Former Yugoslavia: War Crimes Tribunal's Workload Exceeds Capacity
(Letter Report, 06/02/98, GAO/NSIAD-98-134).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the startup challenges
the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia faced and the
Tribunal's capacity to carry out its mandate.

GAO noted that: (1) the Tribunal met its early organizational challenges
and has established the organizational structure and legal processes and
procedures to investigate and prosecute war crimes committed in the
former Yugoslavia; (2) there are no precise measurement standards on the
personnel levels or the amount of equipment and facilities the Tribunal
needs to meet its workload, and the rate of surrender or apprehension is
uncertain; (3) nonetheless, based on GAO's analysis of the Tribunal's
primary functions, the Tribunal has insufficient investigators, judges,
courtrooms, and information processors to carry out its existing
workload while ensuring that it complies with its mandate, statute, and
rules of procedure and evidence; (4) as a result, the Tribunal has
suspended six investigations it planned for 1998, has a growing backlog
of unread documentary evidence, and may be unable to try some accused in
custody without undue delay; (5) in addition, on May 8, 1998, the Office
of the Prosecuter announced the withdrawal of charges against 14
indicted individuals because, facing a much larger than anticipated
workload, the Tribunal wanted to focus its available resources on
persons holding higher levels of responsibility; (6) according to the
President of the Tribunal and other experts, what constitutes undue
delay is not specifically defined, but they believe the Tribunal's
credibility and legitimacy may be jeopardized if it cannot bring accused
in custody to trial within at least 2 years, although this time period
may vary depending on the circumstances of each case; (7) the existing
caseload exceeds the 18 persons in custody and 5 trials the Tribunal
originally projected in its 1998 budget request, and GAO's analysis
shows the Tribunal will need 3 years or more to try all accused
currently in custody; (8) if more indictees are arrested or additional
requirements arise, such as investigating recent incidents in Kosovo,
the Tribunal's already overburdened capacity in key areas will be
further strained; (9) GAO's analysis of the Tribunal's plans and
available resources indicates that it does not have the capacity to
handle its current workload, and the problem is likely to get worse; and
(10) moreover, there are significant barriers that could inhibit efforts
to quickly increase the Tribunal's capacity, such as the United Nations'
lengthy recruitment process and its practice of assessing a surcharge
for voluntary contributions.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-98-134
     TITLE:  Former Yugoslavia: War Crimes Tribunal's Workload Exceeds 
             Capacity
      DATE:  06/02/98
   SUBJECT:  War crimes
             Foreign governments
             Criminal procedure
             Trials
             Homicide
             Human resources utilization
             International organizations
IDENTIFIER:  Yugoslavia
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S.  Senate

June 1998

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA - WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNAL'S WORKLOAD EXCEEDS
CAPACITY

GAO/NSIAD-98-134

Former Yugoslavia Tribunal

(711300)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  OIOS - Office of Internal Oversight Services
  OTP - Office of the Prosecutor
  SFOR - Stabilization Force

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-279546

June 2, 1998

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate

Dear Mr.  Chairman: 

The wars that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991 resulted in
an estimated 250,000 deaths, many of them civilians, and 2 million
displaced persons.  According to the United Nations Commission of
Experts, the wars also involved atrocities, genocide, and other
crimes against humanity.  In 1993 the U.N.  Security Council created
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to
investigate and prosecute individuals responsible for these crimes. 
As requested, this report (1) reviews the startup challenges the
Tribunal faced and (2) assesses the Tribunal's capacity to carry out
its mandate; that is, whether the Tribunal has sufficient staff,
facilities, and equipment needed to investigate and prosecute
individuals indicted in accordance with its statute and rules of
procedure and evidence.  This report includes information as of May
14, 1998. 

As discussed with your staff, we did not assess whether the Tribunal
had efficiently and effectively allocated and used its resources
because to have done so would have required access to internal
documents of the Tribunal that the United Nations did not provide to
us.  In addition, the United Nations did not provide us access to
certain internal budgetary and planning information that we
specifically requested.  Consequently, we cannot comment on the
overall adequacy of the financial support the Tribunal has received
to carry out its mandate.  Our scope and methodology are discussed in
appendix I. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

The series of wars that occurred in connection with the breakup of
the former Yugoslavia (see fig.  1) devastated many areas within the
region and was marked by extreme violations of international
humanitarian law, including forced population movements; forcible
surrenders of property; military targeting of civilian populations;
and systematic rapes, tortures, and mass murders.  Civilians often
were the primary targets of military actions, or used as human
shields, resulting in thousands of deaths.  Many were driven from
their homes in campaigns of terror known as "ethnic cleansing."

   Figure 1:  Map of the Former
   Yugoslavia

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  Serbia and Montenegro have asserted the formation of a joint
entity known as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  The United
States does not recognize this entity. 

On May 25, 1993, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution
827, which established the Tribunal under chapter VII of the U.N. 
charter (see app.  II for a list of Security Council resolutions
concerning the establishment of the Tribunal).\1 This resolution set
forth the Tribunal's mandate to prosecute individuals responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed on the
territory of the former Yugoslavia since January 1, 1991.\2 Fighting
in Croatia had ended in November 1995 after the Croatian government
and local Serb authorities signed an agreement on the region of
Eastern Slavonia.  In Bosnia hostilities were put on hold with a
cease-fire among the three warring factions in October 1995.  In
December 1995 parties to the Bosnia conflict, including Croatia and
Serbia, signed the Dayton Agreement.\3 New incidents of violence
occurred in early 1998 in Kosovo, a southern region of Serbia, that
may place further demands on the Tribunal.  Many international
officials and observers believe that the success of the Tribunal is
critically important to the overall international effort to bring
peace and stability to the region. 

The Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was the first criminal
tribunal established as a subsidiary U.N.  organization and had to
rely on the international community to help it investigate and
prosecute accused war criminals.  The Tribunal lacks the capability
to capture those it has indicted as possible war criminals and must
rely on others to execute its orders and warrants, including their
arrest and delivery to The Hague, the Netherlands.\4 To carry out its
mandate, the Tribunal also had to develop an operating structure and
create a legal and judicial process that could be viewed by the
international community as fair and credible. 

The Tribunal's statute established three bodies:  the judicial
chambers, an Office of the Prosecutor, and a Registry for common
administrative support.  The statute also directed these bodies to
conduct investigations, issue indictments and arrest warrants,
prosecute and arrange for the defense of the accused before a
three-judge panel, sentence convicted persons, and hear appeals.\5 To
carry out these tasks, the Tribunal needed judges, a prosecutor,
investigators, lawyers, and administrative support plus a building to
work in, facilities to detain suspects, and a courtroom for
proceedings before investigations could begin and individuals be
arrested and prosecuted.  (See app.  III for more information on the
Tribunal's jurisdiction, organization, and process.)

To ensure its decisions are viewed as credible and withstand
international scrutiny, the Tribunal's rules of procedure and
evidence require that the Prosecutor present enough evidence to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a conviction.  This may
require investigators to collect thousands of pages of information,
analyze the military and civilian command structures of the various
factions to establish command responsibility, obtain physical
evidence from mass graves, and locate and interview potential
eyewitnesses who are scattered throughout Europe and the rest of the
world.  Under its statute and rules of procedure and evidence, the
Tribunal must protect the rights of the accused, including the right
to counsel and to be informed of any information known to the
Prosecutor that may suggest their innocence or mitigate their guilt. 
The Tribunal also must try the accused "without undue delay." The
maximum penalty that the Tribunal can impose is life imprisonment. 


--------------------
\1 Chapter VII authorizes the Security Council to take measures
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. 

\2 The area of the former Yugoslavia now comprises the countries of
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Serbia, and Montenegro.  Serbia and Montenegro have asserted the
formation of a joint independent state known as the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia.  The United States does not recognize this entity. 

\3 Representatives from Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia's three major
ethnic groups signed the Dayton Agreement on December 14, 1995.  The
agreement declared Bosnia a single, multi-ethnic state and
established a multinational peace operation to help implement the
agreement's goals.  A list of other GAO products pertaining to Bosnia
is provided at the end of the report. 

\4 Under its rules of procedure and evidence, if states refuse to
comply, the Tribunal can only report their refusal back to the
Security Council.  In contrast, the Nuremberg International Military
Tribunal was established in 1945 by an agreement between the
victorious Allied powers.  Because of the unconditional surrender of
Germany, it had the ability to gain access to any part of Germany,
obtain any witness, and make arrests.  The Nuremberg Tribunal could
also draw upon massive armed forces for the trials, investigations,
and other activities necessary to bring war criminals to justice. 

\5 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and
the Rwanda Tribunal have some joint elements.  They share the
Prosecutor and the appeals chamber judges of the Tribunal.  The
Security Council established the Rwanda Tribunal in November 1994 to
investigate and prosecute persons responsible for genocide and other
crimes against humanity in Rwanda and neighboring territories. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

The Tribunal met its early organizational challenges and has
established the organizational structure and legal processes and
procedures to investigate and prosecute war crimes committed in the
former Yugoslavia.  There are no precise measurement standards on the
personnel levels or the amount of equipment and facilities the
Tribunal needs to meet its workload, and the rate of surrender or
apprehension is uncertain.  Nonetheless, based on our analysis of the
Tribunal's primary functions, the Tribunal has insufficient
investigators, judges, courtrooms, and information processors to
carry out its existing workload while ensuring that it complies with
its mandate, statute, and rules of procedure and evidence.  As a
result, the Tribunal has suspended six investigations it planned for
1998, has a growing backlog of unread documentary evidence, and may
be unable to try some accused in custody without undue delay.  In
addition, on May 8, 1998, the Office of the Prosecutor announced the
withdrawal of charges against 14 indicted individuals because, facing
a much larger than anticipated workload, the Tribunal wanted to focus
its available resources on persons holding higher levels of
responsibility.\6

According to the President of the Tribunal and other experts, what
constitutes undue delay is not specifically defined, but they believe
the Tribunal's credibility and legitimacy may be jeopardized if it
cannot bring accused in custody to trial within at least 2 years,
although this time period may vary depending on the circumstances of
each case.  The existing caseload exceeds the 18 persons in custody
and 5 trials the Tribunal originally projected in its 1998 budget
request, and our analysis shows the Tribunal will need 3 years or
more to try all accused currently in custody.  If more indictees are
arrested or additional requirements arise, such as investigating
recent incidents in Kosovo, the Tribunal's already overburdened
capacity in key areas will be further strained. 

Our analysis of the Tribunal's plans and available resources
indicates that it does not have the capacity to handle its current
workload, and the problem is likely to get worse.  Moreover, there
are significant barriers that could inhibit efforts to quickly
increase the Tribunal's capacity, such as the United Nations' lengthy
recruitment process and its practice of assessing a surcharge for
voluntary contributions. 


--------------------
\6 The Prosecutor reserved the right to pursue the same or other
charges against the 14 accused at a later date if circumstances
changed.  The Prosecutor's decision to withdraw the charges does not
affect our conclusions regarding the Tribunal's capacity to handle
its workload because the individuals named in the motion were not in
custody and therefore not part of the Tribunal's existing workload
that formed the basis of our analysis. 


   TRIBUNAL OVERCAME STARTUP
   CHALLENGES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

The Tribunal started its mission with few resources and staff.  The
U.N.  General Assembly elected the 11 judges in 4 months, but more
than a year was required to develop judicial rules and procedures,
select a Prosecutor, acquire facilities, hire investigators, obtain a
formal funding mechanism, and secure other critical resources and
staff needed to conduct its work.  The Tribunal encountered numerous
startup problems and, as reported by the United Nations' Office of
Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), inefficiently used some of its
resources.  For example, in 1996 OIOS reported that up to 15 guards
were hired more than 6 months before the first detainee arrived and
before the construction of the detention facility was completed. 
Also, in March 1997, OIOS reported that the Tribunal could achieve
greater efficiencies by looking into outsourcing, cost sharing, and
pooling administrative functions.\7

Nonetheless, the Tribunal has grown into a fully functioning
organization.  From 1993 to 1998, the Tribunal has grown from an
organization with 11 judges and an approved budget of $500,000 to an
approved staff level of 571 with a budget of almost $70 million.\8


--------------------
\7 In its comments on a draft of this report, the Tribunal said that
guards were not contracted before construction of the detention
facility was complete and noted that the Tribunal had entered into a
number of arrangements with other organizations involving common
support functions. 

\8 Since 1996 the Tribunal has had a 1-year, or annual, budget cycle,
unlike other U.N.  activities that have 2-year, or biennial, budget
cycles. 


      TRIBUNAL EFFORTS TO BECOME
      FULLY FUNCTIONAL
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1

The Tribunal needed rules of procedure and evidence, a Prosecutor,
judges, investigators, lawyers, administrative support, and
facilities to become a functioning international judicial body.  It
took 18 months after the Security Council first authorized the
creation of the Tribunal before all the main elements necessary to
carry out its mandate were in place (see table 1). 



                                Table 1
                
                 Dates of Key Events in Creation of the
                                Tribunal

Event                                               Date
--------------------------------------------------  ------------------
Security Council authorizes creation of Tribunal    February 1993
and requests Secretary General report on
implementation proposals and options

Security Council approves the Secretary General's   May 1993
report and establishes Tribunal

General Assembly elects 11 judges                   September 1993

Judges adopt rules of procedure and evidence        February 1994

Tribunal hires first investigator and legal         June 1994
officer

First field investigation begins                    July 1994

First Prosecutor takes office                       August 1994

First indictment issued                             November 1994

First indictee taken into custody                   April 1995

First trial begins                                  May 1996
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  U.N.  Security Council resolutions and Tribunal annual
reports. 

The Tribunal initially used offices provided by the International
Court of Justice in The Hague to conduct its work.  In mid-1994, the
Netherlands, the host government for the Tribunal's activities,
provided the Tribunal's premises and a courtroom and arranged the
construction of a detention facility to house those in custody.  The
Netherlands continues to provide security for the Tribunal's
facilities, judges, senior officials, accused in custody, and
witnesses. 

The Tribunal also received other in-kind contributions, including
equipment such as computers, vehicles, video-delay equipment, and
personnel loaned by member states and nongovernmental
organizations.\9 In 1994, the United States loaned 22 personnel to
the Office of the Prosecutor--about 20 percent of the Tribunal's
staff at the time--to help the Tribunal get started.  The number of
loaned staff from member states has remained relatively constant at
around 50 since 1995. 

During the Tribunal's first 2 years, it did not have a formal U.N. 
budget but instead operated with funds advanced by the Secretary
General from the U.N.  regular general budget with only a 6-month
commitment authority.  Under this condition, the Tribunal could not
enter into any long-term commitments extending beyond its temporary
budget authority.  This also meant that since the Tribunal had no
permanent funding, a formal lease for premises could not concluded
until 1994, and the Tribunal could not recruit experienced staff and
personnel other than on short-term contracts.  Further, it could not
purchase and install the technical equipment necessary to start
investigations. 

After a lengthy debate, in July 1995 U.N.  member states reached a
compromise agreement to create a special account to finance the
Tribunal.  The compromise called for half of the Tribunal's budget to
be funded using the U.N.  regular assessment scale and half using the
peacekeeping assessment scale.\10 Figure 2 shows the amount and
source of funds for the Tribunal's budget. 

   Figure 2:  Sources and Amount
   of the Tribunal's Budgets,
   1993-98

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Sources:  Compiled by GAO from U.N.  financial documents. 


--------------------
\9 Staff loaned from U.N.  member states to the United Nations are
also known as "seconded" or "gratis" personnel. 

\10 Developing countries argued that they should pay a lesser scale
and that permanent members of the Security Council should pay at the
higher peacekeeping assessment scale.  The United States and some
other countries argued that the Tribunal should be funded like the
International Court of Justice, using the U.N.  regular budget
assessment scale. 


      VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS FILL
      CRITICAL RESOURCE NEEDS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2

In addition to in-kind contributions, loaned personnel, and regular
budget assessments, in September 1993 the General Assembly asked
member states and other interested parties to make voluntary cash
contributions to the Tribunal's trust fund.\11 As shown in table 2,
since the Tribunal was established and through March 1998, the
cumulative voluntary cash contributions and pledges have been about
$14 million from 28 countries and organizations. 



                                Table 2
                
                  Voluntary Cash Contributions to the
                     Tribunal as of March 31, 1998

                         (Dollars in thousands)

Country                                                         Amount
----------------------------------------  ----------------------------
Malaysia                                                      $2,500.0
United Kingdom                                                 2,485.1
Netherlands                                                    2,247.7
Italy                                                          2,030.0
United States                                                  1,190.0
Pakistan                                                       1,000.0
Canada                                                           988.2
European Commission                                              342.6
Saudi Arabia                                                     300.0
Switzerland                                                      230.2
Denmark                                                          213.7
Norway                                                           191.3
Ireland                                                          121.8
Austria                                                          100.0
Luxembourg                                                       100.0
Other countries                                                  108.6
======================================================================
Total                                                        $14,149.2
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note:  Cash contributions do not include the value of in-kind
donations. 

Source:  U.N.  financial documents. 

According to State and Tribunal officials, the Tribunal has used
voluntary contributions to finance critical resource needs.  For
example, in January 1998, the Netherlands contributed $1.7 million in
in-kind contributions and the United States $1 million in in-kind
contributions to construct a second, fully equipped courtroom for the
Tribunal.  Previously, the United Kingdom had contributed about
$500,000 for the construction of another courtroom.  The United
States also contributed $1.1 million in March 1998 to support the
Tribunal's investigation of the Serbian attack on ethnic Albanians in
Kosovo and other investigative priorities.\12


--------------------
\11 U.N.  General Assembly resolution 47/235 (1993). 

\12 While most of the U.S.  contribution was in-kind, $400,000 of the
total amount was a cash contribution to the trust fund.  Table 2 does
not include this recent cash contribution. 


   TRIBUNAL'S CURRENT AND FUTURE
   WORKLOADS EXCEED CAPACITY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

Our analysis of the Tribunal's plans and available resources
indicates that it does not have the capacity to handle its current
workload, and the problem is likely to get worse.  The Tribunal will
be unable to conduct the number of investigations it planned for
1998, may be unable to begin trials without undue delay, and will
continue to have a growing backlog of unread documentary evidence. 
Moreover, as more indictees are arrested during the year, the
Tribunal's ability to continue ongoing investigations and ensure
indictees are brought to trial without undue delay will be further
eroded.  There are major obstacles to quickly expanding the
Tribunal's capabilities, including the U.N.  system's complex
recruitment process and a surcharge assessed to donors who make
voluntary contributions. 

Although the Tribunal has no specific guidelines for determining the
exact length of time after which detention is no longer lawful, the
Tribunal statute requires the Tribunal to try the accused without
undue delay.  According to the Tribunal President and State
Department officials, pretrial detention longer than 2 years could be
considered undue delay, although this may vary depending on the
circumstances of each case.  The ability to start trials soon after
indictees are brought into custody can have important political
implications.  For example, one of the important conditions of the
U.S.-negotiated surrender of 10 Bosnian Croats in October 1997 was
the U.S.  commitment to support the Prosecutor's pledge to be ready
to try some of the 10 accused within 3 to 5 months of their surrender
(as of May 1998, trials for the 10 who surrendered had not begun). 
According to State Department officials, indictees are less likely to
surrender if they face the prospect of months or years in custody
before their trials begin. 


      CURRENT WORKLOAD EXCEEDS
      CAPACITY
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1

Our analysis shows that, based on its current workload and capacity,
the Tribunal will be unable to undertake the number of investigations
it planned for 1998 and will take at least 3 years to complete the
trials and appeals of the accused currently in custody.  The Tribunal
has the capacity to handle the workload that existed in the fall of
1997 when it submitted its resource request for the year.  As of May
14, 1998, however, 10 more indictees had been arrested or surrendered
and investigations in Kosovo had been added--already exceeding the
workload the Tribunal had expected for the entire year (see table
3).\13 Moreover, only three-quarters of the new hires planned for
1998 will be in place by August 1998.  As a result, the Tribunal
currently does not have sufficient capacity in a number of key areas
to handle its present workload. 



                                Table 3
                
                Planned and Actual Tribunal Workload as
                            of May 14, 1998

                                  Planned workload   Existing workload
Workload indicator                        for 1998  as of May 14, 1998
------------------------------  ------------------  ------------------
Number of indicted in custody                   18                26\a
Number of indicted waiting to                  2-8                  18
 go to trial
Number of trials underway                        5                   4
Number of trials in                              4                   8
 preparation
Number of investigations                      12\b                10\c
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a An additional indictee was granted provisional release for health
reasons and will have to return to the Tribunal when his trial
begins. 

\b In its 1998 budget request, the Office of the Prosecutor planned
to conduct 12 fully active investigations during 1998. 

\c According to the Office of the Prosecutor, none of these
investigations is being carried out by a full complement of
investigators, although each is fully active to the extent that
resources permit.  Six investigations have been suspended, and an
unspecified number of additional investigations have been unable to
start due to lack of investigators. 

Source:  Tribunal 1998 budget request (U.N.  General Assembly
document A/C.5/52, dated Oct.  19, 1997). 


--------------------
\13 The Tribunal's 1998 budget request was based on conservative
assumptions about the number of accused who would be arrested during
1998 because, according to Tribunal officials, the United Nations had
denied previous requests for budget increases based on expected
increases in the number of accused in custody. 


         INVESTIGATORS
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1.1

Although no standards exist on the appropriate number of
investigators for an international criminal tribunal, the Tribunal
does not have sufficient investigators to carry out its existing
investigatory workload.  At the time of our visit in November 1997,
the Tribunal had 41 investigators, including loaned personnel,\14 to
investigate potentially thousands of serious violations of
international humanitarian law, including nearly 1,000 prison camps
and other places of detention, over 10,000 cases of rape and sexual
assault, and 187 mass grave sites identified by the U.N.  Commission
of Experts. 

The Deputy Prosecutor told us that the 1998 budget would provide the
Office of the Prosecutor sufficient investigators and other resources
to adequately carry out its mandate for the first time, based on its
planned 1998 workload.  The 1998 budget authorized 72 investigators
to conduct
12 fully active investigations and support 9 ongoing or pending
trials.  To meet these goals, the Office of the Prosecutor expected
to supplement its
72 U.N.-hired investigators with up to 30 loaned staff from member
states. 

However, since the budget was approved, investigators have had to
support 12 ongoing or pending trials.  Further, they have had to
suspend six investigations and have been unable to begin an
unspecified number of additional investigations (see table 4).  As of
April 1998, the Tribunal had 39 U.N.-hired and 13 loaned
investigators from member states.  None of its 10 active
investigations were being carried out by a full complement of
investigators, although each investigation is fully active to the
extent that resources permit.  In addition, it will be several months
before the new U.N.  staff approved in the 1998 budget will be on
board, and the Tribunal's ability to use any loaned staff beyond June
1998--and thus accomplish the goals it set out in the 1998
budget--remains uncertain in light of the U.N.  General Assembly's
September 1997 resolution to largely eliminate the use of loaned
staff at the United Nations.  The resolution stated that loaned staff
should not be used as a substitute for U.N.-hired staff necessary for
the implementation of mandated programs and activities.\15 However,
the U.N.  Secretary General could accept loaned personnel for (1)
very specialized functions for a short period of time or (2) in cases
of urgent need or expanded mandate.\16



                                Table 4
                
                   Planned and Existing Workload for
                         Tribunal Investigators

                                  Investigato  Existing    Number of
                          Planne  rs           workload    investigato
                               d  required     as of       rs on staff
                          worklo  (as per      May 14,     as of
                              ad  1998         1998        April 16,
------------------------  ------  budget)      ----------  1998
Criminal investigations     12\a               10\b (6
                                               suspended)
                                  102 (72                  52 (39
                                  U.N.-hired               U.N.-hired
                                  and 30                   and 13
                                  loaned from              loaned from
                                  member                   member
                                  states)                  states)

Ongoing trials and trial       9               12
preparation
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The Tribunal planned for these investigations to be fully active. 

\b According to the Office of the Prosecutor, it can no longer make a
distinction between fully and partially active investigations.  None
of these investigations has the full complement of investigators but
investigations are considered fully active to the extent that
resources permit. 

Source:  Tribunal. 

Several current Office of the Prosecutor staff, former Office of the
Prosecutor staff now at the Justice and Defense Departments, and
State Department officials told us the number of investigators in the
1998 budget was still far short of the total necessary to handle the
scope of the Office of the Prosecutor's work.  They said that to
adequately carry out its mandate, the Office of the Prosecutor would
require at least twice as many investigators as requested in the 1998
budget.  Several noted that a single Tribunal investigation was
comparable in complexity and scope to a large criminal case in the
United States, even though the entire investigative resources for the
Tribunal were significantly smaller than what would be applied to
such a case in the United States.\17 One Office of the Prosecutor
official told us he had only 6 people on his investigative team, when
35 were required to cover the scope of its work effectively.  Other
Office of the Prosecutor officials told us of alleged atrocities
involving hundreds of deaths that could not be investigated due to
lack of investigators.  In its 1998 budget request, the Office of the
Prosecutor reported that as of October 1997, almost 60 percent of its
investigative resources were assigned to trial teams, causing the
suspension of some ongoing investigations. 

The Tribunal's investigative capacity is strained by the need to
prepare cases for trial when indictees are brought into custody.  For
an indictment to be confirmed, the Office of the Prosecutor need only
satisfy a judge that there is a prima facie case for believing that a
suspect has committed a crime.  However, to obtain a conviction under
the Tribunal's rules of procedure and evidence, prosecutors need to
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.  Consequently, after an indictee
is detained and brought to The Hague, investigators need to conduct
additional work to prepare the case for trial.  The amount of
additional work required to prepare for trial depends, in part, upon
the extent of the evidence collected before the indictment\18 and the
amount of time that has elapsed since the indictment.  Investigators
may need to locate original witnesses and ensure their testimony is
consistent with their original statements and investigate potential
defense theories.\19

In general, however, the Tribunal estimates that a seven-person
prosecution team needs to be established for each pending trial,
including at least two investigators who have to be pulled off
ongoing investigations.  Using this estimate, the Office of the
Prosecutor will need 16 investigators, or 22 percent of its
U.N.-hired investigators, to handle its current pending trial load,
plus additional investigators to support ongoing trials.  As more
indictees are brought into custody, more investigators will be
assigned to trial preparation, which will steadily degrade the Office
of the Prosecutor's ability to carry out ongoing investigations. 
According to Tribunal and State Department officials, the resources
required for trial preparation can be much greater for higher profile
indictees.  For example, these officials told us that the Office of
the Prosecutor moved over half of its investigative staff from
investigations to trial preparation when a Bosnian Croat general
surrendered to the Tribunal in April 1996. 

The recent violent incidents and killings in Kosovo have also
strained the Tribunal's investigators and highlighted the Office of
the Prosecutor's limited ability to quickly respond to new situations
that were not foreseen in the 1998 budget.  According to a senior
State Department official, the Office of the Prosecutor could not
provide investigators to conduct work in Kosovo without seriously
hampering ongoing investigations and trial preparations.  As a
result, the United States contributed over $1 million, loaned a
prosecutor and an investigator to the Tribunal, and sought additional
voluntary contributions and personnel from other nations. 


--------------------
\14 The Tribunal's 1997 budget authorized 36 investigator positions. 
At the time of our visit, 30 of these slots were filled.  Another 11
investigators were loaned from U.N.  member states. 

\15 U.N.  General Assembly resolution 51/243 (1997). 

\16 State Department officials told us that the U.N.  Secretary
General had agreed to allow the continued use of loaned personnel
throughout 1998.  See pp.  22-24 for additional discussion and pp. 
51-52 for the State Department's comments on this issue. 

\17 According to one expert's analysis, the cost of a recent
investigation and prosecution of one Mafia leader was greater than
the Tribunal's entire budget for 1998. 

\18 According to the Office of the Prosecutor, indictments issued in
1995 and 1996 were based on sufficient evidence to establish a prima
facie case against the accused as provided in the rules of procedure
and evidence.  Those issued after 1996 were prepared to meet a
higher, trial-ready standard of sufficient evidence to establish the
guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. 

\19 In commenting on this report, the Office of the Legal Counselor
at the U.S.  embassy in The Hague said that the additional
investigative work associated with the passage of time was the more
important workload factor.  This suggests a possible "feedback loop"
where delays in bringing a case to trial creates additional
investigative workload, which in turn, because of limited
investigative capacity, creates additional delays. 


         COURTROOMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1.2

As of March 1998, the Tribunal had only one courtroom to conduct its
current caseload--4 ongoing trials, 1 appeal, and various procedural
and pretrial motions associated with 8 pending trials involving 18
defendants.\20 To handle this caseload, the Tribunal has to rotate
the use of the single courtroom between pretrial motions, ongoing
trials, administrative functions of the court, and appeals.  The need
to handle the Tribunal's entire caseload in one courtroom is
inefficient and delays the entire judicial process.  For example,
ongoing trials are frequently delayed by the need to hear procedural
or pretrial motions associated with other cases.  Such motions took
up over 25 percent of available court time during 1997.  The need to
rotate court time between ongoing trials, motions, and appeals
greatly increases the amount of time necessary to complete each
ongoing trial and requires those in custody for other cases to wait
for months before their trials can even begin. 

To address the need for additional courtrooms, the U.S., Dutch,
British, and Canadian governments have voluntarily provided $3.3
million to finance the construction of two additional courtrooms--one
fully equipped to handle trials with multiple defendants, the other
capable of handling pretrial motions and appeals or trials with up to
two defendants.\21 The Tribunal expects to have all three courtrooms
in use by the end of June 1998;\22 nonetheless, we estimated that it
will still take over 2.6 years to finish the trials and appeals of
all persons currently on trial or awaiting trial.  This estimate
assumes that (1) both new courtrooms will be completed on time; (2)
court will be in session 240 days a year in each courtroom; and (3)
there will be a sufficient number of judges, prosecutors, and support
elements to fully staff all three on a full-time basis.\23 As of May
1998, the Tribunal had prepared, but not submitted, a request to the
United Nations to hire additional support staff to run each
courtroom. 


--------------------
\20 The number of pending trials is subject to change.  Indictments
with multiple defendants can be tried as a single case, provided
everyone listed on the indictment is in custody and the judicial
chamber hearing the case agrees.  However, there is the possibility
that multiple defendants on a single indictment could receive
separate trials. 

\21 The courtroom for trials uses highly technical equipment to allow
the display of evidence and to shield the identity of witnesses who
prefer to testify confidentially.  Pretrial motions and appeals do
not necessarily require such elaborate equipment. 

\22 On May 5, 1998, the Tribunal inaugurated the first of the new
courtrooms. 

\23 It will take the Tribunal about 3.7 years if court is in session
for the same number of days (166) as it was in 1997. 


         JUDGES
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1.3

The Tribunal's ability to try its growing caseload in a timely manner
is limited by the lack of judges.  The Tribunal's statute sets the
total number of judges for the Tribunal at 11.  The rules of
procedure and evidence require that a panel of three judges hear each
case, except that a judge who confirms an indictment cannot later sit
on the panel that tries the accused.  In addition, the five members
of the appeals chamber cannot include a judge who confirmed an
indictment or sat on a trial involving the indictee who brings the
appeal.\24 If every convicted indictee appeals his conviction and
sentence, which has been the case thus far, each indictee will
require nine different judges.  This did not pose a problem when the
Tribunal only had one trial going at a time.  Now, with four trials
and one appeal underway and eight more trials pending, the Tribunal's
ability to assign judges to cover the growing caseload has been
strained to capacity.  For example, as of March 1998, one judge was
assigned six different cases, creating serious scheduling problems. 

No matter how many courtrooms, investigators, attorneys, and
translators or how much support it has, under the Tribunal's current
judicial rules and procedures it can conduct no more than 3 trials at
the same time with
11 judges.  However, this would mean the appeals chamber could not be
constituted at the same time.  Our analysis of this best-case
scenario showed that the chambers could complete five trials a year,
assuming court is in session 240 days a year, and each trial takes
130 court days\25

(including pretrial motions and appeals).  However, the Tribunal will
have only two trial chambers.  This will enable the Tribunal to
conduct no more than two simultaneous trials without hindering
appeals proceedings.  Therefore, under the same assumptions, it will
only be able to complete three trials per year.  At that rate, it
will take more than 3 years to clear the current caseload. 

To handle its planned caseload for 1998, the Tribunal assumed its
11 judges would have dramatically increased workloads.  For 1998, it
assumed the chambers would handle more than twice as many trials;
issue twice as many motions, orders, and warrants; and keep court in
session 240 days--a 41-percent increase over 1997.  However, as of
March 1998, the number of pending trials already exceeds what was
planned for the year.  The President of the Tribunal told us she was
concerned about the judges' ability to handle their growing workload,
noting the draining nature of the subject, the unprecedented nature
of the legal issues involved, and the requirement to create and
revise the rules of procedure and evidence.  In her view, the
Tribunal needs at least a reserve of judges who can cover trials if
the need arises.  Since the number of judges for the Tribunal was
established by the U.N.  Security Council,\26 the Security Council
would have to approve an increase in the number of judges. 

In light of these concerns, in February 1998 the President of the
Tribunal asked the Security Council to authorize four more judges. 
This would allow the creation of a third trial chamber and provide
greater flexibility to assign judges to trial and appeal chambers as
needed.  On May 13, 1998, the Security Council passed a resolution
authorizing three additional judges for the Tribunal. 

In addition, the appeals chamber also hears and decides appeals that
come from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.  A State
Department official told us that five judges will have to travel to
Africa to hear and decide on two pending appeals sometime later in
1998.  This has the potential to further disrupt the Tribunal's
ability to handle its current caseload, although we were unable to
quantify the impact of this requirement. 


--------------------
\24 In commenting on a draft of this report, the Tribunal noted that
it is "an essential element of a fair process .  .  .  that Judges . 
.  .  not sit in more than one of [these] three capacities [so they]
cannot be in a position to review their own decisions.  .  .  ."

\25 These figures are based on the Tribunal's estimate of the length
of pretrial, trial, and appellate proceedings. 

\26 Article 12 of the Tribunal Statute sets the number of judges at
11.  U.N.  Security Council resolution 827 (1993) approved the
Secretary General's report on the Tribunal, which included the
Statute as an annex. 


         INFORMATION BACKLOG
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1.4

The Tribunal has collected an immense amount of evidence and
information on war crimes in the former Yugoslavia.  By the end of
1997, the Tribunal's documents showed it had obtained nearly 1.5
million pages of documents, 12,000 photographs, 1,500 videos, and 47
cubic yards of physical evidence.  However, the Tribunal has been
unable to translate, process, analyze, and use this information
throughout the organization.  By the end of 1997, less than half of
this information had been indexed, summarized, and entered into
Tribunal computer information systems--leaving an information backlog
of over 800,000 pages of documents, about 9,000 photographs, and so
much unviewed videotape we estimated it would take one person over 2
years to watch. 

Sustaining such a huge information backlog means the Tribunal is
unaware of all the evidence it has obtained.  Evidence vital to
ongoing or planned investigations may be sitting in boxes, unread or
unviewed.  Not only may the Prosecutor's ability to construct a case
be limited, but also evidence of potential benefit to the defense may
not be known at the time of a trial.  Under Tribunal rules of
procedure and evidence, the Prosecutor is required to disclose to the
defense any evidence it is aware of that may suggest the innocence or
mitigate the guilt of an accused or affect the credibility of
prosecution evidence.  Although Tribunal officials told us that the
most important evidence and information already had been processed
into the system, some staff were concerned that exculpatory evidence
might not be discovered until after a trial was completed. 

The Tribunal has a computer database with summary information on all
documents obtained to date, which investigators and attorneys use to
get a general idea of the information on hand.  Defense teams use
information extracted from this database in preparing cases for their
clients.  In early 1997, the Tribunal estimated it had about 560,000
pages of documents collected by its investigators waiting to be
indexed, summarized, and entered into this system.  To help clear
this backlog, the Dutch government provided $2 million to fund a team
of 20 staff to index and summarize these documents.  The Tribunal
anticipates that the Dutch-funded project will have entered summaries
of all this information into the Tribunal's computer system by June
1998. 

While this project has been addressing the backlog that existed in
early 1997, the Tribunal receives new information at the rate of
20,000 pages of documents a month, which it has been unable to
process.  The Office of the Prosecutor refers to this additional
information backlog as its "frontlog." We estimate that, as of April
1998, it amounted to about 260,000 pages of documents.  The Office of
the Prosecutor expects that the additional resources provided in the
1998 budget will allow it to eliminate this new backlog at a rate of
between 14,000 to 18,000 pages per month.  However, with these new
resources devoted to eliminating this new backlog, it is unclear how
the Office of the Prosecutor will be able to process the additional
20,000 pages of documents obtained each month.  In addition, over
600,000 pages of archived and other documents obtained from other
organizations have never been processed into the system.  The Office
of the Prosecutor also has no capability to process nearly 500,000
pages of documents it expects to receive during 1998 from the
archives of the U.N.  Peace Forces.  In January 1998, the Deputy
Prosecutor concluded that the Office of the Prosecutor's inability to
process these collections will create additional backlogs. 

After being summarized, selected documents critical to ongoing
investigations or trials are fully translated, scanned, and entered
into a more complex database that shows links between documents,
persons, and organizations.  These links are critical for developing
chain of command and command authority portions of indictments.  As
of January 1998, about 60,000 pages of documents were waiting to be
entered into this system.  According to the Office of the Prosecutor,
a project funded by the International Committee of the Red Cross will
help eliminate half of this backlog by the end of June 1998 and could
entirely eliminate the backlog by the end of October 1998 if
additional funding is secured.  The Office of the Prosecutor also
estimates that when 1998 approved staff levels are reached, the
Tribunal believes it will have enough resources on hand to keep up
with the 1,500 pages of new information coming in from investigators
every month for entry into the more complex database.  However, the
Office of the Prosecutor will not have enough staff to be able to
enter new information obtained from other sources. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Prosecutor said that our
report could raise concerns that the information backlog may cause a
miscarriage of justice.  While deploring the lack of available
resources for backlog processing, the Prosecutor said that she and
her staff take all possible initiatives to ensure that the Tribunal's
ability to deliver justice is not harmed and does not believe that
the backlog has tainted the Tribunal's process.  In addition, the
Prosecutor noted that the Tribunal's rules of procedure and evidence
allow for the review of judgments in the event new information is
discovered after trials are completed. 


      ADDITIONAL ARRESTS COULD
      OVERWHELM THE TRIBUNAL
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2

With the Tribunal's May 8, 1998, announcement that it was withdrawing
indictments for 14 individuals, there are currently 32 known indicted
persons still at large and an unknown number of persons whose
indictments are under seal (see app.  IV for the status of publicly
indicted individuals).  A series of recent events has made it more
likely that there will be significant increases in the Tribunal's
future workload before the end of 1998.  First, international
military forces in the region have begun detaining individuals
indicted by the Tribunal, including those listed in public and sealed
indictments.  Since June 1997, international military forces in
Bosnia and Croatia have detained seven indictees and killed another
who resisted apprehension.  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
officials have said that Stabilization Force (SFOR) troops in Bosnia
will continue to detain individuals indicted by the Tribunal that
they encounter during the course of their normal duties if the
tactical situation permits.\27 Second, in January 1998, the National
Assembly of Republika Srpska elected a new, moderate Prime Minister,
Milorad Dodik, who announced that his government would strictly
implement the Dayton Agreement, including cooperating with the
Tribunal to the extent permitted by the Republika Srpska
constitution.\28

Our analysis suggests that an increase in the number of indictees in
custody during the year will overwhelm the Tribunal's ability to
conduct ongoing investigations and handle trial preparations with its
1998 resource level.  If arrests and surrenders continue throughout
1998, the Tribunal would likely have to close down ongoing
investigations, transfer investigators to trial preparation, and seek
significant additional donor support--particularly if high-profile
indictees such as Radovan Karadzic or a large number of lesser
indictees are taken into custody. 

An increase in the number of indictees in custody will create other
problems for the Tribunal.  It will have to find additional space and
guards to keep them in custody.  In April 1998, the number of
indictees in custody (26) exceeded the capacity of the Tribunal's
detention facility (24).  In response, the Dutch government agreed to
provide the Tribunal additional detention capacity.  As required by
the statute, indigent indictees also have the right to free defense
counsel.  According to a senior State Department official, an
increase in the number of those in custody would seriously strain the
existing capabilities of the two-person staff in the defense counsel
unit, which arranges for and provides support to defense attorneys,
and the Tribunal could require additional funding to expand this
unit.  An increase in the number of indictees preparing for trial
also would place a heavy burden on the Office of the Prosecutor's
computer support staff.  Under Tribunal rules, the prosecutor must
provide defense counsel access to all information relevant to the
indictees.  For example, Tribunal figures showed that discovery
searches for the first three trials took between 117 and 200 days. 
Officials in the information and evidence section told us that these
searches placed such a great strain on the computer system that other
users were unable to print documents without a 30- to 40-minute
delay. 

The impact of an increase in the number of indictees in custody on
the prosecution would depend on the number of indictments (and thus
roughly the number of pending trials) in which the indictees were
included.  In the Tribunal's 1998 budget request, the Office of the
Prosecutor said it required two attorneys, one legal officer, and one
case manager for each pending trial.  However, the Tribunal's 1998
budget request only provides for two trial preparation teams.\29 The
Office of the Prosecutor also told us that on average it had to
transfer two investigators from ongoing investigations to assist in
trial preparations per indictment.\30 Tribunal and State Department
officials said that, depending on the number of additional pending
trials, the need to transfer additional investigators to trial
preparation would significantly disrupt ongoing investigations.\31
Without additional staff, courtrooms, and judges, the indictees would
have to wait for the Tribunal to dispose of its current trial
caseload--a likely 3-year project with current resources--before
their trials begin.  Finally, U.S.  officials said that, if more
investigators and attorneys were added to deal with the influx, the
Tribunal also would require greater overall administrative help in
such critical areas as translation and victim and witness support. 


--------------------
\27 See Bosnia Peace Operation:  Pace of Implementing the Dayton
Agreement Accelerated in Mid-1997 (GAO/NSIAD-98-138, June 2, 1998)
for further details about the status of arrests and surrenders of
indicted war crimes suspects. 

\28 While Dodik has stated that his government will encourage
individuals indicted by the Tribunal to voluntarily surrender, his
ability to carry out his pledges is hindered by his lack of control
over police and military in some parts of Republika Srpska.  Dodik
has also said his government will not arrest and extradite
individuals indicted by the Tribunal because the Republika Srpska
constitution does not permit such action. 

\29 The budget for 1998 also provides for four trial teams.  Trial
preparation teams will become trial teams once preparatory work is
completed and trial activities commence. 

\30 Since an average of four persons is listed per indictment, an
arrest or surrender strategy designed to minimize the number of
trials could lessen the workload impact on the Tribunal. 

\31 In January 1998, the Deputy Prosecutor wrote that the transfer of
resources (investigators) from investigations to trial preparation
during the course of 1997 had ".  .  .  progressively eroded" the ". 
.  .  investigative aspect of the [Tribunal's] mandate.  .  .  ."


      CHALLENGES TO INCREASING
      CAPACITY
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3

We noted that there are several administrative barriers that could
inhibit efforts to quickly increase the Tribunal's capacity.  For
example, the Tribunal must comply with U.N.  rules for recruitment. 
According to State, U.N., and Tribunal officials, the complex U.N. 
process for locating, selecting, and placing new staff in The Hague
can take many months.  Recruitment for U.N.  positions must include
global notification, screening for necessary skills, and compliance
with geographic and gender diversity requirements.  In an effort to
speed this process, the U.N.  Secretariat has granted the Tribunal
nearly complete control over recruitment.  Nonetheless, the Registry,
which provides administrative support for the Tribunal, told us it
expected it would take about 3 months from the time a position
vacancy is posted before new staff are actually in place at The
Hague.  However, State and Tribunal officials who have had experience
with this process told us that it actually takes 6 to 12 months to
identify candidates and bring him or her on board. 


         SURCHARGE
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3.1

Another barrier is the United Nations' surcharge on voluntary
contributions.  Voluntary contributions to U.N.  programs
administered and managed by the U.N.  Secretariat, such as the
Tribunal, are charged a 13-percent overhead surcharge for cash and
in-kind contributions, such as loaned personnel.\32 According to the
U.N.  Under-Secretary-General for Management, a 1980 U.N.  General
Assembly resolution does not allow the United Nations to use funds
from its regular budget to support the costs incurred by voluntary
contributions from member states.\33 U.N.  officials told us that the
surcharge is necessary to recoup the administrative costs involved in
supporting the equipment and staff contributed by member states,
although in commenting on this report, the United Nations said that
the surcharge can be waived if a contribution does not involve
additional costs to the United Nations. 

The surcharge can deter potential donors.  For example, because of
the surcharge, the United States significantly reduced the number of
U.S.  loaned staff from 22 in 1994 to 7 in March 1998.  The Defense
Department has never agreed to pay the surcharge and, as a result, in
December 1996, removed the staff it had loaned to the Tribunal. 
Defense Department officials likened the surcharge to paying tax on a
gift, and the Department will not loan staff to the Tribunal unless
the United Nations drops the fee or the State Department pays the
13-percent U.N.  surcharge.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation also
refused a December 1997 Tribunal request to loan investigators to the
Tribunal until the State Department agreed to pay the surcharge or
the United Nations agreed not to impose it.  These interagency
negotiations delayed the delivery of U.S.-loaned staff to the
Tribunal by several months.  According to a senior State Department
official, in March 1998 the U.N.  Secretary General and the Secretary
of State discussed this issue.  The official said that the Secretary
General indicated his agreement with the U.S.  position and would
address the issue.  The State Department took this to mean that the
United States would no longer be billed for the voluntary
contribution surcharge.  In commenting on this report, the U.N. 
Under-Secretary-General for Management clarified the Secretary
General's comments during the meeting, and said that the Secretary
General did not announce a change in the United Nations' policy on
the surcharge, but only indicated that adjustments might be
possible.\34


--------------------
\32 Cash contributions funds are maintained in a special U.N.  trust
fund account and are available to the Tribunal when it asks U.N. 
headquarters to release the money for specific activities. 

\33 U.N.  General Assembly resolution 35/217 (1980). 

\34 In March 1998, after meeting with the Secretary of State, the
Secretary General reported on the U.N.  method for applying
administrative costs to loaned personnel and cited two conditions
under which there would be no surcharge.  First, assessed budgets
could include a limited number of posts for very specialized
functions for which gratis personnel might be needed.  If the budget
were approved, these personnel would be considered U.N.  staff and
not subject to a surcharge.  Second, if temporary and urgent
assistance were needed for new or expanded mandates, gratis personnel
would be required for short durations and not be subject to a
surcharge. 


         LOANED STAFF
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3.2

The use of loaned staff at the United Nations has also been a
controversial issue for a number of years.  In September 1997, the
General Assembly passed a resolution calling on the Secretary General
to phase out at the earliest possible date the use of most loaned
personnel at the United Nations.\35 U.N.  documents show that
developing countries in particular dislike the practice because, in
part, they see it as damaging potential employment opportunities for
their nationals.  They also see the practice as a means for the
wealthy countries to influence the United Nations unfairly, according
to these documents and a former U.S.  official. 

As of February 1998, 9 governments and 3 nongovernmental
organizations had loaned about 50 personnel to the Tribunal,
including 5 from the United States, primarily prosecutors from the
Department of Justice.  The Tribunal is expected to gain additional
loaned personnel from U.N.  member states for the first 6 months of
1998 to help the Tribunal handle its increasing workload, until new
staff hired with funds from the 1998 budget are brought on board. 
Although there are provisions for continued use of a limited number
of specialized positions that cannot be filled through the U.N. 
recruitment system, the Tribunal's 1998 budget assumed that its
entire complement of loaned staff would be gone by the end of the
year.  In commenting on this report, the Registrar said that, in
accordance with the instructions of the General Assembly and the
Secretary General, the Tribunal is taking steps to phase out
virtually all of its loaned personnel by the end of June 1998.\36
However, according to State Department officials, the Secretary
General told the Secretary of State in a March 1998 meeting that he
would find a way to address the issue of restrictions on the
continued use of staff loaned to the Tribunal.  State Department
officials told us that as of May 4, 1998, the United States had sent
two additional loaned personnel to the Tribunal and plans to send at
least eight more. 

If the use of loaned staff is discontinued, the Tribunal would lose
vital expertise in areas such as investigations and forensics that
are needed to conduct the Tribunal's work, according to Tribunal and
U.S.  officials.  Discontinuing the use of loaned personnel also
would remove an important tool the Tribunal has used in the past to
obtain skilled personnel for key positions quickly.  U.S.  officials
told us that loaned staff are the best way for the Tribunal to
quickly obtain the highly skilled personnel necessary to handle its
complex investigations and prosecutions.  For example, the Tribunal's
ability to rapidly send investigators to Kosovo will rely on loaned
staff from the United States and other countries.  In addition, three
out of four of the attorneys that prosecuted the first trial at the
Tribunal were loaned staff.  According to U.S.  officials, as a
result of the Secretary of State's discussions with the U.N. 
Secretary General, the Tribunal would be allowed to continue to use
loaned personnel.  According to State Department officials, the
General Assembly resolution that calls for the discontinuation of
loaned personnel contains exceptions that appear to fit the
circumstances of the Tribunal. 


--------------------
\35 U.N.  General Assembly resolution 51/243 (1997). 

\36 Exceptions to this general policy will be made for loaned
personnel who (1) had agreements in place before the General Assembly
decision was made in October 1997 or (2) have expertise vital to the
Tribunal's work. 


   CONCLUSIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

After overcoming significant startup challenges, the Tribunal has
begun to successfully investigate and prosecute war criminals. 
However, the Tribunal has insufficient investigators, judges,
courtrooms, and information processors to carry out its existing
workload because the recent increase in the number of detainees
exceeds what the Tribunal planned for in its 1998 budget request. 
The Tribunal's capacity to carry out its primary functions will
become more strained as more indicted are brought into custody.  As a
result, with its current capacity, the Tribunal will be unable to
perform all of the investigations it planned for the year or ensure
that trials begin without undue delay.  If arrests and surrenders
continue throughout 1998, the international community will likely
have to provide additional support to the Tribunal to ensure it can
maintain its legitimacy. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

The Departments of State and Defense, the Tribunal, and the U.N. 
Under-Secretary-General for Management provided written comments on a
draft of this report.  State and Defense generally concurred with the
report.  State, the Tribunal, and the U.N.  Under-Secretary-General
for Management described their views on the merits of the United
Nations' policy on imposing a surcharge on cash and in-kind voluntary
contributions and its application to contributions to the Tribunal. 
In some cases, these views differ and we added information to the
report to reflect their respective positions.  We did not assess the
merits of the surcharge policy, but rather focused on its impact on
efforts to increase the Tribunal's capacity.  The Tribunal and the
U.N.  Under-Secretary-General for Management also provided comments
which we have incorporated in the report as appropriate.  The
comments of the Departments of State and Defense, the Tribunal, and
the U.N.  Under-Secretary-General for Management along with our
evaluation of them are reprinted in their entirety in appendixes V
through VIII, respectively. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.1

We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate
congressional committees, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the
U.N.  Secretary General, and the President of the Tribunal.  Copies
will also be made available to other interested parties upon request. 


Please contact me at (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report.  Major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix IX. 

Sincerely yours,

Benjamin F.  Nelson
Director, International Relations
 and Trade Issues


OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY
=========================================================== Appendix I

This report (1) reviews the startup challenges the Tribunal faced and
(2) assesses the Tribunal's capacity to carry out its mandate; that
is, whether the Tribunal has sufficient staff, facilities, and
equipment needed to investigate and prosecute individuals indicted in
accordance with its statute and rules of procedure.  We included
information as of May 14, 1998. 

To review the startup challenges of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, we consulted Tribunal annual
reports and press releases, budget resolutions from the United
Nations' Fifth Committee and Advisory Committee on Administrative and
Budgetary Questions, and budget documents from the U.N.  Secretariat. 
We also met with State Department, U.N., and Tribunal officials to
discuss how the Tribunal was created and how its current structure
and operations evolved over time. 

To assess the Tribunal's capacity to carry out its mandate, we
measured its capacity in four areas--investigators, courtrooms,
judges, and information processing--that (1) were central to the
Tribunal's ability to perform its mission and (2) we were best able
to assess from the available documentation.  The Tribunal's annual
reports and 1998 budget request contain detailed information on these
four areas that we supplemented in follow-up discussions with
Tribunal officials.  We did not assess the Tribunal's administrative
functions. 

To obtain the information necessary to assess the Tribunal's
capacity, we met with Tribunal officials at The Hague, the
Netherlands, including the President of the Tribunal, the Registrar,
and the Deputy Prosecutor; and with officials from the U.S.  embassy
in The Hague; the U.N.  Secretariat; the U.N.  Office of Internal
Oversight Services (OIOS); the Department of State in Washington,
D.C.; and the U.S.  Mission to the United Nations in New York City. 
We also spoke with a number of officials from the U.S.  Departments
of Justice and Defense who had worked at the Tribunal on loan from
the United States.  We obtained documents and reports from the
Departments of State, Justice, and Defense that pertained to the
Tribunal.  We also obtained and reviewed a number of U.N.  and
Tribunal documents, including the Tribunal's annual reports and press
releases, budget resolutions from the United Nations' Fifth Committee
and Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions,
budget documents from the U.N.  Secretariat, and OIOS reports about
the Tribunal. 

Because we are an agency of the U.S.  government, we do not have
audit authority to review the operations of the United Nations and
the Tribunal.  Although Tribunal officials consented to our study and
were helpful and forthcoming in our discussions, the United Nations
and the Tribunal did not provide us with the internal documents that
would have enabled us to assess how effectively or efficiently the
Tribunal has used its available financial resources.  Reports from
the OIOS indicate that this may have been a problem.  Without such
access, we were unable to review the overall adequacy of the
Tribunal's financial resources nor could we determine whether the
Tribunal could have more efficiently and effectively allocated them. 
For example, we did not have access to internal Tribunal documents
that detailed the assumptions and rationales behind its 1998 budget
request, nor could we review Tribunal financial records to determine
whether allocated funds were being fully or effectively used in all
areas of the operation. 

Nonetheless, we were able to compare the Tribunal's current and
future workload with its capacity in its key investigative,
prosecutorial, and judicial functions.  As part of its 1998 budget
request, the Tribunal developed 113 indicators such as number of
ongoing trials and number of courtrooms to measure its workload,
establish goals, and judge performance.  We used some of these
indicators to measure the Tribunal's current and future workload. 
Table I.1 shows some additional examples of these indicators. 




                               Table I.1
                
                Examples of Tribunal Workload Indicators

                                                         Projected for
Indicator                  Level in 1996  Level in 1997  1998
-------------------------  -------------  -------------  -------------
Ongoing trials             1              2              5

Pretrial motions, orders,  152            100            200
and applications

Number and status          28 (9          10 (3          12 (12 fully
of investigations          active;        active;        active)
                           10 partially   7 partially
                           active;        active)
                           3 suspended;
                           6 completed)

Witnesses                  1,693          2,300          4,600
interviewed

Number of documents in     68,000         113,000        161,000
OTP evidence collection

Detainees                  4              20             18
(average)

Pages translated           27,300         29,500         40,000
per year

Court sessions supported   131            183            309
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Legend
OTP = Office of the Prosecutor. 

Source:  Tribunal's 1998 budget request. 

Since the Tribunal is an unprecedented body with a unique mandate,
there are few recognized standards or criteria for critical aspects
of its operations, such as how many investigators are required per
investigation, how many attorneys are necessary for preparing an
indictment, how many people the Tribunal needs to indict, and how
long it should remain in operation.  However, the Security Council
resolutions that established the Tribunal, its statute, and its rules
of procedure and evidence provide a series of requirements for the
Tribunal and its judicial process.  For example, each trial must be
heard by three judges and the accused have the right to be informed
of any evidence known to the Prosecutor that may suggest their
innocence or mitigate their guilt and to be tried without undue
delay.  We performed our assessment by determining whether the
Tribunal had sufficient capacity in key areas to be able to comply
with these criteria. 

The ability to ensure that trials begin without undue delay is
particularly important.  However, the Tribunal has no specific
guideline for determining the exact length of time which constitutes
undue delay.  In a September 1996 decision, a Tribunal trial chamber
found that applying the "without undue delay" standard depends on
individual circumstances and cited seven factors enumerated by the
European Commission of Human Rights that should be considered when
making that determination.\1 These factors include the seriousness of
the offense, the difficulties in conducting the investigation, and
the impact of detention on the indictee.  In that decision, the
Tribunal ruled that a detainee's 4-month detention before the start
of his trial could not, in the circumstances of that case, be
considered undue delay.  The Tribunal President and State Department
officials generally considered that pretrial detention longer than 2
years could be considered undue delay, although this may vary
depending on the circumstances of the case. 

To examine the relationship between capacity and workload, we used
estimates the Tribunal had developed on the number of people or
amount of time necessary to carry out key tasks based on its past
experience.  For example, the Tribunal assumed each trial would
require 100 court days and that one person could index between 14,000
to 18,000 pages of information per month (see table I.2).  The
Tribunal used these estimates to justify its request for funds.  As
such, the Tribunal's 1998 budget request represents its best judgment
on what it needed to accomplish its performance goals for the year. 
We used these estimates to calculate the number of staff or length of
time necessary to handle the Tribunal's current and potential
workload. 



                               Table I.2
                
                   Tribunal's Estimates of Necessary
                       Capacity for Certain Tasks

Task                          Necessary capacity
----------------------------  ----------------------------------------
Trial                         100 courtroom days

Pretrial motions              20 courtroom days

Investigation team            1 team leader, 7 investigators, 1
                              analyst

Trial team                    3 attorneys, 2 investigators, 1 legal
                              officer, 1 case manager, 1 trial support
                              assistant

Summarize documents           14,000 to 18,000 pages per month, per
                              person
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  Tribunal 1998 budget request. 

In assessing the number of investigators, we used the Tribunal's
estimates of the number of investigations it planned to undertake as
the criteria for measuring whether it had enough investigators.  Our
ability to analyze the number of investigators was further limited
because we did not have access to specific information on the
relationship between the number of investigations and the number of
investigators.  Nonetheless, we contrasted the number of
investigators the Tribunal has with the number it thought necessary
to carry out the 12 investigations it planned for 1998.  We also
calculated the number of investigators that would have to be pulled
off investigations to assist in trial preparation based on
information we received from the Office of the Prosecutor. 

To calculate how long it would take the Tribunal to complete its
current caseload based on the number of courtrooms, we applied the
Tribunal's standard estimates of 20 days necessary for pretrial
motions, 100 days for the trial, and 10 days for the appeals to
determine the total number of trial days.  We assumed that all
verdicts would be appealed.\2 We also used the Tribunal's 1998 budget
estimates of the number of days (1) court was in session during 1997
and (2) the Tribunal plans to have court in session in 1998.  This
allowed us to estimate the total number of courtroom days per year
and the total length of time necessary to complete the current
caseload. 

The courtroom analysis assumed that there will be enough judges and
other staff to allow the operation of three courtrooms.  With its
current
11 judges, the Tribunal can have no more than three trials going at
the same time, due to the requirement in the Tribunal's statute that
three judges need to hear each trial.  However, in practice, the
Tribunal can only hear two trials at the same time without
jeopardizing its ability to constitute an appeals chamber, since it
has only two trial chambers.  Using the Tribunal's estimate of being
in session 240 days a year, we assumed that the court could handle
480 trial days a year.  If each trial takes 130 days, the Tribunal
could complete about 3.7 trials per year. 

Our analysis of the size of the Tribunal's information backlog and
its ability to eliminate it was based on the 1998 budget request and
supplementary information we obtained from the Office of the
Prosecutor.  Based on this information, we calculated that the
Tribunal has nearly 1.5 million pages of information.  We then
estimated the size of the Tribunal's backlog based on its estimates
of how quickly staff could summarize and index documents, enter
documents into the detailed database, and scan photos into the
document database.  We also calculated the number of hours of
unviewed videotape based on estimates we obtained from the Tribunal. 
Finally, based on figures in the 1998 budget request, we estimated
how long it would take the Tribunal to clear its backlog of
information and whether the Tribunal would be able to keep up with
the inflow of new information during the year. 

We conducted our work from September 1997 to May 1998 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


--------------------
\1 Decision on Motion for Provisional Release Filed by the Accused
Zejnil Delalic, Case No.  IT-96-21-T (Sept.  25, 1996). 

\2 Every verdict issued to date has been appealed.  The statute
allows the Prosecutor or the defense to appeal a verdict. 


U.N.  SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
PERTAINING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
THE TRIBUNAL
========================================================== Appendix II

Resolution
number         Date           Purpose
-------------  -------------  ----------------------------------------
764            July 13, 1992  Reaffirms that all parties to the
                              conflict are bound to comply with their
                              obligations under international
                              humanitarian law.

771            August 13,     Condemned any violations of
               1992           international humanitarian law and
                              required that all parties cease and
                              desist from breaches of the law. Called
                              on U.N. member states to report
                              violations.

780            October 6,     Established an impartial Commission of
               1992           Experts to investigate "grave breaches
                              of the Geneva Conventions and other
                              violations of international humanitarian
                              law. . . ."

787            November 16,   Reinforced request in resolution 780 for
               1992           Commission to continue its investigative
                              efforts. Reaffirmed the United Nations'
                              condemnation of violations of
                              humanitarian law. Emphasized persons
                              would be held individually responsible.

808            February 22,   Authorized the establishment of the
               1993           International Criminal Tribunal and
                              requested the U.N. Secretary General
                              report on the statute of the Tribunal
                              within 60 days.

827            May 25, 1993   Established the Tribunal and approved
                              the Secretary General's draft of the
                              statute.

857            August 20,     Established list of 23 potential judges
               1993           from which the General Assembly was to
                              select 11.

877            October 21,    First selection of Tribunal
               1993           Prosecutor.\a

936            July 8, 1994   Appointment of second Tribunal
                              Prosecutor.\b
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The first person selected as Prosecutor declined the position in
early 1994 without ever taking office. 

\b The second person selected as Prosecutor was the first to actually
take office. 

Source:  United Nations. 


THE TRIBUNAL'S JURISDICTION,
ORGANIZATION, AND PROCESS
========================================================= Appendix III


   TRIBUNAL'S JURISDICTION
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:1

The Tribunal's jurisdiction stems from its U.N.  Security Council
mandate to prosecute individuals responsible for serious violations
of international humanitarian law committed on the territory of the
former Yugoslavia since January 1, 1991.  To implement its mandate,
the Tribunal functions in accordance with the provisions of the
Security Council-approved 1993 statute and its set of rules of
procedure and evidence.  The statute authorizes the Tribunal to
prosecute persons for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of
1949, violations of the laws or customs of war, crimes against
humanity, and the commission of genocide.  The Tribunal and national
courts in Bosnia, Croatia, and other member states have concurrent
jurisdiction; however, the statute recognizes the Tribunal as having
primacy over those courts.  Thus, the Tribunal can formally request
national courts to defer to the Tribunal at any stage in their own
investigation or prosecution of alleged war crimes. 

The statute requires all U.N.  member states to cooperate with the
Tribunal in the investigation and prosecution of accused war
criminals.  States are required to comply without undue delay with
any Tribunal request for assistance or order issued by a trial
chamber.  This includes the identification and location of persons;
the production of evidence; the service of documents; and the arrest,
detention, and transfer of the accused to Tribunal headquarters in
The Hague, the Netherlands.  However, the Tribunal has no direct
enforcement power if a state fails to comply.  It can only report
lack of compliance to the Security Council.  For example, in July
1997, three judges from the Tribunal ruled that Croatia and its
Minister of Defense are required to comply with subpoenas requiring
them to produce documents relevant to an ongoing trial.  However, in
October 1997, the appeals chamber of the Tribunal ruled that although
the Tribunal can order the production of information by states, it
has no authority to enforce those orders and must rely on the
Security Council to take action against the uncooperative state.\1
The signatories of the 1995 Dayton Agreement, some of whom are not
members of the United Nations, also pledged to fully cooperate with
the Tribunal, although the Bosnian entity Republica Srpska, and
Serbia and Montenegro have not lived up to their pledge.  The statute
also provides a role for the U.N.  General Assembly in electing the
judges of the Tribunal, approving the budget, and reviewing the
Tribunal's annual reports. 


--------------------
\1 The Tribunal's 1997 annual report noted that it "must turn to
States for the execution of its orders and warrants.  If States are
ready and willing to cooperate, the Tribunal is in a position to
fulfill its mission.  If States instead refuse to implement those
orders or to execute warrants, the Tribunal will turn out to be
utterly impotent."


   TRIBUNAL'S ORGANIZATION
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2

As shown in figure III.1, the Tribunal is organized into three
bodies:  an Office of the Prosecutor, the judicial chambers, and a
Registry for common administrative support.  In total, these bodies
constitute an entire criminal justice system.  The Tribunal shares
the Prosecutor and the five members of its judicial appeals chamber
with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. 

   Figure III.1:  Tribunal
   Organization Chart

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  Tribunal 1998 budget request. 

The Office of the Prosecutor is required to both investigate and
prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since
1991.  The Prosecutor, who heads the Office of the Prosecutor, is
nominated by the U.N.  Secretary General and appointed by the U.N. 
Security Council, serves a 4-year term, and is eligible for
reappointment.  The first acting Prosecutor took office in July 1994,
and the current Prosecutor began serving her term on October 1, 1996. 
The Prosecutor selects the appropriate cases to investigate,
identifies and locates relevant potential witnesses, gathers evidence
to corroborate that criminal acts have occurred, and establishes that
those acts were crimes within its jurisdiction.  The Office of the
Prosecutor operates independently of the judges of the Tribunal.  The
investigation division of the Office of the Prosecutor is responsible
for conducting investigations of suspected war criminals.  The
prosection division conducts the trial proceedings before the
Chambers and provides legal advice to assist ongoing investigations. 
The information and evidence section is responsible for the
retention, storage, security, and retrieval of information and
physical evidence and provides computer services support.  The Office
of the Prosecutor also has three small offices in Sarajevo, Zagreb,
and Belgrade to support and assist investigators working in the
field.  The government of Republika Srpska has also offered to allow
the Office of the Prosecutor to open a fourth office in Banja Luka. 

The Judicial Chambers holds the trials and makes the ultimate
determination of guilt or innocence of the indictees.  The chambers
is composed of 11 judges from 11 different countries who rotate
between
2 trial chambers of 3 judges and an appeals chamber of 5 judges.  The
judges are elected by the General Assembly from a list of nominees
submitted by the Security Council for a term of 4 years and are
eligible for reelection.  The President of the Tribunal, who is also
a member of the appeals chamber, is elected by the judges and assigns
the judges to both chambers, presides over the plenary meetings of
the chambers, and supervises the performance of the Registry
functions.  The President is also responsible for preparing and
submitting the Tribunal's annual reports to the United Nations and
reporting instances of noncompliance by states. 

The Registry provides support to the Tribunal.  Its judicial
responsibilities include managing courtroom operations, providing
legal support to judges, assigning defense counsel to indigent
indictees, supervising the detention unit, protecting and supporting
victims and witnesses, and recommending protective measures and
maintaining contacts with U.N.  member states.  The Registry's
administrative responsibilities involve financial administration and
resource planning, human resource management, language services,
meetings and documentation services, electronic and communications
support, and building management.  The Registry is also responsible
for security at the Tribunal, handling relations with the press, and
providing information to the public on the Tribunal's activities. 
The Registry is headed by the Registrar, who is appointed by the U.N. 
Secretary General. 


   TRIBUNAL'S PROCESS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:3

The Tribunal's overall process for carrying out its mandate is
divided into a number of steps, as shown in figure III.2.  Each step
is a link in the functions of the overall criminal-judicial process. 
The international community, and not the Tribunal, is responsible for
the arrest or surrender of indictees. 

   Figure III.2:  Tribunal's
   Process

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  GAO analysis of Tribunal documents. 

The process begins when the Office of the Prosecutor collects,
translates, and organizes evidence of violations of international
humanitarian law.  This information comes from individuals, member
states, or nongovernmental organizations or is collected by
investigators from the Office of the Prosecutor.  The Prosecutor may
summon and question suspects, victims, and witnesses; obtain their
statements; collect evidence; and conduct site investigations and
other matters necessary for completing the investigation and
preparing the case for trial.  After reviewing information collected
during the investigation, the Prosecutor prepares an indictment if
there is sufficient evidence to provide reasonable grounds for
believing that a suspect has committed a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal.  If a reviewing judge agrees that the
evidence establishes a prima facie case, the indictment is confirmed
and an arrest warrant issued.  The indictee must then be located,
arrested, and transferred to The Hague by authorities other than the
Tribunal. 

Upon arrival in The Hague, the indictee is placed in detention,
enters a plea, and receives a trial date set by a judge.  The
Tribunal's statute requires that the trial chambers try the accused
without undue delay, in a fair and expeditious manner.  During the
trial, the Prosecutor and defense present their cases to a panel of
three judges; there is no jury.  After the presentation of evidence
and cross-examination, the trial chamber announces its decisions. 
Either the Prosecutor or defense can appeal the decision within 15
days.  If the five-member Appeals Chamber upholds a conviction, the
guilty party is transported from The Hague to serve his sentence in a
country designated by the President of the Tribunal.  Italy, Finland,
and Norway have signed formal agreements with the Tribunal to allow
persons convicted by the Tribunal to serve sentences in their
national prisons. 

The Tribunal's statute and rules of evidence and procedure spell out
a series of procedural requirements and standards that the Tribunal
must comply with as it carries out each step of this process.  For
example, only the Prosecutor can determine who will be investigated. 
Indictments must have sufficient evidence to provide reasonable
grounds for believing a suspect has committed a crime--but the
Prosecutor must eventually collect enough information to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Indictees are presumed innocent until
proven guilty and have a number of rights, including the right to
counsel and the ability to avoid self-incrimination, to be tried
without undue delay, and to be informed of any information known to
the Prosecutor that may suggest their innocence or mitigate their
guilt.  The rules of procedure and evidence also require newly
arrested indictees to appear without delay before a trial chamber to
enter a plea, which may delay ongoing trials.  Ongoing trials will
not be delayed by pleas once the new courtroom room for limited trial
proceedings is completed in the spring of 1998. 


STATUS OF PUBLICLY INDICTED
INDIVIDUALS AS OF MAY 14, 1998
========================================================== Appendix IV

As of May 14, 1998, the Tribunal has made public 20 indictments
against
79 individuals.  With the Tribunal's May 8, 1998, announcement that
it was withdrawing indictments for 14 individuals,\1 there are
currently 32 known indicted persons still at large,\2 26 are in
custody, 3 were released after detention for lack of evidence, 3 are
dead, and 1 was granted provisional release for health reasons on the
understanding that he will return to The Hague when his trial begins. 
Of those in custody or on provisional release, 18 are waiting for
their trials to start, 7 are currently on trial, 1 pled guilty and
has been sentenced, and another has been convicted and is waiting for
a decision on his appeal.  The pace of surrenders and arrests has
dramatically increased in recent months.  Twenty-two
indictees--including three later released for lack of evidence--were
arrested or surrendered to the Tribunal in the past 12 months,
including eight since the beginning of 1998.  Because of the
reluctance of some states to hand over indicted persons to the
Tribunal, the Prosecutor has also obtained approval from confirming
judges to seal an unknown number of indictments and issue sealed
arrest warrants to other states or international military forces
willing or able to carry them out.  The total number of persons
listed in these sealed indictments is unknown. 

This appendix provides information on the 20 indictments made public
by the Tribunal (see table IV.1) and the status of the 79 persons
named in those indictments (see table IV.2) as of May 14, 1998.  Some
indictments are named for the location of where the alleged
atrocities took place and others for the person named in the
indictment. 



                               Table IV.1
                
                 Tribunal Indictments Made Public as of
                              May 14, 1998

Indictment          Charges
------------------  --------------------------------------------------
Bosanski Samac      Slobodan Miljkovic and five others planned and
                    carried out deportations, killings, beatings,
                    sexual assaults, and torture against the non-Serb
                    population of Bosanski Samac in northeastern
                    Bosnia.

Brcko               Goran Jelisic and one other systematically killed,
                    tortured, sexually assaulted, and beat Bosniak\a
                    and Bosnian Croat detainees in Brcko and the
                    nearby Luka Camp in northeastern Bosnia.

Celebici            Zejnil Delalic and three others murdered,
                    tortured, raped, and beat Bosnian Serb prisoners
                    at the Celebici Camp in central Bosnia from late
                    spring to fall of 1992.

Drljaca and         Simo Drljaca and Milan Kovacevic committed
Kovacevic           genocide in the Prijedor municipality of
                    northwestern Bosnia between April 1992 and January
                    1993 by planning, organizing, and implementing the
                    establishment of detention camps for the Bosniak
                    and Bosnian Croat population.

Erdemovic           Drazen Erdemovic participated in the summary
                    execution of hundreds of Bosniaks following the
                    Bosnian Serb takeover of Srebrenica in July 1995.

Foca                Dragan Gagovic and seven others subjected Bosniak
                    women, some as young as 12 years of age, to gang
                    rape, systematic rape, sexual assaults, torture,
                    and enslavement.

Furundzija          Anto Furundzija did nothing to stop the torture
                    and rape of prisoners near Vitez in May 1993.

Karadzic and        Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic are responsible
Mladic              for genocide in the unlawful confinement, murder,
                    rape, torture, beating, robbery, and inhumane
                    treatment of the non-Serb civilian population of
                    Bosnia. Karadzic and Mladic are also responsible
                    for the sniping campaign against civilians in
                    Sarajevo and for taking U.N. peacekeepers hostage
                    and using them as human shields.

Keraterm Camp       Dusko Sikirica and 12 others killed, sexually
                    assaulted, tortured, and beat Bosniak and Bosnian
                    Croat detainees at the Keraterm Camp near Prijedor
                    in northwestern Bosnia.

Kordic and others   Dario Kordic and five others carried out the
                    "ethnic cleansing" of the Lasva Valley in central
                    Bosnia including the murder, wounding, detention,
                    and use of the Bosniak civilian population as
                    hostages, forced labor, and/or human shields.

Kupreskic and       Zoran Kupreskic and seven others carried out
others              systematic attacks in April 1993 against the town
                    of Vitez, the village of Ahmici, and eight other
                    Bosniak villages in the Lasva Valley of central
                    Bosnia, leading to the murder or illegal detention
                    of many of their civilian inhabitants.

Marinic             Zoran Marinic murdered four of his Bosniak
                    neighbors and wounded a fifth in the Bosnian
                    Croat-controlled village of Busovaca in central
                    Bosnia in April 1993.

Omarska Camp        Zeljko Meakic and 18 others killed, sexually
                    assaulted, tortured, and beat Bosniak and Bosnian
                    Croat detainees at the Omarska camp near Prijedor
                    in northwestern Bosnia.

Sarajevo            Djordje Djukic planned, prepared, or otherwise
                    aided in the shelling of civilian targets in
                    Sarajevo, Bosnia, from May 1992 to December 1995.

Srebrenica          Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic planned,
                    instigated, ordered, or otherwise aided in the
                    mass killing of thousands of Bosniaks following
                    the takeover of Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia in
                    July 1995.

Stupni Do           Ivica Rajic commanded the unlawful attack by the
                    Bosnian Croat military against the Bosniak village
                    of Stupni Do in October 1993, killing at least 16
                    civilians and almost totally destroying the
                    village.

Susica Camp         Dragan Nikolic killed, tortured, and treated
                    detainees inhumanely at the Susica camp in eastern
                    Bosnia in the summer of 1992.

Tadic and other     Dusko Tadic and Goran Borovnica persecuted the
                    Bosniak and Bosnian Croat population of the
                    Prijedor area; deported civilians to prison camps;
                    and killed, beat, and raped civilians within and
                    outside the Omarska Camp in northwestern Bosnia.

Vukovar Hospital    Mile Mrksic and three others were responsible for
                    the killing of about 260 non-Serb men after their
                    forcible removal from the hospital in Vukovar,
                    Croatia, in November 1991.

Zagreb              Milan Martic ordered the firing of cluster bombs
                    into the central part of Zagreb, Croatia, in May
                    1995.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a This report defines "Bosniak" as "Bosnian Muslims," the definition
used in State Department human rights reports. 

Source:  Tribunal publicly released indictments. 




                                    Table IV.2
                     
                     Status of Persons Whose Indictments Were
                          Made Public as of May 14, 1998

                                                            Status as of May 14,
Name                Ethnicity           Indictment(s)       1998
------------------  ------------------  ------------------  --------------------
Zlatko Aleksovski   Bosnian Croat       Kordic and others   Arrested by Croatian
                                                            authorities on June
                                                            8, 1996, and
                                                            delivered to the
                                                            Tribunal on
                                                            April 28, 1997.
                                                            Currently in custody
                                                            and on trial at the
                                                            Tribunal.

Stipo Alilovic      Bosnian Croat       Kupreskic and       Tribunal confirmed
                                        others              dead on December 18,
                                                            1997.

Mirko Babic         Bosnian Serb        Omarska             The Tribunal dropped
                                                            the charges against
                                                            him in May 1998,
                                                            although it reserved
                                                            the right to
                                                            reinstate charges at
                                                            a later date.

Nenad Banovic       Bosnian Serb        Keraterm            At large

Predrag Banovic     Bosnian Serb        Keraterm            At large

Tihomir Blaskic     Bosnian Croat       Kordic and others   Surrendered to the
                                                            Tribunal in April
                                                            1996. Currently in
                                                            custody and on trial
                                                            at the Tribunal.

Goran Borovnica     Bosnian Serb        Tadic and other     At large

Mario Cerkez        Bosnian Croat       Kordic and others   Surrendered to the
                                                            Tribunal on October
                                                            6, 1997. Currently
                                                            in custody at the
                                                            Tribunal, awaiting
                                                            the start of his
                                                            trial.

Ranko Cesic         Bosnian Serb        Brcko               At large

Zejnil Delalic      Bosniak             Celebici            Arrested by German
                                                            authorities on
                                                            March 18, 1996, and
                                                            delivered to the
                                                            Tribunal on May 8,
                                                            1996. Currently in
                                                            custody and on trial
                                                            at the Tribunal.

Hazim Delic         Bosniak             Celebici            Arrested by Bosnian
                                                            authorities on May
                                                            2, 1996, and
                                                            delivered to the
                                                            Tribunal on
                                                            June 13, 1996.
                                                            Currently in custody
                                                            and on trial at the
                                                            Tribunal.

Djordje Djukic      Bosnian Serb        Sarajevo            Arrested by Bosnian
                                                            authorities on
                                                            January 30, 1996,
                                                            and delivered to the
                                                            Tribunal. Released
                                                            from Tribunal for
                                                            health reasons in
                                                            April 1996 and died
                                                            of cancer on May 18,
                                                            1996.

Slavko Dokmanovic   Croatian Serb       Vukovar             Arrested by UNTAES
                                                            forces and Tribunal
                                                            authorities in
                                                            Croatia on June 27,
                                                            1997, at which time
                                                            his sealed
                                                            indictment was made
                                                            public. Currently in
                                                            custody and on trial
                                                            at the Tribunal.

Damir Dosen         Bosnian Serb        Keraterm            At large

Simo Drljaca        Bosnian Serb        Drljaca and         Killed by SFOR
                                        Kovacevic           forces on July 10,
                                                            1997, while
                                                            resisting
                                                            detainment, at which
                                                            time his sealed
                                                            indictment was made
                                                            public.

Drazen Erdemovic    Bosnian Croat       Erdemovic           Arrested by Serbian
                                                            authorities on March
                                                            2, 1996; sent to the
                                                            Tribunal on March
                                                            30, 1996, as a
                                                            witness; and
                                                            indicted on May 29,
                                                            1996. Pled guilty on
                                                            May 31, 1996, and
                                                            sentenced to 10
                                                            years on November
                                                            29, 1996. Sentence
                                                            reduced to 5 years
                                                            on March 5, 1998,
                                                            after successful
                                                            appeal. Currently in
                                                            custody at the
                                                            Tribunal, awaiting a
                                                            decision on where he
                                                            will serve his
                                                            sentence.

Anto Furundzija     Bosnian Croat       Furundzija          Detained by SFOR
                                                            forces on December
                                                            18, 1997, at which
                                                            time his sealed
                                                            indictment was made
                                                            public. Currently in
                                                            custody at the
                                                            Tribunal, awaiting
                                                            the start of his
                                                            trial.

Dragan Fustar       Bosnian Serb        Keraterm            At large

Dragan Gagovic      Bosnian Serb        Foca                At large

Zdravko Govedarica  Bosnian Serb        Omarska             The Tribunal dropped
                                                            the charges against
                                                            him in May 1998,
                                                            although it reserved
                                                            the right to
                                                            reinstate charges at
                                                            a later date.

Goran Gruban        Bosnian Serb        Omarska             The Tribunal dropped
                                                            the charges against
                                                            him in May 1998,
                                                            although it reserved
                                                            the right to
                                                            reinstate charges at
                                                            a later date.

Momcilo Gruban      Bosnian Serb        Omarska             At large

Janko Janjic        Bosnian Serb        Foca                At large

Nikica Janjic       Bosnian Serb        Omarska, Keraterm   The Tribunal dropped
                                                            the charges against
                                                            him in May 1998,
                                                            although it reserved
                                                            the right to
                                                            reinstate charges at
                                                            a later date.

Gojko Jankovic      Bosnian Serb        Foca                At large

Goran Jelisic       Bosnian Serb        Brcko               Detained by SFOR
                                                            forces on January
                                                            22, 1998. Currently
                                                            in custody at the
                                                            Tribunal, awaiting
                                                            the start of his
                                                            trial.

Drago Josipovic     Bosnian Croat       Kupreskic and       Surrendered to the
                                        others              Tribunal on October
                                                            6, 1997. Currently
                                                            in custody at the
                                                            Tribunal, awaiting
                                                            the start of his
                                                            trial.

Radovan Karadzic    Bosnian Serb        Karadzic and        At large
                                        Mladic, Srebrenica

Marinko Katava      Bosnian Croat       Kupreskic and       Surrendered to the
                                        others              Tribunal on October
                                                            6, 1997, and
                                                            released in December
                                                            1997 for lack of
                                                            evidence.

Dusan Knezevic      Bosnian Serb        Omarska, Keraterm   At large

Dragan Kondic       Bosnian Serb        Keraterm            The Tribunal dropped
                                                            the charges against
                                                            him in May 1998,
                                                            although it reserved
                                                            the right to
                                                            reinstate charges at
                                                            a later date.

Dario Kordic        Bosnian Croat       Kordic and others   Surrendered to the
                                                            Tribunal on October
                                                            6, 1997. Currently
                                                            in custody at the
                                                            Tribunal, awaiting
                                                            the start of his
                                                            trial.

Milojica Kos        Bosnian Serb        Omarska             At large

Predrag Kostic      Bosnian Serb        Omarska             The Tribunal dropped
                                                            the charges against
                                                            him in May 1998,
                                                            although it reserved
                                                            the right to
                                                            reinstate charges at
                                                            a later date.

Radomir Kovac       Bosnian Serb        Foca                At large

Milan Kovacevic     Bosnian Serb        Drljaca and         Detained by SFOR
                                        Kovacevic           forces on July 10,
                                                            1997, at which time
                                                            his sealed
                                                            indictment was made
                                                            public. Currently in
                                                            custody at the
                                                            Tribunal, awaiting
                                                            the start of his
                                                            trial.

Dragan Kulundzija   Bosnian Serb        Keraterm            At large

Dragoljub Kunarac   Bosnian Serb        Foca                Surrendered to the
                                                            Tribunal on March 4,
                                                            1998. Currently in
                                                            custody at the
                                                            Tribunal, awaiting
                                                            start of his trial.

Mirjan Kupreskic    Bosnian Croat       Kupreskic and       Surrendered to the
                                        others              Tribunal on October
                                                            6, 1997. Currently
                                                            in custody at the
                                                            Tribunal, awaiting
                                                            the start of his
                                                            trial.

Vlatko Kupreskic    Bosnian Croat       Kupreskic and       Shot and wounded by
                                        others              SFOR forces while
                                                            resisting detention
                                                            on December 18,
                                                            1997. Currently in
                                                            custody at the
                                                            Tribunal, awaiting
                                                            the start of his
                                                            trial.

Zoran Kupreskic     Bosnian Croat       Kupreskic and       Surrendered to the
                                        others              Tribunal on October
                                                            6, 1997. Currently
                                                            in custody at the
                                                            Tribunal, awaiting
                                                            the start of his
                                                            trial.

Miroslav Kvocka     Bosnian Serb        Omarska             Detained by SFOR
                                                            forces on April 8,
                                                            1998. Currently in
                                                            custody at the
                                                            Tribunal, awaiting
                                                            the start of his
                                                            trial.

Goran Lajic         Bosnian Serb        Keraterm            The Tribunal dropped
                                                            the charges against
                                                            him in May 1998,
                                                            although it reserved
                                                            the right to
                                                            reinstate charges at
                                                            a later date.

Esad Landzo         Bosniak             Celebici            Arrested by Bosnian
                                                            authorities on May
                                                            2, 1996, and
                                                            delivered to the
                                                            Tribunal on
                                                            June 13, 1996.
                                                            Currently in custody
                                                            and on trial at the
                                                            Tribunal.

Zoran Marinic       Bosnian Croat       Marinic             At large

Milan Martic        Bosnian Serb        Zagreb              At large

Zeljko Meakic       Bosnian Serb        Omarska             At large

Slobodan            Bosnian Serb        Bosanski Samac      At large
Milijkovic

Ratko Mladic        Bosnian Serb        Karadzic and        At large
                                        Mladic, Srebrenica

Mile Mrksic         Serb                Vukovar             At large

Zdravko Mucic       Bosnian Croat       Celebici            Arrested by Austrian
                                                            authorities on
                                                            March 18, 1996, and
                                                            delivered to the
                                                            Tribunal on April 9,
                                                            1996. Currently in
                                                            custody and on trial
                                                            at the Tribunal.

Dragan Nikolic      Bosnian Serb        Susica              At large

Dragan Papic        Bosnian Croat       Kupreskic and       Surrendered to the
                                        others              Tribunal on October
                                                            6, 1997. Currently
                                                            in custody at the
                                                            Tribunal, awaiting
                                                            the start of his
                                                            trial.

Nedjeljko Paspalj   Bosnian Serb        Omarska             The Tribunal dropped
                                                            the charges against
                                                            him in May 1998,
                                                            although it reserved
                                                            the right to
                                                            reinstate charges at
                                                            a later date.

Milan Pavlic        Bosnian Serb        Omarska             The Tribunal dropped
                                                            the charges against
                                                            him in May 1998,
                                                            although it reserved
                                                            the right to
                                                            reinstate charges at
                                                            a later date.

Milutin Popovic     Bosnian Serb        Omarska             The Tribunal dropped
                                                            the charges against
                                                            him in May 1998,
                                                            although it reserved
                                                            the right to
                                                            reinstate charges at
                                                            a later date.

Dragoljub Prcac     Bosnian Serb        Omarska             At large

Drazenko            Bosnian Serb        Omarska             The Tribunal dropped
Predojevic                                                  the charges against
                                                            him in May 1998,
                                                            although it reserved
                                                            the right to
                                                            reinstate charges at
                                                            a later date.

Miroslav Radic      Serb                Vukovar             At large

Mladen Radic        Bosnian Serb        Omarska             Detained by SFOR
                                                            forces on April 8,
                                                            1998. Currently in
                                                            custody at the
                                                            Tribunal, awaiting
                                                            the start of his
                                                            trial.

Ivica Rajic         Bosnian Croat       Stupni Do           At large

Ivan Santic         Bosnian Croat       Kordic and others   Surrendered to the
                                                            Tribunal on October
                                                            6, 1997, and
                                                            released in December
                                                            1997 for lack of
                                                            evidence.

Vladimir Santic     Bosnian Croat       Kupreskic and       Surrendered to the
                                        others              Tribunal on October
                                                            6, 1997. Currently
                                                            in custody at the
                                                            Tribunal, awaiting
                                                            the start of his
                                                            trial.

Dragomir Saponja    Bosnian Serb        Omarska, Keraterm   The Tribunal dropped
                                                            the charges against
                                                            him in May 1998,
                                                            although it reserved
                                                            the right to
                                                            reinstate charges at
                                                            a later date.

Zeljko Savic        Bosnian Serb        Omarska             The Tribunal dropped
                                                            the charges against
                                                            him in May 1998,
                                                            although it reserved
                                                            the right to
                                                            reinstate charges at
                                                            a later date.

Dusko Sikirica      Bosnian Serb        Keraterm            At large

Blagoje Simic       Bosnian Serb        Bosanski Samac      At large

Milan Simic         Bosnian Serb        Bosanski Samac      Surrendered to the
                                                            Tribunal on February
                                                            14, 1998. Granted
                                                            provisional release
                                                            from the Tribunal
                                                            custody for health
                                                            reasons on March 26,
                                                            1998. Currently in
                                                            Bosanski Samac, but
                                                            will return to the
                                                            Tribunal when his
                                                            trial begins.

Pero Skopljak       Bosnian Croat       Kordic and others   Surrendered to the
                                                            Tribunal on October
                                                            6, 1997, and
                                                            released in December
                                                            1997 for lack of
                                                            evidence.

Veselin             Serb                Vukovar             At large
Sljivancanin

Radovan Stankovic   Bosnian Serb        Foca                At large

Dusko Tadic         Bosnian Serb        Tadic and other     Arrested by German
                                                            authorities in
                                                            February 1994 and
                                                            turned over to the
                                                            Tribunal in April
                                                            1995. Convicted by
                                                            the Tribunal of
                                                            crimes against
                                                            humanity and
                                                            violations of the
                                                            laws or customs of
                                                            war in May 1997 and
                                                            sentenced to 20
                                                            years. Tadic remains
                                                            in custody at the
                                                            Tribunal, awaiting
                                                            the outcome of
                                                            pending prosecution
                                                            and defense appeals
                                                            of his sentence.

Miroslav Tadic      Bosnian Serb        Bosanski Samac      Surrendered to the
                                                            Tribunal on February
                                                            14, 1998. Currently
                                                            in custody at the
                                                            Tribunal, awaiting
                                                            the start of his
                                                            trial.

Nedjeljko Timarac   Bosnian Serb        Keraterm            The Tribunal dropped
                                                            the charges against
                                                            him in May 1998,
                                                            although it reserved
                                                            the right to
                                                            reinstate charges at
                                                            a later date.

Stevan Todorovic    Bosnian Serb        Bosanski Samac      At large

Zoran Vukovic       Bosnian Serb        Foca                At large

Simo Zaric          Bosnian Serb        Bosanski Samac      Surrendered to the
                                                            Tribunal on February
                                                            24, 1998. Currently
                                                            in custody at the
                                                            Tribunal, awaiting
                                                            the start of his
                                                            trial.

Dragan Zelenovic    Bosnian Serb        Foca                At large

Zoran Zigic         Bosnian Serb        Omarska, Keraterm   Surrendered to the
                                                            Tribunal on April
                                                            16, 1998. Currently
                                                            in custody at the
                                                            Tribunal, awaiting
                                                            the start of his
                                                            trial.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legend
SFOR = Stabilization Force
UNTAES = U.N.  Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia,
Baranja, and Western Sirmium

Sources:  Compiled by GAO from Tribunal annual reports, press
releases, and a report by the Commission on Security and Cooperation
in Europe. 



(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix V

--------------------
\1 The Tribunal dropped the charges due to a larger than anticipated
number of trials and a prosecutorial strategy of focusing on persons
holding higher levels of responsibility.  The Prosecutor stated that
she reserves the right to pursue charges against the 14 accused at a
later date if the circumstances change. 

\2 Thirty of those still at large are Serbs. 


COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
========================================================== Appendix IV



(See figure in printed edition.)




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix VI
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
========================================================== Appendix IV




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix VII
COMMENTS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA
========================================================== Appendix IV



(See figure in printed edition.)

Now on p.  5.
See comment 1. 

Now on p.  5.
See comment 1. 

Now on p.  6.
See comment 1. 

Now on p.  7.
See comment 1. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

Now on p.  9.
See comment 1. 

Now on p.  10.
See comment 1. 

Now on p.  11.
See comment 2. 

Now on p.  12.
See comment 1. 

Now on p.  13.
See comment 1. 

Now on p.  15.
See comment 1. 

Now on p.  15.
See comment 1. 

Now on p.  15.
See comment 3. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

Now on p.  16.
See comment 1. 

Now on p.  17.
See comment 4. 

Now on p.  17.
See comment 1. 

Now on p.  20.

See comment 1.

See comment 1. 

Now on p.  20.
See comment 1. 

Now on p.  21.
See comment 1. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

Now on p.  21.
See comment 1. 

Now on p.  22.
See comment 5. 

Now on p.  22.
See comment 1. 

Now on p.  23.

See comment 1. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

Now on p.  24.
See comment 6. 

Now on p.  31.
See comment 7. 

Now on p.  40.
See comment 1. 

Now on p.  42.
See comment 1. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

See comment 8. 

See comment 9. 

Now on p.  17. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

See comment 1. 

See comment 1. 



(See figure in printed edition.)


The following are GAO's comments on the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia's letter dated May 5, 1998. 

GAO COMMENTS

1.  We modified the text to incorporate these comments. 

2.  We specifically explain the limitations on the use of loaned
personnel. 

3.  It is possible for the Tribunal to hold three trials at the same
time, although this would mean the appeals chamber could not be
simultaneously constituted.  We modified the text to clarify this
point.  As such, our analysis used the best-case scenario of holding
three trials at a time; an approach we believe to be conservative. 

4.  We calculated the figure of 800,000 pages in the document backlog
from information obtained from the Office of the Prosecutor. 

5.  We acknowledge the Tribunal's comment, however, our report does
not express an opinion on the United States' position regarding the
surcharge. 

6.  As explained in our Objectives, Scope, and Methodology (app.  I),
we did not assess the Tribunal's administrative functions, or the
efficiency and effectiveness with which it used its resources because
to have done so would have required complete access to U.N.  internal
documents on these matters.  The United Nations does not make such
documents available to us. 

7.  We reviewed past performance reports for the Tribunal and found
that they did not provide the level of detail necessary to perform a
review of the Tribunal's capacity. 

8.  As we noted in our Objectives, Scope, and Methodology, there are
uncertainties in attempting to estimate the potential future trial
workload for the Tribunal.  The number of future trials is a function
of when accused are arrested or surrender, the extent to which they
are tried in groups, and the uncertainties involved in estimating how
long pretrial motions, trials, and appeals will take.  To estimate
workload, our analysis used the Tribunal's historic trends and track
record on these factors. 

9.  We agree that in this instance the accused would not face any
additional delay.  Although our analysis indicates that the Tribunal
may be unable to begin trials without undue delay, this does not mean
that accused war criminals should avoid surrendering. 




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix VIII
COMMENTS FROM THE U.N. 
UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR
MANAGEMENT
========================================================== Appendix IV

Now on p.  1.

See comment 1. 

Now on pp.  21-23.

See comment 2. 

See comment 3. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

See comment 4. 

See comment 5. 

See comment 6. 

See comment 7. 

See comment 6. 

See comment 8. 


The following are GAO's comments on the U.N.  Under-Secretary-General
for Management's letter dated May 7, 1998. 

GAO COMMENTS

1.  The United Nations and the Tribunal did not provide us access to
budget requests and justifications from component units of the
Tribunal that were used to support the budget request; Tribunal
budget requests as submitted to U.N.  headquarters; and memorandums
detailing operational implications of resource shortfalls, how
assumptions behind budget requests were developed, and rationales for
estimates of future workload. 

2.  The issues of loaned personnel and the 13-percent surcharge are
matters of disagreement between the United States and the United
Nations.  We have presented the factual basis for our comments as
contained in the available documentary evidence, including cables and
memos from the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice; General
Assembly resolutions; and reports from the Secretary General.  We
modified our report to better reflect the information contained in
these documents, specifically that the mandate from the United
Nations to discontinue the use of loaned staff came from a General
Assembly resolution. 

3.  We did not reprint this attachment to the Under-Secretary's
comments.  The attachment is available as U.N.  document A/51/688. 

4.  The issue of what was discussed and agreed to at the meeting
between the Secretary of State and the Secretary General is a matter
for the State Department and the United Nations to resolve.  Since we
did not attend the meeting, and written documentation of the meeting
was not available, information in our report is based on the
recollection of State Department officials who attended the meeting. 
We also discussed this matter with a U.N.  official who attended the
meeting and attempted to clarify the report to reflect the United
Nations' view. 

5.  Evidence we obtained, as discussed in the report, shows that
potential donors have been deterred from loaning personnel to the
Tribunal because of the surcharge.  For example, officials from the
Departments of Defense and Justice specifically told us that they
would only loan personnel if the surcharge is not applied. 

6.  We have modified the text to incorporate this comment. 

7.  This indicator appears in paragraph 25 of the Tribunal's budget
request. 

8.  Our analysis assumed that all 11 judges would remain in The
Hague.  Having to relocate five judges to Rwanda to hear appeals will
decrease the number of judges available to hear trials in The Hague,
and thus potentially increase the amount of time necessary to handle
the caseload.  We did not quantify this effect. 


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix IX

NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Harold J.  Johnson
Tetsuo Miyabara
David Maurer
Zina Merritt
Rona Mendelsohn

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mark Speight

DENVER FIELD OFFICE

Maria Durant

RELATED GAO PRODUCTS

Bosnia Peace Operation:  Pace of Implementing the Dayton Accords
Accelerated in Mid-1997 (GAO/NSIAD-98-138, June 2, 1998). 

Bosnia Peace Operation:  Progress Toward the Dayton Agreement's
Goals--An Update (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-216, July 17, 1997). 

Bosnia Peace Operation:  Progress Toward Achieving the Dayton
Agreement's Goals (GAO/NSIAD-97-132, May 5, 1997). 

Peace Operations:  Update on the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia
(GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR, May 8, 1995). 

Humanitarian Intervention:  Effectiveness of U.N.  Operations in
Bosnia (GAO/NSIAD-94-156BR, Apr.  13, 1994). 

*** End of document. ***