Electronic Warfare: DOD Should Select Most Cost-Effective Infrared
Countermeasure System (Letter Report, 04/28/1998, GAO/NSIAD-98-2).

To better protect U.S. aircraft from infrared guided missiles, the
military is seeking to acquire two active countermeasure systems,
including one being jointly developed with the British. GAO found that
the Defense Department may be able to realize sizeable savings by
procuring only the more cost-effective of the two systems.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-98-2
     TITLE:  Electronic Warfare: DOD Should Select Most Cost-Effective
	     Infrared Countermeasure System
      DATE:  04/28/1998
   SUBJECT:  Radar equipment
	     Military procurement
	     Warning systems
	     Air warfare
	     Electronic warfare
	     Cost effectiveness analysis
	     Defense cost control
	     Defense capabilities
IDENTIFIER:  Army Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasures System
	     Directional Infrared Countermeasure System

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Cover
================================================================ COVER

Report to the Secretary of Defense

April 1998

ELECTRONIC WARFARE - DOD SHOULD
SELECT MOST COST-EFFECTIVE
INFRARED COUNTERMEASURE SYSTEM

GAO/NSIAD-98-2

Electronic Warfare

(707216)

Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  ATIRCM - Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure
  DIRCM - x
  DOD - x
  SOCOM - x

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER

B-276171

April 28, 1998

The Honorable William S.  Cohen
The Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr.  Secretary:

The Army is developing the Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure
(ATIRCM) System to protect U.S.  aircraft from infrared guided
missiles, while the U.S.  Special Operations Command (SOCOM) intends
to procure the Directional Infrared Countermeasure (DIRCM) System,
which it is jointly developing with the United Kingdom, to satisfy
the same requirement.  We reviewed these programs to determine
whether the Department of Defense (DOD) is justified in acquiring
both systems.  We are issuing this report to bring to your attention
our finding that the acquisition of both systems simultaneously may
not be cost-effective and that substantial savings may be realized by
procuring and having to support and maintain only one system.

   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

SOCOM and the Army are purchasing two separate active infrared
countermeasure systems to protect U.S.  aircraft.  They plan to spend
a total of approximately $2.74 billion, including about $2.475
billion for 815 ATIRCM systems and associated common missile warning
systems and about $261 million for 60 DIRCM systems and its own
unique missile warning system.  In addition, there are many other
potential customers for an active infrared countermeasure system,
such as Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft that have not yet
been committed to either ATIRCM or DIRCM.

SOCOM and the Army both have a need for an effective integrated
infrared countermeasure system capable of defeating infrared guided
weapon systems.  The Army considers this capability especially
critical to counter newer, more sophisticated, infrared guided
missiles.  Likewise, SOCOM has established an urgent need for a
near-term directional infrared countermeasure system capable of
countering currently deployed infrared guided missiles.  To meet its
urgent need, SOCOM plans to exercise its first production option for
15 DIRCM systems in July 1998 and procure 45 additional systems
during fiscal years 1998 and 1999.  The Army expects to begin ATIRCM
production in April 2001.

Two generations of infrared missiles are currently deployed.  First
generation missiles can be defeated by current countermeasures, such
as flares.  Second generation infrared guided missiles are more
difficult to defeat.  More advanced infrared guided missiles are
being developed that will have even greater capabilities against
current countermeasures.

To defeat infrared guided missiles, the ATIRCM and DIRCM systems will
emit directed energy to decoy or jam the missile's seeker.  Both
systems are composed of a missile approach warning system, a computer
processor, a power supply, and energy transmitters housed in a
pointing turret.  After a missile is detected, the computer is to
rotate the turret and point the transmitters at the missile.  The
transmitters are to then emit the directed energy.

   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

DOD may be able to achieve sizable savings by procuring, supporting,
and maintaining only one active infrared countermeasure system to
protect its aircraft from infrared guided missiles.  Despite
congressional emphasis on, and DOD's stated commitment to,
commonality, SOCOM and the Army are acquiring two separate
countermeasure systems that eventually will have the same laser
technology.  DOD should determine which system is more cost-effective
and procure that one to protect its aircraft.  If DIRCM is determined
to be more cost-effective, the ATIRCM program should be terminated.
If ATIRCM is determined to be more cost-effective, no additional
DIRCM systems should be procured beyond those planned to be procured
in July 1998 to meet SOCOM's urgent need.

   CONGRESS AND DOD RECOGNIZE THE
   BENEFIT OF COMMON SYSTEMS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

Congress and DOD have a long-standing interest in reducing
proliferation of electronic warfare systems.  By urging development
of common systems, Congress expected to reduce the costly
proliferation of duplicative systems and achieve cost savings in
program development, production, and logistics.  DOD agrees on the
need for commonality, and its policy statements reflect congressional
concerns about electronic warfare system proliferation.  DOD policy
states that prior to initiating a new acquisition program, the
services must consider using or modifying an existing system or
initiate a new joint-service development program.  DOD policy also
requires the services to consider commonality alternatives at various
points in the acquisition process.

Joint electronic warfare programs and increased commonality among the
services' systems results in economy of scale savings.  Buying larger
quantities for common use among the services usually results in lower
procurement costs.  Similarly, lower support costs result from a more
simplified logistics system providing common repair parts,
maintenance, test equipment, and training.  For example, under Army
leadership, a common radar warning receiver was acquired for
helicopters and other special purpose aircraft of the Army, Marine
Corps, and Air Force.  In addition, a follow-on radar warning system
for certain Army and Marine Corps special purpose aircraft and
helicopters was jointly acquired with savings estimated by Army
officials of $187.7 million attributable to commonality benefits.\1

--------------------
\1 Electronic Warfare:  Costly Radar Warning Receiver Duplication
Continues (GAO/NSIAD-94-4, Nov.  29, 1993).

   DIRCM AND ATIRCM WILL
   EVENTUALLY HAVE THE SAME
   TECHNOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

The ATIRCM and DIRCM systems will initially have one key difference
in technological capability.  The DIRCM system will rely on existing
flash lamp technology to defeat all currently deployed first and
second generation threat missiles.  (A flash lamp emits a beam of
light energy to confuse the missile's seeker.) The Army's ATIRCM
system will also be fielded with a flash lamp but it will also have a
laser.  According to SOCOM officials, after the flash lamp-equipped
DIRCM is fielded, they plan to upgrade the DIRCM system with a laser
that has completed development and is already in production.  As
described later in this report, the upgraded DIRCM system could be
available around the same time as the ATIRCM system.  Furthermore,
the DIRCM laser could be the same as the one used in ATIRCM,
according to DOD officials.  The Army's cost and effectiveness
analysis used to justify the ATIRCM system indicates that with a
laser upgrade, DIRCM could provide capability equal to the ATIRCM.

The two systems will have a total of three different size turrets.
According to DOD and contractor officials, the size of the turret
matters because larger aircraft present larger targets and must apply
more energy to decoy an incoming missile's seeker.  A larger turret
can direct more of the flash lamp's energy.  The larger the amount of
directed energy, the greater the likelihood the missile will become
confused as to the actual location of the target aircraft.  The DIRCM
turret, to be used on SOCOM C-130s, is the largest of the three.  The
United Kingdom intends to use the larger DIRCM turret on its larger
aircraft and a smaller turret for its helicopters and smaller
aircraft.  The ATIRCM turret is between the two DIRCM turrets in
size.  Since the ATIRCM turret will also have a laser, however, DOD
acquisition officials believe it will ultimately be more effective
than any system equipped only with a flash lamp.

   LASER-EQUIPPED DIRCM AND ATIRCM
   ARE EXPECTED TO BE AVAILABLE AT
   ABOUT THE SAME TIME
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

Both the DIRCM and ATIRCM programs are experiencing delays that have
moved their projected availability dates significantly closer
together.  However, DOD has not yet taken advantage of the schedule
changes to determine if one system will be more cost-effective than
the other and if it can achieve significant savings by procuring only
one system to protect all its aircraft.

SOCOM plans to exercise the first of three production options and buy
15 DIRCM systems in July 1998.  These systems will not be equipped
with lasers.  Production funds are projected to be included in the
fiscal
year 2001 budget for the DIRCM laser upgrade.  Production of ATIRCM
is to begin in April 2001.  SOCOM officials maintain that because of
their urgent need they cannot wait for the laser-equipped ATIRCM.
However, the difference in the time frames for beginning production
can be misleading.  DIRCM is scheduled to go into production before
operational testing begins, while the ATIRCM is not scheduled to
begin production until operational testing is completed.  If both
DIRCM and ATIRCM production begin immediately after their respective
operational tests, DIRCM's production is delayed until April 2000 and
ATIRCM is moved up to January 2001.  As a result, the systems will
start production within 9 months of each other.  Additionally, DIRCM,
with a laser upgrade, is projected to be available in 2001, about the
same time as ATIRCM with a laser.

   ATIRCM AND DIRCM ARE BEING
   DEVELOPED FOR THE SAME OR
   SIMILAR AIRCRAFT
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

The Army is developing ATIRCM and the United Kingdom with SOCOM is
developing DIRCM to work on a variety of aircraft, including some
that are the same or similar.  (See table 1.) For example, the United
Kingdom plans to use the DIRCM system on the CH-47 Chinook helicopter
while the Army plans to use ATIRCM on the Chinook.  By varying the
size of the turret, the United Kingdom intends to use DIRCM on
aircraft of a wide range of sizes, from its very large, fixed-wing
C-130s to small rotary wing aircraft such as the Lynx.  Although the
Army currently has no plans to install ATIRCM on fixed-wing aircraft
the size of C-130s, it too will be placing its system on a wide range
of aircraft from the very large CH-47 heavy lift helicopter, to the
small OH-58D helicopter.  If development of both systems is
successful, therefore, the Army and the United Kingdom will prove
that ATIRCM and DIRCM provide redundant capability for many aircraft.

In addition to those SOCOM and Army aircraft identified as platforms
for DIRCM or ATIRCM, there are many potential Air Force, Navy, and
Marine Corps aircraft that are not yet committed to either system.
These include large fixed-wing aircraft of the Air Force, as well as
425 future Marine Corps V-22 aircraft and the Navy's SH-60
helicopters.

                                Table 1

                 Planned Aircraft for DIRCM and ATIRCM

                                DIRCM               ATIRCM
------------------------------  ------------------  ------------------
United States                   Fixed Wing          Rotary Wing
                                C-130               AH-64
                                                    CH-47
                                                    OH-58D
                                                    UH/EH-60

                                                    Fixed Wing
                                                    CV-22

United Kingdom                  Fixed Wing          Fixed Wing
                                HS-125              None
                                BAe-146
                                C-130
                                VC-10
                                ISLANDER

                                Rotary Wing         Rotary Wing
                                EH-101              WAH-64
                                CH-47
                                PUMA
                                A-109
                                LYNX
                                H-3
----------------------------------------------------------------------

   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

DOD's plans to acquire infrared countermeasure capability may not
represent the most cost-effective approach.  While we recognize
SOCOM's urgent need for a countermeasure capability in the near term,
we believe that DOD can satisfy this need and meet the Army's needs
without procuring two separate systems.  Specifically, proceeding
with procurement of the first 15 DIRCM systems beginning in July 1998
appears warranted.  However, continued production of DIRCM may not be
the most cost-effective option for DOD since the Army is developing
the ATIRCM system, which will have the same technology, be available
at about the same time, and is being developed for the same or
similar aircraft.

We, therefore, recommend that the Secretary of Defense (1) direct
that the appropriate tests and analyses be conducted to determine
whether DIRCM or ATIRCM will provide the most cost-effective means to
protect U.S.  aircraft and (2) procure that system for U.S.  aircraft
that have a requirement for similar Infrared Countermeasure
capabilities.  Until that decision can be made, we further recommend
that the Secretary of Defense limit DIRCM system procurement to the
first production option of 15 systems to allow a limited number for
SOCOM's urgent deployment needs.

   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
recommendation that the appropriate tests and analyses be conducted
to determine whether ATIRCM or DIRCM will provide the most
cost-effective protection for U.S.  aircraft.  According to DOD, the
results of such analyses were completed in 1994 and 1995 and showed
that both systems were the most cost-effective:  DIRCM for large,
fixed-wing C-130 aircraft and ATIRCM for smaller, rotary wing
aircraft.

However, as a result of events that have occurred in both programs
since the analyses were conducted in 1994 and 1995, DOD's earlier
conclusions as to cost-effectiveness are no longer necessarily valid
and a new analysis needs to be conducted as we recommended.  For
example, the 1994 cost- and operational effectiveness analysis
conducted for SOCOM's C-130s concluded that DIRCM should be selected
because it was to be available significantly sooner than ATIRCM.  As
our report states, the DIRCM schedule has slipped significantly, and
by the time the planned laser upgrade for DIRCM is available, ATIRCM
is also scheduled to be available.  Furthermore, the 1994 analysis
justifying DIRCM concluded that ATIRCM would be a less expensive
option and did not conclude that DIRCM would be more effective than
ATIRCM.  Thus, the question of which system would be most
cost-effective for SOCOM's C-130s is a legitimate issue that should
be addressed by DOD in a new cost-effectiveness analysis before SOCOM
commits fully to DIRCM.

In addition, the Army's 1995 cost- and operational effectiveness
analysis justifying ATIRCM also concluded DIRCM could meet the Army's
rotary wing requirement if DIRCM's effectiveness were to be improved
by adding a laser.  As our report notes, DOD now plans to acquire a
laser as an upgrade for DIRCM.  Thus, whether DIRCM or ATIRCM would
be most cost-effective for the Army's rotary wing aircraft remains a
legitimate and viable question that DOD should reconsider.

Further, in 1994 and 1995, when DOD conducted the prior
cost-effectiveness analyses, effectiveness levels for DIRCM and
ATIRCM had to be assumed from simulations because no operational test
results were available at that time.  Operational testing, including
live missile shots against the DIRCM system, is scheduled to begin in
the summer of 1998 and ATIRCM testing is scheduled for 1999.  In the
near future, then, DOD may be in a better position to know
conclusively how effective DIRCM or ATIRCM will be and this should be
taken into consideration in a new cost-effectiveness analysis.

DOD did not concur with a recommendation in a draft of this report
that one system be procured for all U.S.  aircraft, arguing that one
system cannot meet all aircraft requirements.  We have clarified our
recommendation by eliminating the word "all".  Our intent was to
focus this recommendation on U.S.  aircraft having a requirement for
advanced infrared countermeasure protection, such as that to be
provided by DIRCM or ATIRCM.  For those aircraft that have an
advanced infrared countermeasure requirement, we reiterate that the
United Kingdom plans to use the DIRCM system on a wide variety of
fixed- and rotary wing aircraft of many shapes and sizes, and the
Army plans to use ATIRCM on a wide variety of rotary wing aircraft,
as well as the fixed-wing CV-22.  Thus, DOD should reconsider whether
DIRCM or ATIRCM could provide the advanced infrared countermeasure
protection necessary to meet the multiple U.S.  aircraft
requirements.

In commenting further on its belief that one system cannot meet all
U.S.  aircraft requirements, DOD also stated that (1) the SOCOM DIRCM
is too heavy for Army helicopters, (2) ATIRCM's smaller turret drive
motors are not designed for the increased wind in SOCOM C-130
applications, and (3) ATIRCM will not emit enough Band I and II
jamming energy to protect SOCOM's C-130s.\2 We agree that the SOCOM
DIRCM is too heavy for Army helicopters, but point out that the DIRCM
contractor is designing a smaller DIRCM turret for the United
Kingdom's helicopters that would not be too heavy for the Army's
helicopters.  DOD has never planned for DIRCM or ATIRCM to be the
only means of protection for its aircraft from infrared guided
missiles.  Other systems are available to DOD to help protect against
threat missiles, including those in Bands I and II, and these
alternatives should be considered for use in conjunction with DIRCM
or ATIRCM as DOD tries to determine how to protect its aircraft in
the most cost-effective manner.

DOD also did not concur with our recommendation that it limit initial
DIRCM production to the first 15 units to begin filling its urgent
need and to provide units to be used for testing and analysis before
committing SOCOM's entire fleet of 59 C-130s to the DIRCM program.
DOD maintained that SOCOM's remaining C-130s would remain vulnerable
to missile threats such as the one that shot down a SOCOM AC-130
during Operation Desert Storm if any production decisions were
delayed.

We continue to believe that the additional analysis needs to be
conducted before any DIRCM production decisions beyond the first one
are made.  More than 7 years have passed since the unfortunate loss
of the SOCOM AC-130 and its crew in 1991.  During that time, DOD
delayed the first DIRCM production decision several times.  The
resolution of the technical problems causing these schedule slips can
only be known through successful testing and implementation of our
recommendation would allow units to be produced for testing.
Finally, we agree with DOD that SOCOM's need is urgent and believe
that the best way to begin fulfilling the urgent need while
determining whether DIRCM or ATIRCM is the more cost-effective system
for C-130s is to limit DIRCM production to only the first 15 systems.

--------------------
\2 The seekers on infrared guided missiles are designed to seek out
and home in on particular groups of wavelengths, or "bands," of heat
energy given off by targets.  DOD considers the specifics of which
bands are associated with which seekers to be classified.

   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9

To develop information for this report, we compared and examined the
Army's and the SOCOM's respective plans and proposed schedules for
acquiring the ATIRCM and DIRCM systems.  We obtained acquisition and
testing plans and the proposed schedule for acquiring and fielding
the systems.  We compared these plans to legislative and DOD
acquisition guidance and to the results of past DOD procurements.  We
discussed the programs with officials of the ATIRCM Project Office,
St.  Louis, Missouri, and the DIRCM Project Office, Tampa, Florida.
Also, we visited with Lockheed-Sanders, the ATIRCM contractor, and
Northrop-Grumman, the DIRCM contractor, and discussed their
respective programs.

We conducted our review from August 1996 to December 1997 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :9.1

As you know, 31 U.S.C.  720 requires the head of a federal agency to
submit a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee
on Government Reform and Oversight not later than 60 days after the
date of the report.  A written statement must also be submitted to
the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations with an agency's
first request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the
date of the report.

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional
committees, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Technology, the Secretary of the Army, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, and the Commander of the U.S.  Special
Operations Command.  We will also make copies available to others on
request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report.  Major contributors to this report
were Danny Owens, Wendy Smythe, Charles Ward, and Mark Lambert.

Sincerely yours,

Louis J.  Rodrigues
Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues

(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I
COMMENTS FROM THE OFFICE OF THE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
============================================================== Letter

(See figure in printed edition.)

(See figure in printed edition.)

*** End of document. ***