Haiti: U.S. Response to Allegations of an Assassination Plot (Letter
Report, 02/14/97, GAO/NSIAD-97-87).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information regarding
how the U.S. government handled the allegations it received regarding a
plot to assassinate a prominent Haitian attorney and critic of President
Jean-Bertand Aristide and the government of Haiti, focusing on: (1) who
decided that the government of Haiti was responsible for warning Mrs.
Mireille Durocher Bertin of the assassination plot; (2) whether other
approaches to handling the assassination plot allegations were
considered; (3) what information was available to U.S. decisionmakers on
the involvement of Haitian officials in political violence; (4) whether
Mrs. Bertin was warned of the assassination plot; (5) whether the
Haitian government investigated the assassination plot allegations; (6)
whether there are U.S. laws, regulations, or guidelines governing the
notification of targets of assassination plots; and (7) whether the
United States has warned any individuals in Haiti of threats against
their lives since Mrs. Bertin was assassinated.

GAO found that: (1) the U.S. multinational force (MNF) Commander in
Haiti decided that the responsibility for directly warning Mrs. Bertin
of the threat against her life lay with the government of Haiti, and the
U.S. Ambassador concurred; (2) MNF and U.S. Embassy officials ultimately
decided to inform both President Aristide and Justice Minister Exume of
the evidence they had regarding the plot and to urge them to warn Mrs.
Bertin and investigate the plot; (3) it is impossible to determine
whether Mrs. Bertin was adequately warned of the assassination plot, as
no one witnessed the conversations between Mrs. Bertin and Justice
Minister Exume; (4) Mrs. Bertin's family members agree that Justice
Minister Exume spoke with Mrs. Bertin twice within a few days of
receiving the plot information from U.S. officials, but none of the
family members believe that Justice Minister Exume warned Mrs. Bertin of
a murder plot; (5) U.S. officials said that Justice Minister Exume had
personally assured them on at least two occasions that he had told Mrs.
Bertin that she was in danger and offered her protection, which she
rejected; (6) President Aristide provided a written response to the MNF,
which stated that Mrs. Bertin has been warned; (7) a U.N. official told
GAO that during a luncheon meeting she arranged with Mrs. Bertin, Mrs.
Bertin spoke of her conversation with Justice Minister Exume; (8) in a
letter dated March 24, 1995, the President of Haiti advised the MNF
Commander that his initial investigation of the assassination plot did
not indicate that the Haitian Minister of the Interior was involved; (9)
the President indicated that Justice Minister Exume would continue to
look into the matter; (10) however, the Justice Minister told GAO that
he did not have sufficient time to investigate the accusations before
Mrs. Bertin was assassinated, and was unaware of what inquiries
President Aristide had made; (11) U.S. officials indicated they were
skeptical that a thorough investigation actually took place; (12) while
U.S. laws and regulations did not impose any legal responsibility on
U.S. officials to warn Mrs. Bertin directly about the assassination
plot, GAO did note that shortly after President Aristide returned to
Haiti in October of 1994, Embassy officials directly contacted two
Haitian citizens to discuss concerns about their safety; (13) after Mrs.
Bertin's assassination, the Department of State issued guidelines requi*

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-97-87
     TITLE:  Haiti: U.S. Response to Allegations of an Assassination Plot
      DATE:  02/14/97
   SUBJECT:  Assassinations
             International relations
             International cooperation
             Government information dissemination
             Foreign governments
             Public officials
             Embassies
IDENTIFIER:  Port-au-Prince (Haiti)
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Requesters

February 1997

HAITI - U.S.  RESPONSE TO
ALLEGATIONS OF AN ASSASSINATION
PLOT

GAO/NSIAD-97-87

Haiti

(711233)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DOD - Department of Defense
  MNF - multinational force

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-276242

February 14, 1997

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate

The Honorable Strom Thurmond
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Richard Armey
Majority Leader
House of Representatives

The Honorable Benjamin A.  Gilman
Chairman, Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives

The Honorable Floyd Spence
Chairman, Committee on National Security
House of Representatives

On March 28, 1995, Mrs.  Mireille Durocher Bertin, a prominent
attorney and critic of President Aristide and the government of
Haiti, was assassinated.  In response to your request, we are
providing information regarding how the U.S.  government handled the
allegations it received regarding a plot to assassinate her.  You
asked us to respond to the following questions: 

  -- Who decided that the government of Haiti was responsible for
     warning Mrs.  Bertin of the assassination plot? 

  -- Were other approaches to handling the assassination plot
     allegations considered? 

  -- What information was available to U.S.  decisionmakers on the
     involvement of Haitian officials in political violence? 

  -- Was Mrs.  Bertin warned of the assassination plot? 

  -- Did the Haitian government investigate the assassination plot
     allegations? 

  -- Are there U.S.  laws, regulations, or guidelines governing the
     notification of targets of assassination plots? 

  -- Since Mrs.  Bertin was assassinated, has the United States
     warned any individuals in Haiti of threats against their lives? 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

On September 30, 1991, 8 months after his inauguration as Haiti's
first democratically elected president, Jean-Bertand Aristide was
overthrown by a military coup.  On September 18, 1994, after 3 years
of economic and diplomatic pressure, including the threat of direct
U.S.  military intervention, Haiti's military regime agreed to
relinquish power and allow Aristide to return to office in October
1994.  Among other things, this agreement allowed for the nonviolent
entry of U.S.  troops into Haiti on September 19, 1994.  From
September 1994 through March 30, 1995, the U.S.-led multinational
force (MNF) of 20,000 U.S.  and 4,100 foreign troops was deployed to
Haiti to establish a "safe and secure environment." On March 31,
1995, this responsibility was transferred to the U.N.  Mission in
Haiti, with 6,900 troops, about half of whom were U.S.  troops. 

On March 19, 1995, a Haitian national working as a translator for the
MNF informed U.S.  troops that he was part of a conspiracy to
assassinate
Mrs.  Bertin.  The informant alleged that a group of four other
Haitians would be meeting at his home later that day and that they
would stake out
Mrs.  Bertin's house that night.  He also said that the Minister of
the Interior was somehow involved.  MNF forces acted quickly to
detain the informant, his wife, and the four suspects.  Subsequently,
on March 28, 1995, Mrs.  Bertin was assassinated in the Haitian
capital of Port-au-Prince while driving with a client to a meeting. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

The U.S.  MNF Commander in Haiti decided that the responsibility for
directly warning Mrs.  Bertin of the threat against her life lay with
the government of Haiti, and the U.S.  Ambassador concurred.  As part
of the decision-making process, some U.S.  Embassy officials
initially argued that U.S.  officials should warn Mrs.  Bertin
directly to guarantee that she was adequately alerted of the danger. 
MNF and U.S.  Embassy officials ultimately decided to inform both
President Aristide and Justice Minister Exume of the evidence they
had regarding the plot and to urge them to warn
Mrs.  Bertin and investigate the plot.  They did so on March 22,
1995.  Embassy officials believed that notifying both the President
and the Justice Minister would better ensure that Mrs.  Bertin was
warned, yet leave the government of Haiti responsible for the
warning.  According to MNF officials, U.S.  officials told the
President and Justice Minister that if they were not satisfied that
Mrs.  Bertin had been warned, they would warn her directly.  Both the
President and the Justice Minister assured U.S.  officials that Mrs. 
Bertin would be warned and the allegations investigated immediately. 

Cables, and other documents, as well as discussions indicate that MNF
and Embassy officials were aware of allegations that high-level
Haitian security officials might be implicated in violent activities. 
The officials indicated this did not influence the decision-making
process. 

It is impossible to determine whether Mrs.  Bertin was adequately
warned of the assassination plot, as no one witnessed the
conversations between Mrs.  Bertin and Justice Minister Exume. 
However, statements we obtained from family members, U.S.  officials,
Haitian government officials, and a U.N.  representative provide
information and perspectives on the events leading up to the
assassination. 

Mrs.  Bertin's family members agree that Justice Minister Exume spoke
with Mrs.  Bertin twice within a few days of receiving the plot
information from U.S.  officials.  However, we found no one who heard
exactly what was discussed.  None of the family members believe that
Justice Minister Exume warned Mrs.  Bertin of a murder plot because
(1) she told the family the Justice Minister said only that she might
be arrested, (2) she did not appear particularly concerned following
the conversations, and (3) she would have taken the Minister's
warning of an assassination conspiracy seriously and would have taken
appropriate precautions.  Her father told us, however, that his
daughter was aware that individuals plotting to kill her were taken
into custody by the MNF. 

U.S.  officials said that Justice Minister Exume had personally
assured them on at least two occasions that he had told Mrs.  Bertin
that she was in danger and offered her protection, which she
rejected.  Furthermore, President Aristide provided a written
response to the MNF, which stated that Mrs.  Bertin had been warned. 
Minister Exume informed us that he told Mrs.  Bertin that the MNF had
uncovered a plot to kill her and had detained the alleged
conspirators, but he said he did not discuss who they were or why
they might want to kill her.  He also said he told Mrs.  Bertin that
she should take necessary precautions and offered her protection,
which she declined.  He said he also gave her his private telephone
number in case she felt threatened.  He told us that he was very
explicit in the conversation about a threat to her life and did not
see how she could have misinterpreted the call.  Nevertheless, he
noted that Mrs.  Bertin did not appear to take his warning seriously,
saying that the threat was probably just another ploy to try to force
her to leave the country. 

A U.N.  official told us that during a luncheon meeting she arranged
with
Mrs.  Bertin to explore what was happening politically in the
country,
Mrs.  Bertin spoke of her conversation with Justice Minister Exume. 
The U.N.  official said that Mrs.  Bertin told her that she had
received a disturbing call from the Justice Minister during which he
informed her that "she was in trouble." The U.N.  official stated
that Mrs.  Bertin appeared concerned and commented that it would have
to be very serious for a Minister of the government to warn her and
questioned whether the U.N.  official could help her if she were
arrested. 

In a letter dated March 24, 1995, the President of Haiti advised the
MNF Commander that his initial investigation of the assassination
plot did not indicate that the Haitian Minister of the Interior was
involved.  The President indicated that Justice Minister Exume would
continue to look into the matter.  However, the Justice Minister told
us that he did not have sufficient time to investigate the
accusations before Mrs.  Bertin was assassinated, and he was unaware
of what inquiries President Aristide had made.  U.S.  officials
indicated they were skeptical that a thorough investigation actually
took place.  After the assassination, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation took control of the investigation at the request of the
government of Haiti. 

While U.S.  laws and regulations did not impose any legal
responsibility on U.S.  officials to warn Mrs.  Bertin directly about
the assassination plot, we did note, that shortly after President
Aristide returned to Haiti in October of 1994, Embassy officials
directly contacted two Haitian citizens to discuss concerns about
their safety.  Further, after Mrs.  Bertin's assassination, the
Department of State issued guidelines requiring Embassy officials in
Haiti to notify individuals when they have information that a
credible threat exists.  Since that time, Embassy officials have
notified nine individuals of threats against their lives, including
members of opposition political parties, former military officers,
and members of the government, including the current and former
president.  Additionally, Department of Defense (DOD) officials
informed us that U.S.  forces also informed individuals of threats
against their safety. 

In a separate classified report, we provide supplementary information
on each of your questions and a chronology of events relevant to
political violence in Haiti. 



   AGENCY COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

DOD, the State Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency
reviewed a draft of this report and supplied technical corrections
and clarifications, which we incorporated, as appropriate. 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

To determine who made the decision to ask the government of Haiti to
notify Mrs.  Bertin and what other approaches were considered to
inform Mrs.  Bertin about the murder plot, we met with the U.S. 
Ambassador, the MNF Commander and Deputy Commander, and other
officials from the Departments of State and Defense in Haiti and in
Washington, D.C., and officials from the National Security Council. 
We also reviewed unclassified and classified cables, memorandums,
personal journals and reports, and submissions to congressional
committees from these organizations. 

To determine the information that was available to decisionmakers on
the possible involvement of Haitian officials in political violence,
we reviewed classified cables, memorandums, and reports from the
State Department, National Security Council, MNF, and Defense
Intelligence Agency.  To attempt to determine whether Mrs.  Bertin
was actually warned of the plot, we met with current and former
officials from the government of Haiti and the United Nations, and
interviewed members of Mrs.  Bertin's family. 

We researched federal statutes and regulations and spoke with or
received information from general counsels from the Department of
Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement
Administration, Department of State, and DOD to determine whether
regulations or guidelines existed regarding threat warnings.  To
determine whether the United States has subsequently warned any
individuals in Haiti of threats against their lives, we met with the
U.S.  Ambassador and other Embassy officials and reviewed cables and
memorandums. 

We did not receive access to staff or information from the Central
Intelligence Agency or Federal Bureau of Investigation interview
summaries.  Additionally, former President Aristide did not respond
to two requests:  to meet with us or to respond to a set of questions
regarding the assassination.  The former Prime Minister declined the
U.S.  Embassy's request that he meet with us.  Furthermore, it should
be noted that because individuals' recollections of dates,
conversations, and events that occurred over a year ago varied, the
accounts of events we received were not entirely consistent. 

We conducted this review from June to November 1996 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and appropriate
congressional committees.  We will also make copies of this report
available to others upon request. 

If you have any questions about this report, please call me on (202)
512-4128.  The major contributors to this report are Jess Ford,
Ronald Kushner, Richard Newbold, Jose Pena, and Joan Slowitsky. 

Benjamin F.  Nelson
Director, International Relations
 and Trade Issues

*** End of document. ***