Air Force Aircraft: Reorganizing Mobility Aircraft Units Could Reduce
Costs (Letter Report, 01/21/98, GAO/NSIAD-98-55).

GAO assessed the cost-effectiveness of organizing the Air Force's
airlift and refueling force into fewer, larger-sized squadrons and
wings, focusing on: (1) the effect that reorganization may have on
mission accomplishment; (2) whether costs could be reduced through
redistributing aircraft among fewer wings; and (3) five possible options
for redistributing C-130 and KC-135 aircraft among fewer wings at lower
operating costs.

GAO noted that: (1) the Air Force could reduce costs and meet peacetime
and wartime commitments if it reorganized its C-130 and KC-135 aircraft
into larger-sized squadrons and wings at fewer locations; (2) these
savings would primarily result from fewer people being needed to operate
these aircraft; (3) for the reorganization options GAO developed, up to
$209 million dollars could be saved annually; (4) creating larger-sized
squadrons and wings would still allow the Air Force to accomplish its
peacetime and wartime missions with the existing number of aircraft; (5)
in peacetime deployments, reserve component C-130 and KC-135 personnel
do not participate as part of entire squadrons or wings but rather as
individual volunteers; (6) thus, creating larger-sized squadrons and
wings should not compromise these missions; (7) for wartime deployments,
requirements for C-130 and KC-135 aircraft are typically stated by the
number of aircraft rather than by squadrons or wings; (8) moreover, war
plans where existing flying squadrons are assigned can be changed to
accomodate larger-sized squadrons; (9) specific reserve component wings
are not usually assigned in existing war plans; (10) thus, the impact of
reducing them would be minimal; (11) redistributing the reserve
component's C-130 and KC-135 existing aircraft into fewer, larger-sized
squadrons and wings would reduce operating costs; (12) for example,
redistributing 16 C-130 aircraft from two 8-aircraft wings to one
16-aircraft wing would save about $11 million annually, primarily from
personnel savings; (13) GAO developed five options to illustrate the
kind of savings that can be achieved by creating larger-sized squadrons;
(14) these savings range from about $51 million to $209 million
annually; and (15) sufficient personnel could be recruited and most
locations' facilities could be inexpensively expanded to accomodate the
unit sizes in GAO's options.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-98-55
     TITLE:  Air Force Aircraft: Reorganizing Mobility Aircraft Units 
             Could Reduce Costs
      DATE:  01/21/98
   SUBJECT:  Federal agency reorganization
             Military facilities
             Armed forces reserves
             Military aircraft
             Military cost control
             Military aviation
             Combat readiness
             Cost effectiveness analysis
             Military downsizing
             Defense contingency planning
IDENTIFIER:  KC-135 Aircraft
             C-130 Aircraft
             Hercules Aircraft
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to the Secretary of Defense

January 1998

AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT - REORGANIZING
MOBILITY AIRCRAFT UNITS COULD
REDUCE COSTS

GAO/NSIAD-98-55

Air Force Aircraft

(701089)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DOD - Department of Defense
  SABLE - Systematic Approach to Better Long-Range Estimating

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-276447

January 21, 1998

The Honorable William Cohen
The Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr.  Secretary: 

Over the past few years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been
interested in modernizing its forces with new weapons and equipment. 
For a variety of reasons, these efforts have been stymied, and funds
that DOD expected to have available to modernize the force have been
needed instead for current operational activities.  Therefore, you
have expressed an interest in reducing operating costs. 

We have been assessing various Air Force activities to determine the
feasibility of reducing operating costs.  A few years ago, we
evaluated whether the Air Force could operate its fighter forces more
cost-effectively.  In May 1996, we reported that the Air Force's
fighter force was not organized economically and recommended that the
Air Force develop an implementation plan for operating its fighter
force in larger, more cost-effective squadrons.\1 DOD concurred with
that recommendation. 

For this follow-on effort, we assessed the cost-effectiveness of
organizing the Air Force's airlift and refueling force into fewer,
larger-sized squadrons and wings.  In making this assessment, we (1)
evaluated the effect that reorganization may have on mission
accomplishment, (2) determined whether costs could be reduced through
redistributing aircraft among fewer wings, and (3) developed five
possible options for redistributing C-130 and KC-135 aircraft among
fewer wings at lower operating costs.  This report focuses on the
reserve component\2 combat C-130 and KC-135 aircraft. 


--------------------
\1 Air Force Aircraft:  Consolidating Fighter Squadrons Could Reduce
Costs (GAO/NSIAD-96-82,
May 6, 1996). 

\2 In this report, the term reserve component refers to the Air Force
Reserve (Reserve) and the Air National Guard (Guard) collectively. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

The C-130 and KC-135 aircraft are important parts of DOD's air
mobility force.  The C-130's primary role is to provide airlift for
theater cargo and personnel.  The KC-135 aircraft is the Air Force's
core refueler.  The majority of these aircraft are in the reserve
component, as shown in
table 1. 



                                Table 1
                
                    C-130 and KC-135 Force Structure

                                                                Percen
                                                                  t of
                                                Number  Number     Air
                                                    of      of   Force
                                                aircra  locati  aircra
Type of aircraft                                    ft     ons      ft
----------------------------------------------  ------  ------  ------
C-130
Active Air Force                                   148       7      33
Air National Guard                                 196      23      44
Air Force Reserve                                  104      10      23
======================================================================
Total                                              448      40     100
KC-135
Active Air Force                                   204       7      43
Air National Guard                                 204      19      43
Air Force Reserve                                   64       6      14
======================================================================
Total                                              472      32     100
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  Air Force, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard data. 

Reserve component C-130 flying squadrons generally have 8 aircraft,
and KC-135 squadrons generally have 10.  Active force C-130 squadrons
typically have 14 aircraft, while active KC-135 squadrons have 12.  A
reserve component wing comprises flying squadrons and other nonflying
squadrons.  Generally, reserve component wings have one flying
squadron, unlike active wings, which generally have two to three
flying squadrons.  Some of the nonflying squadrons, such as
maintenance, military police, and logistics squadrons, are directly
related to the flying squadron, while others, such as medical, civil
engineering, and communications squadrons, are not directly related. 

Reserve component C-130 and KC-135 aircraft are dispersed throughout
the continental United States and Hawaii and Alaska.  There are 22
states whose National Guard wings have C-130 aircraft, and 19 states
whose National Guard wings have KC-135 aircraft.  Seven states have
both.  There are nine states that have Air Force Reserve wings with
C-130 aircraft and five states that have Air Force Reserve wings with
KC-135 aircraft.  Seven of the Guard wings with KC-135 aircraft are
located on military bases and 12 are located with civilian airports. 
All six Reserve wings with KC-135 aircraft are located on military
bases.  Most Guard wings with C-130 aircraft, 20 of 23, are located
with civilian airports.  Half of the 10 Reserve wings with C-130
aircraft are located on military bases, and the other half are with
civilian airports.  Several locations maintain both Guard and Reserve
wings. 

Though reserve component members are sometimes thought of as weekend
warriors, about one quarter to one third of wing personnel are
full-time military or civilian employees.  These personnel are
concentrated in areas such as maintenance, logistics, and security
squadrons and the wing staff.  The balance of wing personnel are
part-time military personnel and are likely to have full-time
employment in addition to their military responsibilities. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

The Air Force could reduce costs and meet peacetime and wartime
commitments if it reorganized its C-130 and KC-135 aircraft into
larger-sized squadrons and wings at fewer locations.  These savings
would primarily result from fewer people being needed to operate
these aircraft.  For the reorganization options we developed, up to
$209 million dollars could be saved annually. 

Creating larger-sized squadrons and wings would still allow the Air
Force to accomplish its peacetime and wartime missions with the
existing number of aircraft.  In peacetime deployments, reserve
component C-130 and KC-135 personnel do not participate as part of
entire squadrons or wings but rather as individual volunteers.  Thus,
creating larger-sized squadrons and wings should not compromise these
missions.  For wartime deployments, requirements for C-130 and KC-135
aircraft are typically stated by the number of aircraft rather than
by squadrons or wings.  Moreover, war plans where existing flying
squadrons are assigned can be changed to accommodate larger-sized
squadrons.  Finally, specific reserve component wings are not usually
assigned in existing war plans; thus, the impact of reducing them
would be minimal. 

Redistributing the reserve component's C-130 and KC-135 existing
aircraft into fewer, larger-sized squadrons and wings would reduce
operating costs.  For example, redistributing 16 C-130 aircraft from
two 8-aircraft wings to one 16-aircraft wing would save about $11
million annually, primarily from personnel savings. 

We developed five options to illustrate the kind of savings that can
be achieved by creating larger-sized squadrons.  These savings range
from about $51 million to $209 million annually.  We found that
sufficient personnel could be recruited and most locations'
facilities could be inexpensively expanded to accommodate the unit
sizes in our options. 


   MISSIONS CAN BE FULFILLED WITH
   LARGER-SIZED RESERVE COMPONENT
   UNITS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

Larger-sized reserve component units would still be able to perform
peacetime missions.  When reserve component C-130 and KC-135 units
have participated in peacetime deployments in Bosnia, Saudi Arabia,
and Panama they have done so on a rotational basis.  However, unlike
the active Air Force, Reserve and Guard rotations are not assigned
completely to a single flying squadron or wing, which makes the
squadron size less important.  In a typical reserve component
rotation, while one wing is designated to lead the mission, it
depends on many other wings to provide aircraft and personnel.  For
example, the reserve component was assigned to support operations in
Saudi Arabia for a 3-month period.  Personnel and aircraft from 19
Guard wings were typically rotated for 15 to 30 days to staff a
flying squadron of 8 aircraft.  A similar practice was used in Bosnia
and Panama.  Rotations are done in this manner because participation
by reserve component members without a presidential call-up is
voluntary.  To obtain the complement of personnel needed, individual
volunteers from many units are necessary.  Thus, the number or size
of units is not as important as the number of people that volunteer. 
Unit officials from several wings cited advantages in increasing the
number of aircraft in a flying squadron.  These included increased
training opportunities and improved scheduling flexibility. 

Creating fewer larger-sized flying squadrons should have little
impact on wartime missions as well.  Wartime requirements for C-130
and KC-135 aircraft are not typically defined by the number of
squadrons or wings but by the number of aircraft.  For example, the
July 1996 Joint Chief of Staff's Intratheater Lift Analysis expresses
C-130 requirements in terms of aircraft, not wings or squadrons.  The
recent C-130 Airlift Master Stationing Plan also expresses
requirements in terms of the number of C-130 aircraft.  Moreover, the
study also states that the current C-130 inventory exceeds
requirements, which we believe further lessens the impact of
eliminating squadrons.\3

The manner in which the Air Force plans to use reserve component
units in wartime also minimizes the impact of reducing the number of
flying squadrons.  According to planning officials from the Air
Combat Command and the Air Mobility Command, because active Air Force
units are available immediately, they are typically tasked as lead
units to provide the command and control in theater for wartime
deployments.  Reserve component flying squadrons generally follow
active Air Force units and are placed under their command structure. 
These officials stated that planners partly assign existing reserve
component flying squadrons in war plans by matching the capacity at
likely deployment locations with the squadrons available in the
reserve component inventory.  They said that as long as the total
number of aircraft available to perform missions remained the same,
they could change assignments based on larger-sized squadrons. 
Further, an Air Force official stated that while the Air Force
prefers to assign aircraft by squadrons for planning purposes, flying
squadrons' aircraft can be split, provided a command structure is in
place.  Unit officials stated that during Operation Desert Shield,
reserve component aircraft and personnel were used in this manner. 
Moreover, in current deployment plans we viewed, one KC-135 flying
squadron was split between two locations. 

Although squadrons are assigned to wings in peacetime, war plans
described to us did not call for these wings to deploy or operate
together.  For example, civil engineer, medical, and security police
squadrons may operate separately from the flying squadron.  Wing
officials stated that the Air Force has moved away from activating
entire reserve component units; instead, war-fighting commanders
choose packages of equipment and personnel that will meet their
requirements for the mission at hand.  At several wings we visited,
officials stated that they had not deployed as a wing and were
unaware of any plan to deploy as a wing.  Further, many wing staff,
including the wing commander, are not tasked in war plans and do not
have a specific supporting mission. 


--------------------
\3 This report was submitted to congressional defense committees in
1997.  The Air Force planned to reduce the number of C-130 aircraft
in its active and reserve component inventories to reflect
requirements.  However, the Conference Report on the 1998 Department
of Defense Appropriations Act recommended that reserve component
squadrons remain at current levels. 


   REORGANIZING C-130 AND KC-135
   SQUADRONS AT FEWER LOCATIONS
   COULD REDUCE COSTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

Redistributing the reserve's component C-130 and KC-135 existing
aircraft into fewer, larger squadrons and wings would reduce
operating costs.  For example, redistributing 16 C-130 aircraft from
two 8-aircraft wings to one 16-aircraft wing would save about $11
million dollars annually, primarily from personnel savings.\4 This
reorganization could eliminate about
155 full-time positions and 245 part-time positions.  The decrease in
full-time positions is especially significant, since the savings
associated with these positions represents about $8 million, or 75
percent, of the total savings.  Fewer people would be needed in areas
such as wing headquarters, logistics, operations, and support group
staffs as well as maintenance, support, and military police
squadrons.  Appendix II describes the organization of a typical wing
and how redistributing aircraft would affect the wing. 

In many cases eliminating the aircraft from a wing could also
generate savings additional to operating savings.  For example, civil
engineering and medical squadrons, which help to support the wing and
base in peacetime, are not directly related to the aircraft.  If the
wing is inactivated, these units' worldwide requirements would have
to be reexamined to determine whether they were still needed in the
force structure.  When the Reserve inactivated a C-130 wing in 1997,
all eight of the nonflying squadrons not directly related to the
aircraft were eliminated from the force structure, which involved
about 140 full-time and about 625 part-time drill positions.  Using
average Air Force Reserve full- and part-time pay rates, these
eliminations represent about $12 million in annual salaries. 


--------------------
\4 Savings were calculated using the Air Force's Systemic Approach to
Better Long-Range Estimating (SABLE) model.  For a more complete
description of SABLE, see appendix III. 


   OPTIONS FOR REORGANIZING
   AIRCRAFT AND ACHIEVING SAVINGS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

We developed five options for redistributing the existing reserve
component C-130 and KC-135 aircraft into larger-sized squadrons that
show a gradual increase in savings in operating costs--from $51
million to $209 million annually.\5 Our options are not the only ones
possible, but they do illustrate the significance of the savings that
can be achieved through a redistribution of the aircraft.  The
options base like model aircraft together and involve the same number
of aircraft as are now planned for the reserve component.  In
developing our options, we considered the two factors that reserve
component officials cited as most important to successful
reorganization:  adequate recruiting potential and facility capacity. 

We also evaluated how three other issues could affect our options: 
one-time costs of redistributing the aircraft, the significance of
the geographical location of the aircraft, and the effect that
eliminating squadrons would have on states' abilities to respond to
domestic crises. 


--------------------
\5 To the extent that options are selected that would cause civilian
personnel reductions that exceed the thresholds established in 10
U.S.C.  2687, the Secretary would have to follow the procedures
provided for in that section. 


      OPTIONS REDISTRIBUTED
      AIRCRAFT FROM EXISTING
      SQUADRONS TO CREATE LARGER
      SQUADRONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1

We developed five options that redistributed aircraft from existing
C-130 and KC-135 flying squadrons to other squadrons.  The first
option required the least reorganizing, increasing the number of
squadrons with fewer than 10 aircraft to that level.  This
reorganization would be achieved by redistributing aircraft from
three C-130 squadrons and one KC-135 squadron to other squadrons. 
Our fifth option increased the squadron size to 16 aircraft for the
C-130 and 12 for the KC-135 by redistributing aircraft from 13 C-130
squadrons and 5 KC-135 squadrons to other squadrons.  A detailed
discussion of each option is in appendix I. 


      POPULATIONS SURROUNDING
      GAINING BASES COULD SUPPORT
      INCREASED RECRUITMENT
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.2

Our analysis of data provided by Guard and Reserve recruiting
officials demonstrates that a sufficient number of personnel could
likely be recruited to meet increased requirements of larger
squadrons in most locations.  Air Reserve headquarters recruiters
estimated that they could recruit enough personnel to support 16
C-130 aircraft at 8 of their current 10 locations.  Guard
headquarters recruiters estimated it could recruit an adequate number
of personnel to support 16 aircraft at 9 of 23 C-130 locations.  For
KC-135 aircraft locations, Air Reserve officials estimated it could
recruit enough personnel to support a 12-aircraft squadron at five of
its six locations, with two locations capable of adding an entire
10-aircraft squadron.  Guard recruiting estimates for the KC-135
indicate that 12-aircraft squadrons could be supported at 15 of 19
locations.  Headquarters officials stated that for some options that
double the sizes of existing flying squadrons, additional recruiters
would be required for at least 6 years at affected locations. 

Reserve component officials at units we visited were more optimistic
about their ability to recruit additional personnel than were
headquarters officials.  The four C-130 wings we visited estimated
that they could add four additional aircraft with little or no
problem.  While headquarters recruiters estimated adding four C-130
aircraft at some locations could take several years to fully staff,
unit officials estimated that recruiting additional personnel for the
same number of aircraft would usually take no longer than 18 to 24
months.  Recruiters also indicated that recruiting additional
personnel for more than four aircraft at a given location would be
more challenging but possible, if additional experienced recruiters
were added to the wing receiving the aircraft and if spaces were
available at schools to train new recruits. 

According to reserve component recruiters, the outlook for recruiting
could improve if full- and part-time personnel moved with the
aircraft.  In the recent move of four C-130 aircraft from Chicago,
Illinois, to Milwaukee, Wisconsin, about 200 part-time personnel
relocated to Milwaukee.  Reserve component officials believe it is
probable that many personnel from wings clustered closely would move
with the aircraft if the aircraft were moved to a nearby location. 

The outlook for recruiting could improve further if personnel from
the C-141 fleet, which is being phased out of the inventory, could be
used to support C-130 and KC-135 aircraft.  The reserve component
provides personnel to support most of the C-141 fleet of about 160
aircraft.\6 Only about three-quarters of the C-141 aircraft will be
replaced with C-17 aircraft.  Some current Reserve units are not
scheduled to become C-17 or any other Reserve units.  Thus, this
trained pool of personnel could be available for C-130 or KC-135
aircraft.  Reserve officials have been actively seeking a role for
these personnel. 


--------------------
\6 Only 56 C-141 aircraft are owned by the reserve component.  The
Air Force Reserve provides crews and maintenance personnel for
approximately 100 additional C-141 aircraft owned by the active
force. 


      FACILITIES HAVE SUFFICIENT
      CAPACITY TO EXPAND WITH
      LITTLE INVESTMENT
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.3

Our analysis of facility data provided by reserve component civil
engineering officials shows that many bases could absorb additional
aircraft at little or no cost.  According to these officials, 38
locations could increase the number of assigned aircraft with no
military construction costs.\7 In other cases, ramp and hangar space
would need to be increased slightly.  Also, some locations may
require increased administrative and supply space.  Only in very few
instances would locations require completely new facilities, such as
additional hangars.  All of the National Guard KC-135 wings could
expand to at least 12 aircraft (3 already have more than 12 aircraft)
with one-time construction costs of no more than $6 million.  For
most Guard C-130 wings, the military construction costs would be no
more than a $1 million for increasing from 8 to 12 aircraft.  Also,
17 of 23 locations could accommodate 16 aircraft at a cost ranging
from $1 million to about $10 million. 

Expansion is possible at only three of six Air Force Reserve wings
where KC-135 aircraft are located.  The Reserve estimates it could
add up to 10 additional aircraft at two of the three locations at a
one-time cost of $1 million per squadron.  The Reserve has two
locations with 16 C-130 aircraft.  With an investment of $1.5 million
to $5.5 million per location, the Reserve could accommodate 16
aircraft at five of its other eight C-130 locations. 


--------------------
\7 For most of these locations, funds would be needed for real
property maintenance to existing facilities.  For the majority of
those locations needing this maintenance, the costs would be $75,000
or less. 


      GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF C-130
      AND KC-135 AIRCRAFT A
      CONSIDERATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.4

Before developing our options, we considered whether any mission
requirements would preclude C-130 and KC-135 aircraft moving from
their current locations.  We were told that only four had unique
missions.  Other than those locations, Guard and Reserve officials
stated that airlift and refueling missions could be accomplished from
a number of locations as long as some general geographical
requirements were met.  For instance, tankers meet their customers
off the east and west coasts in a high concentration of areas to
facilitate the movement of aircraft over the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans.  Thus, some refueling aircraft should be located in proximity
to these areas.  These officials also believe that it is important to
maintain reserve component KC-135 aircraft in the northeast because
active duty KC-135 aircraft are no longer based in this region.  Some
officials told us that KC-135 and C-130 aircraft should be based
close to the units they train with, whether with other aircraft
units--as in the case of KC-135 aircraft--or Army units for the C-130
aircraft. 


      LONG-TERM SAVINGS WOULD
      EXCEED ONE-TIME COSTS OF
      CONSOLIDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.5

Although we could not determine one-time costs of consolidating C-130
and KC-135 aircraft in larger squadrons, we do not believe these
costs to be significant relative to expected savings.  Our options
would result in some initial costs for such things as training for
additional people hired at a location gaining aircraft and for
transferring some personnel from one location to another.  In some
cases, personnel could be eligible for severance pay if their
position was eliminated.  Reserve component officials could not
provide estimates of these costs, which would vary depending on how
many trained personnel might relocate with the aircraft and how much
of the relocation expenses the Air Force would pay.  Because we did
not identify specific bases in our options, it is difficult to
determine these costs.  However, during the 1995 base realignment and
closure process, initial implementation costs to move C-130 aircraft
from three locations were estimated to be offset in 1 year for two of
the three locations and 3 years for the third.  According to reserve
component officials, these implementation costs could be minimized in
several ways, for example, by moving aircraft to nearby bases and
allowing recruiters sufficient time to phase in additional personnel. 


      ELIMINATING WINGS IN SOME
      STATES SHOULD NOT PREVENT
      EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.6

National Guard units are unique in that they are under state control
when not federalized.  These assets are available to governors during
emergencies and disasters.  For this reason, inactivating Guard units
has historically caused concern.  However, not all states have C-130
or KC-135 aircraft in their Guard units.  In 16 states, no Guard
units are equipped with C-130 or KC-135 aircraft.  We recognize that
some of our options would likely eliminate National Guard wings in
some states, but these states could still receive assistance during
disasters and emergencies.\8 States can receive assistance from other
states' National Guard units in several ways, for example, through
state compacts, federal laws, DOD regulations, and informal
agreements. 

Compacts, which are agreements between states to support one another
in times of need, are one way that assistance can be provided.  One
of the most inclusive compacts is the Emergency Management Assistance
Compact, which was originally sponsored and established by the
Southern Governors' Association in 1992.  Under this compact, member
states agree to provide for mutual assistance in managing any
declared emergency or disaster as well as mutual cooperation in
exercises and training.  Through this compact, members agree on
issues such as terms of liability, compensation, and reimbursement
when emergency assistance is provided to member states.  The compact
was endorsed by the National Governors' Association and other
regional and national organizations, and any state can now become a
member.  Currently, 20 states have joined the compact.  While a
National Guard official stated that no C-130 or KC-135 aircraft have
yet been used under this compact, other assets such as helicopters
have been shared.  For example, Virginia, Florida, and Kentucky have
provided helicopters to other states. 

States can also receive assistance during a natural disaster or
emergency through the Robert T.  Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act, which authorizes the Federal Emergency
Management Agency to assign missions to any federal agency if the
President declares a federal emergency or disaster.  Under the act,
the agency can provide federal assets, including National Guard and
active duty personnel and equipment, to states that are experiencing
the emergency or disaster.  For example, C-130 aircraft from a
National Guard unit in Maryland assisted Florida, which has no C-130
aircraft in its National Guard, in its efforts to reduce the effects
of Hurricane Andrew. 

Another way states can receive assistance is under a recently
implemented Defense Department directive referred to as "innovative
readiness training." Under this directive, Defense assets can be used
to assist states and communities if the assistance provides a
training opportunity related to units' wartime missions.  In this
case, the Guard can authorize units to participate even if a federal
disaster is not declared.  For example, we were told by Guard
officials that Guard units from outside Iowa received training in
water purification during floods in Iowa. 

Beyond these provisions, National Guard officials stated that
assistance can be coordinated through the National Guard Bureau, even
without an agreement among the states.  To reduce response time,
Guard officials sometimes develop preliminary plans for providing
assistance when a major disaster is pending.  For example, before
Hurricane Iniki struck Hawaii, California National Guard, National
Guard Bureau, and Hawaii National Guard officials coordinated relief
efforts to allow California Guard units' C-130 aircraft to be
prepared to provide assistance there, even though no formal agreement
existed between the two states. 


--------------------
\8 With the approval of a state governor, National Guard units
located entirely within one state may make certain organizational
changes. 


   RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

The reserve components' C-130 and KC-135 aircraft can be
redistributed into larger-sized squadrons and still accomplish their
peacetime and wartime missions.  Such a reorganization would result
in significant savings that could be used to partially fund the
modernization of the Defense Department's force.  Therefore, we
recommend that you direct the Secretary of the Air Force to develop a
plan to organize the C-130 and KC-135 aircraft in the Air National
Guard and Air Force Reserve into larger wings at fewer locations and
seek congressional support for the plan. 

As you know, 31 U.S.C.  720 requires you to submit a written
statement on actions taken on this recommendation to the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight not later than 60 days after the date
of the report and to the Senate and House Committees on
Appropriations with the agency's first request for appropriations
made more than 60 days after the date of the report. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

DOD generally concurred with our findings but non-concurred with our
recommendation.  The Department agrees that reorganizing aircraft at
fewer locations could reduce costs while still allowing the Air Force
to meet its commitments but it pointed out that other factors must
also be weighed in any reorganization plan. 

DOD disagreed that it should develop a specific plan to consolidate
at this time.  The Department observed that some options could
involve base closures and/or realignment of military installations
and the Department intends to seek legislative authority to close and
realign installations in conjunction with its fiscal year 1999
budget.  DOD believes that it would be premature to develop a plan
until Congress acts on the Department's proposal. 

We recognize that many factors are involved in reorganizing aircraft
locations and we assume that the Air Force would take these factors
into account in developing a reorganization plan.  We also recognize
that some options could have base closure and realignment
implications, and that DOD's authority in this area is subject to the
requirements of 10 U.S.C.  2687.  However, the range of options
available to the Secretary is broad, and many options would entail
reductions that would not be subject to these requirements.  Because
DOD agrees that there are cost reductions associated with
reorganizing C-130 and KC-135 aircraft into larger-sized squadrons
and wings, we believe that the Air Force should not delay in
developing a reorganization plan and seek congressional support for
that plan. 

A detailed explanation of our scope and methodology appears in
appendix III, and DOD's comments are reproduced in appendix IV. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of the Air
Force and interested congressional committees.  We will also make
copies available to others upon request. 

Please contact me at 512-3504 if you or your staff have any questions
concerning this report.  Major contributors to this report are listed
in appendix V. 

Sincerely yours,

Richard Davis
Director, National Security
 Analysis


OPTIONS FOR REORGANIZING RESERVE
COMPONENT C-130 AND KC-135
AIRCRAFT
=========================================================== Appendix I

We developed five options for organizing reserve component C-130 and
KC-135 aircraft more cost-effectively into fewer, larger-sized
squadrons.  In developing these options, we incrementally increased
the number of aircraft per squadron for each succeeding option with
16 aircraft as the limit for C-130 squadrons and 12 aircraft as the
limit for KC-135 squadrons.  For each option we developed, we
assessed whether (1) the Guard and Reserve could recruit sufficient
personnel to support additional aircraft and (2) sufficient existing
locations had facilities that could be expanded to accommodate
additional aircraft.  We also varied the mix of Guard and Reserve
aircraft slightly and limited consideration of units outside the
continental United States in some options because these issues have
been identified as sensitive. 

We based our recruiting assessments on data provided by Guard and
Reserve officials.  They rated their likely ability to increase
personnel at all existing C-130 and KC-135 locations as (1) fully
able to meet additional personnel requirements, (2) could meet
personnel requirements with some difficulties, and (3) unlikely to
meet additional requirements.  We based our facility expansion
assessments on civil engineering estimates provided by Guard and
Reserve officials.  We rated locations as low cost if expansion could
be accommodated for $3 million or less, medium cost if expansion
could be accommodated for $3 million to $10 million, high cost if
expansion could be accommodated for over $10 million. 

To calculate savings, we determined the total operating costs for
larger-sized units in our options and compared them to the baseline
costs for the smaller-sized units.  We did not determine
option-specific one-time implementation costs for military
construction or other costs.  Our options show possible annual
savings from $51 million to $209 million, as shown in table I.1. 



                               Table I.1
                
                Total Annual Savings From Reorganization
                     of C-130 and KC-135 Squadrons

                         (Dollars in millions)

                                                   Annual recurring
                                                       savings
                                                ----------------------
                                                           KC-
Option                                           C-130     135   Total
----------------------------------------------  ------  ------  ------
One                                                $35     $16     $51
Two                                                $66     $32     $98
Three                                             $110     $66    $176
Four                                              $130     $77    $207
Five                                              $130     $79    $209
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  Developed by GAO using Guard and Reserve data. 


   C-130 OPTIONS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1

In our five options, we eliminated from 3 to 13 C-130 flying
squadrons from the reserve components' current number of 34
squadrons.  We did not reduce the number of C-130 aircraft already in
the reserve component inventory. 

Option one increased almost half of the flying squadrons with less
than 10 aircraft to that level.  Aircraft located outside the
continental United States were not considered in the analysis for
this option.  There were sufficient locations with the capability to
recruit personnel to fully meet personnel requirements in most cases
and to expand facilities at low cost.  Six aircraft shifted from the
Guard to the Reserve.  Three squadrons were eliminated, and a net of
12 squadrons would increase in size.  This option would save about
$35 million annually. 

Option two increased some squadrons with less than 12 aircraft to
that level.  There were sufficient locations with capabilities to
recruit personnel to fully meet personnel requirements in most cases
and to expand facilities at low cost.  Four aircraft moved to the
Guard from the Reserve,
6 squadrons were eliminated, and a net of 12 squadrons would increase
in size.  This alternative would save about $66 million annually. 

Option three increased many squadrons with less than 14 aircraft to
that level.  Most locations would be able to recruit personnel to
fully meet personnel requirements, but recruiting would be
challenging at some locations.  Most facility needs could be met at
low cost, but a few locations could expand only at medium cost. 
Eight aircraft moved from the Guard to the Reserve, 10 squadrons were
eliminated, and a net of 14 squadrons would increase in size.  This
option would save about $110 million annually. 

Option four increased some of the squadrons to a maximum of 16
aircraft.  Recruiting would be challenging at more locations than in
option three, but most facility needs could be met at low cost, with
some locations able to expand at medium cost.  Two aircraft moved
from the Guard to the Reserve, 12 squadrons were eliminated, and a
net of 15 squadrons would increase in size.  This option would save
slightly more than $130 million annually. 

Option five maximized the number of flying squadrons with 16
aircraft.  The recruiting and facility situations were about the same
as in option four, with some recruiting challenges and facility
expansion possible at medium cost in some areas.  Eight aircraft
moved from the Guard to the Reserve, 13 squadrons were eliminated,
and a net of 14 squadrons would increase in size.  This option saved
about the same amount as option four, $130 million annually. 

Table I.2 shows the Air Force's current basing plan for its squadrons
of C-130 aircraft and the reorganization of the aircraft in our five
options. 



                                                                                      Table I.2
                                                                       
                                                                       Comparison of Air Force's Planned C-130
                                                                             Basing With Our Five Options

                                                                                                      Option
                               -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Current basing                One                           Two                          Three                          Four                          Five
           ------------------  ----------------------------  ----------------------------  ----------------------------  ----------------------------  -----------------------------
                                                     Change                        Change                        Change                        Change
                                                         in                            in                            in                            in
Squadron   Squadron            Squadron            squadron  Squadron            squadron  Squadron            squadron  Squadron            squadron  Squadron            Change in
size              s  Aircraft         s  Aircraft         s         s  Aircraft         s         s  Aircraft         s         s  Aircraft         s         s  Aircraft  squadrons
---------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  ---------
Guard
4                 2         8         2         8         0         1         4        -1         0         0        -2         0         0        -2         0         0         -2
8                16       128         4        32       -12         4        32       -12         2        16       -14         1         8       -15         1         8        -15
10                0         0         9        90         9         2        20         2         1        10         1         0         0         0         1        10          1
12                5        60         5        60         0        12       144         7         3        36        -2         2        24        -3         5        60          0
14                0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         9       126         9         7        98         7         1        14          1
16                0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         4        64         4         6        96          6
====================================================================================================================================================================================
Subtotal         23       196        20       190        -3        19       200        -4        15       188        -8        14       194        -9        14       188         -9
Reserve
8                 8        64         5        40        -3         3        24        -5         2        16        -6         2        16        -6         0         0         -8
10                0         0         3        30         3         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0          0
12                2        24         2        24         0         5        60         3         2        24         0         1        12        -1         0         0         -2
14                0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         4        56         4         1        14         1         0         0          0
16                1        16         1        16         0         1        16         0         1        16         0         4        64         3         7       112          6
====================================================================================================================================================================================
Subtotal         11       104        11       110         0         9       100        -2         9       112        -2         8       106        -3         7       112         -4
====================================================================================================================================================================================
Total            34       300        31       300        -3        28       300        -6        24       300       -10        22       300       -12        21       300        -13
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  Developed by GAO using Guard and Reserve data. 


   KC-135 OPTIONS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2

In our five options, we eliminated from 1 to 5 KC-135 flying
squadrons from the reserve components' current number of 29 squadrons
but did not reduce the number of KC-135 aircraft already in the
reserve components' inventories.  We did not reduce the number of
aircraft from the four locations that the Air National Guard
considered mission unique in any of our options. 

For option one, we increased most squadrons with less than 10
aircraft to that level.  There were sufficient locations with
adequate capabilities to recruit personnel to fully meet requirements
with one exception, where recruiting would be challenging. 
Facilities could be expanded at low cost at every location.  One
squadron was eliminated, and a net of seven squadrons would increase
in size.  This option would save about $16 million annually. 

Option two increased all squadrons but one to a minimum of 10
aircraft.  There were sufficient locations with adequate capabilities
to recruit personnel to fully meet requirements with one exception,
where recruiting would be challenging.  Facilities could be expanded
at low cost at every location.  Four aircraft were shifted from the
Guard to the Reserve, two squadrons were eliminated, and a net of 10
squadrons would increase in size.  This option would save about $32
million annually. 

Option three increased most squadrons to 11 aircraft.  For a few
locations, recruitment would be challenging, but for all others there
was adequate capability to recruit personnel to fully meet
requirements.  Facilities could be expanded at low cost at all but
two locations, where expansion was possible at medium cost at one and
at high cost at the other.  Six aircraft were shifted from the Guard
to the Reserve, 4 squadrons were eliminated, and a net of 20
squadrons would increase in size.  This option would save about $66
million annually. 

Option four increased many squadrons to 12 aircraft.  There was
adequate capability to recruit personnel to fully meet requirements
at most locations, and facilities could be expanded at low cost. 
Five squadrons were eliminated, and a net of 16 squadrons would
increase in size.  This option would save about $77 million annually. 

Option five maximized the number of squadrons with 12 aircraft and
minimized the number of locations.  Most locations were capable of
fully meeting personnel requirements, with recruiting more
challenging, but possible, at several locations.  Most locations
could expand facilities at low cost, with expansion at one location
possible at medium cost and at another location at high cost.  Ten
aircraft were shifted from the Guard to the Reserve, 5 squadrons were
eliminated, and a net of 16 squadrons would increase in size.  This
option would save about $79 million annually. 

Table I.3 shows the Air Force's current basing plan for its squadrons
of KC-135 aircraft and the reorganization of the aircraft in our five
options. 



                                                                                      Table I.3
                                                                       
                                                                        Comparison of Air Force's Planned KC-
                                                                           135 Basing With Our Five Options

                                                                                                      Option
                               -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Current basing                One                           Two                          Three                          Four                          Five
           ------------------  ----------------------------  ----------------------------  ----------------------------  ----------------------------  -----------------------------
                                                     Change                        Change                        Change                        Change
                                                         in                            in                            in                            in
Squadron   Squadron            Squadron            squadron  Squadron            squadron  Squadron            squadron  Squadron            squadron  Squadron            Change in
size              s  Aircraft         s  Aircraft         s         s  Aircraft         s         s  Aircraft         s         s  Aircraft         s         s  Aircraft  squadrons
---------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  ---------
Guard
8                 5        40         3        24        -2         0         0        -5         0         0        -5         0         0        -5         2        16         -3
9                 6        54         0         0        -6         0         0        -6         0         0        -6         0         0        -6         0         0         -6
10               11       110        18       180         7        20       200         9         0         0       -11         5        50        -6         1        10        -10
11                0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0        18       198        18         2        22         2         0         0          0
12                0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0        11       132        11        14       168         14
====================================================================================================================================================================================
Subtotal         22       204        21       204        -1        20       200        -2        18       198        -4        18       204        -4        17       194         -5
Reserve
6                 1         6         1         6         0         0         0        -1         0         0        -1         0         0        -1         0         0         -1
8                 1         8         1         8         0         1         8         0         1         8         0         1         8         0         0         0         -1
10                5        50         5        50         0         6        60         1         4        40        -1         2        20        -3         5        50          0
11                0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         2        22         2         0         0         0         0         0          0
12                0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         3        36         3         2        24          2
====================================================================================================================================================================================
Subtotal          7        64         7        64         0         7        68         0         7        70         0         6        64        -1         7        74          0
====================================================================================================================================================================================
Total            29       268        28       268        -1        27       268        -2        25       268        -4        24       268        -5        24       268         -5
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  Developed by GAO using Guard and Reserve data. 


CONSOLIDATION OF AIRCRAFT COULD
RESULT IN REDUCTION IN PERSONNEL
POSITIONS
========================================================== Appendix II

Organizing existing C-130 and KC-135 aircraft into fewer wings could
result in significant savings due to reductions in personnel
positions.  These reductions would primarily be in squadrons directly
related to each aircraft, since much of the overhead at locations
losing aircraft would no longer be needed; the Air Force would have
to determine the disposition of squadrons not directly related to the
flying squadrons.  Also, squadrons with duplicative functions could
be eliminated.  According to data provided by Guard and Reserve
program officials, only small increases in positions would be
necessary at existing locations receiving additional aircraft. 
Figure II.1 shows the major elements of a typical wing structure. 

   Figure II.1:  Typical Reserve
   Component Wing Organization

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  Shaded organizations are typically directly related to
aircraft and personnel savings in these areas make up the cost
savings in this report. 

Source:  Developed by GAO using Guard and Reserve data. 

The following sections describe each main organization typically in a
wing and the effect that consolidation is likely to have on its
personnel requirements.  Actual locations may have additional
squadrons in the wing that are not directly related to the aircraft. 


   WING HEADQUARTERS
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1

The wing headquarters includes the wing commander and staff that
develop operational plans; evaluate exercises; and provide financial,
legal, safety, public affairs, historical, and other services.  If a
wing loses its only flying squadron, the wing headquarters would
likely be eliminated.  The wing headquarter's staff would not need to
increase if the squadrons' aircraft increase from 8 to 12.  The
number of full-time staff would increase slightly. 


   OPERATIONS GROUP
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2

The operations group comprises a commander and a small staff that
supervise the flying squadron and the operations support flight.  The
flying squadron is staffed with pilots and a crew that operate the
aircraft and are in a fixed ratio to the number of aircraft.  The
operations support flight provides intelligence, scheduling, combat
tactics, training, air crew life support, airfield and air traffic
operations, and weather support to the flying squadron.  If a wing
loses its flying squadron, the operations group would be eliminated. 
As shown in table II.1, the wing that receives a 50-percent increase
in aircraft would need to increase its flying squadron personnel by
42 percent.  Full-time staff would increase about the same
percentage.  The other squadrons would increase minimally. 


   LOGISTICS GROUP
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:3

The logistics group commander and staff oversee the aircraft
generation squadron, maintenance squadron, logistics squadron, and
the logistics support squadron.  The aircraft generation squadron
handles flight line maintenance and related tasks, and the
maintenance squadron handles more substantial repairs.  The logistics
squadron manages transportation vehicles and other base-owned
equipment.  The logistics support squadron manages engines and
training.  All of these squadrons are directly related to the
performance of the aircraft.  If a wing loses it flying squadron, the
logistics group would be eliminated.  The wing that receives a
50-percent increase in aircraft, from 8 to 12, would have to increase
its aircraft generation squadron and maintenance squadron personnel
by about 25 percent.  Full-time staff would increase by a slightly
greater percentage.  Other organizations would be affected only
slightly. 


   SUPPORT GROUP
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:4

The support group includes the mission support squadron and the
security police squadron, which are directly related to the aircraft,
and elements that provide base and other support services, such as
the communications flight, civil engineer, and services flight
squadrons.  If a wing loses its flying squadron, the support group
would be eliminated.  The mission support squadron and security
police at the receiving wing would not increase if the number of
aircraft increased from 8 to 12.  The civil engineering squadron and
the communication and services flights are not directly tied to the
aircraft, and their disposition would have to be determined by the
Air Force. 


   MEDICAL GROUP
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:5

The medical squadron provides family practice, inpatient, and medical
nursing and emergency room, mental health, pharmaceutical, and dental
services.  In the reserve component, one squadron may be the only
organization in the group.  This squadron is not directly related to
the aircraft and would be unaffected at a receiving unit if
additional aircraft were assigned.  The disposition of the medical
squadron losing aircraft would have to be determined by the Air
Force. 

Table II.1 shows the impact of adding four additional aircraft to an
eight-aircraft reserve component C-130 wing. 



                                    Table II.1
                     
                      Comparison of Squadron Staffing for an
                              8-and 12-Aircraft Unit

                                              Person                      Person
                                               nel                         nel
                                              increa                      increa
                                                se                          se
                                              (perce      Full-time       (perce
                          Military personnel   nt)        personnel        nt)
                          ------------------  ------  ------------------  ------
                               8                           8
                          aircra          12          aircra          12
Wing organization             ft    aircraft      50      ft    aircraft      50
------------------------  ------  ----------  ------  ------  ----------  ------
================================================================================
Wing headquarters staff       56          56       0      20          21       5
Operations group staff         6           6       0       1           1       0
Operations squadron           95         135      42      19          28      47
Operations support            20          21       5       7           8      14
 squadron
================================================================================
Operations subtotal          121         162      34      27          37      37
Logistics group staff         10          11      10       6           7      17
Logistics support flight      13          13       0       9           9       0
Logistics squadron           112         112       0      41          44       7
Aircraft generation           63          79      25      29          36      24
 squadron
Maintenance squadron         138         175      27      52          71      37
================================================================================
Logistics subtotal           336         390      16     137         167      22
Support group staff            5           5       0       2           2       0
Mission support flight        26          26       0      12          13       8
Security police squadron      58          58       0      12          12       0
================================================================================
Support subtotal              89          89       0      26          27       4
================================================================================
Wing total                   602         697      16     210         252      20
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  Developed by GAO using Guard and Reserve data. 


OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY
========================================================= Appendix III

We assessed whether the Air Force's reserve component combat C-130
and KC-135 aircraft could feasibly be reorganized into fewer,
larger-sized squadrons and wings.  In making this assessment, we (1)
determined the effect of a reorganization of the C-130 and KC-135
aircraft on mission accomplishment, (2) determined whether costs
could be reduced through a restructuring of the aircraft squadrons,
and (3) developed five possible options for increasing the number of
aircraft in C-130 and KC-135 squadrons and analyzed their effect on
operations and costs.  We focused on combat-coded reserve component
C-135 and C-130 aircraft.  We did not include locations that had only
special-mission versions of these aircraft, especially the C-130. 

To determine the effect of a reorganization of C-130 and KC-135
aircraft on mission accomplishment, we interviewed officials and
obtained data from the Headquarters, Air National Guard, and the
Office of the Air Force Reserve, in Washington, D.C.; the Air
National Guard Readiness Center at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland;
and the Air Force Reserve Command, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia, in
the following functional areas:  recruiting, civil engineering,
manpower, financial management, planning and programming, and
training.  We discussed legal provisions that would affect the
relocation of existing reserve component flying squadrons with the
Air National Guard General Counsel staff and Air Force Reserve
planning staff. 

We also interviewed wing and squadron officials at the 135th Airlift
Squadron at Martin State Airport, Maryland; the 133rd and 934th
Airlift Wings at Minneapolis-St.  Paul International Airport,
Minnesota; the 302nd Airlift Wing, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado;
and the 163rd Air Refueling and 452nd Mobility Wings, March Air Force
Reserve Base, California, to discuss the same functional areas listed
above.  These flying squadrons represent a cross section of reserve
component basing arrangements.  We examined a variety of Air Force
and reserve component regulations, including those regarding facility
requirements and staffing procedures.  We interviewed officials at
the Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, and the Air
Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, to understand how
reserve component assets would fit into the gaining command's war
plans and to obtain their perspectives on the effect of
consolidations. 


   ESTIMATING COST IMPLICATIONS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:1

To determine whether costs could be reduced through a restructuring
of the aircraft squadrons, we developed staffing estimates from data
provided by reserve component officials that develop personnel
requirements.  In developing our estimates, we interviewed staffing
and budget officials at the services' headquarters, readiness
centers, and the squadrons we visited.  We also obtained wing
staffing and budget reports for all squadrons and analyzed specific
squadron staffing authorization documents for 12 squadrons of various
sizes.  At the squadrons we visited, we reviewed and discussed the
number of assigned personnel and the squadron's budgets and discussed
their estimates of the personnel increases and facility additions
that might be needed to accommodate additional aircraft.  Since over
70 percent of the operating costs and almost all of the estimated
savings are associated with military and civilian personnel, we
primarily analyzed the reasonableness of the services' personnel and
salary planning factors.  We found their estimates to be reasonable. 
We provided these staffing estimates to Air Force officials to use in
its SABLE model.\1 Our savings estimates include only the savings
from reduced operating costs that are directly related to each
aircraft and do not include any military construction, base closure,
and other fixed or indirect costs and savings that may be associated
with transferring aircraft from one location to another. 


--------------------
\1 The Air Force's Systematic Approach to Better Long Range
Estimating (SABLE) automated model uses various cost and planning
factors to estimate the peacetime operating and support costs of
flying units.  Operating costs include cost elements in the operation
and maintenance, military personnel, and other procurement
appropriations.  Within these appropriations, the major cost
categories directly related to each aircraft include military and
civilian pay, aviation fuel, depot maintenance, and depot level
repairables.  These costs are estimated for each type and model of
aircraft within each reserve component.  This model is not considered
budget quality. 


   DEVELOPING OPTIONS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2

To determine the feasibility of increasing the number of aircraft in
C-130 and KC-135 squadrons at various locations, we examined the
reserve component's submissions on capacity to the 1995 Base
Realignment and Closure Commission.  The reserve component's
headquarters civil engineering branches provided more current
estimates of the estimated capacity of each squadron and the cost to
increase the capacity.  During visits to C-130 and KC-135 wings, we
obtained civil engineering estimates on each location's ability to
expand, the facilities needed, and the accompanying cost to ensure
that data provided from headquarters was reliable. 

To determine the reserve component's capability to recruit additional
personnel needed to organize wings with additional aircraft, we
obtained assessments from the Air National Guard's and the Air Force
Reserve's headquarters recruitment staff.  These personnel provided
estimates for each location's ability to support additional personnel
for incremental aircraft increases.  We also factored in personnel
readiness standards used by the Department of Defense.  A more
complete discussion of the methodology used in developing options is
included in appendix I. 

For the four C-130 and two KC-135 squadrons we visited, we used the
squadron's recruiting potential according to headquarter's estimates
and assessed its consistency with the local recruiting office's
estimate of its ability to recruit an adequate number of people for
an increase in aircraft at its location. 

To estimate one-time costs for facility improvements, we obtained
cost estimates from the reserve component's civil engineering
headquarters for each location.  We checked these estimates against
those made by local civil engineering personnel at the squadrons we
visited.  To estimate relocation and separation expenses, we examined
1995 base closure estimates on permanent change of station and
separation costs for civilians and military personnel.  We also
interviewed reserve component training personnel to gain an
understanding of the expected changes in training demand due to
consolidation. 

We conducted our review from July 1996 to September 1997 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix IV
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
========================================================= Appendix III


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
=========================================================== Appendix V

NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Fred Dziadek, Assistant Director
Rodell Anderson, Evaluator-in-Charge
Anthony DeFrank, Senior Evaluator

NORFOLK FIELD OFFICE

Dan Omahen, Senior Evaluator
Mary Jo LaCasse, Evaluator


*** End of document. ***