Air Force Bombers: Moving More B-1s to the Reserves Could Save Millions
Without Reducing Mission Capability (Letter Report, 02/26/98,
GAO/NSIAD-98-64).

GAO reviewed the cost and operational implications of assigning more B-1
bombers to the reserve component, focusing on: (1) whether operational
factors preclude greater reserve component participation in the B-1
mission; and (2) options for increasing the number of B-1s assigned to
reserve component units and their effect on operations and costs.

GAO noted that: (1) Air Force active and reserve components consider
essentially the same operational factors in determining whether a
mission is suitable for the reserve component; (2) factors Air Force
officials consider include: (a) overseas presence; (b) peacetime
training; (c) mission response times; (d) personnel tempo; and (e)
personnel recruiting; (3) GAO's assessment of these factors showed that
they do not preclude assigning more B-1s to the reserve component; (4)
B-1s are not based overseas, peacetime training can be scheduled around
part-time reservists' civilian employment, reserve units could mobilize
to meet mission response times, and personnel tempo rates for B-1 unit
personnel do not exceed the Air Force's maximum desired standard; (5)
however, the lack of availability of recruitable personnel in some
locations limits where reserve units can operate; (6) if the Air Force
were to assign more B-1s to the reserve component than are currently
planned, the cost to operate the B-1 fleet could be reduced--without
adversely affecting day-to-day peacetime training or critical wartime
missions or closing any bases; (7) GAO developed six options for
assigning more B-1s to the reserves; and (8) based on Congressional
Budget Office cost savings projections and GAO's analysis of other
one-time costs, GAO estimates that implementing these options could
produce savings ranging from $87.1 million to $235.3 million during the
last 5 years (1999-2003) of the current Future Years Defense Program.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-98-64
     TITLE:  Air Force Bombers: Moving More B-1s to the Reserves Could 
             Save Millions Without Reducing Mission Capability
      DATE:  02/26/98
   SUBJECT:  Bomber aircraft
             Combat readiness
             Military cost control
             Air warfare
             Air Force reservists
             Personnel recruiting
             Defense capabilities
             Defense contingency planning
             Armed forces reserve training
IDENTIFIER:  DOD Future Years Defense Program
             B-1 Aircraft
             FYDP
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to the Secretary of Defense

February 1998

AIR FORCE BOMBERS - MOVING MORE
B-1S TO THE RESERVES COULD SAVE
MILLIONS WITHOUT REDUCING MISSION
CAPABILITY

GAO/NSIAD-98-64

Air Force Bombers

(701100)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DOD - Department of Defense

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-275839

February 26, 1998

The Honorable William S.  Cohen
Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr.  Secretary: 

Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard forces continue to receive
key consideration in formulating both Department of Defense (DOD) and
Air Force long-range force structure plans.  As we reported during an
earlier review of Air Force bombers,\1 the reserve component carries
out many of the same missions as the active duty units, generally at
lower cost.  During our current work, we focused on the cost and
operational implications of assigning more B-1 bombers to the reserve
component.  Specifically, we (1) assessed whether operational factors
preclude greater reserve component participation in the B-1 mission
and (2) developed options for increasing the number of B-1s assigned
to reserve component units and analyzed their effect on operations
and costs. 


--------------------
\1 Air Force Bombers:  Options to Retire or Restructure the Force
Would Reduce Planned Spending (GAO/NSIAD-96-192, Sept.  30, 1996). 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

The B-1, a long-range heavy bomber that began operations in 1986, was
designed primarily to carry nuclear munitions.  Effective October
1997, B-1 units were no longer assigned the nuclear mission.\2 The
B-1 continues, however, to support Air Force conventional wartime
missions, and planned modifications will provide the B-1 the future
capability to deliver precision-guided munitions. 

The Air Force is currently authorized 70 "mission-coded" B-1s, that
is, aircraft that are fully funded in terms of operations and
maintenance, load crews, and spare parts.  Currently, 52 B-1s are
operated by active duty units.  The remaining 18 are assigned to the
reserve component--10 to the Kansas Air National Guard and 8 to the
Georgia Air National Guard. 

The Air Force has announced plans to increase the number of fully
funded B-1s to 84 over the next several years by funding aircraft
currently held in reserve.  It is expected that this fleet of 84
aircraft will be assigned to both active and reserve component units,
as shown in table 1. 



                                Table 1
                
                     Announced B-1 Force Structure

Air Force Base                  Type unit                         B-1s
------------------------------  ------------------------------  ------
Dyess, Tex.                     Active                              36
Ellsworth, S. Dak.              Active                              24
McConnell, Kans.                Air National Guard                  10
Mt. Home, Idaho                 Active                               6
Robins, Ga.                     Air National Guard                   8
======================================================================
Total                                                               84
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  U.S.  Air Force. 


--------------------
\2 Although the B-1 nuclear mission has been withdrawn, the U.S.  has
plans for reconstitution of B-1 nuclear capability should the need
arise. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

Air Force active and reserve components consider essentially the same
operational factors in determining whether a mission is suitable for
the reserve component.  Factors Air Force officials consider include

  -- overseas presence,

  -- peacetime training,

  -- mission response times,

  -- personnel tempo, and

  -- personnel recruiting. 

Our assessment of these factors showed that they do not preclude
assigning more B-1s to the reserve component.  B-1s are not based
overseas, peacetime training can be scheduled around part-time
reservists' civilian employment, reserve units could mobilize to meet
mission response times, and personnel tempo rates for B-1 unit
personnel do not exceed the Air Force's maximum desired standard. 
However, the lack of availability of recruitable personnel in some
locations limits where reserve units can operate. 

If the Air Force were to assign more B-1s to the reserve component
than are currently planned, the cost to operate the B-1 fleet could
be reduced--without adversely affecting day-to-day peacetime training
or critical wartime missions or closing any bases.  We developed six
options for assigning more B-1s to the reserves.  Based on
Congressional Budget Office cost savings projections and our analysis
of other one-time costs, we estimate that implementing these options
could produce savings ranging from $87.1 million to $235.3 million
during the last 5 years (1999-2003) of the current Future Years
Defense Program.\3


--------------------
\3 The Future Years Defense Program is an authoritative record of
current and projected force structure, costs, and personnel levels
that has been approved by the Secretary of Defense. 


   OPERATIONAL FACTORS DO NOT
   PRECLUDE ASSIGNING MORE B-1S TO
   THE RESERVES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

In general, reserve component B-1 units are considered just as
capable of carrying out operational missions as their active duty
counterparts.  Both the Kansas and Georgia B-1 reserve units train to
mobilize and deploy fully mission-ready B-1s on short notice to
support the conventional war plans of theater commanders in chief. 
Like their active duty counterparts, reserve component units are
routinely subjected to standardized Air Force operational
evaluations.  In a recent Air Force operational readiness inspection,
unit personnel and aircraft from the Kansas Air National Guard
demonstrated their ability to satisfactorily perform their assigned
wartime mission.  The Georgia unit attained initial operational
capability status in December 1997 and expects to conduct its first
operational inspection in November 1998. 

Our analysis of five operational factors the Air Force considers in
assessing whether a mission is suitable for reserve component
participation indicates that assigning more B-1s to the reserve
component than the Air Force has announced would not adversely affect
peacetime and wartime missions.  The following summarizes the results
of this analysis. 


      OVERSEAS PRESENCE
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1

When aircraft are permanently based overseas, enough aircraft must be
in the active component to ensure that an adequate number of
stateside positions are available for personnel returning from
overseas.  However, since B-1s are based only in the United States,
the assignment of more B-1s to the reserve component would not affect
overseas presence and stateside rotations. 


      PEACETIME TRAINING
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2

For a mission to be suitable for the reserve component, peacetime
training requirements must allow sufficient lead times to enable
part-time reservists to arrange absences from their full-time
civilian employment.  According to Air National Guard B-1 unit
officials, aircrews must fly about four times per month, which can
easily be scheduled around part-time reservists' civilian employment. 
Moreover, the B-1 has not been involved in any peacetime operations
that have required frequent or unscheduled participation by reserve
component personnel. 


      MISSION RESPONSE TIMES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.3

Except for the additional 24 hours reserve component units are
allowed to recall unit personnel and mobilize their forces prior to
deployment, there is little distinction between the kinds of wartime
missions assigned to reserve component units and their active duty
counterparts.  Notwithstanding the additional time that reserve
component units may require to mobilize, regional combatant commands
stated that current conventional threat warning times provide ample
time for reserve component B-1 units to mobilize and meet the
earliest planned mission response times.  Should an unforeseen
contingency arise with little or no warning, other active duty bomber
units would continue to retain the capability to provide the first
response. 


      PERSONNEL TEMPO
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.4

B-1 personnel have not experienced excessive peacetime personnel
tempo rates--frequent and lengthy temporary duty assignments away
from their home operating locations.  This is due in part to the
political sensitivities of other countries to the temporary overseas
basing of B-1s during peacetime.  Air Force data showed that B-1
personnel were on temporary duty for an average of 48 days during
fiscal year 1997, much less than the Air Force's maximum desired
standard of 120 days.  Thus, personnel tempo rates would not preclude
placing more B-1s in the reserve component. 


      PERSONNEL RECRUITING
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.5

The ability to recruit personnel into the reserve component is highly
dependent on the location of the unit.  Recruiting officials said it
is not possible to recruit sufficient reserve component personnel at
two of the current five B-1 locations.  None of our options include
placing more B-1s in the reserve component at these locations.  For
the three other locations, recruiting officials said that recruiting
sufficient reservists was possible given adequate time and resources
but that recruiting would be difficult for some of our options. 


   SAVINGS COULD ACCRUE IF MORE
   B-1S WERE ASSIGNED TO THE
   RESERVES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

Force mix studies on active and reserve forces\4 have traditionally
asserted that it is less costly to operate a reserve component unit
than an active duty unit of comparable size and mission.  Indeed, the
potential for savings was the primary reason cited by the Air Force
for establishing reserve component B-1 units with the Kansas and
Georgia Air National Guard.  In its September 1994 response to the
Senate Appropriations Committee's request for details on transferring
bombers to the reserve component, the Air Force stated that placing
bombers in the reserve component was fiscally prudent, with no
anticipated loss in war-fighting capability. 

The force mix studies we reviewed noted that the cost to operate a
reserve component unit is generally lower than for an active duty
unit for several reasons.  First, reserve component aircrews are more
experienced than their active duty counterparts and require fewer
flying hours to meet mission training requirements.  Second, reserve
component units employ fewer full-time military personnel than active
units.  Additionally, because of the part-time manning of traditional
reserve component units, there are fewer requirements for permanent
and costly base infrastructure--such as family housing and base
medical care facilities--necessary to support full-time active duty
personnel and their families. 

Table 2 describes six options for assigning more B-1s to the reserves
and shows the estimated savings the Air Force could achieve by
implementing these options.  Savings range from $87.1 million to
$235.3 million during fiscal years 1999-2003. 



                                     Table 2
                     
                     Potential Savings From Implementing B-1
                       Reserve Component Force Mix Options
                             (fiscal years 1999-2003)

                              (Dollars in millions)

                                   Number of      Percent of
                                     reserve         reserve
                                   component       component     B-1
                               mission-coded   mission-coded  locati   Estimated
Option                                  B-1s            B-1s     ons     savings
----------------------------  --------------  --------------  ------  ----------
Air Force announced force                 18              21       5           0
 structure plan
1 -Convert in place an                    30              36       5       $87.1
 existing active unit
2 -Convert in place the B-1               36              43       5       130.6
 aircrew training unit
3 -Convert in place the B-1               42              50       5       174.2
 aircrew training unit and
 an operational squadron
4 -Consolidate B-1s at two                54              64       2       208.6
 bases, one active and one
 reserve
5 -Consolidate B-1s at one                48              57       3       230.0
 active and two reserve
 locations
6 -Convert in place a base                54              64       5       235.3
 and assign B-1s to the
 reserve component
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  GAO and Congressional Budget Office cost analyses. 

By way of illustration, option 1--converting in place an existing
active squadron of 12 aircraft--could produce $87.1 million in
operational savings over the 5-year period.\5 Option 5--consolidating
B-1s at one active and two reserve locations--may be more challenging
to implement but could result in greater savings.  For example, under
option 5, the Air Force would need to convert one active duty base to
a reserve component base and consolidate B-1 operations at two other
existing locations, one active and one reserve.  As shown in table 2,
this option could save an estimated $230 million over the 5-year
period.  The savings include $217.7 million from operational savings
and $43.3 million from the elimination of B-1 military construction
projects programmed at two of the bases where the B-1 would no longer
be assigned.  In calculating the net savings, we took into account
one-time costs of about $26 million to move an active duty C-130 unit
at the converted base to another location and $5 million to construct
a squadron operations facility to accommodate an additional B-1 unit
at another location. 

It should be noted that the estimated $230-million savings under
option 5 and the $208.6-million savings under option 4 do not include
additional savings the Air Force expects would result from reducing
the number of B-1 operating locations to less than five.  According
to Air Force active and reserve component logisticians, reducing the
requirement to support five B-1 bases would help ease current
shortages in B-1 support equipment and war reserve mobilization kit
spare parts reported by B-1 operating units and reduce future
expenditures for B-1 support equipment and spare parts.  Moreover,
converting an active base to a reserve component base could result in
lower costs to operate hospital, family housing, and other facilities
associated with active duty units. 

Appendix I presents the potential costs and savings related to each
option and the actions the Air Force would need to take to implement
each option. 


--------------------
\4 We examined force mix studies prepared by the Department of
Defense, the U.S.  Air Force, the Air Force Reserve Command, the Air
National Guard, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Rand
Corporation. 

\5 Includes direct and indirect cost savings such as fuel,
maintenance, military pay, training, and medical care. 


   RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

Whether the Air Force chooses among our options or develops options
of its own, we believe millions of dollars could be saved without
reducing mission capability by placing more B-1s in the reserve
component.  Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to prepare a plan to place more
B-1s in the reserve component and seek congressional support for the
plan. 

As you know, 31 U.S.C.  720 requires you to submit a written
statement on actions taken on this recommendation to the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight not later than 60 days after the date
of the report and to the Senate and House Committees on
Appropriations with the agency's first request for appropriations
made more than 60 days after the date of the report. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially
concurred with our findings.  While DOD agreed that the mix of B-1s
at active and reserve components needs further study, it believed
that our recommendation that the Secretary of the Air Force develop a
plan to place more B-1s in the reserve component is too strong
without looking at war mobilization requirements and severe
limitations on basing options.  DOD believes it has the right mix of
B-1s in the active and reserve components and stated that it has no
plans at this time to move more B-1s to the reserves or to implement
any of our force mix options.  DOD agreed, however, to (1) use our
report, along with other analyses, to develop a mission-capable,
cost-effective force mix; (2) study in detail our force mix options
where savings may exist; and (3) ask the Secretary of the Air Force
to thoroughly review our report to determine whether it is
operationally feasible and cost-effective to move more B-1s to the
reserves.  DOD also said that after the Air Force conducts a thorough
review of the bomber force mix, the results will be incorporated into
the upcoming budget cycles. 

We agree that war mobilization requirements and basing options are
important factors and, in fact, considered them in our analysis. 
Specifically, we assessed five operational factors, including mission
response times, that the Air Force considers in determining whether a
mission is suitable for reserve component participation.  Except for
the additional 24 hours reserve component units are allowed to recall
unit personnel and mobilize their forces prior to deployment, there
is little distinction between the kinds of wartime missions assigned
to reserve component B-1 units and their active duty counterparts. 
Furthermore, we note that in its September 1994 response to the
Senate Appropriations Committee's request for details on transferring
bombers to the reserve component, the Air Force stated that placing
bombers in the reserve component could be done with no anticipated
loss in war-fighting capability.  Because our audit revealed no
operational reason to limit the number of B-1s in the reserve
component to the current level, and a range of basing options is
available, we continue to believe that our recommendation is sound. 

DOD further expressed concern that some of our options would
significantly change bases' loading patterns and that it lacks
continuing base closure authority.  We agree with DOD that several of
our options could result in changes to the base aircraft loading
patterns.  However, DOD has a range of options for moving more B-1s
into the reserve component that could be accomplished within existing
authority.  We met with Air Combat Command civil engineering
officials and were assured that the B-1 bases included in our force
mix options have the capacity to accommodate additional B-1s being
moved to the reserves. 

Lastly, DOD stated that the Congressional Budget Office's model
appears to overstate the savings for our options by excluding
modernization and initial training costs.  Since the entire B-1 fleet
is already being modernized, the same modernization costs will be
incurred whether the B-1s are in the active or reserve component.  We
acknowledge that the model did not capture some of the one-time
costs, including initial training costs, that would be incurred. 
However, additional costs would be relatively small and would be
recouped from the annual operational savings realized by adding B-1s
to the reserve component. 

DOD's comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

We held extensive discussions with Air Force officials in
Headquarters, U.S.  Air Force; the Air Force Reserve Command; the Air
National Guard; and the Air Combat Command and researched reports,
documents, and prior studies to determine the operational factors the
Air Force uses to assess the suitability of missions for the reserve
component.  We used these factors to develop criteria to assess the
feasibility of increasing the reserve component's participation in
the B-1 mission. 

We visited all five B-1 bases and the Air Combat Command to assess
the active and reserve component units' mission requirements and
operational capabilities.  We discussed force mix issues with
operations, plans, and training officials.  From these visits, we
obtained information such as planned force structure, base capacity,
recruiting potential, and military construction costs and used it to
develop force mix options. 

We analyzed the recruiting, response times, and cost implications for
each option.  Estimates of recruiting potential were developed by the
Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard.  To assess how more
B-1s in the reserve component would impact wartime mission response
requirements, we obtained information from operational plans, unit
capability requirements, and the combatant commands for the theaters
in which the B-1 would be employed.  To assess the potential savings
from placing more B-1s in the reserve component, we used operational
cost estimates developed by the Congressional Budget Office and other
costs Air Force officials provided such as for the military
construction and movement of an operational unit that would be
required to implement some of our options.  We did not determine
whether any of the options we presented would require congressional
notification under 10 U.S.C.  2687, base closures and realignments. 
Neither did we obtain estimates of one-time personnel costs, such as
severance pay for civilian employees or change of station costs for
active duty personnel. 

We performed our review from September 1996 to December 1997 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :7.1

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees and members, the House National Guard and Reserve Caucus
and the Senate National Guard Caucus, the Secretary of the Air Force,
the Commander of the Air Combat Command, the Commander of the Air
Force Reserve Command, the Director of the Air National Guard, the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office, and the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-3504 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report.  Major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix III. 

Sincerely yours,

Richard Davis
Director, National Security
 Analysis


OPTIONS FOR ASSIGNING MORE B-1S TO
THE RESERVE COMPONENT
=========================================================== Appendix I


   OPTION 1:  CONVERT IN PLACE AN
   EXISTING ACTIVE UNIT
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1

  -- Convert an existing active 12-aircraft squadron at Dyess Air
     Force Base, Texas, to a reserve squadron at Dyess. 

  -- No change at the other four B-1 locations. 

Table I.1 shows the number of B-1s at each base under the Air Force's
announced plan and under our option 1. 



                                    Table I.1
                     
                         B-1 Force Structure for Option 1

            Dyess     Ellsworth   McConnell    Mt. Home     Robins      Total
          ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------
            AC    RC    AC    RC    AC    RC    AC    RC    AC    RC    AC    RC
--------  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----
Plan        36     0    24     0     0    10     6     0     0     8    66    18
Option 1    24    12    24     0     0    10     6     0     0     8    54    30
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legend:

AC = active component
RC = reserve component


      ESTIMATED SAVINGS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.1

The Congressional Budget Office estimated that this option would save
$87.1 million in operational expenses.  These expenses include direct
and indirect costs such as fuel, maintenance, military pay, training,
and medical care. 


      OTHER IMPACTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.2

According to Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard recruiters,
recruiting to implement this option is possible.  These officials
estimate that an additional three to eight recruiters would be needed
for about
2 years to recruit the required personnel.  The cost for these
additional recruiters is relatively minor and was not deducted from
the savings shown above. 


   OPTION 2:  CONVERT IN PLACE THE
   B-1 AIRCREW TRAINING UNIT
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2

  -- Convert an existing active 18-aircraft aircrew training squadron
     at Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, to a reserve squadron at Dyess. 

  -- No change at the other four B-1 locations. 

Table I.2 shows the number of B-1s at each base under the Air Force's
announced plan and under our option 2. 



                                    Table I.2
                     
                         B-1 Force Structure for Option 2

            Dyess     Ellsworth   McConnell    Mt. Home     Robins      Total
          ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------
            AC    RC    AC    RC    AC    RC    AC    RC    AC    RC    AC    RC
--------  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----
Plan        36     0    24     0     0    10     6     0     0     8    66    18
Option 2    18    18    24     0     0    10     6     0     0   8 4   8 3     6
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

      ESTIMATED SAVINGS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.1

The Congressional Budget Office estimated that this option would save
$130.6 million in operational expenses. 


      OTHER IMPACTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.2

Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard recruiters concluded that
recruiting for this option would be difficult.  They estimated that
an additional three to eight recruiters would be needed for about 2
years to recruit the required personnel.  The cost for these
additional recruiters is relatively minor and was not deducted from
the savings shown above. 


   OPTION 3:  CONVERT IN PLACE THE
   B-1 AIRCREW TRAINING UNIT AND
   AN OPERATIONAL SQUADRON
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3

  -- Convert an existing active 18-aircraft aircrew training squadron
     and a 6-aircraft squadron at Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, to
     reserve squadrons at Dyess. 

  -- No change at the other four B-1 locations. 

Table I.3 shows the number of B-1s at each base under the Air Force's
announced plan and under our option 3. 



                                    Table I.3
                     
                         B-1 Force Structure for Option 3

            Dyess     Ellsworth   McConnell    Mt. Home     Robins      Total
          ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------
            AC    RC    AC    RC    AC    RC    AC    RC    AC    RC    AC    RC
--------  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----
Plan        36     0    24     0     0    10     6     0     0     8    66    18
Option 3    12    24    24     0     0    10     6     0     0     8    42    42
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

      ESTIMATED SAVINGS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3.1

The Congressional Budget Office estimated this option would save
$174.2 million in operational expenses. 


      OTHER IMPACTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3.2

Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard recruiters concluded that
recruiting for this option would be difficult but not impossible. 
They estimated an additional four to eight recruiters would be needed
for
2 years to recruit the required personnel.  The cost for these
additional recruiters is relatively minor and was not deducted from
the savings shown above. 


   OPTION 4:  CONSOLIDATE B-1S AT
   TWO BASES, ONE ACTIVE AND ONE
   RESERVE
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4

  -- Establish a reserve component unit of 54 B-1s at Dyess Air Force
     Base by reducing to zero both the active duty unit of 36 B-1s at
     Dyess and the reserve component units of 10 and 8 B-1s at
     McConnell and Robins Air Force bases, respectively. 

  -- Convert Dyess from an active to a reserve component base. 

  -- Increase the active duty unit at Ellsworth from 24 to 30 B-1s by
     reducing the active duty B-1 unit at Mt.  Home from 6 to zero. 

  -- Move an active duty C-130 unit at Dyess to another (unspecified)
     location. 

Table I.4 shows the number of B-1s at each base under the Air Force's
announced plan and under our option 4. 



                                    Table I.4
                     
                         B-1 Force Structure for Option 4

            Dyess     Ellsworth   McConnell    Mt. Home     Robins      Total
          ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------
            AC    RC    AC    RC    AC    RC    AC    RC    AC    RC    AC    RC
--------  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----
Plan        36     0    24     0     0    10     6     0     0     8    66    18
Option 4     0    54    30     0     0     0     0     0     0     0    30    54
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

      ESTIMATED SAVINGS AND COSTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4.1

The Congressional Budget Office estimated that this option would save
$261.3 million in operational expenses.  Additionally, $43.3 million
in military construction funds planned for fiscal years 1999-2003
would be saved by removing the B-1 units from Mt.  Home and Robins. 
However, according to estimates from Air Force officials, these
savings would have to be reduced by $26 million to cover the cost of
relocating the C-130 unit at Dyess and by $70 million for military
construction costs at Dyess to accommodate the additional 18 B-1s. 
Thus, the net potential savings are estimated at $208.6 million. 


      OTHER IMPACTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4.2

This option could produce other savings that are not shown in table
I.4.  For example, reducing the B-1 operating bases to two could help
ease the shortages in B-1 support equipment and mobilization kit
spare parts reported by B-1 operating units and reduce future
expenditures for B-1 support equipment and spare parts.  Converting
Dyess from an active to a reserve component base could also produce
an undetermined amount of savings from reduced permanent and costly
base infrastructure--such as family housing and base medical care
facilities--necessary to support full-time active duty personnel and
their families.  Moreover, by placing additional B-1s at Dyess and
Ellsworth, the Air Force could take advantage of unused capacity at
those locations. 

Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard recruiters concluded that
recruiting for this option at Dyess would be difficult but not
impossible.  They estimated an additional six to eight recruiters
would be needed for about 2 years to recruit the required personnel. 
The cost for these additional recruiters is relatively minor and was
not deducted from the savings shown above. 


   OPTION 5:  CONSOLIDATE B-1S AT
   ONE ACTIVE AND TWO RESERVE
   LOCATIONS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5

  -- Establish a reserve component unit of 38 B-1s at Dyess Air Force
     Base by reducing the active duty unit at Dyess from 36 to zero
     B-1s and adding 2 more B-1s to Dyess from Robins.\1

  -- Convert Dyess from an active to a reserve component base. 

  -- Increase the active duty unit at Ellsworth from 24 to 36 B-1s by
     reducing the active duty unit B-1s at Mt.  Home from 6 to zero
     and the reserve unit B-1s at Robins from the remaining 6 to
     zero. 

  -- Move an active duty C-130 unit at Dyess to another (unspecified)
     location. 

  -- No change to the reserve component unit at McConnell. 

Table I.5 shows the number of B-1s at each base under the Air Force's
announced plan and under our option 5. 



                                    Table I.5
                     
                         B-1 Force Structure for Option 5

            Dyess     Ellsworth   McConnell    Mt. Home     Robins      Total
          ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------
            AC    RC    AC    RC    AC    RC    AC    RC    AC    RC    AC    RC
--------  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----
Plan        36     0    24     0     0    10     6     0     0     8    66    18
Option 5     0    38    36     0     0    10     0     0     0     0    36    48
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------
\1 The additional two B-1s were added to create a squadron-sized
unit. 


      ESTIMATED SAVINGS AND COSTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5.1

The Congressional Budget Office estimated that this option could save
$217.7 million in operational expenses.  Additionally, $43.3 million
in military construction funds planned for fiscal years 1999-2003
could be saved by removing the B-1 units from Mt.  Home and Robins. 
However, according to estimates from Air Force officials, these
savings would have to be reduced by $26 million to relocate the C-130
unit at Dyess and $5 million to construct a squadron operations
facility at Ellsworth to accommodate an additional operational unit. 
Therefore, net potential savings under this option are estimated at
$230 million. 


      OTHER IMPACTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5.2

This option could produce savings that are not shown in table I.5. 
For example, reducing the requirement to support fewer than five
operating bases could help ease the shortages in B-1 support
equipment and mobilization kit spare parts reported by B-1 operating
bases and reduce future expenditures for B-1 support equipment and
spare parts.  Converting Dyess from an active to a reserve component
base could also produce an undetermined amount of savings from
reduced permanent and costly base infrastructure--such as family
housing and base medical care facilities--necessary to support
full-time active duty personnel and their families.  Moreover, by
moving 12 additional B-1s to Ellsworth, the Air Force could take
advantage of the unused capacity at Ellsworth. 

Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard recruiters determined that
recruiting at Dyess would be very difficult but not impossible.  They
estimated that an additional four to eight recruiters would be needed
for at least 2 years to recruit the required personnel.  The cost for
these additional recruiters is relatively minor and was not deducted
from the savings shown above. 


   OPTION 6:  CONVERT IN PLACE A
   BASE AND ASSIGN B-1S TO THE
   RESERVE COMPONENT
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:6

  -- Establish a reserve component unit of 36 B-1s at Dyess Air Force
     Base by reducing the active duty unit at Dyess from 36 to zero. 

  -- Convert Dyess from an active to a reserve component base. 

  -- Move an active duty C-130 unit at Dyess to another (unspecified)
     location. 

  -- No change at the other four B-1 locations. 

Table I.6 shows the number of B-1s at each base under the Air Force's
announced plan and under our option 6. 



                                    Table I.6
                     
                         B-1 Force Structure for Option 6

            Dyess     Ellsworth   McConnell    Mt. Home     Robins      Total
          ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------
            AC    RC    AC    RC    AC    RC    AC    RC    AC    RC    AC    RC
--------  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----
Plan        36     0    24     0     0    10     6     0     0     8    66    18
Option 6     0    36    24     0     0    10     6     0     0     8    30    54
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

      ESTIMATED SAVINGS AND COSTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:6.1

The Congressional Budget Office estimated that this option would save
$261.3 million in operational expenses.  However, to convert Dyess to
a reserve component base, the active C-130 unit at Dyess would have
to be moved at an estimated cost of $26 million.  Therefore, net
potential savings under this option are estimated at $235.3 million. 


      OTHER IMPACTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:6.2

Converting Dyess from an active to a reserve component base could
produce an undetermined amount of savings from reduced permanent and
costly base infrastructure--such as family housing and base medical
care facilities--necessary to support active duty personnel and their
families. 

Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard recruiters assessed the
recruiting for this option to be difficult but not impossible.  They
estimated that an additional six or more recruiters would be needed
for about
2 years to recruit the required personnel.  The cost for these
additional recruiters is relatively minor and was not deducted from
the savings shown above. 




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix II
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
=========================================================== Appendix I



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================= Appendix III

NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Gary K.  Weeter, Assistant Director

NORFOLK FIELD OFFICE

George O.  Morse, Evaluator-in-Charge
Leslie M.  Gregor, Senior Evaluator
Suzanne K.  Wren, Senior Evaluator


*** End of document. ***