Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Changes Needed in the Management of the
Emergency Preparedness Program (Letter Report, 06/11/97,
GAO/NSIAD-97-91).

GAO conducted a follow-up review to: (1) assess the Chemical Stockpile
Emergency Preparedness Program's (CSEPP) progress in enhancing emergency
preparedness in all 10 states participating in the program; and (2)
identify opportunities to improve program management.

GAO noted that: (1) although it has taken longer than it should, CSEPP
officials expect that most critical items will be in place by the end of
1998; (2) after 9 years and funding of $431.4 million, states and local
communities surrounding the chemical stockpile storage sites still lack
some items critical to responding to a chemical stockpile emergency; (3)
as GAO has reported since 1992, CSEPP's slow progress has been due
largely to long-standing management weaknesses, including disagreement
between the Army and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) over
their respective roles and responsibilities; (4) the FEMA Inspector
General, Members of Congress, and state and local officials have also
expressed concern about these management weaknesses; (5) moreover, the
Congress has expressed concern that states and communities lack critical
CSEPP items and that program costs continue to increase; (6) although
the Army and FEMA have taken actions in response to this criticism,
opportunities still exist to improve program management; (7)
specifically, disagreements between Army and FEMA officials on their
respective roles and responsibilities continue to hamper program
effectiveness; (8) for example, the Army is still working to respond to
the requirement of the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act to report
on the integrated process teams because FEMA questions the efficiency of
the Army's involvement; (9) as a result of this and other differences,
the Army and FEMA have not reached agreement on a long-term management
structure for the program; (10) in his March 1997 letter to the Chairman
of the House Committee on National Security, the Assistant Secretary of
the Army said that, if the Army and FEMA were unsuccessful in reaching
an agreement on the long-term management structure for CSEPP and
integrated process teams the Army would assume full control and
responsibility for the program; and (11) until the Army and FEMA
leadership take steps to delineate their agencies' roles and
responsibilities and reach agreement on a long-term management structure
for CSEPP, the future effectiveness for CSEPP is at risk.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-97-91
     TITLE:  Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Changes Needed in the 
             Management of the Emergency Preparedness Program
      DATE:  06/11/97
   SUBJECT:  Chemical warfare
             Intergovernmental relations
             Emergency preparedness
             Waste disposal
             Army facilities
             Internal controls
             Program management
             Hazardous substances
             Interagency relations
             Munitions
IDENTIFIER:  Army Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
             Washington
             Alabama
             Arkansas
             Colorado
             Illinois
             Indiana
             Kentucky
             Maryland
             Oregon
             Utah
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Committees

June 1997

CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILE -
CHANGES NEEDED IN THE MANAGEMENT
OF THE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
PROGRAM

GAO/NSIAD-97-91

Chemical Weapons Stockpile

(709230)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  CSEPP - Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
  DOD - Department of Defense
  FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency
  FEMIS - Federal Emergency Management Information System

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-276238

June 11, 1997

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K.  Inouye
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd D.  Spence
Chairman
The Honorable Ronald V.  Dellums
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W.  Bill Young
Chairman
The Honorable John P.  Murtha
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on National Security
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

In July 1996, we reported that 8 years after the Chemical Stockpile
Emergency Preparedness Program's (CSEPP) inception, Alabama
communities near Anniston Army Depot were not fully prepared to
respond to a chemical stockpile emergency because they lacked
critical items.\1 Given the lack of progress in Alabama's CSEPP and
prior CSEPP management weaknesses we have reported on, we conducted a
follow-up review to (1) assess CSEPP's progress in enhancing
emergency preparedness in all 10 states participating in the program
and (2) identify opportunities to improve program management.  We
conducted this review under our basic legislative responsibilities
and are addressing it to you because of your oversight
responsibilities for chemical weapons disposal programs.  Our scope
and methodology are described in appendix I. 


--------------------
\1 Chemical Weapons Stockpile:  Emergency Preparedness in Alabama Is
Hampered by Management Weaknesses (GAO/NSIAD-96-150, July 23, 1996). 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

In November 1985, the Congress directed the Department of Defense
(DOD) (through the Army) to destroy the U.S.  stockpile of lethal
chemical agents and munitions and directed that the disposal program
provide for the maximum protection of the environment, the public,
and the personnel involved in disposing of the munitions.\2 In 1988,
the Army established CSEPP to help communities near the chemical
stockpile storage sites enhance existing emergency management and
response capabilities in the unlikely event of a chemical stockpile
accident.  Another focus of CSEPP is to enhance the emergency
preparedness of the eight Army installations where the chemical
stockpile munitions are stored.  (See app.  II for the locations of
the chemical stockpile storage sites.)

The Army is responsible for determining the overall direction for
CSEPP.  Under a memorandum of understanding with the Army, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides technical
assistance and distributes Army funds to states through cooperative
agreements.\3 Program funds flow from the Army to FEMA headquarters,
through FEMA regional offices, and to the states.\4 Annual
allocations to the states are based on the states' current concept of
operations and progress in implementing approved and funded CSEPP
initiatives and on the results of annual negotiations.  (See app. 
III for data on funds allocated to the various CSEPP entities in
fiscal years 1988-96.) On the basis of approved activities and
projects, states provide funds to counties as their subgrantees. 
States and counties, in accordance with state and local laws, have
primary responsibility for developing and implementing programs to
enable communities to respond to a chemical stockpile emergency. 

In 1993 and 1994, the Army and FEMA issued CSEPP benchmarks and
planning guidance that identify funding priorities and items critical
to respond to a chemical stockpile emergency.\5

In February 1994, in response to congressional guidance, the Army and
FEMA signed a restructuring agreement to establish the CSEPP Joint
Army/FEMA Team to coordinate and implement public affairs, exercises,
training, communications, and other activities for the program.  The
Joint Army/FEMA Team is managed by Army's Project Manager for
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness and consists of 14 Army
officials and 6 FEMA officials.  The team's objectives are to create
an environment for teamwork and build a working partnership. 

In the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L.  104-201,
section 1076), the Congress directed the Secretary of the Army to
submit a report on his assessment of the implementation and success
of the site-specific integrated process teams.  As envisioned by the
Army, the integrated process teams will (1) identify issues, develop
solutions, and integrate program plans and budget submissions among
CSEPP jurisdictions and (2) include officials from the CSEPP Joint
Army/FEMA Team, appropriate FEMA region, participating states and
counties, and local Army chemical storage command.  According to the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and
Acquisition, the joint Army and FEMA report was scheduled to be
issued by the end of May 1997.\6 On May 30, 1997, the Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics, and Environment)
informed the Congress that the Secretary's report would be delayed
until July 15, 1997. 


--------------------
\2 Public Law 99-145, section 1412. 

\3 The funds provided to the states are covered by FEMA's Uniform
Administrative Requirements for Grants and Cooperative Agreements to
State and Local Governments (44 CFR, part 13) and the Office of
Management and Budget Circular A-128. 

\4 Section 1521 (c) (3) 50 U.S.C.  provides that the Secretary of
Defense may make grants to state and local governments, either
directly or through FEMA. 

\5 Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency
Preparedness Program, the Army and FEMA (May 17, 1996). 

\6 Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and
Acquisition letter to the Chairman, House Committee on National
Security (Mar.  31, 1997). 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

Although it has taken longer than it should, CSEPP officials expect
that most critical items will be in place by the end of 1998.  After
9 years and funding of $431.4 million, states and local communities
surrounding the chemical stockpile storage sites still lack some
items critical to responding to a chemical stockpile emergency (see
table 1). 



                                     Table 1
                     
                       Availability of Five Critical CSEPP-
                      Funded Items in the States We Visited

                                        Personal
                                        protecti  Personnel
                          Integrated    ve        decontaminat          Tone
                          communicatio  equipmen  ion           Siren   alert
CSEPP entity              ns system     t         equipment     system  radios
------------------------  ------------  --------  ------------  ------  --------
Alabama and counties      Partial       Partial   Partial       Yes     No

Arkansas and counties     Yes           No        Yes           Yes     No

Colorado and county       Yes           No        No            No      No

Maryland and counties     Yes           No        Partial       Partia  No
                                                                l

Oregon and counties       Partial       Partial   No            No      No

Utah and counties         Partial       Yes       Yes           Yes     Partial

Washington and county     Yes           No        No            Yes     No
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note:  As of March 1, 1997. 

Source:  Based on data provided by the Army's Project Manager for
CSEPP and state and county emergency management agencies. 

As we have reported since 1992, CSEPP's slow progress has been due
largely to long-standing management weaknesses, including
disagreement between the Army and FEMA over their respective roles
and responsibilities.\7 The FEMA Inspector General, Members of
Congress, and state and local officials have also expressed concern
about these management weaknesses.  Moreover, the Congress has
expressed concern that states and communities lack critical CSEPP
items and that program costs continue to increase.\8

Although the Army and FEMA have taken actions in response to this
criticism, opportunities still exist to improve program management. 
Specifically, disagreements between Army and FEMA officials on their
respective roles and responsibilities continue to hamper program
effectiveness.  For example, the Army is still working to respond to
the requirement of the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act to
report on the integrated process teams because FEMA questions the
efficiency of the Army's involvement.  As a result of this and other
differences, the Army and FEMA have not reached agreement on a
long-term management structure for the program.  In his March 1997
letter to the Chairman of the House Committee on National Security,
the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development, and
Acquisition) said that, if the Army and FEMA were unsuccessful in
reaching an agreement on the long-term management structure for CSEPP
and integrated process teams, the Army would assume full control and
responsibility for the program.  Until the Army and FEMA leadership
take steps to delineate their agencies' roles and responsibilities
and reach agreement on a long-term management structure for CSEPP,
the future effectiveness of CSEPP is at risk. 


--------------------
\7 See list of related GAO products at the end of this report. 

\8 Program costs have remained level since the Joint Army/FEMA Team
developed the CSEPP life-cycle cost estimate in 1995. 


   PROGRESS IN ENHANCING STATE AND
   LOCAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
   HAS BEEN SLOW
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

Nine years after CSEPP's inception and funding of $431.4 million,
states and local communities still lack items critical to responding
to a chemical stockpile emergency, including integrated communication
systems, personal protective equipment, personal decontamination
equipment, sheltering-in-place enhancements, and alert and
notification systems.  Program officials expect that nearly all these
items will be funded and/or operational by the end of 1998, but that
may be optimistic unless management weaknesses and differences at the
Army and FEMA level are corrected and states and counties take prompt
actions to implement the projects. 


      ALMOST $431.4 MILLION HAS
      BEEN ALLOCATED TO CSEPP
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1

Through fiscal year 1996, almost $431.4 million has been allocated to
the program (see table 2).  As of December 1996, approximately $152.5
million had been allocated to Army organizations, installations, and
contracts.  According to Army officials, some of these expenditures
were for computer equipment and software provided to state and local
emergency management agencies and emergency preparedness projects at
Army installations.  Approximately $43.2 million was allocated to
FEMA headquarters, regional offices, and contracts.  According to
FEMA, the agency's contracts support the entire CSEPP community and
include the development of program guidance, training courses, and
computer software.  Participating states and counties have received
$220.8 million.  The Army has allocated $1.1 million to other
organizations and has not allocated $13.8 million. 



                                Table 2
                
                  Allocation of CSEPP Funds in Fiscal
                             Years 1988-96

                         (Dollars in thousands)

                                                                Percen
Entity/activity                                         Amount       t
------------------------------------------------------  ------  ------
Army organizations, installations, and contracts        $152,5    35.4
                                                          09.2
FEMA headquarters, regional offices, and contracts\a    43,234    10.0
                                                            .4
States and counties                                     220,77    51.2
                                                           9.0
Other organizations                                     1,093.     0.3
                                                             1
Not allocated                                           13,766     3.2
                                                            .4
======================================================================
Total                                                   $431,3   100\b
                                                          82.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note:  As of December 1996. 

\a Includes $14.7 million (3.4 percent) allocated to FEMA
headquarters and regions and $28.6 million (6.6 percent) allocated
for contracts. 

\b Percents do not total 100 due to rounding. 

Source:  Based on data provided by the Army's Project Manager for
CSEPP. 

The Army's current life-cycle cost estimate for CSEPP is $1.03
billion, an 800-percent increase of the initial estimate of $114
million in 1988.  According to Army officials, the initial CSEPP
estimate was made before the Army had fully defined the program's
scope, requirements, and time frames, and the current estimate has
not increased since the CSEPP Joint Army/FEMA Team developed the
$1.03 billion life-cycle cost estimate in 1995.  Management
weaknesses, including the lack of adequate financial data and
internal controls, have contributed to the growth in costs. 


      STATES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES
      LACK CRITICAL CSEPP ITEMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2

State and local emergency management officials repeatedly expressed
concern to us about their communities' lack of readiness to respond
to a chemical stockpile emergency.  In 1993 and 1994, the Army and
FEMA issued benchmarks and program guidance that identified items
critical to respond to a chemical stockpile emergency, such as
automated information systems, emergency operations centers,
integrated communication systems, personal protective equipment,
personnel decontamination equipment, sheltering-in-place
enhancements, and alert and notification systems.  Table 3 shows the
status of CSEPP items in each of the 10 states participating in the
program. 



                                       Table 3
                       
                        Availability of Critical CSEPP-Funded
                              Items (as of Mar. 1, 1997)

    Alabam  Arkans          Illino  Indian  Kentuc  Maryla  Oregon  Utah
    a and   as and  Colora  is and  a and   ky and  nd and  and     and     Washingt
It  counti  counti  do and  counti  counti  counti  counti  counti  counti  on and
em  es      es      county  es      es      es      es      es      es      county
--  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------  --------
Au  Partia  Partia  Partia  Partia  Partia  Partia  Partia  Partia  Partia  Partial
to  l       l       l       l       l       l       l       l       l
ma
te
d
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
sy
st
em
\a

Em  Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Partia  Yes     Partia  Partia  Yes     Partial
er                                  l               l       l
ge
nc
y
op
er
at
io
ns
ce
nt
er

In  Partia  Yes     Yes     Partia  Yes     Partia  Yes     Partia  Partia  Yes
te  l\b                     l               l               l       l
gr
at
ed
co
mm
un
ic
at
io
ns
sy
st
em

Pe  Partia  No      No      No      Partia  No      No      Partia  Yes     No
rs  l                               l                       l
on
al
pr
ot
ec
ti
ve
eq
ui
pm
en
t\
c

Pe  Partia  Yes     No      No      No      No      Partia  No      Yes     No
rs  l                                               l
on
ne
l
de
co
nt
am
in
at
io
n
eq
ui
pm
en
t

Sh  No      Yes     No      NR      No      NR      Yes     No\d    NR      NR
el
te
ri
ng
-
in
-
pl
ac
e
en
ha
nc
em
en
ts

Si  Yes     Yes     No      NR      Yes     Yes     Partia  No      Yes     Yes
re                                                  l
ns
sy
st
em

To  No      No      No      NR      No      Partia  No      No      Partia  No
ne                                          l                       l
al
er
t
ra
di
os
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note:  Yes means that the CSEPP-funded item is fully operational and
meets standards. 

Partial means that the CSEPP-funded item is partially operational
because additional requirements are anticipated and/or the current
system or equipment do not meet CSEPP standards. 

No means that the state and counties do not have the required CSEPP
item. 

NR means that the state and counties do not have a requirement for
the CSEPP item. 

\a Federal Emergency Management Information System. 

\b The system was fully funded in 1996. 

\c The equipment has been funded since 1995. 

\d The enhancements were funded in 1996. 

Source:  Based on data provided by the Army's Project Manager for
CSEPP and state and county emergency management agencies. 

In our survey of CSEPP participants, all 10 states and 37 of 40
counties participating in the program said that their emergency
response capabilities had increased since the implementation of
CSEPP.  Officials of three counties said that their emergency
response capabilities had not changed.  Most communities near the
chemical stockpile sites had little capability to respond to a
chemical emergency when the program began in 1988.  For example,
emergency management officials from both the state of Oregon and
Lonoke County, Arkansas, said that CSEPP has made good progress,
considering that they had very little capability before the program
was implemented.  According to a Lonoke County official, the county
would have only a few radios without CSEPP's assistance, and it is
better able now to respond to all types of emergencies.  Appendix IV
discusses the status and funding of specific CSEPP projects. 

According to FEMA, most CSEPP states and local communities have the
operational capability to respond to a chemical stockpile emergency
even though all CSEPP items have not been procured or installed.  We
did not assess whether states and local communities have operational
capability to respond to a chemical incident.  Our conclusion that
states and local communities lack critical items is based on CSEPP
benchmarks and guidance and data from the Army, FEMA, states, and
local communities.  We continue to believe that using benchmarks and
program guidance is the appropriate measure for assessing whether
program goals are being met. 


      PROGRAM OFFICIALS EXPECT
      THAT CSEPP WILL TRANSITION
      TO A MAINTENANCE PHASE AFTER
      1998
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.3

By the end of 1998, according to federal, state, and county
officials, states and local communities will have nearly all of the
critical CSEPP items funded and/or available and the program will
transition from procurement into a maintenance phase.  At that time,
most of the program's expenditures are expected to be for operations
and maintenance activities rather than construction or procurement of
major capital items.  The transition to a maintenance phase will
require less contract management, training, and federal oversight of
state and local daily operations.  According to Army CSEPP officials,
the programs in Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, and Utah have already
transitioned into the maintenance phase.  Local communities in
Alabama, Colorado, and Oregon, however, will still lack some critical
CSEPP items after 1998. 

The CSEPP Joint Army/FEMA Team is in the process of negotiating
standard baseline operating costs with each of the 10 states
participating in the program.  The negotiated funding will cover (1)
agreed-upon recurring fixed-costs (for example, salaries, office
supplies, and telephones) plus an inflation factor and (2) variable
operating costs (for example, training and exercises) that are
recognized costs but the level of funding is subject to annual
fluctuation.  Other funding will be for short-term projects and
one-time procurement requirements.  Procurement funds are used to
purchase major capital items such as communication systems or
decontamination equipment.  According to Army officials, inadequate
actions by states and counties have caused several of the major
projects to lag and the accumulation of procurement funds in state
accounts. 

For fiscal years 1997-2004, the Army expects to need another $598.6
million to operate the program.  It estimates that 66.4 percent of
the funding allocated to the states will be operations and
maintenance funds and 33.6 percent will be procurement funds (see
fig.  1).  Only Alabama is estimated to receive more procurement
funds, mostly for costly sheltering-in-place projects, than
operations and maintenance funds.\9 Other states such as Illinois,
Indiana, and Maryland are expected to receive very little procurement
funds compared with their estimated operations and maintenance
funding. 

   Figure 1:  Estimated Allocation
   of CSEPP Funds for Fiscal Years
   1997-2004

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  Future allocations are based on the estimated funding required
to maintain an acceptable level of emergency preparedness.  Within
DOD's budget constraints, the required funding will vary by CSEPP
jurisdiction. 

Source:  Based on CSEPP's life-cycle cost data provided by the Army's
Project Manager for CSEPP. 


--------------------
\9 Sheltering-in-place enhancements can be as simple as taping doors
and windows or as elaborate as installing pressurized air filtration
systems in schools, hospitals, jails, community centers, and public
buildings.  In 1996, the Calhoun County Emergency Management Agency
in Alabama estimated that the county would require about $67.6
million for sheltering-in-place enhancements to 55 facilities located
near the stockpile storage site. 


   CSEPP HAS A HISTORY OF
   MANAGEMENT WEAKNESSES AND
   CONCERNS STILL REMAIN
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

The Army, FEMA, and the states and counties have been frustrated in
attempts to implement CSEPP.  As we and FEMA's Inspector General have
reported, problems have stemmed from management weaknesses in the
program and disagreements over respective roles and responsibilities. 


      PRIOR REPORTS DISCUSS
      MANAGEMENT WEAKNESSES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1

The Army has been slow in achieving its main objective of helping
communities to enhance their emergency management capabilities
because the program's (1) management roles and responsibilities are
fragmented between Army and FEMA offices and are not well defined,
(2) planning guidance is imprecise, (3) the budget process lacks
coordination and communications, and (4) financial data and internal
controls are inadequate.  Army and FEMA officials have differed and
continue to differ on various aspects of program management, and
consequently, CSEPP's effectiveness and efficiency continue to
suffer. 

In 1993, we testified that the Army had made little progress in
achieving its main objective of helping communities prepare for
emergencies involving chemical agent release.\10 The lack of progress
was partly because of management weaknesses at the federal level,
including fragmented authorities and responsibilities and weak
financial controls, that led to missed program milestones and delays
in issuing program guidance.  In 1994, we reported that the Army's
management approach had not been effective and that communities near
the chemical stockpile sites were not prepared to respond to a
chemical stockpile emergency.\11

In 1995, we reported that program officials lacked accurate financial
information to identify how funds were spent and ensure that program
goals were achieved.\12 Because of inadequate financial data and
internal controls, Army and FEMA could not provide reliable
information on actual expenditures.  Army and FEMA officials still do
not have accurate financial information to identify how funds are
spent.  Specifically, records on expenditure data are limited;
allocation data differ among federal, state, and local agencies; and
states and counties maintain large unexpended balances of funds. 
According to Army and FEMA officials, the Office of Management and
Budget's Circular A-102 limits the Army in requesting expenditure
data from the states. 

In July 1996, we reported that Alabama communities near the Anniston
Army Depot were not prepared to respond to a chemical emergency
because they lacked critical items.  Although the communities had
been allocated $46 million, they had not spent $30.5 million because
federal, state, and local officials had not reached agreement on
specific requirements for four projects.  We concluded that the lack
of progress was the result of management weaknesses at the Army and
FEMA levels and inadequate action by state and local agencies. 


--------------------
\10 Chemical Weapons Storage:  Communities Are Not Prepared to
Respond to Emergency (GAO/T-NSIAD-93-18, July 16, 1993). 

\11 Chemical Weapon Stockpile:  Army's Emergency Preparedness Program
Has Been Slow to Achieve Results (GAO/NSIAD-94-91, Feb.  22, 1994). 

\12 Chemical Weapons:  Army's Emergency Preparedness Program Has
Financial Management Weaknesses (GAO/NSIAD-95-94, Mar.  15, 1995). 


      MANAGEMENT WEAKNESSES CITED
      BY THE FEMA INSPECTOR
      GENERAL
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2

In February 1993, the FEMA Inspector General reported that CSEPP's
reporting system did not provide timely, accurate, or consistent data
and did not satisfy the management needs of either FEMA or the
Army.\13 Specifically, FEMA officials could not accurately account
for how CSEPP funds were spent and Army officials lacked accurate
data to determine whether funds were spent effectively. 


--------------------
\13 Audit of FEMA's Management of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency
Preparedness Program, FEMA Inspector General (Feb.  1993). 


      CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY STATE
      AND COUNTY OFFICIALS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3

Several states and counties said that they were frustrated with the
Army's and FEMA's joint management of CSEPP and needed greater
discretion in the use of program funds (see table 4).  However, Army
officials expressed concern over providing the states greater
discretion in the use of CSEPP funds because of past indiscretions. 
In 1995, we reported some of the indiscretions noted by the Army. 
For example, Arkansas reprogrammed $413,000 in unobligated funds to
construct office space, and Washington reprogrammed $100,000
allocated for telecommunication equipment to design an emergency
operations center without FEMA headquarters' approval. 



                                     Table 4
                     
                     Selected States' and Counties' Comments
                      About the Army and FEMA Management of
                                      CSEPP

Organization        Comment
------------------  ------------------------------------------------------------
Alabama Emergency   If CSEPP was effectively managed, the program would be much
Management Agency   farther along than it is now.

Clay County         CSEPP lacks federal leadership and guidance.
Emergency
Management Agency,
Alabama

Etowah County       Substantive changes in the program's management, direction,
Emergency           and budget process are needed to make CSEPP effective.
Management Agency,
Alabama

Arkansas Office of  Federal agencies lack sensitivity to state and local
Emergency Services  requirements and micromanage the budget process.

Jefferson County    Federal agencies need to improve CSEPP's lines of
Office of           communications and coordination.
Emergency
Services, Arkansas

Colorado Office of  Federal agencies spend too much effort micromanaging and
Emergency           reevaluating every aspect of the state's program.
Management

Kentucky Disaster   Recent changes in CSEPP guidance, lines of communications,
and Emergency       and responsibilities have hampered the progress of the
Services            program.

Maryland Emergency  Inadequate and partial funding of CSEPP projects detracts
Management Agency   from the state's ability to respond to a chemical stockpile
                    emergency.

Baltimore County    If program priorities and guidance were firmly established,
Office of           CSEPP would be more effective and less costly.
Emergency
Preparedness,
Maryland

Harford County      The Army and FEMA roles and responsibilities are not clear,
Division of         and they often dictate to state and local governments.
Emergency
Operations,
Maryland

Oregon Emergency    CSEPP lacks good communications, clear priorities, and
Management Agency   timely decisions.

Morrow County       The Army and FEMA roles and responsibilities are not clearly
Emergency           defined.
Management, Oregon

Utah Department of  Federal micromanagement of CSEPP compromises the state's
Public Safety       ability to plan, direct, implement, and evaluate the
                    program.

Washington          Federal agencies lack clear direction, roles, and
Military            responsibilities.
Department

Benton County       Federal agencies micromanage the program and make decisions
Emergency           with little or no coordination with the county.
Management,
Washington
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note:  Based on our prior work and recent visits to 7 of the 10
states and several of their counties, we believe that these comments
are valid and are based on justified concerns about the Army and FEMA
management of the program. 

As discussed later in this report, our work shows that the Army and
FEMA have management problems and disagreements that have adversely
affected CSEPP's effectiveness. 


   EFFORTS TO IMPROVE PROGRAM
   MANAGEMENT HAVE BEEN FRUSTRATED
   BY CONTINUED DISAGREEMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

Although Army and FEMA officials have acted in response to criticism
and improved program management, the effectiveness of these actions
has been limited by continued disagreements between Army and FEMA
officials.  Specifically, the lack of agreement prevented the
Secretary of the Army from timely compliance with the statutory
requirement to report on the implementation and success of CSEPP
integrated process teams.  Two important steps taken to improve the
management of the program were to establish the CSEPP Joint Army/FEMA
Team and implement the integrated process teams.  However, based on
FEMA's stated positions, we believe that the agency does not fully
support the Joint Army/FEMA Team or site-specific integrated process
teams.  Because of these and other differences regarding their roles
and responsibilities, Army and FEMA officials have not agreed to a
long-term management arrangement for CSEPP. 


      DISAGREEMENTS OVER THE
      IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CSEPP
      JOINT ARMY/FEMA TEAM
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1

In 1993, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported that CSEPP's
cost growth and program delays were unacceptable, and indicated that
there were problems with the program's management structure.\14 In
addition, the Committee concluded that the Army and FEMA maintained a
top-heavy bureaucratic organization to manage the program.  The
Committee directed the Army to (1) assume full management
responsibility for the execution of CSEPP, (2) directly receive and
review states' budget requests for program funds, (3) tighten program
controls and ensure timely improvements in local capabilities to
respond to a chemical stockpile emergency, (4) streamline CSEPP's
management structure, (5) reevaluate FEMA's role in CSEPP, (6)
establish milestones for critical CSEPP projects, and (7) establish
strict financial controls to ensure accountability over program
funds.  Although the Army established the CSEPP Joint Army/FEMA Team
in response to this direction, the team has not functioned as the
Army intended.  Specifically, CSEPP's management structure was not
streamlined, and the Army and FEMA continue to share responsibility
for executing CSEPP, receiving and reviewing states' budget requests,
and implementing financial controls over program funds. 

According to the CSEPP Joint Army/FEMA Team's charter, dated January
6, 1995, the joint team was intended to (1) establish a focal point
for accountability of the program, (2) coordinate and integrate on-
and off-post activities, and (3) create an environment for teamwork. 
However, according to DOD officials, the team has not functioned as
intended.  According to FEMA officials, the establishment of the
joint team has posed several management challenges to FEMA, including
the differentiation between the roles and responsibilities of the
team and FEMA's regional offices.  FEMA officials have proposed that
the Army eliminate the joint team and associated staffing. 

In August 1996, the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization
reported that, in some situations, FEMA's implementation of the
charter had inhibited the progress of CSEPP.\15

According to the Program Manager, pressure from FEMA headquarters'
officials to have the agency's joint team members spend more of their
duty time at FEMA headquarters' and less with the joint team had
impeded their integration with Army's members.  The Program Manager
concluded that communications with the CSEPP participants and
coordination with the Army had been adversely affected.  In response,
FEMA's Deputy Associate Director for Preparedness, Training, and
Exercises agreed that the program was not functioning as effectively
as it should and that respective roles, responsibilities, and working
relationships needed to be clarified. 


--------------------
\14 Senate Report No.  103-158, at 368-369 (1993). 

\15 The Army's Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization letter
to FEMA's Deputy Associate Director for Preparedness, Training, and
Exercises (Aug.  20, 1996). 


      DISAGREEMENTS OVER THE
      IMPLEMENTATION OF CSEPP
      INTEGRATED PROCESS TEAMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.2

In the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L.  104-201,
section 1076), the Congress directed the Secretary of the Army to
submit a report, within 120 days of the law's enactment, that
assessed the implementation and success of the site-specific
integrated process teams.  The act further states that if the Army
and FEMA were unsuccessful in implementing the integrated process
teams within each of the participating states within
120 days, the Secretary of the Army shall (1) assume full control and
responsibility for the program by eliminating the role of the FEMA
Director as a joint manager; (2) clearly define the goals of the
program; (3) establish fiscal constraints for the program; and (4)
agree with each of the participating states regarding program
requirements, implementation schedules, training and exercise
requirements, and funding to include direct grants for program
support. 

In January 1997, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research,
Development, and Acquisition, reported that the Army was unable to
provide the report on January 28, 1997, as required, because of
delays in scheduling required training and the subsequent
establishment of site-specific integrated process teams.\16 The Army
views these teams as a mechanism for identifying issues, developing
solutions, and integrating program plans and budget submissions among
CSEPP jurisdictions at each stockpile location.  The teams will make
recommendations to Army and FEMA officials for consideration and
determine solutions to site-specific issues.  The Assistant
Secretary's letter included an interim status of the formation of the
site-specific integrated process teams, concluding that the training
and formation of the teams were nearing completion.  He also reported
that FEMA headquarters had some concerns over the efficiency of the
integrated process teams.  In contrast, the FEMA regions were
supporting the teams. 

In March 1997, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research,
Development, and Acquisition, reported to the Chairman of the House
Committee on National Security that the Army was unable to provide
the report, as required, because Army and FEMA officials had not
reached agreement on the long-term management structure for CSEPP and
on the implementation of integrated process teams at the management
and working levels.  While training and implementation of the
working-level integrated process teams had been completed, he said
that it was necessary to further delay the submission of the report
on the implementation and success of the teams until May 30, 1997.\17
The Assistant Secretary concluded that, if the Army and FEMA were
unsuccessful in reaching an agreement on the long-term management
structure for CSEPP and integrated process teams, the Army would
assume full control and responsibility for the program.  According to
FEMA's comments on a draft of this report, FEMA officials disagree
with Army's conclusions in the letters complying with the legislative
reporting requirement. 

Several state and local officials we visited were pleased with the
initial results of the teams.  However, others expressed concern that
the teams may be good in theory but only add another layer of
bureaucracy to the program.  For example, officials in Oregon and
Kentucky expressed concern over which agency or integrated process
team would be responsible for making final decisions. 

Although FEMA has participated in CSEPP's integrated process teams,
its concept for site-specific integrated process teams differs from
the Army's concept, and the agency has not signed the Army's proposed
memorandum implementing the integrated process teams.  Specifically,
FEMA does not want the Army involved in off-post CSEPP activities and
wants to eliminate the Army from site-specific integrated process
teams.  FEMA's desire to eliminate the Army from site-specific
integrated process teams is inconsistent with the tenets of the
process and does not recognize the Army's position that they should
work as partners. 


--------------------
\16 Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and
Acquisition letter to the Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed
Services (Jan.  30, 1997). 

\17 On May 30, 1997, the Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations, Logistics, and Environment) informed the Congress
that the report would be delayed until July 15, 1997. 


      ARMY AND FEMA OFFICIALS
      DISAGREE ON FEMA'S FUTURE
      ROLE
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.3

In September 1996, FEMA's Deputy Associate Director for Preparedness,
Training, and Exercises reported that the Army and FEMA had very
different management styles and philosophies and that the current
approach was not working.\18 She concluded that attempts to combine
Army and FEMA approaches in developing off-post preparedness
capabilities have resulted in delays and conflicting messages to
participating states.  Additional FEMA correspondence indicates that
the agency continues to want to manage all off-post activities with
little or no Army involvement. 

In October 1996, the Army Program Manager for Chemical
Demilitarization agreed that Army's and FEMA's management styles were
different and added that relationships were strained and leadership
was less effective than desired.\19 The Program Manager reported that
maintaining the current management structure would continue regional
and state confusion over the program's leadership and prolong the
program's problems.  He concluded that FEMA's participation in CSEPP
was preferred but suggested that FEMA's role and personnel involved
in the program be reduced.  (See app.  V.) He rejected options to
eliminate either the Army's or FEMA's role in the program. 

The Program Manager also provided FEMA with a draft memorandum
reorganizing CSEPP.  The memorandum identifies the Army Project
Manager for CSEPP as the primary program decision-making authority
and the site-specific integrated process teams as the primary means
of carrying out the program.  FEMA officials said they had not agreed
to the reorganization because of questions over the integrated
process teams and FEMA's future role in the program.  Because of
these and other differences regarding their roles and
responsibilities, the Army and FEMA have not agreed to a management
arrangement for CSEPP after September 1997. 


--------------------
\18 FEMA's Deputy Associate Director for Preparedness, Training, and
Exercises letter to the Army's Program Manager for Chemical
Demilitarization (Sept.  20, 1996). 

\19 The Army's Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization letter
to FEMA's Deputy Associate Director for Preparedness, Training, and
Exercises (Oct.  9, 1996). 


   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

We believe that the future effectiveness of CSEPP is at risk given
the continuing disagreements between Army and FEMA officials and that
high-level management attention is needed to clearly define CSEPP
management roles and responsibilities.  Therefore, we recommend that
the Secretary of the Army and the Director of FEMA work together to
complete the mandated assessment of the implementation and success of
integrated process teams by July 15, 1997.  We also recommend that,
as part of this assessment, the Secretary and the Director reach
agreement on a long-term management structure for CSEPP that clearly
defines the roles and responsibilities of Army and FEMA personnel. 
Should the Secretary and the Director be unable to complete their
assessment and issue a report that includes a plan for revising
CSEPP's management structure, we recommend that the Secretary of the
Army implement the requirements of the 1997 National Defense
Authorization Act to (1) assume full control and responsibility for
the program and eliminate the role of the FEMA Director as a joint
manager; (2) clearly define the goals of the program; (3) establish
fiscal constraints for the program; and (4) agree with each of the
participating states regarding program requirements, implementation
schedules, training and exercise requirements, and funding to include
direct grants for program support. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

We received written comments on a draft of this report from both DOD
and FEMA, and they are presented in their entirety in appendixes VI
and VII, respectively.  DOD concurred with the report and its
recommendations.  FEMA generally concurred with the recommendations
but strongly disagreed with our conclusions.  Our evaluation of
FEMA's overall response is presented below and our specific comments
are presented in
appendix VII.  We also added information to the report to more fully
reflect FEMA's position.  DOD and FEMA also provided technical
corrections and clarifications and, where appropriate, we
incorporated them in the report as well. 

FEMA disagreed with our assessment that the program is at risk
because of its ongoing differences with the Army.  FEMA noted that it
has been working closely with the Army to clarify roles,
responsibilities, and working relationships and resolve the
differences as soon as possible.  While we agree that FEMA and the
Army have been discussing this issue, it continues to go unresolved
after more than a year of discussions.  Our concern is not whether
the Army's or FEMA's approach to resolving the management issue is
the more appropriate; we are concerned that CSEPP's implementation is
being delayed because this issue has not been resolved.  As a
consequence, the program's goal of providing communities with items
critical to responding to a chemical stockpile emergency remains to
be achieved after 9 years and funding of $431.4 million. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :7.1

We prepared this report under our basic legislative responsibilities. 
We are providing it to you because of your oversight responsibilities
for chemical weapons disposal programs.  We are also sending copies
of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and the Army, the
Directors of the Office of Management and Budget and FEMA, and other
interested parties.  We will make copies available to others upon
request. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-8412 if you or your staff have any
questions.  Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix
VIII. 

David R.  Warren, Director
Defense Management Issues


OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY
=========================================================== Appendix I

In July 1996, we reported that 8 years after the Chemical Stockpile
Emergency Preparedness Program's (CSEPP) inception, Alabama
communities near Anniston Army Depot were not fully prepared to
respond to a chemical stockpile emergency because they lacked
critical items.  Given the lack of progress in Alabama's CSEPP and
prior CSEPP management weaknesses we have reported on, we conducted a
follow-up review to (1) assess CSEPP's progress in enhancing
emergency preparedness in all 10 states participating in the program
and (2) identify opportunities to improve program management. 

To assess CSEPP's progress in enhancing emergency preparedness in the
states participating in the program, we examined a variety of Army,
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), state, and county
planning and funding documents and reconciled data among the Army,
FEMA, and state and county emergency management agencies.  We
interviewed and obtained and analyzed data on the status of CSEPP
projects from officials of the Army Program Manager for Chemical
Demilitarization and the CSEPP Joint Army/FEMA Team located at
Edgewood, Maryland, and from officials of the Aberdeen Proving
Ground, Maryland; the Anniston Army Depot, Alabama; the Pine Bluff
Arsenal, Arkansas; the Pueblo Depot Activity, Colorado; the Tooele
Army Depot, Utah; and the Umatilla Depot Activity, Oregon.  We also
met with officials from FEMA headquarters and regional offices in
Atlanta, Georgia, and Bothell, Washington.  Although we met with
officials from the Army installations where the chemical stockpile
munitions are stored, we did not try to assess the status of the
installations' emergency preparedness programs. 

To observe emergency preparedness operations and facilities, we
visited Alabama and its Calhoun and Talladega counties, Arkansas and
its Jefferson and Grant counties, Colorado and its Pueblo county,
Maryland and its Harford and Baltimore counties, Oregon and its
Morrow and Umatilla counties, Utah and its Tooele and Salt Lake
counties, and Washington and its Benton county.  We also interviewed
and obtained data on the status and costs of CSEPP projects from
emergency management officials in Illinois, Indiana, and Kentucky. 
In addition, we sent questionnaires to the 10 state and 40 county
program directors at the end of 1995 to obtain data on the status of
their emergency preparedness programs and on their views of the
Army's and FEMA's joint management of the program.  All state and
county program directors responded to our questionnaire.  We updated
portions of the questionnaire responses through interviews and data
collection instruments in October 1996 through February 1997.  For
those critical projects not yet completed, we did not attempt to
determine their impact on emergency preparedness and risk to the
local population, but we identified and analyzed the reasons for the
delay in their implementation. 

To identify opportunities to improve program management, we discussed
the actions the Army has taken and further actions that should be
taken to improve the program with Army, FEMA, state, and local
officials.  We also discussed the impact of the Army's actions and
reviewed planning documents, progress reports, memoranda, and
correspondence.  We discussed the CSEPP benchmarks and guidance with
federal, state, and local officials to determine how this guidance
was applied in implementing the program.  Furthermore, we compared
planning and operational data for CSEPP projects with the benchmarks
and guidance and determined whether the projects complied with
program requirements and time frames.  To assess the effectiveness of
the federal, state, and county management, we reviewed the Army's and
FEMA's management structure and guidance and compared them with state
and local requirements and concerns.  We also documented and analyzed
the magnitude and impact of state and county emergency management
agencies' involvement in the funding process, federal feedback on the
budget process, partial funding of projects, and slow disbursements
of funds. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) and FEMA provided written comments on
a draft of this report and they are presented in their entirety in
appendixes VI and VII, respectively.  DOD agreed with the
recommendations in our draft report.  FEMA generally concurred with
the recommendations but strongly disagreed with our conclusions.  Our
evaluation of FEMA's specific points is presented in appendix VII. 
DOD and FEMA also provided technical clarifications and, where
appropriate, we incorporated them in the report. 

Our review was conducted from August 1996 to March 1997 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


CHEMICAL STOCKPILE LOCATIONS IN
THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES
========================================================== Appendix II



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

   Source:  Based on data provided
   by the Army's Program Manager
   for Chemical Demilitarization.

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


FUNDS ALLOCATED TO CSEPP ENTITIES
IN FISCAL YEARS 1988-96
========================================================= Appendix III

                              (Dollars in thousands)

                                                                          Percen
Entity                                                            Amount       t
----------------------------------------------------------------  ------  ------
Army headquarters and commands                                    $27,84     6.5
                                                                     6.2
Army installations                                                36,070     8.4
                                                                      .1
Army major contracts (over $100,000)\a                            88,195    20.4
                                                                      .0
Other Army contracts\a                                             398.3     0.1
FEMA headquarters and regions                                     14,667     3.4
                                                                      .0
FEMA contracts\a                                                  28,567     6.6
                                                                      .4
Alabama and counties                                              54,808    12.7
                                                                      .6
Arkansas and counties                                             22,030     5.1
                                                                      .5
Colorado and county                                               14,670     3.4
                                                                      .6
Illinois and counties                                             3,877.     0.9
                                                                       1
Indiana and counties                                              14,336     3.3
                                                                      .7
Kentucky and counties                                             21,194     4.9
                                                                      .6
Maryland and counties                                             19,382     4.5
                                                                      .5
Oregon and counties                                               25,303     5.9
                                                                      .0
Utah and counties                                                 27,991     6.5
                                                                      .2
Washington and county                                             17,184     4.0
                                                                      .2
Other entities                                                    1,093.     0.3
                                                                       1
Not allocated                                                     13,766     3.2
                                                                      .4
================================================================================
Total                                                             $431,3   100.0
                                                                    82.5
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a According to the Army and FEMA, these contracts support the entire
CSEPP community and include direct support to Army installations; the
development of program guidance, training courses, and computer
programs; and the procurement of personal protective equipment and
computer hardware and software. 

Source:  The Army's Project Manager for CSEPP. 


ACQUISITION AND INSTALLATION OF
ESSENTIAL CSEPP PROJECTS ARE
BEHIND SCHEDULE
========================================================== Appendix IV

Implementation of projects needed to respond to a chemical stockpile
emergency is behind schedule.  States and local communities still
lack items critical to responding to a chemical stockpile emergency,
including integrated communication systems, personnel protective
equipment, personnel decontamination equipment, sheltering-in-place
enhancements, and alert and notification systems. 


   THE FINAL AUTOMATED INFORMATION
   SYSTEM CONTINUES TO EXPERIENCE
   PROBLEMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1

In 1994, officials estimated that the installation of the final CSEPP
automated information system would be completed by July 1995.  The
CSEPP automated information system--computer equipment and
software--is required to support planning and managing emergency
response activities.  The process of determining appropriate
protective actions is too complex and time-consuming to perform
manually during a chemical stockpile emergency.  Computer equipment
and software are considered essential in helping local officials to
plan for the appropriate protective actions.  In 1993, the Army and
FEMA started to develop a standard automated information system,
called the Federal Emergency Management Information System (FEMIS),
with the specifications of software requirements by the CSEPP
community.  The Army started testing FEMIS in September 1994, and
since then, the system has undergone eight tests, culminating in the
government acceptance test in Alabama.  Although the Army spent $14.7
million on FEMIS,\1 the system still has problems. 

During the period September 9 through 20, 1996, the Army tested FEMIS
at the Anniston CSEPP site, and the system met most performance
measures.  The test plan identified 75 measures of performance.  Of
these, 59 were satisfied, 5 failed, and 11 were not tested. 
According to personnel participating in the test, however, the system
was slow and cumbersome.  In addition, the reliability, availability,
and maintainability parameters for FEMIS had not been established and
were not evaluated as in a traditional operational test.  The test
was structured to determine the level of confidence that the
reliability, availability, and maintainability of the system is
progressing.  Test results indicated that FEMIS was available for 61
percent of the training and test period.  The predominant reason for
the system's unavailability was its inability to update data from one
CSEPP location to another, which occurred when power at a CSEPP site
either surged or was interrupted.  For example, during the test, the
Alabama emergency operations center was struck by lightning.  Other
sites experienced interruptions in telephone connections when the
local telephone company was making repairs and when nearby
construction workers cut a telephone cable.  Hardware and software
maintenance was outside the scope of the test and was not evaluated. 

Because of the system's technical problems and requirement for
supplemental personnel, Army and FEMA officials decided in 1996 that
FEMIS was the preferred but optional system.  As a result, the system
may not be adopted by all participating states and counties (see
table IV.1).  Until FEMIS is operational, CSEPP states and counties
are using interim automated information systems--computer equipment
and software--to support planning and managing emergency response
activities.  These interim systems include the Army's Emergency
Management Information System (designed to be used by Army
installations where the chemical stockpile weapons are stored) and
Integrated Baseline System (designed to be used by the off-post
communities). 



                                    Table IV.1
                     
                      Status of CSEPP Automated Information
                               Systems, by Location

Location                   Status
-------------------------  -----------------------------------------------------
Alabama and counties       The state and counties are now using the on-post
                           Emergency Management Information System. The state
                           and counties may decide to field FEMIS.

Arkansas and counties      At the beginning of 1997, the state and counties
                           installed the Emergency Management Information
                           System. Final selection of the automated information
                           system will be based on the results of FEMIS'
                           government acceptance test.

Colorado and county        Pueblo County is now using the Emergency Management
                           Information System. The state and county may select
                           either the Emergency Management Information System or
                           FEMIS depending on the results of the government
                           acceptance test of FEMIS. Full implementation at
                           Pueblo County depends on CSEPP's providing adequate
                           support for the system and network management.
                           Negotiations with FEMA for contract support are
                           continuing.

Illinois and counties      The state and counties are now using the Emergency
                           Management Information System. The state has
                           requested $100,000 for computer equipment and work
                           stations. Final selection of the automated
                           information system will be based on the results of
                           FEMIS' government acceptance test.

Indiana and counties       The state and counties are currently using the
                           Emergency Management Information System. Final
                           selection of the automated information system will be
                           based on the results of FEMIS' government acceptance
                           test.

Kentucky and counties      The state and county will be using the Emergency
                           Management Information System and plan to switch to
                           FEMIS.

Maryland and counties      The state and counties are now using a variety of
                           over-the-counter software, including the Emergency
                           Information System and SoftRisk, and have detached
                           copies of the Emergency Management Information
                           System. The state and counties are not connected to
                           the automated information system at Aberdeen Proving
                           Ground, but funding was provided for the connection
                           for the state and Harford County in fiscal year 1997.
                           Final selection of the automated information system
                           will be based on the results of FEMIS' government
                           acceptance test and correction of faults.

Oregon and counties        The state and counties are currently using the
                           Integrated Baseline System, but plan to switch to
                           FEMIS.

Utah and counties          The state and counties are using FEMIS, but the
                           system is not fully operational. Tooele County is
                           using portions of the Emergency Management
                           Information System to communicate with the Tooele
                           Army Depot for the daily work plans and hazard
                           assessments. The county decided to use the Emergency
                           Management Information System and not FEMIS.

Washington and county      Equipment has been purchased, installed, and
                           configured for the installation of FEMIS. At the
                           discretion of the Army, the installation of FEMIS
                           software is expected in mid-May 1997.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------
\1 Funding is through fiscal year 1996. 


   MOST EMERGENCY OPERATION
   CENTERS ARE FULLY OPERATIONAL
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:2

In 1993, the Army and FEMA agreed that each Army installation and
immediate response zone county should have a functioning emergency
operations center where responsible officials can gather to direct
and coordinate emergency operations, speak with other jurisdictions
and emergency response officials in the field, and formulate
protective action decisions. 

Benton County, Washington; Harford County, Maryland; Vermillion
County, Indiana; the state of Colorado; and Morrow and Umatilla
counties, Oregon; are constructing or trying to upgrade their
emergency operation centers.  At an estimated cost of $1.5 million,
Benton County's center is scheduled to be completed by August 1997. 
Construction of a new operations center in Harford County, Maryland,
is scheduled to be completed in mid-May 1997.  In Indiana, Vermillion
County is trying to upgrade its emergency operations center to better
support the CSEPP automated information system.  Vermillion County
has set aside $140,000 for the project but received a contractual bid
of $197,000 for the project.  The county is requesting $57,000 in
CSEPP funds to pay for the funding shortfall.  In fiscal year 1996,
Colorado requested $20,000 to determine the requirements for a
state-operated emergency operations center, but the request was
denied.\2 The state requested funding again in fiscal year 1997. 

According to local officials in Oregon, the Morrow County emergency
operations center does not meet CSEPP requirements.  In fiscal year
1992, the Army and FEMA provided Morrow County $315,000 to renovate
an existing building for the county's emergency operations center. 
The Morrow County Emergency Management Director said that his center
has limited capacity, lacking adequate space for CSEPP equipment, and
should be expanded.\3 In Umatilla County, construction of the new
CSEPP emergency operations center is scheduled to be completed in
February 1998. 


--------------------
\2 The Pueblo County Emergency Operations Center has been operational
since 1992. 

\3 The center includes office space and a holding cell for the county
sheriff. 


   MOST CSEPP COMMUNICATION
   SYSTEMS ARE FULLY OPERATIONAL
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:3

In 1992, the Army and FEMA determined that every CSEPP jurisdiction
should have a functioning communications system connecting the Army
installation, state emergency management agency, and immediate
response zone counties.  The system should provide direct, reliable,
and redundant communications capabilities to interagency and
intra-agency emergency response workers.  Currently, 5 of the 10
CSEPP states have fully operational CSEPP communication systems.  The
communication systems in Alabama, Kentucky, and Oregon do not meet
program standards, and Illinois and Utah are upgrading their
communication systems.  (See
table IV.2.)



                                    Table IV.2
                     
                      Status of CSEPP Communication Systems,
                                   by Location

Location                   Status
-------------------------  -----------------------------------------------------
Alabama and counties       The primary CSEPP communications system is not
                           operational, but is fully funded. The county project
                           manager expects to begin operational testing in
                           August 1997 and begin operations in March 1998.

Arkansas and counties      The CSEPP communications system is operational.

Colorado and county        The CSEPP communications system is operational.

Illinois and counties      The state is upgrading its CSEPP communications
                           system.

Indiana and counties       The CSEPP communications system is operational.

Kentucky and counties      The funded elements of the communications system are
                           operational. The state wants to expand the current
                           system and requested additional funds in fiscal year
                           1997. Funding was deferred, pending completion of a
                           cost-sharing agreement between the state and Madison
                           County.

Maryland and counties      The CSEPP communications system is operational.

Oregon and counties        Oregon is experiencing contractual and technical
                           problems in implementing the CSEPP communications
                           system, and the system is not fully operational.
                           These problems are considered significant, and the
                           completion date of the system is not known. The
                           project is managed by the state of Oregon.

Utah and counties          According to county officials, the CSEPP
                           communications system is not fully operational. Two
                           new microwave links are required to provide proper
                           communications coverage linking the state and
                           counties. Partial funding was approved, but a second
                           allocation is needed to purchase and install the
                           equipment. Tooele County also needs to replace two
                           obsolete microwave links that provide voice and data
                           communications and siren activation capabilities.
                           Army officials said that the current CSEPP
                           communications system in Utah was operational without
                           these upgrades.

Washington and county      The CSEPP communications system is operational.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

   PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
   PURCHASES ARE SCHEDULED FOR
   COMPLETION IN 1997 AND 1998
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:4

Personal protective equipment has been considered a critical response
requirement for several years.  In July 1994, the Argonne National
Laboratory concluded there was a potential for the aerosol deposition
of agents off post from a chemical stockpile accident.\4

The deposition creates the requirement for personal protective
equipment, which includes portable respirators, protective suits,
gloves, boots, and hoods.  Because of their assigned traffic,
decontamination, health, and other critical response duties at the
periphery of the chemical plume, local emergency workers may find
themselves in danger of contamination from an unexpected shift in the
plume.  Although the states received funding for the equipment in
1995 or before, only communities in Utah have the required personal
protective equipment.  Other CSEPP jurisdictions are now determining
requirements or acquiring the equipment.  These projects are
scheduled to be completed in 1997 and 1998.  (See table IV.3.)



                                    Table IV.3
                     
                       Status and Funding of CSEPP Personal
                        Protective Equipment, by Location

Location            Status                                   Funding\a
------------------  -----------------------------  -----------------------------
Alabama and         The project is not completed.            $850,000
 counties            According to state
                     officials, only a portion of
                     the requirement has been
                     funded. Talladega County has
                     received government-
                     furnished equipment, and
                     Calhoun County is now
                     acquiring the equipment.
                     Procurement of additional
                     equipment will be based on a
                     needs assessment, scheduled
                     to be completed in late
                     1997.
Arkansas and        The project is not completed.             720,000
 counties            The equipment was funded in
                     September 1995 and will be
                     purchased based on
                     recommendations of the
                     Arkansas integrated process
                     team.
Colorado and        The project is not completed.             760,000
 county              The equipment was funded in
                     fiscal year 1995 and part of
                     the equipment is scheduled
                     to be purchased in early
                     1997. Issues regarding the
                     remaining equipment are
                     being negotiated by Army and
                     FEMA officials.
Illinois and        The project is not completed.             200,000
 counties            The equipment was funded in
                     fiscal year 1995 and is
                     scheduled for delivery in
                     mid-1997.
Indiana and         The project is not completed.             400,000
 counties            The equipment was funded in
                     fiscal year 1995, 400 suits
                     have been received, and the
                     protective masks are
                     scheduled for delivery in
                     July 1997.
Kentucky and        The project is not completed.             400,000
 counties            The equipment was funded in
                     fiscal year 1995. It will be
                     purchased based on the
                     state's needs assessment, to
                     be completed in October
                     1997.
Maryland and        The project is not completed.            1,240,000
 counties            Equipment was funded in
                     fiscal year 1995, but the
                     funds were retained at the
                     state pending completion of
                     a federal, state, and county
                     team's review and selection
                     of equipment. However, this
                     effort was placed on hold,
                     pending the results of the
                     Maryland integrated process
                     team's examination of all
                     aspects of CSEPP in the
                     state.
Oregon and          The project is not completed.             420,000
 counties            The equipment was funded in
                     fiscal year 1995 and 277
                     protective masks were
                     received in January 1997.
                     Federal, state, and local
                     officials disagree over
                     which protective suit to
                     purchase and whether an
                     additional person is needed
                     to support and care for the
                     personal protective
                     equipment.
Utah and counties   The project is completed. The             648,000
                     equipment was funded in
                     fiscal year 1993 and
                     received in December 1996.
Washington and      The project is not completed.             445,000
 county              The equipment was funded in
                     1995, but no procurement
                     action will be taken,
                     pending the completion of
                     negotiations over monitoring
                     requirements and the
                     appropriate type of
                     equipment.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Allocated funds for fiscal years 1988-96. 


--------------------
\4 Potential for Surface Contamination by Deposition of Chemical
Agent Following Accidental Release at an Army Storage Depot, Argonne
National Laboratory (July 1994). 


   PERSONNEL DECONTAMINATION
   EQUIPMENT PURCHASES ARE
   SCHEDULED FOR COMPLETION IN
   1997
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:5

The most urgent decontamination priority during a chemical stockpile
emergency is the cleansing of people contaminated with chemical
agents.  The decontamination process helps to minimize the effects on
people's health and to prevent the spread of agents to other people. 
Communities in Arkansas and Utah have operational decontamination
units.  The remaining locations have received funding for personnel
decontamination units and are conducting need assessments, acquiring
the equipment, or requesting additional equipment to move the units. 
The decontamination projects are scheduled to be completed in 1997. 
(See table IV.4.)



                                    Table IV.4
                     
                         Status and Funding of Personnel
                      Decontamination Equipment, by Location

Location            Status                                   Funding\a
------------------  -----------------------------  -----------------------------
Alabama and         The project is not completed.            $216,000
 counties            Four decontamination units
                     were funded in fiscal year
                     1995 and delivered to
                     Calhoun County in February
                     1996. The Alabama Department
                     of Public Health has
                     purchased and delivered
                     small decontamination units
                     to each of the nine
                     hospitals in the area.
                     According to Alabama
                     Emergency Management Agency
                     officials, there is an unmet
                     requirement for more than 10
                     additional decontamination
                     units.
Arkansas and        The project is completed.                 517,000
 counties
Colorado and        The project is not completed.             240,000
 county              Four decontamination units
                     were funded in fiscal year
                     1995 and are scheduled for
                     delivery in 1997.
Illinois and        The project is not completed.             64,000
 counties            Eight decontamination units
                     were funded in fiscal year
                     1995. Federal and state
                     officials are negotiating
                     design requirements.
Indiana and         The project is not completed.             44,000
 counties            Four decontamination units
                     were funded in fiscal year
                     1995 and are scheduled for
                     delivery in December 1997.
Kentucky and        The project is not completed.             250,000
 counties            Kentucky's needs assessment
                     was completed in October
                     1996. Five decontamination
                     units were funded in fiscal
                     year 1995 to cover basic
                     requirements, and the units
                     are scheduled for delivery
                     by September 1997.
Maryland and        The project is not completed.             35,684
 counties            Equipment was funded in
                     fiscal year 1995, but the
                     funds were retained at the
                     state, pending completion of
                     a federal, state, and county
                     team's review and selection
                     of equipment.\b
Oregon and          The project is not completed.             200,000
 counties            Four decontamination units
                     were funded in fiscal year
                     1995. Federal and county
                     officials are negotiating
                     the type of decontamination
                     units to purchase.
Utah and counties   The project is completed.                 291,000
                     Four decontamination units
                     were purchased.
Washington and      The project is not completed.             152,000
 county              The initial proposal covers
                     the equipment costs for the
                     main traffic control points
                     and a reception center and
                     includes four small
                     decontamination trailers and
                     equipment for the
                     construction of
                     decontamination stations.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Allocated funds for fiscal years 1988-96. 

\b This effort was placed on hold pending the results of the Maryland
integrated process team's review of all aspects of CSEPP in the
state.  As a result of this review, CSEPP requirements have been
reduced.  Inflatable decontamination tents and some equipment were
purchased in 1997 to augment Harford County's existing
decontamination capabilities. 


   ADDITIONAL SHELTERING-IN-PLACE
   PROJECTS ARE ANTICIPATED
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:6

Program documents state that people closest to most stockpile storage
sites will not have time to evacuate and will remain in place during
a chemical stockpile release.  Sheltering-in-place enhancements can
be as simple as taping doors and windows or as elaborate as
installing pressurized air filtration systems in schools, hospitals,
jails, community centers, and public buildings.  Pressurization
systems draw outside air into the shelter through a filter that
removes the chemical agent.  The pressure from this filtered air
increases to the point that the contaminated air from the outside
cannot leak into the facility.  Pressurized air-filtration systems
have been completed in Arkansas and Maryland and are scheduled for
completion in Alabama, Colorado, Indiana, and Oregon.  Communities in
Illinois, Kentucky, Utah, and Washington are located too far from the
chemical stockpile sites to require pressurized air-filtration
systems for their facilities.  (See table IV.5.)



                                    Table IV.5
                     
                           Status and Funding of CSEPP
                       Pressurization Projects, by Location

Location            Status                                   Funding\a
------------------  -----------------------------  -----------------------------
Alabama and         The pressurization projects             $7,400,000
 counties            are not completed. In fiscal
                     years 1995 and 1996, the
                     state received funding for
                     pressurization of 37
                     facilities in Calhoun
                     County. The projects are
                     scheduled to be completed by
                     June 1999. State and county
                     officials believe that
                     additional projects will be
                     funded in the future.
Arkansas and        The pressurization project is             140,175
 counties            completed.
Colorado and        The pressurization projects               200,000
 county              are not completed. Two
                     projects in the immediate
                     response zone were funded in
                     fiscal year 1995 and are
                     tentatively schedule to be
                     completed in late 1997.
                     According to Army officials,
                     the lack of adequate action
                     by the county has delayed
                     this project.
Illinois and        There is no requirement.
 counties
Indiana and         The pressurization projects               87,500
 counties            are not completed.
                     Vermillion County plans to
                     protect the county jail.
                     Funding has not been spent,
                     pending the results of a
                     technical review of the
                     project. County officials
                     expect that additional
                     funding will be needed to
                     complete the project.
Kentucky and        There is no requirement.
 counties
Maryland and        The pressurization projects              1,016,100
 counties            are near completion.
                     Pressurization equipment was
                     installed in four Harford
                     County schools in fiscal
                     year 1996 and completed and
                     tested in January 1997. As a
                     result of additional FEMA
                     guidance in January 1997,
                     the county and its
                     contractors are considering
                     additional changes to the
                     pressurization projects.
                     County officials estimate
                     that additional costs of
                     $300,000 and delays of 6
                     months may be realized.
Oregon and          The pressurization projects              2,800,398
 counties            are not completed. In fiscal
                     years 1994 and 1995, the
                     state received funding for
                     the pressurization of 14
                     facilities in Morrow and
                     Umatilla counties. Morrow
                     County projects are
                     scheduled to be completed in
                     1997. Umatilla County has
                     requested additional funding
                     to complete its projects.
Utah and counties   There is no requirement.
Washington and      There is no requirement.
 county
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Allocated funds for fiscal years 1988-96. 


   MOST ALERT AND NOTIFICATION
   SYSTEMS ARE SCHEDULED FOR
   COMPLETION IN 1997 AND 1998
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:7

During the initial minutes of a chemical stockpile emergency, sirens
and tone alert radios should instruct government officials, emergency
response workers, and residents on what protective actions to take. 
Outdoor sirens with voice message capability can alert the population
of the emergency and provide instructional messages about appropriate
protective actions.  Tone alert radios are placed in homes, schools,
hospitals, jails, nursing homes, and businesses to provide alert
signals and instructional messages.  Initially, CSEPP officials
planned to have alert and notification equipment installed and tested
by October 1992.  In 1994, we reported that program officials
anticipated that sirens would be installed at all eight storage sites
by January 1995 and that tone alert radios would be installed at six
sites by October 1995. 

Communities in 6 of the 10 CSEPP states have operational siren
systems.  Communities in Illinois are located too far from the
Newport Chemical Activity, Indiana, to require a system.  The
remaining siren systems are schedules to be completed in 1997 and
1998.  (See table IV.6.)



                                    Table IV.6
                     
                       Status and Funding of Outdoor Siren
                               Systems, by Location

Location            Status                                   Funding\a
------------------  -----------------------------  -----------------------------
Alabama and         The siren system is                     $2,417,602
 counties            operational. The first
                     installment is completed,
                     but county officials
                     anticipate that the county
                     will need additional sirens.
Arkansas and        The siren system is                      1,312,368
 counties            operational.
Colorado and        The siren system is not                   475,000
 county              completed. Federal funding
                     was allocated in 1994 for
                     sirens. A sound propagation
                     study was completed in
                     February 1996, and funds for
                     the siren system are
                     scheduled to be committed in
                     late 1997.
Illinois and        There is no requirement for
 counties            sirens.
Indiana and         The siren system is                      1,061,288
 counties            operational.
Kentucky and        The siren system is                       873,244
 counties            operational.
Maryland and        The siren system is not fully            1,294,700
 counties            operational. The contract
                     was awarded in April 1996,
                     and installation and testing
                     were completed in December
                     1996 and January 1997,
                     respectively. As a result of
                     problems encountered during
                     the initial test, the final
                     60-day test and prove-out
                     period has been delayed, and
                     the state will not take
                     possession of the system
                     until the period is
                     successfully completed.
Oregon and          Forty-two sirens were                    1,373,758
 counties            installed, but the system is
                     not operational. The project
                     is managed by the state of
                     Oregon.
Utah and counties   The siren system is                      1,755,771
                     operational.
Washington and      The siren system is                      1,687,406
 county              operational. Testing of the
                     siren system was completed
                     in February 1997.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Allocated funds for fiscal years 1988-96. 

In general, homes and buildings in communities near the chemical
stockpile sites do not have tone alert radios.  The exception is
Kentucky, where 5,000 radios have been installed and additional
radios are scheduled to be installed in 1997 and 1998.  Most of the
remaining indoor alert radio projects are scheduled to be completed
in 1997 and 1998.  (See table IV.7.)



                                    Table IV.7
                     
                     Status and Funding of Indoor Alert Radio
                              Projects, by Location

Location            Status                                   Funding\a
------------------  -----------------------------  -----------------------------
Alabama and         The project is not completed.           $4,002,850
 counties            The radios are scheduled to
                     be installed in December
                     1998, pending completion of
                     the demographics survey in
                     April 1998.
Arkansas and        The project is not completed.            2,043,720
 counties            The radios are scheduled to
                     be installed in October
                     1997.
Colorado and        The project is not completed.             600,000
 county\b            Funds for the tone alert
                     radios and infrastructure
                     were allocated in fiscal
                     year 1995 and are scheduled
                     to be committed by late
                     1997.
Illinois and        There is no requirement for
 counties            tone alert radios.
Indiana and         The project is not completed.            1,319,500
 counties            The state estimates that the
                     project will cost $1,319,500
                     to complete. The radios are
                     scheduled to be installed
                     and operational by July
                     1997.
Kentucky and        The project is partially                 3,890,371
 counties            completed. Ten thousand
                     radios have been delivered,
                     of which 5,000 have been
                     installed; the remaining
                     5,000 radios are scheduled
                     to be installed in mid-
                     1997. Additional radios are
                     scheduled to be purchased
                     and installed by March 1998.
Maryland and        The project is not completed.             650,000
 counties            Requirements for tone alert
                     radios will not be addressed
                     until the Maryland
                     integrated process team
                     completes its review of all
                     aspects of CSEPP in the
                     state. According to Harford
                     County officials, it is
                     possible that few or no tone
                     alert radios will be needed.
Oregon and          The project is not completed.            3,713,300
 counties\b          Procurement of the radios is
                     deferred, pending completion
                     of a review of alternatives
                     to tone alert radios. The
                     review is scheduled to be
                     completed in 1997.
Utah and counties   The project is not completed.             574,570
                     Installation of tone alert
                     radios in households is in
                     progress and scheduled to be
                     completed in mid-1997. The
                     procurement of enhanced
                     radios with printing
                     capabilities for special
                     need populations and
                     facilities is in progress
                     and scheduled to be
                     completed at the end of
                     1997.
Washington and      The project is not completed.             100,000
 county\b
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Allocated funds for fiscal years 1988-96. 

\b In an effort to reduce the cost of each tone alert radio through
economies of scale, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington are attempting
to combine their purchases. 


ARMY'S PROPOSED FULL-TIME
EQUIVALENT POSITIONS FOR FEMA IN
SUPPORT OF CSEPP
=========================================================== Appendix V

                                                        Full-time
Position                      Location                 equivalent
----------------------------  -------------------  -------------------
CSEPP Joint Army/FEMA Team    Edgewood, Maryland            6
 action officers
Clerical and administrative   Edgewood, Maryland            2
 support
Information technology        Olney, Maryland           As needed
 support
Emergency Management          Emmittsburg,                  1
 Institute                     Maryland
Exercise support              Washington, D.C.              2
Public affairs support        Washington, D.C.              1
Financial and administrative  Washington, D.C.              2
 support
Planning and federal          Washington, D.C.              1
 preparedness coordination
Clerical and administrative   Washington, D.C.              1
 support
Action officers, FEMA Region  Philadelphia,                 3
 III                           Pennsylvania
Action officers, FEMA Region  Atlanta, Georgia              4
 IV
Action officers, FEMA Region  Chicago, Illinois             3
 V
Action officers, FEMA Region  Kansas City,                  3
 VII                           Missouri
Action officers, FEMA Region  Denver, Colorado              4
 VIII
Action officers, FEMA Region  Seattle, Washington           4
 X
======================================================================
Total                                                      37
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  Based on correspondence from the Army's Program Manager for
Chemical Demilitarization to FEMA's Deputy Associate Director for
Preparedness, Training, and Exercises (Aug.  20, 1996). 




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix VI
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
=========================================================== Appendix V



(See figure in printed edition.)




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix VII
COMMENTS FROM THE FEDERAL
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
=========================================================== Appendix V



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)


The following are GAO's comments on the letter from the Director,
FEMA, dated April 22, 1997. 

GAO COMMENTS

1.  The issues raised here are also covered in FEMA's detailed
comments and we respond to them specifically in the agency comments
and evaluation section of the report and the notes that follow. 

2.  Our report states that state and local emergency response
capability has increased since the implementation of CSEPP.  However,
as shown in
table 3, in some cases progress has been made but, in others, much
remains to be done to provide all 10 CSEPP states and their counties
with the items CSEPP officials have defined as critical to emergency
preparedness.\1

We revised the report to reflect FEMA's position that CSEPP states
and local communities could respond to a chemical stockpile emergency
even though they do not have all critical CSEPP items.  We also
reviewed FEMA capability graphs and, where appropriate incorporated
them in the report.  However, we did not assess whether states and
local communities have operational capability to respond to a
chemical incident.  Our conclusion that states and local communities
lack critical items is based on CSEPP benchmarks and guidance and
data from the Army, FEMA, states, and local communities, and we
continue to believe this is the appropriate criteria for measuring
progress. 

We disagree with FEMA's position that program delays were not the
result of disagreements between the Army and FEMA over their
respective roles and responsibilities.  Despite attempts to
streamline decisionmaking for programmatic and budget issues, five
federal offices are still involved in decisionmaking.  State and
local officials have expressed confusion over which office is in
charge and reported that the fragmented management structure delayed
decisionmaking.  In October 1995, CSEPP state directors identified 27
individual issues and concerns.  One concern was the lack of an
agreement defining the roles and responsibilities of the Army and
FEMA headquarters and the CSEPP Joint Army/FEMA Team.  This basic
problem continues today. 

Moreover, both FEMA and Army officials have reported that their
disagreements over management roles and responsibilities have
resulted in program delays.  For example in September 1996, the FEMA
Deputy Associate Director for Preparedness, Training, and Exercises
wrote that CSEPP was not functioning as effectively as it might and
that respective roles, responsibilities, and working relationships
needed to be clarified.  Similarly, in October 1996, the Army Program
Manager for Chemical Demilitarization wrote that the Army and FEMA
leadership was divided and less effective than desired.  He concluded
that the management was not focused on CSEPP and effectiveness and
efficiency could be improved. 

3.  Since 1992, we have reported on CSEPP's management weaknesses,
which include fragmented and unclear management roles and
responsibilities, imprecise and incomplete planning guidance, a
cumbersome budget process, and ineffective financial controls.  These
weaknesses have resulted in time-consuming negotiations among
federal, state, and county officials and hampered the progress of
numerous CSEPP projects.  In addition, we have reported that
inadequate actions by states and counties have also slowed the
progress of several CSEPP projects.  As stated in comment 2 and our
evaluation of FEMA's comments on pages 18 and 19, our concern is not
whether the Army's or FEMA's approach to resolving the management
issue is the more appropriate; we are concerned that CSEPP's
implementation is being delayed because this issue has not been
resolved.  As a consequence, the program's goal of providing
communities with items critical to responding to a chemical stockpile
emergency remains to be achieved after 9 years and funding of $431.4
million. 

4.  See comment 2. 

5.  We added information to table 2 of the report to note that $14.7
million (3.4 percent) was allocated to FEMA headquarters and regions
and $28.6 million (6.6 percent) was allocated for FEMA's contracts. 

6.  See comments 2 and 3. 

7.  We revised the report to show that the CSEPP Joint Army/FEMA Team
was in the process of negotiating standard baseline operating costs
with each of the 10 states participating in the program. 

8.  We did not assess whether FEMA's financial management system
complies with the Office of Management and Budget requirements. 
Nonetheless, we are encouraged to see that FEMA's CSEPP Program
Office is working with the FEMA Inspector General to improve
management and funding accountability of specific state projects. 

Notwithstanding these actions, we continue to be concerned about the
adequacy of financial management data available to CSEPP managers. 
Specifically, records on expenditure data are limited; allocation
data differ among FEMA, states, and counties; and states and counties
continue to maintain large unexpended fund balances.  For example,
data at FEMA consist primarily of reports that identify states'
withdrawals from the federal treasury, but not how the funds were
spent.  Also, as of July 1996, participating states held $67.2
million in unexpended CSEPP funds, or 35.3 percent of the funds
allocated to them.  We continue to believe that effective stewardship
over the program requires managers to have information on actual
expenditures of funds. 

9.  We revised the report to show that the FEMA Inspector General
reported that CSEPP's reporting system did not provide FEMA managers
timely, accurate, or consistent data or the data they need to monitor
CSEPP's progress.  In addition, the Inspector General report states
that "[t]he two financial reports in the CCA [Comprehensive
Cooperative Agreement] reporting system do not meet the financial
reporting need of FEMA CSEPP managers or the Army.  They monitor
allocation of funds to States and identify surplus funds.  They do
not track the use of funds."

10.  Table 4 is included to support our position that state and
county CSEPP officials have expressed a sense of dissatisfaction with
the Army's and FEMA's management of the program. 

We do not agree that table 4 should be deleted from the report as
FEMA suggested.  States and local officials have primary
responsibility for developing and implementing programs to respond to
a chemical stockpile emergency.  We believe it is important to
include their views as part of our analysis. 

11.  We revised the report to reflect FEMA's position that it
disagrees with the Assistant Secretary's position on integrated
process teams. 

12.  Although FEMA has participated in CSEPP's integrated process
teams, its concept for site-specific integrated process teams differs
from the Army's concept, and the agency has not signed the Army's
proposed memorandum implementing the teams.  Specifically, FEMA does
not want the Army involved in off-post CSEPP activities and wants to
eliminate the Army from site-specific integrated process teams.  The
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and
Acquisition cited the lack of agreement as a basis for requesting an
extension to the legislative requirement to report on the
implementation and success of the teams.  FEMA's desire to eliminate
the Army from site-specific integrated process teams is inconsistent
with the tenets of the process and does not recognize the Army's
position that they should work as partners.  Moreover, the example
cited by FEMA illustrates the fundamental problems that exists over
roles and responsibilities and why that issue has hampered CSEPP's
progress. 

As envisioned by the Army, the integrated process teams will (1)
identify issues, develop solutions, and integrate program plans and
budget submissions among CSEPP jurisdictions and (2) include
officials from the CSEPP Joint Army/FEMA Team, appropriate FEMA
region, participating states and counties, and local Army chemical
storage command.  The teams are designed to foster open
communications with the CSEPP stakeholders and empower the team
members with decisionmaking authority.  Integrated process team
literature suggests that full and open discussion does not mean that
each view must be acted on by the team. 

13.  We believe that the establishment of the CSEPP Joint Army/FEMA
Team was an important step to improving the management of the
program.  According to the CSEPP Joint Army/FEMA Team's charter,
dated January 6, 1995, the joint team was intended to (1) establish a
focal point for program accountability, (2) coordinate and integrate
on- and off-post activities, and (3) create an environment for
teamwork.  We believe that, if effectively implemented, the CSEPP
Joint Army/FEMA Team could eliminate the problems associated with
management roles and responsibilities. 

However, the team has not functioned as intended.  In August 1996,
the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization reported that, in
some situations, FEMA's implementation of the charter had inhibited
the progress of CSEPP.  According to the Program Manager, pressure
from FEMA headquarters officials to have the agency's joint team
members spend more of their duty time at FEMA headquarters and less
with the joint team had impeded their integration with Army members. 
The Program Manager concluded that communications with the CSEPP
participants and coordination with the Army had been adversely
affected. 

14.  See comments 2 and 3. 


--------------------
\1 Our conclusion that CSEPP states and local communities lacked
critical items was based on CSEPP standards.  Specifically, we used
the 1993 CSEPP National Benchmarks and the May 17, 1996, CSEPP
Planning Guidance as our criterion to determine whether local
communities should have the emergency preparedness or response items. 
To assess the availability of those items in the CSEPP communities,
we used data from the Army, FEMA, states, and local communities. 


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
======================================================== Appendix VIII

NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Thomas J.  Howard, Assistant Director
Mark A.  Little, Evaluator-in-Charge
Bonita J.  Page, Evaluator

ATLANTA FIELD OFFICE

Fredrick W.  Felder, Evaluator
Terry D.  Wyatt, Evaluator





RELATED GAO PRODUCTS
============================================================ Chapter 0

Chemical Weapons and Materiel:  Key Factors Affecting Disposal Costs
and Schedule (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118, Mar.  11, 1997). 

Chemical Weapons and Materiel:  Key Factors Affecting Disposal Costs
and Schedule (GAO/NSIAD-97-18, Feb.  10, 1997). 

Chemical Weapons Stockpile:  Emergency Preparedness in Alabama Is
Hampered by Management Weaknesses (GAO/NSIAD-96-150, July 23, 1996). 

Chemical Weapons Disposal:  Issues Related to DOD's Management
(GAO/T-NSIAD-95-185, July 13, 1995). 

Chemical Weapons:  Army's Emergency Preparedness Program Has
Financial Management Weaknesses (GAO/NSIAD-95-94, Mar.  15, 1995). 

Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Review (GAO/NSIAD-95-66R, Jan. 
12, 1995). 

Chemical Weapons:  Stability of the U.S.  Stockpile (GAO/NSIAD-95-67,
Dec.  22, 1994). 

Chemical Weapons:  Issues Involving Destruction Technologies
(GAO/T-NSIAD-94-159, Apr.  26, 1994). 

Chemical Weapons Destruction:  Advantages and Disadvantages of
Alternatives to Incineration (GAO/NSIAD-94-123, Mar.  18, 1994). 

Chemical Weapon Stockpile:  Army's Emergency Preparedness Program Has
Been Slow to Achieve Results (GAO/NSIAD-94-91, Feb.  22, 1994). 

Chemical Weapons Storage:  Communities Are Not Prepared to Respond to
Emergencies (GAO/T-NSIAD-93-18, July 16, 1993). 

Chemical Weapons Destruction:  Issues Affecting Program Cost,
Schedule, and Performance (GAO/NSIAD-93-50, Jan.  21, 1993). 


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