    Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the U.S.
    Military Presence on Okinawa (Chapter Report, 03/02/98, GAO/NSIAD-98-66).

    Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the contents of the
    Final Report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), focusing
    on: (1) the impact on readiness of U.S. forces based on Okinawa after
    implementation of the report recommendations; (2) the U.S. cost of
    implementing the recommendation; and (3) the benefit or necessity of
    having U.S. Marine Corps forces on Okinawa.

    GAO noted that: (1) the Department of Defense (DOD) believes that Marine
    Corps forces along with other U.S. forces on Okinawa satisfy the U.S.
    national security strategy by visably demonstrating the U.S. commitment
    to security in the region; (2) these forces are thought to deter
    aggression, provide a crisis response capability should deterrence fail,
    and avoid the risk that U.S. allies may interpret the withdrawal of
    forces as a lessening of U.S. commitment to peace and stability in the
    region; (3) Okinawa's proximity to potential regional trouble spots
    promotes the early arrival of U.S. military forces due to shorter
    transit times and reduces potential problems that could arise due to
    late arrival; (4) the cost of this presence is shared by the government
    of Japan, which provides bases and other infrastructure on Okinawa
    rent-free and pays part of the annual cost of Okinawa-based Marine Corps
    forces; (5) SACO Final Report calls on the United States to: (a) return
    land that includes one base and portions of camps, sites, and training
    areas on Okinawa to Japan; (b) implement changes to three operational
    procedures; and (c) implement changes to five noise abatement
    procedures; (6) the United States has established requirements that
    Japan must meet as it designs, builds, and pays for the sea-based
    facility before Futenma is closed and are moved to the sea-based
    facility; (7) such a facility has never been built and operated; (8)
    annual operations and maintenance costs for the sea-based facility were
    initially estimated at $200 million; (9) the United States requested
    that the Japanese government pay the cost to maintain the new sea-based
    facility, but as of the date of this report, it had not agreed to do so;
    (10) excluding the cost to operate the sea-based facility, the current
    estimated cost to the United States to implement the SACO land return
    recommendations is about $193.5 million over about 10 years; (11) the
    United States and Japan are negotiating an arrangement under which Japan
    would assume some SACO-related responsibilities consistent with their
    domestic laws; (12) this arrangement could result in reduced U.S. costs;
    (13) while final implementation of the SACO recommendations is intended
    to reduce the burden of U.S. forces' presence in Okinawa, two
    environmental issues could arise; (14) the first issue concerns the
    potential for environmental contamination being found on military
    facilities returned to Japan and responsibility for cleanup of those
    facilities; and (15) the potential adverse effects that the construction
    and operation of the sea-based facility could have on the environment.

    --------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

     REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-98-66
         TITLE:  Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact
                 of the U.S. Military Presence on Okinawa
          DATE:  03/02/98
       SUBJECT:  Armed forces abroad
                 Military withdrawal
                 Military bases
                 Facility construction
                 Military policies
                 International relations
                 Cost analysis
                 Base closures
                 Combat readiness
    IDENTIFIER:  Japan
                 Okinawa

    ******************************************************************
    ** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
    ** GAO report.  Delineations within the text indicating chapter **
    ** titles, headings, and bullets are preserved.  Major          **
    ** divisions and subdivisions of the text, such as Chapters,    **
    ** Sections, and Appendixes, are identified by double and       **
    ** single lines.  The numbers on the right end of these lines   **
    ** indicate the position of each of the subsections in the      **
    ** document outline.  These numbers do NOT correspond with the  **
    ** page numbers of the printed product.                         **
    **                                                              **
    ** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
    ** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
    ** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
    **                                                              **
    ** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
    ** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
    ** document's contents.                                         **
    **                                                              **
    ** A printed copy of this report may be obtained from the GAO   **
    ** Document Distribution Center.  For further details, please   **
    ** send an e-mail message to:                                   **
    **                                                              **
    **                                            **
    **                                                              **
    ** with the message 'info' in the body.                         **
    ******************************************************************

    Cover
    ================================================================ COVER

    Report to the Honorable
    Duncan Hunter, House of Representatives

    March 1998

    OVERSEAS PRESENCE - ISSUES
    INVOLVED IN REDUCING THE IMPACT OF
    THE U.S.  MILITARY PRESENCE ON
    OKINAWA

    GAO/NSIAD-98-66

    Overseas Presence

    (703214)

    Abbreviations
    =============================================================== ABBREV

      DOD - Department of Defense
      FIG - Futenma Implementation Group
      IFR - Instrument Flight Rules
      MCAS - Marine Corps Air Station
      SACO - Special Action Committee on Okinawa
      SCC - Security Consultative Committee
      SSC - Security Sub-Committee
      USFJ - United States Forces-Japan

    Letter
    =============================================================== LETTER

    B-278862

    March 2, 1998

    The Honorable Duncan Hunter
    House of Representatives

    The United States and Japan released the Final Report of the Special
    Action Committee on Okinawa on December 2, 1996.  The report made 27
    recommendations to reduce the impact of the U.S.  military presence
    on the Okinawan people.  As requested, we reviewed the contents of
    the Final Report, evaluated the impact on readiness of U.S.  forces
    based on Okinawa after implementation of the report recommendations,
    estimated the U.S.  cost of implementing the recommendations, and
    determined the benefit or necessity of having U.S.  Marine Corps
    forces on Okinawa.

    We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking
    Minority Members of the House Committee on National Security, the
    Senate Committee on Armed Services, and the House and Senate
    Committees on Appropriations; the Secretaries of State, Defense, the
    Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine
    Corps.  We will make copies available to others on request.

    This report was prepared under the direction of Carol R.  Schuster,
    Associate Director, Military Operations and Capabilities Issues, who
    may be reached on (202) 512-3958 if you or your staff have any
    questions.  Other major contributors are listed in appendix III.

    Sincerely yours,

    Mark E.  Gebicke
    Director, Military Operations
     and Capabilities Issues

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
    ============================================================ Chapter 0

       PURPOSE
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

    The United States maintains a military presence of about 100,000
    servicemembers in the Asia-Pacific region.  Of this presence, 47,000
    servicemembers are in Japan, over half of whom are based on Okinawa.
    On December 2, 1996, the United States and Japan agreed to a number
    of recommendations for reducing the impact of U.S.  military
    operations and training on the people of Okinawa and thereby
    strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance.  These recommendations were
    set forth in the Final Report of the Special Action Committee on
    Okinawa (SACO) and are to be implemented over the next decade.
    Concerned over the impact that implementation of SACO recommendations
    will have on the readiness and training of U.S.  forces stationed on
    Okinawa, Congressman Duncan Hunter requested GAO to review several
    issues.  This report (1) describes the Department of Defense's
    perspectives on the need for U.S.  forces on Okinawa and (2)
    describes SACO's report recommendations and identifies the impact of
    their implementation on U.S.  operations, training, and costs,
    particularly the recommendation to build a sea-based facility off
    Okinawa.  The report also provides information on two environmental
    issues that may result from implementing the SACO recommendations.

       BACKGROUND
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

    The U.S.  military presence in Japan and on Okinawa began at the end
    of World War II.  Although the U.S.  occupation in Japan ended in
    1952, U.S.  administration continued on Okinawa until 1972.  The
    U.S.-Japan security relationship is defined by a number of documents,
    including the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which
    commits both countries to meet common dangers, and a Status of Forces
    Agreement that governs the legal status of U.S.  forces and their
    dependents stationed in Japan.  The U.S.  forces on Okinawa occupy
    about 10 percent of the land in the prefecture.\1 Japan provides part
    of the cost of the forward deployment of U.S.  forces throughout
    Japan, through an annual burden-sharing payment.  This payment was
    about $4.9 billion in fiscal year 1997.

    Discontent among the people of Okinawa regarding the U.S.  military
    presence and its impacts has been rising for years.  Their chief
    complaint is that the Okinawa prefecture hosts over half of the U.S.
    forces in Japan and that about 75 percent of the land U.S.  forces
    occupy in Japan is on Okinawa.  They also believe the U.S.  presence
    has hampered economic development.  The abduction and rape of an
    Okinawan schoolgirl in September 1995 by three U.S.  servicemembers
    prompted the U.S.  and Japanese governments to establish the SACO in
    November 1995.  To reduce the impact of the U.S.  military presence
    on the people of Okinawa, the SACO developed recommendations to
    realign, consolidate, and reduce U.S.  facilities and adjust
    operational procedures.  In December 1996, the United States agreed
    to return to Japanese control about 21 percent of the land on Okinawa
    used for U.S.  military bases, adjust training and operational
    procedures, implement noise abatement procedures, and change Status
    of Forces Agreement procedures.  (The SACO Final Report is reprinted
    verbatim in app.  I.)

    --------------------
    \1 Japan is divided into 47 local administrative jurisdictions, or
    prefectures.  The Okinawa prefecture includes the main island of
    Okinawa plus several outlying islands.

       RESULTS IN BRIEF
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

    The Department of Defense (DOD) believes that Marine Corps forces
    along with other U.S.  forces on Okinawa satisfy the U.S.  national
    security strategy by visibly demonstrating the U.S.  commitment to
    security in the region.  These forces are thought to deter
    aggression, provide a crisis response capability should deterrence
    fail, and avoid the risk that U.S.  allies may interpret the
    withdrawal of U.S.  forces as a lessening of U.S.  commitment to
    peace and stability in the region.  Okinawa's proximity to potential
    regional trouble spots promotes the early arrival of U.S.  military
    forces due to shorter transit times and reduces potential problems
    that could arise due to late arrival.  The cost of this presence is
    shared by the government of Japan, which provides bases and other
    infrastructure on Okinawa rent-free and pays part of the annual cost
    of Okinawa-based Marine Corps forces.

    The SACO Final Report calls on the United States to (1) return land
    that includes one base and portions of camps, sites, and training
    areas on Okinawa to Japan; (2) implement changes to three operational
    procedures, and (3) implement changes to five noise abatement
    procedures.  Additionally, it recommends implementing eight changes
    to Status of Forces Agreement procedures.  In implementing most of
    the SACO recommendations, the United States expects to encounter few
    operational and training problems; however, replacing Marine Corps
    Air Station Futenma with a sea-based facility will be a major
    challenge.  In addition to significant cost, the sea-based facility
    poses technological and operational complications that must be
    overcome if U.  S.  operational capability is to be maintained.  The
    United States has established requirements that Japan must meet as it
    designs, builds, and pays for the sea-based facility before Futenma
    is closed and operations are moved to the sea-based facility.
    However, such a facility has never been built and operated.

    Annual operations and maintenance costs for the sea-based facility
    were initially estimated at $200 million based on a $4-billion design
    and construction cost, significantly higher than the $2.8 million
    currently being paid by the United States at Futenma.  The United
    States requested that the Japanese government pay the cost to
    maintain the new sea-based facility, but as of the date of this
    report, it had not agreed to do so.  Further, the current schedule
    for designing and building the sea-based facility does not include a
    risk-reduction phase that includes risk assessments, life-cycle cost
    analyses, and design trade-offs.  Given the scope, technical
    challenges, and unique nature of the sea-based facility, a
    risk-reduction phase would permit the U.  S.  and Japanese
    governments to establish that the proposed facility will be
    affordable and operationally suitable.

    Excluding the cost to operate the sea-based facility, the current
    estimated cost to the United States to implement the SACO land return
    recommendations is about $193.5 million over about 10 years.  The
    United States and Japan are negotiating an arrangement under which
    Japan would assume some SACO-related responsibilities consistent with
    their domestic laws.  This arrangement could result in reduced U.S.
    costs.  U.S.  costs include the cost to renovate some facilities at
    Futenma, previously identified by both the United States and Japan
    for replacement, until the sea-based facility is ready for occupancy.
    Japan had planned to replace these facilities but decided not to
    after SACO was established in 1995.  Additionally, the U.S.  cost
    could be significantly higher than the estimated $193.5 million if
    Japan does not agree to pay operations and maintenance cost of the
    new sea-based facility.

    While final implementation of the SACO recommendations is intended to
    reduce the burden of the U.S.  forces' presence on Okinawa, two
    environmental issues could arise.  The first issue concerns the
    potential for environmental contamination being found on military
    facilities returned to Japan and responsibility for cleanup of those
    facilities.  The second issue concerns the potential adverse effects
    that the construction and operation of the sea-based facility could
    have on the environment.

       PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4

          U.S.  FORCES ON OKINAWA
          SUPPORT NATIONAL SECURITY
          STRATEGY
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1

    The III Marine Expeditionary Force (along with other U.S.  forces on
    Okinawa and in the region) supports the U.S.  national security
    strategy to promote peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region
    and to deter aggression by forcing an aggressor to risk a military
    confrontation with U.S.  forces, according to DOD.  The national
    security strategy and the congressionally mandated Quadrennial
    Defense Review\2 cite U.S.  presence in the region as necessary to
    demonstrate U.S.  political commitment to security in the region.  In
    addition, the United States has long-standing mutual defense treaty
    obligations with five countries in the region, including Japan and
    South Korea, and the U.S.  forward presence visibly demonstrates
    commitment to these treaties, according to the U.S.  Pacific Command,
    the geographic combatant command.

    In addition to showing the U.S.  commitment to the region, the U.S.
    forces on Okinawa could be used if crises arise, according to the
    Pacific Command.  Furthermore, forward-deployed U.S.  forces could
    readily respond to a contingency because Okinawa is near several
    potential regional trouble spots, including the Korean peninsula, and
    the operational risk of a late arrival in an area of operations could
    be avoided.  Moreover, Japan pays a significant share of the
    Okinawa-based Marine Corps force's annual cost, including the cost of
    base infrastructure that is provided rent-free to the United States.

    --------------------
    \2 The Quadrennial Defense Review was required by section 923 of the
    National Defense Authorization Act for 1997 to study national defense
    strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure,
    budget plans, and other issues in 1997 and at the start of each newly
    elected administration after 1997.

          BUILDING A SEA-BASED
          FACILITY WILL BE A MAJOR
          CHALLENGE BUT OTHER CHANGES
          POSE FEW PROBLEMS
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2

    Of all the SACO recommendations, construction of a sea-based facility
    to replace Marine Corps Air Station Futenma poses the greatest
    challenge.  Three types of sea-based facilities were under
    consideration:  two would float and one would be supported on columns
    driven into the sea floor.  Some local opposition has surfaced
    against the facility in the area in which it is to be built, but U.S.
    officials are proceeding on the basis that the facility will be
    built.  The United States and/or Japan will face (1) significant
    costs to acquire and maintain the facility; (2) major technological
    challenges, as no sea-based facility of the type and scale envisioned
    has ever been built; and (3) operational complications because the
    sea-based facility envisioned would be insufficient to support all
    U.S.  operating requirements and maintain maximum safety margins, as
    stated in a Marine Corps study.

    The United States also runs the risk that Japan will design and build
    a sea-based facility that does not meet all U.S.  requirements
    because at the time of GAO's review, U.S.  oversight capability was
    limited.  Officials at U.S.  Forces Japan and the Naval Facilities
    Engineering Command told GAO that the organizations currently tasked
    with oversight responsibility cannot provide the day-to-day detailed
    oversight such a project requires and still meet their other
    responsibilities.  USFJ has requested establishment of a Project
    Management Office to oversee and coordinate SACO implementation while
    the Naval Facilities Engineering Command has asked for funding for a
    special project office to oversee the design and construction of the
    sea-based facility.

    Japan's acquisition strategy could add to U.S.  operating and support
    costs and increase operational risk unnecessarily.  At the time of
    GAO's review, Japan had not included a risk-reduction phase in its
    acquisition schedule.  Given the scope, technical challenges, and
    unique nature of the sea-based facility, a risk-reduction phase would
    allow the U.S.  and Japanese governments to prove that the sea-based
    facility will be affordable and operationally suitable prior to
    committing to a specific design.  The inclusion of a risk-reduction
    phase in the sea-based facility's acquisition schedule is currently
    being discussed between the United States and Japanese governments.

    U.S.  operational capability can be maintained if the problems
    associated with the sea-based facility can be overcome and Japan
    imposes no limits on U.S.  operating rights in Okinawa other than
    those recommended by SACO.  The SACO recommendations to return land
    do not significantly add risks to U.S.  operations, but at the time
    of GAO's review, the cost to implement these recommendations was
    about $193.5 million above current operating costs over about 10
    years.  The United States and Japan are negotiating an arrangement
    under which Japan would assume some responsibilities, consistent with
    its domestic law thereby reducing U.S.  cost.  U.S.  costs include
    the cost to renovate facilities at Futenma to maintain base
    operations while the sea-based facility is designed and built.  Japan
    had planned to replace these facilities under the Japan Facilities
    Improvement Program\3 but decided not to after the SACO was
    established in 1995.  The United States believes these projects need
    to be completed in order to continue to operate Futenma during the
    sea-based facility acquisition period.  U.S.  costs could be
    significantly higher than the $193.5 million estimate because the
    United States and Japan have not agreed on which country will be
    responsible for the sea-based facility's maintenance.  This cost is
    estimated to be $200 million annually based on a $4-billion sea-based
    facility design and construction cost.  The United States is
    currently responsible for the maintenance of its facilities in Japan
    and spends about $2.8 million annually for maintenance at Futenma.

    The United States has encountered some problems in implementing one
    of the three changes to operational procedures.  After relocating
    parachute exercises for Army Special Forces units to nearby Ie Jima
    Island, about 73 percent of the planned jumps were cancelled, most
    often for weather-related reasons.  These cancellations have put
    these forces at risk of failing to stay airborne qualified.  On the
    other hand, artillery live-fire training for Marine Corps forces has
    been relocated from Okinawa to ranges on the main Japanese islands.
    The training is comparable to that on Okinawa and other ranges in the
    United States.  For the remaining provisions of the SACO
    report--implementing noise reduction initiatives and changing some
    Status of Forces Agreement procedures--the United States expects to
    encounter few problems.

    --------------------
    \3 Under the Japan facilities budget, Japan pays for certain
    facilities improvements on installations used by U.S.  forces,
    including new construction under the Japan Facilities Improvement
    Program, vicinity improvements, and relocation construction and other
    costs.

          TWO ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
          COULD ARISE FROM
          IMPLEMENTING SACO
          RECOMMENDATIONS
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3

    If environmental contamination is found in areas to be returned under
    SACO, cleanup could be expensive and reuse could be delayed.  When
    the United States returns land or closes bases in Japan, it is not
    obligated, under the Status of Forces Agreement, to return lands to
    the condition they were in when they became available to the United
    States.  According to U.S.  Forces-Japan officials, this agreement
    relieves the United States of an obligation for environmental
    cleanup.  However, DOD policy calls for the removal of known imminent
    and substantial dangers to health and safety due to environmental
    contamination caused by operations on DOD installations or facilities
    designated for return to the host nation.  The government of Japan
    believes it has found hazardous substances on an installation on
    Okinawa returned by the United States prior to the SACO report.  It
    has requested that the United States look for environmental
    contamination on its remaining bases on Okinawa and clean up the
    bases if contamination is found before returning them under the SACO
    process.  If a survey is conducted and contamination is found, a
    decision would be needed as to whether the United States or Japan
    would pay cleanup costs.

    Regarding the second issue, concerns have been raised that
    construction of the sea-based facility or the facility itself after
    construction could adversely affect the ocean environment, including
    nearby coral reefs.  The United States intends to operate at the
    facility in a manner that protects and preserves Okinawa's natural
    resources.  However, routine operations aboard the facility may
    inadvertently contaminate the nearby ocean environment, including
    coral reefs.  For example, the accidental runoff of fuels, cleaning
    fluids, and other substances required for aircraft and base
    operations could pose a risk.  The government of Japan has undertaken
    a study to determine the condition of the coral.

       RECOMMENDATIONS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5

    GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense

      -- decide on the means to monitor the design, engineering, and
         construction of the sea-based facility;

      -- work with Japan to include a risk-reduction phase in the
         acquisition schedule to establish that the designed sea-based
         facility will be affordable and operationally suitable;

      -- take steps to ensure that all U.S.  concerns, especially the
         costs of operations and maintenance on the sea-based facility
         and operational concerns, have been satisfactorily addressed
         before Japan begins to build the sea-based facility; and

      -- request the Japanese government to allocate funds for those
         projects at Futenma that were cancelled by Japan due to the
         planned closure of Futenma and are deemed essential to continued
         operations of the station and the 1st Marine Air Wing until
         completion of the replacement facility.

       AGENCY COMMENTS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6

    In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with
    GAO's recommendations and noted that the report effectively outlines
    the major operational and technical issues involved in realigning,
    consolidating, and reducing U.S.  force presence on Okinawa, as set
    forth in the SACO process.  DOD also noted that the role of Congress
    will be critical in maintaining the strategic relationship with Japan
    and therefore the GAO report was timely and welcome.  DOD provided
    technical comments, which were incorporated in the report where
    appropriate.  The DOD response is printed in its entirety in appendix
    II.

    GAO also provided a copy of the draft report to the Department of
    State.  In oral comments, the Department of State concurred with
    GAO's report and offered one technical change which was incorporated
    into the report.

    INTRODUCTION
    ============================================================ Chapter 1

    Since the end of World War II, the U.S.  military has maintained a
    presence in Japan and on Okinawa, first as an occupation force and
    later as an ally committed to maintaining security in the
    Asia-Pacific region.  The security relationship between the United
    States and Japan is defined through bilateral agreements and is
    managed through a joint process.  Over half of the U.S.  forces in
    Japan are on Okinawa, a presence that has caused increasing
    discontent among the people of Okinawa.  In September 1995, after
    three U.S.  servicemen raped an Okinawan schoolgirl, Japan and the
    United States formed the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO)
    to find ways to limit the impact of the U.S.  military presence on
    Okinawa.  The Committee developed 27 recommendations to reduce the
    impact of U.S.  operations.

       THE U.S.  MILITARY HAS
       MAINTAINED A PRESENCE IN JAPAN
       SINCE WORLD WAR II
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1

    Since the end of World War II, the U.S.  military has based forces in
    Japan and Okinawa.  The U.S.  military occupation of Japan began
    after World War II and continued until 1952, but the United States
    administered the Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa, until 1972.

    Since the end of World War II, U.S.  forces have mounted major
    operations from Japan when needed.  Among the most important of these
    operations was the initial defense of South Korea in the 1950-53
    Korean War, when Eighth U.S.  Army units left occupation duties in
    Japan to help defend South Korea.  The United States again used its
    bases in Japan and on Okinawa to fight the Vietnam War.  Finally,
    elements of the III Marine Expeditionary Force deployed from their
    bases on Okinawa to the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm in
    the early 1990s.

    To demonstrate a commitment to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific
    region, the United States has about 47,000 servicemembers, about half
    of all U.S.  forces deployed in the Pacific region, stationed in
    Japan.  Of the 47,000 U.S.  servicemembers in Japan, over half are
    based on Okinawa, a subtropical island about 67 miles long and from 2
    to 18 miles wide, with coral reefs in many offshore locations.  In
    fiscal year 1997, U.S.  forces on Okinawa occupied 58,072 acres of
    the land in the Okinawa prefecture.

       THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY
       RELATIONSHIP IS MANAGED THROUGH
       BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND A
       JOINT PROCESS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2

    The security relationship between the United States and Japan is
    defined through bilateral agreements.  The Treaty of Mutual
    Cooperation and Security, signed in January 1960 by the United States
    and Japan, specifies that each country recognizes that an attack
    against either country in the territory of Japan is dangerous to its
    peace and security and declares that both countries would respond to
    meet the common danger under their constitutional processes.  The
    treaty also commits the two countries to consult with each other from
    time to time and grants to U.S.  military forces the use of
    facilities and areas in Japan.  Lastly, the treaty specifies that a
    separate Status of Forces Agreement will govern the use of these
    facilities and areas as well as the status of U.S.  forces in Japan.

    The Status of Forces Agreement, signed on the same day as the treaty,
    permits the United States to bring servicemembers and their
    dependents into Japan.  It also contains certain stipulations
    regarding U.S.  forces in Japan, including some exemptions from
    import duties for items brought into Japan for the personal use of
    U.S.  servicemembers; the right of the U.S.  military services to
    operate exchanges, social clubs, newspapers, and theaters; and legal
    jurisdiction over U.S.  servicemembers and their dependents accused
    of committing a crime in Japan.\1 The agreement also (1) requires the
    United States to return land to Japan when the land is no longer
    needed, (2) specifies that the United States will perform maintenance
    on bases its occupies in Japan, and (3) relieves the United States of
    the obligation to restore bases in Japan to the condition they were
    in when they became available to the United States.  U.S.
    Forces-Japan (USFJ) has interpreted this latter provision to mean
    that the United States is not required to conduct environmental
    cleanup on bases it closes in Japan.  The agreement also required the
    United States and Japan to establish a Joint Committee as the means
    for consultation in implementing the agreement.  In particular, the
    Joint Committee is responsible for determining what facilities U.S.
    forces need in Japan.

    The U.S.-Japan security relationship is managed through a joint
    process that includes meetings between the U.S.  Secretaries of State
    and Defense and Japan's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of
    State for Defense, who make up the Security Consultative Committee.
    The Committee sets overall bilateral policy regarding the security
    relationship between the United States and Japan.

    Japan pays part of the cost of the U.S.  forces stationed in its
    country with annual burden-sharing payments that totaled about $4.9
    billion in fiscal year 1997.\2 The annual payments fall into four
    categories.  First, Japan paid about $712 million for leased land on
    which U.S.  bases sit.  Second, Japan provided about $1.7 billion in
    accordance with the Special Measures Agreement, under which Japan
    pays the costs of (1) local national labor employed by U.S.  forces
    in Japan, (2) public utilities on U.S.  bases, and (3) the transfer
    of U.S.  forces' training from U.S.  bases to other facilities in
    Japan when Japan requests such transfers.  Third, USFJ estimated that
    Japan provided about $876 million in indirect costs, such as rents
    foregone at fair market value and tax concessions.\3 Last, although
    not covered by any agreements, Japan provided about $1.7 billion from
    its facilities budget for facilities and new construction which
    included new facilities under the Japan under the Japan Facilities
    Improvement Program, vicinity improvements, and relocation
    construction and other costs.

    Finally, in September 1997, the United States and Japan issued new
    Guidelines for U.S.- Japan Defense Cooperation that replaced the
    existing 1978 guidelines.  The new guidelines provide for more
    effective cooperation between U.S.  forces and Japan's self-defense
    forces under "normal circumstances," when an armed attack against
    Japan has occurred, and as a response to situations in areas
    surrounding Japan that could threaten Japan's security.

    --------------------
    \1 Japan also has jurisdiction over U.S.  servicemembers and their
    dependents for offenses committed within Japan and punishable by
    Japanese law.

    \2 In 1997, Japan's burden-sharing payments totaled about 544 billion
    yen, or about $4.9 billion using a conversion rate of 111 yen to
    $1.00, according to USFJ.

    \3 The Congressional Research Service believes that the Department of
    Defense (DOD) overstates the true value of burden-sharing payments
    from Japan because such costs as base lease payments and rents
    foregone are costs unique to operating in Japan.  DOD would not pay
    these costs if troops based in Japan were relocated to bases in the
    continental United States.  For more information, see the
    Congressional Research Service's Defense Burdensharing:  Is Japan's
    Host Nation Support a Model for Other Allies?  (94-515 F, June 20,
    1994).

       THE SACO PROCESS IS A REACTION
       TO DISCONTENT ABOUT THE U.S.
       MILITARY PRESENCE ON OKINAWA
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3

    Discontent among the people of Okinawa about the impact of the U.S.
    presence on their land has been rising for years, particularly as the
    economic benefits of the U.S.  presence have diminished and the
    people of Okinawa became relatively more prosperous, according to the
    Congressional Research Service.\4 Among the chief complaints of the
    Okinawan people is that their prefecture hosts over half of the U.S.
    force presence in Japan and that about 75 percent of the total land
    used by U.S.  forces in Japan is on Okinawa.  Figure 1.1 shows the
    location and approximate size of major U.S.  installations in the
    Okinawa prefecture.

       Figure 1.1:  Major U.S.
       Installations on Okinawa

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    Source:  Marine Corps Bases, Japan.

    Some Okinawans feel the U.S.  military presence has hampered economic
    development.  Other Okinawans object to the noise generated by U.S.
    operations, especially around the Air Force's Kadena Air Base and
    Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma (which are located in the
    middle of urban areas), and risks to civilians from serious military
    accidents, including crashes of aircraft.  In addition, some have
    objected to artillery live-fire exercises conducted in the Central
    Training Area.  When the exercises were held, firing took place over
    prefectural highway 104, and the highway had to be closed to civilian
    traffic until the exercises concluded.  The Okinawa prefectural
    government has also objected to the destruction of vegetation on
    nearby mountains in the artillery range's impact area.  Lastly, some
    perceive that crime committed by U.S.  personnel and their dependents
    on Okinawa is a problem.\5

    The public outcry in Okinawa following the September 1995 abduction
    and rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl by three U.S.  servicemembers
    brought to a head long-standing concerns among Okinawans about the
    impact of the U.S.  presence and made it difficult for some members
    of the Japanese Diet to support the continued U.S.  military presence
    in Japan.\6 According to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
    continued ability of the United States to remain in Japan was at risk
    due to the outcry over the rape incident, and the United States and
    Japan had to do something to reduce the impact of the presence on
    Okinawans.  To address Okinawans' and Japanese legislators' concerns,
    bilateral negotiations between the United States and Japan began, and
    the Security Consultative Committee established the Special Action
    Committee on Okinawa in November 1995.  The Committee developed
    recommendations on ways to limit the impact of the U.S.  military
    presence on Okinawans.  On December 2, 1996, the U.S.  Secretary of
    Defense, U.S.  Ambassador to Japan, Japanese Minister of Foreign
    Affairs, and Minister of State and Director-General of the Defense
    Agency of Japan issued the Committee's final report.

    According to USFJ, the SACO Final Report is not a binding bilateral
    agreement, but it does contain a series of recommendations to which
    the U.S.  and Japanese governments have committed themselves.
    Officials from USFJ and Marine Corps Bases, Japan, told us that the
    United States approaches the recommendations as if they were
    agreements by making reasonable efforts to implement the
    recommendations.  However, they also stated that if Japan does not
    provide adequate replacement facilities or complete action needed to
    implement some recommendations, the United States will not be
    obligated to implement those particular recommendations.

    --------------------
    \4 Congressional Research Service, Okinawa Bases and Other Issues in
    U.S.  - Japan Security Relations (96-646 F, July 23, 1996).

    \5 According to the U.S.  Consolidated Public Affairs Office,
    Okinawa, U.S.  personnel make up about 3.8 percent of the population
    and were responsible for about 1.1 percent of total crime on Okinawa
    in 1996.

    \6 The U.S.  servicemembers were convicted.  Two were sentenced to
    7-year jail terms and one to a 6.5-year jail term.

       OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
       METHODOLOGY
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4

    In response to Representative Duncan Hunter's concerns about the
    impact of implementing SACO's recommendations on U.S.  force
    readiness, we describe (1) the benefit or necessity of retaining U.S.
    forces in Japan and on Okinawa and (2) SACO's report recommendations
    and identify the impact of implementation on U.S.  operations,
    training, and costs.  The report also identifies two environmental
    issues that may remain after the SACO recommendations have been
    implemented.

    To determine DOD's views on the benefit or necessity of having U.S.
    forces stationed on Okinawa, we interviewed officials and obtained
    relevant documents, including the Quadrennial Defense Review report,
    the President's National Security Strategy for a New Century, The
    Security Strategy for East Asia, the Commander-in-Chief of the
    Pacific Command's regional strategy, and other documents.  Because it
    was outside the scope of our work, we did not evaluate any
    alternatives to forward deployment.  However, in a June 1997 report,
    we concluded that DOD had not adequately considered alternatives to
    forward presence to accomplish its stated security objectives.\7 To
    determine U.S.  and Japanese obligations under the bilateral security
    relationship, we reviewed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
    Security between Japan and the United States, the Status of Forces
    Agreement, the Special Measures Agreement, Joint Statement of the
    Security Consultative Committee on the review of 1978 guidelines for
    defense cooperation, the new 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense
    Cooperation, and other documents.

    To determine SACO's report recommendations, we reviewed the Final
    Report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa, Joint Committee
    meeting minutes and related documents, briefings, the testimony of
    the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S.  Pacific Command to the Senate
    Committee on Armed Services on March 18, 1997, and other documents.
    To determine the impact of the SACO report recommendations on
    readiness, training, and costs of operations of U.S.  forces, we
    interviewed officials and reviewed memorandums, cables, reports,
    analyses, and other documents discussing the impact on readiness and
    training or providing evidence of the impact.  To review the
    feasibility of construction and operation of a sea-based facility, we
    interviewed officials and reviewed relevant documents, including the
    Functional Analysis and Concept of Operations report prepared by DOD
    officials from several organizations, briefing documents,
    memorandums, and other documents.  We also reviewed a number of
    scholarly papers presented at the Japanese Ministry of Transport's
    International Workshop on Very Large Floating Structures, held in
    Hayama, Japan, in November 1996.

    To identify the environmental issues that could remain after the SACO
    recommendations are implemented, we reviewed the Status of Forces
    Agreement and DOD environmental policy and interviewed DOD and
    Department of State officials.

    We also interviewed officials at the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense/International Security Affairs, the Joint Staff, headquarters
    of the U.S.  Marine Corps, headquarters of the U.S.  Air Force,
    Office of Naval Research, Defense Logistics Agency, Military Traffic
    Management Command, and Department of State in Washington, D.C., and
    the U.S.  Special Operations Command in Tampa, Florida.  We also
    interviewed officials from the U.S.  Pacific Command; Marine Forces,
    Pacific; Pacific Air Forces; Naval Facilities Engineering Command;
    Army Corps of Engineers; Military Traffic Management Command; and
    East-West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii.  We interviewed officials from
    U.S.  Forces-Japan, the 5th Air Force, U.S.  Naval Forces-Japan, U.S.
    Army-Japan, and the U.S.  Embassy-Tokyo in the Tokyo, Japan, area.
    Lastly, we interviewed officials from Marine Corps Bases, Japan; the
    1st Marine Air Wing; the Air Force's 18th Wing; the Army's 1/1
    Special Forces Group (Airborne); the Army's 10th Area Support Group;
    the Navy's Fleet Activities, Okinawa; and the Navy's Task Force 76 on
    Okinawa.  To discuss the feasibility of very large floating
    structures, we interviewed two ocean engineering professors at the
    University of Hawaii who were instrumental in organizing the 1996
    conference in Japan.  We also viewed the proposed site for a
    sea-based facility by helicopter and inspected several U.S.  bases
    affected by the SACO process, including MCAS Futenma; Kadena Air
    Base; Camp Schwab; and the Northern, Central, Gimbaru, and Kin Blue
    Beach training areas on Okinawa.  We also visited the Ie Jima
    parachute drop zone on Ie Jima Island.

    We obtained comments from the Departments of Defense and State on
    this report and have incorporated their comments where appropriate.

    We conducted our work from June 1997 to March 1998 in accordance with
    generally accepted government auditing standards.

    --------------------
    \7 Overseas Presence:  More Data and Analysis Needed to Determine
    Whether Cost-Effective Alternatives Exist (GAO/NSIAD-97-133, June 3,
    1997).

    U.S.  FORCES ON OKINAWA SUPPORT
    U.S.  NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
    ============================================================ Chapter 2

    U.S.  forces on Okinawa support U.S.  national security and national
    military strategies to promote peace and maintain stability in the
    region.  These forces can also deter aggression and can deploy
    throughout the region if needed.  According to the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense, the Pacific Command, and USFJ, relocating these
    forces outside the region would increase political risk by appearing
    to decrease commitment to regional security and treaty obligations
    and undercut deterrence.  Furthermore, relocating U.S.  forces
    outside of Japan could adversely affect military operations by
    increasing transit times to areas where crises are occurring.
    Finally, the cost of the U.S.  presence in Japan is shared by the
    government of Japan, which also provides bases and other
    infrastructure used by U.S.  forces on Okinawa.

       U.S.  FORCES ON OKINAWA ARE
       PART OF THE PACIFIC COMMAND'S
       REGIONAL FORWARD PRESENCE
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1

    The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Command, who is the geographic
    combatant commander for the Asia-Pacific region, develops a regional
    strategy to support the national security strategy and the national
    military strategy.  The Pacific Command's area of responsibility is
    the largest of that of the five geographic combatant commands:  it
    covers about 105 million square miles (about 52 percent of the
    earth's surface) and contains 44 countries, including Japan, China,
    India, and North and South Korea (see fig.  2.1).

       Figure 2.1:  U.S.  Pacific
       Command's Area of
       Responsibility

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    Source:  U.S.  Pacific Command.

    Pacific Command forces provide a military presence in the
    Asia-Pacific region, promote international security relationships in
    the region, and deter aggression and prevent conflict through a
    crisis response capability, according to the Pacific Command.  These
    forces include over 300,000 servicemembers, of which about 100,000
    are in Alaska, Hawaii, Japan, South Korea, and certain other
    locations overseas.  The Quadrennial Defense Review reaffirmed the
    need for the U.S.  forward presence of about 100,000 U.S.  troops in
    the Asia-Pacific region.  About 47,000 U.S.  servicemembers are
    stationed in Japan.  Of those, about 28,000 are based on Okinawa,
    including about 17,000 assigned to the Marine Corps' III Marine
    Expeditionary Force and supporting establishment.

    The III Marine Expeditionary Force, the primary Marine Corps
    component on Okinawa, consists of the (1) 3rd Marine Division, the
    ground combat component; (2) 1st Marine Air Wing, the air combat
    component; (3) 3rd Force Service Support Group, the logistics support
    component; and (4) command element.  The Force, and other deployed
    U.S.  forces, support the security strategy by providing the forces
    that could be employed if crises arise.  The III Marine Expeditionary
    Force can deploy throughout the region, using sealift, airlift, and
    amphibious shipping, and operate without outside support for up to 60
    days.

       U.S.  FORCES IN THE
       ASIA-PACIFIC REGION PROVIDE
       POLITICAL BENEFITS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2

    Under the national strategy, U.S.  forward deployment is necessary
    because it demonstrates a visible political commitment by the United
    States to peace and stability in the region, according to DOD.  The
    United States has mutual defense treaties with Japan, South Korea,
    the Philippines, Australia, and Thailand.  In addition to
    demonstrating commitment, the U.S.  forward deployment also deters
    aggression, according to the Pacific Command, because a regional
    aggressor cannot threaten its neighbors without risking a military
    confrontation with U.S.  forces in place on Okinawa (or elsewhere in
    the region).

    To help maintain peace and stability in the region, the Pacific
    Command strategy features engagement through joint, combined, and
    multilateral military exercises; military-to-military contacts; and
    security assistance, among other activities.  According to the
    Pacific Command, the III Marine Expeditionary Force is a key force
    that is employed to carry out these activities.

    According to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Pacific Command,
    and USFJ, a withdrawal of U.S.  forces from the region could be
    interpreted by countries in the region as a weakening of the U.S.
    commitment to peace and stability in Asia-Pacific and could undercut
    the deterrent value of the forward deployment.  While U.S.  forces
    may not have to be on Okinawa specifically for the United States to
    demonstrate such commitments, USFJ officials told us that U.S.
    forces do need to be located somewhere in the Western Pacific region.

       THE U.S.  PRESENCE IN OKINAWA
       PROVIDES OPERATIONAL BENEFITS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3

    If hostilities erupt in the Asia-Pacific region, U.S.  forces need to
    arrive in the crisis area quickly to repel aggression and end the
    conflict on terms favorable to the United States.  U.S.  forces could
    be used in a conflict and could deploy from their bases on Okinawa.
    The forward deployment on Okinawa significantly shortens transit
    times, thereby promoting early arrival in potential regional trouble
    spots such as the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan straits, a
    significant benefit in the initial stages of a conflict.  For
    example, it takes 2 hours to fly to the Korean peninsula from
    Okinawa, as compared with about 5 hours from Guam, 11 hours from
    Hawaii, and 16 hours from the continental United States.  Similarly,
    it takes about 1 1/2 days to make the trip from Okinawa by ship to
    South Korea, as compared with about 5 days from Guam, 12 days from
    Hawaii, and 17 days from the continental United States.

    In addition to its strategic location, Okinawa has a well-established
    military infrastructure that is provided to the United States
    rent-free and that supports the III Marine Expeditionary Force (and
    other U.S.  forces).  Housing, training, communications, and numerous
    other facilities are already in place on Okinawa, including those at
    MCAS Futenma, a strategic airfield for the 1st Marine Air Wing, and
    Camp Courtney, home of the 3rd Marine Division.  Marine Corps
    logistics operations are based at Camp Kinser, which has about a
    million square feet of warehouse space for Marine forces' use in the
    Pacific.  For example, warehouses hold war reserve supplies on
    Okinawa that would support U.S.  operations, including 14,400 tons of
    ammunition, 5,000 pieces of unit and individual equipment, and 50
    million gallons of fuel.  Military port facilities capable of
    handling military sealift ships and amphibious ships are available at
    the Army's Naha Military Port and the Navy's White Beach.  In
    addition to providing base infrastructure, Japan provides about $368
    million per year as part of its burden-sharing to help support the
    III Marine Expeditionary Force deployment on Okinawa.

    SOME SACO RECOMMENDATIONS CARRY
    RISK THAT MUST BE OVERCOME TO
    MAINTAIN U.S.  OPERATIONAL
    CAPABILITY
    ============================================================ Chapter 3

    The SACO Final Report calls for the United States to (1) return land
    at 11 U.S.  bases on Okinawa and replace MCAS Futenma with a
    sea-based facility, (2) change 3 operational procedures, (3)
    implement 5 noise abatement procedures, and (4) implement 7 Status of
    Forces Agreement changes.  Japan agreed to implement one Status of
    Force Agreement procedure change.  Of all of the SACO report
    recommendations, replacing MCAS Futenma with a sea-based facility
    poses the greatest challenge.  Most of the other SACO report
    recommendations can be implemented with few problems.

       THE UNITED STATES PLANS TO
       RETURN LAND USED ON OKINAWA
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1

    As called for in the SACO Final Report, the United States plans to
    return to Japan about 12,000 acres, or 21 percent of the total
    acreage, used by U.S.  forces on 11 installations.  The plan is to
    relocate personnel and facilities from bases to be closed to new
    bases or to consolidate them at the remaining bases.  Table 3.1 shows
    the land to be returned, the planned return date, and the plan for
    replacing capabilities that would be lost through the land return.

                                   Table 3.1

                    Land to be Returned to Japan Under SACO
                                Recommendations

                                    Planned return      Replacement
    Land return                     date                facility
    ------------------------------  ------------------  ------------------
    MCAS Futenma                    Between 2001 and    Sea-based facility
                                    2003

    About 9,900 acres of the        March 2003          Remaining Northern
    Northern Training Area                              Training Area plus
                                                        new acreage to be
                                                        added by March
                                                        1998

    Aha training area               March 1998          Acreage added to
                                                        the Northern
                                                        Training Area

    Gimbaru training area           March 1998          Kin Blue Beach
                                                        training area and
                                                        Camp Hansen

    Sobe communications site        March 2001          Camp Hansen

    Yomitan auxiliary airfield      March 2001          Ie Jima auxiliary
                                                        airfield

    Most of Camp Kuwae              March 2008          Camp Zukeran and
                                                        other facilities

    Senaha communications station   March 2001          Torii
                                                        communications
                                                        station

    Small portion of the            Between 1998 and    Remaining
    Makiminato service area         2001                Makiminato service
                                                        area and Kadena
                                                        Air Base

    Naha Port                       No date             Urasoe pier area
                                    established

    Housing consolidation on Camps  March 2008          Remaining portions
    Kuwae and Zukeran                                   of Camps Kuwae and
                                                        Zukeran
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    Sources:  SACO Final Report; Marine Corps Bases, Japan; and the 18th
    Wing.

    The most significant land deal involves the planned closure and
    return of MCAS Futenma.  The installation is a critical component of
    the Marine Corps' forward deployment because it is the home base of
    the 1st Marine Air Wing.  The Wing's primary mission is to
    participate as the air component of the III Marine Expeditionary
    Force.  The wing's Marine Air Group-36 provides tactical fixed and
    rotary wing aircraft and flies about 70 aircraft, including CH-46 and
    CH-53 helicopters and KC-130 aerial refueling airplanes.

    MCAS Futenma's primary mission is to maintain and operate facilities
    and provide services and materials to support Marine aircraft
    operations.  MCAS Futenma covers 1,188 acres of land and is
    completely surrounded by the urbanized growth of Ginowan City, as
    shown in figure 3.1.

       Figure 3.1:  Aerial View of
       MCAS Futenma

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    Source:  MCAS Futenma Master Plan.

    Officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, USFJ, and Marine
    Corps Bases, Japan, told us that encroachment along the perimeter of
    MCAS Futenma is a concern.  In fact, according to Marine Corps Bases,
    Japan, in one instance, the owner of land outside MCAS Futenma
    erected a building at the end of the runway that was tall enough to
    create a hazard to aircraft using the base.  The building was
    removed.

    The land at MCAS Futenma is leased from about 2,000 private
    landowners by the government of Japan.  About 40 percent of the base
    is used for runways, taxiways, and aircraft parking.  The remaining
    portions of the base are used for air operations, personnel support
    facilities, housing, and administrative activities.  MCAS Futenma has
    a runway and parallel taxiway that are 9,000 feet long as well as an
    aircraft washrack, maintenance facilities, vehicle maintenance
    facilities, fuel storage facilities, a hazardous waste storage and
    transfer facility, a control tower, an armory, and other facilities
    needed to operate a Marine Corps air station.

    If the Marine Corps presence is to be maintained with air and ground
    combat units and logistical support collocated on Okinawa, then MCAS
    Futenma or a suitable replacement is required to maintain the
    operational capability of the III Marine Expeditionary Force's air
    combat element.

       MCAS FUTENMA IS SCHEDULED TO BE
       LARGELY REPLACED BY A SEA-BASED
       FACILITY
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2

    The U.S.  and Japanese governments established a working group to
    examine three options for replacing MCAS Futenma.  The options were
    relocation of the air station onto (1) Kadena Air Base, (2) Camp
    Schwab, or (3) a sea-based facility to be located in the ocean
    offshore from Okinawa Island.  The SACO Final Report stated that the
    sea-based facility was judged to be the best option to enhance the
    safety and quality of life of the Okinawan people and maintain the
    operational capabilities of U.S.  forces.  The report also cited as a
    benefit that a sea-based facility could be removed when no longer
    needed.

    Acquisition of the sea-based facility would follow a process that
    began with the United States' establishing operational and
    quality-of-life requirements and would conclude with Japan's
    selecting, financing, designing, and building the sea-based facility
    to meet U.S.  requirements.  The government of Japan has decided to
    locate the sea-based facility offshore from Camp Schwab.  However, at
    the time of our review some residents living near the proposed site
    had opposed having the sea-based facility near their community, but
    U.S.  officials are proceeding on the basis that the facility will be
    built.

    The Security Consultative Committee established the Futenma
    Implementation Group to identify a relocation site and an
    implementation plan for the transfer from MCAS Futenma to the
    sea-based facility.  On the U.S.  side, the Group is chaired by the
    Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
    Affairs and has representatives from the Joint Staff; the
    headquarters of the Marine Corps; the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
    for Installations and Environment; the Pacific Command; USFJ; the
    Office of Japanese Affairs, Department of State; and the
    Political-Military Affairs Section of the U.S.  Embassy-Tokyo.  The
    Group was established to oversee the design, construction, testing,
    and transfer of assets to the sea-based facility.

    MCAS Futenma will not be closed until the sea-based facility is
    operational.  Only when U.S.  operating and support requirements have
    been met will Marine Air Group-36 and its rotary wing aircraft
    relocate to the sea-based facility.  As part of the closure and
    return of MCAS Futenma, 12 KC-130 aircraft are scheduled to relocate
    to MCAS Iwakuni, on the Japanese mainland, after Japan builds new
    maintenance and other facilities to support the relocation.  In
    addition, Japan is scheduled to build other support facilities at
    Kadena Air Base to support aircraft maintenance and logistics
    operations that are to relocate there.  Ground elements of the 1st
    Marine Air Wing not relocated to the sea-based facility would
    relocate to other bases on Okinawa.

          DOD HAS ESTABLISHED
          REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
          SEA-BASED FACILITY
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.1

    The sea-based facility is to be designed by Japan to meet U.S.
    operational requirements.

    During regular operations, about 66 helicopters and MV-22 aircraft
    (when fielded) would be stationed aboard the sea-based facility.  The
    MV-22 can operate in either vertical takeoff and landing mode, like a
    helicopter, or short takeoff and landing mode, like an airplane.  The
    sea-based facility airfield requirements are based on MV-22 operating
    requirements.  According to a Marine Corps study, a runway length of
    2,600 feet is sufficient for normal day-to-day operations, training
    missions, and self-deployment to Korea in its vertical takeoff and
    landing mode under most conditions.  The Pacific Command has
    established a 4,200-foot runway for all MV-22 operations based on
    aircraft performance and meteorological data.  The Marine Corps study
    indicates that a 4,200-foot runway is sufficient for most training
    and mission requirements.  However, the study also stated that for
    missions requiring an MV-22 gross weight near the maximum of 59,305
    pounds, the aircraft would have to operate in its short takeoff mode
    and would require a runway of 5,112 feet under certain weather
    conditions.

    The United States has established a runway length requirement of
    about 4,200 feet for the sea-based facility.  Arresting gear would be
    located about 1,200 feet from either end of the runway to permit
    carrier aircraft to land.  In addition, the runway would have
    328-foot overruns at each end to provide a safety margin in case a
    pilot overshoots the optimal landing spot during an approach and a
    parallel taxiway about 75 feet wide alongside the runway.  Additional
    aircraft facilities include a drive-through rinse facility for
    aircraft corrosion control, an air traffic control tower, and
    aircraft firefighting and rescue facilities.  Up to 10,000 pounds of
    ordnance would be stored in a magazine collocated with an ordnance
    assembly area aboard the sea-based facility.  Also, flight simulators
    and security and rescue boat operations, among other capabilities,
    are required aboard the sea-based facility.

    Aircraft maintenance would be performed aboard the sea-based
    facility.  Marine Air Group-36 requires hangar space for five
    helicopter squadrons, including space for Marine Corps air logistics;
    corrosion control; aircraft maintenance; secure storage;
    administrative functions; ground support equipment; and engine test
    cells, among other facilities.  Logistics operations requirements
    aboard the sea-based facility include aircraft supply and fuel/oil
    supply, spill response capability, and parking for up to 800
    personally owned and government-owned vehicles.  MCAS Futenma can
    store about 828,000 gallons of aircraft fuel.  At the time of our
    review, the United States had not determined how much fuel storage
    capacity was needed, or how fuel is to be provided to support
    sea-based facility operations.  Food service for about 1,400 on-duty
    servicemembers per meal would be required on the sea-based facility
    to provide meals during the day and for crews working nights.

    The United States planned to locate the headquarters, logistics, and
    most operational activities aboard the sea-based facility and most
    quality-of-life activities, including housing, food service, and
    medical and dental services, ashore at Camp Schwab.  U.S.  officials
    estimate that over 2,500 servicemembers currently stationed at MCAS
    Futenma would transfer to the sea-based facility and Camp Schwab.  To
    accommodate the incoming arrivals from MCAS Futenma, Marine Corps
    Bases, Japan, plans to relocate about 800 to 1,000 servicemembers
    currently housed at Camp Schwab to Camp Hansen and absorb the
    remainder at Camp Schwab.  U.S.  engineers estimated that about 1,900
    people would work on the sea-based facility.

    Due to a lack of DOD dependent schools in the Camp Schwab area, only
    unmarried servicemembers will be housed at Camp Schwab.
    Servicemembers accompanied by dependents will be housed where most of
    them and most of the DOD schools (including the only two high
    schools) are located now, although not on MCAS Futenma.  Marine Corps
    Bases, Japan, would have to either house all incoming servicemembers
    on or near Camp Schwab and bus their dependent children to the
    schools or keep servicemembers who have dependents housed in the
    southern part of the island and have them commute to work.  Marine
    Corps Bases, Japan, chose the latter.

          CONTRACTORS HAVE DEVELOPED
          THREE CONCEPTS FOR A
          SEA-BASED FACILITY
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.2

    Japan will design, build, and pay for the sea-based facility and
    plans to locate it offshore from Camp Schwab.  The sea-based facility
    is be provided rent-free to USFJ, which would then provide it to the
    1st Marine Air Wing.  Government of Japan, ocean engineering and
    other university professors, and other experts have concluded that
    three types of sea-based facilities are technically feasible--the
    pontoon-type, pile-supported-type, or semisubmersible-type.

          PONTOON-TYPE SEA-BASED
          FACILITY
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.3

    A pontoon-type sea-based facility would essentially be a large
    platform that would float in the water on pontoons (see fig.  3.2).
    The structure would be located about 3,000 feet from shore in about
    100 feet of water.  Part of the platform would be below the water
    line.  To keep the sea relatively calm around the platform, a
    breakwater would be installed to absorb the wave action.  The
    breakwater would be constructed in about 60 feet of water atop a
    coral ridge.  To prevent the structure from floating away, it would
    be attached to a mooring system attached to the sea floor.

       Figure 3.2:  Artist's
       Conception of a Pontoon-Type
       Sea-Based Facility With a
       Cut-Away To Show the Lower Deck

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    Source:  Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security
    Affairs.

    The pontoon-type sea-based facility envisioned would have a runway
    and control tower on the deck and most maintenance, storage, and
    personnel support activities (such as food service) below deck.
    According to documents that we obtained, no floating structure of the
    size required has ever been built.  In addition, Naval Facilities
    Engineering Command officials told us that construction of a
    breakwater in about 60 feet of water would be "at the edge of
    technical feasibility."

          PILE-SUPPORTED SEA-BASED
          FACILITY
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.4

    A pile-supported sea-based facility essentially would be a large
    platform supported by columns, or piles, driven into the sea floor
    (see fig.  3.3).  The structure would be located in about 16 feet to
    82 feet of water and relatively closer to shore than the proposed
    pontoon-type sea-based facility.  According to Naval Engineers, about
    7,000 piles would be needed to support a structure of the size
    proposed.

       Figure 3.3:  Artist's
       Conception of a Pile-Supported
       Sea-Based Facility

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    Source:  Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security
    Affairs.

    The pile-supported sea-based facility envisioned would have one deck.
    In addition to the runway and control tower, maintenance, storage,
    and personnel support activities would be in buildings on the deck.
    Structures similar to the pile-supported sea-based facility have
    already been built for other purposes.

          SEMISUBMERSIBLE-TYPE
          SEA-BASED FACILITY
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.5

    The semisubmersible-type sea-based facility would consist of a
    platform above the water line supported by a series of floating
    underwater hulls (see fig.  3.4).  The facility would have
    interconnected modules with a runway and control tower atop the deck
    and maintenance, storage, and other functions on a lower deck.

       Figure 3.4:  Artist's
       Conception of a Semisubmersible
       Sea-Based Facility

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    Source:  Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security
    Affairs.

    The semisubmersible sea-based facility relies on technology that does
    not yet exist, according to documents provided by DOD.  For example,
    documents indicate that semisubmersible sea-based facilities are
    limited by current technology to about 1,000 feet in length.

       COSTS, CHALLENGES, AND
       COMPLICATIONS THREATEN
       CAPABILITY OF THE SEA-BASED
       FACILITY
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3

    The United States and/or Japan are likely to encounter high costs,
    technological challenges, and operational complications in designing,
    constructing, and operating the sea-based facility.

          COSTS
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.1

    The sea-based facility is estimated to cost Japan between $2.4
    billion and $4.9 billion to design and build.  Operations and support
    costs are expected to be much higher on the sea-based facility than
    at MCAS Futenma.  Under the Status of Forces Agreement, the United
    States pays for the maintenance of bases it uses in Japan.  Based on
    a $4-billion sea-based facility design and construction cost, U.S.
    engineers have initially estimated maintenance costs to be about $8
    billion over the 40-year life span of the facility.  Thus, annual
    maintenance would cost about $200 million, compared with about $2.8
    million spent at MCAS Futenma.  At the time of this report, the
    United States and Japan were discussing having Japan pay for
    maintenance on the sea-based facility.  If Japan does not pay
    maintenance costs, then the U.S.  cost related to the SACO
    recommendations could be much higher.

    In addition to potential increased maintenance costs, the United
    States may spend money to renovate facilities at MCAS Futenma
    previously identified by both the U.S.  and Japanese governments for
    replacement by Japan.  Because of the planned closure of MCAS
    Futenma, the government of Japan cancelled about $140 million worth
    of projects at the air station that were to be funded under Japan's
    Facilities Improvement Program.  The United States believes these
    facilities are important to Futenma's operations until the sea-based
    facility is ready.  Marine Forces, Japan, has requested $13.6 million
    in U.S.  funds to complete some of those projects.  During the
    10-year sea-based facility acquisition period, some of the other
    projects may be needed to continue to operate MCAS Futenma.  If the
    government of Japan does not fund these projects for MCAS Futenma,
    the United States will have to choose between the added risk of
    operating from decaying facilities or pay additional renovation costs
    at a base scheduled for closure.

          TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.2

    Technological challenges may arise because no sea-based facility of
    the type and scale envisioned has ever been built to serve as an air
    base.  To address these challenges and develop sea-based facility
    operational and support requirements, the Naval Facilities
    Engineering Command convened a working group in August 1997.  In its
    report, the group concluded that for the three sea-based facilities
    being considered, "none of these technologies has been demonstrated
    to the scale envisioned."

    The report described numerous challenges that would have to be
    overcome to make a sea-based facility viable.  For example, the
    sea-based facility would have to survive natural events such as
    typhoons, which strike within 180 nautical miles of Okinawa Island an
    average of four times per year.  During a typhoon, personnel would
    evacuate the sea-based facility, but the aircraft would remain aboard
    the facility in hangars to ride out the storm, according to 1st
    Marine Air Wing officials.  U.S.  engineers we spoke with indicated
    that a pile-supported sea-based facility's underside would have to
    withstand pressure caused by storm-tossed waves slamming beneath the
    deck, and the pontoon- and semisubmersible-type sea-based facilities
    must be designed to avoid instability or sinking.  Tsunamis are also
    a threat.  In a tsunami, the water level near shore generally drops
    (sometimes substantially) and then rises to great heights, causing
    large, destructive waves.  U.S.  engineers we spoke with indicated
    that a floating sea-based facility's mooring system would have to
    permit the floating structure to drop with the water level without
    hitting bottom and then rise as the waves returned.

    Also, structural issues pose technological challenges.  The sea-based
    facility would have to be invulnerable to sinking or capsizing and
    resume normal operations within 24 to 48 hours after an aircraft
    crash, an accident involving ordnance aboard the facility, or an
    attack in wartime or by terrorists.  An issue involving the pontoon
    and semisubmersible facilities is the potential for them to become
    unstable if an interior compartment is flooded.  Thus, watertight
    doors and compartments (similar to those on ships) may be required.
    Corrosion control is a major concern because the facility would
    always be in salt water.  Therefore, that part of the structure below
    the waterline would have to be built to minimize or resist corrosion
    for the 40-year life span of the facility, or a method of identifying
    and repairing corrosion (possibly underwater) without disrupting
    military operations would have to be devised.

          OPERATIONAL COMPLICATIONS
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.3

    The Marine Corps may experience operational complications because the
    proposed length of the sea-based facility runway can compromise
    safety margins when an MV-22 aircraft is taking off at maximum weight
    under wet runway conditions.\1 Since the MV-22 requires a 5,112-foot
    runway to take off at its maximum weight of 59,305 pounds and
    maintain maximum safety margins on a wet runway, the proposed
    4,200-foot runway for the sea-based facility is too short.  While the
    MV-22 can take off from a 4,200-foot runway at its maximum weight, in
    the event of an engine failure, or other emergency, on a wet runway,
    the safety margin is reduced.  This risks the loss of the aircraft
    because the stopping distance for an aborted takeoff is longer on a
    wet runway than the runway planned.  According to the Pacific
    Command, conditions that require more than 4,200 feet for takeoff
    would not preclude effective MV-22 contingency missions.  A commander
    would need to make a decision to accept the increased risk of
    aircraft loss based on the criticality of the mission, or to reduce
    the aircraft's load.  The Pacific Command considers the risk
    acceptable and accepted the reduced the size of the sea-based
    facility.

    Alternatively, with a reduced load, MV-22s could take off from the
    sea-based facility without a full fuel load, use Kadena Air Base to
    finish fueling to capacity, and take off from its longer runway to
    continue the mission.  However, this requires Kadena Air Base to
    absorb increased air traffic and risks later arrival in an area of
    operations.  Ultimately, the added risk, time, and coordination are
    problems that would not occur at MCAS Futenma because its 9,000-foot
    runway is long enough for all MV-22 missions.  Also, if Kadena Air
    Base is not available for MV-22 operations, the Marines would have no
    alternative U.S.  military runway of sufficient length on Okinawa to
    support MV-22 missions at its maximum weight and maintain maximum
    safety margins in certain weather conditions.

    Moreover, the loss of MCAS Futenma's runway equates to the loss of an
    emergency landing strip for fixed-wing aircraft in the area.
    However, safety margins may not be compromised even if Kadena Air
    Base is shut down (for weather or other reasons), MCAS Futenma is
    closed, and the sea-based facility's runway as currently designed is
    too short for certain aircraft, because Naha International Airport
    would be available as an emergency landing strip for U.S.  military
    aircraft.

    --------------------
    \1 According to the Pacific Command, Okinawa experiences rainfall an
    average of 135 days a year.

          U.S.  PROJECT OVERSIGHT IS
          CURRENTLY LIMITED
    -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.4

    USFJ and Naval Facilities Engineering Command officials told us that
    the United States must oversee the design, engineering, and
    construction of the sea-based facility to ensure that it meets U.S.
    requirements, is operationally adequate, and is affordable to operate
    and maintain.  However, current staff and funding resources are
    dedicated to managing other programs associated with the U.S.
    presence in Japan.  Therefore, USFJ has requested establishment of a
    Project Management Office to oversee and coordinate SACO
    implementation while the Naval Facilities Engineering Command has
    asked for funding for a special project office to oversee the design
    and construction of the sea-based facility.

    In addition to the high cost, technological challenges, and
    operational complications that stem from the planned sea-based
    facility and limited U.S.  oversight of the project, Japan's
    sea-based facility acquisition strategy compounds the risk.  At the
    time of our review, Japan did not have a risk-reduction phase planned
    to demonstrate that the design of the sea-based facility meets U.S.
    operating and affordability requirements.  A risk-reduction phase
    could include risk assessments, life-cycle cost analyses, and design
    tradeoffs.  DOD's policy is to include a risk-reduction phase in its
    acquisition of major systems.  U.S.  officials believe it will take
    up to 10 years to design, build, and relocate to the sea-based
    facility as compared with the 5 to 7 years estimated in the SACO
    Final Report.  On the other hand, these officials also believe that
    adding time to the project is a price worth paying to include a
    risk-reduction phase.  Given the scope, technical challenges, and
    unique nature of the sea-based facility, including a risk-reduction
    phase would permit the U.S.  and Japanese governments to establish
    that the proposed sea-based facility will be affordable and
    operationally suitable.  The inclusion of a risk-reduction phase in
    the sea-based facility's acquisition schedule is currently being
    discussed between the U.S.  and Japanese governments.

       PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH
       REMAINING 10 LAND RETURN
       RECOMMENDATIONS ARE MINIMAL,
       AND SOME BENEFITS ARE LIKELY
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4

    U.S.  forces on Okinawa will face minimal risks to operations from
    the remaining 10 land return issues.  The services can maintain
    training opportunities and deployment plans and schedules, because
    land to be returned is no longer needed or will be returned only
    after Japan provides adequate replacement facilities on existing
    bases or adds land by extending other base boundaries.

    First, while the Northern Training Area is still used extensively for
    combat skills training, about 9,900 acres can be returned to Japan
    because that land is no longer needed by the United States.  The
    Marine Corps will retain about 9,400 acres of the Northern Training
    Area and expects to be able to continue all needed training on the
    remaining acreage.  The return of the 9,900 acres is contingent on
    Japan's relocating helicopter landing zones within what will remain
    of the Northern Training Area.  In addition, the adjacent Aha
    training area can be returned without risk once Japan provides new
    shoreline access to the Northern Training Area to replace what would
    be lost by the closure and return of the Aha training area.
    Likewise, return of the Gimbaru training area presents low risk
    because the helicopter landing zone is to be relocated to the nearby
    Kin Blue Beach training area and the vehicle washrack and
    firefighting training tower will be relocated to Camp Hansen.  The
    Yomitan auxiliary airfield can be returned because parachute drop
    training conducted there has already been transferred to the Ie Jima
    auxiliary airfield on Ie Jima Island, just off the northwest coast of
    Okinawa Island.  Lastly, the Sobe communication station can be
    returned because it will be relocated to the remaining Northern
    Training Area, and Naha Port can be returned when it is replaced by a
    suitable facility elsewhere on Okinawa.

    While risks from the return of land (other than that related to MCAS
    Futenma) are minimal, the United States expects some benefits from
    the consolidation of housing on the remaining portion of Camp
    Zukeran.  First, the SACO Final Report calls on Japan to build a new
    naval hospital on Camp Zukeran to replace the existing hospital on
    that part of Camp Kuwae scheduled for return.  Marine Corps Bases,
    Japan estimated the construction cost to be about $300 million, which
    Japan is scheduled to pay.  In addition, Japan is to provide 2,041
    new or reconstructed housing units at Camp Zukeran as part of the
    SACO process and another 1,473 reconstructed housing units at Kadena
    Air Base, which is not part of SACO's recommendations.  Air Force
    18th Wing civil engineering officials estimated the total housing
    construction cost at about $2 billion.\2 The 18th Wing has requested
    establishment of a special project office to help with the design of
    the housing units and to ensure that the units meet U.S.  health and
    safety code standards.

    The current estimated cost to the United States to implement the
    recommendations related to the return of land is about $193.5 million
    over about 10 years.  This includes (1) $80 million to furnish the
    new hospital; (2) $71 million for the Futenma Implementation Group;
    (3) $8.2 million to furnish 2,041 housing units; (4) $8.1 million for
    USFJ to oversee and coordinate SACO implementation; (5) $8 million
    for the Naval Facilities Engineering Command project office to
    oversee the sea-based facility's engineering and construction; (6)
    $4.4 million for a special project office for oversight of the
    housing project and master plan; and (7) $13.6 million for MCAS
    Futenma projects that would have been paid for by Japan had it not
    cancelled funding for the base.  DOD officials told us that the U.S.
    and Japanese governments were negotiating an arrangement whereby
    Japan might assume those portions of the $71 million in costs which
    they can pay (and still comply with their domestic laws), for the
    Futenma Implementation Group.  This arrangement could reduce U.S.
    costs below the current estimate of $193.5 million.  Also, some
    initial costs may be offset in later years because the 18th Wing
    expects maintenance costs will be lower at the new hospital and
    housing.  However, U.  S.  costs could be significantly higher than
    the $193.5 million estimate because the United States and Japan have
    not agreed on which country would be responsible for the sea-based
    facility's maintenance.

    --------------------
    \2 The Air Force is DOD's executive agent for housing in Japan.

       SOME PROBLEMS AND RISKS IN
       IMPLEMENTING ONE OF THE THREE
       OPERATIONAL CHANGES
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5

    The United States has already implemented all three changes in
    training and operational procedures called for in the SACO Final
    Report (see table 3.2).

                                   Table 3.2

                      Training and Operational Procedures
                      Changes Addressed in the SACO Final
                                     Report

                                              How operational procedures
    Operational procedure change              will be maintained
    ----------------------------------------  ----------------------------
    End artillery live-fire training over     Relocate training to ranges
    highway 104                               on Japan's mainland

    Relocate parachute drop training to Ie    End parachute drop training
    Jima auxiliary airfield                   at Yomitan auxiliary
                                              airfield and relocate to Ie
                                              Jima auxiliary airfield.

    End conditioning hikes on public roads    Relocate training onto U.S.
                                              bases
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    Sources:  SACO Final Report and Marine Corps Bases, Japan.

    The 3rd Marine Division's artillery live-fire exercises have been
    relocated from the Central Training Area on Okinawa to the Kita-Fuji,
    Higashi-Fuji, Ojojihara, Yausubetsu, and Hijudai training ranges on
    the Japanese mainland.  Prior to the SACO Final Report, the 3rd
    Marine Division was already conducting 60 to 80 days of artillery
    live-fire exercises at the two Fuji ranges.  Under the SACO
    relocation, another 35 days of training will be split among the five
    ranges.  Japan has agreed to pay transportation costs to the
    artillery ranges and wants to use Japanese commercial airliners for
    this purpose.

    The III Marine Expeditionary Force believes the training at the five
    ranges is comparable to that available on Okinawa and other ranges in
    the United States.  At the time of our review, the Marine Corps had
    successfully completed one relocated artillery live-fire exercise
    each at the Kita-Fuji and Yausubetsu ranges.  The relocation has had
    virtually no impact on deployment plans and schedules, according to
    III Marine Expeditionary Force officials.

    In addition to the artillery training relocation, the United States
    has transferred parachute jump training conducted by the Army's 1st
    Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), from the Yomitan
    auxiliary airfield (which was closed) to the auxiliary airfield on Ie
    Jima Island, just off the northwest coast of Okinawa.\3 However,
    special forces soldiers are at increased risk of failing to maintain
    airborne qualifications because parachute operations training has
    proven more difficult to complete on Ie Jima Island.  About 73
    percent of the training jumps scheduled between July 1996 and
    September 1997 on Ie Jima Island were canceled due to adverse weather
    at the drop zone; adverse weather at sea, preventing required safety
    boats from standing by in the event a parachutist landed in the
    water; and equipment problems that prevented the safety boats from
    departing their berths.  The relocation has not affected operational
    deployments and schedules, although training deployments have been
    disrupted.

    Lastly, the Marine Corps has already ended conditioning hikes for
    troops on public roads off base and transferred those hikes to roads
    within U.S.  bases.  USFJ and Marine Corps Bases, Japan, indicated
    that this has not cost the United States any money and has had no
    impact on operational capability, deployment plans and schedules, or
    training.

    As requested, we also reviewed the impact of the SACO Final Report
    recommendations on bomber operations in the Pacific, although bomber
    operations were not specifically addressed by the SACO report.
    According to the headquarters of the Air Force, Pacific Air Forces,
    and 18th Wing, the SACO Final Report recommendations will have no
    impact on bomber operations in the Pacific.

    --------------------
    \3 The Yomitan auxiliary airfield has been closed but is not
    scheduled for return to Japan until March 2001.

       RISKS ARE MINIMAL FROM FIVE
       NOISE REDUCTION INITIATIVES
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:6

    The United States has implemented two noise reduction initiatives at
    Kadena Air Base and MCAS Futenma called for in the SACO Final Report.
    Three more noise reduction initiatives are to be implemented after
    Japan constructs new facilities.  Table 3.3 shows the status of the
    five noise reduction initiatives and U.S.  plans for maintaining
    training and operational capability after their implementation.

                                   Table 3.3

                     Noise Reduction Initiatives Called For
                            in the SACO Final Report

                                                        How training and
                                                        operational
                                    Implementation      procedures are to
    Noise reduction initiative      date                be maintained
    ------------------------------  ------------------  ------------------
    Aircraft noise countermeasures  Implemented         All flights
    at Kadena Air Base and MCAS                         required to do
    Futenma                                             missions and
                                                        maintain aircrew
                                                        proficiency are
                                                        permitted, even at
                                                        night.

    Transfer KC-130 and AV-8        Partially           Japan will build
    aircraft                        implemented         replacement
                                                        facilities at MCAS
                                                        Iwakuni for the
                                                        KC-130s; all but 6
                                                        AV-8s have
                                                        returned to the
                                                        United States\.\a

    Relocate Navy aircraft and MC-  Partially           Japan will build
    130 operations within Kadena    implemented         facilities at
    Air Base                                            Kadena Air Base.

    Noise reduction baffles at      March 1998          Japan will build
    Kadena Air Base                                     noise reduction
                                                        baffles.

    Limitations on nighttime        Implemented         Nighttime flying
    training operations at MCAS                         is still permitted
    Futenma                                             for training.
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    \a These aircraft are now based at MCAS Iwakuni and frequently deploy
    to Kadena Air Base.

    Sources:  SACO Final Report; Marine Corps Bases, Japan; and the 18th
    Wing.

    The United States will encounter few problems from the noise
    abatement procedures, according to USFJ; Marine Corps Bases, Japan;
    and the 18th Wing.  Commanders at MCAS Futenma and Kadena Air Base
    retain the right to order nighttime flying operations to maintain
    aircrew proficiency and meet all training, mission, and safety
    requirements.  In fact, the noise abatement countermeasures have been
    in effect since March 1996, and commanders at both installations
    indicated that the procedures have not affected operational
    capability, deployment plans and schedules, or training.

       RISKS ARE MINIMAL FROM EIGHT
       STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT
       CHANGES
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:7

    The United States has implemented seven of the eight changes to
    Status of Forces Agreement procedures called for in the SACO Final
    Report.  Table 3.4 shows the new Status of Forces Agreement
    procedures.

                                   Table 3.4

                        Improvements to Status of Forces
                              Agreement Procedures

    Improve Status of Forces Agreement procedures
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    Provide timely reports on U.S. military accidents to authorities in
    Japan.

    Provide greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements.

    Implement new procedures to authorize visits to U.S. facilities by
    Japanese nationals.\a

    Attach new number plates to all U.S. force official vehicles,
    including tactical vehicles.

    Advise U.S. personnel to purchase supplemental automobile insurance
    for personally owned vehicles.\b

    Japan will try to pay the difference between Japanese court judgments
    and the amount that the United States is willing to pay to compensate
    for claims against U.S. military personnel not involved in the
    performance of official duties.\c

    Implement new quarantine procedures for pets brought to Japan by U.S.
    personnel.

    Continue to use procedures already in place for removal of unexploded
    ordnance at the Central Training Area. These procedures are equivalent
    to those used in the United States.
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    \a Some Japanese nationals visit U.S.  bases to view land that they
    own within the base and because some ancient cultural assets are
    located within some U.S.  bases.

    \b USFJ went beyond the SACO report goal and now requires U.S.
    personnel to buy supplemental insurance for their personally owned
    vehicles.

    \c Japan is scheduled to implement these procedures by March 1998.

    Sources:  SACO Final Report; USFJ; and Marine Corps Bases, Japan.

    According to USFJ officials, with the exception of affixing number
    plates to official vehicles, the changes in Status of Forces
    Agreement procedures cost the United States nothing and had no impact
    on deployment plans, schedules, and training.  The number plates cost
    about $30,000 according to USFJ officials.

       RECOMMENDATIONS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:8

    We recommend that the Secretary of Defense

      -- decide on the means to monitor the design, engineering, and
         construction of the sea-based facility;

      -- work with Japan to include a risk-reduction phase in the
         acquisition schedule to establish that the designed sea-based
         facility will be affordable and operationally suitable;

      -- take steps to ensure that all U.S.  concerns, especially the
         costs of operations and maintenance on the sea-based facility
         and operational concerns, have been satisfactorily addressed
         before Japan begins to build the sea-based facility; and

      -- request the Japanese government to allocate funds for those
         projects at Futenma that were cancelled by Japan due to the
         planned closure of Futenma and are deemed essential to continued
         operations of the station and the 1st Marine Air Wing until
         completion of the replacement facility.

       AGENCY COMMENTS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:9

    In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with
    GAO's recommendations and noted that the report effectively outlines
    the major operational and technical issues involved in realigning,
    consolidating, and reducing U.S.  force presence on Okinawa, as set
    forth in the SACO process.  DOD also noted that the role of Congress
    will be critical in maintaining the strategic relationship with Japan
    and therefore the GAO report was timely and welcome.  DOD provided
    technical comments, which we have incorporated in our report where
    appropriate.  The DOD response is printed in its entirety in appendix
    II.

    We also provided a copy of our draft report to the Department of
    State.  In oral comments, the Department of State concurred with our
    report and offered one technical change which we incorporated into
    the report.

    TWO ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES COULD
    ARISE FROM IMPLEMENTING THE SACO
    RECOMMENDATIONS
    ============================================================ Chapter 4

    It may take a decade or more to fully achieve all of the SACO's
    recommendations, but two environmental issues may arise and remain
    during and after implementation.  The first concerns the potential
    for environmental contamination on U.S.  bases scheduled for closure.
    The second concerns the potential adverse impact on the environment
    from construction and operation of the sea-based facility.

       ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP ISSUES
       COULD AFFECT LAND RETURN
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1

    If environmental contamination is found on bases to be closed under
    the SACO process, cleanup could be expensive.  As we noted in chapter
    1, the Status of Forces Agreement does not require the United States
    to return bases in Japan to the condition they were in at the time
    they were provided to U.S.  forces or to compensate Japan for not
    having done so.  Thus, USFJ and Marine Corps Bases, Japan, officials
    believe that the United States is not obligated to do environmental
    cleanup at bases to be closed.  Nevertheless, a 1995 DOD policy calls
    for the removal of known imminent and substantial dangers to health
    and safety due to environmental contamination caused by DOD
    operations on installations or facilities designated for return to
    the host nation overseas.  Furthermore, if the bases are closed and
    the land returned to Japan and environmental contamination is
    subsequently found, redevelopment and reuse efforts planned for some
    of these facilities could be hampered.  In fact, Marine Corps Bases,
    Japan, and other Okinawa-based U.S.  forces were informed by a letter
    dated August 25, 1997, from the government of Japan's Naha Defense
    Facilities Administration Bureau that the toxic substances mercury
    and polychlorinated biphenyls were found on the Onna communications
    site.  The United States had closed the base and returned the land to
    Japan in November 1995 (a land return unrelated to the SACO process).
    The letter indicated that the presence of these substances has
    prevented the land from being returned to its owners and thus being
    available for reuse.  The letter concludes by requesting that the
    United States conduct a survey, identify any contamination that may
    exist, and clean up bases scheduled for closure in the future.  If
    the United States agrees to this request, land return under the SACO
    process could be affected.  At the time of our review, the United
    States had not responded to the letter.

    If such a survey, sometimes called an environmental baseline survey,
    is conducted and contamination is found, cleanup could prove
    expensive.  For example, environmental remediation at MCAS Tustin in
    California is expected to cost more than $53 million when completed.
    If a survey is conducted and contamination is found, a decision would
    be needed as to whether the United States or Japan would pay the
    cost.

       CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF
       THE SEA-BASED FACILITY COULD
       HARM THE ENVIRONMENT
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2

    DOD's position is that the sea-based facility should be constructed
    and operated in a manner that preserves and protects the natural
    resources of Okinawa, including the ocean environment and coral reefs
    that partially surround the island.  Further, the United States and
    Japan, along with a substantial number of other countries, support an
    international coral reef initiative aimed at conservation and
    management of coral reefs and related ecosystems.  Coral reefs are in
    the area in which the sea-based facility is tentatively to be
    located.  However, two sea-based facility options currently under
    consideration have the potential to harm the coral reefs.  The
    pontoon-type facility requires the installation of a large breakwater
    and several mooring stations onto the seafloor.  The pile-supported
    facility requires several thousand support pilings that would need to
    be driven into the coral reef or seafloor and reinforced to withstand
    storm conditions.  Both of these options require at least one, and
    possibly two, causeways connecting them to shore facilities.
    Numerous scientific studies show that large construction projects can
    cause damage to coral reefs and the nearby coastal areas.  The
    government of Japan is evaluating the condition of the coral reef.

    The environment could also be contaminated through routine operations
    aboard the sea-based facility.  The accidental runoff of cleaning
    fluids used to wash aircraft or unintentional fuel system leaks could
    contaminate the nearby ocean environment.

    THE FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
    ACTION COMMITTEE ON OKINAWA
    =========================================================== Appendix I

    The SACO Final Report, December 2, 1996, by Minister for Foreign
    Affairs Ikeda, Minister of State for Defense Kyuma, Secretary of
    Defense Perry, Ambassador Mondale

    The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established in
    November 1995 by the Governments of Japan and the United States.  The
    two Governments launched the SACO process to reduce the burden on the
    people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan-US alliance.

    The mandate and guidelines for the SACO process were set forth by the
    Governments of Japan and the United States at the outset of the joint
    endeavor.  Both sides decided that the SACO would develop
    recommendations for the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on ways
    to realign, consolidate and reduce US facilities and areas, and
    adjust operational procedures of US forces in Okinawa consistent with
    their respective obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
    and Security and other related agreements.  The work of the SACO was
    scheduled to conclude after one year.

    The SCC which was held on April 15, 1996, approved the SACO Interim
    Report which included several significant initiatives, and instructed
    the SACO to complete and recommend plans with concrete implementation
    schedules by November 1996.

    The SACO, together with the Joint Committee, has conducted a series
    of intensive and detailed discussions and developed concrete plans
    and measures to implement the recommendations set forth in the
    Interim Report.

    Today, at the SCC, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry
    and Ambassador Mondale approved this SACO Final Report.  The plans
    and measures included in this Final Report, when implemented, will
    reduce the impact of the activities of US forces on communities in
    Okinawa.  At the same time, these measures will fully maintain the
    capabilities and readiness of US forces in Japan while addressing
    security and force protection requirements.  Approximately 21 percent
    of the total acreage of the US facilities and areas in Okinawa
    excluding joint use facilities and areas (approx.  5,002 ha/12,361
    acres) will be returned.

    Upon approving the Final Report, the members of the SCC welcomed the
    successful conclusion of the year-long SACO process and underscored
    their strong resolve to continue joint efforts to ensure steady and
    prompt implementation of the plans and measures of the SACO Final
    Report.  With this understanding, the SCC designated the Joint
    Committee as the primary forum for bilateral coordination in the
    implementation phase, where specific conditions for the completion of
    each item will be addressed.  Coordination with local communities
    will take place as necessary.

    The SCC also reaffirmed the commitment of the two governments to make
    every endeavor to deal with various issues related to the presence
    and status of US forces, and to enhance mutual understanding between
    US forces and local Japanese communities.  In this respect, the SCC
    agreed that efforts to these ends should continue, primarily through
    coordination at the Joint Committee.

    The members of the SCC agreed that the SCC itself and the Security
    Sub-Committee (SSC) would monitor such coordination at the Joint
    Committee as described above and provide guidance as appropriate.
    The SCC also instructed the SSC to seriously address the
    Okinawa-related issues as one of the most important subjects and
    regularly report back to the SCC on this subject.

    In accordance with the April 1996 Japan-US Joint Declaration on
    Security, the SCC emphasized the importance of close consultation on
    the international situation, defense policies and military postures,
    bilateral policy coordination and efforts towards a more peaceful and
    stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region.  The SCC
    instructed the SSC to pursue these goals and to address the
    Okinawa-related issues at the same time.

       RETURN LAND
    --------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1

          FUTENMA AIR STATION
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.1

    See attached (p.  56).

          NORTHERN TRAINING AREA
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.2

    Return major portion of the Northern Training Area (approx.  3,987
    ha/9,852 acres) and release US joint use of certain reservoirs
    (approx.  159 ha/393 acres) with the intention to finish the process
    by the end of March 2003 under the following conditions:

    Provide land area (approx.  38 ha/93 acres) and water area (approx.
    121ha/298 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end
    of March 1998 in order to ensure access from the remaining Northern
    Training Area to the ocean.

    Relocate helicopter landing zones from the areas to be returned to
    the remaining Northern Training Area.

          AHA TRAINING AREA
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.3

    Release US joint use of Aha Training Area (approx.  480 ha/1,185
    acres) and release US joint use of the water area (approx.  7,895
    ha/19,509 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end
    of March 1998 after land and water access areas from the Northern
    Training Area to the ocean are provided.

          GIMBARU TRAINING AREA
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.4

    Return Gimbaru Training Area (approx.  60 ha/149 acres) with the
    intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after the
    helicopter landing zone is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area,
    and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.

          SOBE COMMUNICATION SITE
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.5

    Return Sobe Communication Site (approx.  53 ha/132 acres) with the
    intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the
    antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to
    Camp Hansen.

          YOMITAN AUXILIARY AIRFIELD
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.6

    Return Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (approx.  l91 ha/471 acres) with
    the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after
    the parachute drop training is relocated to Ie Jima Auxiliary
    Airfield and Sobe Communications Sites is relocated.

          CAMP KUWAE
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.7

    Return most of Camp Kuwae (approx 99 ha/245 acres) with the intention
    to finish the process by the end of March 2008 after the Naval
    Hospital is relocated to Camp Zukeran and remaining facilities there
    are relocated to Camp Zukeran or other facilities and areas in
    Okinawa.

          SENAHA COMMUNICATION STATION
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.8

    Return Senaha Communication Station (approx.  61 ha/151 acres) with
    the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after
    the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are
    relocated to Torii Communication Station.  However, the microwave
    tower portion (approx.- 0.  l ha/0.3 acres) will be retained.

          MAKIMINATO SERVICE AREA
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.9

    Return land adjacent to Route 58 (approx.  3 ha/8 acres) in order to
    widen the Route, after the facilities which will be affected by the
    return are relocated within the remaining Makiminato Service Area.

          NAHA PORT
    ------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:1.10

    Jointly continue best efforts to accelerate the return of Naha Port
    (approx.  57 ha/140 acres) in connection to its relocation to the
    Urasoe Pier area (approx.  35 ha/87 acres).

          HOUSING CONSOLIDATION (CAMP
          KUWAE AND CAMP ZUKERAN)
    ------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:1.11

    Consolidate US housing areas in Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran and
    return portions of land in housing areas there with the intention to
    finish the process by the end of March 2008 (approx.  83 ha/206 acres
    at Camp Zukeran; in addition, approx.  35 ha/85 acres at Camp Kuwae
    will be returned through housing consolidation.  That land amount is
    included in the above entry on Camp Kuwae.

       ADJUST TRAINING AND OPERATIONAL
       PROCEDURES
    --------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2

          ARTILLERY LIVE-FIRE TRAINING
          OVER HIGHWAY 104
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.1

    Terminate artillery fire-training over Highway 104, with the
    exception of artillery fire required in the event of a crisis, after
    the training is relocated to maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan
    within Japanese Fiscal Year 1997.

          PARACHUTE DROP TRAINING
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.2

    Relocate parachute drop training to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield.

          CONDITIONING HIKES ON PUBLIC
          ROADS
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.3

    Conditioning hikes on public roads have been terminated.

       IMPLEMENT NOISE REDUCTION
       INITIATIVES:
    --------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3

          AIRCRAFT NOISE ABATEMENT
          COUNTERMEASURES AT KADENA
          AIR BASE AND FUTENMA AIR
          STATION
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3.1

    Agreements on aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air
    Base and Futenma Air Station announced by the Joint Committee in
    March 1996 have been implemented.

          TRANSFER OF KC-130 HERCULES
          AIRCRAFT AND AV-8 HARRIER
          AIRCRAFT
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3.2

    Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft currently~ based at Futenma Air Station
    to Iwakuni Air Base after adequate facilities are provided.  Transfer
    of 14 AV-8 aircraft from Iwakuni Air Base to the United States has
    been completed.

          RELOCATION OF NAVY AIRCRAFT
          AND MC-130 OPERATIONS AT
          KADENA AIR BASE
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3.3

    Relocate Navy aircraft operations and supporting facilities at Kadena
    Air Base from the Navy ramp to other side of the major runways.  The
    implementation schedules for these measures will be decided along
    with the implementation schedules for the development of additional
    facilities at Kadena Air Base necessary for the return of Futenma Air
    Station.  Move the MC-130s at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to
    the northwest corner of the major runways by the end of December
    1996.

          NOISE REDUCTION BAFFLES AT
          KADENA AIR BASE
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3.4

    Build new noise reduction baffles at the north side of Kadena Air
    Base with the intention to finish the process by the end of March
    1998.

          LIMITATION OF NIGHT FLIGHT
          TRAINING OPERATIONS AT
          FUTENMA AIR STATION
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3.5

    Limit night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station to the
    maximum extent possible, consistent with the operational readiness of
    US forces.

       IMPROVE STATUS OF FORCES
       AGREEMENT PROCEDURES
    --------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4

          ACCIDENT REPORTS
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4.1

    Implement new Joint Committee agreement on procedures to provide
    investigation reports on US military aircraft accidents announced on
    December 2, 1996.

    In addition, as part of the US forces' good neighbor policy, every
    effort will be made to insure timely notification of appropriate
    local officials, as well as the Government of Japan, of all major
    accidents involving US forces' assets or facilities.

          PUBLIC EXPOSURE OF JOINT
          COMMITTEE AGREEMENTS
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4.2

    Seek greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements.

          VISITS TO US FACILITIES AND
          AREAS
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4.3

    Implement the new procedures for authorizing visits to US facilities
    and areas announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.

          MARKINGS ON US FORCES
          OFFICIAL VEHICLES
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4.4

    Implement the agreement on measures concerning markings on US forces
    official vehicles.  Numbered plates will be attached to all
    non-tactical US forces vehicles by January 1997, and to all other US
    forces vehicles by October 1997.

          SUPPLEMENTAL AUTOMOBILE
          INSURANCE
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4.5

    Education programs for automobile insurance have been expanded.
    Additionally, on its own initiative, the US has further elected to
    have all personnel under the SOFA obtain supplemental auto insurance
    beginning in January 1997.

          PAYMENT FOR CLAIMS
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4.6

    Make joint efforts to improve payment procedures concerning claims
    under paragraph 6, Article XVIII of the SOFA in the following manner:

    Requests for advance payments will be expeditiously processed and
    evaluated by both Governments utilizing their respective procedures.
    Whenever warranted under US laws and regulatory guidance, advance
    payment will be accomplished as rapidly as possible.  A new system
    will be introduced by the end of March 1998, by which Japanese
    authorities will make available to claimants no-interest loans, as
    appropriate, in advance of the final adjudication of claims by US
    authorities.

    In the past there have been only a very few cases where payment by
    the US Government did not satisfy the full amount awarded by a final
    court judgment.  Should such a case occur in the future, the
    Government of Japan will endeavor to make payment to the claimant, as
    appropriate, in order to address the difference in amount.

          QUARANTINE PROCEDURES
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4.7

    Implement the updated agreement on quarantine procedures announced by
    the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.

          REMOVAL OF UNEXPLODED
          ORDINANCE IN CAMP HANSEN
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4.8

    Continue to use USMC procedures for removing unexploded ordinance in
    Camp Hansen, which are equivalent to those applied to ranges of the
    US forces in the United States.

          CONTINUE EFFORTS TO IMPROVE
          THE SOFA PROCEDURES IN THE
          JOINT COMMITTEE\1
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4.9

    --------------------
    \1 Marine Corps Bases, Japan officials stated that this item is an
    ongoing process and does not require any specific action as a result
    of the signing of the SACO Final Report.

       THE SACO FINAL REPORT ON
       FUTENMA AIR STATION (AN
       INTEGRAL PART OF THE SACO FINAL
       REPORT) TOKYO, JAPAN, DECEMBER
       2, 1996
    --------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5

          INTRODUCTION
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5.1

    At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held on December 2,
    1996, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry, and Ambassador
    Mondale reaffirmed their commitment to the Special Action Committee
    on Okinawa (SACO) Interim Report of April 15, 1996 and the Status
    Report of September 19, 1996.  Based on the SACO Interim Report, both
    Governments have been working to determine a suitable option for the
    return of Futenma Air Station and the relocation of its assets to
    other facilities and areas in Okinawa, while maintaining the
    airfield's critical military functions and capabilities.  The Status
    Report called for the Special Working Group on Futenma to examine
    three specific alternatives:  1) incorporate the heliport into Kadena
    Air Base; 2) incorporate the heliport at Camp Schwab; and 3) develop
    and construct a sea-based facility (sea-based facility).

    On December 2, 1996, the SCC approved the SACO recommendation to
    pursue the sea-based facility option.  Compared to the other two
    options, the sea-based facility is judged to be the best option in
    terms of enhanced safety and quality of life for the Okinawan people
    while maintaining the operational capabilities of United States
    forces.  In addition, the sea-based facility can function as a fixed
    facility during its use as a military base and can also be removed
    when no longer necessary.

    The SCC will establish a bilateral United States-Japan working group
    under the supervision of the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) entitled
    the Futenma Implementation Group (FIG), to be supported by a team of
    technical experts.  The FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will
    develop a plan for implementation no later than December 1997.  Upon
    SCC approval of this plan, the FIG, working with the Joint Committee,
    will oversee design, construction, testing, and transfer of assets.
    Throughout this process, the FIG will periodically report to the SSC
    on the status of its work.

          DECISIONS OF THE SCC
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5.2

    Pursue construction of a sea-based facility to absorb most of the
    helicopter operational functions of Futenma Air Station.  This
    facility will be approximately 1500 meters long, and will support the
    majority of Futenma Air Station's flying operations, including an
    Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)-capable runway (approximately 1300
    meters long), direct air operations support, and indirect support
    infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics,
    quality-of-life functions, and base operating support.  The sea-based
    facility will be designed to support basing of helicopter assets, and
    will also be able to support short-field aircraft operations.

    Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base.  Construct
    facilities at this base to ensure that associated infrastructure is
    available to support these aircraft and their missions.

    Develop additional facilities at Kadena Air Base to support aircraft,
    maintenance, and logistics operations which are currently available
    at Futenma Air Station but are not relocated to the sea-based
    facility or Iwakuni Air Base.

    Study the emergency and contingency use of alternative facilities
    which may be needed in the event of a crisis.  This is necessary
    because the transfer of functions from Futenma Air Station to the
    sea-based facility will reduce operational flexibility currently
    available.

    Return Futenma Air Station within the next five to seven years, after
    adequate replacement facilities are completed and operational.

          GUIDING PRINCIPLES
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5.3

    Futenma Air Station's critical military functions and capabilities
    will be maintained and will continue to operate at current readiness
    levels throughout the transfer of personnel and equipment and the
    relocation of facilities.

    To the greatest extent possible, Futenma Air Station's operations and
    activities will be transferred to the sea-based facility.
    Operational capabilities and contingency planning flexibility which
    cannot be supported by the shorter runway of the sea-based facility
    (such as strategic airlift, logistics, emergency alternate divert,
    and contingency throughput) must be fully supported elsewhere.  Those
    facilities unable to be located on the sea-based facility, due to
    operational, cost, or quality-of-life considerations, will be located
    on existing US facilities and areas.

    The sea-based facility will be located off the east coast of the main
    island of Okinawa, and is expected to be connected to land by a pier
    or causeway.  Selection of the locations will take into account
    operational requirements, air-space and sea-lane deconfliction,
    fishing access, environmental compatibility, economic effects, noise
    abatement, survivability, security, and convenient, acceptable
    personnel access to other US military facilities and housing.

    The design of the sea-based facility will incorporate adequate
    measures to ensure platform, aircraft, equipment, and personnel
    survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions; corrosion
    control treatment and prevention for the sea-based facility and all
    equipment located on the sea-based facility; safety; and platform
    security.  Support will include reliable and secure fuel supply,
    electrical power, fresh water, and other utilities and consumables.
    Additionally, the facility will be fully self-supporting for
    short-period contingency/emergency operations.

    The Government of Japan will provide the sea-based facility and other
    relocation facilities for the use of United States forces, in
    accordance with the U.  S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
    Security and the Status of Forces Agreement.  The two Governments
    will further consider all aspects of life-cycle cost as part of the
    design/acquisition decision.

    The Government of Japan will continue to keep the people of Okinawa
    informed of the progress of this plan, including concept, location,
    and schedules of implementation.

          POSSIBLE SEA-BASED FACILITY
          CONSTRUCTION METHODS
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5.4

    Studies have been conducted by a "Technical Support Group" comprised
    of Government engineers under the guidance of a "Technical Advisory
    Group" comprised of university professors and other experts outside
    the Government.  These studies suggested that all three construction
    methods mentioned below are technically feasible.

    Pile Supported Pier Type (using floating modules)-supported by a
    number of steel columns fixed to the sea bed.

    Pontoon Type-platform consisting of steel pontoon type units,
    installed in a calm sea protected by a breakwater.

    Semi-Submersible Type-platform at a wave free height, supported by
    buoyancy of the lower structure submerged under the sea.

          THE NEXT STEPS
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5.5

    The FIG will recommend a candidate sea-based facility area to the SCC
    as soon as possible and formulate a detailed implementation plan no
    later than December 1997.  This plan will include completion of the
    following items:  concept development and definition of operational
    requirements, technology performance specifications and construction
    method, site survey, environmental analysis, and final concept and
    site selection.

    The FIG will establish phases and schedules to achieve operational
    capabilities at each location, including facility design,
    construction, installation of required components, validation tests
    and suitability demonstrations, and transfer of operations to the new
    facility.

    The FIG will conduct periodic reviews and make decisions at
    significant milestones concerning sea-based facility program
    feasibility.

    (See figure in printed edition.)Appendix II
    COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
    DEFENSE
    =========================================================== Appendix I

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
    ========================================================= Appendix III

       NATIONAL SECURITY AND
       INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
       WASHINGTON, D.C.
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:1

    Reginald L.  Furr
    Brian J.  Lepore
    Colin L.  Chambers
    Nancy L.  Ragsdale
    Julio A.  Luna

       OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL,
       WASHINGTON, D.C.
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2

    Richard Seldin

    *** End of document. ***