-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-98-140
TITLE: BATTLEFIELD AUTOMATION -
ACQUISITION ISSUES FACING THE ARMY
BATTLE COMMAND, BRIGADE AND BELOW
PROGRAM
DATE: 06/30/1998
-----------------------------------------------------------------
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to the Chairman
Subcommittee on National Security
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
June 1998
BATTLEFIELD AUTOMATION -
ACQUISITION ISSUES FACING THE ARMY
BATTLE COMMAND, BRIGADE AND BELOW
PROGRAM
GAO/NSIAD-98-140
Battlefield Automation
(707284)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
DOD -
EPLRS -
FBCB2 -
SINCGARS -
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-277967
June 30, 1998
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
Chairman
National Security Subcommittee
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The Army plans to increase the exchange of information on the
battlefield through the Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below
(FBCB2) Program\\1 . The goal is to "digitize" the forces--create an
automated information network at the brigade level and below by
installing computers on individual battlefield platforms and linking
those computers by radio. The Army plans to equip a division with
this capability by the end of fiscal year 2000.
As requested, we reviewed the Army's acquisition plans for FBCB2.
Specifically, we evaluated the program's significance to the Army's
battlefield digitization goal, the Army's derivation of cost
estimates, and the feasibility of the Army's fielding schedule. We
also collected information on experimental performance results to
date.
--------------------
\1 Army pamphlet 10-1, Organization of the United States Army Jun.
1994, describes "brigade and below" as follows: the brigade
(3,000-5,000 soldiers), battalion (300-1,000 soldiers), company
(62-190 soldiers), platoon (16-44 soldiers), squad (9-10 soldiers),
and the individual soldier.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
FBCB2 will be the principal digital command and control system for
the Army at the brigade level and below and will constitute the third
major component of the Army's Battle Command System. Currently, the
Battle Command System comprises the (1) Global Command and Control
System-Army located at strategic and theater levels, which
interoperates with other theater, joint, and multinational command
and control systems, and with Army systems at the corps and levels
below and (2) Army Tactical Command and Control System, which meets
the command and control needs from corps to battalion.
When fielded, FBCB2 is expected to provide enhanced situational
awareness to the lowest tactical level\2 --the individual
soldier--and a seamless flow of command and control information
across the battlespace. To accomplish these objectives, FBCB2 will
be composed of:
-- a computer that can display a variety of information\3 ,
including a common picture of the battlefield overlaid with
graphical depictions (known as icons) of friendly and enemy
forces;
-- software that automatically integrates Global Positioning System
data, military intelligence data, combat identification data,
and platform data (such as the status of fuel and ammunition);
and
-- interfaces to communications systems.
Battlefield data will be communicated to and received from users of
FBCB2 through a "Tactical Internet." This is a radio network
comprising the Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS)
and the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS).
By connecting platforms through this Tactical Internet, data needed
for battlefield situational awareness and command and control
decisions can be made available to commanders at all levels of the
Army's Battle Command System.
To explore the FBCB2 concept, the Army acquired and installed
sufficient quantities of equipment to field a brigade-size
experimental force in June 1996. This experimental force then used
FBCB2 prototype equipment in an Advanced Warfighting Experiment,
which culminated in March 1997 during a 2 week deployment against an
opposing force at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin,
California. Results from the Advanced Warfighting Experiment were
considered sufficiently positive that the Army conducted an FBCB2
Milestone I/II review in July 1997.\4 FBCB2 was conditionally
approved for entry into the engineering and manufacturing development
acquisition phase (acquisition milestone II) pending completion of
certain essential action items, including the final Operational
Requirements Document and the Test and Evaluation Master Plan. The
program is expected to incur life cycle costs of about $3 billion (in
then year dollars) by fiscal year 2012.
Department of Defense (DOD) Regulation 5000.2R offers a general model
for management of the acquisition process for programs such as FBCB2.
This regulation states that managers shall structure a program to
ensure a logical progression through a series of phases designed to
reduce risk, ensure affordability, and provide adequate information
for decision-making. At the start of a program, consideration is
given to program size, complexity, and risk and a determination is
made regarding acquisition category. More costly, complex, and risky
systems are generally accorded more oversight. The determination
made at program initiation is reexamined at each milestone in light
of then-current program conditions.
The regulation describes the differences among acquisition categories
and places them in one of three categories: I, II, or III. In
general, the milestone decision authority for category I programs is
at a higher level than category II or III programs. In addition,
category I programs generally require that more information--such as
an Analysis of Alternatives\5 and a Cost Analysis Improvement Group\6
review--be available for decision-making. Category I programs are
defined as programs estimated by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Technology to require eventual expenditure for
research, development, test, and evaluation of more than $355 million
(fiscal year 1996 constant dollars) or procurement of more than $2.1
billion (fiscal year 1996 constant dollars). Category II programs
have lower dollar classification thresholds than category I programs;
for example, the research, development, test, and evaluation dollar
threshold for an acquisition category II program is $140 million
(fiscal year 1996 constant dollars). Category III programs are
defined as those which do not meet the criteria for category I or II
programs. FBCB2 is currently classified as a category II acquisition
program.
--------------------
\2 The Army describes "situational awareness" as near real time
information on current unit positions and their tactical/logistical
status. Also, intelligence sources will enable a continuous flow of
information on enemy locations and intelligently derived and widely
disseminated analysis of probable enemy intent.
\3 Platforms such as the M1A2 Abrams tank and the M2A3 Bradley
fighting vehicle, which already have an on-board data processing
capability, will not require another computer. Instead, the FBCB2
"embedded battle command" software will be used to interface with
existing software. Other platforms will require FBCB2 computers. In
November 1997, the Army's acquisition objective was 2,604 embedded
FBCB2 systems and 59,522 systems requiring computer installations.
\4 Department of Defense Regulation 5000.2R explains that the
acquisition process shall be structured in logical phases separated
by major decision points called milestones. In general, an
acquisition program will progress through four milestones. These
milestones are: milestone 0, approval to conduct concept studies;
milestone I, approval to begin a new acquisition program; milestone
II, approval to enter engineering and manufacturing development; and,
milestone III, approval for production or fielding/deployment.
\5 DOD regulation 5000.2R requires an analysis of alternatives for
all acquisition I programs. These analyses are intended to (1) aid
and document decision-making by illuminating the relative advantages
and disadvantages of alternatives being considered, and (2) show the
sensitivity of each alternative to possible changes in key
assumptions (e.g., threat) or variables (e.g., selected performance
capabilities). Discussion of interoperability and commonality of
components/systems that are similar in function to other DOD
component programs or Allied programs are sometimes included. The
analysis shall aid decision-makers in judging whether any of the
proposed alternatives to an existing system offer sufficient military
and/or economic benefit to be worth the cost. There shall be a clear
linkage between the analysis of alternatives, system requirements,
and system evaluation measures of effectiveness.
\6 The Cost Analysis Improvement Group is part of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Program Analyses and Evaluation Office and
their reviews are used to ensure cost data of sufficient accuracy is
available to support reasonable judgements on affordability for
acquisition I programs.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
On the basis of the Army's estimate of FBCB2 research, development,
test and evaluation costs, the program has been classified as a
category II acquisition--one that does not require systematic
oversight by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Technology. We believe that because of the FBCB2's significance,
cost, and schedule risk, the FBCB2 should be classified as a category
I acquisition and receive a higher level of oversight. Specifically:
-- Although FBCB2 is critical to the Army's digitization plan--the
system ties the upper level command and control systems to the
digital battlefield--FBCB2 is the only major system in the
Army's Battle Command System that has not been designated
category I. The system's potential to provide thousands of
soldiers with the ability to send and receive clear and
consistent battlefield information in almost real time
demonstrates the system's significance as a linchpin of the
digital battlefield. This significance is confirmed by the
Army's own designation of FBCB2 as one of the highest priority
command and control systems and the Army's plan to equip a
division with an FBCB2 capability by the end of fiscal year
2000.
-- Our analysis indicates that there are additional research,
development, test, and evaluation costs that, when included,
increase the dollar significance of this program to a category I
acquisition level.
-- The FBCB2 program faces significant schedule risk in meeting the
fiscal year 2000 mandate for fielding the first digitized
division. The mandate was set by the Army Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations and Plans in August 1997. To achieve this
schedule, the FBCB2 program will, in a 18-month period, need to
pass a series of tests, including two operational tests. Each
test requires different versions of software for each of the two
hardware components--the computer and the communications
interface unit. Additionally, new versions of two weapon
systems participating in the FBCB2 operational tests--the Abrams
tank and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle--will be concluding their
own operational tests just prior to the start of FBCB2
operational testing. The Army acknowledges that the program
schedule is high risk. However, despite this acknowledged
schedule risk, the Army is moving ahead with its highly
compressed schedule with no apparent risk management strategy
specifically addressing alternatives and the implications of not
fielding an adequately developed system by the end of fiscal
year 2000.
Because the FBCB2 program has only recently entered engineering and
manufacturing development, no operational evaluations are yet
available for analysis. However, the 1997 Task Force XXI Advanced
Warfighting Experiment employed a prototype FBCB2. Two independent
organizations, the Army's Operational Test and Evaluation Command and
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Operational Test and
Evaluation Office, assessed FBCB2 results and found a number of
problems. These included poor message completion, limitations
related to the experimental hardware and software, a lack of adequate
digital connectivity, immaturity of the Applique--the Army's name for
the FBCB2 computer--and the Tactical Internet, and inadequate
training. These organizations offered recommendations for the
continued development, maturity, and oversight of upcoming FBCB2
operational tests. Army officials currently assess the program's
technical risk as medium.
PROGRAM SIGNIFICANCE, ESTIMATED
COST, AND SCHEDULE RISK
INDICATE NEED FOR HIGHER LEVEL
SYSTEMATIC OVERSIGHT
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
FBCB2 is currently designated a category II acquisition on the basis
of the Army's estimate of research, development, test, and evaluation
costs. As a result, oversight is provided within the Army. We
believe that the program should be a category I acquisition on the
basis of (a) significance of the program; (b) estimated research,
development, test, and evaluation costs; and (c) high schedule risk.
The Army acknowledges that the program schedule involves high risk.
FBCB2 IS A PRIORITY ONE ARMY
PROGRAM
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1
Throughout the next decade and beyond, the Army plans to modernize
its forces through an overarching initiative called Force XXI.
Components of the Force XXI initiative are Army XXI, which extends to
about the year 2010, and the Army After Next, which is looking beyond
the year 2010. Included within the modernization objectives of Army
XXI is the integration of information technologies to acquire,
exchange, and employ timely information throughout the battlespace.
In general, integrated situational awareness and command and control
information technologies available to Army commanders currently
extend through the Army Tactical Command and Control System to
tactical operations centers at the brigade and battalion levels. By
extending the integration of information technologies to the
thousands of soldiers operating outside the tactical operations
centers, the Army expects to increase the lethality, survivability,
and operational tempo of its forces. FBCB2 is the critical link
needed to extend the information to those soldiers.
On August 1, 1997, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
announced that the first digitized division would be the 4th Infantry
Division and that, at a minimum, fielded equipment would include the
Army Training and Doctrine Command's list of priority one systems and
associated equipment. The Training and Doctrine Command has
identified 15 priority one systems. They primarily consist of
command, control, and communications systems, including FBCB2. It is
considered a critical element within the Army's digitization effort
because of the contribution it makes to achieving the required
capabilities for the digitized battlefield. Approved by the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
January 1995, these capabilities are:
-- integrated battle command from platoon to corps,
-- relevant common picture of the battlespace at each level,
-- smaller units that are more lethal and survivable,
-- more responsive logistics within and between theaters, and
-- joint interoperability at appropriate levels.
It is unlikely that all the required capabilities of the digitized
battlefield can be achieved without FBCB2. However, despite this
critical role, the Army has not designated FBCB2 as a category I
acquisition--a designation it has given to the other major systems in
the Army's Battle Command System.
The significance of this program has also been noted by the Office of
the Secretary of Defense Operational Test and Evaluation Office,
which in October 1997 recommended that FBCB2 be elevated to a
acquisition category I-D status on the basis of the program's
"significant and far-reaching impact\7 ." That office placed FBCB2 on
the same level as the Army's Maneuver Control System, which is also
an acquisition category I-D program. The Maneuver Control System is
a key component of the Army's Tactical Command and Control System
that provides automated critical battlefield assistance to commanders
and their battle staff at the corps-to-battalion level.
--------------------
\7 The "D" refers to the Defense Acquisition Board which advises the
milestone decision authority, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Technology. Other category I programs are designated
I-C programs; the "C" refers to the Component Head or Component
Acquisition Executive as the milestone decision authority.
COST ESTIMATE DOES NOT
INCLUDE ALL PROGRAM COSTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2
The Army's cost estimate for research, development, test, and
evaluation activities, adjusted to fiscal year 1996 constant
dollars,\8 is $265.4 million. This estimate covers the period from
fiscal year 1997 through fiscal year 2004. However, we believe the
Army's estimate is understated in that other research, development,
test, and evaluation costs should be added. As shown in table 1,
these costs raise the research, development, test, and evaluation
cost estimate above the category I threshold of $355 million.
Table 1
Our Estimate of Total FBCB2 Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation Costs
(Dollars in millions)
Fiscal
year
Then year Conversion 1996
Cost category estimate factor estimate
---------------------------------- ---------- ---------- ----------
Research, development, test, and $283.4 1.0424 $271.9
evaluation costs included in
Army's life cycle cost estimate
(1998 dollars)
Less: adjustment for fiscal year (6.8) 1.0424 (6.5)
1998 (1998 dollars)
======================================================================
Subtotal of Army estimated costs $265.4
Additional relevant costs
identified
Sunk costs included in Army life 48.7 1.0424 46.7
cycle cost estimate (1998
dollars)
Adjustment for fiscal year 1999 5.5 1.0643 5.2
(1999 dollars)
Warfighter Rapid Acquisition
Program 4.3 1.0210 4.2
Applique (1997 dollars) Applique 2.6 1.0424 2.5
(1998 dollars)
Warfighter Rapid Acquisition
Program 8.0 1.0210 7.8
Tactical Internet (1997 dollars) 8.0 1.0424 7.7
Tactical Internet (1998 dollars)
Expected transfer to Abrams 14.2 1.0643 13.3
Program Manager (1999 dollars)
Expected transfer to Bradley 3.5 1.0643 3.3
Program Manager (1999 dollars)
Estimated cost of FBCB2 limited 8.5 1.0424 8.2
user test (1998 dollars)
Estimated cost of FBCB2 initial
operational test and evaluation
(1999 dollars) 15.4 1.0643 14.5
(2000 dollars) 7.5 1.0867 6.9
======================================================================
Subtotal of Our additional costs $120.3
======================================================================
Total $385.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------
We discussed these figures with Army program officials, and they
agreed with $7.2 million of our additional costs, which included
partial amounts from the Warfighters Rapid Acquisition Program\9
related to the FBCB2 computer--$2.0 million of the fiscal year 1997
($1.4 million) and 1998 ($.6 million)--and a $5.2 million difference
between what was included in the life cycle cost estimate ($47
million) and the actual budget request ($52.5 million) converted to
1996 constant dollars.
Army officials disagreed with the addition of remaining cost
categories amounting to $113.1 million on the basis that (1) Army
policies and procedures require them to include only those funds
obligated by the program office after the establishment of a formal
acquisition program; (2) FBCB2-related funds obligated by other
program managers, such as the Abrams and Bradley managers, should be
excluded; and (3) costs directly related to test and evaluation
activities for acquisition category II, like FBCB2, are identified in
the Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command's Support of
Operational Testing program element. Our assessment of the Army's
arguments follows.
--------------------
\8 To make the adjustments, we used the inflation indices published
by the Army Material Command on December 27, 1996.
\9 The Warfighter Rapid Acquisition Program started with a $50
million fiscal year 1997 appropriation for Force XXI Initiatives.
The fiscal year 1997 funding was followed by a fiscal year 1998
appropriation of nearly $100 million. The Force XXI Initiatives
funding was intended to allow the Army to accelerate the fielding of
promising technologies.
FUNDS USED TO BUY
PROTOTYPE HARDWARE AND
SOFTWARE SHOULD BE
INCLUDED
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2.1
The Army Digitization Program provided $47.6 million for FBCB2
research, development, test, and evaluation activities through fiscal
year 1996. The funds used were to buy FBCB2 prototype hardware and
software used in the Advanced Warfighting Experiment at the National
Training Center. Army officials stated that these funds were
obligated prior to the establishment of the FBCB2 acquisition program
and thus should not be included in this cost estimate. We found that
the Army had included these funds in its total life cycle cost
estimate and, while the source of the funds was the digitization
program element, the explanation to the Congress in appropriate
descriptive summaries shows the funds were needed for activities
related to the development of FBCB2 hardware and software.
Therefore, we believe these funds should be included in the
derivation of the FBCB2 research, development, test, and evaluation
cost estimate.
FUNDS FOR INTEGRATION
ACTIVITIES AND OBLIGATED
BY ABRAMS AND BRADLEY
PROGRAM MANAGERS SHOULD
BE INCLUDED
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2.2
Our analysis shows that $2.8 million in fiscal year 1997 funding and
$1.9 million in fiscal year 1998 funding were specified for FBCB2
platform (shown as Applique in figure 1)\10 integration activities
and obligated by Abrams and Bradley program managers. Army officials
stated that a new Army regulation requires that all platform-related
costs be identified as part of the total platform cost and that these
funds were given to and obligated by the Abrams and Bradley program
offices. However, the Army obtained these funds from the Warfighters
Rapid Acquisition Program on the basis that they would be used to
provide an improved design that was not part of the original FBCB2
budget. Additionally, when requesting these funds, the Army stated
that, without this funding, FBCB2 would be at risk of not meeting its
fiscal year 2000 deadline. In our opinion, since these funds were
specifically requested, used, and obligated for FBCB2, they should be
considered part of the total research, development, test, and
evaluation cost estimate.
Our analysis also shows that $7.8 million in fiscal year 1997 and
$7.7 million in fiscal year 1998 were requested to complete system
engineering and integration work on the Tactical Internet. According
to Army officials, these funds were obligated by program managers for
Tactical Radio Command Systems and Warfighter Information
Network-Terrestrial and, since they were not controlled or obligated
by the FBCB2 program manager, should not be included in the estimate.
We believe these funds should be included as part of FBCB2 research,
development, test and evaluation cost because the Army justified its
need for these funds on the basis that they would be used to correct
known shortcomings and make the Tactical Internet compatible with the
evolution of the FBCB2 software development effort. In describing
the critical nature of the funding, the Army concluded that without
the Tactical Internet there would be no FBCB2.
We also found that interface funding is specifically characterized in
the fiscal year 1999 Army descriptive summary for the Digitization
program element as needed to complete integration, procure
prototypes, and initiate testing of FBCB2 in the M1A1 Abrams, M1A2
Abrams with system enhancements, and the M2A2 Bradley Operation
Desert Storm configurations. Therefore, we believe these funds are
more appropriately categorized as FBCB2-related rather than research,
development, test, and evaluation activities unique to the Abrams or
Bradley platforms.
--------------------
\10 The Applique funding provided to the Army by the Warfighters
Rapid Acquisition Program was accounted for in two ways. For fiscal
year 1997 the adjusted amount of $4.2 million was apportioned as $1.6
million to the FBCB2 program element and $2.8 to the Abrams and
Bradley program managers. In fiscal 1998, the adjusted amount of
$2.5 million was apportioned as $0.6 million to the FBCB2 program
element and $1.9 million to the Abrams and Bradley program managers.
TEST AND EVALUATION COSTS
ARE ALREADY IDENTIFIED IN
ANOTHER PROGRAM ELEMENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2.3
According to Army policy, test and evaluation costs associated with a
category I program are included in the program element. Since we
believe FBCB2 should be classified as a category I acquisition, we
included $8.5 million in fiscal year 1998 for the FBCB2 Limited User
Test, $15.4 million in fiscal year 1999 for the FBCB2 Initial
Operational Test and Evaluation, and $7.5 million in fiscal year 2000
for the FBCB2 Initial Operational Test and Evaluation. We were
unable to determine the estimated cost for Force Development Test and
Evaluation. Had we been able to do so, these costs would also be
included in our estimate.
Our belief that FBCB2 is justifiably a category I acquisition on the
basis of cost is shared by an office in Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Technology. In November 1997, the Director,
Test, System Engineering, and Evaluation, recommended that FBCB2 be
designated a category I-D program because of "significant integration
risks with other major systems and the potential dollar thresholds
involved." The Director noted that cost estimates do not include
communications and integration costs that potentially will drive the
program above category II thresholds. We believe examples of these
type of costs discussed in this report are communication costs
associated with the Tactical Internet and integration costs
associated with the Abrams and Bradley platforms.
Army program management officials expressed concern about a category
I-D designation for the FBCB2 program because it would require the
insertion of formal oversight review milestones, with their
consequent resource demands, into an already risky schedule.
However, our recent discussions with these officials disclosed that
issues of cost estimates and acquisition category are still being
explored. For example, a comprehensive Army cost estimate, currently
being developed with help of the Cost Analysis Improvement Group, is
expected to be available by September 1998. According to these
officials, the FBCB2 Overarching Integrated Product Team is trying to
reach a consensus on a recommendation regarding the appropriate
amount of oversight required for the program. That recommendation
may await the outcome of the Army cost estimate effort currently
being developed.
FBCB2 SCHEDULE IS HIGH RISK
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.3
To achieve the Army's end of fiscal year 2000 schedule, the FBCB2
program will need to pass a series of tests, including two
operational tests. Additionally, new versions of two weapon systems
participating in the FBCB2 operational tests will be concluding their
own testing just prior to the start of FBCB2 operational testing.
The Army acknowledges that the program schedule involves high risk.
However, despite this acknowledged schedule risk, the Army is moving
ahead with its highly compressed schedule without specifically
addressing the implications of not fielding an adequately developed
system by the end of fiscal year 2000.
DELAYS IN DOCUMENTING
REQUIREMENTS AND COMPLEX
TESTING SCHEDULE
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.3.1
In its effort to move the program rapidly along to meet the year 2000
implementation deadline, the Army is making decisions that may prove
troublesome later in the acquisition. In this regard, we found that
the development of critical acquisition documentation and plans are
experiencing significant delays. For example, in July 1997 the Army
made the decision to move FBCB2 to acquisition milestone II
(Engineering and Manufacturing Development) contingent on completion
of the Operational Requirements Document and Test and Evaluation
Master Plan by November 1, 1997. In November 1997, these actions had
not been completed and the new expected approval date for these
documents slipped to March 1998 . Our discussions with Army
officials now indicate that these documents are not expected to be
complete and approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
until July 1998. This means that the Army is currently relying on a
December 1997 Training and Doctrine Command-approved Operational
Requirements Document as the basis for the program until it is
replaced by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council-approved
Operational Requirements Document. Therefore, the requirements
process is expected to conclude only one month prior to the start of
the first FBCB2 operational test--Limited User Test--in August 1998.
Further, to meet the Army's fiscal year 2000 schedule, the FBCB2
program will need to successfully complete a series of tests,
including two operational tests. Each test requires different
versions of software for each of the two hardware components--the
computer and the communications interface unit. The second
operational test also requires that FBCB2 software be successfully
integrated into the new digitized versions of the Abrams tank and the
Bradley Fighting vehicle. The new versions of these platforms will
be concluding their own independent operational test and
evaluations--to demonstrate the capability of the platform as a
weapon system--just prior to the start of the FBCB2 initial
operational test and evaluation. These scheduled activities are
shown in figure 1.
Figure 1: FBCB2 Schedule and
Related Information
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Legend:
ASIP SINCGARS Advanced System Improvement Program SINCGARS
FDT&E Force Development Test and Evaluation
FT Field Test
IOT&E Initial Operational Test and Evaluation
LUT Limited User Test
VHSIC EPLRS