Military Recruiting: DOD Could Improve Its Recruiter Selection and
Incentive Systems (Chapter Report, 01/30/98, GAO/NSIAD-98-58).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the military services'
recruiting processes, focusing on the recruiter incentive systems that
the military services use to optimize the performance of military
recruiters and ensure that only fully qualified applicants are enlisted.
GAO noted that: (1) the Department of Defense (DOD) could enhance the
success of its recruiters if the services strengthened key aspects of
their systems for selecting and training recruiters; (2) only the Air
Force requires personnel experienced in recruiting to interview
candidates for recruiting positions and uses selection tests to screen
interviewees for recruiting duty; (3) while recruiters from each service
receive practical training to improve their ability to recruit and
enlist personnel, Marine Corps and Navy training also emphasize the
importance of retaining recruits once enlisted and require recruiters to
focus on retention as well as recruiting; (4) the services have taken
steps to improve their delayed entry programs, such as increasing the
amount of contact between recruiters and recruits; (5) although all the
services give recruits in the delayed entry programs access to their
physical fitness facilities and encourage the recruits to become or stay
physically fit, only the Marine Corps conducts regular physical training
for recruits who are waiting to go to basic training; (6) although
recruits who are physically fit are more likely to complete basic
training, only the Marine Corps requires all recruits to take a physical
fitness test before reporting to basic training; (7) achieving monthly
goals has been the key measure of recruiter performance; (8) only the
Marine Corps and the Navy consider retention in measuring and rewarding
recruiter performance; (9) specifically, they consider the number of
recruits completing basic training when evaluating the success of
recruiters; the Army and the Air Force consider primarily the number of
recruits enlisted or the number reporting to the basic training; (10)
DOD's 1996 survey of service recruiters showed that the number of hours
that recruiters work reached its highest point since 1989; (11) despite
this effort, less than one-half of the recruiters achieved their goals
in 9 or more months of a 12-month period; (12) the recruiters GAO
interviewed were concerned about the difficulties they face in meeting
monthly goals and the long hours they must devote to their jobs; and
(13) establishing quarterly floating goals could ease the burden on
recruiters and still provide an incentive to meet recruitment goals.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-98-58
TITLE: Military Recruiting: DOD Could Improve Its Recruiter
Selection and Incentive Systems
DATE: 01/30/98
SUBJECT: Military recruiting
Military enlistment
Military training
Attrition rates
Personnel management
Enlisted personnel
Employee incentives
Military policies
Military cost control
IDENTIFIER: DOD Delayed Entry Program
Army Basic Training Program
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to the Subcommittee on Personnel, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate
January 1998
MILITARY RECRUITING - DOD COULD
IMPROVE ITS RECRUITER SELECTION
AND INCENTIVE SYSTEMS
GAO/NSIAD-98-58
Military Recruiting
(703189)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
DEP - delayed entry program
DOD - Department of Defense
GAO - General Accounting Office
MEPS - military entrance processing station
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-278680
January 30, 1998
The Honorable Dirk Kempthorne
Chairman
The Honorable Max Cleland
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Personnel
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
This report responds to the request of the Chairman and the former
Ranking Minority Member that we review the recruiter incentive
systems that the military services use to optimize the performance of
military recruiters and ensure that only fully qualified applicants
are enlisted. We reviewed the services' recruiting processes to (1)
screen, select, and train recruiters; (2) screen, select, and prepare
recruits for basic training; and (3) measure and reward recruiter
performance. Specifically, we identified practices in each service
that enhance recruiter performance and retention of recruits and
could be expanded to other services.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense,
the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force and the Commandant of the
Marine Corps. We will also make copies available to others upon
request.
Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix IV.
Mark E. Gebicke
Director, Military Operations and
Capabilities Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0
PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
Through extensive recruiting efforts, the military services send more
than 167,000 men and women each year to basic training. However,
about one-third of the enlisted personnel recruited since fiscal year
1987 left the military before completing their initial service
obligations. In response to concerns of the Chairman and former
Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Personnel, Senate Committee
on Armed Services, about this attrition and the cost of recruiting
and training personnel who do not complete their initial military
obligations, GAO reviewed the services' recruiting processes to (1)
screen, select, and train recruiters; (2) screen, select, and prepare
recruits for basic training; and (3) measure and reward recruiter
performance. Specifically, GAO identified practices in each service
that enhance recruiter performance and recruit retention and could be
expanded to other services.
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
Recruiting and retaining well-qualified military personnel is among
the goals included in the Department of Defense's (DOD) strategic
plan, as required by the Government Performance and Results Act of
1993.\1 DOD has approximately 12,000 recruiters at 5,500 recruiting
stations in the United States and overseas who are responsible for
selling potential recruits on the benefits of military service. The
Air Force is the only service that has an all-volunteer recruiter
force. Each of the services has its own process for selecting,
training, and rewarding its recruiters, who are generally assigned
monthly goals of people to enlist to help meet their services' annual
recruiting missions.
Recruiters prescreen applicants for military service using
established criteria. Those applicants who pass this initial
screening are sent to
1 of 65 military entrance processing stations located throughout the
United States. At these stations, applicants take a battery of tests
and receive a medical examination. Applicants who are selected for
service sign an enlistment contract and enter the delayed entry
program, in an unpaid status, for up to 1 year. Recruits have time
while in this program to prepare mentally and physically for basic
training. Recruiters are responsible for managing the delayed entry
program by providing recruits with information and instruction that
will help them to transition from civilian to military life.
Between fiscal years 1987 and 1996, DOD sent approximately 2.2
million recruits to basic training. However, over 700,000 of those
recruits failed to complete their initial service obligations, with
about 200,000 failing to complete even 90 days of service. In
addition, recent service data show that between 13 and 21 percent of
recruits in the delayed entry program dropped out of the military
even before leaving for basic training. Appendix I contains DOD and
service information related to the costs of recruiting and training
new servicemembers and our analysis of the difficulties associated
with estimating the costs of attrition.
--------------------
\1 This act requires all federal agencies to develop strategic plans
that define the agency's mission, set goals, and link activities and
resources to those goals.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
DOD could enhance the success of its recruiters if the services
strengthened key aspects of their systems for selecting and training
recruiters. Only the Air Force requires personnel experienced in
recruiting to interview candidates for recruiting positions and uses
selection tests to screen interviewees for recruiting duty. While
recruiters from each service receive practical training to improve
their ability to recruit and enlist personnel, Marine Corps and Navy
training also emphasize the importance of retaining recruits once
enlisted and require recruiters to focus on retention as well as
recruiting.
The services have taken steps to improve their delayed entry
programs, such as increasing the amount of contact between recruiters
and recruits. Although all the services give recruits in the delayed
entry programs access to their physical fitness facilities and
encourage the recruits to become or stay physically fit, only the
Marine Corps conducts regular physical training for recruits who are
waiting to go to basic training. Although recruits who are
physically fit are more likely to complete basic training, only the
Marine Corps requires all recruits to take a physical fitness test
before reporting to basic training.
Achieving monthly goals has been the key measure of recruiter
performance. Only the Marine Corps and the Navy consider retention
in measuring and rewarding recruiter performance. Specifically, they
consider the number of recruits completing basic training when
evaluating the success of recruiters. The Army and the Air Force
consider primarily the number of recruits enlisted or the number
reporting to basic training.
DOD's 1996 survey of service recruiters showed that the number of
hours that recruiters work reached its highest point since 1989.
Despite this effort, less than one-half of the recruiters achieved
their goals in 9 or more months of a 12-month period. The recruiters
GAO interviewed were concerned about the difficulties they face in
meeting monthly goals and the long hours they must devote to their
jobs. Establishing quarterly floating goals could ease the burden on
recruiters and still provide an incentive to meet recruitment goals.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
IMPROVED RECRUITER
SELECTION, SCREENING, AND
TRAINING COULD ENHANCE
RECRUITER SUCCESS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1
The services designate personnel to screen and select recruiters. In
general, these personnel follow various processes, including
conducting interviews and checking the medical and personnel records
of potential recruiters. Factors that may disqualify a person for
recruiting duty include average or low performance marks; recent
alcohol or drug use; and financial, health, and legal problems. The
Air Force has the most extensive screening program, relying heavily
on a team of experienced, senior recruiters to interview candidates.
In contrast, many Army and Marine recruiting candidates are
interviewed by personnel in their current chain of command who may
not have recruiting experience. The Navy is beginning to change its
recruiter selection procedures to more closely resemble those of the
Air Force.
During interviews of prospective candidates for recruiting duty, Air
Force recruiters evaluate the potential of candidates to be
successful recruiters, including the ability to communicate
effectively. In fact, the Air Force recently began using a screening
test to assess a candidate's personality. The Army, the Marine
Corps, and the Navy tend to focus on a candidate's past performance
in non-recruiting positions. However, the Navy is planning to test
the use of an instrument that is similar to the Air Force test.
All of the services' recruiter school curriculums emphasize the
importance of recruiting well-qualified personnel. However, training
for Marine Corps and Navy recruiters also address attrition problems
and emphasize the importance of the recruiters' role in retaining
recruits after basic training. The Marine Corps also takes advantage
of the fact that its recruiter school is colocated with one of its
basic training locations. Future recruiters interact with drill
instructors and recruits at basic training to gain insight on ways to
motivate recruits in the delayed entry program. Navy recruiters have
the same interaction but not until after they have been in the
recruiting field for a period of time.
INCREASING EMPHASIS ON
PHYSICAL FITNESS COULD HELP
REDUCE EARLY ATTRITION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2
The delayed entry program provides time for recruits to prepare
mentally and physically for basic training. To strengthen the
recruits' commitment to serve while in this program, the services
have made specific efforts to provide better information, training,
and benefits to the recruits. For example, all of the services
require recruiters to have regular contact with recruits in the
program and give recruits access to their physical fitness centers.
The Army also gives its recruits the opportunity to earn points
toward future promotions by working on correspondence courses.
Recruits who cannot pass physical fitness tests can be discharged
from the services, and service officials acknowledged that poor
physical condition among recruits is often a contributing factor in
early attrition. Although all of the services encourage recruits in
the delayed entry program to maintain or achieve a specific level of
physical fitness before leaving for basic training, only the Marine
Corps conducts regular physical training and fitness tests.
Specifically, Marine recruits usually take a physical fitness test
within the first 30 days after entering the program and are required
to take the test within 30 days of beginning basic training. A study
of almost 14,500 Marines who attended basic training in fiscal year
1994 found that recruits who failed the initial physical fitness test
had an attrition rate of 24.1 percent, whereas those who passed had
an attrition rate of 13.4 percent.
INCLUDING ATTRITION AS A
FACTOR IN MEASURING
RECRUITER SUCCESS COULD
INCREASE THE FOCUS ON DOD'S
RETENTION GOAL
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3
Two of the services include attrition as a factor in measuring and
rewarding recruiter performance. Specifically, the Marine Corps ties
recruiter success and awards to basic training graduation rates, and
the Navy began moving in that direction in fiscal year 1996.
However, the Army and the Air Force, which annually bring in almost
55 percent of DOD's recruits, generally reward recruiters based on
the number of recruits who are enlisted or who report to basic
training rather than the number who graduate and become productive
servicemembers. According to DOD's strategic plan, which is required
under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, one of
DOD's goals is not only to recruit well-qualified personnel but also
to retain them.
MONTHLY GOALS MAY RESTRICT
RECRUITERS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.4
Recruiters in all of the services generally work long hours, take
very little leave, and are under almost constant pressure until they
achieve their assigned monthly goals. Successful recruiters are
often required to make up for recruiters who do not perform well. A
1996 DOD survey indicated that recruiter performance is at an
all-time low, even though the number of working hours increased to
the highest point since 1989. For example, only 42 percent of the
services' recruiters met assigned goals for 9 or more months in the
previous 12-month period.
The current system of monthly goals requires each recruiter to
typically recruit two to three people each month. Recruiters who
achieve double their monthly goal are usually assigned the same or
higher goals in the next month and are not given credit toward that
month's goal. Recruiters who miss their goal in one month are
concerned about their performance rating even if they meet or exceed
their annual goals. Recruiters GAO interviewed believed that monthly
goals were restrictive and that the hours they worked were long. A
system of quarterly floating goals could provide recruiters more
flexibility in their working hours and leave plans and still provide
the checks and incentives needed to encourage productivity.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
To enhance the performance of recruiters and the retention of
recruits, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the
services to
-- use experienced field recruiters to interview in person all
potential recruiters and use communication skills as a key
recruiter selection criterion;
-- develop or procure personality screening tests that can aid in
the selection of recruiters;
-- emphasize the recruiters' role in reducing attrition in their
recruiter training curriculums and provide opportunities for
recruiter trainees to gain insight into problems encountered in
basic training by having (1) drill instructors meet with
students at the recruiter schools and (2) recruiter students
meet with separating recruits and those who are being held back
due to poor physical conditioning;
-- conduct physical fitness tests before recruits report to basic
training and encourage the services to incorporate more
structured physical fitness training for recruits into their
delayed entry programs;
-- link recruiter awards more closely to recruits' successful
completion of basic training; and
-- encourage the use of quarterly floating goals as an alternative
to the services current systems of monthly goals.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND GAO'S
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
In commenting on a draft of GAO's report, DOD concurred with GAO's
recommendations to develop or procure personality screening tests to
aid in the selection of recruiters, establish better communication
between the recruiting force and basic training drill instructors,
conduct physical fitness tests on recruits before they report to
basic training and encourage the services to incorporate more
structured physical fitness training into their delayed entry
programs, and link recruiter awards more closely to recruits'
successful completion of basic training.
DOD partially concurred with GAO's recommendation to use experienced
field recruiters to personally interview all potential recruiters.
Although DOD stated that GAO's recommendation is valid, where
possible, it also stated that this recommendation is not feasible in
the Army due to the large number of men and women who are selected
annually for recruiting duty and to the geographic diversity of their
assignments. While it may be difficult for the Army to use field
recruiters to interview 100 percent of its prospective recruiters,
GAO continues to believe that senior, experienced recruiters have a
better understanding than operational commanders about what is
required in recruiting duty and, therefore, encourages the Army to
place a greater emphasis on the use of recruiter selection teams or
explore other alternatives that would produce similar results.
DOD also partially concurred with our recommendation to encourage the
use of quarterly floating goals as an alternative to the services'
current systems of monthly goals. DOD's primary concern with this
recommendation is that floating quarterly goals would reduce the
services' ability to make corrections to recruiting difficulties
before they become unmanageable. However, it should be noted that
this proposal is for floating, rather than static, quarterly goals.
Floating goals would still provide recruiting commands with the
ability to identify recruiting shortfalls in the first month that
they occur and control the flow of new recruits into the system on a
monthly basis.
DOD's comments appear in their entirety in appendix III and are
discussed in chapters 2, 3, and 4.
INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1
To ensure that the Department of Defense (DOD) has an adequate number
of military personnel in place to meet U.S. national security
objectives, the services continuously conduct recruiting efforts.
The four services have nearly 12,000 recruiters at 5,500 recruiting
stations throughout the United States and overseas. Each of the
services has its own process for selecting, training, and rewarding
its recruiters. The Air Force is the only service with a recruiter
force comprised entirely of volunteers. Recruiters are generally
assigned monthly goals of the number of people to enlist to help meet
their services' annual recruiting goals.
Recruiters are responsible for selling the benefits of military
service to various audiences, including possible recruits, their
parents, and teachers, and then prescreening applicants, according to
established criteria, to determine whether the applicants should
continue through the enlistment process. Those who pass the
prescreening process are sent to
1 of 65 military entrance processing stations (MEPS) located
throughout the United States. At a MEPS, applicants take a battery
of tests and receive a medical examination to determine their
eligibility for military service. Applicants who qualify for service
sign their first contract, take their first enlistment oath as
members of the Individual Ready Reserve, and enter the delayed entry
program (DEP), in an unpaid status, for up to 1 year while awaiting
assignment to basic training. While in the DEP, recruits have time
to prepare mentally and physically for basic training. Recruiters
are responsible for maintaining contact with recruits in the DEP and
providing them with information and instruction that will help them
successfully move from civilian to military life.
Each service has its own basic training program, and the duration of
the four programs ranges from 6 to 12 weeks. Before leaving for
basic training, recruits return to the MEPS for final processing. At
that time, the recruits undergo another medical examination, sign
their second contract, and take their second enlistment oath as
active duty servicemembers. After basic training, most recruits
attend technical training for a few weeks to more than 1 year before
reporting to their first assignment. Most initial enlistments last 4
years, including the time spent in training.
RECRUITING AND RETENTION IS A
KEY DOD GOAL
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1
The services recruit more than 167,000 men and women each year.
Between fiscal years 1987 and 1996, DOD sent almost 2.2 million
first-time recruits to basic training, which enabled all four
services to meet or exceed their annual recruiting goals during that
time. The Army enlisted about 38 percent of these recruits, the Navy
31 percent, the Air Force 16 percent, and the Marine Corps 15
percent. The Marine Corps replaces the greatest portion of its
enlisted forces each year--typically close to 20 percent. The Air
Force has the smallest yearly personnel changes; new recruits
generally constitute less than 10 percent of its total enlisted
force. While the number of new enlistees generally declined between
1987 and 1996 due to the drawdown of forces,\1 the percentage of
traditional high school diploma graduates remained fairly steady at
about 94 percent.
About one-third of the personnel recruited since fiscal year 1987, or
more than 700,000 personnel, left military service after reporting to
basic training but before completing their initial service
obligations. Over this same period, approximately 9 percent, or
about 200,000 personnel, left within the first 90 days of service.\2
In addition, recent service data show that between 13 and 21 percent
of recruits in the DEP dropped out of the military even before they
left for basic training. These high attrition rates mean that
recruiters must now enlist two people to fill one service obligation.
Recruiting and retaining well-qualified military personnel is among
the goals included in DOD's strategic plan required under the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-62, Aug.
3, 1993). The act was designed to create a new results-oriented
federal management and decision-making approach that requires
agencies to clearly define their missions, set goals, and link
activities and resources to those goals. The act required that
federal agencies' strategic plans be developed no later than
September 30, 1997, for at least a 5-year period.
--------------------
\1 The general downward trend reversed in fiscal year 1996, largely
as a result of increased Army accessions.
\2 Our report, Military Attrition: DOD Could Save Millions by Better
Screening Enlisted Personnel (GAO/NSIAD-97-39, Jan. 6, 1997),
addressed attrition occurring within the first 6 months of service.
We are currently conducting another assignment that addresses
attrition occurring after 6 months but before the end of an
enlistment contract.
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2
In response to concerns of the Chairman and former Ranking Minority
Member, Subcommittee on Personnel, Senate Committee on Armed
Services, about the cost of recruiting and training personnel who do
not complete their initial military obligations, we reviewed the
services' recruiting efforts to (1) screen, select, and train
recruiters; (2) screen, select, and prepare recruits for basic
training; and (3) measure and reward recruiter performance.
Specifically, we identified practices in each service that enhance
recruiter performance and recruit retention and could be expanded to
other services. We are also providing DOD and service information
related to the costs of recruiting and training new servicemembers
and our analysis of the difficulties associated with estimating the
costs of attrition (see app. I).
We limited the scope of our review to the role that recruiters might
play in reducing attrition. We recognize that many other factors can
contribute to attrition, such as medical, security, or other
screenings performed by individuals or agencies outside the
recruiting commands. However, we did not examine the adequacy of
these factors. Also, we did not evaluate the role of basic training
policies and personnel in reducing attrition.
To address these objectives, we met with representatives from service
recruiting commands, recruiter teams, and service recruiter schools.
We also reviewed applicable instructions, regulations, policy
statements, and recruiter school curriculums and observed 50
recruiter screening interviews.
In addition, we discussed selection and training procedures with 35
experienced recruiters at various U.S. locations. We also spoke
with the recruiters about the role they play in screening applicants
for enlistment and preparing them for basic training. Finally, the
recruiters provided us with their perspectives of the services'
recruiter award and incentive systems. The 35 recruiters did not
constitute a representative sample of all recruiters, but they did
provide broad perspectives based on more than 280 years of collective
recruiting experience in 21 different states. To corroborate their
statements, we compared the information they provided us with the
results of DOD's 1996 recruiter survey, which was based on a
representative sample of recruiters.
We also reviewed past accession and attrition studies done by audit
agencies and private firms and collected and analyzed accession and
attrition data from each of the services and the Defense Manpower
Data Center to determine recruiting and retention trends.
Although we did not extensively test the reliability of the Center's
data base, we did check computations of attrition percentages from
accession and attrition statistics. We also compared Center data
with information in the services' databases. Because personnel
numbers can change daily and the service data we used was not
compiled on the same day as the Center's data, we did not attempt to
match these numbers. However, our data analysis revealed the same
trends between service-generated data and Center data, and we did not
find any large discrepancies between the databases. Finally, we
discussed our data with recruiting command officials to ensure that
no large discrepancies existed.
We performed our work at the following locations:
-- Directorate for Accession Policy, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense, Force Management Policy, Washington, D.C.;
-- Army Recruiting Command, Fort Knox, Kentucky;
-- Army Recruiting and Retention School, Fort Jackson, South
Carolina;
-- Air Force Recruiting Service, Randolph Air Force Base, San
Antonio, Texas;
-- Air Force Technical Training School, Recruiter Training Flight,
Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas;
-- Navy Recruiting Command, Arlington, Virginia;
-- Naval Recruiter School, Pensacola, Florida;
-- Marine Corps Recruiting Command, Arlington, Virginia; and
-- Marine Corps Recruiter School, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San
Diego, California.
We conducted our review between January and December 1997 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
ENHANCED RECRUITER SELECTION AND
TRAINING COULD IMPROVE THE
RECRUITING PROCESS
============================================================ Chapter 2
The services use a variety of screening methods, such as reviewing
annual performance appraisals and obtaining commanding officer
recommendations, to ensure that personnel who are assigned to
recruiting duty are chosen from among the best noncommissioned
officers in their respective career fields. However, not all of
these screening methods ensure that personnel selected for recruiting
duty possess the communication and interpersonal skills necessary to
be successful recruiters. The Air Force is the only service that
critically evaluates communication skills as part of the recruiter
screening process. It is also the only service that uses a
personality assessment test during its recruiter screening.
Personnel selected for recruiting duty in all of the services receive
practical training in communication skills, sales techniques, and
enlistment and paperwork requirements. This training supports a
direct link between recruiter daily performance and DOD's strategic
goal of recruiting well-qualified military personnel. However, only
the Marine Corps and the Navy recruiter schools have curriculums that
are directly linked with DOD's goal of retaining these personnel.
SERVICES' RECRUITER SELECTION
STANDARDS DO NOT NECESSARILY
IDENTIFY THE PEOPLE MOST LIKELY
TO SUCCEED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1
Because recruiters represent the military services in civilian
communities, they must meet high selection standards. These
standards ensure that recruiters are selected from among the best
noncommissioned officers in the military, but they do not necessarily
identify those who possess or can develop the communication and
interpersonal skills needed to become successful recruiters. Only
the Air Force's screening process critically evaluates
servicemembers' communication skills and uses assessment tests to
predict the likelihood of their success as recruiters.
COMMUNICATION SKILLS ARE NOT
EMPHASIZED IN THE SCREENING
PROCESSES OF ALL SERVICES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.1
Although actual screening standards vary by service, the recruiting
commands generally use interviews and medical and personnel records
to screen and select personnel for recruiting duty. The services
generally draw their recruiters from noncommissioned officers in
paygrades E-5 through E-7. During the screening process, the
services use different but measurable criteria to evaluate a
prospective recruiter's education, health, moral character, emotional
and financial stability, personal appearance, and job performance.
Failure to meet any of these standards can disqualify a person from
recruiting duty. The services also have minimum and maximum pay
grade and time-in-service requirements, and those selected for
recruiting duty are generally required to reenlist if they do not
have at least 3 years remaining on their current enlistment.
Finally, personnel with performance marks below a certain level are
not eligible for recruiting duty. For example, Navy regulations
disqualify any servicemember who has received an overall evaluation
below 3.8 or individual marks below 3.6 (on a 4.0 rating scale)
during the previous 3 years.
Successful recruiters must be able to effectively communicate with a
variety of people in the civilian community and convince them of the
benefits of military service. These people include not only
potential recruits but also parents, teachers, guidance counselors,
coaches, school administrators, and others who may influence
potential recruits. However, we found that only the Air Force's
screening process has measurable criteria to evaluate the
communication and interpersonal skills of prospective recruiters. It
is important to measure these skills because noncommissioned officers
can excel in many military job specialties without possessing the
ability to effectively interact with the general civilian population.
The Air Force is the only service to require that recruiting command
officials interview all prospective recruiters. Most Air Force
interviews (about 70 percent) are conducted by a team of experienced
recruiters who travel to U.S. and overseas bases. The team makes
general presentations about recruiting duty and then conducts
interviews with individuals who are interested in becoming
recruiters. According to a team member, interviews generally last
between 30 and 45 minutes, and spouses are required to be present. A
prospective recruiter's ability to communicate with the team is a key
factor in determining whether the person will be selected.
Prospective recruiters who lack communications skills can be rejected
even if they meet all the pay grade, time-in-service, legal,
financial, appearance, and performance requirements. The remaining
interviews (30 percent) are for personnel who were not available or
interested in recruiting at the time of the recruiter team's visit.
These candidates are interviewed by a high-level recruiting command
official in their geographic area.
The Marine Corps also has a recruiter screening team that travels to
bases to present an overview of recruiting duty and interview people
who have volunteered for recruiting duty or have been identified by
the recruiting command as possible recruiters. However, a
prospective recruiter's ability to communicate with the screening
team is not critically evaluated during these screening interviews,
which typically last 5 to 10 minutes. Spouses are encouraged, but
not required, to attend the interviews. Most Marines recruiters are
screened by the team, but those who are unable to attend an interview
with the screening team can be selected for recruiting duty based on
a check of their records and an interview with their commanding
officer. Marines who are selected for recruiting duty undergo a
second, more in-depth screening interview when they arrive at the
Marine Corps recruiter school in San Diego.
The Army's recruiter team interviews a much smaller percentage of the
soldiers who have volunteered or are identified as prospective
recruiters than the Air Force and the Marine Corps recruiter
selection teams. Prospective Army recruiters can be interviewed by
high-level officials within their chain of command who may, but most
likely do not, have recruiting experience. These officials use a
general checklist in deciding whether to recommend a person for
recruiting duty. The checklist has measurable criteria for some
items. For example, prospective recruiters must be a sergeant, a
staff sergeant, or a sergeant first class and must have between 4 and
14 years time in service. They must also be high school graduates or
have 1 year of college and a high school equivalency degree, and they
cannot have been convicted of a crime by a civilian court or military
court-martial. However, the checklist does not have any measurable
standards regarding the prospective recruiters' communication or
interpersonal skills.
Volunteers and other prospective Navy recruiters are interviewed by
their commanding officers to determine whether they meet established
standards. The commanding officers do not evaluate the prospective
recruiters' ability to communicate effectively in determining whether
to endorse a person for recruiting duty. Navy officials told us that
they think recruiting command personnel are in a better position to
evaluate a person's chances of being a successful recruiter.
Therefore, the Navy is beginning to change its recruiter selection
procedures to more closely resemble those of the Air Force. These
officials said that the Navy hopes to have a traveling recruiter
selection team in place in the near future. In its response to a
draft of this report, DOD stated that the Navy has, in fact,
assembled a recruiting team consisting of four career recruiters who
will be augmented by field recruiters.
AIR FORCE USES A PERSONALITY
TEST TO SCREEN PROSPECTIVE
RECRUITERS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.2
In 1996, noting the results of studies of private salespeople,\1 the
Air Force began investigating the possibility of using a personality
assessment test in screening potential recruiters. After
administering a commercially developed biographical screening test to
1,171 recruiters, the Air Force found that recruiters with certain
traits were much more likely to succeed than recruiters who lacked
those traits. These traits, in order of importance, were
assertiveness, empathy, self-regard (awareness of strengths and
weaknesses), problem-solving ability, happiness and optimism,
interpersonal relations, emotional self-awareness (ability to
recognize one's feelings), and reality testing (ability to
distinguish between what you see and what is). The study also found
that high performers worked the least number of hours and reported
higher marital satisfaction and that neither the recruiter's
geographic region nor zone was a factor in predicting recruiter
success. In August 1997, the Air Force purchased the 133-question
biographical screening test for less than the cost of putting one
recruiter in the field. In November 1997, the Air Force's recruiter
screening team began administering this test to prospective
recruiters.
All of the services use the armed services vocational aptitude
battery of tests to measure servicemembers' aptitude for initial job
placement, yet none of the services uses this battery of tests to
evaluate a person's aptitude for recruiting. In its response to a
draft of this report, DOD stated that the Navy is planning to test
the use of an instrument that is similar to the Air Force test.
--------------------
\1 Personality tests allow private firms to predict an applicant's
potential to succeed before investing resources in hiring and
training the individual. Although there are significant differences
between military recruiters and civilian salespeople, both
professions require people with excellent communication skills who
are capable of effectively interacting with the general public.
RECRUITER SCREENING
CONTINUES DURING THE
TRAINING PROCESS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.3
Personnel selected for recruiting duty report to training sites where
their suitability for recruiting duty continues to be evaluated. To
become fully qualified, all recruiters undergo formal classroom
training that lasts between 5 and 7 weeks and on-the-job training
that can last up to 1 year. The Air Force and the Marine Corps are
not only more selective than the other two services in the recruiters
they send to school but also in the recruiters they allow to graduate
from school. The Air Force recruiter school has an attrition rate of
17 percent, despite having all volunteer recruiters who have passed
the most detailed pretraining screening process of the four services.
Attrition rates at the Marine Corps recruiter school typically run
between 14 and 16 percent. The Navy recruiter school has an
attrition rate of approximately 6 percent, and the Army recruiter
school attrition rate was under 5 percent during fiscal year 1997.
AIR FORCE RECRUITERS HAVE
THE HIGHEST SUCCESS RATES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.4
Air Force recruiters are more than twice as productive as recruiters
from the other services. On average, each Air Force recruiter sends
at least
32 recruits to basic training each year, whereas recruiters for the
other services send between 12 and 16 recruits to basic training
annually. Officials from all the services acknowledged that part of
this difference is due to the fact that the Air Force is "the service
of choice," receiving the most walk-in applicants and having the
lowest turnover rate of the services. However, the Commanding
General of the Air Force Recruiting Service attributes a large part
of this success to the Air Force's intensive recruiter screening
process. Also, Air Force recruiters are the most successful in terms
of meeting their assigned goals. Despite having the highest
individual recruiting goals, DOD's 1996 recruiter survey showed that
62 percent of Air Force recruiters reported making their assigned
monthly goals 9 or more times during the previous year, compared with
a DOD average of 42 percent.
Lower turnover rates may also contribute to the success rate of Air
Force recruiters. Air Force recruiters typically serve 4-year tours,
whereas recruiters in the other services normally serve 3-year tours.
Various studies have found that recruiter productivity increases
after an initial learning period in the field, suggesting that the
positive effects of experience can be realized as early as the
4-month point or as late as the 2-year point. Regardless of the
length of the learning curve, the Air Force achieves some efficiency
from the increased experience and lower turnover rates of its
recruiters.
MOST RECRUITER TRAINING DOES
NOT EMPHASIZE COMMUNICATION
WITH BASIC TRAINING PERSONNEL
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2
The services' recruiter schools support a direct link between
recruiter daily performance and DOD's strategic goal to recruit
well-qualified military personnel. The curriculums consist of
instruction, practical exercises, and examinations in communication
and sales techniques as well as enlistment and paperwork
requirements. However, only the Marine Corps recruiter school spends
a significant amount of time teaching recruiters about preventing
attrition, thus supporting DOD's strategic goal to retain
well-qualified personnel.
MARINE CORPS EMPHASIZES
COMMUNICATION AND LEADERSHIP
AS WAYS TO REDUCE ATTRITION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.1
The Marine Corps recruiter school, located at the Marine Corps
Recruit Depot in San Diego, supports DOD's strategic retention goal
by teaching recruiters that they have an important role in reducing
attrition that occurs before the end of the first enlistment
contract. Communication and leadership are viewed as the keys to
reducing attrition. The curriculum devotes more than a full week,
out of 7, to these issues: 2-1/2 days to communication and basic
training issues and 3-1/2 days to leadership training. Students at
recruiter training discuss attrition issues with basic training drill
instructors, recruits who are separating from basic training, and
recruits who are being held back in basic training because they
cannot meet the physical fitness requirements. Marine Corps
officials believe this interaction with drill instructors helps to
open the lines of communication between drill instructors and
recruiters after the recruiters graduate. The interaction with
recruits helps the recruiters to realize that they not only need to
recruit people but that they also need to prepare them for basic
training and maintain contact with them while they are at basic
training.
A large portion of the Marine Corps school's leadership training
focuses on the effect that DEP leadership can have on reducing
attrition. One lesson begins with a classroom demonstration in which
all of the students are initially standing. Then, about 19 percent
of the students are told to sit down to represent DEP discharges.
Next, another 12 percent are instructed to sit down to represent
basic training attrition. Finally, another 25 percent of the class
is told to sit down to represent the rest of the first-term
attrition. This lesson vividly illustrates to the students that less
than one of every two recruits actually completes the first full term
of obligated service. Afterward, the instructor explains that
recruiters have to make up every one of the discharges and emphasizes
the four goals of the Marine Corps' national DEP: to reduce DEP
attrition, reduce basic training attrition, positively impact other
first-term attrition, and deliver better motivated Marines to the
Fleet Marine Force. Marine Corps recruiters are taught that they
must sell their enlistees on the features and benefits of DEP,\2 just
as they sold them initially on the Marine Corps.
All Marine Corps recruiters are required to write to their recruits
and the recruits' families while the recruits are in basic training.
One Marine Corps recruiter told us that he was required to send three
letters to each recruit in basic training and that none of the
letters was allowed to be a form letter. According to Marine Corps
recruiters, drill instructors often call recruiters to warn them if
one of their recruits is having trouble at basic training. To
prevent attrition, the recruiters can then talk to their recruits on
the telephone and remind them of the reasons that they joined the
Marine Corps. The recruiters said basic training attrition would
probably be much higher if they were not given early warnings of
trouble and allowed to resell their recruits on the benefits of
serving in the Marine Corps. According to a Marine Corps document,
the percentage of recruit training graduates is indicative of the
efforts that have taken place from contract to accession. It
demonstrates quality prospecting and screening, sound sales
practices, and an effective DEP.
--------------------
\2 Recruits who participate in DEP activities are better prepared for
basic training, as evidenced by their lower attrition rates. In
addition, recruits can get to know other recruits in the DEP, and can
even be promoted if they supply qualified referrals who enlist in the
Marine Corps.
OTHER SERVICE CURRICULUMS DO
NOT INCLUDE INTERACTIONS
WITH DRILL INSTRUCTORS AND
RECRUITS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.2
Although the Army's recruiter school is located at Fort Jackson,
South Carolina, which is also the site of one of its basic training
programs, the curriculum does not include any interaction between
future recruiters and recruits or drill instructors at basic
training. Likewise, the Air Force's recruiter school is colocated
with its basic training squadrons at Lackland Air Force Base in San
Antonio, Texas. However, the curriculum does not include discussions
between the students and drill instructors or new recruits, except
during a 1-hour tour of the basic training facilities. Students at
the Navy's recruiter school do not have any interaction with drill
instructors or recruits because the recruiter school is located in
Florida and the basic training site is in Illinois. However, the
Navy recently began a 4-day refresher training course for its
recruiters who have been in the field between 12 and 18 months. The
refresher course is held at the basic training site in Illinois, and
recruiters spend about one-half of their time observing and
interacting with recruits and their families, drill instructors, and
other training command personnel at basic training and graduation
events. After all current recruiters have attended this training,
the Navy plans to send new recruiters to the training after they have
been in the field about 6 to 8 months.
The Army, the Navy, and the Air Force do not have separate leadership
modules in their recruiter school curriculums. Although they all
include instruction in DEP management as part of their recruiter
curriculums, this training is less extensive than the Marine Corps'
leadership training, lasting only 3 to 9 hours. In addition, these
services do not emphasize the relationship between effective DEP
management and DOD's strategic retention goal.
Army, Navy, and Air Force recruiters we spoke with said that drill
instructors hardly ever call them to give an early warning that a
recruit is having difficulties at basic training. The recruiters
said they usually learn that a recruit is having problems only
through the recruit's family or when they see the recruit back in
town after dropping out of basic training. In addition, some Air
Force recruiters told us that they were prohibited from writing
letters to recruits in basic training due to concerns that some
recruits would receive more mail from their recruiters than others.
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3
By carefully selecting recruiters based on a demonstrated aptitude
for recruiting, as well as excellent performance in another military
specialty, the services should be able to increase the effectiveness
of their recruiters. In addition, by training these recruiters to
lead and motivate recruits in the DEP and requiring the recruiters to
keep in touch with their recruits at basic training, the services
could help to increase retention and the efficiency of their
recruiting commands.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4
For the services to meet DOD's strategic goal of recruiting and
retaining well-qualified military personnel, optimize recruiting
command efficiency by identifying personnel who are likely to succeed
as recruiters, and increase recruits' chances of graduating from
basic training, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense instruct
the services to
-- use experienced field recruiters to personally interview all
prospective recruiters and evaluate their potential to
effectively communicate with applicants, parents, teachers, and
others in the civilian community;
-- jointly explore the feasibility of developing or procuring
assessment tests that can aid in the selection of recruiters;
and
-- instruct officials at the service recruiting schools to
emphasize the retention portion of DOD's long-term strategic
goal by having drill instructors meet with students at the
schools and having the recruiters in training meet with
separating recruits and those being held back due to poor
physical conditioning. These practices could establish an
ongoing dialogue between recruiters and drill instructors and
enhance understanding of problems that lead to early attrition.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to use experienced
field recruiters to interview all prospective recruiters. In its
response, DOD agreed that the selection and training of the recruiter
force is of vital importance and that our recommendation to use
experienced recruiters to personally interview prospective recruiters
is valid, where possible. However, DOD also stated that this
recommendation is not economically feasible in the Army due to the
large number of men and women who are selected annually for
recruiting duty and to the geographic diversity of their assignments.
While it may be difficult for the Army to use field recruiters to
interview 100 percent of its prospective recruiters, we continue to
believe that senior, experienced recruiters have a better
understanding than operational commanders about what is required in
recruiting duty. Therefore, we encourage the Army to place a greater
emphasis on the use of recruiter selection teams or explore other
alternatives that would produce similar results. In the case of the
Marine Corps, DOD did not present any reasons to suggest that this
service could not implement this recommendation. Instead, DOD
referred to the additional screening that the Marine Corps conducts
at its recruiter school and the Marine Corps' belief that it does not
place any recruiters on the street who are not properly screened. We
discussed this additional screening and cited the relatively high
attrition rate that this school experiences. However, we also
presented some limitations in the Marine Corps' current screening
process and believe, therefore, that this service would also benefit
from this recommendation. As previously stated in this report and in
DOD's comments, the Air Force already relies on recruiters, and the
Navy is changing its recruiter selection procedures to more closely
resemble those of the Air Force.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to jointly explore the
feasibility of developing or procuring assessment tests that can aid
in the selection of recruiters. In its response, DOD said that the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management
Policy will work with the services to evaluate various assessment
tests.
DOD also concurred with our recommendation to establish better
communication between the recruiting force and basic training drill
instructors, adding that this recommendation is sound and viable. In
its response, DOD stated that the Army is reviewing the recruiter
school curriculum and will establish a linkage between the recruiter
school and the recruiter liaison at the basic training site at Fort
Jackson and that the Air Force has incorporated an in-depth tour of
basic training into its recruiting school's curriculum. DOD also
cited the Navy's refresher training for new recruiters, where
recruiters have the opportunity to meet and interview recruits during
the last week of basic training.
ADDITIONAL PHYSICAL FITNESS
PREPARATION
CAN ENHANCE RECRUIT RETENTION
============================================================ Chapter 3
Recruiters use standard criteria in screening applicants for military
service, but physical fitness is not among the criteria. Thus, the
services have no assurance that recruits will be able to pass their
physical fitness tests in basic training. To help prepare recruits
for basic training and reduce early attrition, the services are now
encouraging recruits to maintain or improve their physical fitness
while in the DEP. However, only the Marines Corps conducts regular
physical fitness training for its recruits in the DEP and requires
them to take a physical fitness test before reporting to basic
training. The Marine Corps has found that attrition is lower among
those who pass this test.
RECRUITERS CONSIDER STANDARD
CRITERIA IN SCREENING RECRUITS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1
Recruiters are only one part of the enlistment process. They play an
important role in the process by applying criteria established by
Congress, DOD, and the individual services during initial screening
interviews to identify applicants who are preliminarily qualified for
enlistment. However, physical fitness is not among the criteria.
Also, recruits may request a waiver if they do not meet one or more
of the established criteria.
RECRUITERS PLAY AN IMPORTANT
ROLE IN THE ENLISTMENT
PROCESS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.1
Service personnel in several different organizations play a role in
screening and selecting candidates for military service. The
accuracy and thoroughness of the recruiter in screening for
established criteria during the initial interview are critical to the
efficiency of the entire recruit selection process. Failure to
screen for all of the established criteria can allow unqualified
candidates to continue needlessly through the selection process,
wasting time and money on applicants who will likely be disqualified
during further enlistment processing at a MEPS or discharged from
service.
The head of one service's recruiting command told us that recruiters
should be selective in their initial screenings and that it is
appropriate for them to use their judgment in addition to the
established criteria. However, most recruiters we spoke with said
that they do not screen out individuals who meet the established
screening criteria. The recruiters also explained that they
generally did not want to pass judgment on an applicant's suitability
for service because some prior assessments had proven to be wrong.
In addition, the recruiters were concerned that they could receive
congressional inquiries if individuals who met the eligibility
criteria were not selected for service.
STANDARD CRITERIA DO NOT
INCLUDE PHYSICAL FITNESS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.2
Congress and DOD have set minimum standards for two of the primary
screening criteria--possession of a high school diploma and score on
the Armed Forces Qualification Test. DOD guidelines state that a
minimum of 90 percent of recruits who have not previously served in
the military need high school diplomas. The guidelines also state
that at least 60 percent of first-time recruits need to score in the
top three of six mental categories on the qualification test.
Further, Congress has prohibited the selection of recruits from the
bottom test category and limited the number of recruits who can score
in the next lowest category.
DOD and service enlistment standards establish additional criteria
that potential recruits must meet. These criteria, which can vary by
service, include age, citizenship, weight, number of dependents,
health, prior drug or alcohol abuse, and law violations. Potential
recruits also receive a medical examination to determine a certain
level of wellness. However, actual physical fitness is not included
as a criterion, even though service officials acknowledge that poor
physical conditioning among recruits is often a contributing factor
in early attrition. As a result, the services spend thousands of
dollars training recruits without any assurance that they will be
capable of passing their physical fitness tests. Recruits who cannot
pass service physical fitness tests face discharge.
SOME ENLISTMENT CRITERIA MAY
BE WAIVED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.3
Most of the applicants who are enlisted meet all of the services'
enlistment criteria. However, those applicants who do not meet one
or more of these criteria can continue to pursue entrance into the
military by requesting a waiver for each criterion not met.
Recruiters are not required to encourage unqualified prospects to
apply for a waiver. Nevertheless, when applicants wish to pursue a
waiver, recruiters do not have the authority to disapprove this
request and must forward the waiver through their chains of command.
Generally, the farther an applicant is from meeting an established
standard, the higher the waiver approval authority. For example, an
Army applicant convicted of driving under the influence could apply
for a waiver from a recruiting battalion commander. However, a
waiver request for two incidents of driving under the influence would
need to be considered by the Commanding General of the Army
Recruiting Command. The burden is on applicants to prove to the
waiver authorities that they have overcome any disqualifying
condition.
IMPROVED DEP PARTICIPATION CAN
ENHANCE RECRUIT RETENTION
LEVELS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2
To enhance recruit retention levels, the services are improving their
DEPs. The services now encourage recruits to maintain or improve
their physical fitness level so that they will be able to meet the
initial physical conditioning requirements of basic training.
However, only the Marine Corps conducts regular physical fitness
training for its recruits and requires them to take a physical
fitness test while in the DEP. The Marine Corps reports that
attrition is lower among recruits who passed the test.
DEPS ARE BEING IMPROVED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.1
One of the purposes of the DEP is to obtain a recruit's commitment to
serve. The services have recently attempted to strengthen the
commitment of recruits in the DEP by providing them with better
information, training, and benefits. The services believe that
individuals with a strong commitment to serve are less likely to drop
out of the DEP or leave military service before the end of their
first enlistment period.
The Navy and the Marine Corps recognize the positive effect the DEP
can have on retention rates and have established a minimum and
optimum time, respectively, that their recruits should spend in the
DEP. Overall DOD attrition statistics for fiscal years 1987 through
1994 showed that recruits who spent at least 3 months in the DEP had
lower attrition rates than those who spent less time. This
correlation was much stronger for the Marine Corps and the Navy than
it was for the Army and the Air Force.
DEP programs vary by service, but all require their recruiters and
recruits to be in regular contact with each other. Army, Navy, and
Air Force recruiters are responsible for contacting their recruits on
a regular basis. The Marine Corps, on the other hand, tries to
instill responsibility in its recruits by requiring them to contact
their recruiters each week.
Participation in DEP activities is voluntary, but all of the services
strongly encourage recruits to attend monthly DEP meetings to help
them prepare for basic training. Some services also give recruits
basic training material to study before basic training begins. In
addition, Army recruits have the opportunity to earn points toward
future promotions by working on correspondence courses while in the
DEP.
All of the services are also encouraging recruits to maintain or
improve their level of physical fitness while in the DEP. For
example, recruits now have access to their service's physical fitness
centers. However, only the Marine Corps conducts regular physical
training for DEP members and requires all recruits to take a physical
fitness test before leaving for basic training. Other services only
require recruits in a few selected career fields to take physical
fitness tests before basic training. Army and Air Force officials
have expressed concerns about service liability for injuries that
recruits could sustain during DEP physical training. The Navy
addressed this concern by giving recruits access to medical
facilities if they suffer DEP-related injuries. Marine Corps
officials said that there have been minor injuries during DEP
physical training but that none of these injuries have resulted in a
serious claim against the government.
MARINE CORPS HOLDS DEP
RECRUITS TO HIGHER STANDARDS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.2
The Marine Corps generally holds its DEP recruits to higher standards
than the other services. These recruits are told that they must earn
their way to basic training by preparing mentally, psychologically,
and physically. The Commander of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command
stated that failure to participate in DEP training programs is
evidence of a lack of desire and motivation to become a Marine and
could result in discharge.
The Marine Corps implemented changes to its DEP in May 1994, and
physical training is a key component of this program. Recruiters are
encouraged to give recruits an initial physical fitness test within
their first 30 days in the DEP, but a test must be given within 30
days of the date that the recruit is to leave for basic training.
Recruiters also encourage recruits to exceed the test's minimum
requirement before leaving for basic training.
According to the Commander of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command,
recruits who cannot accomplish the minimum standard in the physical
fitness test experience significantly higher attrition rates and are
much more at risk of injury than those who can pass the test.\1
Marine Corps attrition statistics also show a strong correlation
between performance on the test and attrition rates. A study of
almost 14,500 male Marines who attended basic training in fiscal year
1994 found that recruits who failed the initial physical fitness test
had an attrition rate of 24.1 percent, whereas those who passed had
an attrition rate of 13.4 percent. In addition, attrition rates were
only about 11 percent for recruits who far exceeded the minimum test
requirements by doing 10 or more pull-ups or running a 1-1/2 miles in
less than 12 minutes.\2
Statistics also show that recent Marine Corps efforts to reduce
attrition, including the changes to its DEP in May 1994, are working.
Twelve-month attrition rates across DOD rose from 15 percent in
fiscal year 1990 to 19 percent in fiscal year 1995. However, while
Army, Navy, and Air Force attrition rates were increasing by 4 to 6
percent over this time period, Marine Corps attrition rates declined
by 4 percent.
--------------------
\1 Minimum passing requirements for males are 2 pull-ups, 35 sit-ups
in under 2 minutes, and a 1-1/2-mile run in 13 minutes and 30 seconds
or less.
\2 There was no statistically significant difference in attrition
rates for those who did 35 to 39 sit-ups and those recruits who did
50 or more sit-ups.
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3
Recruiters have many tools at their disposal to help them screen
candidates for military service. However, while education
requirements provide some assurance that recruits will be capable of
learning the academic material that will help them become productive
servicemembers, and physical examinations provide some assurance that
recruits have a minimum level of wellness, the absence of physical
fitness screening requirements prevents the services from having any
assurance that their recruits will be able to pass their physical
fitness tests. Since all servicemembers are required to pass
physical fitness tests, the services may be investing thousands of
dollars training an individual who will eventually face discharge.
The Army, the Navy, and the Air Force may be able to improve their
attrition rates by running stronger DEP programs. The Marine Corps
emphasizes physical fitness training in its DEP program and
administers a physical fitness test to its recruits at least 30 days
before they report to basic training. Recent statistics show a
strong correlation between performance on this test and attrition
rates. Recruits who attained higher scores on the test experienced
lower attrition rates than those who either attained lower scores or
failed the test. Although it may be more difficult for recruiters
with large geographic areas to conduct regular physical training with
members of their DEP, most recruiters should not have this problem.
However, even recruiters with large areas should be able to follow
the Marine Corps' practice of giving all recruits a physical fitness
test before basic training.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4
To maintain recruit quality and increase a recruit's chances of
graduating from basic training, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense instruct the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force to implement
the Marine Corps' practice of administering a physical fitness test
to recruits before they report to basic training. In addition, we
recommend that the Secretary encourage the services to incorporate
more structured physical fitness training into their DEP program.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
recommendation regarding administering a physical fitness test to
recruits before they report to basic training and encouraging the
services to incorporate more structured physical fitness training
into their DEP programs (see app. III). DOD stated that, in an
attempt to reduce basic training attrition, the Army, the Navy, and
the Air Force are now taking steps similar to the Marine Corps to
better prepare recruits in the DEP for the physical rigors of basic
training. Furthermore, DOD stated that the Office of the Secretary
of Defense for Force Management Policy will investigate the legal
status of DEP members and the limits of their medical entitlements
while they are in the DEP.
SOME SERVICE PERFORMANCE MEASURES
IGNORE ATTRITION, AND MONTHLY
GOALS MAY RESTRICT RECRUITERS
============================================================ Chapter 4
All of the services reward recruiter success. However, many existing
awards and incentives are based on output measures that do not
reflect DOD's long-term retention goal to retain quality personnel.
Only the Marine Corps and the Navy use basic training graduation
rates as criteria in evaluating recruiters for awards, thus linking
DOD's strategic goals to their recruiters' daily operations.
According to DOD recruiter satisfaction surveys, recruiter job
performance has been declining since 1991, and is the lowest it has
been since recruiter surveys were first administered in 1989. In
1996, 58 percent of the services' recruiters said they had missed
their monthly goals 3 or more times during the previous 12 months.
Recruiters also said that they are under constant pressure to make
their assigned goals and that their working hours are increasing.
DOD's 1996 recruiter survey showed that 54 percent of recruiters were
dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with recruiting, compared with 47
percent in DOD's 1994 survey and 35 percent in the 1991 survey. The
results of DOD's recruiter surveys and our interviews with
experienced recruiters show that current award and incentive systems
have not effectively dealt with recruiters' two biggest
concerns--their monthly goals and working hours.
SOME AWARD SYSTEMS ARE NOT TIED
TO THE RIGHT PERFORMANCE
MEASURES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1
Incentive and award systems based on recruit graduation rates from
basic training would provide the services with a required link
between DOD's long-term strategic goals to recruit and retain
well-qualified military personnel and daily recruiter operations.
However, only the Marine Corps and the Navy use recruits' basic
training graduation rates as key criteria when evaluating recruiters
for awards. The Army and the Air Force measure recruiter performance
primarily by the number of recruits who enlist or the number who
report to basic training rather than the number who graduate and
become productive servicemembers.
Award and incentive systems have differed significantly by service
and within services over time, but they are usually based on point
systems that take into account the quality of recruits enlisted, the
positions the recruits fill, and the recruiter's success in making
his or her goal.\1 At various times, the services have used
individual, team, and combination awards, and they have based these
awards on both absolute and relative performance. Despite numerous
studies on recruiter award and incentive systems, all of the services
have been unable to settle on an optimal system. Also, the services
have, at times, altered their recruiter incentive systems in opposite
directions: as one service moved from individual to team awards,
another de-emphasized team awards and moved toward greater reliance
on individual awards. Current recruiter awards vary from badges and
plaques to meritorious promotions.
--------------------
\1 The Marine Corps does not have a point system and counts all
recruits the same for competition purposes.
RECRUIT ATTRITION IS A KEY
CRITERION FOR MARINE CORPS
RECRUITER AWARDS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.1
The Marine Corps is the only service that has consistently used
attrition data as an important criterion in determining awards for
its top performers. For example, the Commandant of the Marine Corps
gives out two top achievement awards annually, one for the top
recruiter and one for the top noncommissioned officer in charge of a
recruiting substation. The recruiters nominated for these awards
must meet numerical and quality accession goals and have DEP
attrition rates below 20 percent and basic training attrition rates
below 13 percent. Between 1993 and 1996, Marine Corps basic training
attrition remained relatively stable between 12.7 and 13.5 percent.
Therefore, recruiters nominated for the Commandant's awards had to
ensure that their recruits' basic training attrition rates were at or
below average attrition rates. Marine Corps recruiting awards
presented at lower levels also take attrition rates into account.
NAVY USES A POINT SYSTEM TO
REWARD RECRUITERS FOR
RECRUIT SUCCESS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.2
The Navy has numerous awards for its top recruiters and recruiting
stations but, unlike the Marine Corps, bases these awards on a
competitive point system. Since fiscal year 1996, this point system
has undergone several changes that were designed to give greater
weight to recruits who completed part or all of basic training.
The Navy awards recruiters points when one of their recruits enlists
at a MEPS. The number of points awarded is based on Navy needs and
can vary throughout the year. Recruits with high school diplomas and
good enlistment test scores who enlist into difficult fields, such as
nuclear power, generally earn recruiters high point levels.
Conversely, recruits without diplomas or with low test scores usually
yield recruiters fewer points. Recruiters can also earn points when
their recruits help the Navy to meet its racial, ethnic, or gender
goals. In fiscal year 1998, Navy recruiters will be awarded an
additional set of points, worth four times the original point value,
when a recruit leaves for basic training, thus giving recruiters a
strong incentive to monitor and mentor their recruits in the DEP.
When recruits graduate from basic training, the Navy will award their
recruiters with additional points worth 5 times the recruit's
original point value, for a total of 10 times the original point
value. The additional points give recruiters a strong incentive to
ensure that recruits are motivated and prepared to succeed at basic
training. To be competitive, a recruiter who can sell applicants on
enlisting but cannot motivate them to go to basic training would have
to enlist 10 applicants just to keep pace with the recruiter who
enlists and motivates 1 recruit who graduates from basic training.
ARMY AND AIR FORCE RECRUITER
AWARDS ARE NOT BASED ON
RECRUIT RETENTION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.3
Army and Air Force awards are generally based on the number and
quality of initial contracts and accessions in relation to assigned
recruiting goals. These services do not reward recruiters based on
the number of recruits who graduate and go on to become productive
soldiers or airmen. The Army and the Air Force, which bring in
almost 55 percent of DOD's new recruits, see clear lines of
separation between the recruiting and training processes, and believe
it is inappropriate to hold recruiters accountable for recruits who
fail to complete basic training.
Although the Army and the Air Force do not use basic training
graduation rates as key criteria when selecting award recipients,
they can exclude recruiters from awards if their attrition statistics
are extremely high. For example, Air Force senior and master
recruiter badges are earned primarily on the basis of production, but
recruiters are not eligible for the badges if the basic training
attrition rate for their recruits is above 15 percent. Between
fiscal year 1993 and 1996, overall Air Force basic training attrition
rates varied between 8.7 and 11.1 percent. Therefore, a recruiter's
the basic training attrition rate had to be 35 to 72 percent above
the Air Force average before he or she was prevented from earning a
senior or master recruiter badge.
RECRUITERS HAVE TO MAKE UP
FOR EARLY ATTRITION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.4
In effect, all of the services hold their recruiters indirectly
accountable for early attrition through higher goals, even if their
awards systems do not reflect this. The number of recruits that is
needed in a given year is determined based on projected end
strengths, historical loss rates, and the mix of contract lengths for
current servicemembers. In setting goals for their recruiters, the
services recognize two different types of attrition. The first is
DEP attrition, which occurs between the time an applicant first signs
an enlistment contract at a MEPS and the date the recruit leaves for
basic training. The second is active duty attrition, which occurs
any time after a servicemember reports to basic training.
Recruits in the DEP are allowed to quit for any reason. Enlistment
contracts are simply canceled for those who quit, with no permanent
adverse effect on the recruits. However, with the exception of the
Navy,\2 recruiters are held individually responsible for DEP
attrition, and their current month's goal is raised each time one of
their recruits drops out of the DEP.
Recruiters are not held individually responsible for active duty
attrition. However, the services use active duty attrition rates,
which have remained fairly steady at about one-third of accessions,
to compute annual goals for the service recruiting commands.
Application of this attrition rate causes recruiting command goals to
be much higher than they would be if attrition did not exist or was
much lower.
Since recruiting command headquarters personnel do not actually
recruit, increased recruiting goals are passed down through the chain
of command and eventually result in increased goals for individual
recruiters in the field. Therefore, although some services claim
that recruiters cannot affect attrition and should not be held
accountable for it, all of the services are, in fact, currently
holding their recruiters accountable for attrition.
--------------------
\2 Navy goals are formally assigned only to the station level and not
to individual recruiters. In addition, the Navy recently changed its
procedures to combat last minute DEP attrition. Now, the monthly
station goal is raised only if a recruit drops out of the DEP within
5 weeks of the date he or she was scheduled to leave for basic
training.
MOST RECRUITERS ARE NOT MEETING
MONTHLY GOALS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2
Recruiter performance is primarily measured against and driven by
monthly contracting and accession goals. Additional performance
measures have changed over the years, but monthly contracting and
accession numbers have remained largely unchanged as the primary
performance measures. Recruiters said that they are under pressure
to make their goal beginning on the first day of every month, and the
pressure often does not let up when they make their monthly goal.
Recruiters told us that, once they make their own monthly goal, they
are often pressured to recruit one more person to cover for other
recruiters who do not make their goal. Table 4.1 shows the number of
recruits the average production recruiter needed to recruit for the
services to achieve their 1997 accession goals.\3
Table 4.1
Recruiter Productivity Needed to Support
1997 Service Accession Goals
Number of
recruits needed
Average number yearly per
Accessio of production production
Service n goals recruiters recruiter
------------------------ -------- ---------------- ----------------
Army 89,700 5,525 16.2
Navy 53,628 3,850 13.9
Marine Corps 35,300 2,650 13.3
Air Force 30,200 1,055 28.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: DOD and service testimony before the Subcommittee on
Personnel, Senate Armed Services Committee, March 1997.
Recruiter monthly goals vary from one to four or more recruits.
However, since all of the services need their production recruiters
to achieve more than one accession per month to make their service's
accession goal, most recruiters are assigned a minimum goal of two
recruits per month. Many Air Force recruiters have goals of three
accessions per month because of that service's higher requirements
per recruiter.
Recruiter responses in DOD's 1996 recruiter satisfaction survey
showed that recruiter job performance was at an all-time low.
Despite the successes of the service recruiting commands, only 42
percent of the recruiters who responded to DOD's survey said that
they had made their goal 9 or more months out of the previous 12.
This figure represented a decrease of 8 percent from DOD's 1994
survey and the lowest level since DOD began its recruiter surveys in
1989. In addition, 28 percent of the respondents said that their
monthly goals were unachievable.
--------------------
\3 Production recruiters are those recruiters who are expected to
actually bring people into the services each month. Other recruiters
are sometimes assigned supervisory and administrative
responsibilities, such as conducting field training, and they are not
given a monthly recruiting goal.
RECRUITERS ARE DISSATISFIED
WITH WORKING HOURS AND
PRESSURES TO MAKE GOALS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3
At the same time that recruiters' job performance has been dropping,
their working hours have been increasing. In DOD's 1996 recruiter
survey, 63 percent of recruiters said they worked 60 or more hours
per week. These results show that the percentage of recruiters
working long hours is at the highest level since recruiter surveys
were first taken in 1989. In addition, only 23 percent of the
services' recruiters said they would remain in recruiting if given
the chance to be reassigned to another job.
During our review, we spoke to 35 recruiters who had a total of over
280 years of recruiting experience. Many of these recruiters
corroborated the results of the 1996 recruiter survey. They said
that working hours in many places are getting worse and that
recruiters everywhere experience tremendous pressures to meet their
monthly goal. Recruiters who do not make their goal are often put on
extended working hours until the goal is achieved, and successful
recruiters who exceed their goal are often required to work longer
hours to make up for those who do not make their goal.
TIME OFF IS AN IMPORTANT
MOTIVATOR
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.1
All of the 35 experienced recruiters we spoke with said that time off
is an important incentive for motivating recruiters. In fact, most
of the recruiters said it is the biggest incentive a production
recruiter ever receives. This sentiment was repeated even among
those recruiters who had been meritoriously promoted as a reward for
their recruiting excellence.
Senior enlisted officials in the Marine Corps told us that the
commanding officer of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command had given
recruiters
4 days off after the Command made its 24th consecutive monthly goal.
However, according to these officials, many supervisors did not give
their recruiters the time off and never even informed them that they
were supposed to get the time off.
RECRUITERS HAVE PROBLEMS
TAKING LEAVE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.2
Command-level officials in all of the services encourage recruiters
to take leave. However, the same encouragement does not always flow
down the chain of command to production recruiters. In the Air
Force, recruiters who take 2 weeks of leave in 1 month will not be
assigned a goal for that month. Army recruiters are encouraged to
take 1 week of leave per quarter. According to senior Marine Corps
Recruiting Command officials, the commanding officer of the Marine
Corps Recruiting Command personally monitors recruiter leave balances
to ensure that recruiters are not denied the opportunity to take
leave. Despite all these efforts, 68 percent of the recruiters who
responded to DOD's 1996 survey said the demands of the job had
prevented them from taking leave during the previous 12 months. This
figure represented almost a 50-percent increase from the level in the
1994 survey and the highest level since the first DOD recruiter
survey in 1989.
We spoke with several recruiters who were called in off leave or who
came to work during their leave. With regard to the problem of
taking leave, some recruiters suggested that the services should
close all recruiting and MEPS stations during the week between
Christmas and New Year's Day and require recruiters to take leave
during that typically unproductive time period. The recruiters said
this action is the only way to guarantee that production recruiters
will actually get time off to use their leave.
RECRUITERS HAVE LITTLE OR NO
CONTROL OVER THEIR MONTHLY
GOALS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:4
Under the current monthly goal system, recruiters cannot work ahead
and sign extra recruits in one month so they can ease up and take
some leave the next month. Recruiters who make double their monthly
goal are usually assigned the same or higher goals for the next
month. In addition, recruiters who have a bad month face concerns
about how they will be rated after missing one or more monthly goals,
even when they meet or exceed their annual goals.
A senior official at the Air Force Recruiting Service suggested that
quarterly floating goals could overcome recruiter concerns about
monthly goals and still provide the services with a steady flow of
recruits to fill training slots. Under a quarterly floating goal
system, recruiters would still be assigned monthly goals, and their
performance would still be evaluated on a monthly basis. However,
each month the current month's goal would be added to the goals of
the previous 2 months and compared to the recruiter's performance
during that 3-month period, rather than comparing the current month's
performance to the current month's goal.
Recruiters who make their goals every month under the current system
would be unaffected by changing to quarterly floating goals. They
would still be considered successful. Recruiters who never make
their monthly goals would also be unaffected by a change to quarterly
floating goals. However, quarterly floating goals could benefit
recruiters who make their annual goals but underproduce in some
months and overproduce in others. Appendix II contains additional
information about quarterly floating goals, including examples of how
these goals could help individual recruiters without jeopardizing the
services' ability to make their command goals.
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:5
Recruiters can be motivated to support DOD's long-term strategic
goals, but they must view their award systems as fair and reasonable
and closely linked to those strategic goals. The Marine Corps and
the Navy have tied many of their awards and incentives to basic
training graduation rates, establishing a link between recruiter
performance and DOD's strategic retention goal. Marine Corps and
Navy recruiters thus understand that they bear some of the
responsibility for basic training attrition. The Army and the Air
Force award systems place very little weight on recruit performance
at basic training and base awards primarily on the number of recruits
a recruiter enlists or sends to basic training. Under Army and Air
Force award systems that do not tie awards to retention, recruiters
may mistakenly believe that they have no responsibility for basic
training attrition. However, because these services need to replace
the people who drop out of basic training, recruiters are given
monthly goals that are higher than they would be if attrition did not
occur. Thus, recruiters are responsible for making up for basic
training attrition.
The results of DOD's most recent recruiter survey demonstrate a
fairly high level of dissatisfaction among recruiters over the
current system of monthly goals and the long hours that they must
work to achieve the goals. This dissatisfaction may create morale
problems that adversely affect productivity. These conditions might
also discourage others from volunteering for recruiting duty.
Changing the monthly goal system to a floating quarterly goal system
could relieve some pressure from recruiters and enhance their working
conditions without sacrificing overall recruiting goals. Better
morale and working conditions could encourage additional candidates
to volunteer for recruiting duty.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:6
In our January 1997 report on military attrition, we recommended that
the services link recruiting quotas more closely to recruits'
successful completion of basic training. We also suggested
consideration of a quarterly floating goal system. In a March 1997
memorandum directing the services to act on our report, DOD deferred
taking a position on those issues pending recommendations from this
follow-up review. This report expands upon our earlier work and
provides a detailed example of how a floating goal system might
operate.
To enhance recruiter success and help recruiters focus on DOD's
strategic retention goal, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
instruct the services to link recruiter awards more closely to
recruits' successful completion of basic training.
To enhance recruiters' working conditions and the services' ability
to attract qualified candidates for recruiting duty, we also
recommend that the Secretary of Defense encourage the use of
quarterly floating goals as an alternative to the services' current
systems of monthly goals.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:7
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the services link
recruiter awards more closely to recruits' successful completion of
basic training, stating that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Force Management Policy will ensure that all the services incorporate
recruit success in basic training into their recruiter incentive
systems.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense encourage the use of quarterly floating goals as an
alternative to the services' current systems of monthly goals. DOD's
primary concern with this recommendation is that floating quarterly
goals would reduce the services' ability to make corrections to
recruiting difficulties before they become unmanageable.
DOD also stated that the Air Force had tried floating goals, and that
its experience indicated that such a system leads to a lessened sense
of urgency early in the goaling cycle and more pressure later in the
cycle. In a follow-on discussion with a senior official at the Air
Force Recruiting Service, we learned that the Air Force did
experiment with a quarterly system in its northeast region from
October to December 1991. However, the Air Force canceled this
experiment in January 1992 when it discovered that many recruiters
had fallen behind in their goals for that 3-month period.
We do not believe that the Air Force's experience truly measured the
potential merits of a quarterly floating goal system since the Air
Force canceled this program after only 3 months. While we agree that
recruiting commands must maintain the ability to control the flow of
new recruits into the system on a monthly basis, it should be noted
that this proposal is for floating, rather than static, quarterly
goals. As a result, recruiting shortfalls would still be identified
in the first month that they occur and not disrupt the flow of
recruits to training. Accordingly, we believe that a longer test
period than 3 months would be needed to fully test this concept.
Moreover, DOD recruiter surveys show that recruiter performance is at
an all-time low and that the percentage of recruiters working long
hours is the highest it has ever been since the surveys were first
taken in 1989. We believe this matter warrants serious attention and
that these problems will continue if changes are not made. The
quarterly floating goal proposal would provide recruiters with some
flexibility and enhanced quality of life and still provide recruiting
commands with the ability to control the flow of new recruits into
the system on a monthly basis. Better working conditions and
recruiter morale could ultimately encourage additional candidates to
volunteer for recruiting duty, thereby easing the current burden on
recruiting commands to screen and select new recruiters.
COSTS OF RECRUITING, TRAINING, AND
ATTRITION
=========================================================== Appendix I
COSTS OF RECRUITING AND
TRAINING
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1
The military services' investment in their enlisted personnel is made
up of both fixed and variable costs. The fixed costs can be thought
of as overhead or infrastructure costs that are not easily or quickly
changed and cannot be directly associated with a single enlistee.
Examples of this type of cost are the total number of recruiters or
drill instructors or the money spent by a service on a television
advertisement campaign for recruiting. The variable costs are
directly connected to each recruit, such as costs for issuance of
clothing and pay and allowances for each enlistee.
Table I.1 shows the services' 1996 and 1997 recruiting and
advertising investment for each recruit who reported to basic
training.
Table I.1
Recruiting and Advertising Investment
per Recruit
Recruiting and Recruiting and
advertising in advertising in Advertising in
fiscal year fiscal year fiscal year
1996 1997 1997
---------------------- -------------- -------------- --------------
Army $8,310 $7,354 $775
Navy 6,636 6,297 687
Marine Corps 5,165 4,923 559
Air Force 3,740 3,934 349
DOD 7,187 6,704 673
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: President's budget for fiscal years 1998-99.
The figures above include the costs of advertising, leasing
recruiting facilities, joint advertising and market research,
recruiter cars, supplies, and recruiter and support personnel
salaries. The figures also include recruit bonuses and college fund
expenses. The figures do not include the cost of transporting
recruits to and from basic training or the cost of housing, feeding,
clothing, and paying the recruits while they are at basic training.
Based on Navy figures, we placed those costs at approximately $5,000
in our report last year.\1 Collectively, the service figures are
consistent with the Department of Defense's (DOD) figures, which
indicate that it costs between $8,900 and $12,400 to recruit and
train an applicant through basic training.
--------------------
\1 Military Attrition: DOD Could Save Millions by Better Screening
Enlisted Personnel (GAO/NSIAD-97-39, Jan. 6, 1997).
DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH
ESTIMATING ATTRITION COSTS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2
Although the cost of keeping personnel who cannot adjust to military
life or meet established standards could be very high, DOD officials
have acknowledged that a certain percentage of attrition is probably
avoidable. Over the past 2 decades, numerous attrition studies have
been conducted by DOD and other government and private organizations.
However, none of the studies has been able to accurately define an
acceptable or desirable level of attrition. In addition, none has
determined when the costs of recruiting and training are recouped.
We recognize the limitations of available cost information concerning
attrition. Therefore, we have used average cost data from the
services and DOD only to identify the general magnitude of the
military attrition problem rather than a precise cost savings figure.
The costs of attrition increase each day recruits remain in a
training or temporary status. Once recruits report to their
permanent duty stations and begin performing the jobs that they were
recruited to perform, the services begin to receive benefits on their
investment in recruiting and training. Attrition costs can decline
at varying rates both among different career fields and within career
fields. The rate of decline depends on the amount of on-the-job
training required for an individual to become proficient at the job.
Approximately one-half of all attrition occurs between the time
recruits are first sworn into a service at a military entrance
processing station and the time they complete basic training.
Calculating the cost savings that would result if the services
reduced this attrition is complicated. Nevertheless, there are two
different ways of reducing the cost of this early attrition. One way
is to take actions to lower attrition rates, without compromising
retention standards. A second way is to accept current attrition
rates, but cause attrition to occur as early in the recruiting or
training process as possible. Delayed Entry Program (DEP) attrition
is less expensive than basic training attrition, which is generally
less expensive than attrition that occurs during advanced training.
The Army Recruiting Command calculated that, in fiscal year 1996,
each loss from its DEP cost approximately $1,800. However, losses
from basic training would be even greater because the costs of
feeding, clothing, transporting, and housing the recruits would have
to be added to the DEP loss cost. Attrition occurring during
advanced training is costlier still, due to the additional military
pay and infrastucture costs associated with such training.
The cost savings that could be expected by reducing attrition are
difficult to measure for four reasons. First, lower attrition rates
could lead to a decline in recruiting and training support costs.
Recruiting support costs include items such as recruiter,
administrative, and management support salaries; facility leases;
advertising costs; and recruiter car expenses. Training support
costs include drill instructor, administrative, and management
support salaries and the cost of maintaining recruit housing,
classrooms, and other facilities. These cost reductions, however,
would not necessarily be proportional to the decrease in attrition.
For example, if attrition were reduced by 10 percent, it is likely
that infrastructure costs would be reduced by less than 10 percent.
One reason that infrastructure costs are not likely to decrease in
the same proportion as attrition is that the services may need to
ensure that their recruiting and training organizations maintain
excess capacity in the event of future increases in accessions. The
services now determine staffing and funding for recruiting commands
based on the services' accessions missions, which could be lower if
attrition were to decrease.
Second, the near-term savings in variable costs per recruit can vary
significantly depending on which recruits are separated. Some of
these differences are readily apparent. For example, the
transportation costs for sending an Air Force recruit from Alaska to
and from basic training at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio are
obviously much higher than the transportation costs of sending a
recruit who lives in San Antonio to basic training. Other cost
differences may not be as obvious. Only a limited number of
recruits, for example, receive enlistment bonuses or service college
funds, and the attrition of those recruits costs the services more
than the attrition of recruits who do not receive these benefits.
Pay rates of recruits can also be different. Recruits who have
completed some college and recruits who supply their recruiters with
referrals who enlist can enter basic training in pay grades E-2 or
E-3 rather than in pay grade E-1. The difference in pay between E-1
and E-3 is about $200 per month. In addition, uniforms for female
servicemembers can cost more than those for male servicemembers, and
uniform costs can vary within gender categories depending on a
recruit's size.
Third, any additional costs that might be incurred by the services to
better prepare recruiters and recruits would have to be subtracted
from any calcuations of marginal savings. Such added mechanisms
could include adjustments to recruiter screening processes, recruiter
training, and DEP management.
Fourth, recent recruiting practices in the Navy and the Army could
increase the costs of attrition. For example, the Navy is now
requiring all applicants without a high school diploma to score high
enough on the enlistment screening test to qualify for advanced
training in order to enlist. In the past, the Navy enlisted many of
these nondiploma applicants in general seaman, airman, or fireman
career fields that did not require any advanced training. According
to the Navy's compensatory screening model, high-quality applicants
without diplomas should behave similarly to those with high school
diplomas. However, Navy recruits without diplomas are continuing to
experience attrition rates that are much higher than recruits with
diplomas. If attrition rates for nondiploma recruits continue to be
much higher than those of recruits with diplomas, the Navy will
actually be increasing the cost of its attrition by requiring
nondiploma recruits to qualify for advanced training.
The Army is loosening its criteria for its "quick ship" bonuses.\2
Previously, the Army had only been paying these bonuses to recruits
who scored in the top three enlistment test categories. However, it
recently began offering these bonuses to recruits in a lower test
category as well. Recruits from this lower category have higher
attrition rates than recruits from the top categories. Therefore, if
attrition statistics remain unchanged, a higher percentage of the
recruits who drop out will have been paid bonuses, thus driving up
the cost of Army attrition.
--------------------
\2 Quick ship bonuses are paid to recruits who leave for basic
training within 30 days of their initial enlistment.
QUARTERLY FLOATING GOALS
========================================================== Appendix II
Under the current goal system, recruiters are continually evaluated
on a month to month basis, and recruiters and recruiting command
officials told us that recruiters commonly hear the same question and
comment about their performance in relation to their monthly goals.
The question is what has the recruiter done lately. The implication
of this question is that making or exceeding last month's goal no
longer counts if the recruiter has not made this month's goal. The
comment is that the recruiter is either a "hero" or a "zero."
Recruiters who make their goals in a given month are considered
heros. Recruiters who miss their goals (even if they enlist three
people for a goal of four) are considered zeros.
If the services adopted quarterly floating goal systems, recruiters
would still be assigned monthly goals, and their performance would
still be evaluated on a monthly basis. However, each month the
current month's goal would be added to the goals of the previous 2
months and compared to the recruiter's performance during that
3-month period. Recruiters who make their monthly goals every single
month under the current system would be unaffected if the services
changed to quarterly floating goals. They would still be considered
heros. Recruiters who never make their monthly goals would also be
unaffected if the services changed to quarterly floating goals. They
would still be considered zeros. Quarterly floating goals are most
likely to benefit recruiters who make their annual goals but
underproduce in some months and overproduce in other months. Table
II.1 shows an example of how quarterly floating goals could work and
how they could benefit some recruiters. For example, recruiters who
make their annual goal could be considered zeros in some months under
the monthly goal system, but they would be considered heros under the
quarterly foating goal system.
Table II.1
Comparison of Recruiter Goals,
Performance, and Monthly Evaluations
Under Two Different Systems
Monthly goal system Quarterly floating goal system
-------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------
Monthly Recruiter' Floating Quarterly Recruiter'
Monthly enlistment s quarterly enlistment s
Month goal s evaluation goal\a s\b evaluation
---------------- ---------- ---------- -- ---------- -------------- ---------- -- ----------
January 2 3 Hero 2 3 Hero
February 2 1 Zero 4 4 Hero
March 2 2 Hero 6 6 Hero
April 2 3 Hero 6 6 Hero
May 2 1 Zero 6 6 Hero
June 3 4 Hero 7 8 Hero
July 3 4 Hero 8 9 Hero
August 3 2 Zero 9 10 Hero
September 2 3 Hero 8 9 Hero
October 2 2 Hero 7 7 Hero
November 2 1 Zero 6 6 Hero
December 2 3 Hero 6 6 Hero
====================================================================================================
Total 27 29 Met goal 27 29 Met
in floating
8 of 12 goal every
months month
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The goal for January is only January's goal; the goal for February
is figured by adding January and February goals; thereafter, the
floating quarterly goal is figured by adding the last 3 monthly
goals.
\b Enlistments for January include only those made in January;
enlistments for February include those made in January and February;
thereafter, quarterly enlistments are figured by adding enlistments
for the last 3 months on a rolling basis.
A quarterly floating goal system could be phased in over a 3-month
period. For example, in January, recruiters could be evaluated on
the basis of performance in 1 month (January). In February, they
could be evaluated on the basis of performance in 2 months (January
and February). In March they could be evaluated on the basis of
performance in 3 months (January, February, and March). Once
quarterly floating goals were fully implemented in March, recruiters
would be evaluated each month on their performance over the last 3
months compared with their goals. According to our example in table
II.1, in October, a recruiter's performance in August, September and
October would be measured against the goals for those 3 months, or
seven enlistments. In November, a recruiter's performance in
September, October, and November would be measured against the goals
for those particular 3 months, or six enlistments. This pattern
would continue in each successive month. When a new year begins,
monthly totals would carry over from the previous year.
Table II.1 also demonstrates how a quarterly floating system could
help the recruiter who falls short of making his or her goal in any
given month. In May, for example, the recruiter would only have to
enlist one person to stay on track, even though May's monthly goal is
two people. The recruiter would only need one person in May because
he or she made the goal of two in March and surpassed the goal by one
in April. As a result, the recruiter might be inclined to schedule
some leave in May. However, in September the recruiter would need to
enlist three people, even though the goal for that month is two
enlistees. This is due to the fact that the recruiter missed
August's goal by one.
In discussing quarterly floating goals, officials from one of the
service recruiting commands expressed concerns that quarterly
floating goals could cause their best recruiters' production levels
to drop. Although drops could occur, we do not believe these drops
would be significant. Any drops that might occur could be offset by
the benefits of the quarterly floating goal system. For example,
these goals could encourage additional high-caliber recruiters to
volunteer for permanent recruiting duty, thus strengthening the
services' recruiting commands. Table II.2 demonstrates how checks
are built into the quarterly floating goals and shows why quarterly
floating goals will not cause production to drop significantly for
the services' best recruiters.
Table II.2
Production Numbers Necessary for
Excellent Recruiters to Stay on Track
Recruiter's
Number of evaluation
Actual Quarterly Quarterly recruits under
Monthly monthly enlistment floating needed to stay quarterly
Month goal enlistments s goal on track floating goals
-------------- ---------- ------------ ---------- ---------- -------------- -- --------------
January 3 9 9 3 3 Hero
February 3 0 9 6 0 Hero
March 3 2 11 9 0 Hero
April 3 6 8 9 7 Zero
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: See notes in table II.1 for an explanation of quarterly
enlistments and quarterly floating goals.
In this extreme example, the recruiter makes his or her entire
quarterly goal (January through March) in January. The recruiter
then takes off the entire month of February, and part of March. The
recruiter is unlikely to take off all of March because doing so would
increase April's goal to nine enlistments. In April, the recruiter
enlists six people, more than two times April's goal, but still faces
possible counseling, training, and increased supervision for not
making his or her quarterly floating goal. The recruiter is then
likely to get back on track and overproduce on a monthly basis, which
he or she is capable of doing based on January's performance.
Although this scenario is possible, we believe the example shown in
table II.3 more accurately depicts the types of differences that are
likely to occur for excellent recruiters under quarterly floating
goals.
Table II.3 shows how recruiters who operate under a monthly goal
system are more limited in using their leave than recruiters who
operate under a quarterly floating goal system. Under the quarterly
floating goal system, the recruiter who is able to work longer and
harder in May and June is then able to take off the entire month of
July. The recruiter is also able to work less in December and April
by working additional hours during the preceding months.
Table II.3
Possible Production Levels of Excellent
Recruiters Under Different Goals
Quarterl Recruite
Monthly Floating y r's
Monthly enlistme quarterl enlistme evaluati
Month goal nts y goal nts on
-------------------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
January 3 3 3 3 3 for 3
February 3 4 6 4 7 for 6
March 3 4 9 4 11 for 9
April 3 3 9 2 10 for 9
May 3 3 9 4 10 for 9
June 3 5 9 6 12 for 9
July 3 4 9 0 10 for 9
August 3 3 9 5 11 for 9
September 3 4 9 4 9 for 9
October 3 3 9 3 12 for 9
November 3 4 9 5 12 for 9
December 3 3 9 2 10 for 9
======================================================================
Annual total 36 43 36 42 42 for
36
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: See notes in table II.1 for an explanation of quarterly
enlistments and quarterly floating goals.
During our field work, we interviewed production recruiters who said
that they would not consider becoming career recruiters because their
supervisors were constantly dictating their working hours and daily
activities. These recruiters believed that they were not being given
the respect that they had earned as noncommissioned officers who were
productive recruiters. One of these recruiters was the top producer
for his region. Compared to monthly goals, quarterly floating goals
would allow individual recruiters more flexibility in the performance
of their duties. Allowing recruiters the same type of flexibility
and decision-making authority as other noncommissioned officers in
the services may encourage more of the services' outstanding
recruiters to become career recruiters.
The service recruiting commands were also concerned about the effect
that quarterly floating goals could have on their training pipelines.
However, because recruiters would still be evaluated monthly,
fluctuations in the numbers of recruits entering the services each
month are not likely to be significantly different than fluctuations
under the current system of monthly goals. Tables II.2 and II.3
illustrate that recruiters cannot underproduce 2 months in a row and
still be successful. Under a quarterly floating goal system, the
monthly production levels of individual recruiters are likely to vary
more than they do under monthly goals. However, all recruiters are
not likely to overproduce and underproduce during the same months.
Therefore, the overproduction of some recruiters in a given month is
likely to be offset by the underproduction of other recruiters in
that same month. Training pipelines are not currently level
throughout the year. For example, the Marine Corps has established
accession goals of 32 percent for October through January, 22 percent
for February through May, and 46 percent for June through September.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix III
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
========================================================== Appendix II
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix IV
NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Carol R. Schuster
William E. Beusse
David E. Moser
Michael J. Ferren
Karen S. Blum
*** End of document. ***