Navy Mine Warfare: Plans to Improve Countermeasures Capabilities Unclear
(Letter Report, 06/10/1998, GAO/NSIAD-98-135).

Enemy sea mines were responsible for 14 of the 18 Navy ships destroyed
or damaged since 1950, and producing countries have developed mines that
are even more difficult to detect and neutralize. After the Persian Gulf
War, during which two Navy ships were severely damaged by sea mines, the
Navy began to take steps to improve its mine warfare capabilities. This
report (1) discusses the Navy's plans for improving mine countermeasures
capabilities; (2) provides information on the status of current
research, development, test, and evaluation programs; and (3) evaluates
the process that the Defense Department used to prepare the annual
certification required by law.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-98-135
     TITLE:  Navy Mine Warfare: Plans to Improve Countermeasures
	     Capabilities Unclear
      DATE:  06/10/1998
   SUBJECT:  Operational testing
	     Naval warfare
	     Weapons systems
	     Defense capabilities
	     Explosives
IDENTIFIER:  Airborne Mine Neutralization System
	     Shallow Water Assault Breaching System
	     Navy Distributed Explosive Technology Program
	     MH-53E Helicopter
	     H-60 Helicopter
	     Navy Remote Mine Hunting System
	     Navy Closed Loop Degaussing System

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GAO/NSIAD-98-135

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on

Military Research and Development, Committee on National Security, House of
Representatives

June 1998 NAVY MINE WARFARE Plans to Improve Countermeasures Capabilities
Unclear

GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 135

GAO United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D. C. 20548 National Security and International Affairs Division

B- 279054 June 10, 1998 The Honorable Curt Weldon Chairman The Honorable
Owen Pickett, Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Military Research and
Development Committee on National Security House of Representatives

As requested, we reviewed the Navy's mine countermeasures efforts. This
report discusses the Navy's plans for improving mine countermeasures (MCM)
capabilities; provides information on the status of current research,
development, test, and evaluation (RDT& E) programs; and evaluates the
process the Department of Defense (DOD) used to prepare the annual
certification required by Public Law 102- 190.

Background Enemy sea mines were responsible for 14 of the 18 Navy ships
destroyed or damaged since 1950, and producing countries have developed and

proliferated mines that are even more difficult to detect and neutralize.
After the Gulf War, during which two Navy ships were severely damaged by sea
mines, the Navy began several actions to improve its mine warfare
capabilities.

The Navy's current MCM capabilities are in a special purpose force that
consists of 12 mine- hunter, coastal (MHC) and 14 MCM ships, 1 command and
support ship, 24 mine- hunting and clearing helicopters, 17 explosive
ordnance disposal detachments, a very shallow water detachment, and a marine
mammal detachment. According to the Navy, the cost of operating and
maintaining this MCM force from fiscal year 1992 through 2003 will be about
$1.9 billion. Because the Navy's MCM ships lack the speed and endurance they
would need to accompany carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups on
overseas deployments, the Navy has changed its strategy of maintaining only
a special purpose force to also developing mine countermeasure capabilities
to be placed on board combat ships within the fleet.

The Navy has consolidated operational control of all surface and airborne
mine warfare forces under the Commander, Mine Warfare Command, and improved
the readiness of these forces through exercises and training. The

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Navy also initiated research and development projects to address the
weaknesses in its MCM program, especially the lack of on- board MCM
capability throughout the fleet, and created a Program Executive Office for
mine warfare, which brought together disparate MCM programs and their
associated program management offices.

In a prior report, 1 we discussed weaknesses in the Navy's ability to
conduct effective sea mine countermeasures. We reported that critical MCM
capabilities were unmet and reviewed the Navy's efforts to address these
limitations. At that time, the Navy had not established clear priorities
among its mine warfare research and development programs to sustain the
development and procurement of the most needed systems. Consequently, the
Navy experienced delays in delivering new systems to provide necessary
capabilities. DOD concurred with our recommendation that a long- range plan
be developed to identify gaps and limitations in the Navy's MCM capabilities
and establish priorities. DOD said the process was ongoing and consisted of
developing an overall concept of MCM operations and an architecture within
which needs and shortfalls in capabilities could be evaluated and
prioritized. DOD also said that critical programs would be identified and
funded within the constraints of its overall budget.

Congress previously expressed its concern that the Navy had failed to
sufficiently emphasize mine countermeasures in its research and development
program and noted the relatively limited funding allocation. As a result,
mine warfare programs were designated as special congressional interest
items. To support continuing emphasis on developing the desired mine
countermeasures, Congress added a certification requirement in the National
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal years 1992 and 1993. This required the
Secretary of Defense to certify that the Secretary of the Navy, in
consultation with the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the
Marine Corps, had submitted an updated MCM master plan and budgeted
sufficient resources for executing the updated plan. It also required the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine that the budgetary
resources needed for MCM activities and the updated master plan are
sufficient. This certification requirement will expire with the fiscal year
1999 budget submission unless it is renewed.

1 Navy Mine Warfare: Budget Realignment Can Help Improve Countermine
Capabilities (GAO/ NSIAD- 96- 104, Mar. 13, 1996).

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Results in Brief The Navy has not decided on the mix of on- board and
special purpose forces it wants to maintain in the future and committed the
funding

needed for developing and sustaining those capabilities. This decision will
determine the types and quantities of systems to be developed and their
priority. It also affects the schedule and cost of those developments and
the design and cost of the platforms on which they will operate. A final
force structure decision will likely be determined by the level of resources
the Navy decides to dedicate to the MCM mission in the future- a decision
that depends on numerous issues outside the MCM arena such as conflicting
priorities among the various Navy warfare communities- aircraft, surface
ships, and submarines.

Since 1992, the Navy has spent about $1.2 billion in RDT& E funds to improve
its mine warfare capabilities. However, this investment has not produced any
systems that are ready to transition to production. Delaying factors include
funding instability, changing requirements, cost growth, and unanticipated
technical problems. A few systems, such as the Airborne Mine Neutralization
System and the Shallow- Water Assault Breaching system, are scheduled for
production decisions within the next 2 to 3 years. Other systems were not
produced because the Navy never funded their procurement. The Navy plans to
spend an additional $1.5 billion for RDT& E over the next 6 years.

Most officials we interviewed said the annual certification process has
served to increase the visibility of MCM requirements within DOD and the
Navy, with positive results and should continue to be required. However, as
currently conducted, the annual certification process does not address the
adequacy of overall resources for this mission, nor does it contain any
measures against which the Navy's progress in enhancing its MCM capabilities
can be evaluated. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staffs' review for resource
sufficiency, which is conducted because of the congressional mandate, occurs
after the Navy's budget proposals for its MCM program have been formalized.
Therefore, the review does not affect specific Navy MCM acquisition programs
or overall MCM resource decisions.

Future Force Structure Has Not Been Decided

Although it has developed a strategy for overcoming deficiencies in its MCM
capabilities, the Navy has not decided on the composition and size of its
future on- board and special purpose MCM force. Navy officials have
acknowledged the need to maintain some special purpose MCM force, while the
Navy is moving toward an on- board MCM capability. The Navy currently

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has no on- board MCM capabilities and relies on a force of MCM capabilities
that are specifically dedicated to that mission.

The Navy has two assessments in progress to develop the information it needs
to decide on the mix of its future on- board and special purpose forces. The
objectives of these assessments are to determine (1) the quantities and
types of on- board MCM systems the Navy will need to procure to meet fleet
requirements in fiscal years 2005- 2010; (2) the optimal force mix to meet
fleet requirements in the 21st century; and (3) the numbers and types, if
any, of special purpose MCM assets that will still be needed in the fiscal
year 2010- 2015 time frame. Initial results are expected to be available in
October 1998, in time to influence the development of the fiscal year 2001
Navy resource program, with a final report in January 1999. Navy officials
do not expect this phase of the assessments to provide them all of the
information that is needed to tailor the future MCM force structure. They do
expect, however, that it will give them a good idea of how to plan
procurement, training, and maintenance for the on- board systems expected to
be deployed in the fiscal year 2001- 2005 time frame.

To address the lack of on- board capability, the Navy accelerated the
delivery of a Remote Minehunting System and established a contingency
shallow- water mine- hunting capability in one Navy Reserve helicopter
squadron using laser mine detection systems, and it is including mine-
hunting systems in upgrades to existing and in new construction submarines.
Maintaining the special purpose force is costly, and Navy resource managers
have been evaluating how to pay for the operations and support costs of this
force while pursuing costly development of on- board capabilities. A final
force structure decision will likely be driven by the level of resources the
Navy intends to dedicate to the MCM mission in the future- a decision that
depends on numerous issues outside the MCM arena such as conflicting funding
priorities among the various Navy warfare communities (aircraft, surface
ships, and submarines).

A decision on the future force structure is, however, still needed because
that decision will determine the types and quantities of systems to be
procured, set priorities among systems, and determine the level of resources
required for development, procurement, and sustainment. For example, the
Navy is currently debating whether to retire the current mine- hunting
helicopters, the MH- 53, in favor of maintaining only H- 60 series
helicopters. This helicopter decision will directly affect the types

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and quantity of airborne MCM capabilities the Navy will be able to field in
the future.

Research and Development Investment Has Not Yet Paid Dividends

Since 1992, the Navy has invested about $1.2 billion in RDT& E funds to
improve its mine warfare capabilities. The Navy plans to spend an additional
$1.5 billion for RDT& E over the next 6 years. It is currently managing 28
separate MCM development programs and several advanced technology and
advanced concept technology demonstrations. (See app. I for the status of
selected programs.)

So far, according to a Navy official, this investment has not produced any
systems that are ready to transition to production. A few systems, such as
the Airborne Mine Neutralization System, the Shallow- Water Assault
Breaching system, Distributed Explosive Technology, and a Closed Loop
Degaussing system, are scheduled for a production decision over the next 2
to 3 years. Other systems, such as communications data links for the MH- 53
helicopters and the airborne laser mine- detection system (Magic Lantern
Deployment Contingency), were not produced because the Navy never funded
their procurement.

Delays experienced in a number of MCM development programs result from the
same kinds of problems that are found in other DOD acquisitions such as
funding instability, changing requirements, cost growth, and unanticipated
technical problems. For example, although the MCM funding program is small,
the Navy has reduced funding for its MCM research and development programs
after budget approval. (See app. II for two program examples.) These
problems in MCM acquisition programs show that the design, development, and
production of needed systems are complex and that technical processes must
operate within equally complex budget and political processes. If programs
are not well conceived, planned, managed, funded, and supported, problems
such as cost growth, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls can easily
occur.

Two examples of mine warfare programs that have been in the research and
development phase for many years without advancing to procurement are the
AQS- 20, an airborne mine- hunting sonar, and the Airborne Mine
Neutralization System. The AQS- 20 began in 1978 as an exploratory
development model and was scheduled for a limited rate initial production
decision in fiscal year 1999. The Navy terminated the program in 1997 in
favor of a follow- on sonar, the AQS- X, with added mine identification
capability and a tow requirement from a H- 60 helicopter instead of a

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MH- 53 helicopter. During the intervening 19 years, the program was plagued
by cost growth, changing requirements, and a funding shortfall. The
development of the Airborne Mine Neutralization System began in 1975, but a
production decision is not scheduled until fiscal year 2000. The principal
reason for the delay is that the program was canceled and restarted two
times because of funding instability.

Contributing to difficulties in transitioning programs into production are a
number of management and internal control weaknesses noted during the annual
Federal Manager's Financial Integrity Act certification. Since 1992, the
Program Executive Office has attempted to improve internal controls within
five subordinate program offices by developing financial and acquisition
management information and reporting systems. At its request, the Naval
Audit Service is reviewing the state of internal controls within one of the
program offices and expects to issue a report in the fall of 1998.

Certification Requirement Has Had a Positive Impact

A majority of officials we interviewed said that the annual certification
requirement was useful because it served to increase the visibility of MCM
requirements within DOD and the Navy. Most said that some form of the
certification should continue to be required. However, as currently
prepared, the annual certification does not address the adequacy of overall
resources for this mission, nor does it provide for objective measures
against which progress can be evaluated. Moreover, the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff's involvement in the certification process occurs too late
to have a significant impact.

The annual certification does not address the adequacy of overall resources
for this mission because the Navy's budget for MCM programs addresses only
the adequacy of funding for the budget year, not the out years. Further,
nothing in the certification process provides objective measures against
which progress can be evaluated. Such measures have been developed within
the MCM community. For example, the time required by a tactical commander to
clear a certain area of mines with and without various capabilities could be
used in making individual program decisions. Likewise, there are mean times
between repairs and average supply delay times to gauge reliability and
supportability for the MCM and MHC ships.

In the past, the DOD staff has not been willing to challenge Navy decisions
regarding the content and adequacy of its MCM program. Instead, it focused
on analyzing the consistency of the program from year to year.

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Consequently, DOD has been able to certify annually that the budget contains
adequate resources for the program.

However, in November 1997, the Secretary of Defense expressed his concern
about the Navy's financial commitment to mine warfare programs. As a result,
the Navy added about $110 million to MCM programs over the future years
defense planning period.

The inclusion of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the certification
process was intended to give the regional commanders in chief an opportunity
to influence the development of the MCM budget. We believe, however, and DOD
and Navy officials agree, that the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff's
determination has not added any significant value. Although the Joint Staff
has assessed joint MCM requirements and capabilities, its conclusions have
not been used as a basis for challenging the Navy's MCM programs or
suggesting alternatives. Moreover, since the Joint Staff's review has
occurred after, rather than before, the Navy's budget proposals for MCM
programs have been formalized, it has had no impact on specific Navy
acquisition programs or overall resource decisions.

Conclusions To have an effective program, the Navy needs to decide on the
size, composition, and capabilities of its future MCM forces. This decision
will

assist in prioritizing and disciplining its research, development, and
procurement efforts. As with other mission areas, the types and quantities
of systems to be procured and their platform integration will most likely be
driven by the level of resources the Navy allocates to the MCM mission in
the future. What is required is for the Navy leadership and the various
warfare communities to agree on the composition and structure (size) of
future MCM forces and commit the necessary resources to their development
and sustainment. Without such an agreement, budgetary pressures may result
in degradation of the special purpose forces before the Navy has
demonstrated and fielded effective, on- board capabilities within the fleet.

The certification requirement has forced DOD and the Navy to pay increased
attention to the MCM mission, and most officials involved support its
continuation in some form. However, the certification has not provided any
assurance that the resources for the MCM mission are
“sufficient” because it has only addressed the adequacy of
funding for the particular budget year and because the DOD staff and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not challenged Navy resource
allocation or budget

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decisions. If the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's involvement in the
certification process is still considered important, it must occur in time
to influence Navy decisions on requirements and funding. Overall budgetary
pressures, the high operations and maintenance costs associated with the
special purpose MCM fleet, and the Navy's expectation of potential increased
capabilities from on- board systems still early in development may combine
to result in budgetary shifts from current special purpose forces before
potential on- board capabilities are realized.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction
with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of the Navy,
determine

the mix of on- board and special purpose forces DOD plans to maintain in the
future and commit the funding deemed necessary for the development and
sustainment of these desired capabilities. We also recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to sustain the special
purpose MCM forces until the Navy has demonstrated and fielded effective,
on- board capabilities.

Matters for Congressional Consideration

The certification process has increased DOD's and the Navy's attention to
the MCM mission. Since the certification requirement is scheduled to expire
this year, Congress may wish to consider extending the annual certification
requirement until the Navy has determined the mix of on- board and special
purpose forces it will maintain in the future and has fielded effective, on-
board MCM capabilities. To strengthen the certification process, Congress
may wish to consider amending the requirement to ensure that the
participation by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, occurs before the
Navy's fiscal year budget is submitted to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report (see app. III), DOD concurred with
our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Navy to sustain the special purpose MCM forces until the Navy has
demonstrated and fielded effective on- board capabilities. DOD partially
concurred with our first recommendation that the Secretary of Defense
determine the mix of on- board and special purpose forces DOD plans to
maintain in the future and commit the necessary funding. DOD has directed
the Navy to ensure that both current and future mine warfare programs are
adequately funded. In an April 7, 1998, letter to the Secretary of the Navy,
the Secretary of Defense expressed his concern about the Navy's

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lack of commitment of the necessary resources to mine warfare and noted that
currently, requirements exceed resources allocated. He directed the Navy to
(1) protect the mine warfare program from any further funding reductions
until some on- board capabilities are available, (2) avoid using the funds
currently planned for the special purpose forces to fund the development of
on- board capabilities, and (3) develop a future years funding plan that
matches requirements with resources.

DOD, however, cited the Navy as having primary responsibility for MCM
forces, whereas our recommendation was directed to the Secretary of Defense.
We agree that the Navy does have primary responsibility, but the Secretary
of Defense has had a special role through the certification process. As we
conclude in the report, the certification requirement has had a positive
impact. Therefore, we have added a matter for congressional consideration to
the report that suggests that the certification requirement be extended.

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense direct that involvement by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
occur early enough to affect annual Navy budget submissions. DOD said the
Chairman is involved early enough to affect budget decisions. Our
recommendation, however, is based on our conclusion that the certification
process has not been effective in assuring the adequacy of resources. This
conclusion is based, in part, on the late involvement of the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff. For example, we note that the Navy's fiscal year 1999
budget submission went to Congress in late January 1998, yet the Secretary
of Defense's certification, which includes the Chairman's determination
regarding the sufficiency of the Navy's resources in fiscal year 1999, was
submitted in May 1998. Although the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, has
input in the budget process, the certification requirement provides an
additional opportunity to have an effect in assuring the sufficiency of
resources. Since DOD only partially concurred and to strengthen the
certification process, we have deleted our recommendation regarding the
Chairman's participation and added a matter for congressional consideration
that the annual certification requirement be amended to ensure the
participation by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the Navy's
budget is submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The intent of
our matters for consideration is to give additional attention to the
sufficiency of budget resources the Navy has devoted to MCM.

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DOD also provided some updated information in its comments and we have
incorporated it into our report as appropriate.

Scope and Methodology

To obtain information on the status of Navy plans, programs, and the
certification process, we interviewed and obtained documentation from
officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval
Operations, the Naval Air and Sea Systems Commands, the Office of Naval
Intelligence, and the Office of Naval Research in the Washington, D. C.,
area, and the Navy Operational Test and Evaluation Force and the Surface
Warfare Development Group in Norfolk, Virginia. We also interviewed and
obtained information from officials engaged in MCM scientific and technical
research and development activities at the Naval Undersea Warfare Center in
Newport, Rhode Island; the Navy Coastal Systems Station in Panama City,
Florida; and the Applied Physics Laboratory of Johns Hopkins University, in
Laurel, Maryland.

To gain an understanding of existing capabilities and requirements, and an
operational perspective, we interviewed and obtained information from the
staff and operational units of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command and
the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet in Norfolk, Virginia; and the
Commander, Mine Warfare Command, in Corpus Christi, and Ingleside, Texas.

We conducted our review between September 1997 and March 1998 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairman, Senate Committee on
Armed Services; the Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, Senate Committee on
Appropriations; the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, House
Committee on Appropriations; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, and the
Navy; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Copies will also be provided
to other interested parties upon request.

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Please contact me at (202) 512- 4841 if you have any questions about this
report. The major contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Katherine V. Schinasi Associate Director Defense Acquisitions Issues

GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 135 Navy Mine Warfare Page 11

Contents Letter 1 Appendix I Status of Selected Mine Countermeasures
Research and Development Programs

14 Programs Emphasized During Fiscal Years 1996- 97 14 Programs Emphasized
During Fiscal Years 1998- 2003 15 Programs Emphasized Beyond Fiscal Year
2003 17

Appendix II Programmatic Examples of Funding Instability

20 Appendix III Comments From the Secretary of Defense

23 Appendix IV Major Contributors to This Report

26 Tables Table II. 1: AQS- 20 and Airborne Mine Neutralization System

Funding Profile, as of March 1996 20

Table II. 2: AQS- 20 and Airborne Mine Neutralization System Funding
Profile, as of February 1997

21 Table II. 3: AQS- 20 and Airborne Mine Neutralization System

Funding Profile, as of February 1998 22

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense MCM mine countermeasures MHC mine- hunter, coastal
RDT& E research, development, test, and evaluation

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Appendix I Status of Selected Mine Countermeasures Research and Development
Programs

Programs Emphasized During Fiscal Years 1996- 97

Remote Minehunting System

Program description: The Remote Minehunting System program develops a new
remotely operated mine- hunting system that is capable of detecting and
classifying mines. It is intended to provide the surface fleet with an on-
board means of finding and avoiding mined waters. The program has a three-
fold strategy to develop a new vehicle, upgrade it with state- of- the- art
mine- hunting sensors, and provide a supportable, incremental operational
contingency system to the fleet during the development process. Platform:
Surface combatants. Mine threat: Bottom & moored mines/ deep to very shallow
water. Program start date: Fiscal year 1993. Date of estimated completion of
research & development phase: Fiscal year 2002, milestone III on version 4
(proposed). Current status: Milestone III on version 3 had been scheduled
for fiscal year 1999; however, due to cost and schedule problems, the
program has been restructured to drop version 3 and continue development of
version 4. Funding (fiscal years 1992- 97): $44.1 million. Programmed
funding (fiscal years 1998- 03): $103.7 million.

Magic Lantern Program description: The Magic Lantern is a helicopter mounted
laser/ camera system that detects and classifies moored mines. The objective
of the Magic Lantern 1 Deployment Contingency system is to field an advanced
development model on one detachment of Naval Reserve SH- 2G helicopters to
provide on- board mine reconnaissance capability for surface and near
surface water. In fiscal year 1996, Congress directed a competitive
evaluation field test of the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System
technologies. These technologies included Magic Lantern, ATD- 111, and the
Advanced Airborne Hyperspectral Imaging System. This field test took place
in late 1997. The Navy expects to send the final report to Congress by the
end of April 1998. Platform: SH- 2G helicopters. Mine threat: Floating and
shallow- water moored mines.

1 Magic Lantern is the trade name of one of the manufacturers (Kaman) of the
Airborne Laser Mine Detection System technologies. Airborne Laser Mine
Detection System is the Navy project title under which these technologies
have been pursued and funded.

GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 135 Navy Mine Warfare Page 14

Appendix I Status of Selected Mine Countermeasures Research and Development
Programs

Program start date: Fiscal year 1992 (Start of the Airborne Laser Mine
Detection System program). Date of estimated completion of research &
development phase: Fiscal year 1999. Current status: Installation of
contingency systems on H- 60 helicopters. Funding (fiscal years 1992- 97):
$73 million. Programmed funding (fiscal years 1998- 03): $29.3 million.

Programs Emphasized During Fiscal Years 1998- 2003

Near- Term Mine Reconnaissance System

Program description: This system is intended to provide an unmanned undersea
vehicle mine reconnaissance capability in the form of a single operational
prototype, as a stop- gap, interim clandestine offboard system. The system
is to be launched and recovered from a SSN- 688 class submarine. Platform:
SSN- 688 class submarines. Mine threat: Bottom and moored mines in deep
through very shallow water. Program start date: Fiscal year 1994. Date of
estimated completion of research & development phase: Fiscal year 2003.
Current status: Initial operational capability is scheduled for fiscal year
1998. The system is scheduled to participate in the Joint Countermine
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration II in June 1998. Funding (fiscal
years 1994- 97): $42.3 million. Programmed funding (fiscal years 1998- 03):
$29.6 million.

Radiant Clear Program description: Radiant Clear is a joint Navy- Marine
Corps effort to graphically depict the littoral environment and coastal
defenses through the application of advances in the processing of data
collected by national systems. Platform: Not applicable. Mine threat: Very
shallow water to the beach. Program start date: Fiscal year 1996. Date of
estimated completion of research & development phase: Open. Current status:
Demonstration, May 1998.

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Appendix I Status of Selected Mine Countermeasures Research and Development
Programs

Funding (fiscal years 1996- 97): $2 million. Programmed funding (fiscal
years 1998- 03): $6 million.

Shallow Water Assault Breaching System

Program description: This system is an explosive line charge system that is
delivered from a rocket motor and deployed from a manned Landing Craft, Air
Cushion at a standoff range of 200 feet. Platform: Manned Landing Craft, Air
Cushion. Mine threat: Very shallow water and surf zone, optimized for 3- 10
feet water depth. Program start date: Fiscal year 1992. Date of estimated
completion of research & development phase: Fiscal year 1999, milestone III.
Current status: Fiscal year 1998, developmental and operational testing.
Funding (fiscal years 1992- 97): $35.3 million. Programmed funding (fiscal
years 1998- 03): $10.9 million.

Distributed Explosive Technology

Program description: The Distributed Explosive Technology program is a
distributed explosive net that is delivered by two rocket motors and
deployed from a manned Landing Craft, Air Cushion at a standoff range of 200
feet. It is designed to provide a wide swath of mine clearance in the surf
zone. Platform: Manned Landing Craft, Air Cushion. Mine threat: Surf zone,
optimized for depths less than 3 feet to the beach. Program start date:
Fiscal year 1992. Date of estimated completion of research & development
phase: Fiscal year 1999, milestone III. Current status: Fiscal year 1998,
developmental and operational testing. Funding (fiscal years 1992- 97): $47
million. Programmed funding (fiscal years 1998- 03): $19.5 million.

AQS- 20 Program description: The AQS- 20 was to be an airborne towed high
speed mine- hunting sonar. It was to work in conjunction with the Airborne
Mine Neutralization System. The AQS- 20 was to provide the capability to
search, detect, localize, and classify mines. Platform: MH- 53 helicopters.
Mine threat: Bottom, close tethered, and volume mines in deep and shallow
water. Program start date: 1978. Date of estimated completion of research &
development phase: Fiscal

GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 135 Navy Mine Warfare Page 16

Appendix I Status of Selected Mine Countermeasures Research and Development
Programs

year 2001. Current status: Transitioning to AQS- X, a follow- on advanced
sonar with the addition of mine identification capability and towed
capability from the H- 60 helicopter. An advanced sonar fly- off is planned
for fiscal year 1999. Funding (fiscal years 1992- 97): $73.1 million.
Programmed funding (fiscal years 1998- 03): $76.3 million.

Programs Emphasized Beyond Fiscal Year 2003

Advanced Lightweight Influence Sweep System

Program description: This system is a magnetic and acoustic system and is to
rapidly sweep and clear influence mines by emulating the signatures of
amphibious assault craft. It is to be an on- board mine countermeasures
asset and capable of night operations. Platform: Remotely controlled surface
craft, but other platforms are being explored. Mine threat: Influence mines
in shallow and very shallow water. Program start date: Fiscal year 1993.
Date of estimated completion of research & development phase: Fiscal year
2000, scheduled transition from Advanced Technology Demonstration status to
acquisition program. Current status: To be a part of the Joint Countermine
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration II in June 1998 (approximate 6
months slippage from original schedule). Funding (fiscal years 1992- 97):
$49.8 million. Programmed funding (fiscal years 1998- 03): $7 million.

Airborne Mine Neutralization System

Program description: This system is an expendable, remotely operated,
explosive mine neutralization device that is towed by a helicopter. It is
intended to rapidly destroy mines and operate in day or night. Originally,
it was intended to operate in conjunction with the AQS- 20 sonar. With the
termination of the AQS- 20 and transition to AQS- X, the system will operate
with the AQS- 14A sonar, which will be integrated with a laser line scan
system to provide interim mine identification capability. Platform: MH- 53
helicopters. Mine threat: Bottom and moored mines in deep or shallow water.

GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 135 Navy Mine Warfare Page 17

Appendix I Status of Selected Mine Countermeasures Research and Development
Programs

Program start date: Fiscal year 1975. Date of estimated completion of
research & development phase: Fiscal year 2000, milestone III is scheduled.
Current status: Engineering, manufacturing, and development contract award
scheduled for second quarter, fiscal year 1998. Funding (fiscal years 1992-
97): $12.4 million. Programmed funding (fiscal years 1998- 00): $22.6
million.

Rapid Airborne Mine Countermeasures System

Program description: This system is an advanced technology demonstration
program and is intended to employ laser targeting and supercavitating
projectiles to neutralize near surface moored contact mines. Its objective
is to provide fast reacting organic helicopter capability to safely and
rapidly clear mines. Platform: Helicopter. Mine threat: Near surface moored
contact mines. Program start date: Fiscal year 1998. Date of estimated
completion of research & development phase: Fiscal year 2004. Current
status: Fiscal year 1998, demonstration of lethality against key mine types.
Programmed funding (fiscal years 1998- 04): $65 million.

Explosive Neutralization Advanced Technology Demonstration

Program description: The Explosive Neutralization Advanced Technology
Demonstration, as a group of four subsystems, is intended to demonstrate the
capability to neutralize anti- invasion mines in the surf zone and craft
landing zone. Two of the subsystems will consist of line charges and surf
zone array, which are to be launched from an air cushion vehicle and
propelled by new rocket motors for extended range and increased stand- off.
These two subsystems will also have a third subsystem, a fire control
system, for accurate placement of explosives. The fourth subsystem, the
beach zone array, will consist of a glider and an array system. The glider,
an unmanned, unpowered air vehicle, will be released by an air deployment
vehicle. The glider will approach the beach by means of a global positioning
system guidance and control system. To detonate and clear mines, it will
deploy the array of nylon webbing and shaped charges over a predesignated
target. Platform: Unmanned air vehicle. Mine threat: Anti- invasion mines in
the surf and craft landing zones. Program start date: Fiscal year 1993. Date
of estimated completion of research & development phase: Fiscal

GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 135 Navy Mine Warfare Page 18

Appendix I Status of Selected Mine Countermeasures Research and Development
Programs

year 2005 for the line charges, surf zone array, and fire control system and
fiscal year 2009 for the beach zone array. Current status: Demonstration of
fieldable prototype of the beach zone array scheduled for fiscal year 1998.
Funding (fiscal years 1993- 97): $63.7 million. Programmed funding (fiscal
years 1998- 03): $87.8 million.

GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 135 Navy Mine Warfare Page 19

Appendix II Programmatic Examples of Funding Instability

Two examples of mine warfare programs that have been in the research and
development phase for many years without advancing to procurement are the
AQS- 20, a mine- hunting sonar, and the Airborne Mine Neutralization System.
The following tables illustrate the changes, including the recent series of
internal Department of Defense (DOD) increases and decreases, to these
programs' funding. The changes depicted in table II. 1 resulted in a delay
in the AQS- 20 schedule. The production decision slipped 1 year, from second
quarter fiscal year 1998 to second quarter fiscal year 1999.

Table II. 1: AQS- 20 and Airborne Mine Neutralization System Funding
Profile, as of March 1996 Fiscal year

(Dollars in thousands)

1995 1996 1997

As presented in the fiscal year 1996 President's budget

$218 (actual) $12,791

(estimated appropriation)

$20,123 (estimate) Reprogramming from Airborne Laser Mine Detection System

8,947 Congressional undistributed reductions –346

Revised inflation rates –55 –843 Reinitiate Airborne Mine
Neutralization System 10,400

AQS- 20/ MK 105 realignment 1,200

Realignment to Shallow Water Mine Countermeasures program element

–10,431 Realignment to Remote Minehunting System –7,285

Total, as presented in the fiscal year 1997 President's budget

$9,165 (adjusted actual) $12,390

(adjusted appropriation)

$13,164 (revised estimate)

Source: Fiscal year 1997 Navy budget estimates for research development,
test, and evaluation (RDT& E).

The changes depicted in table II. 2 resulted in delays in the schedules of
both the AQS- 20 and the Airborne Mine Neutralization System. The production
decision for the AQS- 20 slipped an additional 6 months, to the fourth
quarter fiscal year 1999. The production decision for the Airborne

GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 135 Navy Mine Warfare Page 20

Appendix II Programmatic Examples of Funding Instability

Mine Neutralization System slipped 1 year, from third quarter fiscal year
1999 to third quarter fiscal year 2000 due to funding constraints.

Table II. 2: AQS- 20 and Airborne Mine Neutralization System Funding
Profile, as of February 1997 Fiscal year

Dollars in thousands)

1996 1997 1998 1999

As presented in the fiscal year 1997 President's budget $12,355 a (actual)
$13,164

(revised estimate) $13,069 (estimate) $5,694

(estimate) Estimated appropriation 19,164 Small Business Innovative Research
assessment –194

General reductions –187 –46 –99 Navy Working Capital Fund
adjustments –807 80 –58 Cost growth related to AQS- 20 design
complexity, contractor requirements 4,500 10,200

Technical evaluation cost growth –1,100 Restructuring of Airborne Mine
Neutralization System 4,200

Total, as presented in the fiscal year 1998- 99 President's budget $11,974

(adjusted actual) $18,357 (adjusted appropriation)

$16,503 (revised estimate) $19,937

(revised estimate)

a The $45 difference between the figure of $12,390 shown in table II. 1 and
the figure of $12,355 is unexplained in the budget documents.

Source: Fiscal year 1998- 99 Navy budget estimates for RDT& E.

The changes depicted in table II. 3 reflect the addition of two new
initiatives, the Configuration Theory Tactical Decision Aid and the Shallow
Water Influence Minesweep System. Congress increased the fiscal year 1998
budget request by $2 million for the Shallow- Water Influence Minesweep
System program.

GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 135 Navy Mine Warfare Page 21

Appendix II Programmatic Examples of Funding Instability

Table II. 3: AQS- 20 and Airborne Mine Neutralization System Funding
Profile, as of February 1998 Fiscal year

(Dollars in thousands)

1997 1998 1999

As presented in the fiscal year 1998- 99 President's budget

$18,357 (actual) $16,503

(estimated appropriation)

$19,937 (estimate)

Appropriations 18,503 Small Business Innovative Research assessment
–366

Navy Working Capital Fund –22 –598 –83 Configuration
Theory Tactical Decision Aid 200

Total, as presented in the fiscal year 1999 President's budget

$17,969 (adjusted actual) $17,905

(adjusted appropriation)

$20,054 (estimate)

Source: Fiscal year 1999 Navy amended budget estimates for RDT& E.

GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 135 Navy Mine Warfare Page 22

Appendix III Comments From the Secretary of Defense

GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 135 Navy Mine Warfare Page 23

Appendix III Comments From the Secretary of Defense

Now on p. 8. Now on p. 8.

GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 135 Navy Mine Warfare Page 24

Appendix III Comments From the Secretary of Defense

Now on p. 9.

GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 135 Navy Mine Warfare Page 25

Appendix IV Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D. C.

Richard J. Price, Assistant Director Martha J. Dey, Senior Evaluator John D.
Heere, Senior Evaluator Jack G. Perrigo, Jr., Senior Evaluator

Office of the General Counsel

William T. Woods, Assistant General Counsel Boston Field Office Ralph L.
Tavares, Senior Evaluator Norfolk Field Office Anton G. Blieberger,
Evaluator- in- Charge

(707301) GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 135 Navy Mine Warfare Page 26

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