    Drug Control: Update on U.S. Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean and
    Eastern Pacific (Letter Report, 10/15/97, GAO/NSIAD-98-30).

    Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed drug trafficking lanes
    into the United States from the Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and
    eastern Pacific Ocean, focusing on: (1) the nature of drug trafficking
    activities through the transit zone; (2) host nation efforts,
    capabilities, and impediments to an effective counternarcotics program;
    (3) U.S. agencies' capabilities, including funding, in interdicting drug
    trafficking activities in the region; and (4) the status of U.S.
    agencies' efforts to plan, coordinate, and implement U.S. interdiction
    activities.

    GAO noted that: (1) since its April 1996 report, the amount of drugs
    smuggled and the counternarcotics capabilities of host countries and the
    United States have remained largely unchanged; (2) cocaine trafficking
    through the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific regions continues, and drug
    traffickers are still relying heavily on maritime modes of
    transportation; (3) recent information shows that traffickers are using
    "go-fast" boats, fishing vessels, coastal freighters, and other vessels
    in the Caribbean and fishing and cargo vessels with multi-ton loads in
    the Eastern Pacific; (4) recent estimates indicate that, of all cocaine
    moving through the transit zone, 38 percent (234 metric tons) is being
    shipped through the Eastern Pacific; (5) although the United States has
    continued to provide technical assistance and equipment to many
    Caribbean and other transit zone countries, the amount of cocaine seized
    by most of the countries is small relative to the estimated amounts
    flowing through the area; (6) the counter-drug efforts of many transit
    zone countries continue to be hampered by limited resources and
    capabilities; (7) the United States does not have bilateral maritime
    agreements with 12 transit zone countries to facilitate interdiction
    activities; (8) the United States has increased funding but has had
    limited success in detecting, monitoring, and interdicting air and
    maritime trafficking in the transit zone; (9) Joint Interagency Task
    Force (JIATF)-East assets devoted to these efforts have stayed at almost
    the same level; (10) JIATF-East has requested additional resources from
    the Department of Defense to address Eastern Pacific drug trafficking;
    (11) Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) officials told GAO
    that it developed an overall strategy that identifies agency roles,
    missions and tasks to execute the drug strategy and establish task
    priorities; (12) according to ONDCP, its performance measurement systems
    remains incomplete; (13) until measurable targets are developed, it will
    not be possible to hold agencies with jurisdiction in the Caribbean
    accountable for their performance; and (14) law enforcement agencies
    with Caribbean jurisdiction are developing a regional plan to be
    completed by January 1998, led by the Drug Enforcement Administration,
    the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the U.S. Customs Service.

    --------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

     REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-98-30
         TITLE:  Drug Control: Update on U.S. Interdiction Efforts in the
                 Caribbean and Eastern Pacific
          DATE:  10/15/97
       SUBJECT:  Narcotics
                 Drug trafficking
                 Foreign governments
                 International cooperation
                 Law enforcement agencies
                 Interagency relations
                 Search and seizure
                 International agreements
                 Federal intelligence agencies
    IDENTIFIER:  Caribbean
                 Gulf of Mexico
                 Central America
                 South America
                 Mexico
                 National Drug Control Strategy
                 Pacific Ocean
                 Atlantic Ocean
                 Coast Guard Operation Frontier Shield
                 ONDCP National Interdiction Command and Control Plan

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    Cover
    ================================================================ COVER

    Report to Congressional Requesters

    October 1997

    DRUG CONTROL - UPDATE ON U.S.
    INTERDICTION EFFORTS IN THE
    CARIBBEAN AND EASTERN PACIFIC

    GAO/NSIAD-98-30

    Drug Control

    (711265)

    Abbreviations
    =============================================================== ABBREV

      AEW - Airborne Early Warning
      DEA - Drug Enforcement Administration
      DOD - Department of Defense
      JIATF - Joint Interagency Task Force
      ONDCP - Office of National Drug Control Policy
      ROTHR - Relocatable Over the Horizon Radar

    Letter
    =============================================================== LETTER

    B-277852

    October 15, 1997

    The Honorable J.  Dennis Hastert
    Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security,
     International Affairs, and Criminal Justice
    Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
    House of Representatives

    The Honorable Bill McCollum
    Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime
    Committee on the Judiciary
    House of Representatives

    Drug traffickers use a 6-million square mile area that includes the
    Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, Central America, the northern
    coast of South America, Mexico, and the Eastern Pacific--commonly
    referred to as the "transit zone"--to move illegal drugs into the
    United States.  In April 1996, we reported\1

    that (1) the level of Caribbean illegal drug activities--especially
    maritime operations--had increased, (2) many Caribbean nations had
    limited resources and capabilities to conduct effective antidrug
    operations, (3) funding and capabilities for U.S.  interdiction
    efforts had declined, and (4) the executive branch had not developed
    a plan of action to implement the U.S.  strategy to counteract
    cocaine smuggling in the transit zone.

    As you requested, we have reviewed what has happened in this area
    since our April 1996 report.  Our specific objectives were to review
    changes in (1) the nature of current drug-trafficking activities
    through the transit zone; (2) host nation efforts, capabilities, and
    impediments to an effective counternarcotics program; (3) U.S.
    agencies' capabilities, including funding, in interdicting
    drug-trafficking activities in the region; and (4) the status of U.S.
    agencies' efforts to plan, coordinate, and implement U.S.
    interdiction activities.

    --------------------
    \1 Drug Control:  U.S.  Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean Decline
    (GAO/NSIAD-96-119, Apr.  17, 1996).

       BACKGROUND
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

    Under the U.S.  National Drug Control Strategy, the United States has
    established domestic and international efforts to reduce the supply
    and demand for illegal drugs.  The strategy includes five goals
    intended to integrate the budgets and activities of all organizations
    involved in counterdrug efforts.  The goals focus on education, law
    enforcement, and treatment in the United States and on eradication,
    alternative development, interdiction, support for host nations,
    money laundering, and other issues outside the United States.\2 Goal
    four of the National Drug Control Strategy is "to shield America's
    air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat." In its efforts to
    achieve this goal, the United States has efforts underway to detect,
    monitor, and interdict illegal narcotics moving through the transit
    zone.

    From 1986 to 1996, the United States spent about $103 billion on
    efforts to reduce drug supply and demand.  About $20 billion of this
    amount was expended on international counternarcotics efforts,
    including $4.1 billion to support crop eradication, alternative
    development, and increased foreign law enforcement capabilities and
    $15.6 billion for interdiction activities.  Funding for drug
    interdiction in the transit zone declined from about $1 billion in
    1992 to $600 million in 1996.

    In 1988, the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) was
    established to set priorities and objectives for national drug
    control, develop an annual drug control strategy, and oversee the
    strategy's implementation.  The U.S.  Interdiction Coordinator, who
    reports to ONDCP, is responsible for coordinating the efforts of all
    U.S.  agencies involved in drug interdiction.  The Department of
    State coordinates U.S.  efforts in host countries, including training
    provided by U.S.  agencies.  The Department of Defense (DOD) supports
    U.S.  law enforcement agencies by tracking and monitoring suspected
    drug-trafficking activities.  Within the transit zone, the U.S.
    Coast Guard is the lead agency for maritime drug interdiction and
    co-lead with the U.S.  Customs Service for air interdiction.  They
    provide aircraft and ships to assist with detection and monitoring
    activities.  The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is responsible
    for coordinating drug enforcement intelligence gathering overseas and
    conducting law enforcement operations.  DEA's activities in the
    Caribbean are managed by its Puerto Rico-based field division and in
    the Bahamas by its Miami field division.

    On September 17, 1997, the executive branch revised the National
    Interdiction Command and Control Plan that called for creating
    several joint interagency task forces that are intended to strengthen
    interagency coordination of U.S.  drug control efforts.  According to
    the revised plan, the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-East,
    located in Key West, Florida, is responsible for detection,
    monitoring, sorting, and handoff of suspect air and maritime
    drug-trafficking events in the Pacific Ocean east of 92 west
    longitude, the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean Sea, Central America
    north of Panama, and surrounding seas and the Atlantic Ocean.
    JIATF-East is composed of personnel from various defense and civilian
    law enforcement agencies.  JIATF-South, located in Panama, focuses on
    source country initiatives and the detection and monitoring of
    suspect drug targets for either subsequent handoff to participating
    national law enforcement agencies or to JIATF-East for further
    monitoring.

    --------------------
    \2 The international aspect of the strategy focuses on supply
    reduction and is guided by a presidential directive issued in
    November 1993 that called for a gradual shift in emphasis from the
    transit zone to the source countries.  Funding for source country
    activities against drug trafficking increased from $231.5 million in
    fiscal year 1996 to $313.7 million in fiscal year 1997.

       RESULTS IN BRIEF
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

    Since our April 1996 report, the amount of drugs smuggled and the
    counternarcotics capabilities of host countries and the United States
    have remained largely unchanged.  Cocaine trafficking through the
    Caribbean and Eastern Pacific regions continues, and drug traffickers
    are still relying heavily on maritime modes of transportation.
    Recent information shows that traffickers are using "go-fast" boats,
    fishing vessels, coastal freighters, and other vessels in the
    Caribbean and fishing and cargo vessels with multiton loads in the
    Eastern Pacific.  Also, recent estimates indicate that, of all
    cocaine moving through the transit zone, 38 percent (234 metric tons)
    is being shipped through the Eastern Pacific.

    Although the United States has continued to provide technical
    assistance and equipment to many Caribbean and other transit zone
    countries, the amount of cocaine seized by most of the countries is
    small relative to the estimated amounts flowing through the area.
    The counterdrug efforts of many transit zone countries continue to be
    hampered by limited resources and capabilities.  Moreover, the United
    States does not have bilateral maritime agreements with 12 transit
    zone countries to facilitate interdiction activities.

    Also since our prior report, the United States has increased funding
    but has had limited success in detecting, monitoring, and
    interdicting air and maritime trafficking in the transit zone.
    JIATF-East assets devoted to these efforts have stayed at almost the
    same level.  However, drug-trafficking events are usually not
    detected and, when detected, often do not result in narcotics
    seizures.  U.S.  counternarcotics officials believe that the Eastern
    Pacific--a major drug-threat area--could benefit from greater
    attention.  JIATF-East has requested additional resources from DOD to
    address Eastern Pacific drug trafficking, believing that cocaine
    seizures it supports could be doubled.  DOD has not determined what,
    if any, additional support will be allocated to the Eastern Pacific
    above current force levels.  In 1996, the U.S.  Customs Service and
    U.S.  Coast Guard initiated two intensive operations in and around
    Puerto Rico and the U.S.  Virgin Islands that resulted in increased
    cocaine seizures and a disruption in drug-trafficking patterns.

    In response to our recommendation in our earlier report that ONDCP
    develop a regional plan of action, ONDCP officials told us that it
    developed an overall strategy that identifies agency roles, missions,
    and tasks to execute the drug strategy and establish task priorities.
    However, the strategy does not include quantitative objectives for
    activities that would establish a defined baseline for developing
    operational plans and resource requirements.  According to ONDCP, its
    performance measurement system remains incomplete, as of October 1,
    1997, because proposed measurable targets, the core of ONDCP's
    system, are still under review.  Until these measurable targets are
    developed, it will not be possible to hold agencies accountable for
    their performance.  In addition, law enforcement agencies with
    jurisdiction in the Caribbean are in the process of developing a
    regional plan led by DEA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
    the U.S.  Customs Service.  This plan is expected to be completed by
    January 1998.

       COCAINE FLOW THROUGH THE
       TRANSIT ZONE CONTINUES TO
       THREATEN THE UNITED STATES
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

    According to the Department of State's 1997 International Narcotics
    Control Strategy Report, about 760 metric tons of cocaine were
    produced in South America in 1996.\\3 Of this amount, U.S.  officials
    estimate that about 608 metric tons moved through the transit zone
    destined for U.S.  markets and 40 metric tons transited to Europe.
    The officials acknowledge, however, that estimates of the amount of
    cocaine that enters the United States are based on limited
    intelligence and other information and may not reflect the actual
    cocaine flow.\4 Maritime conveyances continue to be the predominant
    means for smuggling cocaine into the United States.

    The Eastern Pacific and Western and Eastern Caribbean are the
    principal cocaine smuggling routes from South America to the United
    States.  U.S.  interagency 1996 estimates indicated that of the 608
    metric tons of cocaine destined for the United States, 234 metric
    tons flowed through the Eastern Pacific, 264 metric tons flowed
    through the Western Caribbean, and 110 metric tons flowed through the
    Eastern Caribbean.  About 52 percent of the U.S.-bound cocaine
    transited Mexico and Central America.  As shown in figure 1, the
    United States is the principal destination for cocaine smuggled in
    the transit zone.

       Figure 1:  1996 Cocaine Flow in
       the Western Hemisphere

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    Source:  U.S.  Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement.

    U.S.  interagency estimates for the first 2 quarters of 1997 showed
    that cocaine continued to be moved mostly by maritime conveyances and
    Mexico was the principal destination.  According to interagency
    estimates, Mexico and Central America received 59 percent of the
    cocaine during this period.  The Caribbean countries accounted for 30
    percent of the flow, and 11 percent was shipped directly to the
    United States from source countries.  Also, U.S.  law enforcement
    agencies noted some changes in trafficking patterns in and around
    Puerto Rico.  They attributed this change to increased U.S.  law
    enforcement efforts in this area.

    According to the DEA Caribbean Field Division, the Eastern Caribbean
    corridor remains a prolific drug-trafficking route.  South American
    traffickers continue to use the Bahamas and islands in the Leeward,
    Windward, and Hispaniola routes as staging and transshipment areas.
    Cocaine loads originate in Colombia or Venezuela and are moved by air
    or large motherships to smaller vessels in the Eastern Caribbean.
    The many unguarded airstrips and coastlines of the Caribbean islands
    make it easy for traffickers to refuel or store cocaine for further
    shipment directly to the United States or through Puerto Rico.

    According to DEA, Puerto Rico is a popular gateway to the United
    States and a principal staging destination for South American drug
    traffickers.  Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Jamaica have also
    experienced increased drug-smuggling activity.  For example, DEA has
    indicated that, in the past, the role of Dominicans in the drug
    business was limited to "pick-up crews" and couriers who assisted
    Puerto Rican smugglers.  Today, Dominicans have sophisticated
    drug-smuggling operations and use advanced security systems and
    telephone communications to move and sell cocaine in the Caribbean
    and the United States, according to DEA.  Even with heightened
    enforcement, offshore airdrops along the southern coast of the
    Dominican Republic and in the Mona Passage between Puerto Rico and
    the Dominican Republic continue.  In addition, the Department of
    State has reported that thousands of kilograms of cocaine have been
    smuggled over the border from Haiti into the Dominican Republic,
    whose army has had little success in stopping the flow of drugs.

    Although the Eastern Caribbean remains a major route for illegal drug
    trafficking, the larger quantities of cocaine pass through Mexico via
    the Eastern Pacific and Western Caribbean corridors.  U.S.
    interagency estimates show that, in 1996, 314 metric tons of cocaine
    reached Mexico for eventual movement to the United States through the
    Eastern Pacific and Western Caribbean channels.  Of this amount,
    about 70 percent was shipped through the Eastern Pacific.  Multiton
    shipments of cocaine depart Colombia, Panama, or Ecuador
    predominantly by noncommercial maritime means and travel north via
    the Pacific Ocean.  Shipments reach Mexico directly or are unloaded
    at sites along the Central American coast to smaller vessels.  The
    U.S.  interagency also estimates that about 30 percent of the cocaine
    entering Mexico passed through the Western Caribbean.

    --------------------
    \3 According to the Department of State, estimated worldwide cocaine
    availability is based on potential production of crop harvest yield
    and the assumption that all coca leaf will be converted to cocaine.

    \4 JIATF-East officials said factors such as seizure data, shipments
    to non-U.S.  markets, and consumption in the source zone were not
    considered in cocaine flow assessments prior to 1997.  However, the
    U.S.  international counternarcotics policy interagency working
    group, responsible for generating cocaine flow estimates, plans to
    include these factors in preparing its estimate of the 1997 flow.
    The working group is composed of U.S.  law enforcement and defense
    agencies involved in counternarcotics programs.

          COCAINE SEIZURES IN THE
          TRANSIT ZONE
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1

    Overall cocaine seizures in the transit zone\5 have increased from 61
    metric tons in 1994 to 66 metric tons in 1995 and to 80 metric tons
    in 1996, according to JIATF-East.  These amounts include seizures by
    U.S.  agencies at sea and local law enforcement authorities in Mexico
    and Caribbean and Central American countries.  Of the 1996 seizures,
    53 metric tons were seized by transit zone countries and 27 metric
    tons were seized by the United States at sea.  Seizures by Mexico and
    Central American countries accounted for about 40 of the 80 metric
    tons seized in 1996.

    --------------------
    \5 These seizures do not include those made in Puerto Rico and the
    U.S.  Virgin Islands, which are considered arrival zone seizures.

          MARITIME SMUGGLING CONTINUES
          TO DOMINATE ACTIVITY IN THE
          TRANSIT ZONE
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2

    Since 1993, cocaine traffickers have continued to increase their
    reliance on maritime vessels.  According to JIATF-East, the number of
    known maritime drug-trafficking events has increased by 41 percent,
    from 174 events in 1993 to 246 in 1996.  A "known event" is the
    confirmed movement of illegal drugs supported by seizure of drugs,
    observation of activities that can reasonably be attributed to drug
    smuggling, or reliable intelligence.  Table 1 shows air and maritime
    known events for 1992-96.

                                    Table 1

                       Air and Maritime Drug-Trafficking
                                Events, 1992-96

                                                 Air           Maritime
                                            --------------  --------------
                                                    Percen          Percen
                                                         t               t
                                                        of              of
    Year                                    Events   total  Events   total
    --------------------------------------  ------  ------  ------  ------
    1992                                       344     Not      \a      \a
                                                    applic
                                                      able
    1993                                       217      55     174      45
    1994                                       154      41     223      59
    1995                                       125      33     249      67
    1996                                        86      26     246      74
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    Note:  Events originating in Mexico and the Far East were excluded.

    \a Maritime data for 1992 are not available.

    Source:  JIATF-East.

    According to JIATF-East, the most significant maritime drug-smuggling
    modes of transportation involve "go-fast" boats in the Caribbean and
    fishing vessels in the Eastern Pacific.  The "go-fast" boats are
    difficult to detect and interdict because they are small and capable
    of speeds that enable them to successfully evade law enforcement
    pursuits, according to the U.S.  Coast Guard.  The boats are between
    25 and 45 feet in length, can routinely carry up to a ton of cocaine
    per trip, travel predominantly by night, and have refueling
    capability to complete cocaine runs in one day.  In the first quarter
    of 1997, 38 of the 69 known maritime events, or 55 percent, in the
    transit zone involved "go-fast" boats.  As illustrated in figure 2,
    maritime smuggling events by "go-fast" boats is on an upward trend.

       Figure 2:  Maritime Smuggling
       Events in the Caribbean,
       1995-97 ( first quarter )

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    \a Data for 1997 are through March 31.

    Source:  JIATF-East.

    DEA has also reported an increase in the use of canoes by Jamaican
    smugglers and "yolas" by Dominican smugglers.  The yola is an open
    vessel with twin motors for propulsion and the ability to refuel
    rapidly.  DEA reported that Bahamian and Jamaican transportation
    groups use yolas to smuggle cocaine loads into the Bahamas from
    either airdrops or boat-to-boat transfers off the coast of Jamaica.
    These groups then use the territorial waters of Cuba to shield their
    movements for eventual unloading to pleasure craft, which can easily
    blend in with inter-island boat traffic.  A U.S.  Customs Service
    official told us that "go-fast," recreational, and commercial fishing
    vessels move rapidly from the Bahamas to smuggle drugs into Florida.

    In the Eastern Pacific, cocaine traffickers use large fishing vessels
    that have been retrofitted with hidden compartments and have been
    known to carry as much as 11 metric tons of cocaine.  The largest
    amount of cocaine is smuggled through the Eastern Pacific, and the
    vast majority is delivered into Mexico, where it continues northbound
    over land.  JIATF-East reported that, between May and December of
    1996, there were 27 known or possible events in the Eastern Pacific.
    Figure 3 shows typical maritime vessels most commonly used by drug
    traffickers in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific corridors.

       Figure 3:  Typical Maritime
       Vessels Used by Drug
       Traffickers in the Transit Zone

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

       Source:  JIATF-East.

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

       HOST NATION COUNTERDRUG
       CAPABILITIES REMAIN LIMITED
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

    As we reported in April 1996, host countries in the Caribbean
    continue to be hampered by inadequate counternarcotics capabilities.
    While the drug flow through the transit zone continues at about the
    same level, drug seizures by most countries in this region are
    minimal.  During the last
    2 years, the United States has continued its efforts to strengthen
    host countries' capabilities to complement and support U.S.
    interdiction efforts.  These efforts include commitments made at the
    May 1997 Caribbean/United States Summit in Barbados and new bilateral
    agreements that promote increased air and maritime cooperation with
    countries that have not yet signed agreements.  The Department of
    State points out, however, that the best-trained, best-equipped
    antidrug units cannot succeed for long without the determined
    commitment of host government political authorities.

          CAPABILITIES IN TRANSIT ZONE
          COUNTRIES
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1

    As we reported in April 1996, many host nations have weak economies
    and insufficient resources for conducting law enforcement activities
    in their coastal waters.  In the Caribbean, St.  Martin\6 has the
    most assets for antidrug activities, with three cutters, eight patrol
    boats, and two fixed-wing aircraft, whereas other Caribbean countries
    have much less.  Nevertheless, the United States depends on support
    from host nations and several European countries to help stop the
    drug flow through the transit zone.

    In our 1996 report, we also noted that the need for law enforcement
    training for host governments had been evident for some time.  In
    recognition of this need, the Department of State provided about $7
    million for training 6,700 persons throughout the world in fiscal
    year 1996.  Other U.S.  agencies also have funded and conducted
    training for some host nations.  In addition, at the Barbados Summit,
    the United States committed to continuing to provide technical
    assistance in such areas as law enforcement, judicial systems,
    antimoney laundering, and other counterdrug activities.  To further
    assist in implementation of U.S.  commitments, the Director of ONDCP
    issued budget guidance that tasks departments and agencies to
    implement commitments made at the summit.

    In March 1997, the Department of State reported corruption-related
    problems in various transit zone countries, including Antigua, Aruba,
    Belize, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, St.  Kitts, St.
    Vincent, and others.  Once the influence of drug trafficking becomes
    entrenched, corruption inevitably follows and democratic government
    may be placed in jeopardy.  Even in countries where the political
    will to support antidrug activities exists, corruption can hinder
    counterdrug efforts.  As we have previously reported, low salary
    levels for law enforcement officers and other public servants
    throughout much of the transit zone make them susceptible to
    accepting bribes.\7

    As shown in table 2, the amount of cocaine seized in eight Caribbean
    countries rose from 6.79 metric tons in 1995 to 14.16 metric tons in
    1996.\8 The Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, Cuba, Haiti, the Netherlands
    Antilles, and the United Kingdom Virgin Islands recorded some
    increase in 1996, while seizures in the Dominican Republic and
    Jamaica declined.  Significantly, Cuba accounted for most of the 1996
    increase, represented by one seizure of 6.2 metric tons from the
    disabled Honduran vessel Limerick that was boarded by the U.S.  Coast
    Guard and later drifted into Cuban waters.

                                    Table 2

                     Cocaine Seizures in Selected Caribbean
                               Countries, 1992-96

                                (In metric tons)

    Country                               1992   1993   1994   1995   1996
    -----------------------------------  -----  -----  -----  -----  -----
    Bahamas                               4.80   1.90   0.49   0.39   0.41
    Cayman Islands                         N/A    N/A   0.05   0.31   2.20
    Cuba                                  0.31   0.24   0.24  0.16\   6.30
                                                                  a
    Dominican Republic                    2.36   1.07   2.80   3.60   1.20
    Haiti                                 0.06   0.15   0.72   0.55   1.40
    Jamaica                               0.49   0.16   0.18   0.57   0.24
    Netherlands Antilles                  0.09   0.37    N/A   0.11   0.71
    U.K. Virgin Islands                   0.03   0.70   0.45   1.10   1.70
    ======================================================================
    Total                                 8.14   4.59   4.93   6.79  14.16
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    \a Data is January to August.

    N/A = Not available.

    Sources:  Annual National Narcotics Intelligence and Consumers
    Committee Reports and International Narcotics Control Strategy
    Reports.

    One of JIATF-East's goals for Caribbean countries is to increase
    their seizure rates to at least 15 percent of the cocaine estimated
    to be passing through their territories.  In 1996, cocaine seizures
    in most Caribbean countries were much lower than 15 percent.  In
    Jamaica, for example, the seizure rate was only 1.2 percent, while in
    Haiti it was 4.5 percent; the Dominican Republic, 3.6 percent; and
    Mexico, 7 percent.\9 JIATF-East determined that, if these four
    countries had achieved a 15-percent seizure rate during 1996,
    seizures would have increased by 32 metric tons--from 26.12 metric
    tons to 58.65 metric tons.

    --------------------
    \6 According to a Department of State official, St.  Martin is not an
    independent nation and receives some support from France and the
    Netherlands.

    \7 Drug War:  Observations on the U.S.  International Drug Control
    Strategy (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-182, June 27, 1995).

    \8 JIATF-East identified these countries as important transit zone
    countries.

    \9 Mexico is considered part of the transit zone and is where most
    cocaine seizures occur on land.  In 1996, Mexican seizures were 23.6
    metric tons.

          UNITED STATES LACKS
          BILATERAL MARITIME
          AGREEMENTS WITH 12 NATIONS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2

    In its March 1997 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,
    the Department of State noted that, during 1996, the U.  S.
    government had negotiated an assortment of treaties and agreements
    designated to serve as important new tools in fighting drug
    trafficking.  One type of bilateral agreement is the maritime
    counterdrug agreement, generally consisting of six parts and granting
    the United States full or partial permission for shipboarding,
    shiprider, pursuit, entry to investigate, overflight, and order to
    land.  There are 12 countries in the region with which the United
    States currently has no formal counterdrug agreements.  These include
    Barbados, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, French West Indies,
    Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Suriname.
    Department of State officials told us the U.S.  government is
    undertaking efforts to obtain additional agreements but that progress
    has been impeded by host government concerns about sovereignty and
    legal issues.  The United States currently has six-part agreements
    with 5--Antigua & Barbuda, Grenada, St.  Kitts & Nevis, St.  Lucia,
    and Trinidad & Tobago--of the 28 countries in the region and partial
    agreements (from one to four parts) with 11 other countries.  See
    table 3 for information regarding U.S.  bilateral counterdrug
    agreements with transit zone countries.

                                         Table 3

                          U.S. Bilateral Counterdrug Agreements,
                                    as of August 1997

                                                 Entry to
             Shipboardi                          investigat              Order to
             ng          Shiprider   Pursuit     e           Overflight  land
    -------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  -----------
    Antigua  X           X           X           X           X           X
    &
    Barbuda

    Bahamas              X                                   X

    Barbado
    s\a

    Belize   X           X           X           X

    Costa
    Rica

    Cuba

    Dominic  X           X           X           X
    a

    Dominic  X           X           X           X           \b
    an
    Republi
    c

    Ecuador

    El
    Salvado
    r

    French
    West
    Indies

    Grenada  X           X           X           X           X           X

    Guatema
    la

    Haiti                            X           X           X

    Hondura
    s

    Jamaica
    \a

    Mexico

    Netherl              X           X           X           X
    ands
    Antille
    s

    Nicarag
    ua

    Panama               X

    St.      X           X           X           X           X           X
    Kitts &
    Nevis

    St.      X           X           X           X           X           X
    Lucia

    St.      X           X           X           X
    Vincent
    /
    Grenadi
    nes

    Surinam
    e

    Trinida  X           X           X           X           X           X
    d &
    Tobago

    Turks &              X-air only
    Caicos

    U.K.     X           X
    West
    Indies

    Venezue  X                       X-air only
    la
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Note:  Empty cells indicate no agreement in this area.

    \a Agreements with Barbados and Jamaica have been signed but
    implementation is pending ratification by host government parliaments
    and approval of implementation legislation.

    \b The Dominican Republic has granted temporary overflight authority
    over its territorial waters to dissuade and detect illegal migration
    and illegal drug trafficking through March 15, 1998.

    Shipboarding:  = Standing authority for the U.S.  Coast Guard to
    stop, board, and search foreign vessels suspected of illicit traffic
    located seaward of the territorial sea of any nation.

    Shiprider:  = Standing authority to embark law enforcement officials
    on vessel platforms of the parties.  These officials may then
    authorize certain law enforcement actions.

    Pursuit:  = Standing authority for U.S.  law enforcement assets to
    pursue fleeing vessels or aircraft suspected of illicit drug traffic
    into foreign waters or airspace.  May also include authority to stop,
    board, and search pursued vessels.

    Entry to investigate:  = Standing authority for U.S.  law enforcement
    assets to enter foreign waters or airspace to investigate vessels or
    aircraft located therein suspected of illicit drug traffic.  May also
    include authority to stop, board, and search such vessels.

    Overflight:  = Standing authority for U.S.  law enforcement assets to
    fly in foreign airspace when in support of counterdrug operations.

    Order to land:  = Standing authority for U.S.  law enforcement assets
    to order to land in the host nation aircraft suspected of illicit
    drug traffic.

    Source:  U.S.  Coast Guard.

    Bilateral agreements are not uniform and some provide very limited
    rights to U.S.  law enforcement authorities.  For example, a
    U.S.-Belize agreement allows U.S.  Coast Guard personnel to board
    suspected Belizean-flagged vessels on the high seas without prior
    notification to the Government of Belize.  Also, the U.S.  shiprider
    agreement with Panama contains restrictions that require U.S.  Coast
    Guard vessels operating in Panamanian territorial waters to be
    escorted by a Government of Panama ship.  In contrast, other
    agreements do not include this restriction.

       U.S.  FUNDING AND EFFORTS IN
       THE TRANSIT ZONE
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

    Although budgets for most federal activities in the transit zone
    increased in fiscal year 1997, the number of JIATF-East maritime and
    air assets and resources for detection and monitoring have remained
    relatively unchanged since fiscal years 1995-96 (we have provided
    data through August 1997, however).  Seizures of drugs supported by
    JIATF-East have dropped.  In addition, JIATF-East believes the
    Eastern Pacific merits greater attention.  Assets have been
    inadequate in this area, JIATF-East says.  Although JIATF-East has
    asked for additional resources from DOD to support an 18-month
    operation in the Eastern Pacific, DOD has not decided whether to
    grant this request.  In the Caribbean, two agencies--the U.S.  Coast
    Guard and the U.S.  Customs Service--increased their counterdrug
    efforts, including conducting two "surge" operations to seize and
    disrupt cocaine smuggling activity in and around Puerto Rico and the
    U.S.  Virgin Islands in 1996.  Furthermore, intelligence sharing
    among some U.S.  agencies has been problematic.

          U.S.  COUNTERNARCOTICS
          FUNDING HAS INCREASED SINCE
          FISCAL YEAR 1995
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1

    U.S.  counternarcotics funding in the transit zone increased by about
    $33 million from fiscal year 1995 to fiscal year 1996 and is
    estimated to increase by an additional $97 million in fiscal year
    1997, as shown in
    table 4.  Most of the fiscal year 1997 increase is due to a onetime
    allotment to DOD to modify a P3 aircraft for interdiction activities.
    According to JIATF-East officials, the modifications have not yet
    been completed.  The officials also noted that, when the P3 becomes
    operational, it is likely to be used in the transit zone as well as
    in other areas as needed.

                                         Table 4

                           U.S. Counternarcotics Funding in the
                            Transit Zone, Fiscal Years 1991-98

                                  (Dollars in millions)

                                                                 Estimate   Request
                                                                 ---------  --------
    Agency         1991    1992    1993    1994    1995    1996       1997      1998
    -----------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ---------  --------
    DOD          $407.1  $504.5  $426.0  $220.4  $214.7  $228.9     $304.6    $238.1
    USCG          565.2   443.9   310.5   234.1   301.2   323.2      335.7     388.7
    USCS             \a      \a    16.2    12.5    10.1     4.5        6.2       6.6
    DEA            26.2    28.8    29.1    28.7    29.6    34.0       31.7      36.7
    State          35.9    36.2    14.0     7.9    10.6     8.5       18.4      18.5
    ================================================================================
    Total        $1,034  $1,013  $795.8  $503.6  $566.2  $599.1     $696.6    $688.6
                     .4      .4
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Legend

    USCG = U.S.  Coast Guard
    USCS = U.S.  Customs Service

    Note:

    1.  U.S.  Coast Guard data for 1994 are different from the data
    presented in our April 1996 report because of updated information
    provided by the U.S.  Coast Guard.

    2.  U.S.  Customs Service data do not include funding for Puerto Rico
    and the U.S.  Virgin Islands.  These areas are territories of the
    United States, and funding is not included as part of the transit
    zone.

    \a Customs data for 1991-92 are not available.

    Source:  Indicated federal agencies.

          JIATF-EAST MARITIME AND AIR
          ASSETS REMAIN UNCHANGED
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.2

    Between fiscal year 1995 and 1996, there was little change in
    JIATF-East maritime assets and flight hours devoted to interdiction
    in the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific (see tables 5 and 6).
    However, a significant decline in DOD funding began in fiscal years
    1993 and 1994.  These declines resulted in a 40-percent reduction in
    U.S.  maritime assets by fiscal year 1994.  As indicted in table 5,
    the number of shipdays in 1996 was 1,645 shipdays less than in 1993,
    when it was at its highest level.  The reductions involved almost all
    classes of ships.

                                         Table 5

                           JIATF-East Maritime Assets, 1992-97
                                      (through July)

                                 (In number of shipdays)

                                                                                1997
    Ship                                                                    (through
    type          1992        1993        1994        1995        1996         July)
    ------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ------------
    DOD
    Logist         287          71          40           0           0             0
     ics
    Cruise         558         753         742         488         360           256
     r
    Destro         699         602         118         224         336           114
     yer
    Frigat       2,008       1,441         785         727         509           333
     e
    Amphib          87         188           9           0           0             0
     ious
    Coast            0         138           0         401         654           421
     Guard
    Other\         533       1,255         974       1,005         944           607
     a
    ================================================================================
    Total        4,172       4,448       2,668       2,845       2,803         1,731
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Note:  U.S.  Coast Guard shipdays do not include all U.S.  Coast
    Guard efforts in the transit zone.  For example, in 1991, 1992, and
    1994, the U.S.  Coast Guard reported no shipdays devoted to
    JIATF-East, but spent 4,872, 3,395, and 1,659 shipdays, respectively,
    in its overall counterdrug activities.  The decline in 1994 efforts
    was a direct result of extensive resources diverted from the
    counterdrug missions to support massive alien migration operations.

    \a Other ship types include hydrofoils, patrol craft, and T-AGOS
    radar ships.

    Source:  JIATF-East.

    Flight hours by JIATF-East air assets to support detection and
    monitoring declined by only 4 percent between 1995 and 1996.
    However, the drop between 1993 and 1994 was 27 percent, reflecting a
    decrease in DOD funding in fiscal year 1994.  The flight hours for
    P3C, a maritime patrol aircraft, have continued to decline from 1992
    through August 1997.  JIATF-East stated that the maritime patrol
    aircraft are required for addressing both the "go-fast" boat threat
    in the Caribbean and fishing vessels in the Eastern Pacific.

                                         Table 6

                             JIATF-East Air Assets, 1992-1997
                                     (through August)

                               (In number of flight hours)

    Airc                                                                        1997
    raft                                                                    (through
    type        1992        1993        1994        1995        1996         August)
    ----  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  --------------
    C130         417          97           0           0           0               0
    C141         268          35           0           0           0               0
    E2         4,547       3,608       4,098       3,501       3,618           2,288
    E3         2,734       3,177       1,761       1,125         963             882
    F15/         574         393         455         348         266             148
     F16
    KC13         995       1,233         827         800         813             360
     5
    P3C       16,270      12,122       9,822       9,811       9,290           5,936
    S3         1,644         311         228           0          12               0
    SH2F       2,876       1,854         262           0           0             395
    SH60       4,611       3,710       1,980       2,930       2,751           1,361
     B
    C5            76           0           0           0           0               0
    EC13          62           0           0           0           0               0
     0
    H46D          58           0           0           0           0               0
    UH60         633           0           0           0           0               0
    OV10         240           0           0           0           0               0
    U2           512           0           0           0           0               0
    ================================================================================
    Tota      36,517      26,540      19,433      18,515      17,713          11,370
     l
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Note:  Flight hours are not inclusive of all U.S.  transit zone
    efforts.

    Source:  JIATF-East.

          SEIZURES SUPPORTED BY
          JIATF-EAST HAVE DECLINED
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.3

    JIATF-East-supported seizures in 1996 were substantially less than
    its peak of nearly 70 metric tons seized in 1992 and slightly less
    than in 1995 (see fig.  4).  Also, maritime seizures have continued
    to increase as a proportion of total seizures.

       Figure 4:  Interagency Cocaine
       Seizures Supported by
       JIATF-East, 1989-97 (first
       quarter)

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    Note:  Data for 1997 are through March 31.

    Source:  JIATF-East.

          LIMITED U.S.  SUCCESS
          AGAINST MARITIME DRUG
          SMUGGLING
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.4

    JIATF-East believes its capabilities to detect and monitor maritime
    vessels in the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific are restricted.
    Even when a drug-smuggling event is detected, U.S.  capability to
    interdict the smugglers is limited.  For example, only about 52
    percent of the 246 known maritime events detected in 1996 resulted in
    an apprehension, seizure, or jettison.

             "GO-FAST" BOATS
    -------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.4.1

    According to a JIATF-East official, detecting and monitoring
    "go-fast" boats is difficult because there is often little tactical
    intelligence on when these events will occur and limited marine
    patrol aircraft assets equipped with radar and night-vision
    capability to deal with this problem.  For example, during the first
    quarter of 1997, JIATF-East detected only 8 of 23 "go-fast" events
    that originated in South America.  JIATF-East noted that U.S.  law
    enforcement agencies detected six additional events without
    JIATF-East support.  Of the eight detected events, six were detected
    by maritime patrol aircraft and resulted in three jettisons and three
    seizures.  The remaining two events were detected by radar ships but
    escaped and presumably completed their delivery.  In addition, U.S.
    Coast Guard officials told us that, other than visual identification
    of the wake of "go-fast" boats, detection is nearly impossible
    without more-advanced sensors, especially at night when most of these
    events occur.

             LIMITED COVERAGE IN THE
             EASTERN PACIFIC
    -------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.4.2

    According to U.S.  officials, the small amount of aircraft and
    maritime assets hinders U.S.  interdiction efforts in the Eastern
    Pacific.  In that area, U.S.  air and marine capability to interdict
    commercial and noncommercial fishing vessels is limited.  In May
    1996, JIATF-East initiated Operation Caper Focus to better define the
    nature of the cocaine smuggling threat in the Eastern Pacific.
    Before the operation began, JIATF-East had little intelligence on the
    smuggling methods used and quantities being transported in this area.
    JIATF-East estimated that, from May 1996 through June 1997, 43 known
    or possible maritime smuggling events occurred in the Eastern
    Pacific, and only 4 resulted in seizures.  These events were detected
    from among hundreds of fishing vessels that routinely operate in the
    Eastern Pacific.  JIATF-East officials indicated they have relatively
    little chance of detecting and monitoring these events because they
    currently have only 2 surface ships and about 200 flight hours of
    marine patrol aircraft per month dedicated to the area.

          AIR EVENTS DETECTED BUT FEW
          SEIZURES MADE
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.5

    In 1996, JIATF-East reported that of 86 known air events, 26 resulted
    in an apprehension, seizure, or jettison.  According to JIATF-East, a
    successful interdiction generally involves a number of steps.  It may
    start with an initial detection by Relocatable Over the Horizon Radar
    (ROTHR) systems or a radar ship, followed by a handoff to an asset
    equipped with an Airborne Early Warning (AEW) system.  The aircraft
    will find the detected suspect and hand it off to an interceptor
    aircraft, which will monitor the suspect for ultimate handoff to a
    law enforcement agency.  An analysis by JIATF-East showed that if any
    of the required assets, especially AEW-equipped assets, are not in
    place, the chances of a successful interdiction diminish.

    A JIATF-East analysis of known air events from October 1996 to May
    1997 showed that something usually went wrong that prevented a
    successful interdiction.  During this period, there were 27 known
    events in the Yucatan region.  Of these, five were not known until
    after the drugs were delivered.  In the remaining 22 detected events,
    only 4 resulted in a successful seizure.  The main reasons for lack
    of success were limitations in ROTHR to handoff tracks, lack of
    AEW-equipped assets, and inadequate response and apprehension
    capabilities by host nation law enforcement agencies.  For example,
    the analysis showed that without AEW-equipped assets, JIATF-East was
    able to track and hand off the suspect aircraft to law enforcement
    agencies only 18 percent of the time.  Even when an AEW-equipped
    asset was available, JIATF-East analysis showed that it was able to
    track the suspect aircraft to the handoff point only 45 percent of
    the time because either the AEW-equipped asset or the interceptor
    failed to pick up the track from ROTHR.  Finally, the lack of
    available local law enforcement support further reduced the results
    of adequate tracking.  For example, JIATF-East reported that of the
    seven adequately monitored tracks, three did not result in a seizure
    because local law enforcement authorities in Guatemala did not have
    the assets to respond.

             RADAR CAPABILITY LIMITED
    -------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.5.1

    In 1994, the United States had 26 various radar assets that supported
    counterdrug efforts.  Between 1994 and 1995, however, DOD deactivated
    nine radar assets.  When this occurred, U.S.  law enforcement
    officials told us that reductions in radar capability hampered their
    operations.\10 However, during 1994 and 1995, the United States
    activated two ROTHR systems to cover the Caribbean.  Although the
    ROTHR systems provide a larger area of coverage footprint than
    microwave radars, ROTHR has less probability to handoff (rather than
    detect) an air event to law enforcement agencies because it is not as
    accurate in vectoring in interceptions as microwave radars.  (See
    app.  I for an overview of radar coverage capability.)

    JIATF-East acknowledged that reduced radar capability continues to
    limit operational successes today.  According to JIATF-East, radar
    assets have not changed since our prior report and radar capabilities
    have further been exacerbated by a long term outage of the Guantanamo
    Bay radar because of no funding for operations and maintenance.  In
    commenting on our draft report, U.S.  Coast Guard officials told us
    the Guantanamo Bay radar is expected to be reactivated in the near
    future.

    --------------------
    \10 Drug Control:  U.S.  Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean
    Decline (GAO/NSIAD-96-119, Apr.  17, 1996).

          JIATF-EAST HAS REQUESTED
          ADDITIONAL RESOURCES
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.6

    Although JIATF-East acknowledges that U.S.  capabilities to detect
    and monitor "go-fast" boats in the Caribbean and aircraft throughout
    the transit zone are limited, it currently believes that targeting
    multiton cargo vessels in the Eastern Pacific provides the richest
    target of opportunity to seize large quantities of cocaine.
    Accordingly, JIATF-East has requested two additional ships and an
    additional 450 aircraft surveillance flight hours per month from
    DOD.\11 JIATF-East believes that with these assets the United States
    can increase annual cocaine seizures by an additional 40 metric tons.
    DOD, however, has indicated that it will not be able to fully support
    JIATF-East's request because of other priorities.

    At present, two surface ships and about 200 flight hours are assigned
    to the Eastern Pacific per month.  Most of the assigned U.S.  air and
    marine assets support Caribbean interdiction efforts.  JIATF-East
    officials told us that, although the United States could seize larger
    amounts of cocaine in the Eastern Pacific, JIATF-East is unwilling to
    transfer assets from the Caribbean.  The Director of JIATF-East told
    us that the Caribbean counternarcotics programs have more "voice and
    visibility" in terms of political support from both the United States
    and island nations.  He acknowledged that the United States has
    worked with Caribbean nations to build continued support for fighting
    the war on drugs and any movement of assets may have undesirable
    political consequences.  Between May and December of 1996, JIATF-East
    temporarily shifted assets from the Caribbean to implement Operation
    Caper Focus in the Eastern Pacific.  The temporary operation resulted
    in 27 metric tons of cocaine that were either seized or jettisoned,
    as well as improved intelligence on smuggling methods and routes in
    the region.  Before this operation, few seizures had occurred in this
    region, and none took place during the first quarter of 1997--after
    the operation ended.

    As previously discussed, JIATF-East has requested additional assets
    from DOD to support an 18-month Eastern Pacific operation.\12
    JIATF-East estimated such assets would double the seizures it
    supports from the current level of 40 metric tons annually to 80
    metric tons.  In June 1997, ONDCP provided interagency budget
    guidance that directed the agencies to expand operational support to
    Operation Caper Focus.  In July, ONDCP informed high-level DOD
    officials that interdiction resources were inadequate to support the
    national strategy and that the interdiction effectiveness of
    Operation Caper Focus was at risk.  According to DOD officials, a
    decision is pending as to what, if any, additional support will be
    allocated to the Eastern Pacific above current force levels.

    --------------------
    \11 The JIATF-East request included additional P3 flight hours and
    additional ships (for example, a Navy frigate and oiler).

    \12 JIATF-East estimates that $24.4 million in incremental funding
    would be required.  The funding includes $12.6 million for forward
    deployment of aircraft to Panama and the increased intelligence cost
    at JIATF-East, and $11.8 million for a U.S.  Navy oiler.

          INCREASED INTERDICTION
          EFFORTS BY U.S.  LAW
          ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.7

    Since 1995, the U.S.  Coast Guard and U.S.  Customs Service have
    reported some increases in interdiction activities in the transit
    zone.  Both agencies conduct counterdrug activities that are in
    addition to the shipdays and flight hours provided in support of
    JIATF-East.  For example, in 1996, the U.S.  Customs Service and U.S.
    Coast Guard launched Operations Gateway and Frontier Shield,
    respectively, to disrupt cocaine trafficking in and around Puerto
    Rico and the U.S.  Virgin Islands.  According to ONDCP officials, the
    operations have been successful, as indicated by increases in the
    street prices of cocaine in Puerto Rico.  DEA officials noted that
    the wholesale price, considered a better indicator, doubled in San
    Juan, Puerto Rico, from April to late May 1997.  As of September,
    prices had declined but were still higher than in April.

    Seizures of cocaine during the first year of Operation Gateway
    increased by about 30 percent in comparison to seizures before the
    start of the operation.  In the year prior to the operation, seizures
    were about 11 metric tons while seizures during the first year of the
    operation were about 14 metric tons.  Actual fiscal year 1996 funding
    for Operation Gateway was $2.4 million, and planned funding for
    fiscal year 1997 was $30.1 million.  In its One-Year Report on the
    Operation (covering the period ending February 28, 1997), the U.S.
    Customs Service noted a number of problems, including duplication and
    confusion in the procurement of equipment and services, a lack of
    public affairs coordination with other agencies, and lengthy delays
    in filling numerous authorized staff positions.  The U.S.  Customs
    Service noted, however, that some of these problems were not within
    its control and did not affect the overall performance of Operation
    Gateway.

    The first 3 months of the U.S.  Coast Guard's Operation Frontier
    Shield began with an initial "surge" of activity.  Subsequently,
    operations were somewhat reduced but remained higher than before the
    operation began.  According to the U.S.  Coast Guard, shipdays and
    flight hours devoted to counterdrug missions increased to support the
    surge operation.\13 During the first 10 months of the operation,
    cocaine seizures totaled 10.7 metric tons, an increase of 5.8 metric
    tons over the prior comparable 10-month period.\14 In July 1997, the
    Secretary of Transportation reported that "assessments show a
    decisive shift in drug traffic away from the Frontier Shield area of
    operation" and that "drug runners are being forced to move their
    operations elsewhere." U.S.  Coast Guard officials stated that the
    shift in trafficking routes was anticipated in planning Operation
    Frontier Shield and that additional efforts are planned or underway
    to address this trafficking shift.

    --------------------
    \13 According to the U.S.  Coast Guard, shipdays increased from 2,481
    in fiscal year 1995 to 3,421 in fiscal year 1997; flight hours
    increased from 9,405 in fiscal year 1995 to 14,500 in fiscal year
    1997.  The increase was generally attributed to operations around
    Puerto Rico.  The U.S.  Coast Guard shipdays and flight hours include
    counternarcotics activities in both the transit zone and the arrival
    zone.

    \14 According to a U.S.  Coast Guard official, some of the increases
    may include seizures also reported by the U.S.  Customs Service for
    Operation Gateway.  The interagency process is expected to remove any
    duplication.

          INTELLIGENCE SHARING ISSUES
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.8

    In 1996, we reported that intelligence sharing was a contentious
    issue among various collectors and users of such data, including most
    federal counterdrug agencies.  Since then, some initiatives to
    improve intelligence sharing have begun.  For example, an interagency
    review, initiated by ONDCP on September 18, 1997, is underway to look
    at the national drug intelligence architecture.  The review will
    assess the drug intelligence missions, functions, and resources of
    the major federal counterdrug agencies.\15 According to ONDCP,
    coordination among the intelligence program and between intelligence
    producers and consumers will be a focus of the review.

    In addition, the Federal Bureau of Investigation noted that other law
    enforcement agencies with jurisdiction in the Caribbean are
    developing a regional plan for law enforcement in the Caribbean that
    calls for expanding intelligence coordination.  A draft of the
    regional plan is scheduled to be completed by January 1998.

    JIATF-East officials told us that there are inherent barriers in
    sharing information between and among federal counternarcotics
    agencies.\16

    Specifically, law enforcement agencies are mainly focused on
    individuals and drug organizations in the context of building cases
    for arresting and prosecuting criminals.  In contrast, JIATF-East is
    focused on tactical operations and obtaining information in support
    of detecting and monitoring suspects and making successful and timely
    law enforcement interdictions.

    DEA officials referred to their comments in our prior report that
    noted that there are limitations on what intelligence DEA can legally
    provide other federal agencies developed from grand jury information,
    wiretaps, and court sealing orders.  They also noted that some
    intelligence is not released to protect sources and the integrity of
    ongoing investigations.  DEA officials also stated that the El Paso
    Intelligence Center\17 provides JIATF-East with the necessary
    information to track suspect aircraft and vessels until the
    respective U.S.  and foreign authorities can take appropriate law
    enforcement action.

    --------------------
    \15 The missions of the constituent centers, such as the National
    Drug Intelligence Center, the El Paso Intelligence Center, the
    Director of Central Intelligence Crime and Narcotics Center, and the
    Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, will be reviewed.

    \16 We are currently conducting a review of information sharing among
    federal counternarcotics agencies.

    \17 The center is the national tactical drug intelligence center and
    provides actionable intelligence to JIATF-East.

       U.S.  CARIBBEAN COUNTERDRUG
       ACTION PLAN NOT FULLY DEVELOPED
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

    In April 1996, we recommended that the Director of ONDCP develop a
    Caribbean plan of action that should at a minimum determine resources
    and staffing needed and delineate a comprehensive strategy to improve
    host nation capabilities.  In response to our recommendation, ONDCP
    told us it provided a framework for addressing strategic objectives
    in the transit zone in its classified annex to the National Drug
    Control Strategy issued in February 1997.  ONDCP officials noted that
    the operational tasks for implementing the framework, including
    targets for measuring performance in that area, are still under
    development.  They also noted that implementation of the strategy for
    the transit zone is the responsibility of other federal agencies such
    as the U.S.  Coast Guard, DEA, and DOD.

    According to ONDCP, its performance measurement system will provide
    policymakers with new insights about which programs are effective and
    which are not.  The system is intended to help guide adjustments to
    the National Drug Control Strategy as conditions change, expectations
    are met, or failure is noted.  The goals of the strategy form the
    foundation of a 10-year plan, supported by a 5-year budget.  Each
    goal is to be related to a measurable objective, further defined by
    an outcome that the objective is to produce by 2002.  Each outcome is
    to be quantified by performance targets that identify measurable
    attainments.  ONDCP has instructed agencies to develop plans, without
    being constrained by budget considerations, identifying how they will
    make meaningful progress toward achieving a drug control mission.  As
    of October 1, 1997, the performance measurement system remains
    incomplete because proposed measurable targets, the core of ONDCP's
    system, are still under review.  Since these measurable targets have
    not yet been developed, agencies cannot be held accountable for their
    performance.

          ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.1

    In April 1994, ONDCP and the participating agencies approved the
    National Interdiction Command and Control Plan.  This plan provided
    for establishing three geographically oriented counterdrug joint
    interagency task forces.  The task forces were to be led and staffed
    by DOD, the U.S.  Customs Service, and the U.S.  Coast Guard.  A
    major premise of the plan was that the full-time personnel assigned
    to the task forces would become stakeholders in their operations.  It
    was anticipated that this would ensure close planning and operational
    coordination; the availability of federal assets; and a seamless
    handoff of suspected air, sea, or land targets.  Other agencies that
    either had an interest in or were affected by the operation were to
    provide liaison personnel.  Nevertheless, participating agencies have
    not provided the required staffing to JIATF-East and, thus, it has
    been dominated by DOD personnel and has not achieved the intended
    interagency composition.  According to ONDCP, the revised September
    17, 1997, plan places the task forces more under the control of DOD
    sponsorship rather than remaining an interagency center.

    As of July 1997, little has changed since our last report; many of
    the key civilian positions have remained unfilled.  Thus, JIATF-East
    is still predominately staffed by DOD personnel and has not achieved
    the interagency mix initially hoped for at its creation.  Of the 184
    authorized permanent positions, 132 were DOD, 21 were U.S.  Coast
    Guard, and 31 were other agencies' position.  Thirty-seven authorized
    positions were vacant.  DOD had filled 117 of its 132 authorized
    positions and the U.S.  Coast Guard had filled 17 of 21.  However,
    various other agencies had assigned staff to only 13 of 31 authorized
    positions, compared to having assigned staff to
    11 of 27 authorized positions as of November 1995.  The U.S.  Customs
    Service, for example, had filled only 7 of 22 positions, compared to
    1995 when it had filled 8 positions; the 1 authorized Department of
    State position has never been filled.  JIATF-East has periodically
    requested the civilian agencies to staff these positions, but the
    agencies have not done so.

       CONCLUSION
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

    Since our last report, JIATF-East has more clearly identified the
    problem of "go-fast" boats in the Caribbean and fishing vessels in
    the Eastern Pacific, identified shortcomings in its detection and
    monitoring capabilities, and requested additional resources to
    address the problem.  Also, the U.S.  Coast Guard and the U.S.
    Customs Service have launched two surge operations in and around
    Puerto Rico and the U.S.  Virgin Islands that have resulted in
    seizing additional quantities of cocaine and changing
    drug-trafficking patterns.  By identifying the anticipated benefits
    from providing additional resources to the transit zone, JIATF-East
    has taken an important step in adding accountability to the
    drug-interdiction effort.  Notwithstanding these efforts, the overall
    amount of cocaine seized in the transit zone has not disrupted the
    flow and availability of cocaine in the United States.

    We believe ONDCP has not fully addressed our prior recommendation to
    develop a regional plan.  We continue to believe that a transit zone
    plan that includes quantitative goals and objectives that will allow
    policymakers to determine resource requirements and to evaluate the
    potential benefits of regional interdiction efforts is essential.  An
    effective transit zone operation is an integral part of the U.S.
    strategy to limit drug availability in the United States.  But it
    alone will not be the solution to the drug problem.  A regional plan
    should be a subset to ONDCP's overall strategy.  Therefore, it is
    important that ONDCP develop a comprehensive plan that provides a
    blueprint for how efforts in the transit zone countries are going to
    reduce the flow of cocaine.  Without such a plan, it is not possible
    to judge the merits of individual activities in terms of what are the
    most cost-effective measures in the counterdrug effort.

       AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
       EVALUATION
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

    ONDCP in its written response (see app.  II) stated that it is in
    general agreement with this report.  It provided clarification and
    information on (1) its future plans, (2) the importance of source
    country efforts in complementing those in the transit zone, (3)
    activities of the U.S.  Coast Guard, (4) results from the Bridgetown
    Summit, and (5) the changes to the revised National Interdiction
    Command and Control Plan.  ONDCP recognized that current assets in
    the transit zone are inadequate to accomplish the strategy and
    identified recent initiatives to implement the strategy.  These
    initiatives included a Caribbean action plan, a short-term
    enhancement to transit zone interdiction, a 5-year asset plan for the
    transit zone, intelligence sharing efforts, and a deterrence study.
    These initiatives are expected to provide linkage between planning,
    development of performance measures, and assets required to implement
    the strategy.  However, ONDCP did not provide time frames for
    completing these initiatives.

    We obtained oral comments on a draft of this report from the
    Department of State, DOD, DEA, the U.S.  Coast Guard, the U.S.
    Customs Service, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  None of
    these agencies disagreed with our principal findings or our
    conclusions.  However, several of these agencies indicated we had not
    provided enough information about U.S.  counterdrug activities in the
    transit zone other than those directed by JIATF-East.  In response to
    their concerns, we have expanded our discussion of these other
    activities, particularly those of the U.S.  Coast Guard and the U.S.
    Customs Service, and have added data on overall drug seizures in the
    region.  Each of the commenting agencies suggested points of
    clarification and we have incorporated them into the report where
    appropriate.  In addition, we modified the report to include some
    updated information provided by DOD and the U.S.  Coast Guard on
    operational capabilities in the transit zone.

       SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9

    To determine the nature of drug-trafficking in the transit zone, we
    obtained reports from the U.S.  Coast Guard, DEA, the U.S.  Customs
    Service, JIATF-East, ONDCP, and interagency assessments on cocaine
    smuggling activities.  We analyzed and compared the data from these
    reports with data from prior years to assess the degree of change in
    the cocaine flow to the United States and drug traffickers' methods,
    routes, and modes of transportation.  We also obtained assessment
    briefings about the cocaine threat from DEA headquarters in
    Washington, D.C.; the U.S.  Coast Guard Seventh District and U.S.
    Customs Service in Miami, Florida; and JIATF-East in Key West,
    Florida.

    To obtain information on host nation capabilities and impediments to
    their counternarcotics efforts, we reviewed various Department of
    State cables and other relevant documents, including the annual
    International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports.  We interviewed
    officials from DEA, the U.S.  Coast Guard, the U.S.  Customs Service,
    the Department of State, and JIATF-East and obtained information on
    (1) host nation counterdrug capabilities, (2) the amount of
    cooperation with the U.S.  counterdrug activities, and (3) the extent
    of corruption in host nations.  We also interviewed officials from
    the U.S.  Coast Guard, the Department of State, and JIATF-East for
    information on the status of U.S.  bilateral maritime agreements with
    host countries.

    To assess U.S.  counterdrug capabilities, we reviewed program and
    budget documents and related information from numerous federal
    agencies, including ONDCP, the Departments of Defense and State, the
    U.S.  Coast Guard, the U.S.  Customs Service, and the U.S.
    Interdiction Coordinator.  We obtained summary reports from the U.S.
    Customs Service on Operation Gateway and the U.S.  Coast Guard on
    Frontier Shield to determine their impact on reducing the flow of
    cocaine to United States.  We interviewed and obtained information
    from JIATF-East and other federal agencies on the resources and
    capabilities of U.S.  interdiction efforts in the transit zone.  We
    also documented U.S.  funding trends from 1991 to 1998 and assets
    devoted to detection and monitoring to 1996.

    We interviewed key officials from DOD and U.S.  law enforcement
    agencies to determine the extent of U.S.  planning, coordination, and
    implementation of counterdrug programs in the transit zone.  We met
    with ONDCP officials on the status of its implementation of our
    recommendation to develop a plan of action for the Caribbean and its
    efforts to develop performance measures for U.S.  counternarcotics
    initiatives.  To obtain information on interagency staffing at
    JIATF-East, we reviewed documents, obtained briefings, and
    interviewed cognizant JIATF-East officials.

    We conducted our review between April and September 1997 in
    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :9.1

    As arranged with you, unless you publicly announce its contents
    earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
    after its issue date.  At that time, we will send copies to other
    interested congressional committees, the Director of ONDCP, the
    Secretaries of State and Defense, the U.S.  Attorney General, the
    Commissioner of the U.S.  Customs Service, the Commandant of the U.S.
    Coast Guard and the U.S.  Interdiction Coordinator, the Administrator
    of DEA, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  We
    will make copies of this report available to others upon request.

    If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report,
    please call me at (202) 512-4268.  The major contributors to this
    were
    Janice Villar Morrison, George Taylor, and Louis Zanardi.

    Jess T.  Ford, Associate Director
    International Relations and Trade Issues

    RADAR SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES
    =========================================================== Appendix I

    In 1994, the United States had 26 various radar assets that supported
    counterdrug efforts in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific.  Between
    1994 and 1995, DOD deactivated nine radar assets.  However, during
    1994 and 1995, the United States activated two Relocatable Over the
    Horizon Radar (ROTHR) systems to cover the Caribbean, as shown in
    figure 1.1.  According to the Joint Interagency Task Force
    (JIATF)-East, radar surveillance capabilities illustrated for 1995
    remained current as of September 1997.

       Figure 1.1:  Radar Surveillance

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    Source:  Department of Defense.

    (See figure in printed edition.)Appendix II
    COMMENTS FROM THE OFFICE OF
    NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
    =========================================================== Appendix I

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    (See figure in printed edition.)

    The following are GAO's comments on the Office of National Drug
    Control Policy's letter dated October 3, 1997.

    GAO COMMENTS

    1.  We provided additional information concerning this point in the
    report.

    2.  We recognize that the overall funding levels are not a reflection
    of the assets allocated to JIATF-East.  Accordingly, we have added
    several footnotes to make this distinction in the report.

    *** End of document. ***