Navy Infrastructure: Site Selection Process for the Northeast Regional
Command Contained Weaknesses (Letter Report, 09/28/1998,
GAO/NSIAD-98-230).

The Navy's process for selecting the headquarters site for its new
northeast regional command contains weaknesses. In selecting the site,
it is unclear to what extent the Navy followed its own criteria for
establishing or modifying shore activities or fully assessed the
comparative cost of establishing and operating the new headquarters at
all locations being considered. The cost to move the command from
Groton, Connecticut, to the Earle Naval Weapons Center in New Jersey may
be higher than the Navy estimated. Moreover, the Earle site has some
operational limitations involving the capacity of the facilities'
infrastructure to support the new command and increased travel time and
costs associated with operating from Earle. Although the Navy contends
that it needs a flag rank command closer to New York City to achieve
certain operational benefits, GAO questions (1) how often the need to
visit New York City arises, (2) whether the Earle location would
significantly reduce travel time compared with travel time from Groton,
and (3) whether it is desirable to separate the new command from other
centralized support activities in Groton.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-98-230
     TITLE:  Navy Infrastructure: Site Selection Process for the
	     Northeast Regional Command Contained Weaknesses
      DATE:  09/28/1998
   SUBJECT:  Decision making
	     Naval bases
	     Site selection
	     Military downsizing
	     Military operations
	     Naval personnel
	     Military cost control
	     Federal agency reorganization
	     Cost effectiveness analysis
IDENTIFIER:  New York (NY)

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GAO/NSIAD-98-230

Cover
================================================================ COVER

Report to Congressional Requesters

September 1998

NAVY INFRASTRUCTURE - SITE
SELECTION PROCESS FOR THE
NORTHEAST REGIONAL COMMAND
CONTAINED WEAKNESSES

GAO/NSIAD-98-230

Navy Infrastructure

(709336)

Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  CINCLANTFLT - Commander in Chief, U.S.  Atlantic Fleet
  DOD - Department of Defense
  GAO - General Accounting Office
  NSB - Naval Submarine Base
  NWS - Naval Weapons Station

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER

B-280127

September 28, 1998

The Honorable John H.  Chafee
The Honorable Christopher J.  Dodd
The Honorable Joseph I.  Lieberman
United States Senate

The Honorable Sam Gejdenson
House of Representatives

The Navy is in the process of establishing a new command to oversee
base operations support functions for its shore installations in the
northeast region.  The command would expand upon the responsibilities
of the naval northeast regional coordinator currently located at
Naval Submarine Base (NSB) New London in Groton, Connecticut.  The
Commander Submarine Group Two, in New London, has dual responsibility
as both the operational commander and the Northeast Regional
Coordinator of selected base support functions in the region.  In
December 1997, the Commander in Chief, U.S.  Atlantic Fleet
(CINCLANTFLT), recommended that the new command be headquartered at
the Naval Weapons Station (NWS) Earle in Colts Neck, New Jersey.

As you requested, we examined the Navy's process for developing that
recommendation.  You also asked that we review the extent to which
the Navy fully evaluated the costs and implications of establishing
the command at NWS Earle versus NSB New London or the Naval Undersea
Warfare Center located at Newport, Rhode Island.  Specifically, this
report addresses (1) the extent to which the Navy followed its
criteria for establishing shore activities and the extent to which it
fully analyzed prospective costs of the three sites and (2) location
and infrastructure factors that would affect costs and operations of
the new command at each of the three locations.  This report also
addresses other questions, uncertainties, and concerns that exist
regarding the NWS Earle location.

   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

As part of a Navy-wide infrastructure cost reduction initiative, the
Navy is restructuring its shore establishment by consolidating
installation management functions in areas where significant
concentrations of Navy activities exist, such as San Diego,
California, Jacksonville, Florida, and--for purposes of this
report--the northeastern area of the United States.  This initiative
seeks to reduce management and support redundancies and duplications
of effort and to eliminate unnecessary overhead.  In doing so, a
single commander is given responsibility for the management and
oversight of naval shore installations within a specific geographic
region.\1 Other responsibilities will include providing base support
services to Navy operating forces and other naval activities and
tenant commands, as well as managing the funding associated with
these services.  According to officials at NSB New London, total base
support funding for the Northeast region is estimated to be between
$165 million and $185 million in fiscal year 1999.  Creation of a
separate command to manage and oversee base support functions at Navy
shore installations is expected to provide a more dedicated and
expanded regionwide focus on those activities in an effort to reduce
overhead costs and achieve increased efficiencies totaling millions
of dollars.  The establishment of the Northeast command will complete
a total of 13 regional naval coordinators worldwide.

In recommending the establishment of the new command, CINCLANTFLT is
seeking to relieve the Commander, Submarine Group Two, an operational
commander at NSB New London, of the nonoperational duties associated
with the regional coordinator role.  Establishing a separate command
headed by a flag rank officer (admiral) to oversee northeastern shore
installations would be consistent with other CINCLANTFLT regional
commands that exist in Norfolk, Virginia, and Jacksonville, Florida.
According to Navy officials, these regional commands will support
Navy efforts to eliminate redundant management structures, reduce
infrastructure costs, and foster regional service delivery of
installation management support.  CINCLANTFLT officials estimated
that the staff of the command would consist of a flag rank commanding
officer, 27 other military personnel, and 27 civilian employees.  The
existing regional coordination staff at NSB New London consists of 9
military and 15 civilian personnel.

CINCLANTFLT's recommendation to establish the new command at NWS
Earle is pending approval by the Chief of Naval Operations and the
Secretary of the Navy.

--------------------
\1 Each regional command within the United States is aligned with one
or more of 10 existing Federal Districts.  Under this arrangement,
the Commander, Navy Region Northeast, will be responsible for
coordinating various base support functions at naval shore
installations within Federal Districts I and II, which include the
states of New Jersey and New York and all states northeast of New
York.

   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

Weaknesses exist in the Navy's process for selecting the location for
the headquarters for its new northeast regional command.
Specifically,

  -- In selecting NWS Earle, it is not clear to what extent the Navy
     followed its own criteria for the establishment,
     disestablishment, or modification of shore activities or fully
     assessed the comparative costs of establishing and operating the
     new headquarters at all sites it had indicated were under
     consideration.  The costs to establish the command at NWS Earle
     may be greater than the Navy estimated.

  -- The NWS Earle site has some basic operational limitations
     compared with at least two other sites, including NSB New London
     and Newport.  These limitations relate to facilities'
     infrastructure to support the new command and increased travel
     time and costs associated with operating from NWS Earle.

  -- The Navy stated that it needs a flag rank command closer to New
     York City to attain certain operational benefits.  While this
     need may be appropriate, questions exist about (1) how often the
     need to visit New York City arises, (2) whether the NWS Earle
     location provides a significant reduction in travel time
     compared with travel from the current location at NSB New
     London, and (3) whether it is desirable to separate the new
     command from other centralized support activities located at NSB
     New London.

   UNCERTAINTY REGARDING NAVY'S
   ADHERENCE TO SITE SELECTION
   CRITERIA AND ASSESSMENT OF
   COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH COMPETING
   LOCATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

In reviewing CINCLANTFLT's recommendation of NWS Earle for the new
command headquarters, we could not be certain to what extent the Navy
had fully considered its stated criteria to evaluate or compare
alternate sites because documentation to support the Navy's decision
was limited.  Additionally, costs associated with relocating regional
coordination functions and staff from NSB New London to NWS Earle and
operating from that site may be greater than those estimated by the
Navy.

      COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
      ALTERNATIVE SITES WAS
      LACKING
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1

Navy Instruction 5450.169D, regarding the establishment,
disestablishment, or modification of Navy shore activities, states
that several factors should be considered, including whether (1) an
activity is currently performing the mission or an existing activity
in the same geographical area can assume the mission, (2) an existing
activity of the same type can perform the mission, and (3) the need
for the activity is sufficient to offset the cost of establishing a
separate activity.  Additionally, between October 1997 and March
1998, the Navy stated in correspondence with senators and congressmen
from Connecticut and Rhode Island that several factors were being
considered in selecting a location for the command.  These factors
included the availability of office space, communications, and
suitable family housing; proximity to the regional offices of other
federal government agencies; access to transportation; operational
and military support; relocation and alteration costs; and rent
costs.

Navy officials told us that they considered the criteria stated in
the Navy instruction and in their congressional correspondence in
evaluating and comparing alternate sites.  However, we are concerned
as to the extent of this analysis.  While Navy guidance does not
specifically direct the preparation of cost comparisons for
prospective sites, it does suggest that the Navy seek economy and
efficiency in establishing new activities, which would suggest the
need to compare costs among prospective sites.  CINCLANTFLT officials
told us that the site selection process began with their gathering
some estimated cost data for prospective sites with the intent of
performing a cost comparison.  However, they were informed early in
the process that CINCLANTFLT had already decided to locate the new
command at NWS Earle because that was the desired location.
Consequently, according to these officials, no further data were
developed to estimate and compare the costs associated with
establishing the command at sites other than NWS Earle.

Our review of available documentation and discussions with Navy
officials indicate that CINCLANTFLT's recommendation to establish the
Commander, Navy Region Northeast, at NWS Earle was based primarily on
placing the command in closer proximity to New York City.
CINCLANTFLT's decision paper, referred to as a Fact and Justification
Sheet, cited a number of needs and benefits of such a placement,
focusing primarily on the need for Navy flag rank representation in
the New York-New Jersey area.  Specifically, the justification
highlighted activities such as the importance of acting as the
resident Navy spokesperson; interacting on the Navy's behalf with
major corporations, labor unions, and other organizations associated
with maritime commerce; and serving as the Navy's official
representative for major events such as visiting foreign dignitaries.

      COST ESTIMATES FOR
      ESTABLISHING THE COMMAND AT
      NWS EARLE MAY BE UNDERSTATED
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2

CINCLANTFLT did perform analyses sufficient to estimate the cost to
establish the command at NWS Earle at $1.89 million.  We did not,
however, independently verify these cost estimates.  CINCLANTFLT's
analyses included cost estimates for renovation of flag and officer
office space, displacement of the current occupants of this office
space; moving office furniture, supplies, and equipment; civilian and
military permanent change of station costs; civilian severance pay
for those who do not relocate; and a recurring increase in travel
expenses due to the location of NWS Earle in relation to its
subordinate commands (see table 1).  Detailed cost estimates to
establish the command were not documented for other potential sites.

                                Table 1

                    Estimated Costs Associated with
                 Establishing the Command at NWS Earle

Cost type                                                       Amount
------------------------------------------------------  --------------
Office space renovations                                       $75,000
Displacement of current occupants                              225,000
Moving: Furniture, equipment, and supplies                      75,000
Civilian moving expenses                                     1,300,000
Military moving expenses                                        40,000
Civilian severance pay                                         100,000
Recurring travel expense increases                              75,000
======================================================================
Total                                                       $1,890,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  CINCLANTFLT's Cost Estimates Stated in its December 1997
Fact and Justification Sheet.

CINCLANTFLT's Fact and Justification Sheet acknowledges that no
monetary or manpower savings have been identified with relocating the
Commander, Navy Region Northeast, to NWS Earle.  Our analysis shows
potential for the Navy's one-time cost estimates to be understated.
For example:

  -- CINCLANTFLT officials estimated it would cost approximately
     $75,000 to renovate office space to accommodate the commander
     and his/her staff.  However, officials at NWS Earle stated that
     this renovation cost estimate could increase to as much as
     $130,000 if the decision were made to install central versus
     window air conditioning.

  -- While CINCLANTFLT estimated that travel expenses would increase
     by about $75,000 per year for travel to other subordinate
     commands, other information indicates this estimate may be
     understated.  Officials at NSB New London, where the core staff
     for the new command are currently stationed, provided their
     analysis that suggested that these costs could increase by about
     $100,000 to $200,000 annually.  We did not independently verify
     this analysis.  However, establishing the command at NWS Earle
     will result in the command being located in the southern most
     area of the region, making it relatively less accessible to
     other installations in the region than from its current location
     at NSB New London or from Newport.  For example, travel from NWS
     Earle to other areas of the region would require greater use of
     air travel than from NSB New London or Newport where cars and
     car pools are more readily used to reach other facilities.
     Figure 1 shows the approximate locations of Navy concentration
     areas in the northeast region.

   Figure 1:  Proximity of Naval
   concentration areas in the
   Navy's Northeast Region\a

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

\a There are a number of other naval activities in the region not
shown in figure 1, including the Naval Air Station at Keflavik,
Iceland, and the Joint Maritime Facility in St.  Mawgan, United
Kingdom.  A complete list of major naval bases and commands in this
region is presented in appendix I.

  -- CINCLANTFLT's Fact and Justification Sheet also does not reflect
     cost estimates for renovating the on-base housing at NWS Earle
     to accommodate the flag officer.  According to NWS Earle
     officials, it would cost at least $20,000 to renovate the
     proposed admiral's quarters to meet the Navy housing standards
     for flag officer quarters if the admiral chose to live on base.

  -- The Navy's cost estimates do not include the civilian personnel
     payroll increase that will occur as a result of this move.  Due
     to the location of NWS Earle, each civilian employee would be
     entitled to a salary increase to reflect the locality pay for
     that area.  Based on the U.S.  Office of Personnel Management
     1998 General Schedule, locality pay rates are 9.76 percent and
     9.13 percent, for NWS Earle and NSB New London, respectively.
     Locality pay rates for Newport are 5.4 percent by comparison.

   VARIOUS OPERATING FACTORS RAISE
   ISSUES ABOUT WHETHER NWS EARLE
   IS THE OPTIMAL LOCATION FOR THE
   NEW HEADQUARTERS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

In examining mission and support requirements of the new command, we
found that the NWS Earle location raises two basic operational
limitations when compared to the current location at NSB New London
or the facilities at Newport.  These limitations relate to increased
travel time and costs associated with operating from that location
and the adequacy of existing facility infrastructure to support the
new headquarters relative to at least the NSB New London and Newport
locations.

      STAFF TRAVEL TIME AND COSTS
      COULD BE GREATER OPERATING
      FROM NWS EARLE
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1

According to CINCLANTFLT's Fact and Justification Sheet, the proposed
mission of the Commander, Navy Region Northeast, would primarily
involve management and oversight of the widely dispersed naval shore
activities in the northeast region.  CINCLANTFLT officials expect
that travel expenses would increase over what they would be in a more
central location.  According to NSB New London officials, the mission
requires frequent travel to and from the naval activities within the
region (see fig.  1 and app.  I).  Because NWS Earle is located in
the southern most part of the northeast region, these officials
stated that there would likely be a greater reliance on travel by air
than by car where several persons could travel together at less cost.

   NWS EARLE HAS LIMITED
   INFRASTRUCTURE TO SUPPORT THE
   COMMANDER, NAVY REGION
   NORTHEAST
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

Our review of factors such as office space, housing, and
conference/training facilities at the sites we visited shows that NWS
Earle has the least existing infrastructure to support the new
command's requirements.  We observed that the available
infrastructure at NWS Earle is primarily suited to support its
mission of receiving, storing, and distributing naval ordnance and
has limited office, conference, and classroom space.  As stated
previously, placing the new command at NWS Earle would require the
displacing and relocating of existing command staff and renovating of
other space to accommodate their relocation.  Conversely, at NSB New
London, the Navy would not incur any major renovation costs beyond
the purchase and installation of additional office modular furniture
to accommodate the increased number of staff.  We observed that the
current headquarters building for the regional coordinator staff at
NSB New London has sufficient vacant space on the first and third
floors to accommodate the proposed expansion.  Even if the Navy
decides that the Commander, Navy Region Northeast, and the Commander,
Submarine Group Two, would not occupy the same building, officials at
NSB New London identified four other buildings on base that could
accommodate the Commander, Navy Region Northeast.  We also found that
the Navy facilities and infrastructure at Newport would be adequate
to support the command without major renovation costs.

Additionally, NWS Earle does not have sufficient officer housing
quarters available to accommodate an admiral and additional staff
officers.  The proposed staffing of the new command includes 17
officers, including the commanding officer, whereas the on-base
family housing at NWS Earle includes 38 officer housing units of
which only 2 were vacant as of August 1998 because they were being
renovated.  Furthermore, according to officials at NWS Earle, none of
these officer housing units meets the standards for a flag officer.
Although renovations could be made to improve some officer housing
units, officials at NWS Earle stated that it is more likely the
admiral and his senior staff would choose to reside in quarters
available to them at the Fort Monmouth Army Base, about 6 miles away.
This latter option is already the housing of choice for some command
staff officers currently stationed at NWS Earle.  Conversely, at both
NSB New London and Newport, there is sufficient housing space to
accommodate the proposed command's military staff.  We observed that
both of these bases have housing areas with sufficient space to
accommodate both the numbers and grade levels of the command's
military staff.

As part of the regional coordination mission involving management and
oversight of naval shore activities in the region, the command hosts
frequent conferences and training seminars for personnel from other
naval installations throughout the region.  For example, during
fiscal year 1998, about 20 to 50 personnel at a time attended
training courses and conferences at NSB New London that related to
regional activities such as the Navy's commercial activities program,
casualty assistance calls, information technology, facilities
engineering, family advocacy and family services, and regional
security.  Officials at NWS Earle stated that the command building
there would not include adequate conference and training facilities
to accommodate these activities.  We observed, for example, that the
current command building at NWS Earle that would be used to house the
new command has one conference room, which has sufficient space for a
maximum of about 15 to 20 participants.  Conversely, we observed that
the facilities occupied by the regional coordinator staff at NSB New
London currently have several large conference rooms and several
other smaller meeting facilities that are sufficient to accommodate
expanded requirements.  Similarly, we observed that the building at
Newport that would be used for the new regional command has
sufficient conference and meeting rooms to accommodate the command's
anticipated requirements.

   OTHER QUESTIONS REGARDING
   JUSTIFICATION FOR THE NWS EARLE
   SITE SELECTION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

While the CINCLANTFLT justification was based primarily on NWS
Earle's proximity to New York City, the desire for a flag rank
officer at that location, and several other public relations-related
factors, the high priority given to these criteria appears
questionable when compared to the command's core mission
responsibilities.

CINCLANTFLT's Fact and Justification Sheet states that (1) NWS Earle
is the only primary homeport for Navy ships on the East Coast without
a flag officer and (2) there is a need for Navy flag officer
representation in the New York-New Jersey area to act as the resident
Navy spokesperson and to interact on the Navy's behalf with major
corporations, labor unions, other organizations associated with
maritime commerce, and publishing and media concerns.  It also states
that the regional commander would serve as the official Navy
representative for major events, visiting foreign dignitaries, and
U.S.  Navy and foreign ship port visits.  The regional commander
would serve on numerous area special purpose councils and respond to
requirements for support functions and services in the New York City
area arising from the large population and the Navy's recruiting
efforts in the area.  Furthermore, the justification sheet states
that there is a requirement for essential support functions and
services such as major casualty assistance calls programs, extensive
regional public affairs information services, and a large community
service program in the New York-New Jersey area.

While each of the justification points highlighted in the
justification sheet has merit, available data indicate that these
functions differ significantly from the command's core
responsibilities.  These core responsibilities are more related to
managing installation support services at the Navy's bases and
commands in the region and other important functions highlighted in
the command's draft Mission, Functions and Tasks Statement, such as
providing primary resource support, management control, and technical
support of assigned shore activities.

In addition, according to regional coordination officials at NSB New
London, flag presence has been required in the New York City area
only on an average of about once every 2 months.  CINCLANTFLT
officials stated that flag presence has been requested in the New
York City area more often, but they were unable to provide
documentation to quantify their position.  Nevertheless, in terms of
increased proximity to New York City, NWS Earle is approximately
1-1/2 hours away by automobile.  NSB New London is about 2 hours from
New York City by automobile and is more centrally located in the
northeast region.  Therefore, it is not clear that NWS Earle provides
a geographic advantage over other locations.

Officials at NSB New London stated that they are performing many of
the functions proposed for the new command.  In this regard,
CINCLANTFLT officially designated the Commander, Submarine Group Two,
at NSB New London as the Naval Northeast Regional Coordinator in
1994.  Some of the regional functions that NSB New London staff have
been performing consist of facilities management, regional
environmental coordination, disaster preparedness, casualty
assistance coordination, family advocacy programs, regional security,
and coordination of regional port visits.  Additionally, NSB New
London staff have recently begun a number of regional projects,
including public affairs office consolidation; housing studies;
supply coalition; and a Joint Inter-service Regional Support Group,
which encompasses support for military facilities in Connecticut,
Rhode Island, and Massachusetts.  The establishment of a separate
Commander, Navy Region Northeast, will also expand the
responsibilities of the regional coordinator to include, for example,
managing the funds for the base operations support functions at the
naval shore installations in the region.

As previously noted, while the Navy has emphasized the establishment
of a new command to oversee base support operations in the region,
officials at NSB New London stated that they are currently
responsible for many of the functions proposed for the new command.
According to these officials, moving the command to NWS Earle could
temporarily disrupt the core base operations functions already
established if, as these officials suggest, many of the current
employees choose not to relocate to NWS Earle.  Moreover, we noted
that by moving the new command away from NSB New London, the Navy
would be separating the command from other regional activities
currently located at NSB New London, including the Regional Supply
Coalition and the Regional Emergency Command Center.

   CONCLUSIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

We recognize that site selection decisions are ultimately a
management prerogative based upon weighing relevant factors.  At the
same time, where policy guidance or other stipulated criteria are
established to facilitate decision-making, we believe it is important
for decisionmakers to ensure that such guidance and criteria are
followed and documented to support the basis for their decisions.  It
is not clear, however, to what extent CINCLANTFLT's site selection
process was conducted in accordance with Navy guidance and other
stipulated criteria regarding the current site selection
recommendation.  Further, the justification cited for recommending
NWS Earle over the current location at NSB New London, or other
locations, appears to have a number of weaknesses in the cost
estimates that were made and consideration of nonmonetary benefits
such as infrastructure deficiencies at NWS Earle and command travel
time gains.

   RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense require the Secretary of
the Navy to review and more fully assess the prospective headquarters
location for the Commander, Navy Region Northeast, against the Navy's
decision-making criteria, taking into consideration issues and
questions raised in this report.

   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Navy concurred
with our recommendation and stated that it will review and reconsider
all pertinent facts, including the issues and questions raised in
this report, and that CINCLANTFLT will then resubmit a fact and
justification package on the establishment of a Northeast Region
Commander.

The Navy also stated that, CINCLANTFLT did follow its published
guidance on establishment of shore activities.  It also noted that,
although cost is an important consideration, it is not the only
factor evaluated in the decision- making process.  We agree that cost
is not the only factor.  Our review of available documentation and
discussions with Navy officials have indicated that the
recommendation to select NWS Earle was based primarily on placing the
command in closer proximity to New York City.  Less attention was
given to other fundamental factors such as operational effectiveness,
costs, and core mission responsibilities.  Our draft report raised
questions about the extent to which the Navy had followed its own
criteria regarding the establishment of shore activities since we
could not be certain to what extent the Navy met its stipulated
requirements because the Navy had limited documentation to support
its analyses.  We modified our report to clarify this issue.  The
full text of the Navy's comments from the Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations is presented in appendix II.

   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :10

To assess the process the Navy used for recommending a site for the
Commander, Navy Region Northeast, we reviewed available cost estimate
data gathered by staff within the office of the CINCLANTFLT.  We did
not, however, independently verify the Navy's cost estimates.  We
also reviewed and analyzed CINCLANTFLT's (1) Fact and Justification
Sheet for the recommendation that the command relocate to NWS Earle,
New Jersey; (2) facilities data gathered during the decision-making
process; (3) Navy Instruction 5450.169D regarding the establishment
of shore activities; (4) Instruction 5450.94 regarding the proposed
mission, functions, and tasks statement for the Commander, Navy
Region Northeast; and (5) other related documentation.

We visited and interviewed officials at the Commander, Submarine
Group Two, at the NSB New London in Groton, Connecticut, who are
currently responsible for regional coordination among CINCLANTFLT
activities in the northeast region.  We compared the current mission
and staffing of the regional coordination office to the proposed
mission, functions, and tasks statement for the Commander, Navy
Region Northeast.  We discussed with these officials the facilities,
infrastructure, and base support available to accommodate the new
command.

We also visited and interviewed officials at NWS Earle, New Jersey,
and the naval base at Newport, Rhode Island, to determine how the
command would be accommodated if relocated to these locations.  We
selected these bases for our review because NWS Earle is the base
that CINCLANTFLT has recommended as the site for the Commander, Navy
Region Northeast, and the naval facilities at Newport are centrally
located within the northeast region.  We discussed with these
officials the facilities, infrastructure, and base support available
to accommodate the new command.

We met with senior CINCLANTFLT officials on several occasions to
brief them on the results of our work.  We have incorporated their
comments, as appropriate, to enhance the technical accuracy and
completeness of our report.

We conducted our review from April to August 1998 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

--------------------------------------------------------- Letter :10.1

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking
Minority Members of the Senate Committees on Armed Services and on
Appropriations and the House Committees on National Security and on
Appropriations; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and
the Secretaries of Defense and the Navy.  Copies will also be made
available to others upon request.

Please contact me on (202) 512-8412 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report.  Major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix III.

David R.  Warren, Director
Defense Management Issues

MAJOR NAVAL BASES AND COMMANDS IN
THE NAVY'S NORTHEAST REGION
=========================================================== Appendix I

Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station
Cutler, Maine

Naval Security Group Activity
Winter Harbor, Maine

Supervisor, Shipbuilding
Bath Iron Works
Bath, Maine

Naval Air Station Brunswick\a
Brunswick, Maine

Portsmouth Naval Shipyard\a
Portsmouth, New Hampshire

Nuclear Power Training Unit
Ballston Spa, New York

Naval Education and Training Center \a
Naval Undersea Warfare Center \a
Naval Weapons Center\a
Newport, Rhode Island

Naval Submarine Base New London\a
Groton, Connecticut

Naval Weapons Station Earle\a
Colts Neck, New Jersey

Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst
Lakehurst, New Jersey

Naval Air Station Keflavik
Keflavik, Iceland

Joint Maritime Facility
St Mawgan, United Kingdom

\a Designated as Fleet Concentration Areas in the Navy's Northeast
Region.

(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix II
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
=========================================================== Appendix I

(See figure in printed edition.)

MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================= Appendix III

NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Barry W.  Holman, Associate Director
William W.  Crocker III, Assistant Director

NORFOLK FIELD OFFICE

David A.  Schmitt, Evaluator-in-Charge
John R.  Beauchamp, Evaluator
Patricia F.  Blowe, Evaluator
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