Space Surveillance: DOD and NASA Need Consolidated Requirements and a
Coordinated Plan (Chapter Report, 12/01/97, GAO/NSIAD-98-42).
GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) space surveillance
requirements and DOD's space surveillance capabilities, focusing on: (1)
how well DOD's existing surveillance capabilities support DOD's and
NASA's current and future surveillance requirements; and (2) the extent
to which potential surveillance capabilities and technologies are
coordinated to provide opportunities for improvements.
GAO noted that: (1) DOD's existing space surveillance network is not
capable of providing the information NASA needs to adequately predict
collisions between space objects orbiting the earth and multibillion
dollar space programs like the space station; (2) the existing network
cannot satisfy DOD's emerging space surveillance requirements, which are
currently under review; (3) DOD's plans--to modernize an existing
surveillance network radar system and develop three new ballistic
missile warning systems that could contribute to performing the
surveillance function--do not adequately consider DOD's or NASA's
surveillance requirements; (4) these four systems are separately managed
by the Navy, the Air Force, and the Army; (5) an opportunity exists to
consider these systems' potential capabilities to enhance the
surveillance network to better satisfy requirements and achieve greater
benefits from planned investment in space sensor technology; (6) despite
NASA's dependency on DOD to provide space object information, the 1996
National Space Policy makes no provision for an interagency
mechanism--either organizational or funding--to ensure that DOD's
surveillance capabilities satisfy NASA's requirements; (7) overall,
there is no authoritative direction, formal agreement, or clear plan on
how DOD and NASA could consolidate their space surveillance requirements
for a common capability; (8) a coordinated interagency plan that
considers all existing and planned space surveillance capabilities could
be beneficial in making cost-effective decisions to satisfy a
consolidated set of national security and civil space surveillance
requirements; (9) unless DOD and NASA can agree on such a plan, an
opportunity may be missed to simultaneously: (a) achieve efficiencies;
(b) better ensure the safety of the planned multibillion dollar space
station; and (c) help satisfy national security needs, including the
U.S. forces' future needs for space asset information.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-98-42
TITLE: Space Surveillance: DOD and NASA Need Consolidated
Requirements and a Coordinated Plan
DATE: 12/01/97
SUBJECT: Space exploration
Aerospace research
Satellites
Military communication
Data collection
Interagency relations
Military intelligence
Radar equipment
Warning systems
Systems compatibility
IDENTIFIER: Space Shuttle
NASA International Space Station Alpha Program
DOD Space Surveillance Network
SDI Ground-Based Radar
SDI Theater High Altitude Area Defense System
THAADS
Navy Space Surveillance System
DOD Space-Based Infrared System
DOD Space-Based Infrared System-Low
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Requesters
December 1997
SPACE SURVEILLANCE - DOD AND NASA
NEED CONSOLIDATED REQUIREMENTS AND
A COORDINATED PLAN
GAO/NSIAD-98-42
Space Surveillance
(707209)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
DOD - Department of Defense
GAO - General Accounting Office
GBR - Ground-Based Radar
NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration
SBIRS - Space-Based Infrared System
THAAD - Theater High-Altitude Air Defense
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-275848
December 1, 1997
The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher
Chairman
The Honorable Robert E. Cramer, Jr.
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
Committee on Science
House of Representatives
In response to your request, this report discusses (1) the Department
of Defense's (DOD) and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration's (NASA) requirements for surveillance of space
objects and (2) DOD's space surveillance capabilities to support
these requirements. This report contains recommendations to the
Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense,
the Air Force, the Navy, and the Army; the Administrator of NASA; the
Directors of the Office of Management and Budget, the Office of
Science and Technology Policy, and the Central Intelligence; and
other interested congressional committees. Copies will be made
available to others upon request.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report,
please call me at (202) 512-4841. Major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix IV.
Louis J. Rodrigues
Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0
PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
During the past 40 years, the number of manmade space objects
orbiting the earth--active and inactive satellites and debris
generated from launch vehicle and satellite breakups--has increased
dramatically. Knowing what objects are in space and their locations
are important because of the (1) implications of foreign satellite
threats to U.S. national security and (2) hazards that such objects
create for multibillion dollar space programs, especially large ones
such as the International Space Station.
At the request of the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, House Committee on Science,
GAO is providing this report on the Department of Defense's (DOD) and
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) space
surveillance requirements and DOD's space surveillance capabilities.
GAO evaluated (1) how well DOD's existing surveillance capabilities
support DOD's and NASA's current and future surveillance requirements
and (2) the extent to which potential surveillance capabilities and
technologies are coordinated to provide opportunities for
improvements.
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
According to a National Science and Technology Council report,\1
an estimated 35 million manmade space objects are orbiting the earth.
Of these objects, only about 8,000 can be routinely observed by DOD's
existing space surveillance sensors. DOD and the intelligence
community are interested in knowing the type, status, and location of
space objects, particularly foreign satellites, as part of DOD's
space control mission and other national security functions.\2 NASA
is interested in accurate and timely information on the location and
orbits of space objects to predict and prevent collisions with
spacecraft designed for human space flight--the space station and
space shuttles.
DOD and NASA rely on the U.S. Space Command's Space Surveillance
Network, which is operated and maintained by the Air Force, Naval,
and Army Space Commands, to provide information on space objects.
The network, consisting of radar and optical sensors, data processing
capabilities, and supporting communication systems, detects space
objects; tracks them to determine their orbits; and characterizes
them to determine their size, shape, motion, and type. This
information is transmitted from the sensors to two command centers
for processing and maintained in a catalog, which is used for such
purposes as monitoring foreign satellites and analyzing space debris.
--------------------
\1 This Council was established by the President in 1993 to
coordinate science, space, and technology policies throughout the
federal government. The President is the Council Chairman, and
membership includes the Vice President and cabinet-level and other
federal agency officials. See Interagency Report on Orbital Debris,
November 1995.
\2 The space control mission includes four functions: surveillance
to provide awareness of all activities in space; protection to ensure
U.S. space system survivability; prevention to preclude an adversary
the use of U.S. or third-party space systems, capabilities, and
products; and, when directed, negation to deny adversaries the use of
their space systems.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
DOD's existing space surveillance network is not capable of providing
the information NASA needs to adequately predict collisions between
space objects orbiting the earth and multibillion dollar space
programs such as the space station. Moreover, the existing network
cannot satisfy DOD's emerging space surveillance requirements, which
are currently under review.
DOD's plans to (1) modernize an existing surveillance network radar
system and (2) develop three new ballistic missile warning systems,
which could contribute to performing the surveillance function, do
not adequately consider DOD's or NASA's surveillance requirements.
These four systems are separately managed by the Navy, the Air Force,
and the Army. An opportunity exists to consider these systems'
potential capabilities to enhance the surveillance network to better
satisfy requirements and achieve greater benefits from planned
investment in space sensor technology.
Despite NASA's dependency on DOD to provide space object information,
the 1996 National Space Policy makes no provision for an interagency
mechanism--either organizational or funding--to ensure that DOD's
surveillance capabilities satisfy NASA's requirements. Overall,
there is no authoritative direction, formal agreement, or clear plan
on how DOD and NASA could consolidate their space surveillance
requirements for a common capability. A coordinated interagency plan
that considers all existing and planned space surveillance
capabilities could be beneficial in making cost-effective decisions
to satisfy a consolidated set of national security and civil space
surveillance requirements. Unless DOD and NASA can agree on such a
plan, an opportunity may be missed to simultaneously (1) achieve
efficiencies; (2) better ensure the safety of the planned
multibillion dollar space station; and (3) help satisfy national
security needs, including the U.S. forces' future needs for space
asset information.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
EXISTING NETWORK CANNOT
SATISFY EMERGING
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1
The U.S. Space Command cannot satisfy NASA's space surveillance
requirements with the existing surveillance network. One
requirement--detecting and tracking space objects as small as
1 centimeter--is linked to the potentially catastrophic effect of a
collision between such an object and the space station. Another
requirement--locating space objects more accurately--is not currently
possible because the network's sensors and processing capability and
capacity are insufficient, and DOD does not have a program to measure
object location accuracy. These deficiencies necessitate an upgraded
capability to the surveillance network.
In August 1997, NASA provided surveillance requirements to the U.S.
Space Command that are commensurate with NASA's responsibilities to
ensure the safety of human space flight. According to the NASA
Administrator, these requirements reflect NASA's needs to minimize
risk to human and robotic space flight and assist in recovery from
mishaps of both domestic and foreign spacecraft. However, DOD and
NASA have not reached agreement regarding how to satisfy these
requirements.
DOD's existing space surveillance requirements have been repeatedly
studied and will likely become more stringent to address emerging
needs regarding future threats. DOD is concerned about timely
warning to U.S. forces when a foreign satellite becomes a threat to
military operations. With larger numbers of smaller size satellites
(known as microsatellites) expected in the future, DOD believes the
space surveillance mission will become more difficult to execute.
DOD is currently reviewing its requirements.