998
would be $161 million more than DOD's budget request for Bosnia,
assuming that troops would withdraw by June 1998.  Extending the
mission past June 1998 will further increase fiscal year 1998 costs
and funding requirements.  If DOD were to continue to provide
11,000-12,000 troops in and around Bosnia during July-September 1998,
at the current operational tempo, DOD would need between $400-$500
million more for Bosnia in fiscal year 1998, according to our
analysis.  We also project that DOD would need about $2 billion to
operate for 12 months during fiscal year 1999, using the same
assumptions on troop levels and operational tempo.\5

No DOD funds for Bosnia operations were requested in the President's
budget for fiscal year 1999.  To meet Congress' legislative calendar,
in March 1998, DOD plans to amend its fiscal year 1999 budget and
request supplemental appropriations for fiscal year 1998.  However,
if NATO and the United States have not decided on the force size and
other details by March, then budget-quality estimates may not be
possible at that time.  Congress has directed the President to submit
a supplemental request for any funding necessary to continue DOD's
Bosnia deployment beyond June 30, 1998.\6 In fiscal years 1996 and
1997, DOD received supplemental appropriations for Bosnia. 

RELATED GAO PRODUCTS

Bosnia:  Cost Estimating Has Improved, but Operational Changes Will
Affect Current Estimates (GAO/NSIAD-97-183, July 28, 1997). 

Bosnia Peace Operation:  Progress Toward the Dayton Agreement's
Goals--An Update (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-216, July 17, 1997). 

Bosnia Peace Operation:  Progress Toward Achieving the Dayton
Agreement's Goals (GAO/NSIAD-97-132, May 5, 1997). 

U.N.  Peacekeeping:  Issues Related to Effectiveness, Cost, and
Reform (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-139, Apr.  9, 1997). 

Bosnia:  Costs Are Exceeding DOD's Estimate (GAO/NSIAD-96-204BR, July
25, 1996). 

Contingency Operations:  Update on DOD's Fiscal Year 1995 Cost and
Funding (GAO/NSIAD-96-184BR, June 27, 1996). 

Contingency Operations:  DOD's Reported Costs Contain Significant
Inaccuracies (GAO/NSIAD-96-115, May 17, 1996). 

Contingency Operations:  Defense Cost and Funding Issues
(GAO/NSIAD-96-121BR, Mar.  15, 1996). 

Bosnia:  Costs Are Uncertain but Seem Likely to Exceed DOD's Estimate
(GAO/NSIAD-96-120BR, Mar.  14, 1996). 

Peace Operations:  U.S.  Costs in Support of Haiti, Former
Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda (GAO/NSIAD-96-38, Mar.  6, 1996). 

Peace Operations:  Update on the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia
(GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR, May 8, 1995). 

Peace Operations:  DOD's Incremental Costs and Funding for Fiscal
Year 1994 (GAO/NSIAD-95-119BR, Apr.  18, 1995). 

Humanitarian Intervention:  Effectiveness of U.N.  Operations in
Bosnia (GAO/NSIAD-94-156BR, Apr.  13, 1994). 

--------------------
\5 To estimate the cost of 3 additional months to operate, we
calculated a monthly cost to operate using revised DOD budget data
that covered the first 9 months of fiscal year 1998.  We excluded $65
million not needed for the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar
System and redeployment and reconstitution costs.  To estimate fiscal
year 1999 costs, we used our monthly cost estimate and added back
estimated redeployment and reconstitution costs. 

\6 Both the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998
(P.L.  105-85, sec.  1203) and the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 1998 (P.L.  105-56, sec.  8132) directed the
President to submit a supplemental appropriations request for this
purpose. 


*** End of document. ***