Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the U.S.
Military Presence on Okinawa (Chapter Report, 03/02/98, GAO/NSIAD-98-66).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the contents of the
Final Report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), focusing
on: (1) the impact on readiness of U.S. forces based on Okinawa after
implementation of the report recommendations; (2) the U.S. cost of
implementing the recommendation; and (3) the benefit or necessity of
having U.S. Marine Corps forces on Okinawa.
GAO noted that: (1) the Department of Defense (DOD) believes that Marine
Corps forces along with other U.S. forces on Okinawa satisfy the U.S.
national security strategy by visably demonstrating the U.S. commitment
to security in the region; (2) these forces are thought to deter
aggression, provide a crisis response capability should deterrence fail,
and avoid the risk that U.S. allies may interpret the withdrawal of
forces as a lessening of U.S. commitment to peace and stability in the
region; (3) Okinawa's proximity to potential regional trouble spots
promotes the early arrival of U.S. military forces due to shorter
transit times and reduces potential problems that could arise due to
late arrival; (4) the cost of this presence is shared by the government
of Japan, which provides bases and other infrastructure on Okinawa
rent-free and pays part of the annual cost of Okinawa-based Marine Corps
forces; (5) SACO Final Report calls on the United States to: (a) return
land that includes one base and portions of camps, sites, and training
areas on Okinawa to Japan; (b) implement changes to three operational
procedures; and (c) implement changes to five noise abatement
procedures; (6) the United States has established requirements that
Japan must meet as it designs, builds, and pays for the sea-based
facility before Futenma is closed and are moved to the sea-based
facility; (7) such a facility has never been built and operated; (8)
annual operations and maintenance costs for the sea-based facility were
initially estimated at $200 million; (9) the United States requested
that the Japanese government pay the cost to maintain the new sea-based
facility, but as of the date of this report, it had not agreed to do so;
(10) excluding the cost to operate the sea-based facility, the current
estimated cost to the United States to implement the SACO land return
recommendations is about $193.5 million over about 10 years; (11) the
United States and Japan are negotiating an arrangement under which Japan
would assume some SACO-related responsibilities consistent with their
domestic laws; (12) this arrangement could result in reduced U.S. costs;
(13) while final implementation of the SACO recommendations is intended
to reduce the burden of U.S. forces' presence in Okinawa, two
environmental issues could arise; (14) the first issue concerns the
potential for environmental contamination being found on military
facilities returned to Japan and responsibility for cleanup of those
facilities; and (15) the potential adverse effects that the construction
and operation of the sea-based facility could have on the environment.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-98-66
TITLE: Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact
of the U.S. Military Presence on Okinawa
DATE: 03/02/98
SUBJECT: Armed forces abroad
Military withdrawal
Military bases
Facility construction
Military policies
International relations
Cost analysis
Base closures
Combat readiness
IDENTIFIER: Japan
Okinawa
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to the Honorable
Duncan Hunter, House of Representatives
March 1998
OVERSEAS PRESENCE - ISSUES
INVOLVED IN REDUCING THE IMPACT OF
THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE ON
OKINAWA
GAO/NSIAD-98-66
Overseas Presence
(703214)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
DOD - Department of Defense
FIG - Futenma Implementation Group
IFR - Instrument Flight Rules
MCAS - Marine Corps Air Station
SACO - Special Action Committee on Okinawa
SCC - Security Consultative Committee
SSC - Security Sub-Committee
USFJ - United States Forces-Japan
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-278862
March 2, 1998
The Honorable Duncan Hunter
House of Representatives
The United States and Japan released the Final Report of the Special
Action Committee on Okinawa on December 2, 1996. The report made 27
recommendations to reduce the impact of the U.S. military presence
on the Okinawan people. As requested, we reviewed the contents of
the Final Report, evaluated the impact on readiness of U.S. forces
based on Okinawa after implementation of the report recommendations,
estimated the U.S. cost of implementing the recommendations, and
determined the benefit or necessity of having U.S. Marine Corps
forces on Okinawa.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking
Minority Members of the House Committee on National Security, the
Senate Committee on Armed Services, and the House and Senate
Committees on Appropriations; the Secretaries of State, Defense, the
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine
Corps. We will make copies available to others on request.
This report was prepared under the direction of Carol R. Schuster,
Associate Director, Military Operations and Capabilities Issues, who
may be reached on (202) 512-3958 if you or your staff have any
questions. Other major contributors are listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Mark E. Gebicke
Director, Military Operations
and Capabilities Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0
PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
The United States maintains a military presence of about 100,000
servicemembers in the Asia-Pacific region. Of this presence, 47,000
servicemembers are in Japan, over half of whom are based on Okinawa.
On December 2, 1996, the United States and Japan agreed to a number
of recommendations for reducing the impact of U.S. military
operations and training on the people of Okinawa and thereby
strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance. These recommendations were
set forth in the Final Report of the Special Action Committee on
Okinawa (SACO) and are to be implemented over the next decade.
Concerned over the impact that implementation of SACO recommendations
will have on the readiness and training of U.S. forces stationed on
Okinawa, Congressman Duncan Hunter requested GAO to review several
issues. This report (1) describes the Department of Defense's
perspectives on the need for U.S. forces on Okinawa and (2)
describes SACO's report recommendations and identifies the impact of
their implementation on U.S. operations, training, and costs,
particularly the recommendation to build a sea-based facility off
Okinawa. The report also provides information on two environmental
issues that may result from implementing the SACO recommendations.
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
The U.S. military presence in Japan and on Okinawa began at the end
of World War II. Although the U.S. occupation in Japan ended in
1952, U.S. administration continued on Okinawa until 1972. The
U.S.-Japan security relationship is defined by a number of documents,
including the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which
commits both countries to meet common dangers, and a Status of Forces
Agreement that governs the legal status of U.S. forces and their
dependents stationed in Japan. The U.S. forces on Okinawa occupy
about 10 percent of the land in the prefecture.\1 Japan provides part
of the cost of the forward deployment of U.S. forces throughout
Japan, through an annual burden-sharing payment. This payment was
about $4.9 billion in fiscal year 1997.
Discontent among the people of Okinawa regarding the U.S. military
presence and its impacts has been rising for years. Their chief
complaint is that the Okinawa prefecture hosts over half of the U.S.
forces in Japan and that about 75 percent of the land U.S. forces
occupy in Japan is on Okinawa. They also believe the U.S. presence
has hampered economic development. The abduction and rape of an
Okinawan schoolgirl in September 1995 by three U.S. servicemembers
prompted the U.S. and Japanese governments to establish the SACO in
November 1995. To reduce the impact of the U.S. military presence
on the people of Okinawa, the SACO developed recommendations to
realign, consolidate, and reduce U.S. facilities and adjust
operational procedures. In December 1996, the United States agreed
to return to Japanese control about 21 percent of the land on Okinawa
used for U.S. military bases, adjust training and operational
procedures, implement noise abatement procedures, and change Status
of Forces Agreement procedures. (The SACO Final Report is reprinted
verbatim in app. I.)
--------------------
\1 Japan is divided into 47 local administrative jurisdictions, or
prefectures. The Okinawa prefecture includes the main island of
Okinawa plus several outlying islands.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
The Department of Defense (DOD) believes that Marine Corps forces
along with other U.S. forces on Okinawa satisfy the U.S. national
security strategy by visibly demonstrating the U.S. commitment to
security in the region. These forces are thought to deter
aggression, provide a crisis response capability should deterrence
fail, and avoid the risk that U.S. allies may interpret the
withdrawal of U.S. forces as a lessening of U.S. commitment to
peace and stability in the region. Okinawa's proximity to potential
regional trouble spots promotes the early arrival of U.S. military
forces due to shorter transit times and reduces potential problems
that could arise due to late arrival. The cost of this presence is
shared by the government of Japan, which provides bases and other
infrastructure on Okinawa rent-free and pays part of the annual cost
of Okinawa-based Marine Corps forces.
The SACO Final Report calls on the United States to (1) return land
that includes one base and portions of camps, sites, and training
areas on Okinawa to Japan; (2) implement changes to three operational
procedures, and (3) implement changes to five noise abatement
procedures. Additionally, it recommends implementing eight changes
to Status of Forces Agreement procedures. In implementing most of
the SACO recommendations, the United States expects to encounter few
operational and training problems; however, replacing Marine Corps
Air Station Futenma with a sea-based facility will be a major
challenge. In addition to significant cost, the sea-based facility
poses technological and operational complications that must be
overcome if U. S. operational capability is to be maintained. The
United States has established requirements that Japan must meet as it
designs, builds, and pays for the sea-based facility before Futenma
is closed and operations are moved to the sea-based facility.
However, such a facility has never been built and operated.
Annual operations and maintenance costs for the sea-based facility
were initially estimated at $200 million based on a $4-billion design
and construction cost, significantly higher than the $2.8 million
currently being paid by the United States at Futenma. The United
States requested that the Japanese government pay the cost to
maintain the new sea-based facility, but as of the date of this
report, it had not agreed to do so. Further, the current schedule
for designing and building the sea-based facility does not include a
risk-reduction phase that includes risk assessments, life-cycle cost
analyses, and design trade-offs. Given the scope, technical
challenges, and unique nature of the sea-based facility, a
risk-reduction phase would permit the U. S. and Japanese
governments to establish that the proposed facility will be
affordable and operationally suitable.
Excluding the cost to operate the sea-based facility, the current
estimated cost to the United States to implement the SACO land return
recommendations is about $193.5 million over about 10 years. The
United States and Japan are negotiating an arrangement under which
Japan would assume some SACO-related responsibilities consistent with
their domestic laws. This arrangement could result in reduced U.S.
costs. U.S. costs include the cost to renovate some facilities at
Futenma, previously identified by both the United States and Japan
for replacement, until the sea-based facility is ready for occupancy.
Japan had planned to replace these facilities but decided not to
after SACO was established in 1995. Additionally, the U.S. cost
could be significantly higher than the estimated $193.5 million if
Japan does not agree to pay operations and maintenance cost of the
new sea-based facility.
While final implementation of the SACO recommendations is intended to
reduce the burden of the U.S. forces' presence on Okinawa, two
environmental issues could arise. The first issue concerns the
potential for environmental contamination being found on military
facilities returned to Japan and responsibility for cleanup of those
facilities. The second issue concerns the potential adverse effects
that the construction and operation of the sea-based facility could
have on the environment.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
U.S. FORCES ON OKINAWA
SUPPORT NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1
The III Marine Expeditionary Force (along with other U.S. forces on
Okinawa and in the region) supports the U.S. national security
strategy to promote peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region
and to deter aggression by forcing an aggressor to risk a military
confrontation with U.S. forces, according to DOD. The national
security strategy and the congressionally mandated Quadrennial
Defense Review\2 cite U.S. presence in the region as necessary to
demonstrate U.S. political commitment to security in the region. In
addition, the United States has long-standing mutual defense treaty
obligations with five countries in the region, including Japan and
South Korea, and the U.S. forward presence visibly demonstrates
commitment to these treaties, according to the U.S. Pacific Command,
the geographic combatant command.
In addition to showing the U.S. commitment to the region, the U.S.
forces on Okinawa could be used if crises arise, according to the
Pacific Command. Furthermore, forward-deployed U.S. forces could
readily respond to a contingency because Okinawa is near several
potential regional trouble spots, including the Korean peninsula, and
the operational risk of a late arrival in an area of operations could
be avoided. Moreover, Japan pays a significant share of the
Okinawa-based Marine Corps force's annual cost, including the cost of
base infrastructure that is provided rent-free to the United States.
--------------------
\2 The Quadrennial Defense Review was required by section 923 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for 1997 to study national defense
strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure,
budget plans, and other issues in 1997 and at the start of each newly
elected administration after 1997.
BUILDING A SEA-BASED
FACILITY WILL BE A MAJOR
CHALLENGE BUT OTHER CHANGES
POSE FEW PROBLEMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2
Of all the SACO recommendations, construction of a sea-based facility
to replace Marine Corps Air Station Futenma poses the greatest
challenge. Three types of sea-based facilities were under
consideration: two would float and one would be supported on columns
driven into the sea floor. Some local opposition has surfaced
against the facility in the area in which it is to be built, but U.S.
officials are proceeding on the basis that the facility will be
built. The United States and/or Japan will face (1) significant
costs to acquire and maintain the facility; (2) major technological
challenges, as no sea-based facility of the type and scale envisioned
has ever been built; and (3) operational complications because the
sea-based facility envisioned would be insufficient to support all
U.S. operating requirements and maintain maximum safety margins, as
stated in a Marine Corps study.
The United States also runs the risk that Japan will design and build
a sea-based facility that does not meet all U.S. requirements
because at the time of GAO's review, U.S. oversight capability was
limited. Officials at U.S. Forces Japan and the Naval Facilities
Engineering Command told GAO that the organizations currently tasked
with oversight responsibility cannot provide the day-to-day detailed
oversight such a project requires and still meet their other
responsibilities. USFJ has requested establishment of a Project
Management Office to oversee and coordinate SACO implementation while
the Naval Facilities Engineering Command has asked for funding for a
special project office to oversee the design and construction of the
sea-based facility.
Japan's acquisition strategy could add to U.S. operating and support
costs and increase operational risk unnecessarily. At the time of
GAO's review, Japan had not included a risk-reduction phase in its
acquisition schedule. Given the scope, technical challenges, and
unique nature of the sea-based facility, a risk-reduction phase would
allow the U.S. and Japanese governments to prove that the sea-based
facility will be affordable and operationally suitable prior to
committing to a specific design. The inclusion of a risk-reduction
phase in the sea-based facility's acquisition schedule is currently
being discussed between the United States and Japanese governments.
U.S. operational capability can be maintained if the problems
associated with the sea-based facility can be overcome and Japan
imposes no limits on U.S. operating rights in Okinawa other than
those recommended by SACO. The SACO recommendations to return land
do not significantly add risks to U.S. operations, but at the time
of GAO's review, the cost to implement these recommendations was
about $193.5 million above current operating costs over about 10
years. The United States and Japan are negotiating an arrangement
under which Japan would assume some responsibilities, consistent with
its domestic law thereby reducing U.S. cost. U.S. costs include
the cost to renovate facilities at Futenma to maintain base
operations while the sea-based facility is designed and built. Japan
had planned to replace these facilities under the Japan Facilities
Improvement Program\3 but decided not to after the SACO was
established in 1995. The United States believes these projects need
to be completed in order to continue to operate Futenma during the
sea-based facility acquisition period. U.S. costs could be
significantly higher than the $193.5 million estimate because the
United States and Japan have not agreed on which country will be
responsible for the sea-based facility's maintenance. This cost is
estimated to be $200 million annually based on a $4-billion sea-based
facility design and construction cost. The United States is
currently responsible for the maintenance of its facilities in Japan
and spends about $2.8 million annually for maintenance at Futenma.
The United States has encountered some problems in implementing one
of the three changes to operational procedures. After relocating
parachute exercises for Army Special Forces units to nearby Ie Jima
Island, about 73 percent of the planned jumps were cancelled, most
often for weather-related reasons. These cancellations have put
these forces at risk of failing to stay airborne qualified. On the
other hand, artillery live-fire training for Marine Corps forces has
been relocated from Okinawa to ranges on the main Japanese islands.
The training is comparable to that on Okinawa and other ranges in the
United States. For the remaining provisions of the SACO
report--implementing noise reduction initiatives and changing some
Status of Forces Agreement procedures--the United States expects to
encounter few problems.
--------------------
\3 Under the Japan facilities budget, Japan pays for certain
facilities improvements on installations used by U.S. forces,
including new construction under the Japan Facilities Improvement
Program, vicinity improvements, and relocation construction and other
costs.
TWO ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
COULD ARISE FROM
IMPLEMENTING SACO
RECOMMENDATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3
If environmental contamination is found in areas to be returned under
SACO, cleanup could be expensive and reuse could be delayed. When
the United States returns land or closes bases in Japan, it is not
obligated, under the Status of Forces Agreement, to return lands to
the condition they were in when they became available to the United
States. According to U.S. Forces-Japan officials, this agreement
relieves the United States of an obligation for environmental
cleanup. However, DOD policy calls for the removal of known imminent
and substantial dangers to health and safety due to environmental
contamination caused by operations on DOD installations or facilities
designated for return to the host nation. The government of Japan
believes it has found hazardous substances on an installation on
Okinawa returned by the United States prior to the SACO report. It
has requested that the United States look for environmental
contamination on its remaining bases on Okinawa and clean up the
bases if contamination is found before returning them under the SACO
process. If a survey is conducted and contamination is found, a
decision would be needed as to whether the United States or Japan
would pay cleanup costs.
Regarding the second issue, concerns have been raised that
construction of the sea-based facility or the facility itself after
construction could adversely affect the ocean environment, including
nearby coral reefs. The United States intends to operate at the
facility in a manner that protects and preserves Okinawa's natural
resources. However, routine operations aboard the facility may
inadvertently contaminate the nearby ocean environment, including
coral reefs. For example, the accidental runoff of fuels, cleaning
fluids, and other substances required for aircraft and base
operations could pose a risk. The government of Japan has undertaken
a study to determine the condition of the coral.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
-- decide on the means to monitor the design, engineering, and
construction of the sea-based facility;
-- work with Japan to include a risk-reduction phase in the
acquisition schedule to establish that the designed sea-based
facility will be affordable and operationally suitable;
-- take steps to ensure that all U.S. concerns, especially the
costs of operations and maintenance on the sea-based facility
and operational concerns, have been satisfactorily addressed
before Japan begins to build the sea-based facility; and
-- request the Japanese government to allocate funds for those
projects at Futenma that were cancelled by Japan due to the
planned closure of Futenma and are deemed essential to continued
operations of the station and the 1st Marine Air Wing until
completion of the replacement facility.
AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with
GAO's recommendations and noted that the report effectively outlines
the major operational and technical issues involved in realigning,
consolidating, and reducing U.S. force presence on Okinawa, as set
forth in the SACO process. DOD also noted that the role of Congress
will be critical in maintaining the strategic relationship with Japan
and therefore the GAO report was timely and welcome. DOD provided
technical comments, which were incorporated in the report where
appropriate. The DOD response is printed in its entirety in appendix
II.
GAO also provided a copy of the draft report to the Department of
State. In oral comments, the Department of State concurred with
GAO's report and offered one technical change which was incorporated
into the report.
INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1
Since the end of World War II, the U.S. military has maintained a
presence in Japan and on Okinawa, first as an occupation force and
later as an ally committed to maintaining security in the
Asia-Pacific region. The security relationship between the United
States and Japan is defined through bilateral agreements and is
managed through a joint process. Over half of the U.S. forces in
Japan are on Okinawa, a presence that has caused increasing
discontent among the people of Okinawa. In September 1995, after
three U.S. servicemen raped an Okinawan schoolgirl, Japan and the
United States formed the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO)
to find ways to limit the impact of the U.S. military presence on
Okinawa. The Committee developed 27 recommendations to reduce the
impact of U.S. operations.
THE U.S. MILITARY HAS
MAINTAINED A PRESENCE IN JAPAN
SINCE WORLD WAR II
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1
Since the end of World War II, the U.S. military has based forces in
Japan and Okinawa. The U.S. military occupation of Japan began
after World War II and continued until 1952, but the United States
administered the Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa, until 1972.
Since the end of World War II, U.S. forces have mounted major
operations from Japan when needed. Among the most important of these
operations was the initial defense of South Korea in the 1950-53
Korean War, when Eighth U.S. Army units left occupation duties in
Japan to help defend South Korea. The United States again used its
bases in Japan and on Okinawa to fight the Vietnam War. Finally,
elements of the III Marine Expeditionary Force deployed from their
bases on Okinawa to the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm in
the early 1990s.
To demonstrate a commitment to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific
region, the United States has about 47,000 servicemembers, about half
of all U.S. forces deployed in the Pacific region, stationed in
Japan. Of the 47,000 U.S. servicemembers in Japan, over half are
based on Okinawa, a subtropical island about 67 miles long and from 2
to 18 miles wide, with coral reefs in many offshore locations. In
fiscal year 1997, U.S. forces on Okinawa occupied 58,072 acres of
the land in the Okinawa prefecture.
THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY
RELATIONSHIP IS MANAGED THROUGH
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND A
JOINT PROCESS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2
The security relationship between the United States and Japan is
defined through bilateral agreements. The Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security, signed in January 1960 by the United States
and Japan, specifies that each country recognizes that an attack
against either country in the territory of Japan is dangerous to its
peace and security and declares that both countries would respond to
meet the common danger under their constitutional processes. The
treaty also commits the two countries to consult with each other from
time to time and grants to U.S. military forces the use of
facilities and areas in Japan. Lastly, the treaty specifies that a
separate Status of Forces Agreement will govern the use of these
facilities and areas as well as the status of U.S. forces in Japan.
The Status of Forces Agreement, signed on the same day as the treaty,
permits the United States to bring servicemembers and their
dependents into Japan. It also contains certain stipulations
regarding U.S. forces in Japan, including some exemptions from
import duties for items brought into Japan for the personal use of
U.S. servicemembers; the right of the U.S. military services to
operate exchanges, social clubs, newspapers, and theaters; and legal
jurisdiction over U.S. servicemembers and their dependents accused
of committing a crime in Japan.\1 The agreement also (1) requires the
United States to return land to Japan when the land is no longer
needed, (2) specifies that the United States will perform maintenance
on bases its occupies in Japan, and (3) relieves the United States of
the obligation to restore bases in Japan to the condition they were
in when they became available to the United States. U.S.
Forces-Japan (USFJ) has interpreted this latter provision to mean
that the United States is not required to conduct environmental
cleanup on bases it closes in Japan. The agreement also required the
United States and Japan to establish a Joint Committee as the means
for consultation in implementing the agreement. In particular, the
Joint Committee is responsible for determining what facilities U.S.
forces need in Japan.
The U.S.-Japan security relationship is managed through a joint
process that includes meetings between the U.S. Secretaries of State
and Defense and Japan's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of
State for Defense, who make up the Security Consultative Committee.
The Committee sets overall bilateral policy regarding the security
relationship between the United States and Japan.
Japan pays part of the cost of the U.S. forces stationed in its
country with annual burden-sharing payments that totaled about $4.9
billion in fiscal year 1997.\2 The annual payments fall into four
categories. First, Japan paid about $712 million for leased land on
which U.S. bases sit. Second, Japan provided about $1.7 billion in
accordance with the Special Measures Agreement, under which Japan
pays the costs of (1) local national labor employed by U.S. forces
in Japan, (2) public utilities on U.S. bases, and (3) the transfer
of U.S. forces' training from U.S. bases to other facilities in
Japan when Japan requests such transfers. Third, USFJ estimated that
Japan provided about $876 million in indirect costs, such as rents
foregone at fair market value and tax concessions.\3 Last, although
not covered by any agreements, Japan provided about $1.7 billion from
its facilities budget for facilities and new construction which
included new facilities under the Japan under the Japan Facilities
Improvement Program, vicinity improvements, and relocation
construction and other costs.
Finally, in September 1997, the United States and Japan issued new
Guidelines for U.S.- Japan Defense Cooperation that replaced the
existing 1978 guidelines. The new guidelines provide for more
effective cooperation between U.S. forces and Japan's self-defense
forces under "normal circumstances," when an armed attack against
Japan has occurred, and as a response to situations in areas
surrounding Japan that could threaten Japan's security.
--------------------
\1 Japan also has jurisdiction over U.S. servicemembers and their
dependents for offenses committed within Japan and punishable by
Japanese law.
\2 In 1997, Japan's burden-sharing payments totaled about 544 billion
yen, or about $4.9 billion using a conversion rate of 111 yen to
$1.00, according to USFJ.
\3 The Congressional Research Service believes that the Department of
Defense (DOD) overstates the true value of burden-sharing payments
from Japan because such costs as base lease payments and rents
foregone are costs unique to operating in Japan. DOD would not pay
these costs if troops based in Japan were relocated to bases in the
continental United States. For more information, see the
Congressional Research Service's Defense Burdensharing: Is Japan's
Host Nation Support a Model for Other Allies? (94-515 F, June 20,
1994).
THE SACO PROCESS IS A REACTION
TO DISCONTENT ABOUT THE U.S.
MILITARY PRESENCE ON OKINAWA
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3
Discontent among the people of Okinawa about the impact of the U.S.
presence on their land has been rising for years, particularly as the
economic benefits of the U.S. presence have diminished and the
people of Okinawa became relatively more prosperous, according to the
Congressional Research Service.\4 Among the chief complaints of the
Okinawan people is that their prefecture hosts over half of the U.S.
force presence in Japan and that about 75 percent of the total land
used by U.S. forces in Japan is on Okinawa. Figure 1.1 shows the
location and approximate size of major U.S. installations in the
Okinawa prefecture.
Figure 1.1: Major U.S.
Installations on Okinawa
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: Marine Corps Bases, Japan.
Some Okinawans feel the U.S. military presence has hampered economic
development. Other Okinawans object to the noise generated by U.S.
operations, especially around the Air Force's Kadena Air Base and
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma (which are located in the
middle of urban areas), and risks to civilians from serious military
accidents, including crashes of aircraft. In addition, some have
objected to artillery live-fire exercises conducted in the Central
Training Area. When the exercises were held, firing took place over
prefectural highway 104, and the highway had to be closed to civilian
traffic until the exercises concluded. The Okinawa prefectural
government has also objected to the destruction of vegetation on
nearby mountains in the artillery range's impact area. Lastly, some
perceive that crime committed by U.S. personnel and their dependents
on Okinawa is a problem.\5
The public outcry in Okinawa following the September 1995 abduction
and rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl by three U.S. servicemembers
brought to a head long-standing concerns among Okinawans about the
impact of the U.S. presence and made it difficult for some members
of the Japanese Diet to support the continued U.S. military presence
in Japan.\6 According to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
continued ability of the United States to remain in Japan was at risk
due to the outcry over the rape incident, and the United States and
Japan had to do something to reduce the impact of the presence on
Okinawans. To address Okinawans' and Japanese legislators' concerns,
bilateral negotiations between the United States and Japan began, and
the Security Consultative Committee established the Special Action
Committee on Okinawa in November 1995. The Committee developed
recommendations on ways to limit the impact of the U.S. military
presence on Okinawans. On December 2, 1996, the U.S. Secretary of
Defense, U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Japanese Minister of Foreign
Affairs, and Minister of State and Director-General of the Defense
Agency of Japan issued the Committee's final report.
According to USFJ, the SACO Final Report is not a binding bilateral
agreement, but it does contain a series of recommendations to which
the U.S. and Japanese governments have committed themselves.
Officials from USFJ and Marine Corps Bases, Japan, told us that the
United States approaches the recommendations as if they were
agreements by making reasonable efforts to implement the
recommendations. However, they also stated that if Japan does not
provide adequate replacement facilities or complete action needed to
implement some recommendations, the United States will not be
obligated to implement those particular recommendations.
--------------------
\4 Congressional Research Service, Okinawa Bases and Other Issues in
U.S. - Japan Security Relations (96-646 F, July 23, 1996).
\5 According to the U.S. Consolidated Public Affairs Office,
Okinawa, U.S. personnel make up about 3.8 percent of the population
and were responsible for about 1.1 percent of total crime on Okinawa
in 1996.
\6 The U.S. servicemembers were convicted. Two were sentenced to
7-year jail terms and one to a 6.5-year jail term.
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4
In response to Representative Duncan Hunter's concerns about the
impact of implementing SACO's recommendations on U.S. force
readiness, we describe (1) the benefit or necessity of retaining U.S.
forces in Japan and on Okinawa and (2) SACO's report recommendations
and identify the impact of implementation on U.S. operations,
training, and costs. The report also identifies two environmental
issues that may remain after the SACO recommendations have been
implemented.
To determine DOD's views on the benefit or necessity of having U.S.
forces stationed on Okinawa, we interviewed officials and obtained
relevant documents, including the Quadrennial Defense Review report,
the President's National Security Strategy for a New Century, The
Security Strategy for East Asia, the Commander-in-Chief of the
Pacific Command's regional strategy, and other documents. Because it
was outside the scope of our work, we did not evaluate any
alternatives to forward deployment. However, in a June 1997 report,
we concluded that DOD had not adequately considered alternatives to
forward presence to accomplish its stated security objectives.\7 To
determine U.S. and Japanese obligations under the bilateral security
relationship, we reviewed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security between Japan and the United States, the Status of Forces
Agreement, the Special Measures Agreement, Joint Statement of the
Security Consultative Committee on the review of 1978 guidelines for
defense cooperation, the new 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense
Cooperation, and other documents.
To determine SACO's report recommendations, we reviewed the Final
Report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa, Joint Committee
meeting minutes and related documents, briefings, the testimony of
the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command to the Senate
Committee on Armed Services on March 18, 1997, and other documents.
To determine the impact of the SACO report recommendations on
readiness, training, and costs of operations of U.S. forces, we
interviewed officials and reviewed memorandums, cables, reports,
analyses, and other documents discussing the impact on readiness and
training or providing evidence of the impact. To review the
feasibility of construction and operation of a sea-based facility, we
interviewed officials and reviewed relevant documents, including the
Functional Analysis and Concept of Operations report prepared by DOD
officials from several organizations, briefing documents,
memorandums, and other documents. We also reviewed a number of
scholarly papers presented at the Japanese Ministry of Transport's
International Workshop on Very Large Floating Structures, held in
Hayama, Japan, in November 1996.
To identify the environmental issues that could remain after the SACO
recommendations are implemented, we reviewed the Status of Forces
Agreement and DOD environmental policy and interviewed DOD and
Department of State officials.
We also interviewed officials at the Office of the Secretary of
Defense/International Security Affairs, the Joint Staff, headquarters
of the U.S. Marine Corps, headquarters of the U.S. Air Force,
Office of Naval Research, Defense Logistics Agency, Military Traffic
Management Command, and Department of State in Washington, D.C., and
the U.S. Special Operations Command in Tampa, Florida. We also
interviewed officials from the U.S. Pacific Command; Marine Forces,
Pacific; Pacific Air Forces; Naval Facilities Engineering Command;
Army Corps of Engineers; Military Traffic Management Command; and
East-West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii. We interviewed officials from
U.S. Forces-Japan, the 5th Air Force, U.S. Naval Forces-Japan, U.S.
Army-Japan, and the U.S. Embassy-Tokyo in the Tokyo, Japan, area.
Lastly, we interviewed officials from Marine Corps Bases, Japan; the
1st Marine Air Wing; the Air Force's 18th Wing; the Army's 1/1
Special Forces Group (Airborne); the Army's 10th Area Support Group;
the Navy's Fleet Activities, Okinawa; and the Navy's Task Force 76 on
Okinawa. To discuss the feasibility of very large floating
structures, we interviewed two ocean engineering professors at the
University of Hawaii who were instrumental in organizing the 1996
conference in Japan. We also viewed the proposed site for a
sea-based facility by helicopter and inspected several U.S. bases
affected by the SACO process, including MCAS Futenma; Kadena Air
Base; Camp Schwab; and the Northern, Central, Gimbaru, and Kin Blue
Beach training areas on Okinawa. We also visited the Ie Jima
parachute drop zone on Ie Jima Island.
We obtained comments from the Departments of Defense and State on
this report and have incorporated their comments where appropriate.
We conducted our work from June 1997 to March 1998 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
--------------------
\7 Overseas Presence: More Data and Analysis Needed to Determine
Whether Cost-Effective Alternatives Exist (GAO/NSIAD-97-133, June 3,
1997).
U.S. FORCES ON OKINAWA SUPPORT
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
============================================================ Chapter 2
U.S. forces on Okinawa support U.S. national security and national
military strategies to promote peace and maintain stability in the
region. These forces can also deter aggression and can deploy
throughout the region if needed. According to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Pacific Command, and USFJ, relocating these
forces outside the region would increase political risk by appearing
to decrease commitment to regional security and treaty obligations
and undercut deterrence. Furthermore, relocating U.S. forces
outside of Japan could adversely affect military operations by
increasing transit times to areas where crises are occurring.
Finally, the cost of the U.S. presence in Japan is shared by the
government of Japan, which also provides bases and other
infrastructure used by U.S. forces on Okinawa.
U.S. FORCES ON OKINAWA ARE
PART OF THE PACIFIC COMMAND'S
REGIONAL FORWARD PRESENCE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1
The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Command, who is the geographic
combatant commander for the Asia-Pacific region, develops a regional
strategy to support the national security strategy and the national
military strategy. The Pacific Command's area of responsibility is
the largest of that of the five geographic combatant commands: it
covers about 105 million square miles (about 52 percent of the
earth's surface) and contains 44 countries, including Japan, China,
India, and North and South Korea (see fig. 2.1).
Figure 2.1: U.S. Pacific
Command's Area of
Responsibility
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: U.S. Pacific Command.
Pacific Command forces provide a military presence in the
Asia-Pacific region, promote international security relationships in
the region, and deter aggression and prevent conflict through a
crisis response capability, according to the Pacific Command. These
forces include over 300,000 servicemembers, of which about 100,000
are in Alaska, Hawaii, Japan, South Korea, and certain other
locations overseas. The Quadrennial Defense Review reaffirmed the
need for the U.S. forward presence of about 100,000 U.S. troops in
the Asia-Pacific region. About 47,000 U.S. servicemembers are
stationed in Japan. Of those, about 28,000 are based on Okinawa,
including about 17,000 assigned to the Marine Corps' III Marine
Expeditionary Force and supporting establishment.
The III Marine Expeditionary Force, the primary Marine Corps
component on Okinawa, consists of the (1) 3rd Marine Division, the
ground combat component; (2) 1st Marine Air Wing, the air combat
component; (3) 3rd Force Service Support Group, the logistics support
component; and (4) command element. The Force, and other deployed
U.S. forces, support the security strategy by providing the forces
that could be employed if crises arise. The III Marine Expeditionary
Force can deploy throughout the region, using sealift, airlift, and
amphibious shipping, and operate without outside support for up to 60
days.
U.S. FORCES IN THE
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION PROVIDE
POLITICAL BENEFITS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2
Under the national strategy, U.S. forward deployment is necessary
because it demonstrates a visible political commitment by the United
States to peace and stability in the region, according to DOD. The
United States has mutual defense treaties with Japan, South Korea,
the Philippines, Australia, and Thailand. In addition to
demonstrating commitment, the U.S. forward deployment also deters
aggression, according to the Pacific Command, because a regional
aggressor cannot threaten its neighbors without risking a military
confrontation with U.S. forces in place on Okinawa (or elsewhere in
the region).
To help maintain peace and stability in the region, the Pacific
Command strategy features engagement through joint, combined, and
multilateral military exercises; military-to-military contacts; and
security assistance, among other activities. According to the
Pacific Command, the III Marine Expeditionary Force is a key force
that is employed to carry out these activities.
According to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Pacific Command,
and USFJ, a withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region could be
interpreted by countries in the region as a weakening of the U.S.
commitment to peace and stability in Asia-Pacific and could undercut
the deterrent value of the forward deployment. While U.S. forces
may not have to be on Okinawa specifically for the United States to
demonstrate such commitments, USFJ officials told us that U.S.
forces do need to be located somewhere in the Western Pacific region.
THE U.S. PRESENCE IN OKINAWA
PROVIDES OPERATIONAL BENEFITS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3
If hostilities erupt in the Asia-Pacific region, U.S. forces need to
arrive in the crisis area quickly to repel aggression and end the
conflict on terms favorable to the United States. U.S. forces could
be used in a conflict and could deploy from their bases on Okinawa.
The forward deployment on Okinawa significantly shortens transit
times, thereby promoting early arrival in potential regional trouble
spots such as the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan straits, a
significant benefit in the initial stages of a conflict. For
example, it takes 2 hours to fly to the Korean peninsula from
Okinawa, as compared with about 5 hours from Guam, 11 hours from
Hawaii, and 16 hours from the continental United States. Similarly,
it takes about 1 1/2 days to make the trip from Okinawa by ship to
South Korea, as compared with about 5 days from Guam, 12 days from
Hawaii, and 17 days from the continental United States.
In addition to its strategic location, Okinawa has a well-established
military infrastructure that is provided to the United States
rent-free and that supports the III Marine Expeditionary Force (and
other U.S. forces). Housing, training, communications, and numerous
other facilities are already in place on Okinawa, including those at
MCAS Futenma, a strategic airfield for the 1st Marine Air Wing, and
Camp Courtney, home of the 3rd Marine Division. Marine Corps
logistics operations are based at Camp Kinser, which has about a
million square feet of warehouse space for Marine forces' use in the
Pacific. For example, warehouses hold war reserve supplies on
Okinawa that would support U.S. operations, including 14,400 tons of
ammunition, 5,000 pieces of unit and individual equipment, and 50
million gallons of fuel. Military port facilities capable of
handling military sealift ships and amphibious ships are available at
the Army's Naha Military Port and the Navy's White Beach. In
addition to providing base infrastructure, Japan provides about $368
million per year as part of its burden-sharing to help support the
III Marine Expeditionary Force deployment on Okinawa.
SOME SACO RECOMMENDATIONS CARRY
RISK THAT MUST BE OVERCOME TO
MAINTAIN U.S. OPERATIONAL
CAPABILITY
============================================================ Chapter 3
The SACO Final Report calls for the United States to (1) return land
at 11 U.S. bases on Okinawa and replace MCAS Futenma with a
sea-based facility, (2) change 3 operational procedures, (3)
implement 5 noise abatement procedures, and (4) implement 7 Status of
Forces Agreement changes. Japan agreed to implement one Status of
Force Agreement procedure change. Of all of the SACO report
recommendations, replacing MCAS Futenma with a sea-based facility
poses the greatest challenge. Most of the other SACO report
recommendations can be implemented with few problems.
THE UNITED STATES PLANS TO
RETURN LAND USED ON OKINAWA
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1
As called for in the SACO Final Report, the United States plans to
return to Japan about 12,000 acres, or 21 percent of the total
acreage, used by U.S. forces on 11 installations. The plan is to
relocate personnel and facilities from bases to be closed to new
bases or to consolidate them at the remaining bases. Table 3.1 shows
the land to be returned, the planned return date, and the plan for
replacing capabilities that would be lost through the land return.
Table 3.1
Land to be Returned to Japan Under SACO
Recommendations
Planned return Replacement
Land return date facility
------------------------------ ------------------ ------------------
MCAS Futenma Between 2001 and Sea-based facility
2003
About 9,900 acres of the March 2003 Remaining Northern
Northern Training Area Training Area plus
new acreage to be
added by March
1998
Aha training area March 1998 Acreage added to
the Northern
Training Area
Gimbaru training area March 1998 Kin Blue Beach
training area and
Camp Hansen
Sobe communications site March 2001 Camp Hansen
Yomitan auxiliary airfield March 2001 Ie Jima auxiliary
airfield
Most of Camp Kuwae March 2008 Camp Zukeran and
other facilities
Senaha communications station March 2001 Torii
communications
station
Small portion of the Between 1998 and Remaining
Makiminato service area 2001 Makiminato service
area and Kadena
Air Base
Naha Port No date Urasoe pier area
established
Housing consolidation on Camps March 2008 Remaining portions
Kuwae and Zukeran of Camps Kuwae and
Zukeran
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Sources: SACO Final Report; Marine Corps Bases, Japan; and the 18th
Wing.
The most significant land deal involves the planned closure and
return of MCAS Futenma. The installation is a critical component of
the Marine Corps' forward deployment because it is the home base of
the 1st Marine Air Wing. The Wing's primary mission is to
participate as the air component of the III Marine Expeditionary
Force. The wing's Marine Air Group-36 provides tactical fixed and
rotary wing aircraft and flies about 70 aircraft, including CH-46 and
CH-53 helicopters and KC-130 aerial refueling airplanes.
MCAS Futenma's primary mission is to maintain and operate facilities
and provide services and materials to support Marine aircraft
operations. MCAS Futenma covers 1,188 acres of land and is
completely surrounded by the urbanized growth of Ginowan City, as
shown in figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Aerial View of
MCAS Futenma
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: MCAS Futenma Master Plan.
Officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, USFJ, and Marine
Corps Bases, Japan, told us that encroachment along the perimeter of
MCAS Futenma is a concern. In fact, according to Marine Corps Bases,
Japan, in one instance, the owner of land outside MCAS Futenma
erected a building at the end of the runway that was tall enough to
create a hazard to aircraft using the base. The building was
removed.
The land at MCAS Futenma is leased from about 2,000 private
landowners by the government of Japan. About 40 percent of the base
is used for runways, taxiways, and aircraft parking. The remaining
portions of the base are used for air operations, personnel support
facilities, housing, and administrative activities. MCAS Futenma has
a runway and parallel taxiway that are 9,000 feet long as well as an
aircraft washrack, maintenance facilities, vehicle maintenance
facilities, fuel storage facilities, a hazardous waste storage and
transfer facility, a control tower, an armory, and other facilities
needed to operate a Marine Corps air station.
If the Marine Corps presence is to be maintained with air and ground
combat units and logistical support collocated on Okinawa, then MCAS
Futenma or a suitable replacement is required to maintain the
operational capability of the III Marine Expeditionary Force's air
combat element.
MCAS FUTENMA IS SCHEDULED TO BE
LARGELY REPLACED BY A SEA-BASED
FACILITY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2
The U.S. and Japanese governments established a working group to
examine three options for replacing MCAS Futenma. The options were
relocation of the air station onto (1) Kadena Air Base, (2) Camp
Schwab, or (3) a sea-based facility to be located in the ocean
offshore from Okinawa Island. The SACO Final Report stated that the
sea-based facility was judged to be the best option to enhance the
safety and quality of life of the Okinawan people and maintain the
operational capabilities of U.S. forces. The report also cited as a
benefit that a sea-based facility could be removed when no longer
needed.
Acquisition of the sea-based facility would follow a process that
began with the United States' establishing operational and
quality-of-life requirements and would conclude with Japan's
selecting, financing, designing, and building the sea-based facility
to meet U.S. requirements. The government of Japan has decided to
locate the sea-based facility offshore from Camp Schwab. However, at
the time of our review some residents living near the proposed site
had opposed having the sea-based facility near their community, but
U.S. officials are proceeding on the basis that the facility will be
built.
The Security Consultative Committee established the Futenma
Implementation Group to identify a relocation site and an
implementation plan for the transfer from MCAS Futenma to the
sea-based facility. On the U.S. side, the Group is chaired by the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs and has representatives from the Joint Staff; the
headquarters of the Marine Corps; the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
for Installations and Environment; the Pacific Command; USFJ; the
Office of Japanese Affairs, Department of State; and the
Political-Military Affairs Section of the U.S. Embassy-Tokyo. The
Group was established to oversee the design, construction, testing,
and transfer of assets to the sea-based facility.
MCAS Futenma will not be closed until the sea-based facility is
operational. Only when U.S. operating and support requirements have
been met will Marine Air Group-36 and its rotary wing aircraft
relocate to the sea-based facility. As part of the closure and
return of MCAS Futenma, 12 KC-130 aircraft are scheduled to relocate
to MCAS Iwakuni, on the Japanese mainland, after Japan builds new
maintenance and other facilities to support the relocation. In
addition, Japan is scheduled to build other support facilities at
Kadena Air Base to support aircraft maintenance and logistics
operations that are to relocate there. Ground elements of the 1st
Marine Air Wing not relocated to the sea-based facility would
relocate to other bases on Okinawa.
DOD HAS ESTABLISHED
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
SEA-BASED FACILITY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.1
The sea-based facility is to be designed by Japan to meet U.S.
operational requirements.
During regular operations, about 66 helicopters and MV-22 aircraft
(when fielded) would be stationed aboard the sea-based facility. The
MV-22 can operate in either vertical takeoff and landing mode, like a
helicopter, or short takeoff and landing mode, like an airplane. The
sea-based facility airfield requirements are based on MV-22 operating
requirements. According to a Marine Corps study, a runway length of
2,600 feet is sufficient for normal day-to-day operations, training
missions, and self-deployment to Korea in its vertical takeoff and
landing mode under most conditions. The Pacific Command has
established a 4,200-foot runway for all MV-22 operations based on
aircraft performance and meteorological data. The Marine Corps study
indicates that a 4,200-foot runway is sufficient for most training
and mission requirements. However, the study also stated that for
missions requiring an MV-22 gross weight near the maximum of 59,305
pounds, the aircraft would have to operate in its short takeoff mode
and would require a runway of 5,112 feet under certain weather
conditions.
The United States has established a runway length requirement of
about 4,200 feet for the sea-based facility. Arresting gear would be
located about 1,200 feet from either end of the runway to permit
carrier aircraft to land. In addition, the runway would have
328-foot overruns at each end to provide a safety margin in case a
pilot overshoots the optimal landing spot during an approach and a
parallel taxiway about 75 feet wide alongside the runway. Additional
aircraft facilities include a drive-through rinse facility for
aircraft corrosion control, an air traffic control tower, and
aircraft firefighting and rescue facilities. Up to 10,000 pounds of
ordnance would be stored in a magazine collocated with an ordnance
assembly area aboard the sea-based facility. Also, flight simulators
and security and rescue boat operations, among other capabilities,
are required aboard the sea-based facility.
Aircraft maintenance would be performed aboard the sea-based
facility. Marine Air Group-36 requires hangar space for five
helicopter squadrons, including space for Marine Corps air logistics;
corrosion control; aircraft maintenance; secure storage;
administrative functions; ground support equipment; and engine test
cells, among other facilities. Logistics operations requirements
aboard the sea-based facility include aircraft supply and fuel/oil
supply, spill response capability, and parking for up to 800
personally owned and government-owned vehicles. MCAS Futenma can
store about 828,000 gallons of aircraft fuel. At the time of our
review, the United States had not determined how much fuel storage
capacity was needed, or how fuel is to be provided to support
sea-based facility operations. Food service for about 1,400 on-duty
servicemembers per meal would be required on the sea-based facility
to provide meals during the day and for crews working nights.
The United States planned to locate the headquarters, logistics, and
most operational activities aboard the sea-based facility and most
quality-of-life activities, including housing, food service, and
medical and dental services, ashore at Camp Schwab. U.S. officials
estimate that over 2,500 servicemembers currently stationed at MCAS
Futenma would transfer to the sea-based facility and Camp Schwab. To
accommodate the incoming arrivals from MCAS Futenma, Marine Corps
Bases, Japan, plans to relocate about 800 to 1,000 servicemembers
currently housed at Camp Schwab to Camp Hansen and absorb the
remainder at Camp Schwab. U.S. engineers estimated that about 1,900
people would work on the sea-based facility.
Due to a lack of DOD dependent schools in the Camp Schwab area, only
unmarried servicemembers will be housed at Camp Schwab.
Servicemembers accompanied by dependents will be housed where most of
them and most of the DOD schools (including the only two high
schools) are located now, although not on MCAS Futenma. Marine Corps
Bases, Japan, would have to either house all incoming servicemembers
on or near Camp Schwab and bus their dependent children to the
schools or keep servicemembers who have dependents housed in the
southern part of the island and have them commute to work. Marine
Corps Bases, Japan, chose the latter.
CONTRACTORS HAVE DEVELOPED
THREE CONCEPTS FOR A
SEA-BASED FACILITY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.2
Japan will design, build, and pay for the sea-based facility and
plans to locate it offshore from Camp Schwab. The sea-based facility
is be provided rent-free to USFJ, which would then provide it to the
1st Marine Air Wing. Government of Japan, ocean engineering and
other university professors, and other experts have concluded that
three types of sea-based facilities are technically feasible--the
pontoon-type, pile-supported-type, or semisubmersible-type.
PONTOON-TYPE SEA-BASED
FACILITY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.3
A pontoon-type sea-based facility would essentially be a large
platform that would float in the water on pontoons (see fig. 3.2).
The structure would be located about 3,000 feet from shore in about
100 feet of water. Part of the platform would be below the water
line. To keep the sea relatively calm around the platform, a
breakwater would be installed to absorb the wave action. The
breakwater would be constructed in about 60 feet of water atop a
coral ridge. To prevent the structure from floating away, it would
be attached to a mooring system attached to the sea floor.
Figure 3.2: Artist's
Conception of a Pontoon-Type
Sea-Based Facility With a
Cut-Away To Show the Lower Deck
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security
Affairs.
The pontoon-type sea-based facility envisioned would have a runway
and control tower on the deck and most maintenance, storage, and
personnel support activities (such as food service) below deck.
According to documents that we obtained, no floating structure of the
size required has ever been built. In addition, Naval Facilities
Engineering Command officials told us that construction of a
breakwater in about 60 feet of water would be "at the edge of
technical feasibility."
PILE-SUPPORTED SEA-BASED
FACILITY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.4
A pile-supported sea-based facility essentially would be a large
platform supported by columns, or piles, driven into the sea floor
(see fig. 3.3). The structure would be located in about 16 feet to
82 feet of water and relatively closer to shore than the proposed
pontoon-type sea-based facility. According to Naval Engineers, about
7,000 piles would be needed to support a structure of the size
proposed.
Figure 3.3: Artist's
Conception of a Pile-Supported
Sea-Based Facility
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security
Affairs.
The pile-supported sea-based facility envisioned would have one deck.
In addition to the runway and control tower, maintenance, storage,
and personnel support activities would be in buildings on the deck.
Structures similar to the pile-supported sea-based facility have
already been built for other purposes.
SEMISUBMERSIBLE-TYPE
SEA-BASED FACILITY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.5
The semisubmersible-type sea-based facility would consist of a
platform above the water line supported by a series of floating
underwater hulls (see fig. 3.4). The facility would have
interconnected modules with a runway and control tower atop the deck
and maintenance, storage, and other functions on a lower deck.
Figure 3.4: Artist's
Conception of a Semisubmersible
Sea-Based Facility
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security
Affairs.
The semisubmersible sea-based facility relies on technology that does
not yet exist, according to documents provided by DOD. For example,
documents indicate that semisubmersible sea-based facilities are
limited by current technology to about 1,000 feet in length.
COSTS, CHALLENGES, AND
COMPLICATIONS THREATEN
CAPABILITY OF THE SEA-BASED
FACILITY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3
The United States and/or Japan are likely to encounter high costs,
technological challenges, and operational complications in designing,
constructing, and operating the sea-based facility.
COSTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.1
The sea-based facility is estimated to cost Japan between $2.4
billion and $4.9 billion to design and build. Operations and support
costs are expected to be much higher on the sea-based facility than
at MCAS Futenma. Under the Status of Forces Agreement, the United
States pays for the maintenance of bases it uses in Japan. Based on
a $4-billion sea-based facility design and construction cost, U.S.
engineers have initially estimated maintenance costs to be about $8
billion over the 40-year life span of the facility. Thus, annual
maintenance would cost about $200 million, compared with about $2.8
million spent at MCAS Futenma. At the time of this report, the
United States and Japan were discussing having Japan pay for
maintenance on the sea-based facility. If Japan does not pay
maintenance costs, then the U.S. cost related to the SACO
recommendations could be much higher.
In addition to potential increased maintenance costs, the United
States may spend money to renovate facilities at MCAS Futenma
previously identified by both the U.S. and Japanese governments for
replacement by Japan. Because of the planned closure of MCAS
Futenma, the government of Japan cancelled about $140 million worth
of projects at the air station that were to be funded under Japan's
Facilities Improvement Program. The United States believes these
facilities are important to Futenma's operations until the sea-based
facility is ready. Marine Forces, Japan, has requested $13.6 million
in U.S. funds to complete some of those projects. During the
10-year sea-based facility acquisition period, some of the other
projects may be needed to continue to operate MCAS Futenma. If the
government of Japan does not fund these projects for MCAS Futenma,
the United States will have to choose between the added risk of
operating from decaying facilities or pay additional renovation costs
at a base scheduled for closure.
TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.2
Technological challenges may arise because no sea-based facility of
the type and scale envisioned has ever been built to serve as an air
base. To address these challenges and develop sea-based facility
operational and support requirements, the Naval Facilities
Engineering Command convened a working group in August 1997. In its
report, the group concluded that for the three sea-based facilities
being considered, "none of these technologies has been demonstrated
to the scale envisioned."
The report described numerous challenges that would have to be
overcome to make a sea-based facility viable. For example, the
sea-based facility would have to survive natural events such as
typhoons, which strike within 180 nautical miles of Okinawa Island an
average of four times per year. During a typhoon, personnel would
evacuate the sea-based facility, but the aircraft would remain aboard
the facility in hangars to ride out the storm, according to 1st
Marine Air Wing officials. U.S. engineers we spoke with indicated
that a pile-supported sea-based facility's underside would have to
withstand pressure caused by storm-tossed waves slamming beneath the
deck, and the pontoon- and semisubmersible-type sea-based facilities
must be designed to avoid instability or sinking. Tsunamis are also
a threat. In a tsunami, the water level near shore generally drops
(sometimes substantially) and then rises to great heights, causing
large, destructive waves. U.S. engineers we spoke with indicated
that a floating sea-based facility's mooring system would have to
permit the floating structure to drop with the water level without
hitting bottom and then rise as the waves returned.
Also, structural issues pose technological challenges. The sea-based
facility would have to be invulnerable to sinking or capsizing and
resume normal operations within 24 to 48 hours after an aircraft
crash, an accident involving ordnance aboard the facility, or an
attack in wartime or by terrorists. An issue involving the pontoon
and semisubmersible facilities is the potential for them to become
unstable if an interior compartment is flooded. Thus, watertight
doors and compartments (similar to those on ships) may be required.
Corrosion control is a major concern because the facility would
always be in salt water. Therefore, that part of the structure below
the waterline would have to be built to minimize or resist corrosion
for the 40-year life span of the facility, or a method of identifying
and repairing corrosion (possibly underwater) without disrupting
military operations would have to be devised.
OPERATIONAL COMPLICATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.3
The Marine Corps may experience operational complications because the
proposed length of the sea-based facility runway can compromise
safety margins when an MV-22 aircraft is taking off at maximum weight
under wet runway conditions.\1 Since the MV-22 requires a 5,112-foot
runway to take off at its maximum weight of 59,305 pounds and
maintain maximum safety margins on a wet runway, the proposed
4,200-foot runway for the sea-based facility is too short. While the
MV-22 can take off from a 4,200-foot runway at its maximum weight, in
the event of an engine failure, or other emergency, on a wet runway,
the safety margin is reduced. This risks the loss of the aircraft
because the stopping distance for an aborted takeoff is longer on a
wet runway than the runway planned. According to the Pacific
Command, conditions that require more than 4,200 feet for takeoff
would not preclude effective MV-22 contingency missions. A commander
would need to make a decision to accept the increased risk of
aircraft loss based on the criticality of the mission, or to reduce
the aircraft's load. The Pacific Command considers the risk
acceptable and accepted the reduced the size of the sea-based
facility.
Alternatively, with a reduced load, MV-22s could take off from the
sea-based facility without a full fuel load, use Kadena Air Base to
finish fueling to capacity, and take off from its longer runway to
continue the mission. However, this requires Kadena Air Base to
absorb increased air traffic and risks later arrival in an area of
operations. Ultimately, the added risk, time, and coordination are
problems that would not occur at MCAS Futenma because its 9,000-foot
runway is long enough for all MV-22 missions. Also, if Kadena Air
Base is not available for MV-22 operations, the Marines would have no
alternative U.S. military runway of sufficient length on Okinawa to
support MV-22 missions at its maximum weight and maintain maximum
safety margins in certain weather conditions.
Moreover, the loss of MCAS Futenma's runway equates to the loss of an
emergency landing strip for fixed-wing aircraft in the area.
However, safety margins may not be compromised even if Kadena Air
Base is shut down (for weather or other reasons), MCAS Futenma is
closed, and the sea-based facility's runway as currently designed is
too short for certain aircraft, because Naha International Airport
would be available as an emergency landing strip for U.S. military
aircraft.
--------------------
\1 According to the Pacific Command, Okinawa experiences rainfall an
average of 135 days a year.
U.S. PROJECT OVERSIGHT IS
CURRENTLY LIMITED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.4
USFJ and Naval Facilities Engineering Command officials told us that
the United States must oversee the design, engineering, and
construction of the sea-based facility to ensure that it meets U.S.
requirements, is operationally adequate, and is affordable to operate
and maintain. However, current staff and funding resources are
dedicated to managing other programs associated with the U.S.
presence in Japan. Therefore, USFJ has requested establishment of a
Project Management Office to oversee and coordinate SACO
implementation while the Naval Facilities Engineering Command has
asked for funding for a special project office to oversee the design
and construction of the sea-based facility.
In addition to the high cost, technological challenges, and
operational complications that stem from the planned sea-based
facility and limited U.S. oversight of the project, Japan's
sea-based facility acquisition strategy compounds the risk. At the
time of our review, Japan did not have a risk-reduction phase planned
to demonstrate that the design of the sea-based facility meets U.S.
operating and affordability requirements. A risk-reduction phase
could include risk assessments, life-cycle cost analyses, and design
tradeoffs. DOD's policy is to include a risk-reduction phase in its
acquisition of major systems. U.S. officials believe it will take
up to 10 years to design, build, and relocate to the sea-based
facility as compared with the 5 to 7 years estimated in the SACO
Final Report. On the other hand, these officials also believe that
adding time to the project is a price worth paying to include a
risk-reduction phase. Given the scope, technical challenges, and
unique nature of the sea-based facility, including a risk-reduction
phase would permit the U.S. and Japanese governments to establish
that the proposed sea-based facility will be affordable and
operationally suitable. The inclusion of a risk-reduction phase in
the sea-based facility's acquisition schedule is currently being
discussed between the U.S. and Japanese governments.
PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH
REMAINING 10 LAND RETURN
RECOMMENDATIONS ARE MINIMAL,
AND SOME BENEFITS ARE LIKELY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4
U.S. forces on Okinawa will face minimal risks to operations from
the remaining 10 land return issues. The services can maintain
training opportunities and deployment plans and schedules, because
land to be returned is no longer needed or will be returned only
after Japan provides adequate replacement facilities on existing
bases or adds land by extending other base boundaries.
First, while the Northern Training Area is still used extensively for
combat skills training, about 9,900 acres can be returned to Japan
because that land is no longer needed by the United States. The
Marine Corps will retain about 9,400 acres of the Northern Training
Area and expects to be able to continue all needed training on the
remaining acreage. The return of the 9,900 acres is contingent on
Japan's relocating helicopter landing zones within what will remain
of the Northern Training Area. In addition, the adjacent Aha
training area can be returned without risk once Japan provides new
shoreline access to the Northern Training Area to replace what would
be lost by the closure and return of the Aha training area.
Likewise, return of the Gimbaru training area presents low risk
because the helicopter landing zone is to be relocated to the nearby
Kin Blue Beach training area and the vehicle washrack and
firefighting training tower will be relocated to Camp Hansen. The
Yomitan auxiliary airfield can be returned because parachute drop
training conducted there has already been transferred to the Ie Jima
auxiliary airfield on Ie Jima Island, just off the northwest coast of
Okinawa Island. Lastly, the Sobe communication station can be
returned because it will be relocated to the remaining Northern
Training Area, and Naha Port can be returned when it is replaced by a
suitable facility elsewhere on Okinawa.
While risks from the return of land (other than that related to MCAS
Futenma) are minimal, the United States expects some benefits from
the consolidation of housing on the remaining portion of Camp
Zukeran. First, the SACO Final Report calls on Japan to build a new
naval hospital on Camp Zukeran to replace the existing hospital on
that part of Camp Kuwae scheduled for return. Marine Corps Bases,
Japan estimated the construction cost to be about $300 million, which
Japan is scheduled to pay. In addition, Japan is to provide 2,041
new or reconstructed housing units at Camp Zukeran as part of the
SACO process and another 1,473 reconstructed housing units at Kadena
Air Base, which is not part of SACO's recommendations. Air Force
18th Wing civil engineering officials estimated the total housing
construction cost at about $2 billion.\2 The 18th Wing has requested
establishment of a special project office to help with the design of
the housing units and to ensure that the units meet U.S. health and
safety code standards.
The current estimated cost to the United States to implement the
recommendations related to the return of land is about $193.5 million
over about 10 years. This includes (1) $80 million to furnish the
new hospital; (2) $71 million for the Futenma Implementation Group;
(3) $8.2 million to furnish 2,041 housing units; (4) $8.1 million for
USFJ to oversee and coordinate SACO implementation; (5) $8 million
for the Naval Facilities Engineering Command project office to
oversee the sea-based facility's engineering and construction; (6)
$4.4 million for a special project office for oversight of the
housing project and master plan; and (7) $13.6 million for MCAS
Futenma projects that would have been paid for by Japan had it not
cancelled funding for the base. DOD officials told us that the U.S.
and Japanese governments were negotiating an arrangement whereby
Japan might assume those portions of the $71 million in costs which
they can pay (and still comply with their domestic laws), for the
Futenma Implementation Group. This arrangement could reduce U.S.
costs below the current estimate of $193.5 million. Also, some
initial costs may be offset in later years because the 18th Wing
expects maintenance costs will be lower at the new hospital and
housing. However, U. S. costs could be significantly higher than
the $193.5 million estimate because the United States and Japan have
not agreed on which country would be responsible for the sea-based
facility's maintenance.
--------------------
\2 The Air Force is DOD's executive agent for housing in Japan.
SOME PROBLEMS AND RISKS IN
IMPLEMENTING ONE OF THE THREE
OPERATIONAL CHANGES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5
The United States has already implemented all three changes in
training and operational procedures called for in the SACO Final
Report (see table 3.2).
Table 3.2
Training and Operational Procedures
Changes Addressed in the SACO Final
Report
How operational procedures
Operational procedure change will be maintained
---------------------------------------- ----------------------------
End artillery live-fire training over Relocate training to ranges
highway 104 on Japan's mainland
Relocate parachute drop training to Ie End parachute drop training
Jima auxiliary airfield at Yomitan auxiliary
airfield and relocate to Ie
Jima auxiliary airfield.
End conditioning hikes on public roads Relocate training onto U.S.
bases
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Sources: SACO Final Report and Marine Corps Bases, Japan.
The 3rd Marine Division's artillery live-fire exercises have been
relocated from the Central Training Area on Okinawa to the Kita-Fuji,
Higashi-Fuji, Ojojihara, Yausubetsu, and Hijudai training ranges on
the Japanese mainland. Prior to the SACO Final Report, the 3rd
Marine Division was already conducting 60 to 80 days of artillery
live-fire exercises at the two Fuji ranges. Under the SACO
relocation, another 35 days of training will be split among the five
ranges. Japan has agreed to pay transportation costs to the
artillery ranges and wants to use Japanese commercial airliners for
this purpose.
The III Marine Expeditionary Force believes the training at the five
ranges is comparable to that available on Okinawa and other ranges in
the United States. At the time of our review, the Marine Corps had
successfully completed one relocated artillery live-fire exercise
each at the Kita-Fuji and Yausubetsu ranges. The relocation has had
virtually no impact on deployment plans and schedules, according to
III Marine Expeditionary Force officials.
In addition to the artillery training relocation, the United States
has transferred parachute jump training conducted by the Army's 1st
Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), from the Yomitan
auxiliary airfield (which was closed) to the auxiliary airfield on Ie
Jima Island, just off the northwest coast of Okinawa.\3 However,
special forces soldiers are at increased risk of failing to maintain
airborne qualifications because parachute operations training has
proven more difficult to complete on Ie Jima Island. About 73
percent of the training jumps scheduled between July 1996 and
September 1997 on Ie Jima Island were canceled due to adverse weather
at the drop zone; adverse weather at sea, preventing required safety
boats from standing by in the event a parachutist landed in the
water; and equipment problems that prevented the safety boats from
departing their berths. The relocation has not affected operational
deployments and schedules, although training deployments have been
disrupted.
Lastly, the Marine Corps has already ended conditioning hikes for
troops on public roads off base and transferred those hikes to roads
within U.S. bases. USFJ and Marine Corps Bases, Japan, indicated
that this has not cost the United States any money and has had no
impact on operational capability, deployment plans and schedules, or
training.
As requested, we also reviewed the impact of the SACO Final Report
recommendations on bomber operations in the Pacific, although bomber
operations were not specifically addressed by the SACO report.
According to the headquarters of the Air Force, Pacific Air Forces,
and 18th Wing, the SACO Final Report recommendations will have no
impact on bomber operations in the Pacific.
--------------------
\3 The Yomitan auxiliary airfield has been closed but is not
scheduled for return to Japan until March 2001.
RISKS ARE MINIMAL FROM FIVE
NOISE REDUCTION INITIATIVES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:6
The United States has implemented two noise reduction initiatives at
Kadena Air Base and MCAS Futenma called for in the SACO Final Report.
Three more noise reduction initiatives are to be implemented after
Japan constructs new facilities. Table 3.3 shows the status of the
five noise reduction initiatives and U.S. plans for maintaining
training and operational capability after their implementation.
Table 3.3
Noise Reduction Initiatives Called For
in the SACO Final Report
How training and
operational
Implementation procedures are to
Noise reduction initiative date be maintained
------------------------------ ------------------ ------------------
Aircraft noise countermeasures Implemented All flights
at Kadena Air Base and MCAS required to do
Futenma missions and
maintain aircrew
proficiency are
permitted, even at
night.
Transfer KC-130 and AV-8 Partially Japan will build
aircraft implemented replacement
facilities at MCAS
Iwakuni for the
KC-130s; all but 6
AV-8s have
returned to the
United States\.\a
Relocate Navy aircraft and MC- Partially Japan will build
130 operations within Kadena implemented facilities at
Air Base Kadena Air Base.
Noise reduction baffles at March 1998 Japan will build
Kadena Air Base noise reduction
baffles.
Limitations on nighttime Implemented Nighttime flying
training operations at MCAS is still permitted
Futenma for training.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a These aircraft are now based at MCAS Iwakuni and frequently deploy
to Kadena Air Base.
Sources: SACO Final Report; Marine Corps Bases, Japan; and the 18th
Wing.
The United States will encounter few problems from the noise
abatement procedures, according to USFJ; Marine Corps Bases, Japan;
and the 18th Wing. Commanders at MCAS Futenma and Kadena Air Base
retain the right to order nighttime flying operations to maintain
aircrew proficiency and meet all training, mission, and safety
requirements. In fact, the noise abatement countermeasures have been
in effect since March 1996, and commanders at both installations
indicated that the procedures have not affected operational
capability, deployment plans and schedules, or training.
RISKS ARE MINIMAL FROM EIGHT
STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT
CHANGES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:7
The United States has implemented seven of the eight changes to
Status of Forces Agreement procedures called for in the SACO Final
Report. Table 3.4 shows the new Status of Forces Agreement
procedures.
Table 3.4
Improvements to Status of Forces
Agreement Procedures
Improve Status of Forces Agreement procedures
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Provide timely reports on U.S. military accidents to authorities in
Japan.
Provide greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements.
Implement new procedures to authorize visits to U.S. facilities by
Japanese nationals.\a
Attach new number plates to all U.S. force official vehicles,
including tactical vehicles.
Advise U.S. personnel to purchase supplemental automobile insurance
for personally owned vehicles.\b
Japan will try to pay the difference between Japanese court judgments
and the amount that the United States is willing to pay to compensate
for claims against U.S. military personnel not involved in the
performance of official duties.\c
Implement new quarantine procedures for pets brought to Japan by U.S.
personnel.
Continue to use procedures already in place for removal of unexploded
ordnance at the Central Training Area. These procedures are equivalent
to those used in the United States.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Some Japanese nationals visit U.S. bases to view land that they
own within the base and because some ancient cultural assets are
located within some U.S. bases.
\b USFJ went beyond the SACO report goal and now requires U.S.
personnel to buy supplemental insurance for their personally owned
vehicles.
\c Japan is scheduled to implement these procedures by March 1998.
Sources: SACO Final Report; USFJ; and Marine Corps Bases, Japan.
According to USFJ officials, with the exception of affixing number
plates to official vehicles, the changes in Status of Forces
Agreement procedures cost the United States nothing and had no impact
on deployment plans, schedules, and training. The number plates cost
about $30,000 according to USFJ officials.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:8
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense
-- decide on the means to monitor the design, engineering, and
construction of the sea-based facility;
-- work with Japan to include a risk-reduction phase in the
acquisition schedule to establish that the designed sea-based
facility will be affordable and operationally suitable;
-- take steps to ensure that all U.S. concerns, especially the
costs of operations and maintenance on the sea-based facility
and operational concerns, have been satisfactorily addressed
before Japan begins to build the sea-based facility; and
-- request the Japanese government to allocate funds for those
projects at Futenma that were cancelled by Japan due to the
planned closure of Futenma and are deemed essential to continued
operations of the station and the 1st Marine Air Wing until
completion of the replacement facility.
AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:9
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with
GAO's recommendations and noted that the report effectively outlines
the major operational and technical issues involved in realigning,
consolidating, and reducing U.S. force presence on Okinawa, as set
forth in the SACO process. DOD also noted that the role of Congress
will be critical in maintaining the strategic relationship with Japan
and therefore the GAO report was timely and welcome. DOD provided
technical comments, which we have incorporated in our report where
appropriate. The DOD response is printed in its entirety in appendix
II.
We also provided a copy of our draft report to the Department of
State. In oral comments, the Department of State concurred with our
report and offered one technical change which we incorporated into
the report.
TWO ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES COULD
ARISE FROM IMPLEMENTING THE SACO
RECOMMENDATIONS
============================================================ Chapter 4
It may take a decade or more to fully achieve all of the SACO's
recommendations, but two environmental issues may arise and remain
during and after implementation. The first concerns the potential
for environmental contamination on U.S. bases scheduled for closure.
The second concerns the potential adverse impact on the environment
from construction and operation of the sea-based facility.
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP ISSUES
COULD AFFECT LAND RETURN
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1
If environmental contamination is found on bases to be closed under
the SACO process, cleanup could be expensive. As we noted in chapter
1, the Status of Forces Agreement does not require the United States
to return bases in Japan to the condition they were in at the time
they were provided to U.S. forces or to compensate Japan for not
having done so. Thus, USFJ and Marine Corps Bases, Japan, officials
believe that the United States is not obligated to do environmental
cleanup at bases to be closed. Nevertheless, a 1995 DOD policy calls
for the removal of known imminent and substantial dangers to health
and safety due to environmental contamination caused by DOD
operations on installations or facilities designated for return to
the host nation overseas. Furthermore, if the bases are closed and
the land returned to Japan and environmental contamination is
subsequently found, redevelopment and reuse efforts planned for some
of these facilities could be hampered. In fact, Marine Corps Bases,
Japan, and other Okinawa-based U.S. forces were informed by a letter
dated August 25, 1997, from the government of Japan's Naha Defense
Facilities Administration Bureau that the toxic substances mercury
and polychlorinated biphenyls were found on the Onna communications
site. The United States had closed the base and returned the land to
Japan in November 1995 (a land return unrelated to the SACO process).
The letter indicated that the presence of these substances has
prevented the land from being returned to its owners and thus being
available for reuse. The letter concludes by requesting that the
United States conduct a survey, identify any contamination that may
exist, and clean up bases scheduled for closure in the future. If
the United States agrees to this request, land return under the SACO
process could be affected. At the time of our review, the United
States had not responded to the letter.
If such a survey, sometimes called an environmental baseline survey,
is conducted and contamination is found, cleanup could prove
expensive. For example, environmental remediation at MCAS Tustin in
California is expected to cost more than $53 million when completed.
If a survey is conducted and contamination is found, a decision would
be needed as to whether the United States or Japan would pay the
cost.
CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF
THE SEA-BASED FACILITY COULD
HARM THE ENVIRONMENT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2
DOD's position is that the sea-based facility should be constructed
and operated in a manner that preserves and protects the natural
resources of Okinawa, including the ocean environment and coral reefs
that partially surround the island. Further, the United States and
Japan, along with a substantial number of other countries, support an
international coral reef initiative aimed at conservation and
management of coral reefs and related ecosystems. Coral reefs are in
the area in which the sea-based facility is tentatively to be
located. However, two sea-based facility options currently under
consideration have the potential to harm the coral reefs. The
pontoon-type facility requires the installation of a large breakwater
and several mooring stations onto the seafloor. The pile-supported
facility requires several thousand support pilings that would need to
be driven into the coral reef or seafloor and reinforced to withstand
storm conditions. Both of these options require at least one, and
possibly two, causeways connecting them to shore facilities.
Numerous scientific studies show that large construction projects can
cause damage to coral reefs and the nearby coastal areas. The
government of Japan is evaluating the condition of the coral reef.
The environment could also be contaminated through routine operations
aboard the sea-based facility. The accidental runoff of cleaning
fluids used to wash aircraft or unintentional fuel system leaks could
contaminate the nearby ocean environment.
THE FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
ACTION COMMITTEE ON OKINAWA
=========================================================== Appendix I
The SACO Final Report, December 2, 1996, by Minister for Foreign
Affairs Ikeda, Minister of State for Defense Kyuma, Secretary of
Defense Perry, Ambassador Mondale
The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established in
November 1995 by the Governments of Japan and the United States. The
two Governments launched the SACO process to reduce the burden on the
people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan-US alliance.
The mandate and guidelines for the SACO process were set forth by the
Governments of Japan and the United States at the outset of the joint
endeavor. Both sides decided that the SACO would develop
recommendations for the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on ways
to realign, consolidate and reduce US facilities and areas, and
adjust operational procedures of US forces in Okinawa consistent with
their respective obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security and other related agreements. The work of the SACO was
scheduled to conclude after one year.
The SCC which was held on April 15, 1996, approved the SACO Interim
Report which included several significant initiatives, and instructed
the SACO to complete and recommend plans with concrete implementation
schedules by November 1996.
The SACO, together with the Joint Committee, has conducted a series
of intensive and detailed discussions and developed concrete plans
and measures to implement the recommendations set forth in the
Interim Report.
Today, at the SCC, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry
and Ambassador Mondale approved this SACO Final Report. The plans
and measures included in this Final Report, when implemented, will
reduce the impact of the activities of US forces on communities in
Okinawa. At the same time, these measures will fully maintain the
capabilities and readiness of US forces in Japan while addressing
security and force protection requirements. Approximately 21 percent
of the total acreage of the US facilities and areas in Okinawa
excluding joint use facilities and areas (approx. 5,002 ha/12,361
acres) will be returned.
Upon approving the Final Report, the members of the SCC welcomed the
successful conclusion of the year-long SACO process and underscored
their strong resolve to continue joint efforts to ensure steady and
prompt implementation of the plans and measures of the SACO Final
Report. With this understanding, the SCC designated the Joint
Committee as the primary forum for bilateral coordination in the
implementation phase, where specific conditions for the completion of
each item will be addressed. Coordination with local communities
will take place as necessary.
The SCC also reaffirmed the commitment of the two governments to make
every endeavor to deal with various issues related to the presence
and status of US forces, and to enhance mutual understanding between
US forces and local Japanese communities. In this respect, the SCC
agreed that efforts to these ends should continue, primarily through
coordination at the Joint Committee.
The members of the SCC agreed that the SCC itself and the Security
Sub-Committee (SSC) would monitor such coordination at the Joint
Committee as described above and provide guidance as appropriate.
The SCC also instructed the SSC to seriously address the
Okinawa-related issues as one of the most important subjects and
regularly report back to the SCC on this subject.
In accordance with the April 1996 Japan-US Joint Declaration on
Security, the SCC emphasized the importance of close consultation on
the international situation, defense policies and military postures,
bilateral policy coordination and efforts towards a more peaceful and
stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The SCC
instructed the SSC to pursue these goals and to address the
Okinawa-related issues at the same time.
RETURN LAND
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1
FUTENMA AIR STATION
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.1
See attached (p. 56).
NORTHERN TRAINING AREA
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.2
Return major portion of the Northern Training Area (approx. 3,987
ha/9,852 acres) and release US joint use of certain reservoirs
(approx. 159 ha/393 acres) with the intention to finish the process
by the end of March 2003 under the following conditions:
Provide land area (approx. 38 ha/93 acres) and water area (approx.
121ha/298 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end
of March 1998 in order to ensure access from the remaining Northern
Training Area to the ocean.
Relocate helicopter landing zones from the areas to be returned to
the remaining Northern Training Area.
AHA TRAINING AREA
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.3
Release US joint use of Aha Training Area (approx. 480 ha/1,185
acres) and release US joint use of the water area (approx. 7,895
ha/19,509 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end
of March 1998 after land and water access areas from the Northern
Training Area to the ocean are provided.
GIMBARU TRAINING AREA
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.4
Return Gimbaru Training Area (approx. 60 ha/149 acres) with the
intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after the
helicopter landing zone is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area,
and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.
SOBE COMMUNICATION SITE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.5
Return Sobe Communication Site (approx. 53 ha/132 acres) with the
intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the
antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to
Camp Hansen.
YOMITAN AUXILIARY AIRFIELD
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.6
Return Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (approx. l91 ha/471 acres) with
the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after
the parachute drop training is relocated to Ie Jima Auxiliary
Airfield and Sobe Communications Sites is relocated.
CAMP KUWAE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.7
Return most of Camp Kuwae (approx 99 ha/245 acres) with the intention
to finish the process by the end of March 2008 after the Naval
Hospital is relocated to Camp Zukeran and remaining facilities there
are relocated to Camp Zukeran or other facilities and areas in
Okinawa.
SENAHA COMMUNICATION STATION
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.8
Return Senaha Communication Station (approx. 61 ha/151 acres) with
the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after
the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are
relocated to Torii Communication Station. However, the microwave
tower portion (approx.- 0. l ha/0.3 acres) will be retained.
MAKIMINATO SERVICE AREA
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.9
Return land adjacent to Route 58 (approx. 3 ha/8 acres) in order to
widen the Route, after the facilities which will be affected by the
return are relocated within the remaining Makiminato Service Area.
NAHA PORT
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:1.10
Jointly continue best efforts to accelerate the return of Naha Port
(approx. 57 ha/140 acres) in connection to its relocation to the
Urasoe Pier area (approx. 35 ha/87 acres).
HOUSING CONSOLIDATION (CAMP
KUWAE AND CAMP ZUKERAN)
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:1.11
Consolidate US housing areas in Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran and
return portions of land in housing areas there with the intention to
finish the process by the end of March 2008 (approx. 83 ha/206 acres
at Camp Zukeran; in addition, approx. 35 ha/85 acres at Camp Kuwae
will be returned through housing consolidation. That land amount is
included in the above entry on Camp Kuwae.
ADJUST TRAINING AND OPERATIONAL
PROCEDURES
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2
ARTILLERY LIVE-FIRE TRAINING
OVER HIGHWAY 104
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.1
Terminate artillery fire-training over Highway 104, with the
exception of artillery fire required in the event of a crisis, after
the training is relocated to maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan
within Japanese Fiscal Year 1997.
PARACHUTE DROP TRAINING
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.2
Relocate parachute drop training to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield.
CONDITIONING HIKES ON PUBLIC
ROADS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.3
Conditioning hikes on public roads have been terminated.
IMPLEMENT NOISE REDUCTION
INITIATIVES:
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3
AIRCRAFT NOISE ABATEMENT
COUNTERMEASURES AT KADENA
AIR BASE AND FUTENMA AIR
STATION
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3.1
Agreements on aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air
Base and Futenma Air Station announced by the Joint Committee in
March 1996 have been implemented.
TRANSFER OF KC-130 HERCULES
AIRCRAFT AND AV-8 HARRIER
AIRCRAFT
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3.2
Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft currently~ based at Futenma Air Station
to Iwakuni Air Base after adequate facilities are provided. Transfer
of 14 AV-8 aircraft from Iwakuni Air Base to the United States has
been completed.
RELOCATION OF NAVY AIRCRAFT
AND MC-130 OPERATIONS AT
KADENA AIR BASE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3.3
Relocate Navy aircraft operations and supporting facilities at Kadena
Air Base from the Navy ramp to other side of the major runways. The
implementation schedules for these measures will be decided along
with the implementation schedules for the development of additional
facilities at Kadena Air Base necessary for the return of Futenma Air
Station. Move the MC-130s at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to
the northwest corner of the major runways by the end of December
1996.
NOISE REDUCTION BAFFLES AT
KADENA AIR BASE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3.4
Build new noise reduction baffles at the north side of Kadena Air
Base with the intention to finish the process by the end of March
1998.
LIMITATION OF NIGHT FLIGHT
TRAINING OPERATIONS AT
FUTENMA AIR STATION
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3.5
Limit night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station to the
maximum extent possible, consistent with the operational readiness of
US forces.
IMPROVE STATUS OF FORCES
AGREEMENT PROCEDURES
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4
ACCIDENT REPORTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4.1
Implement new Joint Committee agreement on procedures to provide
investigation reports on US military aircraft accidents announced on
December 2, 1996.
In addition, as part of the US forces' good neighbor policy, every
effort will be made to insure timely notification of appropriate
local officials, as well as the Government of Japan, of all major
accidents involving US forces' assets or facilities.
PUBLIC EXPOSURE OF JOINT
COMMITTEE AGREEMENTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4.2
Seek greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements.
VISITS TO US FACILITIES AND
AREAS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4.3
Implement the new procedures for authorizing visits to US facilities
and areas announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.
MARKINGS ON US FORCES
OFFICIAL VEHICLES
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4.4
Implement the agreement on measures concerning markings on US forces
official vehicles. Numbered plates will be attached to all
non-tactical US forces vehicles by January 1997, and to all other US
forces vehicles by October 1997.
SUPPLEMENTAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4.5
Education programs for automobile insurance have been expanded.
Additionally, on its own initiative, the US has further elected to
have all personnel under the SOFA obtain supplemental auto insurance
beginning in January 1997.
PAYMENT FOR CLAIMS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4.6
Make joint efforts to improve payment procedures concerning claims
under paragraph 6, Article XVIII of the SOFA in the following manner:
Requests for advance payments will be expeditiously processed and
evaluated by both Governments utilizing their respective procedures.
Whenever warranted under US laws and regulatory guidance, advance
payment will be accomplished as rapidly as possible. A new system
will be introduced by the end of March 1998, by which Japanese
authorities will make available to claimants no-interest loans, as
appropriate, in advance of the final adjudication of claims by US
authorities.
In the past there have been only a very few cases where payment by
the US Government did not satisfy the full amount awarded by a final
court judgment. Should such a case occur in the future, the
Government of Japan will endeavor to make payment to the claimant, as
appropriate, in order to address the difference in amount.
QUARANTINE PROCEDURES
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4.7
Implement the updated agreement on quarantine procedures announced by
the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.
REMOVAL OF UNEXPLODED
ORDINANCE IN CAMP HANSEN
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4.8
Continue to use USMC procedures for removing unexploded ordinance in
Camp Hansen, which are equivalent to those applied to ranges of the
US forces in the United States.
CONTINUE EFFORTS TO IMPROVE
THE SOFA PROCEDURES IN THE
JOINT COMMITTEE\1
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4.9
--------------------
\1 Marine Corps Bases, Japan officials stated that this item is an
ongoing process and does not require any specific action as a result
of the signing of the SACO Final Report.
THE SACO FINAL REPORT ON
FUTENMA AIR STATION (AN
INTEGRAL PART OF THE SACO FINAL
REPORT) TOKYO, JAPAN, DECEMBER
2, 1996
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5
INTRODUCTION
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5.1
At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held on December 2,
1996, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry, and Ambassador
Mondale reaffirmed their commitment to the Special Action Committee
on Okinawa (SACO) Interim Report of April 15, 1996 and the Status
Report of September 19, 1996. Based on the SACO Interim Report, both
Governments have been working to determine a suitable option for the
return of Futenma Air Station and the relocation of its assets to
other facilities and areas in Okinawa, while maintaining the
airfield's critical military functions and capabilities. The Status
Report called for the Special Working Group on Futenma to examine
three specific alternatives: 1) incorporate the heliport into Kadena
Air Base; 2) incorporate the heliport at Camp Schwab; and 3) develop
and construct a sea-based facility (sea-based facility).
On December 2, 1996, the SCC approved the SACO recommendation to
pursue the sea-based facility option. Compared to the other two
options, the sea-based facility is judged to be the best option in
terms of enhanced safety and quality of life for the Okinawan people
while maintaining the operational capabilities of United States
forces. In addition, the sea-based facility can function as a fixed
facility during its use as a military base and can also be removed
when no longer necessary.
The SCC will establish a bilateral United States-Japan working group
under the supervision of the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) entitled
the Futenma Implementation Group (FIG), to be supported by a team of
technical experts. The FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will
develop a plan for implementation no later than December 1997. Upon
SCC approval of this plan, the FIG, working with the Joint Committee,
will oversee design, construction, testing, and transfer of assets.
Throughout this process, the FIG will periodically report to the SSC
on the status of its work.
DECISIONS OF THE SCC
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5.2
Pursue construction of a sea-based facility to absorb most of the
helicopter operational functions of Futenma Air Station. This
facility will be approximately 1500 meters long, and will support the
majority of Futenma Air Station's flying operations, including an
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)-capable runway (approximately 1300
meters long), direct air operations support, and indirect support
infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics,
quality-of-life functions, and base operating support. The sea-based
facility will be designed to support basing of helicopter assets, and
will also be able to support short-field aircraft operations.
Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base. Construct
facilities at this base to ensure that associated infrastructure is
available to support these aircraft and their missions.
Develop additional facilities at Kadena Air Base to support aircraft,
maintenance, and logistics operations which are currently available
at Futenma Air Station but are not relocated to the sea-based
facility or Iwakuni Air Base.
Study the emergency and contingency use of alternative facilities
which may be needed in the event of a crisis. This is necessary
because the transfer of functions from Futenma Air Station to the
sea-based facility will reduce operational flexibility currently
available.
Return Futenma Air Station within the next five to seven years, after
adequate replacement facilities are completed and operational.
GUIDING PRINCIPLES
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5.3
Futenma Air Station's critical military functions and capabilities
will be maintained and will continue to operate at current readiness
levels throughout the transfer of personnel and equipment and the
relocation of facilities.
To the greatest extent possible, Futenma Air Station's operations and
activities will be transferred to the sea-based facility.
Operational capabilities and contingency planning flexibility which
cannot be supported by the shorter runway of the sea-based facility
(such as strategic airlift, logistics, emergency alternate divert,
and contingency throughput) must be fully supported elsewhere. Those
facilities unable to be located on the sea-based facility, due to
operational, cost, or quality-of-life considerations, will be located
on existing US facilities and areas.
The sea-based facility will be located off the east coast of the main
island of Okinawa, and is expected to be connected to land by a pier
or causeway. Selection of the locations will take into account
operational requirements, air-space and sea-lane deconfliction,
fishing access, environmental compatibility, economic effects, noise
abatement, survivability, security, and convenient, acceptable
personnel access to other US military facilities and housing.
The design of the sea-based facility will incorporate adequate
measures to ensure platform, aircraft, equipment, and personnel
survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions; corrosion
control treatment and prevention for the sea-based facility and all
equipment located on the sea-based facility; safety; and platform
security. Support will include reliable and secure fuel supply,
electrical power, fresh water, and other utilities and consumables.
Additionally, the facility will be fully self-supporting for
short-period contingency/emergency operations.
The Government of Japan will provide the sea-based facility and other
relocation facilities for the use of United States forces, in
accordance with the U. S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security and the Status of Forces Agreement. The two Governments
will further consider all aspects of life-cycle cost as part of the
design/acquisition decision.
The Government of Japan will continue to keep the people of Okinawa
informed of the progress of this plan, including concept, location,
and schedules of implementation.
POSSIBLE SEA-BASED FACILITY
CONSTRUCTION METHODS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5.4
Studies have been conducted by a "Technical Support Group" comprised
of Government engineers under the guidance of a "Technical Advisory
Group" comprised of university professors and other experts outside
the Government. These studies suggested that all three construction
methods mentioned below are technically feasible.
Pile Supported Pier Type (using floating modules)-supported by a
number of steel columns fixed to the sea bed.
Pontoon Type-platform consisting of steel pontoon type units,
installed in a calm sea protected by a breakwater.
Semi-Submersible Type-platform at a wave free height, supported by
buoyancy of the lower structure submerged under the sea.
THE NEXT STEPS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5.5
The FIG will recommend a candidate sea-based facility area to the SCC
as soon as possible and formulate a detailed implementation plan no
later than December 1997. This plan will include completion of the
following items: concept development and definition of operational
requirements, technology performance specifications and construction
method, site survey, environmental analysis, and final concept and
site selection.
The FIG will establish phases and schedules to achieve operational
capabilities at each location, including facility design,
construction, installation of required components, validation tests
and suitability demonstrations, and transfer of operations to the new
facility.
The FIG will conduct periodic reviews and make decisions at
significant milestones concerning sea-based facility program
feasibility.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix II
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
=========================================================== Appendix I
(See figure in printed edition.)
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================= Appendix III
NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:1
Reginald L. Furr
Brian J. Lepore
Colin L. Chambers
Nancy L. Ragsdale
Julio A. Luna
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2
Richard Seldin
*** End of document. ***