Force Structure: Potential Exists to Further Reduce Active Air Force
Personnel (Chapter Report, 03/28/97, GAO/NSIAD-97-78).

GAO reviewed the Air Force's personnel reduction efforts, focusing on:
(1) how the size and composition of the active Air Force has changed
since 1986; (2) whether the Air Force has sufficient numbers of
personnel to meet wartime requirements; and (3) whether there is
potential to further reduce the active force that could result in more
efficient force.

GAO noted that: (1) between fiscal year (FY) 1986 and 1997, the Air
Force will reduce its active military personnel from over 600,000 to
381,100, or by 37 percent; (2) mission forces have been reduced at a
much greater rate than infrastructure forces during the last decade; (3)
as a result, approximately two-thirds of the Air Force's 381,100 active
duty personnel are now allocated to infrastructure functions such as
installation support and acquisition; (4) further, today's smaller force
has a higher ratio of officers than in 1986; (5) potential exists to
reduce the active Air Force below the 381,100 minimum level set by
Congress, without adversely affecting the Air Force's war-fighting
capability; (6) in May 1996, GAO suggested options to consolidate
fighter squadrons which, if implemented, would permit the Air Force to
maintain the same number of aircraft but carry out its missions with
fewer active duty personnel; (7) GAO has also reported that the Air
Force could achieve savings by replacing military personnel in some
administrative and support positions with civilian employees; (8) for FY
1998, the Air Force plans to seek statutory authority to reduce the
active force by about 9,400 below the current minimum; (9) GAO's
analysis shows the majority of these planned decreases are in
infrastructure functions; (10) prompted by the Secretary of Defense's
goal to reduce infrastructure to free funds for force modernization, the
Air Force has recently identified a potential to reduce the active force
by as many as 75,000 additional military personnel beyond FY 1998; (11)
the Air Force is reviewing options for replacing military personnel
assigned to infrastructure functions with civilian employees or
contractors that may be able to perform some functions at less cost than
military personnel; (12) the actual number of active personnel that will
ultimately be replaced will depend on the results of continuing Air
Force analysis to determine whether such substitutions will be
organizationally feasible and cost-effective; (13) the Air Force
projects it would have an active wartime shortage of about 19,600
personnel if two major regional conflicts occurred; (14) however, the
Air Force does not need additional active personnel to cover this
wartime shortage because it has identified ways to compensate for the
shortage; and (15) moreover, this shortage would present little risk in*

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-97-78
     TITLE:  Force Structure: Potential Exists to Further Reduce Active 
             Air Force Personnel
      DATE:  03/28/97
   SUBJECT:  Military downsizing
             Military cost control
             Personnel management
             Military officers
             Civilian employees
             Human resources utilization
             Combat readiness
             Air Force personnel
             Defense capabilities
             Department of Defense contractors
IDENTIFIER:  DOD Future Years Defense Program
             DOD Bottom-Up Review
             Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
             EF-111 Aircraft
             Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed 
             Services
             F-111 Aircraft
             F-4 Aircraft
             F-15 Aircraft
             A-10 Aircraft
             B-52 Aircraft
             Minuteman II Missile
             FB-111 Aircraft
             RF-4G Aircraft
             B-1B Aircraft
             B-52H Aircraft
             KC-135 Aircraft
             Airborne Warning and Control System
             DOD Quadrennial Defense Review
             DOD Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study
             C-130 Aircraft
             Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
             RC-135 Aircraft
             Raven Aircraft
             Thunderbolt Aircraft
             Hercules Aircraft
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Committees

March 1997

FORCE STRUCTURE - POTENTIAL EXISTS
TO FURTHER REDUCE ACTIVE AIR FORCE
PERSONNEL

GAO/NSIAD-97-78

Force Structure

(701078)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DOD - Department of Defense
  FYDP - Future Years Defense Program
  GAO - General Accounting Office
  MRC - Major Regional Conflict
  OOTW - Operations Other Than War
  OSD - Office of the Secretary of Defense

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-272601

March 28, 1997

The Honorable Dirk Kempthorne
Chairman, Subcommittee on Personnel
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Stephen Buyer
Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives

This report discusses (1) how the size and composition of the active
Air Force has changed since 1986, (2) whether the Air Force has
sufficient numbers of personnel to meet wartime requirements, and (3)
whether there is potential to further reduce the active force that
could result in a more efficient force.  Because of your expressed
interest and oversight of military personnel issues, we are
addressing this report to you.  This report should be useful to your
Committees in their deliberations on the future size and composition
of the Air Force.  The report contains a recommendation to the
Secretary of the Air Force. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense
and the Air Force and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. 
Copies will also be made available to others on request. 

If you or your staff have any questions on this report, please call
me on (202) 512-3504.  Major contributors to this report are listed
in appendix III. 

Richard Davis
Director, National Security
 Analysis


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0


   PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

In 1996, Congress established minimum active duty personnel levels
for each service out of concern that further downsizing would impair
the Department of Defense's (DOD) ability to support two nearly
simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC).  The Air Force floor is
381,000 active duty personnel.  Since the end of the Cold War, the
Air Force has drawn down its active military forces significantly and
plans to reduce the forces to 381,100 during fiscal year 1997. 
Because of congressional concerns about active duty personnel levels,
GAO analyzed (1) how the size and composition of the active Air Force
has changed since 1986, (2) whether the Air Force has any shortfalls
in meeting its wartime requirements, and (3) whether there is
potential to further reduce the active force.  GAO did not examine
the need for the number of fighter wings, bombers, and
intercontinental missiles identified by DOD in its 1993 Bottom-Up
Review of military requirements. 


   BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

The active Air Force is divided between mission and infrastructure
forces.  For each of the services, DOD's 1993 Bottom-Up Review
established the mission force structure needed to conduct two nearly
simultaneous MRCs and implement other elements of the national
military strategy.  The Air Force's planned active mission force will
consist of 13 fighter wings, 161 bombers, 500 intercontinental
missiles, and the forces that provide direct combat support in
wartime.  Mission forces are divided into the following categories: 
combat forces; direct support forces; command, control, and
communications of combat forces; intelligence; and space.  The
infrastructure force comprises activities that provide support
services and primarily operate from fixed locations.  Infrastructure
is divided into eight categories:  acquisition management, force
management, installation support, central communications, central
logistics, central medical, central personnel, and central training. 

In fiscal year 1996, active Air Force military pay was projected to
be $19.3 billion-- $7.3 billion for mission forces and $12.0 billion
for infrastructure forces.  The Secretary of Defense has stated that
DOD must significantly reduce its infrastructure in order to
modernize its force.  In April 1996, GAO reported that operations and
maintenance and the military personnel appropriations must be reduced
if spending for infrastructure activities is to decline, since they
account for 80 percent of infrastructure funding. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

Between fiscal year 1986 and 1997, the Air Force will reduce its
active military personnel from over 600,000 to 381,100, or by 37
percent.  Mission forces have been reduced at a much greater rate
than infrastructure forces during the last decade.  As a result,
approximately two-thirds of the Air Force's 381,100 active duty
personnel are now allocated to infrastructure functions such as
installation support and acquisition.  Further, today's smaller force
has a higher ratio of officers than in 1986. 

Potential exists to reduce the active Air Force below the 381,100
minimum level set by Congress, without adversely affecting the Air
Force's war-fighting capability.  In May 1996, GAO suggested options
to consolidate fighter squadrons which, if implemented, would permit
the Air Force to maintain the same number of aircraft but carry out
its missions with fewer active duty personnel.  GAO has also reported
that the Air Force could achieve savings by replacing military
personnel in some administrative and support positions with civilian
employees.  For fiscal year 1998, the Air Force plans to seek
statutory authority to reduce the active force by about 9,400 below
the current minimum.  GAO's analysis shows the majority of these
planned decreases are in infrastructure functions. 

Prompted by the Secretary of Defense's goal to reduce infrastructure
to free funds for force modernization, the Air Force has recently
identified a potential to reduce the active force by as many as
75,000 additional military personnel beyond fiscal year 1998.  The
Air Force is reviewing options for replacing military personnel
assigned to infrastructure functions with civilian employees or
contractors that may be able to perform some functions at less cost
than military personnel.  The actual number of active personnel that
will ultimately be replaced will depend on the results of continuing
Air Force analysis to determine whether such substitutions will be
organizationally feasible and cost-effective. 

The Air Force projects it would have an active wartime shortage of
about 19,600 personnel if two MRCs occurred.  However, the Air Force
does not need additional active personnel to cover this wartime
shortage because it has identified ways to compensate for the
shortage, such as using the individual ready reserve\1 and hiring
private contractors.  Moreover, this shortage would present little
risk in carrying out the national military strategy since it
primarily affects forces that would provide operating support for
bases in the United States rather than in the forces that would
deploy to war.  GAO agreed that the Air Force's plans to further
reduce active military personnel would not exacerbate these shortages
since the Air Force plans to replace military personnel with
contractors or civilian employees that support infrastructure
activities rather than wartime operations. 


--------------------
\1 The individual ready reserve is a pool of individuals who have
already served in active units or the reserves and have some part of
their military service obligation remaining. 


   PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4


      MISSION FORCES WERE REDUCED
      AT A GREATER RATE THAN
      INFRASTRUCTURE FORCES
      BETWEEN FISCAL YEAR 1986 AND
      1997
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1

Between fiscal year 1986 and 1997, the active Air Force will have
decreased from 608,199 to 381,100, or by 37 percent.  GAO's analysis
shows that mission forces decreased by 122,068, or 47 percent, and
infrastructure forces by 105,031, or 30 percent, as shown in figure
1. 

   Figure 1:  Changes in Active
   Air Force End Strength

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  DOD's Fiscal Year 1997 Future Years Defense Program. 

The Air Force decreased the mission forces primarily by reducing
fighter wings, bombers, and strategic missile forces to the levels
specified in the Bottom-Up Review.  Decreases in installation support
and central training accounted for 89 percent of the infrastructure
reductions.  Despite significant decreases in installation support,
the Air Force still has almost 58,000 military positions in this
category.  Five other infrastructure categories--acquisition
management, force management, central communications, central
medical, and central personnel experienced decreases in military
personnel ranging from 6 to 44 percent.  Central logistics is the
only category that had a net increase of personnel.  The increase
occurred primarily because military personnel associated with the
strategic airlift mission were reclassified from mission forces to
central logistics in 1992. 

GAO's analysis shows that officer and enlisted positions in mission
forces were reduced proportionately, but a higher percentage of
enlisted positions were eliminated from the infrastructure category. 
One reason this occurred is that the central medical function, which
has a high number of officers and has experienced little change over
the past decade, is classified as infrastructure.  The number of
medical positions has remained relatively stable at about 40,000 over
the past 10 years. 


      WARTIME PERSONNEL SHORTFALLS
      IDENTIFIED BY THE AIR FORCE
      POSE LITTLE RISK TO
      IMPLEMENTING THE NATIONAL
      MILITARY STRATEGY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2

The Air Force assesses its ability to satisfy its total wartime
personnel requirements through an exercise called "FORSIZE".\2
FORSIZE determines the forces needed to deploy to each MRC, the
forces needed for strategic missions such as airlift and space, and
those needed to sustain base operations in the United States during
wartime.  Military personnel requirements determined by FORSIZE
include personnel needed to replace casualties expected to occur
during two MRCs.  The number of casualty replacements used in FORSIZE
is classified.  FORSIZE 95 showed the Air Force has an active
shortage of about 19,600, or 5 percent, of its wartime requirements. 

Air Force officials believe this shortage would not have a serious
impact on their ability to implement the national military strategy
since only a small percentage of the shortage is in the forces that
deploy and the majority of the functional areas plan to use the
individual ready reserve, contractors, and new technologies to offset
the shortages.  For example, security police had the largest shortage
of 6,903, all of which represents a shortage that would occur when
security police who guard bases in peacetime deploy for wartime
operations.  Security personnel said they could work around the
shortage by increasing workshifts, closing gates at some bases, and
taking advantage of new sensor technology.  Likewise, transportation
had an overall shortage of 3,536, but most of it is in operating and
maintaining transportation at bases in the United States. 

FORSIZE does not assess whether Air Force personnel are adequate to
meet the requirements for operations other than war because defense
guidance assumes the forces determined to meet the requirements of
two MRCs can also satisfy the needs of contingency operations.  Air
Force data shows that during fiscal years 1995 and 1996, certain
types of units that have been frequently involved in operations other
than war exceeded the Air Force goal of being deployed no more than
120 days per year.  However, a July 1996 Air Force study concluded
that the Air Force does not need to add more units of these types due
to contingency operations, but it must closely manage units that
deploy frequently to prevent excessive use.  The Air Force has taken
several steps in recent years to reduce the impact of operations
other than war on certain units.  For example, both the Air Force
Reserve and the Air National Guard are now supporting a greater share
of contingency taskings. 


--------------------
\2 Requirements for medical personnel were not included because DOD
is currently conducting a study of the services' wartime medical
requirements. 


      AIR FORCE PLANS TO REDUCE
      ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL BELOW
      CONGRESSIONAL FLOOR IN
      FISCAL YEAR 1998
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3

The Air Force plans to seek statutory authority to reduce active duty
end strength by about 9,500 to about 371,600 in fiscal year 1998. 
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 allows
the Secretary of Defense to decrease the services' authorized end
strength up to 1 percent below the floors established by Congress. 
However, the Air Force's planned decrease exceeds this allowance. 
According to Air Force officials, reducing the Air Force's military
end strength will not lessen the Air Force's war-fighting capability,
since the planned decreases are primarily in infrastructure
functions.  GAO's analysis of the planned decreases indicates that
about 8,400 positions, or 88 percent, are in infrastructure functions
and about 1,100, or 12 percent, are in mission forces. 

The net decrease in mission forces will occur primarily from the
drawdown of intercontinental ballistic missiles under the first
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, and the Air Force's plans to retire
the EF-111 electronic support aircraft in fiscal year 1998.  However,
the Air Force is concerned that the Navy may not assume the
electronics warfare mission within the planned time frame, which
could delay these planned reductions. 

The decrease in infrastructure forces includes contracting out or
civilianizing about 2,500 military positions involved in installation
support and communications activities.  According to Air Force
officials, these positions do not need to be military because they do
not deploy and are not needed to support overseas rotation needs. 
The Air Force also plans to start reducing the number of medical
positions to adjust the size of the medical force to post-Cold War
wartime medical requirements.  Other efforts to reduce infrastructure
include reducing the number of military positions in headquarters
operations and support activities, such as the weather service. 


      POTENTIAL EXISTS TO REDUCE
      MILITARY PERSONNEL FURTHER
      BELOW THE LEVEL PLANNED FOR
      FISCAL YEAR 1998
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.4

The Air Force has not routinely assessed whether all positions need
to remain military.  However, three separate initiatives have
identified the potential to replace as many as 75,000 military
personnel with less costly civilian employees or contractors.  By
reducing its reliance on military personnel, the Air Force plans to
achieve savings that can be used to fund force modernization. 

For example, an ongoing Air Force headquarters-led study has
identified approximately 52,600 active military positions--3,000
officer and 49,600 enlisted--that potentially could be replaced by
either contractors or civilian employees.  The study includes all
military positions in commercial activities within the major commands
in the United States and selected overseas locations.  A commercial
activity can be an entire organization or part of an organization
that provides a product or service obtainable from a commercial
source.  To determine the potential for transferring functions to
contractors or civilian employees, the Air Force determined the
universe of personnel in commercial activities and excluded those who
are required to deploy during wartime and those assigned to
military-unique functions, such as headquarters activities and basic
military training.  The major commands are currently identifying the
positions by base and work center, and determining which work centers
represent good candidates for formal cost-comparison studies to
determine the relative cost savings associated with using either
contractors or civilian employees where military are no longer
essential to their mission.  Until this analysis is completed and
approved by Air Force headquarters, the long range plans for reducing
active duty personnel are uncertain. 

Another ongoing Air Force study has identified approximately 21,600
military positions in inherently governmental functions that
potentially could be filled by civilian employees.  Some functions
such as acquisition and contracting are considered inherently
governmental and therefore must be performed by federal employees,
but not necessarily by military personnel.  In October 1996, GAO
reported the Air Force could convert 6,800 officer positions in
career fields such as information and financial management to
civilian positions because it is not essential that they be filled by
military personnel.\3 Such conversions could save $69 million
annually because civilian employees cost less than military personnel
on average.  DOD has agreed to develop an approach for making such
conversions.  The Secretary of the Air Force stated, however, that
converting military positions to civilian positions runs counter to
DOD's goal of reducing its civilian workforce and that DOD needs to
allow the services some flexibility to make the most cost-effective
use of its resources. 

Other GAO work has identified opportunities to organize mission
forces more efficiently.  For example, increasing the size of fighter
squadrons from 18 to 24 aircraft could permit missions to be carried
out with fewer personnel at less cost.  Transferring some functions
from the active force to the reserves may also be possible.  For
example, in September 1996, GAO reported that one option for
restructuring the bomber force would be to place greater numbers of
B-1B bombers in the Air National Guard.\4 The Air Force is also
assessing options to transfer some functions to the reserves. 


--------------------
\3 DOD Force Mix Issues:  Converting Some Support Officer Positions
to Civilian Status Could Save Money (GAO/NSIAD-97-15, Oct.  23,
1996). 

\4 Air Force Bombers:  Options to Retire or Restructure the Force
Would Reduce Planned Spending (GAO/NSIAD-96-192, Sept.  30, 1996). 


   RECOMMENDATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5

DOD has stated it must reduce infrastructure costs in order to
modernize its force.  Several ongoing Air Force studies have
identified potential to replace military personnel with contractors
or civilian employees.  Therefore, GAO recommends that, once the
ongoing efforts are completed, the Secretary of the Air Force develop
a plan that

  -- identifies time frames to study whether it is more
     cost-effective to transfer commercial activities now performed
     by military personnel to civilian employees or private
     contractors and

  -- includes time frames to convert military positions in inherently
     governmental functions to civilian positions. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6

DOD generally agreed with the report, fully concurring with two parts
of GAO's recommendation, and partially concurring with one part.  DOD
stated that an existing system already tracks the services' progress
in completing cost comparison studies and converting positions, so
there is no need to establish an additional system.  GAO agreed with
DOD and has modified the recommendation accordingly.  DOD also stated
that while FORSIZE identified an active shortage of 19,600 personnel,
this shortage can be satisfied through a variety of sources,
including civilians, contractors, and Air National Guard and Air
Force Reserve personnel.  GAO agreed with DOD's position.  GAO's
report reflects that the Air Force has identified several ways to
compensate for these wartime shortages.  The Air Force also provided
technical comments on GAO's draft report, which GAO considered in
preparing the final report.  DOD's comments on a draft of this report
are reprinted in appendix II. 


INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1

On the basis on its 1993 Bottom-Up Review, the Department of Defense
(DOD) adopted a strategy of maintaining the capability to fight and
win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC), conduct
smaller scale operations such as peacekeeping, and provide overseas
presence in critical regions.  The Bottom-Up Review determined that
the Air Force would have 20 fighter wings (13 active and 7 reserve),
up to 187 bombers\1 (161 active and 26 reserve), and 500
intercontinental ballistic missiles to implement the strategy.  The
Bottom-Up Review also concluded the Air Force should maintain the
capability to provide (1) airlift to transport people and equipment
during conflicts, (2) reconnaissance and command and control aircraft
to provide information on the location and disposition of enemy
forces, and (3) aerial refuelers to enhance mission effectiveness by
refueling aircraft during long-range missions.  The review did not
specify the number of military personnel required to implement the
national military strategy.  However, DOD subsequently determined
that the active components would consist of about 1.4 million active
military personnel, 381,000 of which would be Air Force personnel. 
By the end of fiscal year 1997, the Air Force plans to have an active
duty force of 381,100 personnel with an associated military pay of
$16.8 billion. 


--------------------
\1 The Bottom-Up Review determined the Air Force would have 184
bombers, but DOD has subsequently increased the number to 187. 


   CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS TO STEM
   DRAWDOWN OF ACTIVE DUTY
   PERSONNEL
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1

In 1996, Congress established minimum active duty personnel levels
for each military service as part of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996.  The Air Force floor was set
at 381,000.  In creating the floors, Congress sought to ensure that
(1) the services had enough personnel to carry out the national
military strategy and (2) the drawdown of active forces was over to
avoid future recruiting and retention problems.  Finally, Congress
believed that this level force would allow the services to manage the
effects of high operations and personnel tempo. 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 retained
the floor, but allowed the Secretary of Defense the flexibility in
certain circumstances to decrease personnel by 1 percent of the
floor.  For the Air Force, this means the number of active duty
personnel cannot drop below 377,200.  The legislation requires the
services to obtain statutory authority for decreases below the
1-percent threshold. 


   ACTIVE DUTY FORCE CONSISTS OF
   MISSION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
   FORCES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2

Over the last several years, DOD has categorized its planned forces
and funding as either mission or infrastructure.  Air Force mission
forces consist of the fighter wings, bombers, and intercontinental
missiles (as defined in the Bottom-Up Review) and the forces that
provide direct combat support; intelligence; space support; and
command, control and communications in wartime.  Activities that
provide support to the mission forces and primarily operate from
fixed locations are classified as infrastructure forces. 
Infrastructure is divided into the following eight categories: 
acquisition management, force management, installation support,
central communications, central logistics, central medical, central
personnel, and central training.  These categories are described in
appendix I.  Approximately 140,000, or 36 percent, of the active Air
Force personnel are currently categorized as mission forces and
241,000, or 64 percent, are in infrastructure activities. 

The Secretary of Defense wants to reduce and streamline
infrastructure to achieve savings to modernize the force.  In April
1996, we reported that operations and maintenance and the military
personnel appropriations must be reduced if spending for
infrastructure activities is to decline, since they account for 80
percent of infrastructure funding.\2 In fiscal year 1996, the Air
Force spent about $28 billion of its $73 billion total budget on
infrastructure activities.  As shown in figure 1.1, about 83 percent
of the Air Force's direct infrastructure costs are funded by two
appropriations--military personnel and operations and maintenance. 

   Figure 1.1:  Fiscal Year 1996
   Funding for Air Force
   Infrastructure Activities

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

\a Research, development, test, and evaluation. 

Source:  Fiscal Year 1997 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). 

One of the Air Force's major initiatives to generate savings for
weapons modernization is to study the potential to contract out
infrastructure functions.  In deciding whether a function can be
transferred to contractors, the Air Force compares the relative cost
of using civilian employees and private contractors to perform the
same function.  DOD data on cost comparisons completed between fiscal
year 1978 and 1994 indicates that shifting work to contractors has
reduced annual operating cost on average by 31 percent.  Our initial
work on another assignment indicates that such savings may not be as
high as estimated by DOD, but that some savings do result. 


--------------------
\2 Defense Infrastructure:  Budget Estimates for 1996-2001 Offer
Little Savings for Modernization (GAO/NSIAD-96-131, Apr.  4, 1996). 


   AIR FORCE PROCESSES FOR
   DETERMINING PERSONNEL
   REQUIREMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3

The Air Force uses a variety of methods to determine personnel
requirements.  These processes identify requirements as a function of
workload or level of service based on assigned missions.  The various
methods include Air Force staffing standards for positions common
throughout the Air Force such as security police; command staffing
standards for functions unique to a particular command such as pilot
training; a computer- generated model for aircraft maintenance
positions; and crew ratios for each type of aircraft in the
inventory.  The Air Force does not have total control over the
allocation of its personnel.  For example, legislation and DOD
directives establish ceilings on headquarters positions and mandate
the number of positions that the Air Force must fill on the joint
staff, and in unified commands and defense agencies.  Table 1.1 shows
the processes the Air Force uses to develop the number of active
military positions required and the number of positions mandated by
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and legislation. 



                               Table 1.1
                
                   Means Used to Determine Air Force
                   Military Personnel Authorizations

Category                                         Positions     Percent
----------------------------------------------  ----------  ----------
Air Force standards\a                              152,831          43
Command standards\b                                 69,171          20
Logistics composite model                           36,895          10
Headquarters                                        26,650           8
Staffing pattern\c                                  22,773           6
Crew ratios\d                                       13,755           4
Joint Staffs, defense and other federal             16,837           5
 agencies
Other processes                                     14,387           4
======================================================================
Total\e                                            353,299         100
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Includes positions covered by approved variances to Air Force
standards, Air Force standards awaiting approval and being
revalidated, and Air Force directed requirements at wing level or
below. 

\b Includes positions covered by approved variances to major command
standards, major command standards awaiting approval and major
command directed requirements at wing level or below. 

\c Positions primarily in the Systems Program Offices where personnel
requirements vary depending on system development and production. 

\d Number of crews authorized per aircraft, missile and space system. 

\e Students, patients, prisoners, and personnel transferring between
assignments account for the difference between this total and the
total number of authorized active military positions. 

Source:  Air Force data. 


      MANDATED PERSONNEL
      REQUIREMENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3.1

The requirements for some military positions are determined either by
directives or legislation rather than by the Air Force.  For example,
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 restricts
the Secretary of Defense from reducing military medical personnel
unless DOD certifies that the number of people being reduced is
excess to current and projected needs and does not increase the cost
of services provided under the Civilian Health and Medical Program of
the Uniformed Services.  Also, the Goldwater-Nichols Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 gave the Secretary of Defense the
authority to determine the number of joint officer positions.  An
April 1981 memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense states
that DOD cannot increase or decrease resources that support the
National Foreign Intelligence Program without approval from the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.  Likewise, a December
1989 memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated that the
number of military positions within the Special Operations Command
will not be adjusted unless directed by the Deputy Secretary of
Defense. 


   OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
   METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4

Because of congressional concerns about active duty personnel levels,
we assessed (1) how the size and composition of the active Air Force
has changed since 1986, (2) whether the Air Force has any shortages
in meeting its wartime requirements, and (3) whether there is
potential to reduce the active force further.  We did not examine the
need for the number of fighter wings, bombers, and intercontinental
missiles identified by DOD's 1993 Bottom-Up Review. 

We interviewed officials and reviewed documents at OSD and Air Force
headquarters, Washington, D.C.; Air Combat Command, Norfolk,
Virginia; Air Force Materiel Command, Dayton, Ohio; and Air Education
and Training Command, San Antonio, Texas. 

To determine how the size and composition of the active force has
changed, we analyzed data contained in the fiscal year 1997 FYDP and
historical FYDPs.  The FYDP displays the allocation of resources by
programs and activities known as program elements.  We used the
mapping scheme developed by DOD's Office of Program Analysis and
Evaluation to identify mission and infrastructure program elements. 
We then compared the changes in active personnel by mission and
infrastructure categories between fiscal year 1986 and 1997.  We used
fiscal year 1986 as a starting point because it represented the peak
in the number of active duty personnel, preceding the post-Cold War
drawdown.  We obtained data on the number of active military
positions that are determined by legislation or directives, but did
not assess how the requirements for these positions were determined. 

To determine if the Air Force has wartime personnel shortages, we
analyzed the results of the Air Force FORSIZE 95 exercise.  To
determine if the shortages identified by FORSIZE affected the Air
Force ability to carry out the national military strategy, we
interviewed Air Force headquarters functional managers to determine
whether the shortages were in the forces that deploy to theaters of
operation or in forces that sustain operations at bases in the United
States.  We also discussed their plans to resolve the shortages. 
Since FORSIZE did not analyze wartime requirements for medical
personnel, we obtained data on wartime requirements from the Air
Force Office of the Surgeon General. 

To assess the potential to further reduce the active force, we
analyzed the military personnel reductions planned in fiscal year
1998.  Our analysis was based on the Air Force's fiscal year 1998
Budget Estimate Submission provided to OSD.  In addition, we reviewed
Air Force efforts to identify opportunities to replace military
personnel with contractor and civilian personnel.  Since these
efforts have not been completed, our analysis was limited to
reviewing the methodology for identifying potential positions and the
plans for approving which positions will be studied or converted.  In
addition, we used our prior work to identify opportunities to more
efficiently organize the active force. 

We conducted our review from November 1995 through December 1996 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


MISSION FORCES ARE BEING REDUCED
AT A FASTER RATE THAN
INFRASTRUCTURE FORCES
============================================================ Chapter 2

Between fiscal year 1986 and 1997,\1 the Air Force will reduce its
active military personnel from 608,199 to 381,100, or by 37 percent. 
During this time, mission forces will be reduced at a much greater
rate than infrastructure forces--47 percent compared to 30 percent. 
The Air Force reduced active military personnel primarily by (1)
implementing the force structure reductions in accordance with the
Bottom-Up Review, (2) closing bases, (3) transferring some missions
to the reserves, and (4) reorganizing major commands and headquarters
activities.  Our analysis also indicated that the 1997 active duty
Air Force will have a higher percentage of officers compared with the
percentage in 1986. 


--------------------
\1 The fiscal year 1986 total represents the actual number of active
military personnel assigned at the end of the fiscal year, whereas
the fiscal year 1997 figure represents the authorized number of
military personnel. 


   MISSION FORCES WILL DECREASE BY
   ALMOST HALF BETWEEN FISCAL YEAR
   1986 AND 1997
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1

Between fiscal year 1986 and 1997, the Air Force will reduce its
mission forces from approximately 262,000 to 140,000, or by 47
percent, as shown in table 2.1. 



                               Table 2.1
                
                  Changes in Active Duty Personnel by
                            Mission Category

                       Fiscal year
               ----------------------------

                                                            Percentage
Category           1986           1997          Change       of change
-------------  -------------  -------------  -------------  ----------
Combat forces     112,096        61,119        (50,977)           (45)
Direct combat     102,149        46,200        (55,949)           (55)
 support
Command,          20,223          9,169        (11,054)           (55)
 control, and
 communicatio
 n
Intelligence      17,976         18,752           776                4
Research,          5,637           84          ( 5,553)           (99)
 development,
 test, and
 evaluation
Space              3,095          3,892           797               26
Other defense       837            729           (108)            (13)
 missions
======================================================================
Total             262,013        139,945       (122,068)          (47)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  Our analysis of DOD's FYDP data. 

The decrease in combat forces primarily resulted from implementing
the Bottom-Up Review force structure, which significantly reduced the
number of fighter wings, bombers, and intercontinental missiles. 
Table 2.2 compares the force structure between fiscal year 1986 and
1997. 



                               Table 2.2
                
                  Comparison of Air Force Active Force
                 Structure Between Fiscal Year 1986 and
                                  1997

                                                 Fiscal year
                                                --------------
Category                                          1986    1997  Change
----------------------------------------------  ------  ------  ------
Fighter wings\                                      25      13    (12)
Bombers                                            315     126   (189)
Intercontinental missiles                        1,009     580   (429)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
The Air Force reduced the number of fighter wings by retiring the F-4
and F-111 aircraft and transferring the F-15s required for the air
defense of the United States as well as some close air support
aircraft (A-10s) to the reserves.  The Air Force reduced the bomber
force by retiring the FB-111s and many B-52's.  Finally, the Air
Force reduced the missile force by eliminating the Minuteman II
intercontinental ballistic missiles and the ground launched cruise
missiles. 

The decrease in direct combat support forces resulted primarily from
transferring some airlift and refueling missions to the reserves and
retiring some electronic warfare aircraft (RF-4Gs) and reconnaissance
aircraft (TR-1s).  In addition, some of the decrease resulted when
the strategic airlift function was moved to the central logistics
infrastructure category. 

The number of military personnel in command, control, and
communications positions was reduced by abolishing the Air Force
Communications Command.  In addition, the increase in technologies
such as automation and digital communications allowed the Air Force
to assign fewer people to operate and maintain needed capability. 

The decrease in research, development, test, and evaluation primarily
resulted from a change in the way these personnel are categorized. 
Prior to 1988, about 5,600 positions in acquisition and command
support were included in the mission forces under the research,
development, test, and evaluation activity.  However, in 1988 the
majority of these positions were moved to the acquisition
infrastructure category when the Air Force merged two commands to
form the Air Force Materiel Command. 

The remaining two mission categories, intelligence and space, gained
personnel.  While there were decreases in some intelligence functions
such as the retirement of the SR-71, they were offset by increases
resulting from the creation of the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance
Office in 1994.\2 The increase in space forces resulted primarily
because some activities that were categorized as acquisition and
direct support were transferred to space. 


--------------------
\2 The Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office was created to unify
airborne reconnaissance architectures and enhance the acquisition of
manned and unmanned airborne assets and associated ground systems. 


   INFRASTRUCTURE FORCES ARE
   DECREASING AT A SLOWER RATE
   THAN MISSION FORCES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2

Between fiscal year 1986 and 1997, the Air Force will reduce the
number of active personnel in infrastructure functions from
approximately 346,000 to 241,000, or by 30 percent.  Significant
decreases occurred in all infrastructure forces except acquisition,
central medical, and central logistics as shown in table 2.3. 



                               Table 2.3
                
                  Changes in Active Duty Personnel By
                        Infrastructure Category

                       Fiscal year
               ----------------------------

                                                            Percentage
Category           1986           1997          Change       of change
-------------  -------------  -------------  -------------  ----------
Acquisition       10,196          9,569          (627)             (6)
 management
Force             34,016         25,280         (8,736)           (26)
 management
Installation      107,523        57,918        (49,605)           (46)
 support
Central           21,260         16,931         (4,329)           (20)
 communicatio
 ns
Central           12,315         25,174         12,859             104
 logistics
Central           41,380         40,639          (741)             (2)
 medical
Central           21,762         12,283         (9,479)           (44)
 personnel
Central           97,734         53,372        (44,362)           (45)
 training
Resource                          (11)
 adjustments\a
======================================================================
Total             346,186        241,155       (105,031)          (30)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a A means to account for the difference between programmed and
actual personnel levels.  A negative value indicates that
overstaffing is projected for the last day of the fiscal year. 

Source:  Our analysis of DOD's FYDP data. 

The greatest number of personnel decreases occurred in installation
support and central training activities.  The decline in installation
support was caused primarily by the closure of 20 active air bases by
the Secretary of Defense's Base Closure Commission in 1988 and the
Base Closure and Realignment Commission in 1991 and 1993.  The Air
Force also contracted some base operations, which reduced the number
of military personnel in installation support. 

The decrease in central training was related primarily to the
decreases in mission force structure.  For example, the decrease in
the number of wings and bombers resulted in about a 6,700 decline in
the number of undergraduate pilot and navigator training positions
and about an 8,500 decrease in weapons systems training positions. 
Likewise, the decrease in the number of strategic forces reduced
training requirements by about 2,400 positions.  The overall decrease
in the number of active personnel caused a decline of approximately
11,300 positions in general skill level training and about 4,900
positions in recruit training units.  Approximately another 4,000
positions were eliminated from contracting for base operations at
training bases. 

The primary reasons for the decreases in the other categories are
described as follows: 

  -- Acquisition management--This category experienced a net decrease
     of 627 military positions.  However, in 1988 the Air Force
     transferred about 5,600 positions from the mission research,
     development, test, and evaluation category into acquisition. 
     Since 1988, the number of military personnel in the acquisition
     has declined by about 5,800. 

  -- Force management--The decreases occurred in the weather service,
     servicewide support, and from consolidation of various
     headquarters.  For example, the Strategic Air Command, the
     Tactical Air Command, and the Military Airlift Command were
     combined to form the Air Combat Command and the Air Mobility
     Command; the Air Force Systems Command and the Air Force
     Logistics Command were combined to form the Air Force Materiel
     Command. 

  -- Central communications--Approximately 3,900 of the decrease
     occurred because the smaller number of fighter wings and bombers
     required fewer air traffic control personnel. 

  -- Central medical--The number of personnel in central medical has
     not decreased significantly.  OSD and the services are currently
     assessing post-Cold War medical requirements.  OSD is currently
     updating a 1994 study that will provide new estimates of wartime
     medical demands.  However, the scheduled March 1996 completion
     has been delayed because OSD and the services advocate using
     different assumptions and methodologies for factors such as
     population-at-risk and casualty replacements, which affect
     overall medical requirements. 

  -- Central personnel--The decrease resulted primarily because the
     smaller force has reduced the number of permanent
     change-of-station moves, accessions, and training requirements,
     which has reduced the number of people in transit. 

Central logistics is the only infrastructure category that had a net
increase of personnel.  The increase resulted from a change in the
way personnel associated with strategic airlift are categorized. 
Prior to 1992, airlift personnel were counted as direct support
mission forces.  However, they were moved to the central logistics
category in fiscal year 1992 when the U.S.  Transportation Command
assumed responsibility for management of air transportation in
peacetime. 


   OFFICERS NOW REPRESENT A LARGER
   PORTION OF THE FORCE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3

Between fiscal year 1986 and 1997, enlisted personnel will be reduced
by 39 percent and officers by 32 percent.  Our analysis shows a
proportionate decline in officer and enlisted personnel in mission
forces, but a higher percentage decrease of enlisted personnel in
infrastructure activities as shown in table 2.4. 



                               Table 2.4
                
                    Changes in Officer and Enlisted
                Personnel in Mission and Infrastructure
                Forces Between Fiscal Year 1986 and 1997

                            Mission forces      Infrastructure forces
                        ----------------------  ----------------------
                          Officers    Enlisted    Officers    Enlisted
----------------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------
FY86                        42,283     219,730      66,765     274,936
FY97                        21,517     118,428      52,928     188,227
Percent Change                (49)        (46)        (21)        (33)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  Our analysis of DOD's FYDP data. 

According to Air Force officials, one reason for the smaller
percentage decrease of officers versus enlisted personnel in
infrastructure functions can be attributed to the disproportionate
reduction of enlisted in base operations support where major
decreases have occurred.  Generally, there has been one officer for
every 10 enlisted positions in this category.  However, our analysis
of this category showed that between fiscal year 1986 and 1997, the
Air Force eliminated 46,349 enlisted and 3,256 officer positions or
15 enlisted positions for every officer position eliminated. 

Another reason for the smaller percentage decrease is that medical
and joint/DOD positions, which have a high number of officers, are
classified as infrastructure.  As shown in table 2.5, the number of
medical positions has remained relatively stable and the number of
joint positions has decreased by 20 percent between fiscal year 1986
and 1997 while the active force as a whole declined by 37 percent. 
As a result, these positions have increased from 8 percent of the
active force in fiscal year 1986 to 13 percent in fiscal year 1997 as
shown in table 2.5. 



                               Table 2.5
                
                    Positions In Joint Staff/Defense
                   Agencies and Medical Program as a
                    Percent of Total Active Military
                 Personnel Between Fiscal Year 1986 and
                                  1997

                                         Fiscal year
                        ----------------------------------------------
                                 1986                    1997
----------------------  ----------------------  ----------------------
Joint/defense agencies          9,301                   7,508
Medical                         41,380                  40,639
======================================================================
Total                           50,681                  48,147
Total active force             608,199                 381,100
Percent joint, defense            8                       13
 agencies, and medical
 of total active force
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  Our analysis of Air Force data. 

In November 1995, DOD's Office of the Inspector General reported that
although the services have reduced the number of active duty
personnel, there has not been a corresponding decrease in the number
of positions that must be filled on the Joint Staff and in defense
agencies.  The report noted that the services must still give
priority to joint staffing, with a substantially smaller resource
pool.  Finally, the Inspector General found that no standard
methodology or criteria are used to determine and validate personnel
requirements for positions on the Joint Staff or in defense agencies. 
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 requires
us to review DOD's actions in response to the Inspector General's
report. 


MILITARY PERSONNEL SHORTAGES POSE
LITTLE RISK TO IMPLEMENTING THE
NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
============================================================ Chapter 3

The Air Force uses the FORSIZE exercise to estimate total wartime
personnel requirements.  FORSIZE 95 identified an active wartime
shortage of 19,585 personnel.  However, the Air Force believes this
shortage has little impact on their ability to implement the national
military strategy because the shortfall is primarily in forces that
sustain base operations in the United States during wartime, and the
Air Force has identified alternatives for satisfying these shortages. 
FORSIZE 95 did not analyze medical requirements.  However, a separate
study of medical requirements concluded that the Air Force has more
active duty medical personnel than needed for wartime. 

FORSIZE does not consider operations other than war (OOTW).  Air
Force officials stated that defense guidance assumes that the
existing force requirements developed for the two MRCs can satisfy
the needs of contingency operations without posing additional
requirements.  Air Force data shows that during fiscal years 1995 and
1996, certain types of units exceeded the Air Force goal of being
deployed no more than 120 days per year.  However, a July 1996 Air
Force study concluded that the Air Force does not need to increase
its military personnel requirements because of contingency
operations, but it has to closely manage units that deploy
frequently.  The Air Force has taken several steps in recent years to
reduce the impact of OOTWs on certain units. 


   WARTIME PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS
   ESTABLISHED BY FORSIZE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1

FORSIZE estimates the number of active and reserve forces and
civilians needed to (1) deploy to support two MRCs, (2) support
strategic missions such as airlift and space, and (3) sustain base
operations during wartime.  The initial exercise was in 1988;
subsequent exercises were conducted in 1994 and 1995.  There were no
exercises in 1989 through 1993 because of the changing world
environment, numerous Air Force command reorganizations, and the
Persian Gulf War.  FORSIZE 95 did not estimate medical requirements
since OSD is conducting a separate study on these requirements. 
FORSIZE 95, which was completed in February 1996, projects wartime
requirements for fiscal year 1997. 

As a starting point for FORSIZE, the Air Force develops a Time Phased
Force Deployment List to deploy all 20 active and reserve fighter
wings and bombers required by the Bottom-Up Review.  In addition,
FORSIZE determines requirements for personnel needed to operate at
three additional bare bases (airfields with no supporting
infrastructure) and to replace casualties (personnel that are killed
or wounded and cannot return to duty).  Air Force officials stated
that the requirement for the bare bases is based on the Air Force's
experience during the Gulf War and other past operations. 

The number of aviator positions included in FORSIZE is based on the
crew ratio established for each aircraft in the Air Force's
inventory.  A crew ratio is the number of aircrews authorized per
aircraft and is established to enable the Air Force to meet expected
wartime sortie rates.  For example, the current crew ratio for the
F-15C is 1.25, which means that 1.25 pilots are authorized for each
F-15C in the active inventory.  Air Force officials noted that the
actual sortie rates during the Gulf War were higher than could have
been flown under the Air Force's funded crew ratios and that
additional pilots from units that had not deployed were therefore
used.  On the basis of this experience, the Air Force has increased
the crew ratio for some aircraft, increased aircraft spares, and
plans to use additional pilots from the schools to achieve higher
sortie rates.  Air Force officials noted that it is not economically
feasible to increase the crew ratios beyond current levels because
they would have to buy additional aircraft and spares in order to
keep all crews properly trained. 

Personnel requirements for strategic and sustainment forces are
determined at base level for 36 functional areas such as security
police, transportation, and munitions.  In determining these
requirements, FORSIZE assumes that functions currently performed by
military personnel will stay military.  These base level assessments
are intended to ensure that the Air Force has sufficient personnel at
bases in the United States and overseas to (1) protect and maintain
bases, (2) re-supply deploying forces, and (3) provide support to
families of Air Force personnel who deploy to war and those that
remain at their locations.  FORSIZE then compares these requirements
with authorized personnel by functional areas to determine if the Air
Force has enough personnel to carry out missions specified in defense
guidance. 

On the basis of FORSIZE 95, the Air Force concluded that it requires
364,324 active military personnel to meet its wartime requirements
(not including medical).  FORSIZE did not consider whether some
functions that do not deploy could be met with other than military
personnel such as civilian employees or contractors.  As shown in
figure 3.1, the forces that deploy make-up approximately one-third of
the Air Force's active military personnel requirements; strategic and
sustainment forces account for the remaining two-thirds. 

   Figure 3.1:  Breakdown of
   Active Wartime Personnel
   Requirements as Determined by
   FORSIZE 95

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

The wartime personnel requirements estimated during FORSIZE include
requirements to replace casualties.  This number is classified but is
based on two key elements.  First, the population-at-risk is
determined by an Air Force threat model.  The population-at-risk
includes the day-to-day casualty stream of personnel within the two
theaters of operation who are expected to be killed in action,
wounded in action, and otherwise disabled by disease or non-battle
injuries.  Second, casualty rates for each career field are
established based on their proximity to the war zone.  The closer the
career field is to the war zone, the higher the casualty rate.  For
example, maintenance personnel on the flight line have a higher
casualty rate than maintenance personnel working in a rear area. 


   AIR FORCE WARTIME PERSONNEL
   SHORTAGES POSE LITTLE RISK
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2

FORSIZE 95 identified a net active shortage of 19,585 personnel
needed to meet wartime requirements.  According to Air Force
officials the shortage poses little risk to carry out the two MRC
strategy because (1) it is predominantly in the forces that sustain
base operations in the United States and not in the deploying forces
and (2) other alternatives exist to cover most of the shortfall. 

Security police, transportation, intelligence, maintenance, and
munitions account for approximately 16,300, or 83 percent, of the Air
Force's total shortage (see table 3.1).  The remaining shortage
occurred in 10 other functional areas. 



                               Table 3.1
                
                   Projected Active Personnel Wartime
                     Shortages for Fiscal Year 1997


                                                            Percentage
                                                                    of
Functional area                                   Shortage    shortage
----------------------------------------------  ----------  ----------
Security police                                      6,903          33
Transportation                                       3,536          17
Intelligence                                         2,048          10
Munitions                                            1,982           9
Maintenance                                          1,843           9
Other functional areas                               4,539          22
======================================================================
Total--functional areas with shortages              20,851         100
Functional areas where personnel are in excess     (1,266)
 to requirements
Net shortage                                        19,585
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  FORSIZE 95. 

According to Air Force officials, all of the shortages, except
munitions, are associated with requirements for sustaining forces. 
The munitions shortage exists because the Air Force has a shortage of
military personnel in the bomb assembly and bomb loading specialties
for the bomber force.  In September 1996, we reported that the Air
Force cannot meet its war-fighting requirement to support the full
complement of B-1B and B-52H bombers allocated to regional commanders
due to these personnel shortages.\1 The Air Staff has tasked the Air
Combat Command to develop a plan and identify funding requirements to
eliminate the shortages using active or reserve personnel or a
combination of both. 

According to Air Force officials, the security police shortage would
occur in the sustaining force when some security police personnel
guarding bases in the United States deployed to theaters of operation
during wartime.  Such deployment would create a shortage of security
personnel to guard bases in the United States.  Air Force security
police personnel told us they could work around the shortfall by
increasing workshifts, closing some gates at bases, and taking
advantage of new sensor technology.  In addition, one official noted
that the Air Force could also contract for part-time security
personnel. 

The transportation shortfall relates primarily to personnel that
operate and maintain base motor pools in the United States. 
According to transportation officials, the individual ready reserve\2
could be used to offset some of the shortage. 

According to a maintenance official, the maintenance shortfall
represents only 2 percent of total maintenance requirements and is
spread throughout a number of career fields, including jet engines,
guidance and control, avionics systems, fabrication and parachute,
and aircraft metal and technology.  Maintenance officials told us
that, because the maintenance shortfall is so small and would not
impact mission readiness, they have no plans to examine alternatives
to cover it. 

Few of the 10 remaining functional areas, which included such
functions as comptroller, fuels, judge advocate, and weather, have
significant shortages.  Most have a shortage that ranges between 2
and 4 percent of their wartime requirement.  According to Air Force
officials, these shortages will be covered primarily by using the
individual ready reserve and other management actions. 

In nine functional areas, authorized personnel exceeded requirements
by 1,266 but the Air Force did not reallocate any of these positions
to functional areas with shortages.  For example, the education and
training functional area had an excess of 244 personnel, but senior
Air Force officials decided not to reallocate these positions until
ongoing training initiatives have been completed.  Likewise, there
was an excess of 302 personnel in communications, but no action was
taken because the career field is being merged with information
management, which showed a shortage.  According to an Air Force
official, another reason the Air Force decided not to reallocate
personnel is because the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review may
change the current national military strategy, which could change the
Air Force's active requirements and the need to reallocate personnel. 


--------------------
\1 Air Force Bombers:  Options to Retire or Restructure the Force
Would Reduce Planned Spending (GAO/NSIAD-96-192, Sept.  30, 1996). 

\2 The individual ready reserve is a pool of individuals who have
already served in active units or in the reserves and have some part
of their military service obligation remaining. 


      ACTIVE MILITARY MEDICAL
      PERSONNEL EXCEED WARTIME
      REQUIREMENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.1

OSD and Air Force analyses indicate the Air Force has more active
duty medical personnel than needed for wartime requirements, but they
have not yet agreed on the actual number of personnel to be reduced. 
A 1994 OSD study concluded that the number of medical positions
within the services exceeded projected wartime requirements.  This
study is currently being updated because of the services' concerns
regarding the assumptions made to treat casualties and maintain
peacetime operational readiness and training.  However, a separate
Air Force analysis showed the Air Force has about 5,900 active
military medical personnel who are excess to projected wartime
requirements.  The Air Force expects that the ongoing OSD study will
recommend reductions in medical personnel, so the Air Force plans to
reduce the number of medical personnel in fiscal years 1998 through
2003. 


   IMPACT OF OOTW ON AIR FORCE
   PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3

The Air Force does not assess personnel requirements for OOTWs under
FORSIZE.  According to Air Force officials, defense guidance assumes
that the existing force requirements developed for the two MRCs can
accomplish OOTW deployments without posing additional requirements. 
Nonetheless, headquarters Air Force and Air Combat Command officials
are concerned about the high operations tempo OOTWs have on certain
units, and believe the Air Force must closely manage its OOTW
taskings to ensure certain units are not used excessively. 

Due to growing concern about the impact of OOTWs, the Air Combat
Command sponsored a study of fiscal year 1994 deployment taskings. 
The study concluded that the Air Force did not need to increase
personnel levels due to contingency operations, but noted that some
functional areas were more impacted by contingency deployments than
others.  The study also concluded that commands and installations
need to place more emphasis on accuracy and completeness of data
reported for deployment requirements and actual deployments to
promote a fairer distribution of taskings throughout units and across
commands. 

Air Force data shows that, with the exception of one type of unit in
the Air Force Special Operations Command, most units that exceeded
the Air Force goal of being deployed no more than 120 days per year
are in the Air Combat Command.  Figure 3.2 shows the Air Combat
Command units that exceeded the 120-day goal in 1995 and 1996. 

   Figure 3.2:  Days on Temporary
   Duty for Selected Air Combat
   Command Units for Fiscal Years
   1995 and 1996

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  Air Force data. 

To reduce the impact of OOTWs on certain units, the Air Force has
implemented a policy to balance the workload throughout the Air
Force, reduce taskings where appropriate, and make more use of
reserve forces.  For example, in 1995, the Air Combat Command chose
not to send A/OA--10 aircraft to fiscal year 1996 National Training
and Joint Readiness Training Centers exercises in order to reduce
temporary travel for these units.  The Air Force has also activated
associate reserve squadrons\3 for KC-135 refueling and E-3 Airborne
Warning and Control System aircraft.  Additionally, both the Air
Force Reserve and the Air National Guard are now supporting a greater
share of OOTW and other contingency taskings and have increased their
participation in Joint Chief of Staff-sponsored exercises.  This has
been possible primarily due to the Air Force success in encouraging
reservists to volunteer for such duty. 


--------------------
\3 Air Force Reserve units that are collocated with active Air Force
units that fly and maintain active aircraft. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4

DOD stated that although FORSIZE identified an active shortage of
19,600 personnel, this shortage could be addressed with a variety of
sources, including technology, civilians, contractors, and Air
National Guard and Air Force Reserve personnel.  We agreed with DOD's
position.  Our report reflects that the Air Force has identified
several ways to compensate for these wartime shortages. 


OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO REDUCE THE
NUMBER OF ACTIVE DUTY AIR FORCE
PERSONNEL
============================================================ Chapter 4

Potential exists to reduce the number of active duty Air Force
personnel significantly below the congressional floor of 381,000.  In
fiscal year 1998, the Air Force plans to seek statutory authority to
reduce the number of active duty personnel to about 371,600 or 9,400
below the current floor.  In addition, a preliminary air staff review
of its infrastructure force has identified a potential to reduce the
active force by as much as 75,000 beyond fiscal year 1998 by
contracting out some functions now performed by military personnel
and converting some military positions to civilian.  Our prior work
indicates that savings can occur by contracting out functions in lieu
of using military personnel, and significant opportunities exist to
convert military positions to less costly civilian positions. 

Some opportunities may also exist to reduce mission forces.  Our
prior work has shown the Air Force could reduce active personnel
requirements by increasing the size of its fighter squadrons and
transferring some bombers to the reserves.  In addition, several
ongoing defense studies such the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study and
the Quadrennial Defense Review could affect the Air Force's future
active duty personnel requirements. 


   AIR FORCE PLANS TO REDUCE
   ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL BELOW
   CONGRESSIONAL FLOOR IN FISCAL
   YEAR 1998
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1

On the basis of the Air Force's fiscal year 1998 budget proposal
provided to OSD, the Air Force plans to seek statutory authority to
reduce its active military end strength to about 371,600 or 9,400
below the current congressional floor.  Air Force officials stated
the planned personnel reductions will not lessen the Air Force's
war-fighting capability, since they are primarily in
infrastructure-related functions.  Our analysis of the planned
decrease shows that 1,125, or 12 percent, are in mission forces and
8,415, or 88 percent, are in infrastructure forces as shown in table
4.1. 



                               Table 4.1
                
                 Comparison of Active Duty End Strength
                   Between Fiscal Year 1997 and 1998

                     Fiscal year
              --------------------------
Category          1997          1998         Change        Percent
------------  ------------  ------------  ------------  --------------
Mission         139,945       138,820       (1,125)           12
 Forces
Infrastructu
 re
Acquisition      9,569         8,529        (1,040)
Force            25,280        24,551        ( 729)
 management
Installation     57,918        54,846       (3,072)
 support
Central          16,931        15,807       (1,124)
 communicati
 ons
Central          25,174        26,218        1,044
 logistics
Central          40,639        40,135        ( 504)
 medical
Central          12,283        11,056       (1,227)
 personnel
Central          53,372        51,862       (1,510)
 training
Resource          (11)         (264)         (253)
 adjustments
Subtotal        241,155       232,740       (8,415)           88
 infrastruct
 ure
======================================================================
Total           381,100       371,560       (9,540)          100
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  Our analysis of DOD' FYDP and Air Force data. 

The planned decrease in mission forces results primarily from three
initiatives.  First, the final drawdown of intercontinental ballistic
missiles under the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty will reduce
mission forces by 1,014 personnel.  Second, the Air Force plans to
retire the EF-111 electronic support aircraft in fiscal year 1998,
which would reduce active military personnel by 525.  However, the
Air Force is concerned the Navy may not assume the electronics
warfare mission within the planned time frame, which could delay
these planned reductions.  Finally, the Air Force plans to retire 8
C-130 aircraft, which will eliminate 360 positions.  This reduction
is based on a Joint Staff study that showed the Air Force has excess
intra-theater airlift capacity. 

The decreases in mission forces are largely offset by increases
related to funding six additional B-1B bombers for training and
combat operations from the reconstitution reserve,\1 activating an
unmanned aerial vehicle squadron, and adding one Joint Surveillance
Target Attack Radar System (E-8) and one Rivet Joint (RC-135).  Air
Force officials noted the additional Joint Surveillance Target Attack
Radar System and Rivet Joint aircraft will help alleviate the high
personnel tempo in these units. 

The planned infrastructure decreases are based primarily on the Air
Force's plans to either have civilian employees or contractors
perform installation support and communication functions now
performed by about 2,500 military personnel.  The Air Force
determined that these positions do not require military personnel
because they do not deploy and are needed to support overseas
rotation.  Therefore, it plans to study the cost-effectiveness of
contracting out the function or using civilian employees. 

The planned decrease in installation support also includes 360
positions providing base operating support at Howard Air Force Base
in Panama.  The Air Force assumes that all military personnel will
withdraw from Panama after the United States turns control of the
Panama Canal over to Panama in 1999.  However, the State Department
has recently announced an effort to study the possibility of keeping
some U.S.  military personnel in Panama after the transfer, which may
impact the Air Force's plans. 

The decrease in central medical personnel represents the start of an
effort to align peacetime staffing with wartime requirements.  A
study by the Office of the Air Force Surgeon General showed the Air
Force only needed 86 percent of its projected fiscal year 1999
medical personnel to meet wartime medical needs.  The Air Force has
programmed a 4.5-percent reduction (1,748 personnel) through fiscal
year 2003.  According to Air Force officials, it will take up to 12
years to eliminate the remaining positions to minimize personnel
turbulence and impact on peacetime patient care.  An Air Force
official stated that even though the OSD study on post-Cold War
medical requirements has not been completed, officials in the Office
of the Air Force Surgeon General believe the study will recommend
that the services reduce the number of medical personnel.  Thus,
these officials believe it is prudent to start reducing the number of
medical personnel now.  The need for such reductions must be
certified by the Secretary of Defense under 10 U.S.C.  129c. 

The decrease in central personnel represents a decline in the number
of personnel in transit.  An Air Force official stated that the
smaller force has reduced the number of permanent change-of-station
moves, accessions, and training requirements, which reduces the
number of people in transit. 

The changes in force management are caused primarily by decreases in
the number of positions in the Air Weather Service, support to the
Defense Finance and Accounting Service, and headquarters activities. 

Finally, the decrease in acquisition and the increase in central
logistics are due to the transfer of base operations functions at
test centers from the acquisition category to central logistics. 
Congress has directed DOD to prepare a plan to reduce the number of
military and civilian personnel involved in acquisition by 25 percent
over a period of 5 years beginning in fiscal year 1996.  Air Force
officials stated that they have not programmed this additional
decrease because OSD and the services have not agreed on the
definition of the acquisition workforce nor the baseline for
measuring the reductions. 


--------------------
\1 Aircraft stored or on a ramp that are planned for return to
operating forces in the event of mobilization or replacement. 


   ONGOING AIR FORCE STUDIES HAVE
   IDENTIFIED POTENTIAL TO FURTHER
   REDUCE ACTIVE PERSONNEL
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2

The Air Force has not yet fully assessed the potential for
substituting less costly civilian employees or contractors for some
of the active duty personnel currently assigned to infrastructure
activities.  In the past, the Air Force has not periodically reviewed
all of its positions to determine whether they must be filled by
military personnel.  However, the Air Force has recently begun an
effort to identify such savings to help fund force modernization. 
Three ongoing Air Force studies have identified the potential for
eliminating a significant number of active duty personnel.  Two
studies involve the potential to contract out commercial activity
functions now being performed by military and civilian personnel and
another involves the potential for converting military positions in
inherently governmental functions to civilian positions.  The Air
Force's ability to reduce the number of military positions identified
in the ongoing studies could be constrained by DOD goals for reducing
civilian positions. 

DOD Directive 1100.4 requires the services to staff positions
civilian personnel unless the services deem that positions must be
filled by military personnel for one or more of the following
reasons, including combat readiness, legal requirements, rotation,
security, training, and discipline.  In addition, Office of
Management and Budget Circular A-76 classifies government activities
as either inherently governmental functions or commercial activities. 
Inherently governmental functions--those intimately related to the
public interest such as fund control--must be done by federal
employees.  A commercial activity can be an entire organization or
part of an organization that provides a product or service obtainable
from a commercial source.  Commercial activities include functions
such as vehicle and facilities maintenance, automated data
processing, and administrative support.  Circular A-76 sets forth the
procedures for agencies to study whether the functions could be done
more economically by contractors. 


      POTENTIAL EXISTS TO CONTRACT
      OR USE CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES
      FOR SOME COMMERCIAL
      ACTIVITIES NOW PERFORMED BY
      MILITARY PERSONNEL
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2.1

An ongoing Air Force study has identified about 52,600 active
military positions allocated to functions that could potentially be
performed by contractors or civilian employees.\2

These positions have tentatively been identified as not military
essential because their personnel do not deploy, support the rotation
of forces to overseas bases and operations, or perform unique
military missions or functions.  The Air Force study is scheduled to
be completed by the end of April 1997. 

The functional areas under review consist of all military positions
in commercial activities within the Air Force's major commands in the
continental United States and some overseas locations.  The Air Force
has about 160,400 military positions in commercial activities.  The
Air Force has deemed that 82,700 of these positions must be filled by
military personnel because they would deploy during wartime; about
another 25,100 of these positions are in military-unique functions
such as headquarters activities, recruiting, basic military training,
and those personnel needed to maintain an overseas rotation base. 
Once these positions were eliminated from consideration, the Air
Force was left with about 52,600 military in commercial activities
that could be studied for possible conversion, as shown in table 4.2. 



                               Table 4.2
                
                    Military Positions in Commercial
                  Activities That Potentially Could Be
                  Contracted Out or Filled by Civilian
                               Employees

                        Office  Enlist                          Percen
Function                     r      ed          Total                t
----------------------  ------  ------  ======================  ------
Logistics                  541  24,885          25,426              48
Communications           1,348  14,257          15,605              30
Personnel                  320   4,850          5,170               10
Civil engineering          327   3,261          3,588                7
All others                 456   2,334          2,790                5
======================================================================
Total                    2,992  49,587          52,579             100
Percent                      6      94          100.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  Air Force data. 

To further assess the potential to contract out or use civilian
employees for these positions, the Air Staff has provided each major
command with the number of positions within their respective commands
that are candidates for conversion.  Each command is currently
identifying the positions by base and organization to determine how
many functions could be studied further to determine the relative
cost savings associated with replacing military personnel with either
contractors or civilian employees.  The major commands are also
required to identify barriers to contracting and recommend ways to
overcome them.  For example, current Air Force procedure exempts such
units from being studied as candidates for conversion, if some
personnel in the unit are expected to deploy.  Air Staff officials
noted the major commands may be able to identify ways around this
problem in some cases, such as reorganizing units or transferring
functions between bases. 

In a November 1996 letter to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary
of the Air Force stated that DOD's existing civilian workyear policy
needs to be modified so the Air Force can achieve savings by
replacing military personnel assigned to positions that are not
military essential with civilians.  The letter noted that the Air
Force's experience has shown that 40 percent of the cost comparison
studies performed since 1979 determined that an in-house civilian
workforce was more cost-effective than contractors.  When a function
that was predominantly performed by military personnel remains
in-house, the Air Force may have to increase the number of civilian
employees, which runs counter to DOD's efforts to reduce its civilian
workforce.  For example, the maintenance training function at Altus
Air Force Base was performed by 1,444 personnel, of whom 1,401 were
military and 43 were civilian employees.  The cost comparison showed
that an in-house civilian workforce would be more cost-effective than
using the private sector.  Thus, the Air Force had to increase the
number of civilian employees by 692 in order to achieve the projected
savings.  The Secretary of the Air Force stated that the goals for
civilian downsizing pose a disincentive for accomplishing work in the
least costly manner and that some consideration should be given to
relaxing civilian downsizing goals in such cases. 

The Air Force is also conducting a study to determine if there are
opportunities to consolidate its 126 precision measurement electronic
laboratories and have the work performed by civilian employees or
contractors.  There are about 1,200 military personnel in 50 labs in
the active force, and the remaining labs are operated by contractors
or are in the guard and reserve forces.  These personnel are not
included in the universe of military positions in commercial
activities that could potentially be performed by civilian employees
or contractors.  According to an Air Force official, the preliminary
study results indicate that the Air Force could consolidate from 126
to around 50 labs.  This official noted that the final report,
scheduled to be issued in April 1997, will contain a plan to
consolidate the labs as well as for conducting cost comparison
studies. 


--------------------
\2 The study also identified about 55,000 civilian positions that
could be potentially replaced by contractor personnel. 


      POTENTIAL EXISTS TO CONVERT
      SOME MILITARY POSITIONS THAT
      INVOLVE INHERENTLY
      GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS TO
      CIVILIAN POSITIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2.2

The Air Force reviewed all military positions in inherently
governmental functions to determine if military personnel are
required.  Military personnel were considered necessary if the
position deployed, supported overseas rotation, was required by law,
or was in a unique military function such as the honor guard or
recruiting.  On the basis of this criteria, the Air Force identified
approximately 21,600 military positions that are not military
essential and can potentially be converted to civilian positions as
shown in table 4.3. 



                               Table 4.3
                
                 Military Positions by Functional Area
                 That Potentially Could Be Converted to
                           Civilian Positions

                        Office  Enlist                          Percen
Function                     r      ed          Total                t
----------------------  ------  ------  ======================  ------
Operations               1,779   8,600          10,379              48
Acquisition              5,341     529          5,870               27
Intelligence               219   1,121          1,340                6
Civil engineering            0   1,304          1,304                6
Other                      409   2,287          2,696               13
======================================================================
Total                    7,748  13,841          21,589             100
Percent                     36      64           100
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  Air Force data. 

Air Force officials told us they were preparing a briefing for senior
Air Force leadership on the issues concerning military to civilian
conversions.  These officials stated that some of the major commands
believe that many of the positions should remain military.  For
example, the Air Force Materiel Command believes all the acquisition
positions should remain military because military personnel assigned
to these positions bring operational and flightline experience, which
is invaluable to developing new systems.  However, we believe there
is a good basis for studying the potential to replace some military
personnel assigned to acquisition functions with civilian employees. 
According to DOD's fiscal year 1997 FYDP, 41 percent of the Air
Force's acquisition workforce is military while only 12 percent of
the Army's is military.  An Air Force official stated that the senior
Air Force leadership will decide which, if any, positions will be
converted from military to civilian.  This official stated that no
date has been set for the briefing. 

In October 1996, we reported that the Air Force could save $69
million by converting 6,800 officer positions in such fields as
acquisition and financial management to civilian positions because
they are not military essential.\3 We found that civilian employees
cost between $1,261 and $15,731 less annually than military personnel
depending on the grade and rank.  In October 1994, we reported that
similar opportunities exist for converting enlisted support positions
to civilian employees.\4 Both of our reports noted that a number of
impediments exist to military to civilian conversions.  For example,
guidance provides commanders with wide latitude in justifying the use
of military personnel, and local commanders are perceived to prefer
military rather than civilian employees in certain positions. 
Nonetheless, we noted these barriers can be overcome with active
participation of senior managers.  DOD concurred with our reports and
agreed to convene a panel of senior managers within OSD, the joint
staff, and the military services to examine the issue of military to
civilian conversions.  An OSD official stated that the issues
concerning military to civilian conversions will be addressed as part
of the Quadrennial Defense Review. 


--------------------
\3 DOD Force Mix Issues:  Converting Some Support Officer Positions
to Civilian Status Could Save Money (GAO/NSIAD-97-15, Oct.  23,
1996). 

\4 DOD Force Mix Issues:  Greater Reliance on Civilians in Support
Roles Could Provide Significant Benefits (GAO/NSIAD-95-5, Oct.  19,
1994). 


   CONSOLIDATING FIGHTER SQUADRONS
   WOULD REDUCE MILITARY PERSONNEL
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3

Until recently, Air Force fighter wings were predominantly organized
in three squadrons of 24 aircraft.  However, the Air Force has
decided to reduce its squadron size to 18, which also reduced its
wing size to 54.  This change in unit size increased the number of
wings and squadrons to more than would have been needed had the
squadron size stayed at 24. 

In May 1996, we reported that the Air Force's arguments for using
smaller squadrons do not justify the additional cost.\5 Air Force
officials maintain that more squadrons are needed to provide the Air
Force flexibility to respond to numerous potential conflicts across
the globe.  Although the Air Force considers smaller fighter
squadrons beneficial, it had not performed any analysis to justify
its decision.  We developed several options for consolidating the
fighter force that would permit the Air Force to maintain the same
number of aircraft but carry out its missions with fewer active duty
personnel.  Our options could eliminate between two and seven
squadrons, and also eliminate a wing and/or fighter base and reduce
operating costs up to $115 million annually. 


--------------------
\5 Air Force Aircraft:  Consolidating Fighter Squadrons Could Reduce
Costs (GAO/NSIAD-96-82, May 6, 1996). 


   OTHER EFFORTS COULD IMPACT AIR
   FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR ACTIVE
   MILITARY PERSONNEL
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:4

The Air Force's requirements for active duty personnel could also be
affected by several ongoing initiatives and studies.  These include
an Air Force study of the active/reserve force mix, DOD's Deep Attack
Weapons Mix Study, and the Quadrennial Defense Review required by the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997. 

The Air Force is assessing options to transfer some functions now
performed by the active force to the reserves.  The Air Force plans
to examine changes to the mix of active to reserve forces after the
Quadrennial Defense Review is completed.  Moreover, in our September
1996 report on DOD's bomber force, we reported one option for
restructuring the bomber force would be to place more B-1Bs in the
Air National Guard.\6 This option would reduce the cost to maintain
DOD's bomber force while maintaining DOD's force of 95 B-1Bs.  In
1993, DOD reported to Congress that placing B-1Bs in the Air National
Guard would result in no loss of war-fighting capability. 

A major benefit of transferring bombers to the reserve component is
that reserve units have traditionally been less expensive to operate
than their active duty counterparts.  These savings are attributed to
two factors.  First, DOD expects that an Air National Guard squadron
will require fewer flying hours than an active squadron because Air
National Guard units are able to recruit more experienced pilots who
require less frequent training to maintain their proficiency. 
Personnel costs are the second major factor that account for the Air
National Guard's lower cost.  In comparison with active squadrons
that consist primarily of active duty military personnel, Air
National Guard units rely heavily on less-costly civilians and
part-time Guard personnel. 

In addition, DOD's ongoing Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study could change
DOD's requirements for fighters and bombers, which would impact Air
Force military personnel requirements.  The Commission on Roles and
Missions recommended that DOD conduct a DOD-wide cost-effectiveness
study to determine the appropriate number and mix of deep attack
capabilities currently fielded and under development by all the
services.  The first part of the study, which was to be completed in
late 1996, was expected to analyze weapons mix requirements for DOD's
planned force structure in 1998, 2006, and 2014 and determine the
impact of force structure changes on the weapon systems mix.  As of
February 1997, OSD was reviewing the results of this first phase and
had not made the results public.  The second part of the study will
analyze trade-offs among elements of the force structure, such as
bombers and tactical aircraft, for the same years and is to be
completed in early 1997.  The study should provide DOD with an
opportunity to identify options to reduce some of its extensive
ground attack capabilities, which could impact requirements for
active duty personnel. 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 requires
the Secretary of Defense to conduct a quadrennial review of the
defense program.  The first review, now underway, is scheduled to be
completed in May 1997.  It will examine defense strategy, force
structure, force modernization and infrastructure and develop a
defense strategy to the year 2005.  The legislation also established
a National Defense Panel to provide an independent assessment of
DOD's quadrennial review as well as to develop alternative force
structures that could meet anticipated threats to the national
security of the United States.  The results of these studies could
also impact the number of active duty military personnel. 


--------------------
\6 Air Force Bombers:  Option to Retire or Restructure the Force
Would Reduce Planned Spending (GAO/NSIAD-96-192, Sept.  30, 1996). 


   CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:5

Potential exists to replace active military personnel with
contractors or civilian employees.  These potential reductions should
not impact the Air Force's ability to implement the national military
strategy, since they are in the infrastructure forces rather than in
the forces that deploy during wartime.  The actual number of active
military positions that could be eliminated depends on the results of
several ongoing initiatives as well as senior Air Force leadership
commitment to reduce infrastructure to fund force modernization.  We
believe that it is important for the Air Force to move as quickly as
possible to complete its studies and make the conversions to
contractor and civilian employees in view of the recurring savings
that could be achieved.  Developing a plan and time frames for such
cost comparisons and conversions would permit the Air Force
leadership to monitor efforts to reduce infrastructure. 


   RECOMMENDATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:6

DOD has stated it must reduce infrastructure costs in order to
modernize its force.  Several ongoing Air Force studies have
identified potential to replace military personnel with contractors
or civilian employees.  Therefore, we recommend that, once the
ongoing studies are completed, the Secretary of the Air Force develop
a plan that

  -- identifies time frames to study whether it is more
     cost-effective to transfer commercial activities now performed
     by military personnel to civilian employees or private
     contractors and

  -- includes time frames to convert military positions in inherently
     governmental functions to civilian positions. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:7

DOD fully concurred with two parts of our recommendation and
partially concurred with one part.  DOD stated that an existing
system already tracks the services' progress in completing cost
comparison studies and converting positions, so there is no need to
establish an additional system.  We agreed with DOD and have modified
the recommendation accordingly. 


CATEGORIES OF DEFENSE
INFRASTRUCTURE
=========================================================== Appendix I

Acquisition management consists of all program elements that support
program management, program offices, and production support,
including acquisition headquarters, science and technology, and test
and evaluation resources.  This category includes earlier levels of
research and development, including basic research, exploratory
development, and advanced development. 

Force management consists of all programs that provide funding for
personnel for the management and operation of all the major military
command headquarters activities.  Force management also includes
program elements that provide resources for defensewide departmental
headquarters, management of international programs, support to other
defense organizations and federal government agencies, security
investigative services, public affairs activities, and criminal and
judicial activities. 

Installation support consists of activities that furnish personnel to
provide facilities from which defense forces operate.  Activities
include construction planning and design, real property maintenance,
base operating support, real estate management for active and reserve
bases, family housing and bachelor housing, supply operations, base
closure activities and environmental programs. 

Central communications consists of programs that manage all aspects
of the command, control and communications infrastructure for DOD
facilities, information support services, mapping and charting
products, and security support.  This category also includes program
elements that provide nontactical telephone services, the General
Defense Intelligence Program and cryptological activities, the Global
Positioning System, and support of air traffic control facilities. 

Central logistics consists of programs that provide support to
centrally managed logistics organizations, including management of
material, operation of supply systems, maintenance activities,
material transportation, base operations and support, communications,
and minor construction. 

Central medical consists of programs that furnish personnel that
provide medical care to active duty military personnel, dependent,
and retirees.  Activities provide for all patient care, except for
that provided by medical units that are part of direct support units. 
Activities include medical training, management of the medical
system, and support of medical installations. 

Central personnel consists of all programs that provide recruiting of
new personnel and the management and support of dependent schools;
community, youth, and family centers; and child development
activities.  Other programs supporting personnel include permanent
change of station costs, personnel in transient, veterans education
assistance and other miscellaneous personnel support activities. 

Central training consists of program elements that provide resources
for virtually all non unit training, including training for new
personnel, aviation and flight training, military academies, officer
training corps, other college commissioning programs, and officer and
enlisted training schools. 




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix II
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
=========================================================== Appendix I



(See figure in printed edition.)


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================= Appendix III

NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Janet St.  Laurent, Assistant Director
Michael Kennedy, Evaluator-in-Charge
Irene Robertson, Senior Evaluator

NORFOLK FIELD OFFICE

George Morse, Senior Evaluator
Bonita Anderson, Evaluator

*** End of document. ***