Special Operations Forces: Opportunities to Preclude Overuse and Misuse
(Letter Report, 05/15/97, GAO/NSIAD-97-85).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO determined whether the U.S.
special operations forces (SOF) are being used in a manner that best
supports national security objectives.

GAO noted that: (1) SOF is considered an essential element for achieving
U.S. national security objectives; (2) in general, there is a common
understanding of and agreement on primary SOF mission priorities between
the commanders in chief (CINC) and SOF unit commanders assigned to each
of the CINCs, and the CINCs often consider SOF their force of choice for
many diverse combat and peacetime missions; (3) however, there is some
disparity on the priorities for collateral activities for SOF, such as
embassy support and antiterrorism activities; (4) little reliable data
is available on the frequency and types of SOF missions that would allow
an analysis of SOF missions relative to CINC priorities and regional
strategy requirements, and historical data on deployment days for all
SOF elements is not available; (5) nevertheless, responses to GAO's
questionnaire from almost 200 senior-level officers and enlisted
personnel in SOF units indicated that they believe the deployments of
SOF units have increased to the point that SOF readiness has been, or
threatens to be, degraded; (6) specifically, 60, 56, and 86 percent of
the Army, Navy, Air Force respondents to GAO's questionnaire,
respectively, said they believe readiness has been, or threatens to be,
adversely affected by the current level of unit deployments; (7) in
addition, SOF unit leaders believe that SOF are performing some missions
that could be handled by conventional forces; (8) opportunities exist to
reduce the perceived high pace of operations, according to responses to
GAO's questionnaire; (9) there may be opportunities to use conventional
forces instead of SOF for some collateral missions, such as embassy
support, and for missions that are already the responsibility of
conventional forces, such as combat search and rescue; (10) however,
without basic, reliable, quantifiable information on the nature and
extent of actual SOF missions, the way in which SOF personnel are
deployed, and the impact of unit deployments on SOF readiness, the U.S.
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) cannot identify such opportunities
to achieve the appropriate levels of deployment and ensure that SOF are
properly used; and (11) therefore, GAO believes that action is needed to
complete a system that will allow the: (a) pace of SOF operations to be
measured and assessed relative to national security objectives and SOF
training needs; and (b) identification of the factors that cause SOF pe*

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-97-85
     TITLE:  Special Operations Forces: Opportunities to Preclude 
             Overuse and Misuse
      DATE:  05/15/97
   SUBJECT:  Military training
             Military operations
             Command and control systems
             Defense capabilities
             Combat readiness
             Human resources utilization
IDENTIFIER:  MC-130H Helicopter
             MH-53J Helicopter
             JCS Status of Resources and Training System
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness, Committee
on National Security, House of Representatives

May 1997

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES -
OPPORTUNITIES TO PRECLUDE OVERUSE
AND MISUSE

GAO/NSIAD-97-85

Special Operations Forces

(703112)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  CINC - Commander in Chief
  DOD - Department of Defense
  OPTEMPO - operating tempo
  PERSTEMPO - personnel tempo
  SEAL - Sea-Air-Land
  SOF - Special Operations Forces
  SORTS - Status of Resources and Training System
  USSOCOM - U.S.  Special Operations Command

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-276593

May 15, 1997

The Honorable Herbert H.  Bateman
Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives

Dear Mr.  Chairman: 

U.S.  special operations forces (SOF) are considered highly capable,
elite forces that are trained and maintained to address critical U.S. 
national security objectives.  SOF's versatility, speed of
deployment, and capabilities make SOF ideally suited for today's
security environment, where significant dangers are created by
regional conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
and transnational threats.  Thus, it is important for the Department
of Defense (DOD) to ensure that SOF are ready to perform their
intended missions and are used in ways that capitalize on their
unique capabilities. 

During our review, which was done at your request, our overall
objective was to determine whether SOF are being used in a manner
that best supports national security objectives.  Specifically, we
determined (1) whether there is general agreement on the priorities
for the use of SOF by the regional commanders in chief (CINC) and SOF
unit commanders; (2) the pace of SOF operations and how SOF units'
senior officers and enlisted personnel view the impact of that pace
of operations on readiness, morale, and retention; and (3) in those
cases where the pace of operations is perceived to be degrading SOF
readiness, whether opportunities exist to reduce that pace. 

The primary bases for the information in this report are our
discussions with and documents obtained from officials at the five
major commands, visits to numerous special operations units, and
responses to a questionnaire from over 200 senior officers and
enlisted personnel at CINC headquarters and SOF units. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987\1 called
for the establishment of a joint service special operations
capability under a single command.  In April 1987, the Secretary of
Defense established the U.S.  Special Operations Command (USSOCOM),
whose mission is to provide trained and combat-ready special
operations forces to the five geographic CINCs.  The law listed 10
activities over which the Command would exercise authority as they
relate to special operations:  (1) direct action, (2) special
reconnaissance, (3) unconventional warfare, (4) foreign internal
defense, (5) civil affairs operations, (6) psychological operations,
(7) counterterrorism activities, (8) humanitarian assistance, (9)
theater search and rescue, and (10) other activities as may be
specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense (see app.  I). 
Consequently, SOF are used for a wide range of military activities
and other activities that include augmenting embassy staffs,
conducting counternarcotics activities, and training local law
enforcement and U.S.  government agency personnel. 

SOF differ from conventional forces in that they are specially
organized, trained, and equipped to achieve military, political,
economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional means. 
Special operations are conducted independently or in coordination
with conventional forces during peacetime--operations short of
declared war or intense warfare--and war.  Political and military
considerations sometimes shape special operations and often require
clandestine, covert, or low-visibility techniques.  Special
operations also significantly differ from conventional operations
because of their enhanced physical and political risks, operational
techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support,
and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous
assets. 

USSOCOM comprises a wide variety of units:  Army Special Forces
(Green Berets), Rangers, special operations aviation units, civil
affairs units, and psychological operations units; Navy Sea-Air-Land
(SEAL) units and Special Boat units; and an Air Force Special
Operations wing and a Special Tactics Group (see app.  II).  To
create a force capable of proficiency across this wide range of
special activities, USSOCOM provides extensive and expensive
training.  Although most personnel entering SOF have already
undergone basic military training, they must be further trained to
accomplish special operations missions.  The qualification training
for SOF personnel is provided through USSOCOM's service component
commands.  The cost for such training varies greatly by military
specialty.  For example, the cost of SOF qualification for an MC-130H
aircrew varies from about $536,000\2 for the pilot to about $181,000
for the loadmaster; the approximate cost of the entire five-man crew
is $1.4 million.  Similarly, the cost of SOF qualification for a
six-man MH-53J helicopter crew is about $1.7 million.  The estimated
cost of qualifying an Army Special Forces officer was $79,000 in
fiscal year 1995, and according to Navy personnel, the cost of the
basic training for a Navy SEAL is about $33,000, exclusive of jump
school and SEAL tactical training.  These costs do not include the
cost of the continual in-unit training that takes place once the SOF
servicemember is assigned. 

With its own budget, which has averaged about $3 billion per year
since fiscal year 1990, USSOCOM manages a force of almost 47,000
personnel--30,000 active duty servicemembers, 14,000 reserve and
National Guard personnel, and 3,000 civilians.  Of the 30,000 active
duty servicemembers, 14,000 are special operations qualified
personnel assigned to deployable units.  (See app.  III.) The rest
serve in functional areas such as maintenance or logistics. 

During an average week, between 2,000 and 3,000 SOF personnel are
deployed on 150 missions in 60 to 70 countries and are under the
command of the respective theater CINC.  SOF units based within the
continental United States are under the command of USSOCOM and have a
worldwide orientation or are oriented toward a specific theater of
operation.  All these forces continuously train to deploy and meet
CINC needs. 

To perform missions in support of the regional strategy, the theater
CINC employs SOF that are forward based in the theater or that are in
the theater on routine deployments (the Navy SEALs' 6-month
deployments, for example).  If insufficient forces are available in
theater, the CINC will make a request for USSOCOM forces to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.  Once a deployment has been approved by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, specific SOF units or
individuals are deployed to the theater of the requesting CINC and,
with a few exceptions, are under the CINC's operational control. 
Upon completing the deployment, the specific SOF units or individuals
return to USSOCOM's operational control. 


--------------------
\1 Public Law 99-661 (Nov.  14, 1986), codified at 10 U.S.C.  section
167. 

\2 This cost includes about $215,000 for aircraft simulator time. 
Although the other crew members all receive training along with the
pilot, the costs are allocated for pilots only, since they drive the
use of simulators. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

SOF are considered an essential element for achieving U.S.  national
security objectives.  In general, there is a common understanding of
and agreement on primary SOF mission priorities between the CINCs and
SOF unit commanders assigned to each of the CINCs, and the CINCs
often consider SOF their force of choice for many diverse combat and
peacetime missions.  However, there is some disparity on the
priorities for collateral activities for SOF, such as embassy support
and antiterrorism activities. 

Little reliable data is available on the frequency and types of SOF
missions that would allow an analysis of SOF missions relative to
CINC priorities and regional strategy requirements, and historical
data on deployment days for all SOF elements are not available. 
Nevertheless, responses to our questionnaire from almost 200
senior-level officers and enlisted personnel in SOF units indicated
that they believe the deployments of SOF units have increased to the
point that SOF readiness has been, or threatens to be, degraded. 
Specifically, 60, 56, and 86 percent of the Army, Navy, and Air Force
respondents to our questionnaire, respectively, said they believe
readiness has been, or threatens to be, adversely affected by the
current level of unit deployments.  In addition, SOF unit leaders
believe that SOF are performing some missions that could be handled
by conventional forces. 

Opportunities exist to reduce the perceived high pace of operations,
according to responses to our questionnaire.  There may be
opportunities to use conventional forces instead of SOF for some
collateral missions, such as embassy support, and for missions that
are already the responsibility of conventional forces, such as combat
search and rescue.  However, without basic, reliable, quantifiable
information on the nature and extent of actual SOF missions, the way
in which SOF personnel are deployed, and the impact of unit
deployments on SOF readiness, USSOCOM cannot identify such
opportunities to achieve the appropriate levels of deployment and
ensure that SOF are properly used.  Therefore, we believe that action
is needed to complete a system that will allow (1) the pace of SOF
operations to be measured and assessed relative to national security
objectives and SOF training needs and (2) the identification of the
factors that cause SOF personnel to be deployed in excess of
established deployment goals. 


   OPERATIONS PROVIDE VALUABLE
   SUPPORT TO REGIONAL STRATEGIES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

SOF are considered to be an essential element for the CINCs'
successful implementation of U.S.  national security objectives.  SOF
have come to be the CINCs' force of choice in many instances.  In two
of the five theater commands we visited, CINC officials and SOF unit
leaders oriented to those theaters agreed on the top three mission
categories SOF should conduct to support the CINCs' regional
strategies.  There was, however, some disparity between the views of
CINC officials and SOF unit leaders on mission priorities in the
remaining three theaters, and there was less agreement overall on the
priorities of collateral missions performed by SOF, such as embassy
support and antiterrorism activities. 

Officials at the major commands we visited expressed a high degree of
satisfaction with SOF support of their regional requirements.  They
said the CINCs consider SOF the force of choice for many diverse
combat and peacetime missions.  For example, officials at the
European Command said that SOF are critical to the CINC's ability to
conduct engagement activities with an increasingly smaller force. 
For crisis response in the current low-intensity security
environment, the staff considered SOF as the most important. 
Officials in both the European and Pacific Commands said they plan to
employ SOF first when a potential crisis develops, forming a joint
SOF task force to assess the situation, advise the CINC, and prepare
the area for follow-on action, if necessary. 

More significantly, officials at the Southern Command said that
nothing could be done militarily in the theater without SOF.  They
stated that the Command's area of responsibility, which comprises
many countries that do not commit much funding to their militaries,
was "made for SOF." The primary activities in this theater are the
training of foreign military officials, counternarcotics operations,
and miscellaneous other-than-war operations--activities in which SOF
excel.  Officials said that SOF are also good ambassadors for the
United States. 

The CINCs use SOF as one of the elements available to them to support
their regional strategies.  Because of their extensive training,
relative maturity, and in most cases language skills and cultural
orientation, SOF are well-suited to perform a wide variety of
missions, ranging from direct action, rapid response missions, to
foreign internal defense missions\3 that support the CINCs' peacetime
strategies.  Table 1 shows each CINC's top three SOF mission
priorities, as reported to us, and highlights how priorities vary
among the theaters. 



                                Table 1
                
                Top Three SOF Mission Priorities at the
                             Major Commands

                                  SOF mission priority
                  ----------------------------------------------------
Major command     First             Second            Third
----------------  ----------------  ----------------  ----------------
U.S. European     Counterprolifera  Foreign internal  Special
Command           tion              defense           reconnaissance

U.S. Pacific      Special           Counterterrorism  Counterprolifera
Command           reconnaissance                      tion

U.S. Atlantic     Foreign internal  Special           Counterterrorism
Command           defense           reconnaissance

U.S. Central      Counterterrorism  Counterprolifera  Special
Command                             tion              reconnaissance

U.S. Southern     Foreign internal  Special           Counterterrorism
Command           defense           reconnaissance
----------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------
\3 These missions include training, advising, and helping host nation
military and paramilitary forces to combat subversion, lawlessness,
and insurgency. 


      EXTENT OF A COMMON
      UNDERSTANDING OF REGIONAL
      PRIORITIES FOR SOF MISSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1

To ensure that regional priorities are understood and addressed by
SOF, each of the CINCs has a subunified command to serve as an
executive agent for SOF use.  The theater Special Operations
Commander advises the geographic CINC regarding SOF use and
capabilities and plans and coordinates joint SOF activities within
the command.  He also exercises command and control over the SOF
forces assigned, which generally do not include Army civil affairs
and psychological operations personnel.  These assets are generally
controlled directly by the geographic CINC. 

The theater special operations commanders appear to have had some,
albeit not complete, success in establishing a common understanding
of primary SOF mission\4 priorities in the theaters.  Responses to
the "primary SOF missions" segment of our questionnaire show that in
the European and Southern Commands, CINC officials and the leaders of
Army SOF units oriented to those theaters agree on the top three
mission categories for supporting the CINCs' regional strategies. 
Our questionnaire results showed disparities in primary mission
priorities in the Pacific, Central, and the Atlantic Commands, as
shown in table 2. 



                                     Table 2
                     
                       Priorities for Primary SOF Missions

                              Primary SOF mission
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Foreig
            n
       intern                                                              Direc
           al       Special                                      Counter-    t
       defens  reconnaissan  Unconvention                     proliferati  actio
            e            ce    al warfare   Counterterrorism           on    n
Europ
 ean
 Comm
 and
CINC        2             3             6                  4            1    5
10th        1             2             4                  5            3    6
 Spec
 ial
 Forc
 es
 Grou
 p
Pacif
 ic
 Comm
 and
CINC        4             1             5                  2            3    6
1st         1             2             3                  4            5    6
 Spec
 ial
 Forc
 es
 Grou
 p
Atlan
 tic
 Comm
 and
CINC        1             2             5                  3            6    4
3rd         1             3             2                  6            5    4
 Spec
 ial
 Forc
 es
 Grou
 p
Centr
 al
 Comm
 and
CINC        4             3             5                  1            2    6
5th         2             1             3                  6            4    5
 Spec
 ial
 Forc
 es
 Grou
 p
South
 ern
 Comm
 and
CINC        1             2             6                  3            4    5
7th         1             3             5                  2            6    4
 Spec
 ial
 Forc
 es
 Grou
 p
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
It should be noted that table 2 displays only Army Special Forces
units that are forward deployed in a theater or oriented to it.  The
CINCs also have available to meet their priorities Navy SOF deployed
in theater on a rotating basis, Air Force SOF to support special
operations activities in the theater, and other Army SOF. 
Additionally, some disparity between CINC and SOF unit priorities may
be attributed to differences in the service's vision of mission
employment and the larger joint service view of regional
requirements. 

Navy SOF unit leaders' responses also indicated priorities similar to
the priorities indicated by the three CINCs in whose area they are
forward deployed.  They did, however, differ on the priorities of
foreign internal defense and direct action missions.  For example,
the leaders of SEAL units oriented to the European and Southern
Commands reported that foreign internal defense missions should be
low in priority for their units, while CINC officials reported that
foreign internal defense was a high priority.  Unlike the Army
Special Forces, SEALs generally do not receive language or cultural
awareness training.  According to SEAL officers and noncommissioned
officers we talked to, potential problems with language are typically
resolved by augmenting SEAL personnel with interpreters.  However,
officials from both SEAL Groups expressed concern that increased
involvement in foreign internal defense missions may be having a
detrimental effect on the SEAL community.  They said that such
involvement may be altering the expectations of younger SEALs and
causing them to consider leaving the community because SEALs have
traditionally been a direct-action force.  They also said they
believed that SEAL units engaged in foreign internal defense
activities had lost some proficiency in war-fighting skills due to a
lack of training opportunities and, because foreign internal defense
activities are often done by smaller contingents, the unit integrity
of the SEAL platoon had been disrupted. 


--------------------
\4 Primary missions are those for which SOP were organized, trained,
and equipped. 


      COLLATERAL DUTIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2

According to responses to our questionnaire, CINCs and SOF unit
leaders do not always agree on the priority of collateral missions\5
that SOF personnel and units are routinely assigned.  For example,
CINC officials at the European Command ranked embassy support as
their number two priority for SOF collateral activities.  However,
the leaders at the two Army Special Forces Groups and the Naval
Special Warfare Group oriented to the theater ranked embassy support
their number six priority out of nine collateral activities. 
Similarly, in the Pacific Command, CINC officials ranked
antiterrorism their number one priority for collateral activities,
while Army and Navy unit officials consider it their number seven and
four priority, respectively.  Moreover, leaders at the Special Forces
Group and the Naval Special Warfare Group assigned to the Pacific
Command prioritized personnel recovery activities as numbers one and
two collateral activities, respectively, while CINC officials ranked
personnel recovery as number seven. 


--------------------
\5 Collateral missions include activities other than those for which
SOF are organized, trained, and equipped. 


   PACE OF OPERATIONS AND THE
   IMPACT ON SOF READINESS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

In 1995 SOF commanders began to express concern about high levels of
unit deployments (referred to as operating tempo, or OPTEMPO) and
their effect on personnel who were repeatedly away from home for
prolonged periods.  As one commander stated in a memorandum to his
subordinate commands, these deployments "have an adverse impact on
retention, create problems for families, and erode our ability to
maintain the training edge required to fight and win on the
battlefield." Accordingly, USSOCOM initiated efforts to manage
OPTEMPO, including efforts to improve usage data and the development
of a system to monitor the extent to which SOF individuals are
deployed away from home (known as personnel tempo, or PERSTEMPO). 

During our review, we obtained data on current PERSTEMPO rates but
found that prior years' information was not collected or was not
maintained.  The data available revealed that PERSTEMPO varied widely
among SOF units and that some military specialties had high
deployment rates.  Perhaps more important, however, according to
USSOCOM officials, there was no valid data on OPTEMPO to allow for
identification of the factors driving the deployment rates, that is,
what types of activities (for example, training, exercises, and
contingency operations) were increasing and to what degree. 

Although the lack of data did not allow for verification or
quantification of OPTEMPO increases, we did determine that SOF
commanders and staff at the unit level perceive that the increased
rate is adversely affecting their units.  In response to our
questionnaire, the majority of the SOF commanders, staff officers,
and senior enlisted personnel who responded said they believe that
OPTEMPO increases have caused or threatened to cause adverse effects
on readiness. 


      EMPIRICAL DATA ON SOF
      ACTIVITIES IS INACCURATE OR
      INCOMPLETE
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1

Although all commands could provide general information on the types
of missions for which SOF were used, little data were available on
the actual missions and the extent to which they were performed. 
Officials at USSOCOM and the service component commands told us they
have not collected and maintained accurate and complete information
on the numbers of actual missions categorized by mission type. 
Therefore, we could not analyze actual SOF use relative to CINC
priorities. 

USSOCOM develops weekly information on the number of personnel
deployed in total and by country.  This information is used primarily
to develop status briefings for the Commander, USSOCOM.  Officials
told us, however, that data collected prior to fiscal year 1996 were
highly inaccurate due to a lack of consistent definitions for the
different types of missions and incomplete reporting by the SOF
component commands.  USSOCOM officials told us they are still working
to develop standardized mission categories for mission reporting. 

Of the three SOF service component commands, only the Army Special
Operations Command maintains force utilization information by mission
type.  Officials said they maintain information from 1993 to the
present on the number of deployments by type of mission (for example,
counternarcotics and Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises), personnel
deployed by mission type, and the number of personnel deployed to
each CINC.  However, officials told us that inconsistent mission-type
reporting has distorted the categories in which missions are recorded
and that trying to develop a trend on SOF use over time by mission
type could produce misleading results. 

Officials at the Navy Special Warfare Command and the Air Force
Special Operations Command said they do not maintain complete
information on the types of missions fulfilled by their personnel. 
Navy officials told us they are not required to keep such
information, and since their personnel are under a CINC's command and
control, they had not recognized a need for this type of information. 
Air Force Special Operations Command officials told us their job is
to provide the needed support, such as clandestine infiltration, and
they had no need to maintain records on the overall purpose of the
mission. 

USSOCOM officials told us they recognize the need for information on
SOF use by mission category, and the Command is developing standard
mission definitions as an essential first step toward quantifying
missions and identifying the mission areas that are increasing. 
These definitions were finalized during the second quarter of fiscal
year 1997, and USSOCOM officials said that the first information
using these definitions could be available at the end of the fiscal
year. 


      USSOCOM HAS MONITORED SOME
      DEPLOYMENT STATISTICS, BUT
      ACTUAL RATES FOR SOME
      PERSONNEL ARE UNDERSTATED
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2

In October 1995, USSOCOM implemented a system for collecting
information on personnel deployment rates.  The system requires
commanders to submit quarterly information on officer and enlisted
personnel and job position categories.  USSOCOM officials use this
data to identify the personnel categories with higher than desired
deployment rates. 

The reporting system requires unit officials to determine the total
number of days that personnel in each category were deployed during
the quarter and divide the total by the number of personnel assigned
in each category to derive an average deployment rate for each
category.  These rates are compared with USSOCOM and service
component deployment goals to identify personnel groups that have
exceeded established deployment goals.  USSOCOM officials said that
the Army's goal for the maximum number of days deployed per year is
179, and the Air Force's goal is 120 days.  The Navy's goal is 180
days over an 18-month period.  USSOCOM has not officially established
a goal, but officials told us that the informal goal was not to
exceed 180 days per year. 

The methodology that USSOCOM has directed its units to use in
calculating personnel deployment rates results in an understatement
of the actual rate for some categories of personnel.  The figures
reported are understated because they are an average of all SOF
personnel, including staff personnel who do not routinely deploy. 
For example, through June 30 in fiscal year 1996, the reported
average of the number of days officers on one SEAL team were deployed
was 115.  However, if only the officers in the operational platoons
are included, the average is 158 days.  Similarly, for all enlisted
members, the reported average number of days deployed was 122, while
the average for those assigned to the operational platoons was 163
days. 

Ignoring this deficiency, however, the system does provide USSOCOM
with an awareness of deployment activity by specific unit, personnel
categories, and military specialties.  However, USSOCOM lacks, as
noted above, specific data on the actual use, which would allow it to
determine the causes of excessive deployments.  And unless the causes
are identified, it is difficult for USSOCOM to identify alternatives
for alleviating the situation. 


      UNIT-LEVEL COMMANDERS AND
      STAFF BELIEVE INCREASES IN
      OPTEMPO AFFECT READINESS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3

Because reliable data on historical OPTEMPO rates were not available,
we interviewed SOF unit leaders and used our questionnaire to
determine whether unit-level commanders and staff believed increasing
OPTEMPO rates had affected, or threatened to affect, readiness,
retention, and morale.  The interview results were contradicted by
the questionnaire results.  During meetings with unit-level leaders,
we were told that OPTEMPO has historically been high but has not
increased significantly in recent years.  According to Army
officials, the number of days deployed had stayed about the same, and
the Navy SEALs said that, because their deployments are for the most
part based on long-standing commitments to the CINCs, the rate had
remained fairly stable.  Air Force officials said that OPTEMPO had
remained at high levels, especially in units performing combat search
and rescue and in special tactics units. 

The results of our questionnaire indicated that some SOF unit leaders
held opinions quite different from those expressed during the
interviews.  The results show that the majority of respondents
believed that OPTEMPO increases had caused, or threatened to cause,
adverse effects on readiness.  Table 3 shows the percentage of those
responding who believe that OPTEMPO increases have adversely affected
readiness, morale, and retention. 



                                Table 3
                
                SOF Unit Responses to Our Questionnaire
                        on the Effect of OPTEMPO

                         (Percent of responses)

                                                                   Air
Views of SOF commanders and staff                 Army    Navy   Force
----------------------------------------------  ------  ------  ------
OPTEMPO increases have adversely affected unit      60      56      86
OPTEMPO has adversely affected readiness            45      44      67
OPTEMPO has adversely affected morale               45      34      86
OPTEMPO has adversely affected retention            40      32      81
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 4 provides the percentages of responses from particular Special
Operations Forces leaders who believe that OPTEMPO has affected unit
readiness. 



                                Table 4
                
                SOF Unit Responses to Our Questionnaire
                 on the Effect of Increased OPTEMPO on
                               Readiness

                                                            Percent of
                                                       respondents who
                                                     said that OPTEMPO
                                                         had adversely
Unit                                                affected readiness
--------------------------------------------------  ------------------
Army Unit A                                                         50
Army Unit B                                                         30
Army Unit C                                                         88
Army Unit D                                                         53
Air Force Unit E                                                    50
Air Force Unit F                                                    67
Navy Unit G                                                         58
Navy Unit H                                                         32
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note:  The SOF units included are coded to protect the
confidentiality of the respondents. 

Nothing in our review indicates the extent to which readiness has
been affected, and the impact of the perceived increased OPTEMPO on
SOF readiness is not readily apparent in DOD's current readiness
reporting system.  For example, over the past 3 years, the Status of
Resources and Training System (SORTS)\6 reports submitted by Army SOF
unit commanders have continually reported high levels of readiness. 
However, SORTS, as we have reported previously and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff agrees, does not capture all the factors that DOD considers
critical to a comprehensive readiness analysis.\7 For example, SORTS
does not provide information on factors such as mobility, OPTEMPO,
morale, and leadership.  As a result of the lack of supporting data,
we were unable to substantiate the concerns of unit officials
regarding readiness. 

SOF unit leaders also believe that increased OPTEMPO has affected
personnel retention and morale.  Table 5 shows the percentage of
responding SOF unit leaders who told us that retention and morale had
been adversely affected. 



                                Table 5
                
                SOF Unit Responses to Our Questionnaire
                 on the Effect of Increased OPTEMPO on
                          Retention and Morale

                         (Percent of responses)

                                           OPTEMPO has     OPTEMPO has
                                             adversely       adversely
                                              affected        affected
Unit                                         retention          morale
--------------------------------------  --------------  --------------
Army Unit A                                         65              55
Army Unit B                                         50              60
Army Unit C                                         63              63
Army Unit D                                         33              47
Air Force Unit E                                    75              75
Air Force Unit F                                   100             100
Navy Unit G                                         32              42
Navy Unit H                                         32              27
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note:  The SOF units included are coded to protect the
confidentiality of the respondents. 


--------------------
\6 SORTS measures the extent to which units possess the required
resources and are trained to undertake their wartime missions.  These
measurements, called C-ratings, are probably the readiness indicator
most often cited. 

\7 Army Training:  Evaluations of Units' Proficiency Are Not Always
Reliable (GAO/NSIAD-91-72, Feb.  15, 1991); Military Readiness:  DOD
Needs to Develop a More Comprehensive Measurement System
(GAO/NSIAD-95-29, Oct.  27, 1994); Military Readiness:  Improvements
Still Needed in Assessing Military Readiness (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-107,
Mar.  11, 1997). 


   OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO REDUCE
   SOF OPTEMPO
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

Given USSOCOM's concern about OPTEMPO and the widespread belief that
it is affecting SOF readiness, retention, and morale, we examined the
potential for reducing OPTEMPO.  According to CINC and SOF unit
officials, conventional forces could handle many activities routinely
assigned to SOF personnel.  These officials generally agreed that the
missions that offer the greatest potential for the use of
conventional forces are humanitarian assistance, embassy support, and
support to other government agencies.  Additionally, some SOF leaders
told us that the use of SEALs in Navy Amphibious Ready Groups does
not constitute good use of these forces, and Air Force SOF are used
for combat search and rescue missions that are the responsibility of
conventional forces. 

Because reliable data by type of mission were not available, we could
not determine the magnitude of opportunity offered by these missions. 
However, USSOCOM publications and data provided by Joint Chiefs of
Staff officials confirm that SOF personnel are deployed for these
types of missions.  For example, in fiscal year 1996, SOF personnel
were assigned to embassy support duties in all theaters of operation
and were used on humanitarian assistance missions in the Pacific and
European Commands. 


      AIR FORCE SOF ARE USED FOR
      CONVENTIONAL COMBAT SEARCH
      AND RESCUE MISSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1

Although conventional combat search and rescue missions are the
responsibility of conventional forces, Air Force SOF have been
continually used for these missions.  Currently, Air Force SOF are
performing 70 percent of conventional combat search and rescue
missions worldwide, which contributes to the OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO
problems experienced by Air Force SOF units.  And as we reported in
1994, these missions also reduce the readiness of the SOF units
involved because crews lose proficiency due to restrictions imposed
by host nations and the lack of training opportunities.\8

The legislation that created USSOCOM identified theater search and
rescue as a SOF activity insofar as it related to special
operations.\9 Under joint doctrine, each service must provide for
combat search and rescue in support of its own operations; however,
Air Force SOF are routinely tasked to perform conventional combat
search and rescue operations.  SOF assets have been continually used
for these operations since about 1990, and Air Force Special
Operations Command officials told us that they expect that SOF will
continue to be tasked to perform the brunt of the combat search and
rescue mission for conventional forces in the foreseeable future. 

Although Air Force SOF are considered extremely capable of performing
these missions, they do so at the expense of unit and joint training
in special operations skills, the availability and sustainability of
their limited forces, and an acceptable OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO.  Unit
leaders told us that crews assigned are frequently unable to train in
the full range of required capabilities because they are restricted
by host nations.  For example, the flying hours, flight duration, and
flight profiles (night and low-level flights, for example) of the
crews deployed to Turkey in support of Operation Provide Comfort were
restricted.  One commander told us that his personnel were limited to
a 50-mile training radius.  Officials said the host nations expect
SOF to arrive there trained, not to train while there.  Similarly,
the availability of assets is limited by a requirement to maintain an
alert posture for combat search and rescue missions.  Officials at
the Air Force Special Operations Command in the European Command said
that about 20 percent of their force must be on alert status at all
times for combat search and rescue missions.  Further, officials said
the SOF crews assigned to support this conventional mission suffer
high levels of PERSTEMPO, which keeps them deployed near or above the
120-day goal the Air Force has established. 

Who should perform Air Force combat search and rescue missions has
been an issue since 1990 when the Air Force Special Operations
Command was created from the 23rd Air Force, which had been tasked
with the missions.  The transfer left the Air Force without the
specialized aircraft or aircrews trained to conduct the missions. 
The capability to do combat search and rescue was to be developed
within the Air Force's Air Combat Command, and the Command was
expected to assume the combat search and rescue role by the end of
fiscal year 1994.  However, this never occurred.  USSOCOM is
presenting a proposal to the Air Force that would continue to have
the Air Force Special Operations Command perform combat search and
rescue missions, but the Air Force would fund them.  Nevertheless,
performing these missions will continue to generate high levels of
PERSTEMPO for SOF crews performing these conventional missions. 


--------------------
\8 Special Operations Forces:  Force Structure and Readiness Issues
(GAO/NSIAD-94-105, Mar.  24, 1994). 

\9 Public Law 99-661 (Nov.  14, 1986), codified at 10 U.S.C.  section
167(j). 


      SEAL OFFICIALS BELIEVE
      SHIPBOARD DEPLOYMENTS
      ADVERSELY AFFECT PROFICIENCY
      AND READINESS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.2

At all times, the Navy SEALs have a platoon deployed with each of the
three Amphibious Ready Groups.  The Group includes a Marine
Expeditionary Unit and provides the CINC with a mobile,
rapid-response force under his operational control.  Both the Marine
units and the SEAL platoons rotate to the continental United States
after a 6-month deployment.  The SEAL platoon is intended to provide
the Group with a special operations capability, including the
capability to survey and reconnoiter potential landing sites in a
clandestine manner. 

SEAL unit commanders told us that they consider the 6-month
deployment to be a "less than efficient" use of the highly trained
SEAL platoon.  Because of the limited space and assets on ships,
training opportunities are extremely limited and the platoon loses
proficiency.  Moreover, the SEAL unit has to compete for the limited
operational opportunities with the Marines, particularly the Marine
Reconnaissance Unit, which possesses many of the same skills as a
SEAL platoon. 

SEAL officials at the Naval Special Warfare Group and team levels
told us that to reduce OPTEMPO and provide better training
opportunities, they have proposed alternative methods of providing
the Group with the SEAL support, but no action has been taken.  They
maintain that the Amphibious Ready Groups' most pressing need for
SEALs is the hydrographic survey of landing sites and that with
today's air transportation capabilities, SEALs based in the United
States or ashore in a specific theater could be at a proposed site
well ahead of the Group and provide the surveys in a more timely
manner. 


   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

SOF are considered an essential element for the CINCs' successful
implementation of national security objectives, and in less than a
decade these forces have proven themselves the CINCs' force of choice
for many types of missions.  SOF's reputation has been earned by
their acceptance and accomplishment of a wide variety of missions. 

We cannot determine precise increases in SOF activity due to the lack
of reliable quantitative and qualitative data collected over the
years.  For the same reason, we cannot determine the specific ways in
which SOF have been used.  Many SOF unit leaders that responded to
our questionnaire are convinced, however, that OPTEMPO has adversely
affected readiness, retention, and morale. 

SOF unit leaders also believe that SOF are being used for missions
that do not require their skills and that in some instances degrade
their skills.  In addition, unit leaders and CINC officials believe
that conventional forces could fulfill missions routinely performed
by SOF.  Consequently, USSOCOM and the services may have
opportunities to manage SOF OPTEMPO, with the CINCs' concurrence, if
conventional units can be tasked to perform those missions. 

To maintain the readiness of SOF to support national security
objectives and help ensure that readiness is not degraded through
overuse or improper use of SOF, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Commander, USSOCOM, to

  -- complete the Command's efforts to develop an information system
     for monitoring how the Command's forces are used and establish a
     methodology for periodically comparing SOF usage with the CINCs'
     priorities and SOF training needs and

  -- exploit potential opportunities to reduce some SOF deployments
     that do not prepare SOF to perform SOF-unique missions in
     support of national security objectives and that can be
     performed by conventional forces. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with its
accuracy.  DOD stated that the report discusses the various
components of SOF in a way that provides a comprehensive view of the
potential for overuse and misuse. 

DOD concurred with both of our recommendations and stated that it has
already initiated actions that focus on deployments for SOF and other
low-density/high- demand forces.  For example, DOD indicated that the
Global Military Force Policy, instituted in July 1996, is expected to
help senior leaders establish peacetime priorities for
low-density/high-demand assets.  The first data available for
interpretation from the policy is to be available during fiscal year
1998, according to DOD.  Also, DOD stated that while the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff already reviews the use of all U.S.  forces
to ensure proper employment, USSOCOM must retain the latitude to
ensure that SOF users are carefully consulted to preclude elimination
of deployments where SOF involvement could have significant impact on
mission objectives. 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

We developed a data collection instrument using the Analytical
Hierarchy Process (see app.  IV) to rank the most valuable missions
for SOF.  The instrument was distributed to all the theater CINCs'
staffs, the special operations commanders in each theater, and SOF
units worldwide.  It was used to obtain information concerning CINC
priorities for SOF activities by theater of operations, SOF
unit-level leaders' understanding of regional priorities,
perspectives on the best missions for SOF in each theater, and a
prioritization of activities that could be accomplished by
conventional forces.  The instrument also included questions to
obtain unit-level staffs' opinions on OPTEMPO increases and the
resulting effect on readiness, retention, and morale in their units. 

To obtain additional supporting data, we visited four of the five
theater CINCs, the USSOCOM CINC, the three service component
headquarters, four of five Special Forces Groups, both Navy SEAL
Groups, and two Air Force Special Operations Groups.  (See app.  V
for a complete list of sites we visited.) We also interviewed
officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and the Special
Operations Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Because we were
interested in the extent to which SOF are deployed and how they are
used, our review primarily focused on active duty units, which are
normally deployed first to meet mission requirements.  We did,
however, meet with psychological operations and civil affairs
personnel from SOF reserve units during our visits to the European
and Pacific Commands.  The purpose of these meetings was to gain an
understanding of OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO challenges faced by these
low-density/high-deploying personnel. 

In addition, we examined the legislation that established USSOCOM,
Joint Chiefs of Staff publications, and historical publications
provided by the services. 

Our review was conducted from October 1995 through March 1997 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :8.1

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking
Minority Members of the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations
and the Senate Committee on Armed Services; the Secretaries of
Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commander of the
U.S.  Special Operations Command; and the Director, Office of
Management and Budget.  We will also make copies available to others
upon request. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report.  Major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix VII. 

Sincerely yours,

Mark E.  Gebicke
Director, Military Operations and
 Capabilities Issues


ACTIVITIES ASSIGNED TO SPECIAL
OPERATIONS FORCES
=========================================================== Appendix I

Title 10 U.S.C.  section 167(j) lists 10 activities over which the
U.S.  Special Operations Command exercises authority as they relate
to special operations.  These activities and a brief description of
each activity follow: 

Direct actions are short duration strikes and other small-scale
offensive actions to (1) seize, destroy, or inflict damage on a
specified target or (2) destroy, capture, or recover designated
personnel or material. 

Special reconnaissance is conducted to obtain or verify, by visual
observation or other collection means, information concerning the
capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential
enemy or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrological,
geographic, or demographic characteristics of a particular area.  It
includes target acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike
reconnaissance. 

Unconventional warfare is a broad spectrum of military and
paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly
conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized,
trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an
external source.  It includes guerrilla warfare and other
direct-offensive, low-visibility, covert, or clandestine operations
as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage,
intelligence collection, and evasion and escape. 

Foreign internal defense is conducted to assist another government to
free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and
insurgency.  Special operations forces train, advise, and otherwise
assist host nation military and paramilitary forces. 

Counterterrorism is the application of highly specialized
capabilities to preempt or resolve terrorist incidents abroad,
including (1) hostage rescue, (2) recovery of sensitive material from
terrorist organizations, and (3) direct action against the terrorist
infrastructure. 

Civil affairs operations are to establish, maintain, influence, or
strengthen relations between U.S.  and allied military forces, civil
authorities, and people in a friendly or occupied country or area. 

Psychological operations are to support other military operations
through the use of mass media techniques and other actions to
favorably influence the emotions, attitudes, and behavior of a
foreign audience on behalf of U.S.  interests. 

Humanitarian assistance is provided to relieve or reduce the results
of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as
human pain, disease, hunger, or deprivation that might present a
serious threat to life or loss of property.  This assistance
supplements or complements the efforts of host nation civil
authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for
providing this assistance. 

Theater search and rescue is performed to recover distressed
personnel during wartime or contingency operations. 

Other activities are specified by the President or the Secretary of
Defense, such as counterproliferation, which was specified in May
1995. 


U.S.  SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND'S
MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMANDS AND
UNITS
========================================================== Appendix II


   ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1

The Command is responsible for all U.S.-based active and reserve
Special Forces; Rangers; Special Operations Aviation, Psychological
Operations, Civil Affairs, and support units; and selected special
mission and support units assigned by the Secretary of Defense. 

Special Forces (Green Berets) are organized into five active and two
National Guard groups.  The groups are organized, trained, and
equipped to conduct the five primary special operations missions of
direct action, special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare,
foreign internal defense, and counterterrorism.  Special Forces
soldiers train, advise, and assist host nation military or
paramilitary forces. 

Rangers are organized into a regiment that contains a headquarters
company and three battalions.  There are no reserve Ranger units. 
The Rangers are rapidly deployable, airborne, light infantry units
that are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct complex joint
strike operations.  These units can also operate as light infantry in
support of conventional missions. 

Special Operations Aviation is organized into an active regiment with
three battalions, a detachment in Panama, and a National Guard
battalion.  These units provide dedicated specialized aviation
support to other special operations forces.  Their missions include
armed attack; inserting, extracting, and resupplying personnel;
aerial security; medical evacuation; electronic warfare; mine
dispersal; and command and control support. 

Psychological operations forces are organized into one active and two
reserve psychological groups that vary in number and types of
subordinate units depending on their mission and geographic
alignment.  Their mission is to study and be prepared to influence
the emotions, attitudes, and behaviors of foreign audiences on behalf
of U.S.  and allied interests.  They operate with conventional and
other special operations forces to advise and assist host nations in
support of special operations missions such as counterinsurgency,
foreign internal defense, and civil affairs programs. 

Civil Affairs units comprise 3 Army reserve commands, 9 reserve
brigades, 24 reserve battalions, and one active battalion.  The
units' primary function is to establish favorable relationships
between the U.S.  military and foreign governments and populations. 
Moreover, civil affairs forces assist military operations through
population or refugee control and support to other U.S.  agencies. 

The reserve civil affairs units provide professional civilian skills
such as police, judicial, logistical, engineering, and other civil
functions that are unavailable in the one active unit. 


   AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS
   COMMAND AND FORCES
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2

The Command has one Special Operations Wing, two Special Operations
Groups, and one Special Tactics Group in its active force and one
Special Operations Wing in its reserve force. 

The Command's primary missions are to organize, train, and equip its
units, but it may also train, assist, and advise the air forces of
other nations in support of foreign internal defense missions.  The
Command operates uniquely equipped fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft
for missions that include inserting, extracting, and resupplying
personnel; aerial fire support; refueling; and psychological
operations.  Its aircraft are capable of operating in hostile
airspace, at low altitudes, under darkness or adverse weather
conditions in collaboration with Army and Navy Special Operations
Forces (SOF). 


   NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMAND
   AND FORCES
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:3

The Command has two naval special warfare groups, one naval special
warfare development group, and two special boat squadrons split
between the east and west coasts of the United States.  Each special
warfare group includes three Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) teams and one SEAL
delivery vehicle team.  Each squadron includes subordinate special
boat units (three on the east coast and two on the west coast). 
Naval special warfare forces deployed outside the United States
receive support from permanently deployed naval special warfare units
located in Panama, Germany, Puerto Rico, Guam, Spain, and Bahrain. 

The six active SEAL teams are organized into headquarters elements
and ten 16-man operational platoons.  Navy SEALs, like Army Green
Berets, are organized, trained, and equipped primarily to conduct
direct action, special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare,
foreign internal defense, and counterterrorism missions.  They
conduct these missions primarily in maritime and riverine
environments.  SEALs can also directly support conventional naval and
maritime operations. 


   JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS
   COMMAND
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:4

This Command is a joint headquarters designed to study special
operations requirements and techniques; ensure interoperability and
equipment standardization; plan and conduct special operations
exercises and training; and develop joint special operations tactics. 


ACTIVE AND RESERVE SPECIAL
OPERATIONS COMPONENT FORCES
ASSIGNED TO THE U.S.  SPECIAL
OPERATIONS COMMAND
========================================================= Appendix III



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

\a Sea-Air-Land units. 

Source:  Special Operations Command. 


DESCRIPTION OF ANALYTICAL
HIERARCHY PROCESS MODEL
========================================================== Appendix IV

The Analytical Hierarchy Process model is an organized way to
evaluate research questions.  It allows a researcher to divide an
issue by its major elements.  These elements are then organized into
levels, which move from the general to the specific.  To implement
the model in this review, we used the commercial software package
Expert Choice by Expert Choice, Incorporated, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania.  This software allows the researcher to evaluate the
respondents' judgments as to which elements in the model are more
important than others and derives prioritized listings for elements
within each level. 

In typical practice, a panel of persons knowledgeable about the
subject under review is asked to evaluate one element against another
in paired comparison fashion.  For example, in a three-element
evaluation, the panelists are asked to evaluate A versus B, A versus
C, and B versus C.  In other words, regarding the goal, is element A
more important, preferred, or more likely than element B, or is
element B more important, preferred, or more likely than element A? 
Once the panelists reach consensus on which element of a pair is
preferred over the other, they are asked how much more important,
preferred, or more likely is the dominant element of the pair over
the other.  Therefore, both the preference and its intensity are
measured. 

Alternatively, the model can be used in a questionnaire mode, which
is how we employed the model during this review.  We developed a
series of one-level comparisons to reduce the workload on the
respondents.  Convening typical panels would not have been practical
because we wanted to cover as many units and individuals as possible. 

For each pair-wise comparison of our questionnaire, we collected our
respondents' judgments on a coded numerical form that measured not
only the intensity but the direction of the relationship.  In other
words, if element A was moderately preferred to B, then the value of
that judgment for that pair for that individual was entered into our
database. 

To summarize the data, we calculated the geometric mean for each
paired comparison, stratified by SOF units.  The geometric mean
dampens the effect of extremely low or extremely high judgments.  The
resulting averages were entered into the Expert Choice software,
which calculated the priorities for each set of elements for each
Commander in Chief (CINC) and SOF unit.  We printed the results for
each set of paired comparisons and analyzed the differences between
units within a service and also between services. 


LIST OF LOCATIONS VISITED
=========================================================== Appendix V

We visited the following locations during our review of SOF's
activities: 

WASHINGTON, D.C., AREA

  -- Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
     Operations/Low Intensity Conflict

  -- Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations Division

  -- Washington Office, U.S.  Special Operations Command

  -- Naval Sea Systems Command

FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA

  -- Headquarters, Army Special Operations Command

  -- U.S.  Army Special Forces Command

  -- U.S.  Army John F.  Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

  -- Third Special Forces Group

  -- Seventh Special Forces Group

  -- 528th Special Operations Support Battalion

FLORIDA

  -- Headquarters, U.S.  Special Operations Command, MacDill Air
     Force Base

  -- Air Force Special Operations Command, 16th Special Operations
     Wing, 8th Special Operations Squadron, 16th Special Operations
     Squadron, 20th Special Operations Squadron, and 720th Special
     Tactics Group, Hurlburt Field

  -- Air Force Special Operations Command, 9th Special Operations
     Squadron, Eglin Air Force Base

CORONADO, CALIFORNIA

  -- Headquarters, Naval Special Warfare Command

  -- Naval Special Warfare Center

  -- Naval Special Warfare Group One

  -- SEAL Teams One, Three, and Five

VIRGINIA

  -- Headquarters, U.S.  Atlantic Command, Special Operations
     Command-Atlantic, Norfolk

  -- Naval Special Warfare Group Two, SEAL Teams Two and Four, Little
     Creek

FORT CARSON, COLORADO

  -- Headquarters, 10th Special Forces Group

FORT LEWIS, WASHINGTON

  -- Headquarters, 1st Special Forces Group

  -- Headquarters, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment

HAWAII

  -- Headquarters, U.S.  Pacific Command

  -- Special Operations Command Pacific

  -- Headquarters, U.S.  Pacific Fleet

PANAMA

  -- Headquarters, U.S.  Southern Command

  -- Special Operations Command South

GERMANY

  -- Headquarters, U.S.  European Command

  -- Special Operations Command Europe

  -- 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group

  -- Naval Special Warfare Unit Two

  -- 352nd Special Operations Group




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix VI
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
=========================================================== Appendix V



(See figure in printed edition.)


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================= Appendix VII

NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Sharon A.  Cekala
Donald L.  Patton
Colin L.  Chambers
H.  Lee Purdy
Joseph F.  Murray

NORFOLK FIELD OFFICE

Ray S.  Carroll Jr.
James K.  Mahaffey
Lester L.  Ward
Paul A.  Gvoth Jr. 


*** End of document. ***