    Aerospace Testing: Promise of Closer NASA/DOD Cooperation Remains Largely
    Unfulfilled (Letter Report, 03/11/98, GAO/NSIAD-98-52).

    GAO reviewed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA)
    and Department of Defense's (DOD) cooperation to develop a national
    perspective on aerospace test facilities, focusing on: (1) the extent to
    which NASA/DOD working groups on major test facilities have been
    operating on a regular basis; (2) NASA's and DOD's actions in response
    to a future need to test an engine for new Air Force rockets; (3)
    whether NASA and DOD prepared a congressionally required joint plan on
    rocket propulsion test facilities; and (4) whether NASA and DOD are
    implementing a DOD assessment team's recommendation in March 1997 to
    jointly manage with NASA certain aeronautical test facilities.

    GAO noted that: (1) the promise of closer NASA/DOD cooperation and the
    development of a national perspective on aerospace test facilities
    remains largely unfulfilled because NASA and DOD: (a) have not yet
    convened most test facility alliances; (b) compete with each other to
    test engines for new rockets; and (c) did not prepare a congressionally
    required joint plan on rocket propulsion test facilities; (2) although
    NASA and DOD have agreed to go beyond cooperative alliances in
    aeronautics and jointly manage their aeronautical test facilities, they
    have not yet reached agreement on key aspects of management
    organization; (3) NASA and DOD took 20 months (May 16 through December
    1997) to negotiate and sign agreements formally establishing the six
    test facility-related cooperative alliances; (4) despite the formation
    of the rocket propulsion alliance, NASA and DOD compete against each
    other to test engines for new rocket programs; (5) a principal arena of
    competition is the next phase of the Air Force's Evolved Expendable
    Launch Vehicle program; (6) DOD did not prepare a legislatively mandated
    joint plan with NASA to coordinate rocket propulsion test facilities;
    (7) in a letter to congressional committee chairs and other members, DOD
    said that the basis of such a plan are: (a) on-going activities such as
    Vision 21; (b) the May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review of defense
    strategy; and (c) activities of the rocket propulsion alliance; (8)
    however, these efforts are unlikely to form the basis of a joint plan
    because NASA is not participating in either Vision 21 or the Defense
    Review; (9) in October 1997, NASA and Air Force officials took a step
    toward creating a national perspective on test facilities in the
    aeronautics area; (10) specifically, they reached an understanding on
    the scope and approach for joint strategic management of their
    aeronautical test facilities, including a new management organization;
    (11) however, they have not yet resolved basic issues, such as the
    organization's structure and authority; and (12) ultimately, if joint
    strategic management of aeronautics test facilities is successfully
    established, its adaption to other types of test facilities could be
    considered.

    --------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

     REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-98-52
         TITLE:  Aerospace Testing: Promise of Closer NASA/DOD Cooperation
                 Remains Largely Unfulfilled
          DATE:  03/11/98
       SUBJECT:  Interagency relations
                 Federal downsizing
                 Cost effectiveness analysis
                 Aerospace research
                 Base realignments
                 Aerospace engineering
                 Research and development
                 Test facilities
    IDENTIFIER:  DOD Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program
                 DOD Vision 21 Plan
                 DOD Quadrennial Defense Review

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    Cover
    ================================================================ COVER

    Report to the Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee
    on Science, Technology and Space, Committee on Commerce, Science and
    Transportation, U.S.  Senate

    March 1998

    AEROSPACE TESTING - PROMISE OF
    CLOSER NASA/DOD COOPERATION
    REMAINS LARGELY UNFULFILLED

    GAO/NSIAD-98-52

    NASA/DOD Cooperation

    (707250)

    Abbreviations
    =============================================================== ABBREV

      AACB - Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board
      BRAC - Base Realignment and Closure
      DOD - Department of Defense
      EELV - Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
      NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration

    Letter
    =============================================================== LETTER

    B-276817

    March 11, 1998

    The Honorable William H.  Frist
    Chairman
    The Honorable John D.  Rockefeller, IV
    Ranking Minority Member
    Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space
    Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
    United States Senate

    The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the
    Department of Defense (DOD) operate several types of aerospace test
    facilities, including wind tunnels and rocket engine test stands.
    Since the end of the Cold War, Congress has been appropriating less
    money for aerospace programs.  In response to declining budgets and
    reductions in personnel, NASA and DOD agreed in 1995 to perform
    essential aerospace testing on a more cooperative basis.\1 The
    agencies recommended, in April 1996, that they establish joint
    working groups, or alliances, to assess and make recommendations on
    investments and other issues.

    As requested, we are providing you with the results of our review of
    NASA's and DOD's cooperation since May 1996 to develop a national
    perspective on aerospace test facilities.\2 Specifically, to assess
    the progress of cooperative efforts we determined (1) the extent to
    which NASA/DOD working groups ("alliances") on major test facilities
    have been operating on a regular basis, (2) NASA's and DOD's actions
    in response to a future need to test an engine for new Air Force
    rockets, (3) whether NASA and DOD prepared a congressionally required
    joint plan on rocket propulsion test facilities, and (4) whether NASA
    and DOD are implementing a DOD assessment team's recommendation in
    March 1997 to jointly manage with NASA certain aeronautical test
    facilities.

    This report includes a matter for congressional consideration.

    --------------------
    \1 A framework within which changes to the federal research,
    development, test, and evaluation infrastructure can be accomplished
    was discussed in Best Practices:  Elements Critical to Successfully
    Reducing Unneeded RDT&E Infrastructure (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-98-23, Jan.
    8, 1998).

    \2 NASA/DOD cooperation on test facilities was previously discussed
    in NASA Infrastructure:  Challenges to Achieving Reductions and
    Efficiencies (GAO/NSIAD-96-187, Sept.  9, 1996) and
    (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-238, Sept.  11, 1996).

       BACKGROUND
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

    In June 1995, NASA and DOD agreed to identify cooperative actions
    that could lead to significant reductions in investments and cost of
    operations.\3 The agencies identified seven areas of mutual interest,
    one of which was major aerospace test facilities--specifically, wind
    tunnels, aeropropulsion test cells, rocket engine test stands, space
    environmental simulation chambers, arc-heaters, and hypervelocity gas
    guns and ballistic ranges.\4 The cooperation initiative was done
    under the auspices of the joint NASA/DOD Aeronautics and Astronautics
    Coordinating Board (AACB).\5
    Figure 1 shows the location of these test facilities.

       Figure 1:  Location of Major
       NASA and DOD Test Facilities

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    The number of active major test facilities declined from 260 in 1993
    to 186 in 1996.  The AACB's major test facilities study team
    concluded that, in most areas, the present number of major test
    facilities "very nearly represents the minimum required to conduct
    the aeronautical- and space-related research and development programs
    identified for this country."\6 The study team further stated that
    (1) closing facilities without eliminating programs does not generate
    big savings, (2) NASA and DOD are not on a common track to developing
    comparable facility-cost accounting, (3) there is inadequate
    coordination of investments, upgrades, and operations between NASA
    and DOD, and (4) NASA and DOD's rocket propulsion test facilities
    have excess capacity for current and future workload.  To address
    these issues, the team recommended in April 1996 that NASA and DOD
    form six cooperative alliances\7 to

      -- coordinate investment to avoid unnecessary duplication,

      -- coordinate test schedules to spread the workload across
         facilities, and

      -- develop standardized and common business processes.

    Notwithstanding a history of NASA/DOD cooperation on aerospace test
    facility-related issues prior to 1996,\8 these goals collectively
    represent an effort to develop a broader national perspective on such
    issues.  In September 1996, Congress added to this effort by
    requiring NASA and DOD to prepare a joint plan on rocket propulsion
    test facilities.

    --------------------
    \3 Final Report on the 1995-1996 DOD/NASA Cooperation Initiative
    (AACB, May 1996).

    \4 See appendix I for information about these types of test
    facilities.

    \5 The AACB is chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Acquisition and Technology and NASA's Deputy Administrator.  The
    purpose of the AACB is to facilitate coordination of aeronautics and
    space activities of mutual interest.

    \6 The study team documented a 30-percent reduction in active
    aeronautical facilities since 1993, with an annual saving of $14.2
    million.

    \7 In the summer of 1995, NASA officials met several times to discuss
    cooperation on rocket propulsion testing on a national basis, and the
    major test facilities study team's proposal to form alliances drew on
    the discussions of this group.

    \8 For example, DOD relies on NASA to meet all of its subsonic wind
    tunnel testing requirements.  Also, research and test centers such as
    NASA's Lewis Research Center, Ohio, and DOD's Arnold Engineering
    Development Center, Tenn., cooperate in several areas, including
    testing the effects of icing on aircraft wings and engines.

       RESULTS IN BRIEF
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

    The promise of closer NASA/DOD cooperation and the development of a
    national perspective on aerospace test facilities remains largely
    unfulfilled because NASA and DOD (1) have not yet convened most test
    facility alliances, (2) compete with each other to test engines for
    new rockets, and (3) did not prepare a congressionally required joint
    plan on rocket propulsion test facilities.  Although NASA and DOD
    have agreed to go beyond cooperative alliances in aeronautics and
    jointly manage their aeronautical test facilities, they have not yet
    reached agreement on key aspects of a management organization.

    NASA and DOD took 20 months (May 1996 through Dec.  1997) to
    negotiate and sign agreements formally establishing the six test
    facility-related cooperative alliances.\9 During that time, only the
    space environmental simulation alliance met regularly and conducted
    business.  The already established rocket propulsion alliance met
    only once during this period despite a desire by some members to meet
    regularly.  NASA and DOD officials did not regularly convene the
    other four alliances in the absence of approved charters.\10

    Despite the formation of the rocket propulsion alliance, NASA and DOD
    compete against each other to test engines for new rocket programs.
    A principal arena of competition is the next phase of the Air Force's
    Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program.\11 In particular,
    the Air Force has spent millions of dollars to upgrade a test stand
    on the assumption that it, not NASA, would test EELV engines.

    DOD did not prepare a legislatively mandated joint plan with NASA to
    coordinate rocket propulsion test facilities.\12 In a letter to
    congressional committee chairs and other members, DOD said that the
    bases of such a plan are (1) on-going activities such as Vision
    21,\13 (2) the May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review of defense
    strategy,\14 and (3) activities of the rocket propulsion alliance.
    However, these efforts are unlikely to form the basis of a joint plan
    because NASA is not participating in either Vision 21 or the Defense
    Review.  Further, DOD prepared, but did not submit, a legislative
    package for Vision 21, and instead opted to include consolidation of
    its laboratories and test and evaluation centers in future "Base
    Realignment and Closure" (BRAC) rounds.  But Congress, so far, has
    not accepted the need for such rounds.  As a consequence, Vision 21's
    future is unclear until Congress either changes its position on BRAC
    or new guidelines for Vision 21 are developed.

    In October 1997, NASA and Air Force officials took a step toward
    creating a national perspective on test facilities in the aeronautics
    area.  Specifically, they reached an understanding on the scope and
    approach for joint strategic management of their aeronautical test
    facilities, including a new management organization.  However, they
    have not yet resolved basic issues, such as the organization's
    structure and authority.  Ultimately, if joint strategic management
    of aeronautics test facilities is successfully established, its
    adaption to other types of test facilities could be considered.

    --------------------
    \9 The charters were signed by DOD on December 24, 1997, and by NASA
    on January 9, 1998.  See appendix II for the charter of the National
    Rocket Propulsion Test Alliance.

    \10 Between November 1996 and October 1997, NASA and DOD officials
    participated in workshops and meetings on wind tunnel test technology
    and joint management of aeronautics test facilities.  Agency
    officials consider these meetings to be functionally equivalent to
    alliance meetings.  The Airbreathing Propulsion Test Facilities
    alliance held its first meeting on October 23, 1997.  Also, NASA and
    Air Force officials held four discussions on rocket propulsion
    test-related issues during the May 1996-November 1997 period.

    \11 Additional information on the EELV program can be found in Access
    to Space:  Issues Associated With DOD's Evolved Expendable Launch
    Vehicle Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-130, June 24, 1997).

    \12 Section 211(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 1997 (P.L.  104-201, Sept.  23, 1996).

    \13 Vision 21 responds to sections 277 and 265 of the National
    Defense Authorization Act of 1996
    (P.L.  104-106, Feb.  10, 1996).  Section 277 requires a 5-year plan
    to consolidate and restructure DOD's laboratories and test and
    evaluation centers by 2005.  Section 265 requires DOD to conduct a
    comprehensive review of U.S.  aeronautical research and test
    facilities.

    \14 The review of the defense program (potential threats, strategy,
    force structure, readiness posture, military modernization programs,
    and defense infrastructure) was required by the Military Force
    Structure Review Act of 1996 (title IX, subtitle B of P.L.  104-201,
    Sept.  23, 1996).

       MOST NASA/DOD ALLIANCES WOULD
       NOT MEET WITHOUT APPROVED
       CHARTERS
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

    The institutional centerpiece of future NASA/DOD cooperation on
    aerospace test facilities is six alliances approved by the AACB in
    April 1996.  Twenty months later, NASA and DOD signed agreements
    formally establishing these alliances.  However, with one exception,
    the new alliances did not meet regularly during that time, and the
    rocket propulsion alliance--which predates the cooperation
    initiative--met only once.  The one exception was the space
    environmental simulation alliance, which met four times and evaluated
    a proposed new investment at Kennedy Space Center.  The rationale
    given by most alliances for not meeting was the lack of an approved
    charter.

          ONLY ONE ALLIANCE MET
          REGULARLY
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1

    Despite not having official charters, the space environmental
    simulation alliance met four times and the rocket propulsion test
    alliance met once between May 1996 and October 1997.  The other
    alliances could have conducted business without formal charters, but
    did not.  At its inaugural meeting in November 1996, the space
    environmental simulation alliance noted the absence of a charter, but
    agreed to conduct business deemed to be in the "best national
    interest." The alliance also met in February, May, and August 1997.

    Similarly, the rocket propulsion test alliance met in October 1996
    and members noted other alliances "do not appear to be meeting," but
    agreed the rocket propulsion alliance "cannot wait." As of November
    30, 1997, this alliance has not met again.  A NASA official told us
    the alliance did not meet because there was little business to
    discuss until NASA implemented its plan, as discussed below, to
    consolidate NASA's management of rocket propulsion testing.  In
    addition, NASA and DOD officials disagreed over who in their
    respective agencies should sign the alliance's charter.

          ALLIANCE HELPED ELIMINATE
          PROPOSAL TO BUILD VACUUM
          CHAMBER
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2

    An example of how the promise of closer cooperation on test
    facility-related issues can be met by alliances was provided by the
    space environmental simulation alliance in March 1997.  In early
    1997, officials at NASA's Kennedy Space Center proposed to build a
    vacuum chamber to (1) test for leaks in the pressurized parts of the
    International Space Station prior to their launch and assembly in
    space and (2) support an environmental test capability at Kennedy.
    In February 1997, NASA headquarters officials asked the space
    environmental simulation alliance to evaluate the proposal.  In March
    1997, the alliance's evaluation team concluded that there was "no
    compelling reason" to construct such a facility to support space
    station requirements.  With regard to Kennedy's proposed test
    capability, the team recommended a "rigorous" thermal vacuum chamber
    requirements and cost-benefits analysis that, in part, would include
    determination of the national thermal vacuum chamber capabilities.

    On June 25, 1997, the Kennedy Space Center introduced another
    approach to justify acquiring a vacuum chamber.  This time, Kennedy
    officials solicited comments from industry, for planning purposes
    only, on the design, construction, and procurement methodology for a
    thermal vacuum chamber to simulate environments on other planets.
    Kennedy officials estimated the chamber would cost from $35 million
    to $60 million.  NASA's Office of the Inspector General is currently
    doing a review to determine whether (1) the alliance's recommended
    cost-benefit analysis was performed, (2) the vacuum chamber is needed
    to support present and future NASA missions and programs, and (3)
    funding will be available for the project's construction,
    installation, and operation.  The Inspector General has not set a
    completion date for this review.

       NASA AND DOD COMPETE TO TEST
       ROCKET ENGINES
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

    Despite the formation of the rocket propulsion alliance, NASA's and
    DOD's relationship over this type of testing has been recently marked
    by competition.  Partly to improve its competitive position, NASA has
    consolidated rocket propulsion test management in one center, but is
    struggling to define the center's authority for this role.  Testing
    engines in the next phase of the EELV program was the focus of NASA
    and Air Force competition.  In July 1997, an EELV engine contractor
    provisionally selected NASA's Stennis Space Center to test engines in
    the next phase of the program.  Consequently, the future role of the
    Air Force's test center for this program is uncertain.

          NASA CONSOLIDATES MANAGEMENT
          OF ROCKET PROPULSION TEST
          FACILITIES
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1

    NASA tests rocket engines in four locations:  Stennis Space Center,
    Mississippi; Marshall Space Flight Center, Alabama; White Sands Test
    Facility, New Mexico; and Lewis Research Center's Plum Brook Station,
    Ohio.  According to Stennis officials, these four test locations have

         "resulted in facility duplication and higher overall
         infrastructure-related costs.  Substantial investments have been
         made in facilities based on local insight and local funding
         provided by programs, institutions, and non-NASA customers
         rather than on an Agency-wide perspective."

    In May 1996, NASA's Associate Administrator for Space Flight
    unilaterally designated Stennis Space Center the center of excellence
    "not only for NASA, but DOD, other government agencies, academia and
    industry." He noted, the "unique capabilities currently in place" at
    Stennis "permit us to centralize the major propulsion test facilities
    of NASA, DOD, and industry." NASA's rocket propulsion testing is
    managed by the Rocket Propulsion Test Management Board.\15 It
    determines the location of each test, reviews investment
    recommendations, and establishes annual budget requirements.\16 For
    example, in November 1996, the Board accepted a recommendation to
    relocate a 5,000 gallon high pressure liquid hydrogen tank from a
    component test stand at Marshall to the one at Stennis, as part of
    NASA's plan to complete this facility and consolidate test
    capabilities at Stennis.\17 The Board has also decided to move four
    other liquid oxygen tanks from Marshall.

    --------------------
    \15 Board members are from Stennis, Marshall, White Sands, and Lewis.
    The Board's chair is from Stennis.

    \16 According to a Stennis official, Stennis has authority, in
    principle, to establish the rocket propulsion test budget on a
    NASA-wide basis, but details of how it will do so are incomplete.

    \17 NASA requested $45.5 million to complete this partially
    constructed facility.  The funds were appropriated by the Omnibus
    Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (P.L.  104-134, Apr.  26,
    1996).  The facility was started in 1989 in support of the Advanced
    Launch System program and stopped when the program was canceled in
    1992.

          NASA REJECTS INTERNAL PLAN
          TO REDUCE ROCKET PROPULSION
          TEST FACILITIES
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2

    Although NASA has consolidated management of rocket propulsion
    testing at Stennis, it has struggled to define Stennis' authority to
    make investment decisions.  For example, the early goals of
    consolidation went beyond relocation to include mothballing and
    abandoning test assets as necessary to reduce or eliminate
    unnecessary duplication and lower costs.  In January 1997, Stennis
    officials proposed a plan that would have greatly reduced testing at
    Marshall and Plum Brook; some stands would have been abandoned and
    others would have had their capabilities reduced and transferred to
    Stennis and White Sands.  The draft plan was based on known
    requirements for NASA's test services.  But, by June 1997, NASA's
    management decided to abandon Stennis' plan rather than the test
    stands at other centers.  Nearly all of the test stands and
    facilities that would have been deactivated by the January plan will
    remain open.  According to Stennis officials, the June plan is based
    on possible future customers, which are estimated to be more
    plentiful than funded customers.\18

    --------------------
    \18 An unfunded but possible future customer is a liquid fuel engine
    for the Space Shuttle's reusable boosters.  The current boosters use
    solid fuel.  Congress has not approved new types of boosters for the
    Shuttle.

          AIR FORCE TRIES TO IMPROVE
          COMPETITIVE POSITION
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3

    The Air Force tests rocket engines at Phillips Laboratory, Edwards
    Air Force Base, California; and Arnold Engineering Development
    Center, Tennessee.\19 In April 1997, the Air Force established the
    Air Force Research Laboratory consisting of Phillips Laboratory,
    three other laboratories, and the Air Force Office of Scientific
    Research.\20 However, Arnold, as a test center, is not part of the
    consolidation.

    Phillips Laboratory's Test Stand 1A was built in the late 1950s and
    has recently been altered to give it a liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen
    capability.  Phillip's Test Stand 2A also has been changed for a
    high-pressure liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen capability for testing
    engine components.  So far, changes to these stands have cost about
    $49 million.\21 Test stand 1A's changes are for EELV engine testing
    and 2A for the government--and industry--sponsored Integrated High
    Payoff Rocket Propulsion Technology program to boost engine
    performance over the next 15 years.\22

    --------------------
    \19 Phillips Laboratory's headquarters is Kirtland Air Force Base,
    N.Mex.  The Navy and Army test rocket engines at the Naval Air
    Warfare Center, China Lake, Calif.; and Redstone Technical Test
    Center, Redstone Arsenal, Ala., respectively.

    \20 This reorganization is being conducted in phases between March
    1997 and 2001.  Besides Phillips Laboratory, the other laboratories
    affected by the consolidation are Armstrong, Rome, and Wright.

    \21 The cost to change Test Stand 1A has been about $14 million and
    Test Stand 2A about $35 million.

    \22 NASA and DOD have participated in this program since 1993 to
    develop new propulsion technologies in three phases with goals set
    for 2000, 2005, and 2010.  For example, at the end of phase I in
    2000, new propulsion technologies are to cut existing expendable
    launch vehicle costs by 38 percent and increase payloads by an
    average of 40 percent.

          AIR FORCE MAY HAVE LOST
          COMPETITION TO TEST NEW
          ENGINE
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.4

    The federal government currently uses a fleet of expendable launch
    vehicles--Delta, Atlas, and Titan--to transport national security and
    civil satellites into space.  According to DOD, these vehicles
    currently operate at or near their maximum performance capability.
    In 1994, Congress directed DOD to develop a space launch
    modernization plan that led to the initiation of the EELV program.
    On December 20, 1996, the Air Force selected McDonnell Douglas' Delta
    IV and a Lockheed Martin proposal for the "preliminary engineering
    and manufacturing development" phase of the competition to build the
    Air Force's EELVs consisting of small, medium, and heavy launchers.
    Lockheed Martin's EELV will use the Russian-designed RD-180 engine to
    be built by Pratt and Whitney.  Rocketdyne Division of Boeing North
    American is building the Delta IV's first-stage RS-68 engine.\23 In
    November 1996, Rocketdyne selected Phillips to test its engines in
    the second, or pre-engineering and manufacturing development, phase
    of the program.  Originally, a single contractor for the third, or
    engineering and manufacturing development, phase of the EELV program
    was to have been selected in June 1998.\24 The anticipated contract
    value for the third phase was $1.6 billion over approximately
    6 years.  However, on November 6, 1997, the Air Force announced a
    change in acquisition strategy to fund both Boeing's and Lockheed
    Martin's EELVs in the third phase of the program.

    Testing EELV engines in the next phase of the program is important to
    Stennis and Phillips.  According to a Stennis official, Stennis has
    two test stands available for EELV engine testing in 1998, but
    without EELV engine testing, there are no identifiable customers
    starting in 1999 for these and another of its large test stands.\25
    And, as noted previously, the Air Force refurbished Phillip's Test
    Stand 1A for EELV engine testing.  This test stand has no other
    funded customers.

    Despite the Air Force's efforts, it may have lost its EELV engine
    customer to NASA.  On July 19, 1997, Boeing stated that it had
    selected Stennis to conduct development, certification, and
    production acceptance testing of the RS-68 engine.  Boeing has not
    yet fully defined its test requirements, and its intention to test at
    Stennis is conditional pending a satisfactory resolution of such
    issues as the amount of Stennis' user fees.  Boeing may also test
    this engine on Phillip's Test Stand 1A, but it has not made a formal
    commitment to do so.

    --------------------
    \23 The Boeing Company and McDonnell Douglas Corporation began
    operations as a single company on August 4, 1997.

    \24 EELV acquisition is in three phases--low-cost concept validation
    (Aug.  1995-Dec.  1996), pre-engineering and manufacturing
    development (Dec.  1996-June 1998), and engineering, and
    manufacturing development (June 1998-2004).

    \25 Testing the engines for Lockheed's Reusable Launch Vehicle is
    scheduled to start in 2004.

          ROCKET PROPULSION ALLIANCE
          NOT YET PLAYING AN ACTIVE
          ROLE
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.5

    The rocket propulsion alliance last met in October 1996 but did not
    discuss such major current issues as (1) consolidation of propulsion
    testing at NASA or elsewhere, (2) competition between NASA and the
    Air Force to test engines, and (3) investment decisions.

    According to NASA officials, the alliance is likely to be reactive
    and unlikely to initiate a consolidation-related evaluation on its
    own.  At the October meeting, NASA described the reasons for making
    Stennis NASA's center of excellence for rocket propulsion testing and
    noted its consolidation plan would be completed by early 1997.

    At the time of the alliance meeting in October, NASA and the Air
    Force were competing to test EELV engines in the current phase of the
    program.  Upgrades to Phillips' test stands for EELV testing were
    noted at the meeting, but this investment was not critically
    discussed.  Also not discussed was the role the alliance might play
    in evaluating future investment decisions or NASA's effort to
    complete the component test facility at Stennis after the Air Force
    had started to refurbish its own component test stand at Phillips.
    According to a DOD official associated with the alliance, a test of
    its effectiveness is the ability of alliance members to review a
    proposed investment in test facilities.

       REQUIRED JOINT ROCKET
       PROPULSION TEST FACILITIES PLAN
       WAS NOT SUBMITTED
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

    In September 1996, Congress enacted legislation requiring NASA and
    DOD to submit within 90 days a

         "joint plan for coordinating and eliminating unnecessary
         duplication in the operations and planned improvements of rocket
         engine and rocket engine component test facilities managed by
         the [Air Force and NASA].  The plan shall provide, to the extent
         practical, for the development of commonly funded and commonly
         operated facilities."\26

    In a January 1997 response to congressional committees, DOD
    acknowledged that although NASA and the Air Force "do not yet have a
    formal plan," a range of efforts was underway that would "form the
    basis for such a plan." The efforts cited were Vision 21, the
    Quadrennial Defense Review, and the rocket propulsion alliance.

    The first two efforts cited are unlikely to form the basis of a joint
    plan because NASA is not a formal part of the Vision 21 review, and
    DOD does not intend that its 5-year plan to consolidate and
    restructure its laboratories and test and evaluation centers be a
    joint plan with other federal agencies.  NASA also was not a formal
    part of the Quadrennial Defense Review of defense strategy.
    Nevertheless, NASA concurred with DOD's response.  DOD did not state
    in its letter whether it would prepare a joint plan for submission to
    Congress in the future.

    The rocket propulsion test alliance's possible role in joint planning
    is problematical at this time in as much as the alliance has not met
    since October 1996 and the requirement for a joint plan was not
    formally discussed at the meeting.

    There is an additional reason why Vision 21 cannot serve as the basis
    of the joint plan.  DOD prepared, but did not submit, a legislative
    package for Vision 21; instead, it opted to include consolidation of
    its laboratories and test and evaluation centers in future BRAC
    rounds.  But Congress, so far, has not accepted the need for such
    rounds.  As a consequence, Vision 21's future is unclear until
    Congress either changes its position on BRAC or new guidelines for
    Vision 21 are developed.

    --------------------
    \26 Public Law 104-201, section 211(c).

       NASA AND DOD MOVE TOWARD JOINT
       STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF
       AERONAUTICAL TEST FACILITIES
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

    NASA and DOD took a step toward creating a national perspective on
    testing in the area of aeronautics by agreeing in May 1997 to
    consider joint strategic management of their test facilities.  And in
    October 1997, NASA and Air Force officials reached a verbal
    understanding on the scope and approach for joint strategic
    management, but have yet to agree on key aspects of a management
    organization.  Ultimately, if joint strategic management of
    aeronautics testing is successfully established, its adaption to
    other types of test facilities could be considered.

          NASA AND DOD OFFICIALS'
          CONCEPTS OF JOINT MANAGEMENT
          DIFFER
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.1

    The October understanding was preceded by an agreement on May 5,
    1997, between senior NASA and DOD officials to discuss issues
    associated with joint strategic management.  In so doing, they
    rejected the two aeronautical alliances (wind tunnels and
    aeropropulsion) as the way to address a variety of management and
    investment issues.

    This agreement, in turn, followed a DOD assessment team's report,
    which noted in March 1997:

         "Each agency and Service manages its wind tunnel facilities
         independently.  There is no structured oversight of the various
         facilities in the nation .  .  .  .  As a result, there is no
         focused approach to what the national needs are for the various
         facilities."\27

    The DOD assessment team was skeptical that the two aeronautical
    alliances could effectively overcome this tradition of independence
    and recommended, in part, that DOD (1) establish a new office with
    NASA to manage the investment and test-technology-related funds for
    the nation's core government wind tunnel facilities and (2)
    immediately initiate with NASA and industry a long-term program to
    build a new transonic wind tunnel.\28

    The DOD assessment team proposed a new organization--National
    Aeronautical Facility Base--with members from the three military
    departments and NASA.\29

    The members would reside within their parent agencies, and, in ad hoc
    fashion, comprise the new organization.  The organization would not
    have authority over operations and maintenance funds, which would
    remain under the separate authorities of DOD and NASA.  But the
    management organization would "make investments based on a national
    perspective without regard to whether the wind tunnel facility is
    DOD- or NASA-owned."

    NASA's aeronautical officials also were doubtful about the adequacy
    of the cooperative alliances, and in November 1996, before the AACB's
    aeronautics panel, recommended formation of an independent
    organization to strategically manage selected NASA and DOD wind
    tunnels and aeropropulsion test cells.\30

    However, in NASA's proposal, the new organization would receive
    funding from participating agencies and possibly industry, and its
    staff would be full-time members of the organization.

    In proposing their different versions of joint management, NASA and
    DOD officials noted that in 1994 seven European aeronautical research
    establishments had combined to form a joint management organization
    called the Association of European Research Establishments in
    Aeronautics, which now manages five wind tunnels in four countries.
    NASA and DOD officials believe relatively new European wind tunnels
    and the association of research establishments have combined to make
    Europe's facilities especially competitive in attracting new
    test-related business.\31

    In October 1997, NASA and Air Force officials reached a verbal
    understanding on a scope and approach for a joint strategic
    management organization.  The understanding proposes that NASA and
    DOD will continue to own, operate, and fund their own test
    facilities.  The purpose of the new management organization will be
    to provide strategic management in four areas:  (1) planning
    (includes making foreign competitive assessments and developing an
    associated strategy), (2) test technology (includes advocacy for
    resources), (3) operations policy (includes reviewing, coordinating,
    and recommending facilities' test schedules), and (4) business
    management (includes, as discussed below, cost accounting and
    charging policy).  The new organization will be under the review
    authority of the AACB.

    However, basic questions remain about strategic joint management,
    including the new organization's structure and authority to make
    binding decisions and recommendations.  NASA and DOD officials have
    not agreed on a charter for the new management organization.

    --------------------
    \27 DOD Aeronautical Test Facilities Assessment (Mar.  1997), p.  60.

    \28 This recommendation revives a recommendation of the April 1994
    report of the "National Facilities Study" team, which recommended
    that two major new wind tunnels be developed with the primary
    objective of strengthening U.S.  industry's capability to compete
    effectively in the international market for commercial jet
    transports.  In 1996, NASA terminated this program due to budget
    constraints.  See David P.  Radzanowski, Wind Tunnels:  Proposal for
    a New National Wind Tunnel Complex (Congressional Research Service,
    Jan.  4, 1995).

    \29 The model for this organization is DOD's Major Range and Test
    Facility Base, which is comprised of 21 test installations,
    facilities, and ranges, including, for example, Arnold Engineering
    Development Center.

    \30 Aside from Aeronautics, the AACB's other panels are Launch
    Systems Development, Spacecraft Technology, and Space Communications
    and Operations.

    \31 European Aeronautics:  Strong Government Presence in Industry
    Structure and Research and Development Support (GAO/NSIAD-94-71, Mar.
    23, 1994).

          COST ISSUES REMAIN
          UNRESOLVED
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.2

    The major facilities study team recognized that consolidation of test
    facilities depended on the development of "consistent/comparable"
    cost models because currently NASA and DOD differ on the issues of
    how much and whom to charge for testing.  Generally, NASA does not
    charge for use of its aeronautical test facilities, while DOD does.

    The major facilities study team developed some information on cost
    models.  The team noted that although NASA's and DOD's "direct" and
    "indirect" costs were comparable at summary levels, differences over
    what to charge users of test services remained.\32 In 1993, Congress
    gave DOD increased flexibility to adjust charges for indirect costs
    for commercial users of its Major Range and Test Facility Base.\33
    NASA does not charge customers of its aeronautical facilities unless
    they receive "special benefits" over and beyond those which accrue to
    the public at large.  For example, NASA charges commercial customers
    to use its wind tunnels if their tests are not officially supported
    by a government contract or letter of intent, or, if so supported,
    they are beyond the scope of testing requested by the government.  On
    the other hand, DOD's Major Range and Test Facility Base charges
    other federal agencies and commercial customers 100 percent of direct
    costs and a portion of indirect costs.

    --------------------
    \32 Direct costs are those that can be linked to specific activities
    in using a facility itself.  Indirect costs are those common to
    various programs using a facility, plus an allocated share of the
    general and administrative costs of doing business at a research
    center or base.

    \33 Section 846 of the Fiscal Year 1994 National Defense
    Authorization Act (P.L.  103-160, Nov.  30, 1993).

       CONCLUSIONS
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

    By agreeing to the recommendation to establish cooperative alliances,
    the AACB accepted the proposition that institutionalizing cooperative
    behavior in this way would add value to the already established
    cooperative relationship between NASA and DOD.  Progress towards
    validating this proposition has been slow and sporadic.  The
    alliances appear to offer the opportunity for an ongoing evaluation
    of test-related issues and cost-saving efficiencies of mutual
    interest to NASA and DOD, and thereby, create the basis for the
    testing community itself to construct a national perspective on these
    issues.  While this perspective may be emerging in some cases, it is
    essentially absent in others.  By not convening most alliances, the
    development of a national perspective from the bottom up remains
    largely untested.  While the effect of such a delay is unclear, it
    may indicate that some NASA and DOD test officials do not see the
    alliances as having practical value, and that, with few exceptions,
    they would not object to continuing the pre-alliance status quo.

    In 1996, Congress began to push for a national perspective with the
    requirement for joint planning, common funding, and common operations
    of NASA and DOD's rocket propulsion test facilities.  NASA's and
    DOD's formal reply to this requirement was not responsive.
    Consequently, it may be appropriate to reaffirm and extend the search
    for a national perspective on test facility issues begun in the 1996
    legislation.

       MATTER FOR CONGRESSIONAL
       CONSIDERATION
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

    Congressional intent, as reflected in the statutory requirement for
    joint planning of rocket propulsion test facilities, is not being
    fully met by NASA and DOD.  Congress may wish to consider reaffirming
    its intention in this regard and extend its joint planning
    requirement to other types of aerospace test facilities, including a
    requirement that NASA and DOD assess the possible extension of joint
    management of aeronautical facilities to other types of test
    facilities, especially rocket propulsion.

       AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
       EVALUATION
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9

    In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred that
    NASA and DOD need to coordinate more on infrastructure planning, but
    partially concurred that progress in institutionalizing cooperation
    was slow and sporadic.  While DOD agreed that progress was slow in
    some areas, it believed we should give more credit to the progress
    that has been made.  DOD noted that, without formal alliance
    charters, increases have occurred in interagency communications,
    interagency meetings on coordination of test technology, joint
    management alternatives and data bases, and the agencies'
    understanding of each other's policies and capabilities.  DOD also
    partially concurred with our suggestion that Congress may wish to
    consider reaffirming its intention for joint planning of rocket
    propulsion test facilities and assess the possible extension of joint
    planning to other types of aerospace test facilities.  DOD emphasized
    that it fully intends to meet congressional requirements and said
    that further legislation is either not needed or premature.  DOD's
    comments and our evaluation of them are included in appendix III.

    While an objective of our report is to determine the extent to which
    cooperative alliances have been operating on a regular basis, we
    recognized cooperative activities that preceded the signing of the
    alliances' charters in January 1998.  For example, we noted
    cooperation on (1) testing in subsonic wind tunnels, (2) testing the
    effects of icing on aircraft, (3) developing wind tunnel test
    technology plans, (4) discussing rocket engine test issues, and (5)
    boosting rocket engine performance over the next 15 years.  In
    particular, one activity cited by DOD--joint management
    alternatives--is discussed in some detail.

    In responding to our conclusion and matter for congressional
    consideration, DOD did not state when it intends to comply with the
    statutory requirement.  Therefore, because DOD and NASA have not been
    responsive to the congressional requirement, we believe that a
    reaffirmation of congressional intent, which would not necessarily
    require additional legislation, might be appropriate.  We did not
    suggest that Congress extend joint management to other types of
    aerospace test facilities, only that Congress consider requiring an
    assessment of that possibility.  We believe our matter for
    congressional consideration remains valid.

    In its written comments, NASA said the report could be strengthened
    by including updated information and identifying past cooperative
    activities made by the alliances.  As discussed previously, we
    believe our report identified past cooperative activities.  We
    updated the report where appropriate.  NASA's comments are reprinted
    in appendix IV.

    NASA and DOD also provided technical comments which we have
    incorporated where appropriate.

       SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
    ----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :10

    To accomplish our objectives, we obtained documents from and
    interviewed officials at NASA headquarters in Washington, D.C.;
    NASA's Langley Research Center, Virginia; Goddard Space Flight
    Center, Maryland; and John C.  Stennis Space Center, Mississippi.  We
    also held discussions with and obtained documents from officials in
    the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
    Technology, the Air Force's Test and Evaluation Directorate,
    Washington, D.C.; the Air Force's Phillips Laboratory Propulsion
    Directorate, Edwards Air Force Base, California (now part of the Air
    Force Laboratory, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio); the Air
    Force's EELV program office, Los Angeles Air Force Base, California;
    and the Air Force Materiel Command's Arnold Engineering Development
    Center, Arnold Air Force Base, Tennessee.

    To evaluate NASA and DOD's formal cooperation, we interviewed
    cognizant officials about the chartering and perceived value of the
    test facility alliances and reviewed the minutes of all formal
    alliance and AACB panel meetings held between May 1996 and August
    1997.

    With regard to competition to test EELV rocket engines, we
    interviewed cognizant officials and reviewed documents at Stennis
    Space Center and the Propulsion Directorate of Phillips Laboratory on
    the perceived advantages and disadvantages of each test facility in
    relation to EELV testing.  We also discussed EELV testing with
    officials at the Air Force's EELV program office and with officials
    of one of the EELV engine contractors.

    To evaluate NASA and DOD's response to a congressional requirement to
    prepare a joint plan on rocket propulsion test facilities, we
    interviewed officials about DOD's response and analyzed documents
    obtained at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Acquisition and Technology.

    To review proposals for joint management of wind tunnels, we
    interviewed cognizant officials about the perceived need for a new
    management arrangement and reviewed joint-management proposals at the
    Langley and Arnold centers.

    We performed our work between November 1996 and December 1997 in
    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    --------------------------------------------------------- Letter :10.1

    We are sending copies of this report to the NASA Administrator; the
    Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Management and
    Budget.  We will also make copies available to others upon request.

    If you or your staff have any questions, I can be reached at (202)
    512-4841.  Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix
    V.

    Allen Li
    Associate Director,
    Defense Acquisition Issues

    MAJOR TEST FACILITIES
    =========================================================== Appendix I

    The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the
    Department of Defense (DOD) formed cooperative alliances for the
    following types of test facilities:

    Wind tunnels are used to test aerodynamic forces (lift, drag, and
    side force) acting on scale models of air and spacecraft in a
    controlled airstream at different airspeeds.  The challenge to
    testing in a wind tunnel is the applicability of results obtained
    with a scale model to full-sized air and spacecraft.  Figure I.1
    depicts a NASA wind tunnel that consisted of three test sections fed
    by one power source consisting of 4 coupled electric motors capable
    of 180,000 horsepower when operating on a continuous basis.

       Figure I.1:  Wind Tunnel

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

       Source:  NASA.

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    Aeropropulsion test cells are used to test air-breathing engines
    under simulated flight conditions.  (See fig.  I.2.)

       Figure I.2:  Aeropropulsion
       Test Cell

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

       Source:  Arnold Research
       Center.

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    Rocket engine test stands are used to test chemical, solar, electric,
    and other types of rocket engines, and engine components such as fuel
    pumps and injector systems.  Some test stands can simulate high
    altitudes.  The test stand in figure I.3 is 160 feet high and can
    test engines capable of producing 1.5 million pounds of thrust.

       Figure I.3:  Rocket Engine Test
       Stand

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    \a Run tanks directly supply engine with fuel and oxydizer from
    near-by storage tanks.

       Source:  NASA.

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    Space environmental simulation chambers are used to test spacecraft,
    instruments and components in ground handling, launch, and powered
    and orbital flight environments.  Test facilities include acoustic
    and thermal vacuum chambers.  Some simulation chambers are capable of
    creating a vacuum of less than one billionth of atmospheric pressure.
    (See fig.  I.4.)

       Figure I.4:  Space
       Environmental Simulation
       Chamber

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

       Source:  NASA.

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    Arc-heated facilities are used for two fundamental purposes:
    aerothermal testing of materials and structures to simulate the
    aerodynamic heating environment of hypersonic flight, and
    aeropropulsion testing of engines that operate at high velocities and
    temperatures.  NASA tests heating of Earth and planetary entry
    vehicles, and DOD tests heating of ballistic and other types of
    missiles.  The arc heated facility illustrated in figure I.5 is
    capable of heating gas to more than 10,000 degrees Fahrenheit and
    directing it under pressure at an object or material to be tested.

       Figure I.5:  Arc-Heated
       Facility

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

       Source:  NASA.

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    Hypervelocity gas guns are used for impact testing.  NASA tests
    meteoroid/orbital debris-sized particles impacting on space
    structures such as the international space station.  DOD tests
    ballistic missile intercept systems.  In figure I.6, a powder charge
    drives the piston into trapped hydrogen, compressing it.  The petal
    valve ruptures, forcing the projectile and sabot down the launch
    tube.  The sabot is machined plastic that protects the launch tube
    from the projectile.

       Figure I.6:  Hypervelocity Gas
       Gun

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

       Source:  NASA.

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    (See figure in printed edition.)Appendix II
    CHARTER OF NATIONAL ROCKET
    PROPULSION TEST ALLIANCE
    =========================================================== Appendix I

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    (See figure in printed edition.)Appendix III
    COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
    DEFENSE
    =========================================================== Appendix I

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    The following are GAO's comments on DOD's letter dated December 23,
    1997.

    GAO COMMENTS

    1.  Refer to the "agency comments and our evaluation" section of the
    report.

    2.  We do not indicate that the alliances were not pursuing the
    intentions of their charters.

    3.  We did not review the basis of the Air Force's decision to
    upgrade some of Phillips Laboratory's test stands, nor did we
    evaluate the EELV program.  The point of our discussion of EELV
    engine testing was to establish that the NASA/DOD relationship on
    rocket engine testing is defined by both competitive and cooperative
    behavior.  We used EELV engine testing to illustrate the competitive
    aspect of this relationship.  The congressional requirement for joint
    planning of rocket propulsion test facilities establishes the context
    of our discussion because joint planning is one possible way to
    manage the NASA/DOD relationship in this area.  With respect to DOD's
    comment on the rocket propulsion alliance, we did not state that the
    alliance should have reviewed the decision to upgrade Phillip's test
    stands.  Our point is that, in the opinion of some alliance members,
    a test of the alliance's future relevance is its determination and
    ability to evaluate investment issues of the type that had been made
    at Phillips and Stennis Space Center.

    4.  Determining test capacity of rocket engines was not an objective
    of our report.  We note that when DOD states that "Both NASA and Air
    Force officials have challenged the assumption that there is excess
    rocket test capacity with the two agencies," it is, in fact,
    disagreeing with the conclusion of its own May 1996 report on
    NASA/DOD cooperative initiatives.  DOD's response does not provide
    specific information as to why NASA's and DOD's perception changed
    from May 1996 to October 1996 when DOD says the rocket propulsion
    alliance determined that there was no excess test capacity in the
    alliance for the next 2 years.  Subsequent to DOD's response, we
    analyzed the minutes of the October 1996 meeting of the rocket
    propulsion alliance and concluded that these minutes do not clearly
    reflect that a discussion on test capacity took place or that a
    determination about capacity was made.

    5.  We share DOD's concern about the premature expansion of joint
    strategic management to other types of test facilities.  As we stated
    in the report, ultimately, if joint strategic management of
    aeronautics test facilities is successfully established, its adaption
    to other types of test facilities could be considered.

    (See figure in printed edition.)Appendix IV
    COMMENTS FROM THE NATIONAL
    AERONAUTICS AND SPACE
    ADMINISTRATION
    =========================================================== Appendix I

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
    =========================================================== Appendix V

    NATIONAL SECURITY AND
    INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
    WASHINGTON, D.C.

    Frank Degnan
    Tom Mills
    Dan Hoagland

    DENVER FIELD OFFICE

    Maria Durant
    Mark McClarie

    LOS ANGELES FIELD OFFICE

    Ambrose McGraw
    Jeff Webster

    *** End of document. ***