Defense Depot Maintenance: Contracting Approaches Should Address Workload
Characteristics (Letter Report, 06/15/98, GAO/NSIAD-98-130).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed how the Department of
Defense (DOD) manages contracting for depot maintenance, focusing on
the: (1) characteristics of that contracting; and (2) implications of
those characteristics for future depot maintenance contract management
processes and procedures.

GAO noted that: (1) DOD is attempting to rely more on competitive market
forces to assure quality products at fair prices; (2) consistent with
recent declines in the defense budget, resources for administering and
auditing contracts have been cut significantly, with DOD reducing its
total acquisition workforce at all levels; (3) from fiscal year (FY)
1993 to July 1997, the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and the
Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) reduced their personnel
levels by more than 18 and 24 percent, respectively, and further
reductions are planned; (4) in making these reductions, both
organizations are reengineering their processes; (5) they are attempting
to rely more on competitive market forces and contractor internal
processes and controls to assure quality products at fair prices, but it
is uncertain whether these processes and conditions will function as
expected; (6) at present, depot maintenance contracting represents a
challenge to relying on commercial market forces; (7) about 91 percent
of the depot maintenance contracts GAO reviewed were awarded
noncompetitively, mostly to original equipment manufacturers that own
the data rights; (8) other factors, including difficulties in precisely
defining requirements, also impact efforts to rely on competitive market
forces; (9) as DOD continues transitioning from its traditional contract
management and oversight structure, it will need to increase the use of
competitively awarded depot maintenance contracts; (10) to the extent
that competition for some maintenance workloads is not possible or
practicable, DOD will need to address how best to assure product quality
and reasonable prices when competitive market forces are not present;
(11) DOD has developed a logistics strategic plan that lays out specific
objectives and strategies for improving DOD's logistics activities; (12)
however, the plan does not address the depot maintenance issues raised
in this report; (13) GAO has previously recommended that the Secretary
of Defense require the development of a detailed implementation plan for
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of DOD's logistics activities
to include depot maintenance; and (14) the challenges that DOD faces in
successfully relying on competitive market forces for depot maintenance
require management attention and actions to address the unique
characteristics of DOD's depot maintenance activities and assure that
expected savings can be achieved.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-98-130
     TITLE:  Defense Depot Maintenance: Contracting Approaches Should 
             Address Workload Characteristics
      DATE:  06/15/98
   SUBJECT:  Defense cost control
             Defense procurement
             Department of Defense contractors
             Maintenance services contracts
             Privatization
             Reengineering (management)
             Strategic planning
             Equipment maintenance
             Military downsizing
             Competitive procurement

             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Requesters

June 1998

DEFENSE DEPOT MAINTENANCE -
CONTRACTING APPROACHES SHOULD
ADDRESS WORKLOAD CHARACTERISTICS

GAO/NSIAD-98-130

Defense Depot Maintenance

(709251)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DCAA - Defense Contract Audit Agency
  DCMC - Defense Contract Management Command
  DOD - Department of Defense
  DRI - Defense Reform Initiative
  FAR - Federal Acquisition Regulation
  FASA - Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act
  OEM - original equipment manufactures
  QDR - Quadrennial Defense Review

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-279569

June 15, 1998

The Honorable James M.  Inhofe
Chairman
The Honorable Charles S.  Robb
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Readiness
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Department of Defense (DOD) expects to achieve large savings by
contracting out many of its support functions and activities to the
private sector.  As part of this effort, DOD plans to contract out
more of its $13 billion annual requirement for depot-level repair and
maintenance of weapon systems and equipment.  In addition, DOD plans
to streamline its contract management and oversight activities and
rely more on competitive market forces to assure product quality and
reasonable prices.  As you requested, we reviewed how DOD manages
contracting for depot maintenance to determine the characteristics of
that contracting and the implications of those characteristics for
future depot maintenance contract management processes and
procedures. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

Depot maintenance involves the repair, overhaul, modification, and
upgrade of weapon systems, vehicles, and other DOD items at DOD-owned
facilities and private-sector contractor activities.  The workload
mix between the public and private sector has remained relatively
constant for many years.\1 DOD is seeking to contract out more of its
depot maintenance requirements.  The expectation is that increased
competition for DOD's depot maintenance work will produce substantial
savings.  In March 1996, DOD issued regulations directing that new
systems and major upgrade programs "shall maximize the use of
contractor provided, long-term, total life-cycle logistics support
that combines depot-level maintenance along with wholesale and
selected retail materiel management functions."

DOD's approach to assuring product quality and fair prices for depot
maintenance work that is contracted out to the private sector where
competition is limited is through contract management and oversight
requirements.  This includes on-site inspections and record keeping
and reporting requirements.  The military services manage and oversee
depot maintenance contracts with assistance from the Defense Contract
Audit Agency (DCAA) and the Defense Contract Management Command
(DCMC).  DCAA provides accounting and financial advisory services in
connection with negotiating, administering, and closing out
contracts.  DCMC is DOD's principal contract oversight agency, which
provides assistance ranging from evaluation of contractors' proposals
to on-site monitoring of contractors' day-to-day operations. 

DOD is implementing the preference for the acquisition of commercial
items established in the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994
(FASA).  DOD expects that commercial products and services, which are
subject to competitive market forces, will result in high-quality
products and services at a lower cost.  Greater reliance on
commercial products and services, if done in a competitive
environment, should shift much of the quality assurance and cost
control responsibility to the contractors and, thereby, reduce
management and oversight required by DOD contract administration
personnel.  This approach is intended to provide needed product
quality and price control at less cost to the government.  DOD states
that it expects the inclusion of more commercial products and
components in weapon systems to result in a competitive commercial
market for depot-level maintenance and repair of these systems. 


--------------------
\1 This mix was influenced by 10 U.S.C.  2466, which limited depot
maintenance work that could be contracted out to the private sector
to not more than 40 percent of depot-level maintenance funds for any
fiscal year.  The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1998 amended 10 U.S.C.  2466 to provide for a 50/50 mix.  The act
also included a new provision, 10 U.S.C.  2460, which establishes a
statutory definition of depot-level maintenance and repair work that
includes interim contractor support and contractor logistics support
work. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

DOD is attempting to rely more on competitive market forces to assure
quality products at fair prices.  Consistent with recent declines in
the defense budget, resources for administering and auditing
contracts have been cut significantly, with DOD reducing its total
acquisition workforce at all levels.  From fiscal year 1993 to July
1997, DCAA and DCMC reduced their personnel levels by more than 18
and 24 percent, respectively, and further reductions are planned.  In
making these reductions, both organizations are reengineering their
processes.  They are attempting to rely more on competitive market
forces and contractor internal processes and controls to assure
quality products at fair prices, but it is uncertain whether these
processes and conditions will function as expected. 

At present, depot maintenance contracting represents a challenge to
relying on commercial market forces.  This is because most depot
maintenance is currently performed on noncommercial, DOD unique
items.  About 91 percent of the depot maintenance contracts we
reviewed were awarded noncompetitively, mostly to original equipment
manufacturers that own the data rights.  Other factors, including
difficulties in precisely defining requirements, also impact efforts
to rely on competitive market forces.  As DOD continues transitioning
from its traditional contract management and oversight structure, it
will need to increase the use of competitively awarded depot
maintenance contracts.  To the extent that competition for some
maintenance workloads is not possible or practicable, DOD will need
to address how best to assure product quality and reasonable prices
when competitive market forces are not present.  DOD has developed a
logistics strategic plan that lays out specific objectives and
strategies for improving DOD's logistics activities.  However, the
plan does not address the depot maintenance issues raised in this
report.  We have previously recommended that the Secretary of Defense
require the development of a detailed implementation plan for
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of DOD's logistics
activities to include depot maintenance.\2 The challenges that DOD
faces in successfully relying on competitive market forces for depot
maintenance require management attention and actions to address the
unique characteristics of DOD's depot maintenance activities and
assure that expected savings can be achieved. 


--------------------
\2 Outsourcing DOD Logistics:  Savings Achievable but Defense Science
Board's Projections Are Overstated (GAO/NSIAD-98-48, Dec.  8, 1997). 


   STREAMLINING CONTRACT
   MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT
   ACTIVITIES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

As a result of budget declines and DOD's efforts to increase reliance
on competitive market forces for cost control and quality assurance,
DCAA and DCMC have substantially downsized and streamlined their
operations.  DCAA's staffing has decreased by 1,046 personnel--over
18 percent--from fiscal year 1993 to July 1997.  During the same time
period, DCMC's staffing has decreased by 4,579 personnel--a
24-percent reduction.  In addition, since 1993, DCMC has reduced its
field offices from 140 to 79.  This has required prioritizing work to
focus on areas of higher risks and relying more on contractor
self-oversight where risks are low. 

DCAA is focusing its efforts on implementing risk assessment
procedures and process reengineering.  For example, as part of DOD's
plan to rely more on contractor self-oversight, DCAA can reduce its
oversight after determining that strengthened contractor internal
controls can be relied upon.  DCMC officials are focusing resources
on contract areas that have the highest risk for cost growth,
schedule slippage, or significant technical problems and are allowing
contractors to perform self-oversight in the more routine, low-risk
contracting areas.  They are also relying more on sampling methods to
assure quality and contract compliance rather than having inspectors
doing 100-percent inspections.  Sample sizes are based on assessments
of the risks inherent in the contractors' processes.  DCMC officials
stated that they will use a contractor performance-based assessment
model to determine risk and the level and frequency of review based
on an assessment of past performance. 

In our high-risk series report on defense contract management, we
discussed some of the issues related to DOD's management of future
contract risk.\3 We stated that the risk increases substantially when
the activity is coupled with (1) continuing fundamental changes in
the acquisition and contracting processes that have yet to be fully
implemented or evaluated and (2) a contract administration and
auditing resource base that already has been substantially reduced. 


--------------------
\3 High-Risk Series:  Defense Contract Management (GAO/HR-97-4, Feb. 
1997). 


   CHARACTERISTICS OF DEPOT
   MAINTENANCE WORK CREATE
   CHALLENGES FOR IMPLEMENTING
   REFORMS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

Defense depot maintenance contracting has a number of characteristics
that must be considered as DOD moves toward contracting out more of
its depot maintenance.  Primary among these is that most depot-level
maintenance is on noncommercial, DOD unique, weapon systems parts and
components for which there is often no competition or a limited
competitive market.  Other characteristics include (1) reliance on
cost reimbursable type contracts because requirements are often
undefined, (2) use of government provided parts and materials, and
(3) contract provisions that allow contractors to perform work that
may be needed but is not included as a fixed-price line item in the
contract.  This work is usually ordered on the basis of fixed hourly
rates specified in the contract.  These characteristics affect
contract costs and/or performance risks and, accordingly, affect
contract management and oversight requirements. 


      COMPETITION IS LIMITED FOR
      DEPOT MAINTENANCE WORKLOADS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1

Most depot maintenance contracts are currently awarded without
competition.  This is largely because most depot maintenance
contracting is for work on noncommercial, DOD unique items.  Most of
this work is awarded on a sole-source basis to original equipment
manufacturers that own the technical data rights.\4

To assess competitive conditions, we asked 12 government contracting
organizations to classify as competitive or sole source all depot
repair and maintenance contracts awarded from the beginning of fiscal
year 1996 to March 1997.  They identified 15,346 contracts totaling
$2.2 billion.  Sole-source awards were made in 13,930 contracting
actions--about
91 percent--that were valued at about $1.5 billion, or about 69
percent of the total dollars awarded.  Table 1 shows the percent of
noncompetitive contracts by service. 



                                Table 1
                
                    Percent of Sole-Source DOD Depot
                    Maintenance Contracts by Service

                                                            Percent of
                                               Percent of        total
                                                    total       dollar
Service                                            number        value
---------------------------------------------  ----------  -----------
Army                                                   95           99
Air Force                                              50           43
Navy                                                   99           72
----------------------------------------------------------------------
In examining the rationale for sole-source awards, we found that DOD
had not acquired the technical data rights to compete the work for
many of its weapon systems and components and DOD officials believe
that, at this point, buying the data would be too costly.  Officials
at the contracting organizations told us that if technical data is
not bought as a part of the initial acquisition package, the
government has little leverage to get the data at an affordable price
later on in the system life-cycle.  Additionally, it is difficult to
make an argument for a large one-time investment for technical data
once the acquisition program is completed.  Officials also said that
even if the government owns the technical data, private contractors
may have little interest in competing for the work when it involves
(1) small volume, (2) obsolete technology, (3) irregular
requirements, and/or (4) unstable funding. 

DOD plans indicate greater reliance on noncompetitive contracts to
original equipment manufacturers (OEM) for depot maintenance support. 
Within legislative requirements, DOD policy calls for maximum use of
long-term, total life-cycle logistics support contracts for new
weapon systems.  Under such arrangements, the OEMs could become the
providers of many systems' depot maintenance support. 


--------------------
\4 Technical data are the designs, drawings, and specifications
necessary for the production and repair of items.  In most of the
contracts we reviewed, the original equipment manufacturer owns the
exclusive rights to this data. 


      UNDEFINED REQUIREMENTS ARE A
      CHARACTERISTIC OF MANY
      MAINTENANCE WORKLOADS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2

We examined 345 depot maintenance contracts awarded by 12 contracting
organizations, and found that 212, or 61 percent, were fixed-price
type contracts that had price and performance generally defined at
the time of contract award.  However, because of reasons such as
undefined work requirements, 80, or 23 percent, were
cost-reimbursable type contracts.  The remaining were a combination
of the two types of contracts.  Table 2 shows by service the contract
types used for the 345 contracts we sampled. 



                                Table 2
                
                  DOD's Use of Contract Type for Depot
                            Maintenance Work

                                                    Number of Contract
                                                          Types
                                                    ------------------
                                                             Air
Type of contract                                    Army   Force  Navy
--------------------------------------------------  ----  ------  ----
Fixed price                                           22     111    79
Cost                                                  37      38     5
Combination                                           10      18    25
======================================================================
Total                                                 69     167   109
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Officials at the contracting organizations said that as risk
increased with the degree of complexity of the work, the more likely
it was that something other than a fixed-price type contract would be
used.  They said they used fixed-price contracts when adequate repair
histories were available to establish a price range for the
maintenance work.  Officials said they used cost-reimbursement type
contracts when maintenance requirements could not be predetermined
for the contract period or when adequate repair history did not exist
on which to establish reasonable price ranges.  For example,
officials at the Army Communications-Electronics Command stated that
selection of the contract type generally was based on technical
uncertainties surrounding the maintenance work to be performed.  A
cost-reimbursement contract was used whenever the uncertainties were
of such magnitude that cost and performance could not be reasonably
estimated for a fixed-price contract. 

Under fixed-price type contracts, more risk is borne by contractors
because they incur losses when costs are greater than expected. 
Since the contractor assumes most of the risks, the government's
contract administration and oversight burden is reduced.  Conversely,
DOD is subject to greater cost risks under a cost-reimbursable
contract because contractors generally are reimbursed for all
allowable, allocable, and reasonable costs incurred.  Because the
contractor's incentive to maximize efficiency and minimize cost is
generally less, more oversight is required for cost-reimbursable
contracts.  If more commercially available weapon systems parts and
components are used in the future, this could reduce the use of
cost-reimbursable contracts, particularly if repair histories were
commercially established. 


      GOVERNMENT-FURNISHED
      MATERIAL AGREEMENTS REQUIRE
      CLOSE ATTENTION
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3

In some depot maintenance contracts, DOD agrees to provide the
contractor with repair parts and materials from its supply system. 
These practices generally require increased management attention to
assure that the parts and materials are available as required, that
material accountability is maintained, and that the contractor does
not use excessive quantities of government-furnished material.  When
materials are not provided in accordance with contract requirements,
the contractor could incur added costs, which are passed on to DOD. 
Further, if material accountability is not accurately maintained,
costs to the government can be substantially increased.  For example,
the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center had a $113.2 million cost
overrun on F-15 aircraft contract maintenance work that was directly
related to government-furnished material.  DOD and Air Force
officials believed that a cause of the cost overrun was loss of
control over government-furnished items that the contractor returned
in exchange for new ones.  In another instance, we found that the Air
Force paid $24.9 million to settle claims related in part to its
failure to provide a contractor with timely government-furnished
material.  Finally, we have identified workloads where increased
usage of government-furnished material by the contractor
significantly increased the costs to the government of contracting
out the work.  Given these and similar situations, changes in
contract management practices need to take into account the unique
aspects of government-furnished material. 


      NATURE OF REPAIR WORK AND
      ASSOCIATED CONTRACT
      PROVISIONS REQUIRE CLOSE
      ATTENTION
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.4

Depot maintenance contracts often contain provisions that allow
contractors to perform and charge the government for additional work
that could not be specifically defined at the time of contract award
but may be needed as an item is being repaired.  For instance, when
an item is disassembled and inspected during the repair process, the
contractor may discover work needed that was not spelled out by the
basic contract requirements, such as corrosion hidden inside an
aircraft wing.  DOD anticipates the potential for such additional
work and increased costs by including clauses in its maintenance
contracts referred to as "over-and-above" work.  The contract
specifies an hourly rate for such work. 

According to DOD officials, over-and-above work requires close
attention to validate the extent and cost of such work.  For example,
in fiscal year
1997, the Air Force experienced a substantial increase in the over
and above contract cost for programmed depot maintenance on the B-1B
aircraft--from $150,000 to $500,000 per aircraft.  The Air Force
examined the contractor's over-and-above requests and found that some
requests should have been accomplished by the contractor as part of
the basic programmed depot maintenance contract.  After rescinding
the administrative contracting officer's authority to approve them,
program officials are now reviewing all over-and-above requests for
the B-1B. 


      DOD PLANS FOR IMPROVING
      LOGISTICS FUNCTIONS AND
      ACTIVITIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.5

As reflected in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the Defense
Reform Initiative (DRI), DOD has begun a program to improve the
operations of its business activities.  DOD also has developed a
strategic plan for improving logistics functions and activities.  The
plan gives direction to improvements needed to reduce the cost of its
logistics systems and lays out specific objectives and strategies to
produce these improvements.  For instance, the plan provides general
guidance and implementation strategy for depot maintenance related
activities involving (1) outsourcing, privatization, and elimination
of unneeded maintenance capability; (2) reducing existing public
sector maintenance infrastructure; (3) using public-private
competition to the maximum extent allowed by statute for workloads
being performed by DOD depots; and (4) using maximum competition for
workloads previously awarded without full and open competition. 

Although the plan provides guidance and implementation strategy for
some important objectives related to depot maintenance, it does not
specifically address the contract depot maintenance issues raised in
this report.  Previously, we recommended that the Secretary of
Defense require the development of a detailed implementation plan for
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of DOD's logistics
activities, to include depot maintenance.\5 We recommended that the
plan establish time frames for identifying and evaluating the most
cost-effective solutions and identify required resources for
accomplishing cost-reduction initiatives.  In response to that
recommendation, DOD has stated that a specific plan for improving the
efficiency and reducing the cost of DOD's logistics programs,
including depot maintenance, is not needed because the QDR and DRI
provide an overall strategic plan and strategy for reducing DOD's
infrastructure.  While we agree that the QDR and the DRI provide
strategic guidance, our work illustrates the need for more
specificity in implementation plans related to individual business
activities, such as depot maintenance. 


--------------------
\5 Outsourcing DOD Logistics:  Savings Achievable but Defense Science
Board's Projections Are Overstated (GAO/NSIAD-98-48, Dec.  8, 1997). 


   CONCLUSIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

DOD is streamlining and reengineering its traditional contract
management and oversight organizations--including those in its buying
activities, DCAA, and DCMC.  These initiatives are in their early
stages of implementation as they relate to depot maintenance
contracting.  A number of factors unique to contracting for depot
maintenance repair and maintenance workloads create challenges to
DOD's efforts as it implements new contracting approaches.  Primary
among these at this time is that most depot-level maintenance is on
noncommercial, DOD unique parts and components for which there is
often little or no competition.  Other factors that need to be
addressed as implementation continues are the inherent difficulties
of defining repair requirements at the time of contract award, the
management tasks associated with providing government-furnished
material, and the management tasks associated with approving
additional work that contractors discover once the repair of an item
has begun. 

Citing the QDR and DRI, DOD has disagreed with previous
recommendations that we have made for the development of a detailed
implementation plan for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of
DOD's logistics activities, including depot maintenance. 

However, given the results of this and other recently completed work,
we believe DOD should reconsider the need for a detailed
implementation plan to guide future management improvement efforts to
increase the cost-effectiveness of DOD's depot maintenance program,
including that portion of the program that is contracted out to the
private sector. 


   RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense require the development of
a detailed implementation plan to guide future management improvement
efforts to increase the cost effectiveness of DOD's depot maintenance
program, including issues related to improving the management and
cost-effectiveness of contract depot maintenance workloads. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

DOD reviewed a draft of this report and provided official oral
comments.  DOD officials stated that they generally concurred with
the intent of our recommendation.  They also provided comments to
improve the technical accuracy of the report, which have been
incorporated as appropriate. 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

To evaluate the implications of outsourcing and other acquisition
reform initiatives on DOD's management and oversight of depot
maintenance work, we made extensive use of our prior work and the
work of others on issues related to contracting.  See a list of
related GAO products at the end of this report.  We reviewed the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), DOD supplements to the FAR, and
other pertinent regulations to identify the policies, procedures, and
processes that DOD follows in contracting for depot maintenance
support from the private sector.  We examined studies of DOD's
acquisition system that identified concerns with DOD's management and
oversight of its contracting function and proposals to improve the
system.  In addition, we analyzed data from DOD organizations to
evaluate (1) the status of initiatives to improve contract management
and oversight, (2) the impact of these initiatives on staffing and
workload, and (3) the potential impact that increased outsourcing
would have on their management and oversight of contract maintenance. 

We conducted our review in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :8.1

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense,
the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget; and interested congressional committees. 
Copies will be made available to other interested parties upon
request. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report,
please contact me on (202) 512-8412.  Major contributors to this
report are listed in appendix I. 

David R.  Warren, Director
Defense Management Issues


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
=========================================================== Appendix I

NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 

James Wiggins
Julia Denman
Glenn Knoepfle
Jackie Snead
Ed Waytel

ATLANTA FIELD OFFICE

Bobby Worrell
Terry Wyatt

DALLAS FIELD OFFICE

Penney Harwell

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL

John Brosnan

RELATED GAO PRODUCTS

Public-Private Competitions:  Review of San Antonio Air Force Depot
Solicitation (GAO/OGC-98-49, May 14, 1998). 

Defense Depot Maintenance:  Use of Public-Private Partnership
Arrangements (GAO/NSIAD-98-91, May 7, 1998). 

Public-Private Competitions:  Review of Sacramento Air Force Depot
Solicitation (GAO/OGC-98-48, May 4, 1998). 

Public-Private Competitions:  DOD's Additional Support for Combining
Depot Workloads Contains Weaknesses (GAO/NSIAD-98-143, Apr.  17,
1998). 

Defense Depot Maintenance:  DOD Shifting More Workload for New Weapon
Systems to the Private Sector (GAO/NSIAD-98-8, Mar.  31, 1998). 

Depot Maintenance:  Lessons Learned From Transferring Alameda Naval
Aviation Depot Engine Workloads (GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR, Mar.  25, 1998). 

Public-Private Competitions:  Access to Records Is Inhibiting Work on
Congressional Mandates (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-111, Mar.  4, 1998). 

Public-Private Competitions:  Access to Records Is Inhibiting Work on
Congressional Mandates (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-101, Feb.  24, 1998). 

Public-Private Competitions:  DOD's Determination to Combine Depot
Workloads Is Not Adequately Supported (GAO/NSIAD-98-76, Jan.  20,
1998). 

Public-Private Competition:  Processes Used for C-5 Aircraft Award
Appear Reasonable (GAO/NSIAD-98-72, Jan.  20, 1998). 

DOD Depot Maintenance:  Information on Public and Private Sector
Workload Allocations (GAO/NSIAD-98-41, Jan.  20, 1998). 

Air Force Privatization-in-Place:  Analysis of Aircraft and Missile
System Depot Repair Costs (GAO/NSIAD-98-35, Dec.  22, 1997). 

Outsourcing DOD Logistics:  Savings Achievable but Defense Science
Board's Projections Are Overstated (GAO/NSIAD-98-48, Dec.  8, 1997). 

Air Force Depot Maintenance:  Information on the Cost-Effectiveness
of B-1B and B-52 Support Options (GAO/NSIAD-97-210BR, Sept.  12,
1997). 

Navy Depot Maintenance:  Privatizing the Louisville Operations in
Place Is Not Cost-Effective (GAO/NSIAD-97-52, July 31, 1997). 

Defense Depot Maintenance:  Challenges Facing DOD in Managing Working
Capital Funds (GAO/T-NSIAD/AIMD-97-152, May 7, 1997). 

Depot Maintenance:  Uncertainties and Challenges DOD Faces in
Restructuring Its Depot Maintenance Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-111, Mar. 
18, 1997, and GAO/T-NSIAD-112, Apr.  10, 1997). 

Navy Ordnance:  Analysis of Business Area Price Increases and
Financial Losses (GAO/AIMD/NSIAD-97-74, Mar.  14, 1997). 

Defense Outsourcing:  Challenges Facing DOD as It Attempts to Save
Billions in Infrastructure Costs (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-110, Mar.  12,
1997). 

High-Risk Series:  Defense Infrastructure (GAO/HR-97-7, Feb.  1997). 

Air Force Depot Maintenance:  Privatization-in-Place Plans Are Costly
While Excess Capacity Exists (GAO/NSIAD-97-13, Dec.  31, 1996). 

Army Depot Maintenance:  Privatization Without Further Downsizing
Increases Costly Excess Capacity (GAO/NSIAD-96-201, Sept.  18, 1996). 

Navy Depot Maintenance:  Cost and Savings Issues Related to
Privatizing-in-Place the Louisville, Kentucky, Depot
(GAO/NSIAD-96-202,
Sept.  18, 1996). 

Defense Depot Maintenance:  Commission on Roles and Mission's
Privatization Assumptions Are Questionable (GAO/NSIAD-96-161, July
15, 1996). 

Defense Depot Maintenance:  DOD's Policy Report Leaves Future Role of
Depot System Uncertain (GAO/NSIAD-96-165, May 21, 1996). 

Defense Depot Maintenance:  More Comprehensive and Consistent
Workload Data Needed for Decisionmakers (GAO/NSIAD-96-166, May 21,
1996). 

Defense Depot Maintenance:  Privatization and the Debate Over the
Public-Private Mix (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-146, Apr.  16, 1996, and
GAO/T-NSIAD-96-148, Apr.  17, 1996). 

Military Bases:  Closure and Realignment Savings Are Significant, but
Not Easily Quantified (GAO/NSIAD-96-67, Apr.  8, 1996). 

Depot Maintenance:  Opportunities to Privatize Repair of Military
Engines (GAO/NSIAD-96-33, Mar.  5, 1996). 

Closing Maintenance Depots:  Savings, Personnel, and Workload
Redistribution Issues (GAO/NSIAD-96-29, Mar.  4, 1996). 

Navy Maintenance:  Assessment of the Public-Private Competition
Program for Aviation Maintenance (GAO/NSIAD-96-30, Jan.  22, 1996). 

Depot Maintenance:  The Navy's Decision to Stop F/A-18 Repairs at
Ogden Air Logistics Center (GAO/NSIAD-96-31, Dec.  15, 1995). 

Military Bases:  Case Studies on Selected Bases Closed in 1988 and
1991 (GAO/NSIAD-95-139, Aug.  15, 1995). 

Military Base Closure:  Analysis of DOD's Process and Recommendations
for 1995 (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-132, Apr.  17, 1995). 

Military Bases:  Analysis of DOD's 1995 Process and Recommendations
for Closure and Realignment (GAO/NSIAD-95-133, Apr.  14, 1995). 

Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center:  Cost Growth and Other
Factors Affect Closure and Privatization (GAO/NSIAD-95-60, Dec.  9,
1994). 

Navy Maintenance:  Assessment of the Public and Private Shipyard
Competition Program (GAO/NSIAD-94-184, May 25, 1994). 

Depot Maintenance:  Issues in Allocating Workload Between the Public
and Private Sectors (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-161, Apr.  12, 1994). 

Depot Maintenance (GAO/NSIAD-93-292R, Sept.  30, 1993). 

Depot Maintenance:  Issues in Management and Restructuring to Support
a Downsized Military (GAO/T-NSIAD-93-13, May 6, 1993). 

Air Logistics Center Indicators (GAO/NSIAD-93-146R, Feb.  25, 1993). 

Defense Force Management:  Challenges Facing DOD as It Continues to
Downsize Its Civilian Workforce (GAO/NSIAD-93-123, Feb.  12, 1993). 


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