Force Structure: Army Support Forces Can Meet Two-Conflict Strategy with
Some Risks (Chapter Report, 02/28/97, GAO/NSIAD-97-66).

Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed how the Army
determines its support force requirements, and the results of its most
recent process for allocating support forces, known as Total Army
Analysis (TAA) 2003.

GAO found that: (1) it does not appear feasible to have a smaller active
Army support force at this time, but a smaller active combat force and
institutional force may be possible in the future; (2) a smaller active
support force today would certainly increase the Army's risk of carrying
out current defense policy; (3) current initiatives being explored by
the Army regarding its institutional force could lead to greater
efficiencies and thus a smaller active force; (4) improvements in the
requirements determination process for both support forces and
institutional forces could provide greater assurance that the size and
composition of the Army is appropriate to meet war-fighting needs; (5)
on the basis of TAA 2003 results, the Army believes it can deploy
sufficient support forces to meet the requirements of two nearly
simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC) with moderate risk; (6)
because it lacks adequate active support forces and must rely on reserve
forces that take more time to be readied to deploy, an estimated 79,000
support forces needed in the first 30 days would arrive late; (7)
support forces needed for the second conflict would consist of only 12
percent active forces; (8) high reliance on reserves for use in the
second MRC may entail risk if the second MRC occurs without warning, or
if mobilization is delayed; (9) existing active support units are short
another 19,200 required positions and some required support units exist
only on paper; (10) TAA 2003 had some limitations and the Army's risk
assessment depends largely on the assumptions and model inputs that were
adopted for TAA 2003; (11) the Army used many favorable assumptions
that, although consistent with defense guidance, understated risk; (12)
the Army's recent efforts to streamline the institutional active Army by
identifying better ways to organize and adopt more efficient business
practices have identified up to 4,000 military positions that the Army
plans to use to offset active support shortfalls; (13) the Army may
reduce the number of major commands, which could result in some
additional force savings in the future; (14) however, the Army's efforts
to make its institutional force more efficient and potentially smaller
are hampered by long-standing weaknesses in its process to determine
institutional force requirements; (15) GAO's analysis indicates that the
Department of Defense (D0D) has not supported its proposal to reduce th*

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-97-66
     TITLE:  Force Structure: Army Support Forces Can Meet Two-Conflict 
             Strategy with Some Risks
      DATE:  02/28/97
   SUBJECT:  Combat readiness
             Defense contingency planning
             Human resources utilization
             Military cost control
             Army personnel
             Mobilization
             Military downsizing
             Personnel management
             Strategic mobility forces
IDENTIFIER:  Total Army Analysis Process
             Total Army Analysis 2003
             DOD Future Years Defense Program
             Army Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
             DOD Bottom-Up Review
             DOD Quadrennial Defense Review
             Army Force XXI Initiative
             Army Manpower Staffing Standards System
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Committees

February 1997

FORCE STRUCTURE - ARMY SUPPORT
FORCES CAN MEET TWO-CONFLICT
STRATEGY WITH SOME RISKS

GAO/NSIAD-97-66

Force Structure

(701065)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  AFPDA - Army's force planning data and assumptions
  BUR - Bottom-Up Review
  CINC - commander in chief
  DOD - Department of Defense
  FASTALS - Force Analysis Simulation of Theater Administration and
     Logistics Support
  FYDP - Future Years Defense Program
  MRC - major regional conflict
  OOTW - operations other than war
  OSD - Office of the Secretary of Defense
  TAA - Total Army Analysis
  TDA - Table of Distribution and Allowances
  TOE - Table of Organization and Equipment
  TRADOC - Training and Doctrine Command
  TTHS - trainees, transients, holdees, and students

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-272600

February 28, 1997

The Honorable Strom Thurmond
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd D.  Spence
Chairman
The Honorable Ronald V.  Dellums
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives

This report discusses how the Army determines its support force
requirements, and the results of its most recent process for
allocating support forces, known as Total Army Analysis 2003.  It
also discusses the Army's progress to streamline its infrastructure
or institutional force structure.  We are sending this report to you
in response to a provision of the fiscal year 1996 National Defense
Authorization Act requiring us to review these issues and report our
results to Congress by March 1.  The information in this report
should be useful to your Committees in their deliberations on the
future size and composition of the Army.  This report contains
recommendations to the Secretary of the Army. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Army, and the Director, Office of Management and
Budget.  Copies will also be made available to others on request. 

If you or your staff have any questions on this report, please call
me on (202) 512-3504.  Major contributors to this report are listed
in appendix VI. 

Richard Davis
Director, National Security
 Analysis


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0


   PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

In the last 2 fiscal years, the Army has drawn down its active
military forces from 540,000 to 495,000.  A key issue that has
evolved is whether the Army's active end strength should be reduced
to achieve savings to help pay for force modernization.  In 1996,
Congress established an active Army military personnel end strength
floor of 495,000 out of concern that further downsizing would impair
the Army's ability to support the national military strategy of
responding to two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC),
as well as deploying to operations other than war (OOTW).  As the
first of a series of congressionally required reviews of Army end
strength issues, GAO reviewed (1) the extent to which the Army's
process for assessing its active and reserve support forces resulted
in sufficient support force structure to meet the requirements of the
two-MRC scenario and OOTWs; (2) whether the Army's streamlining
initiatives have identified opportunities to reduce Army personnel
resources devoted to institutional functions; and (3) the feasibility
of reducing active Army end strength, a matter Congress will review
when it deliberates future Army end strength authorizations. 


   BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

Most of the active Army is divided between operational (63 percent)
and institutional forces (25 percent), with the remainder of the
force in temporary status, such as students (12 percent). 
Historically, these percentages have remained relatively constant. 
Operational forces are generally those forces that deploy to MRCs and
other military operations.  The operational force is further divided
into the 10 war-fighting divisions and 2 armored cavalry regiments,
and the deployable combat support and combat service support units
needed to sustain this force in wartime.  Combat support includes
such specialties as chemical, engineering, military intelligence, and
military police, while combat service support includes specialties
such as transportation, medical, finance, quartermaster, and
ordnance.  The institutional force, called the Table of Distribution
and Allowances (TDA) force, provides generally nondeployable support
to the Army infrastructure, including training, doctrine development,
base operations, supply, and maintenance. 

The Army uses different processes to determine requirements and
allocate resources to each portion of the active Army.  Combat forces
are determined by defense guidance, which establishes the number of
divisions, and Army doctrine, which establishes the number and type
of forces dedicated to those divisions.  The Army uses a process
known as Total Army Analysis (TAA) to determine the number and types
of support units needed to support the Army's combat forces and to
allocate personnel authorizations to required units.  TAA results are
determined biennially.  For example, TAA 2003, which was completed in
January 1996, projects requirements through the year 2003. 
Resourcing decisions made as a result of TAA are used to develop
future Army budgets.  Requirements for the Army's institutional
forces are determined outside the TAA process and are allocated
largely at the major command level. 

In 1995, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), motivated by a
need to identify additional funds for Army modernization, directed
the Army to reduce its end strength to 475,000 by 1999 based on the
potential for achieving efficiencies under the Army's Force XXI
redesign initiative.\1 OSD projected this lower Army end strength by
1999 in the Fiscal Year 1997 Future Years Defense Program.  The
Future Years Defense Program is an authoritative record of current
and projected force structure, costs, and personnel levels that have
been approved by the Secretary of Defense.  The Army was opposed to
reducing its active end strength by 20,000 and was permitted to
reallocate funds in its proposed budget for fiscal years 1998 through
2003 to remain at an active end strength of 495,000. 


--------------------
\1 The Army's initiative to redesign its combat divisions and
incorporate information age technology on the battlefield is known as
Force XXI.  As part of Force XXI, the Army is also examining ways to
streamline and re-engineer its institutional force. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

It does not appear feasible to have a smaller active Army support
force at this time because this could increase the Army's risk of
carrying out current defense policy.  However, new initiatives being
explored by the Army regarding its combat and institutional forces
could lead to a smaller active force in the future.  Further,
improvements in the requirements determination process for both
support forces and institutional forces could provide greater
assurance that the size and composition of the Army is appropriate to
meet war-fighting needs. 

On the basis of TAA 2003 results, the Army believes it can deploy
sufficient support forces to meet the requirements of two nearly
simultaneous MRCs with moderate risk.  The Army's assessment of risk
is based on several factors.  First, because it lacks adequate active
support forces and must rely on reserve forces that take more time to
be readied to deploy, an estimated 79,000 support forces needed in
the first 30 days would arrive late.  Second, support forces needed
for the second conflict would consist of only 12-percent active
forces.  High reliance on reserves for use in the second MRC may
entail risk if the second MRC occurs without warning, or if
mobilization is delayed.  Third, existing active support units are
short another 19,200 required positions and some required support
units exist only on paper. 

However, TAA 2003 had some limitations and the Army's risk assessment
depends largely on the assumptions and model inputs that were adopted
for TAA 2003.  The Army used many favorable assumptions that,
although consistent with defense guidance, understated risk.  For
example, it assumed that forces committed to OOTWs would be
immediately available to redeploy and U.S.  forces would have
immediate access to overseas ports and airfields.  Less optimistic
assumptions would have led to higher support requirements.  On the
other hand, the Army did not use all available resources to satisfy
its unmet support force requirements, such as support forces that
currently exist in the Army's eight National Guard divisions and the
active Army's institutional forces, and support available from
outside contractors and defense civilians.  The Army could have used
these personnel to meet some of its requirements for later deploying
units that exist only on paper.  Nonetheless, considering these
assets would not solve the Army's shortage of active support forces
to meet its requirements during the first 30 days of the first MRC. 

The Army's recent efforts to streamline the institutional active Army
by identifying better ways to organize and adopt more efficient
business practices have identified up to 4,000 military positions
that the Army plans to use to offset active support shortfalls. 
Moreover, the Army is continuing its streamlining efforts and may
reduce the number of major commands, which could result in some
additional force savings in the future.  However, the Army's efforts
to make its institutional force more efficient and potentially
smaller are hampered by long-standing weaknesses in its process to
determine institutional force requirements.  Specifically, many of
the Army's institutional requirements are not determined through an
analysis of workload to include analyzing what work needs to be done
based on mission and assessing how processes can be improved.  Such
analysis, when combined with the Army's efforts to re-engineer its
overall organization through functional assessments, would help the
Army determine how big its force needs to be and allocate resources
efficiently toward its highest priority institutional needs. 

GAO's analysis indicates that the Department of Defense (DOD) has not
supported its proposal to reduce the active Army to 475,000 by 1999
with sound analysis.  Neither TDA streamlining nor the Army's ongoing
Force XXI combat forces redesign initiative will achieve sufficient
end strength savings to permit a 20,000-cut by 1999.  However, the
Army might be able to achieve efficiencies and further reduce the
size of its active institutional force in the future by reducing the
number of major commands and adopting workload-based requirements. 
Moreover, the Army's combat redesign effort may eventually reduce
requirements for active combat forces by capitalizing on digital
technology and more efficient logistics concepts.  Other options to
restructure the Army's combat forces also exist.  For example, some
variant of the former reserve round-out concept, perhaps at the
battalion level rather than brigade level, could reduce the number of
active personnel committed to combat divisions.  DOD has an
opportunity to explore these and other alternatives during its
Quadrennial Defense Review of defense strategy and force structure
mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1997. 


   PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4


      THE ARMY CAN SUPPORT TWO
      MRCS WITH MODERATE RISK
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1

TAA is the Army's process to determine the number and types of
support units it needs to execute the national military strategy and
to allocate the Army's personnel authorizations, both active and
reserve, among these support force requirements to minimize
war-fighting risks.  The Army defines war-fighting risk as

  -- forces needed in the first 30 days of the first MRC, which would
     arrive late;

  -- insufficient active component support forces for the second MRC;

  -- required units for which no personnel have been authorized or
     required units that exist, but have been allocated fewer
     positions than required; and

  -- the number of anticipated casualties for a given force. 

Based on TAA 2003 results, the Army believes it can provide support
forces for two MRCs at a moderate level of risk.  However, moderate
risk means that about 79,000 support forces needed in the first 30
days of the first MRC would arrive late because the Army lacks
sufficient numbers of active support forces to meet its requirements
and must rely on reserve forces that generally require more than 30
days to mobilize and deploy.  Late support forces represent 30
percent of the 260,000 total authorized Army force needed during this
time period, and 42 percent of the Army support forces required.  DOD
officials believe that even if it were possible to replace reservists
with active support personnel during the first 30 days, some forces
would still arrive late due to strategic lift constraints during that
time frame. 

The Army also found that support forces required for the second MRC
will consist of only about 12 percent of the active forces compared
with
47 percent in the first MRC.  The risk of late arrival would apply
here if mobilization of reserve forces was delayed.  In addition,
existing active units have been authorized 19,200 fewer positions
than Army wartime needs require because total Army requirements
exceed authorized personnel.  Also, units required by Army doctrine
totaling 58,400 support positions were not allocated any personnel
and exist only on paper.  The Army estimates that support from host
nations could meet over 14,000 of this shortfall, reducing the Army's
shortage to about 44,000.  The Army also plans to implement an option
developed by the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study to
convert 42,700 Army National Guard combat division positions to
required support positions.  This option would eliminate most of the
remaining shortage, but will cost up to $2.8 billion and could take
many years to complete.  Finally, TAA modeled risk in terms of
expected casualties.  (Casualty numbers are classified.)


         SOME MODELING ASSUMPTIONS
         UNDERSTATED SUPPORT
         REQUIREMENTS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 0:4.1.1

During TAA, many of the Army's key assumptions in modeling the two
MRCs were identical or similar to assumptions cited in defense
guidance.  Some of these assumptions were favorable; that is, they
minimized risk to U.S.  forces.  If less favorable assumptions were
used, force requirements would be even greater.  For example, TAA
2003 assumed

  -- immediate access to all ports and airfields in the theater of
     operations,

  -- rapid decision-making by the national command authorities to
     mobilize reserve forces and activate the Civil Reserve Air
     Fleet, and

  -- limited use of chemical weapons employed against U.S.  forces. 

Support force requirements also would have been higher had the Army
considered support force requirements for coalition partners. 

Also, TAA 2003 requirements do not adequately reflect the U.S.  role
in OOTWs.  The Army bases its force structure on fighting two MRCs
and assumes those forces will be adequate to support OOTWs.  This is
consistent with defense guidance.  As a result, the Army assumed that
it could extract as many as 15,000 troops engaged in an OOTW and
redeploy them so that they would be available for the early phases of
an MRC.  Commanders in Chief of the European, Central, and Atlantic
Commands, as well as some Army officials, are concerned that not
allowing for delays associated with the extraction and redeployment
of these forces, as well as a degradation in capability from OOTWs is
unrealistic.  However, unless defense guidance changes, the Army has
no plans to change its approach to OOTWs in TAA 2005, which is now
underway. 


         AVAILABLE SUPPORT
         PERSONNEL WERE EXCLUDED
         FROM TAA PROCESS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 0:4.1.2

TAA does not include all available personnel in arriving at its
resourcing decisions, missing opportunities to mitigate risk.  For
example, the Army did not include support forces in the eight Army
National Guard divisions that the Army does not envision using during
a two-conflict scenario.  In 1995, GAO recommended that as part of
TAA 2003, the Army identify the specific unfilled support
requirements that could be met using the support forces embedded in
these divisions and develop a plan to employ this capability.\2

Army officials indicated that the Army would use these personnel if
needed, but to date, they have not been considered in the TAA
process.  The Army also did not include the potential use of TDA
military personnel (with the exception of medical forces) or defense
civilians, even though, in some instances, these personnel can and do
deploy, sometimes on very short notice.  Finally, TAA did not
determine how much of the Army's requirement could be met through the
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, which the Army has been using
to provide logistical and construction support to overseas
operations.  However, most of the above personnel would not be
available in the first 30 days of the first MRC.  Therefore, the Army
will not be able to rely on them to meet its early deployment needs. 

TAA is an analytically rigorous process that relies on extensive
modeling and the judgment of senior Army officials to derive the
composition of the Army's support force.  However, some aspects of
TAA's methodology could be improved.  For example, not all TAA model
inputs were scrutinized to ensure they were free from error; the
process does not easily accommodate changes that occur during its
2-year implementation cycle; and senior leaders do not prioritize
deficiencies that remain and develop action plans to mitigate risk. 
In addition, TAA models are run in the early stages of the process
using the required force structure to fight the war.  The Army does
not rerun its models at the conclusion of the requirements
determination phase to further assess how mobility limitations affect
risk. 


--------------------
\2 Force Structure:  Army National Guard Divisions Could Augment
Wartime Support Capability (GAO/NSIAD-95-80, Mar.  2, 1995). 


      THE ARMY PLANS TO ELIMINATE
      SOME INSTITUTIONAL MILITARY
      POSITIONS BUT IS CONSTRAINED
      BY A WEAK REQUIREMENTS
      PROCESS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2

About 25 percent of the Army's active positions are allocated to the
Army's institutional force.  However, long-standing weaknesses in the
institutional force requirements determination process leave the Army
unable to ensure that military personnel are being used efficiently
and assess what risks would be assumed by eliminating TDA positions. 
Also, allocating positions based on available budgets, without
defining workload requirements, leads to across-the-board cuts that
reduce funds available to all commands irrespective of relative need. 
Senior Army officials acknowledged that the Army's limited progress
in defining TDA in terms of workload remains a weakness, and GAO
found varying levels of compliance with workload-based standards at
the major commands that GAO contacted.  Senior Army officials are
taking steps to promote workload-based requirements by increasing its
review of major commands' requirements determination processes and
establishing a methodology to analyze what work needs to be done
based on mission and how to improve processes through better methods,
benchmarking, capital investment, automation, and improved
facilities.  The Army is also pilot testing an automated system to
collect and analyze workload information and monitor efficiency. 
However, the long-standing weakness with the Army's process, despite
numerous efforts to improve it, suggest that a higher level of
reporting and oversight may be warranted.  The Army has not reported
its historic lack of compliance with its workload-based allocation
policy as a material weakness under the Federal Managers' Financial
Integrity Act (P.L.  97-255).  Policy implementing the act requires
agencies to report material weaknesses that significantly weaken
safeguards against waste. 

The Army could potentially transfer up to 4,000 authorized positions
from its institutional force to its support force as a result of its
initial institutional streamlining initiatives and some recent policy
decisions.  TAA 2003 had anticipated shifting 2,000 of those
positions to offset unmet support requirements.  Army officials said
that the remaining positions will also be transferred to fill support
force shortfalls, but they could not specify which units.  However,
many of the potential transfers are based on plans that have not been
finalized and cannot be counted on with certainty. 

Some potential to further reduce institutional forces may exist but
is difficult to quantify.  As part of its continuing redesign effort,
the Army is evaluating several options to reduce the number of major
commands and align their responsibilities according to core processes
such as training and requirements development.  These options are
intended to eliminate duplication, establish clearer lines of
authority, and streamline resource management, and could result in
fewer TDA positions.  However, such efforts will be weakened without
a requirements determination process based on workload.  Such a
process, when combined with the Army's efforts to re-engineer its
overall organization through functional assessments, would help the
Army allocate resources efficiently toward its highest priority
institutional needs. 

The Army must also consider legislative, regulatory, and budgetary
constraints in its efforts to streamline the institutional Army. 
These actions can influence the size and composition of the
institutional Army force, but are outside the Army's span of control. 
For example, although GAO has identified some military positions that
could be converted to generally less expensive civilian positions,\3
DOD's planned civilian drawdown may make such conversions difficult
to implement.  Further, commanders are reluctant to replace military
personnel with civilian personnel because military personnel are
funded from the Army's centralized military personnel account, while
civilians are funded from the command's operations and maintenance
account.  This reluctance stems from the fact that operations and
maintenance funds are more likely to be cut and result in
insufficient funds to hire civilian replacements.  Finally, by 2001,
37 percent of the Army's TDA positions will be controlled by either
legislative mandate, DOD directive, or other agencies.  For example,
about 5,000 TDA military personnel are required for positions in
joint organizations such as OSD and the war-fighting commands'
headquarters. 


--------------------
\3 DOD Force Mix Issues:  Greater Reliance on Civilians in Support
Roles Could Provide Significant Benefits (GAO/NSIAD-95-5, Oct.  19,
1994). 


      A SMALLER ACTIVE ARMY
      SUPPORT FORCE DOES NOT
      APPEAR FEASIBLE AT THIS
      TIME, BUT A SMALLER COMBAT
      AND INSTITUTIONAL FORCE MAY
      BE POSSIBLE IN THE FUTURE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3

OSD did not support its plan to reduce the Army's active end strength
with detailed analysis.  OSD's March 1995 directive to reduce the
Army to 475,000 by 1999 cited the Army's Force XXI redesign
initiative as a basis for the decrease.  However, the results of the
Army's Force XXI redesign of its combat forces will not be known for
years, and this initiative is not specifically intended to identify
how to make the Army smaller.  Although the institutional force
redesign component of Force XXI has identified a potential to reduce
up to 4,000 active military positions, the Army plans to use these
savings to meet existing active support force shortfalls identified
in TAA 2003.  Further, OSD's recently completed assessment of TAA
2003 did not examine active Army end strength issues, assess the risk
associated with different end strengths, or justify force reductions. 
OSD believes the Army's overall operational force requirements may be
overstated based on its analysis of selected model inputs and the
results of a recent war game and has recommended that the Army
further review issues related to casualty estimates, fuel
consumption, and host nation support.  These studies are ongoing. 

Options may exist to reduce active Army end strength if the Army were
to restructure its active combat and institutional forces to achieve
efficiencies and reap the benefits of new technology.  TDA
streamlining may identify additional opportunities to reduce active
TDA personnel by reducing the number of major commands, while broader
use of workload-based requirements could ensure that military
personnel are used efficiently.  Force XXI's emphasis on digital
technology and more efficient logistics practices may result in
smaller combat divisions in the future.  Other options to restructure
combat forces include reassessing the mix of heavy and light
divisions and assigning reserve forces a role in later deploying
active divisions.  For example, as a result of the Bottom- Up Review
and the Army's experience in Desert Storm, the Army discontinued its
use of reserve component round-up or round-out brigades.  However,
options may exist to adopt some variant of this concept, such as
integrating reserve forces at the battalion level.  The upcoming
Quadrennial Defense Review, mandated by the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, tasks DOD to examine a wide
range of issues that could impact future Army end strength, including
changes to the national military strategy and force structure. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5

To improve TAA's ability to accurately project war-fighting
requirements and allocate the Army's personnel resources, GAO
recommends that the Secretary of the Army

  -- reexamine key model inputs to ensure they are accurate and
     consistent with war-fighting scenarios;

  -- perform analysis to determine how multiple OOTW support force
     requirements might differ from support force requirements based
     on two MRCs and bring any variances to the attention of the
     Secretary of Defense so that he can consider them in developing
     defense guidance;

  -- perform sensitivity analyses on significant model inputs,
     assumptions, and resourcing decisions to determine their impacts
     on war-fighting risk.  For example, although the Army used
     assumptions established by defense guidance, determining the
     implications of less favorable conditions, such as delayed
     call-up of reserves, would provide the Army with additional
     information on which to base its assessment of risk;

  -- rerun TAA models with the required force to assess the impact of
     force size on mobility requirements; and

  -- determine how support units resident within the eight National
     Guard Divisions, TDA military personnel, contractor personnel,
     and DOD civilians can be used to fill some support force
     requirements. 

To improve the management and allocation of personnel resources to
the institutional Army, GAO also recommends that the Secretary of the
Army

  -- report to the Secretary of Defense the Army's long-standing
     problem with implementing workload-based analysis as a material
     weakness under the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act to
     maintain visibility of the issue and ensure action is taken and

  -- closely monitor the military positions the Army plans to save as
     the result of Force XXI initiatives and have a contingency plan
     in place in the event that these savings do not materialize. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6

DOD generally agreed with the report, fully concurring with six of
the recommendations and partially concurring with one.  DOD noted
that the Army has already planned some actions to resolve issues GAO
presented in a draft of this report.  Specifically, the Army plans to
(1) scrutinize key model inputs in preparation for TAA 2005, (2)
conduct additional analyses involving OOTWs, (3) conduct sensitivity
analyses and excursions in TAA 2005 beyond those required by current
defense guidance, and (4) rerun TAA models with the required force to
improve its analysis of risk.  However, DOD only partially concurred
with our recommendation to consider other personnel resources in
filling its support force requirements.  The Army plans to consider
some types of Army National Guard Division assets to fill support
force shortfalls where the capabilities are nearly a match, such as
aviation assets.  The Army also plans to further analyze how to use
its institutional force structure to meet both OOTW and war-fighting
requirements.  However, DOD differs with GAO on recognizing civilian
contractor personnel in TAA.  The Army believes that while contractor
personnel enhance the Army's capabilities, they should not be
considered an available resource in TAA since contractor personnel
are not funded in the outyears of the Program Objective Memorandum. 
The Army also expressed concern about its ability to provide security
to contractors in an MRC environment.  Because contractor personnel
have historically been used by the Army to provide support in many
different types of overseas environments, both OOTWs and MRCs, GAO
believes that, as a minimum, the Army could treat contractor
personnel in the same way it treats host nation support--as an offset
to unmet requirements.  The Army can make assumptions concerning the
funding of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, just as it makes
assumptions about such issues as the availability of host nation
support, the size of the active Army force, or the level of
modernization of the force in future years. 

DOD agreed with both of GAO's recommendations relating to the
institutional Army, including GAO's recommendation that the Secretary
of the Army report its long-standing problems in managing its
institutional personnel as a material weakness under the Federal
Managers' Financial Integrity Act.  DOD's comments on a draft of this
report are reprinted in appendix I. 


INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1

The Army has completed its drawdown of active forces in accordance
with the Bottom- Up Review (BUR) force structure and defense guidance
calling for a force of 495,000.  To ensure that the Army will be able
to maintain the minimum strength necessary to successfully respond to
two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC), Congress
established a permanent legislative end strength floor of 495,000 in
its fiscal year 1996 National Defense Authorization Act.  However,
the Department of Defense's (DOD) fiscal year 1997 Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP)\1 reduced active Army end strength 20,000
below the congressionally mandated floor by 1999.  A key impetus
behind this plan is the concern within the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) that funding the existing active Army force level of
495,000 will prevent the Army from buying the new equipment it needs
to modernize the active force for the 21st century. 


--------------------
\1 The FYDP is an authoritative record of current and projected force
structure, costs, and personnel levels that have been approved by the
Secretary of Defense. 


   ACTIVE ARMY HAS BEEN DOWNSIZED
   AND RESTRUCTURED IN ACCORDANCE
   WITH THE BUR
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1

The BUR strategy called for a force of 10 active Army combat
divisions and 2 active armored cavalry regiments to fight and win 2
nearly simultaneous MRCs.  This force was far smaller than the Cold
War Army, which comprised 18 active divisions and 770,000 personnel
in fiscal year 1989, as well as the Base Force, which in fiscal year
1994, consisted of 12 active combat divisions and 540,000 active
personnel. 

Following the BUR, the Army reorganized its active combat division
structure.  Two division headquarters were eliminated, thus reducing
the number of active divisions from 12 to 10 as specified in the BUR. 
Another significant change was that the Army discontinued its
reliance on reserve component "round-up" or "round-out" units to
bring the active divisions to full combat strength for wartime
deployment.  Instead, the Army determined that each of the remaining
10 combat divisions would comprise 3 fully active ground maneuver
brigades.  This decision was endorsed by the Secretary of Defense
during development of the BUR out of concern that relying on reserve
brigades could slow down a U.S.  response to aggression.  Therefore,
as a result of the BUR, only two active maneuver brigades were
eliminated from Army force structure--
12 combat divisions with a combined total of 32 active brigades were
reduced to 10 divisions with 30 active brigades.  Also, the Army
decided that all 10 remaining divisions would be authorized 100
percent of their wartime military personnel requirement. 

Overall, the reduction in forces, when combined with the force
reductions resulting from the withdrawal of 20,000 military personnel
from Europe between fiscal years 1994 and 1995, brought the force
level down to within 10,000 of the fiscal year 1996 end strength goal
of 495,000.  The remaining personnel reductions came from the
institutional portions of the active Army.  No cuts were made in
"non-divisional" level support forces that would deploy with combat
divisions,\2 since the Army had previously found that support
shortages already existed in these forces.  A comparison of fiscal
years 1994 and 1996 active Army force structure is shown in
table 1.1. 



                               Table 1.1
                
                Comparison of Fiscal Years 1994 and 1996
                      Active Army Force Structure

1994                                      1996
----------------------------------------  ----------------------------
ï¿½ 540,000 end strength.                   ï¿½ 495,000 end strength.

ï¿½ 12 combat divisions.                    ï¿½ 10 combat divisions.

32 active maneuver brigades.              ï¿½ 20,000 troops from Europe
                                          reduced from the force.

ï¿½ Some divisions have fewer than three    ï¿½ All active divisions have
active brigades. Reserve personnel meant  three maneuver brigades.
to fill the remainder of maneuver and     After restructuring
divisional support requirements. These    divisions, only two division
are referred to as "round-up" or "round-  headquarters and two full
out" units.                               brigades had to be
                                          eliminated (16,000-18,000).

ï¿½ Some maneuver brigades authorized at    ï¿½ All maneuver brigades
less than 100 percent of requirements.    authorized at
                                          100 percent of requirements.

                                          ï¿½ Remaining personnel
                                          reductions taken from the
                                          nondeployable Army.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  Department of the Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 


--------------------
\2 A Corps provides non-divisional support for two to five combat
divisions. 


   NOT ALL ARMY FORCES DEPLOY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2

The active Army force of 495,000 is comprised of both deployable and
nondeployable forces.  The deployable force (63 percent) includes the
combat divisions, separate brigades, armored cavalry regiments, and
special forces groups, as well as the Corps level combat support and
combat service support forces that would accompany them to the war
fight.  Taken together, these deployable operational forces are
organized according to Army Tables of Organization and Equipment
(TOE) and are commonly referred to as TOE forces.  Combat forces are
referred to as "above-the-line" TOE, and combat support/combat
service support forces are referred to as "below-the-line" TOE. 
Combat support includes such specialties as engineering, military
intelligence, chemical, and military police, while combat service
support includes specialties such as transportation, medical,
finance, quartermaster, and ordnance. 

The generally nondeployable portion of the Army (historically about
25 percent) is often referred to as the "institutional" force that
supports the Army infrastructure by performing such functions as
training, doctrine development, base operations, supply, and
maintenance.  These forces are organized according to Army Tables of
Distribution and Allowances (TDA) and are simply referred to as TDA
forces.  Another 12 percent of the active Army force is in a
temporary status at any given time and is referred to as "trainees,
transients, holdees and students" or TTHS.  These forces are also
considered to be nondeployable.  Historically, the percentages of the
active force devoted to TOE, TDA, and TTHS have remained relatively
constant.  (See fig.  1.1.)

   Figure 1.1:  Percentage of the
   Army's Forces Represented by
   TOE, TDA, and TTHS Forces,
   Fiscal Years 1988 Through 2001

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  Department of the Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 


   TOTAL ARMY ANALYSIS IS ONE OF
   SEVERAL ARMY RESOURCING
   PROCESSES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3

The Army uses different resourcing processes for each portion of the
active Army (see table 1.2).  Defense guidance specifies the number
of active divisions the Army must have in its structure.  The
elements of these divisions are sized according to Army doctrine. 
The Army's 10 divisions range in size from 10,000 to 15,000 active
personnel, depending on mission (e.g., light and heavy) and type of
equipment.  The Army uses a biennial process known as the Total Army
Analysis (TAA) to determine the number of support units needed to
support these combat forces, and how available personnel
authorizations will be allocated to these requirements.  TDA
resources are allocated in a separate resource management process,
primarily driven by the Army major commands but subject to some
Department of the Army headquarters oversight.  TTHS is essentially
an allocation rather than a managed resource, although Army policy
decisions can influence its size. 



                                    Table 1.2
                     
                     Breakdown of Fiscal Year 1998 Total Army
                       End Strength by Type and Resourcing
                                     Process

                              Resou
                              rcing
Initial                       proce                 National
resource       Force type     ss\a          Active  Guard\b        Reserve
allocation     -------------  -----  -------------  -------------  -------------
Directed by    TOE combat     Defen        176,000  191,000 to     2,000
the Army                      se                    203,000
Chief of                      plann
Staff                         ing
                              speci
                              fies
                              10
                              and
                              two-
                              third
                              activ
                              e
                              divis
                              ions
                              and
                              15
                              Natio
                              nal
                              Guard
                              enhan
                              ced
                              briga
                              des.

                              Divis
                              ion
                              and
                              briga
                              de
                              size
                              deter
                              mined
                              by
                              Army
                              doctr
                              ine.

               TOE support    TAA          136,000  136,000 to     137,000
                              deter                 162,000
                              mines
                              the
                              Army
                              suppo
                              rt
                              struc
                              ture
                              neede
                              d to
                              execu
                              te
                              the
                              two-
                              MRC
                              scena
                              rio.

               TDA            Depar        124,000  40,000         69,000
                              tment
                              of
                              the
                              Army
                              Headq
                              uarte
                              rs
                              alloc
                              ates
                              TDA
                              to
                              major
                              comma
                              nds,
                              based
                              on
                              their
                              input
                              s.

T              THS            Set           59,000  Not            Not
                              aside                 applicable     applicable
                              .

================================================================================
Total                                      495,000  367,000 to     208,000
component end                                       405,000
strength

================================================================================
Total Army                                          1,070,000 to
end strength                                        1,108,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Because TAA 2003 provides the force structure for the 1998-2003
Army Program Objective Memorandum, the Army uses fiscal year 1998 end
strength goals as the starting point to determine requirements and
make resourcing decisions. 

\b The 1998-2003 Army Program Objective Memorandum is built on the
following end strength assumptions:  (1) 495,000 active end strength
and (2) 575,000 reserve end strength (up to 208,000 reserve and up to
367,000 National Guard).  However, Congress allows the National Guard
force structure to be larger than its authorized end strength to
provide the necessary organizational framework to support the
division headquarters. 

Source:  Department of the Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

TAA determines the number and types of support units needed to
support war-fighting missions, regardless of whether active or
reserve positions would be used to meet these requirements.  The
process then allocates forces from the active Army, the Army National
Guard, and the Army Reserve to fill those requirements.  The results
of TAA 2003 were reported in January 1996 and fed into the 1998-2003
Army Program Objective Memorandum.\3 A detailed discussion of the TAA
process, assumptions, and results can be found in chapter 2.  Chapter
3 discusses the TDA requirements process. 


--------------------
\3 The Army Program Objective Memorandum is a biennial publication
that defines Army programs for
6 years into the future and tabulates funding anticipated for these
programs. 


   DOD'S 1997 FYDP REDUCES ARMY
   END STRENGTH WHILE INCREASING
   MODERNIZATION FUNDING
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4

Although Congress established a permanent active Army end strength
floor of 495,000 in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1996, DOD's fiscal year 1997 FYDP reduced active Army end
strength below this level beginning in fiscal year 1998.  Congress
established a permanent end strength floor to ensure that each
service, including the Army, had the minimum force necessary to
fulfill the national military strategy.  However, DOD may reduce
forces below the floor if it notifies Congress and may also increase
authorized end strength as much as 1 percent in any given fiscal
year.  According to the 1997 FYDP, DOD intends to keep Army military
personnel appropriation dollars relatively flat from fiscal years
1995 to 2001.  Because these appropriations will not sustain a force
level of 495,000, DOD planned to reduce the Army's end strength by
10,000 in fiscal year 1998 and an additional 10,000 in fiscal year
1999. 

DOD's 1997 FYDP increases the percentage of the Army budget devoted
to procurement from 10 percent in 1995 to 16 percent by 2001.  This
increase is consistent with DOD's view that modernization is key to
long-term readiness.  In his March 1996 testimony, the Secretary of
Defense said that in recent years, DOD had taken advantage of the
drawdown and slowed modernization in order to fully fund those
expenditures that guarantee near-term readiness, such as spare parts,
training, and maintenance.  As a result, modernization funding in
fiscal year 1997 was said to be the lowest it had been in many years,
about one-third of what it was in fiscal
year 1985.  To reverse this trend, DOD plans to increase funding to
procure new equipment, including funding for "everyday equipment"
ground forces needed in the field, such as tactical communications
gear, trucks, and armored personnel carriers.  Likewise, the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff has expressed concern about the
future readiness of Army forces given reduced levels of modernization
funding. 


   OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
   METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:5

As required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1996, we reviewed (1) the extent to which TAA 2003 resulted in
sufficient combat support/combat service support force structure to
meet the support requirements of the two-MRC scenario and also
operations other than war (OOTW), (2) whether the Army's streamlining
initiatives have identified opportunities to further reduce Army
personnel resources devoted to institutional Army (TDA) functions,
and (3) the feasibility of further reducing active Army end strength. 

In conducting our assessment, we did not examine DOD's rationale for
requiring 10 active combat divisions or the Army's rationale for
using three full active brigades per division instead of round-out or
round-up reserve brigades.  We also did not fully assess ongoing
studies concerning the future use of reserve forces or analyze
potential changes to the current national military strategy.  Since
much of the Army's analysis in TAA 2003 is based on the combat forces
assigned to it by the BUR and the then current defense planning
strategy, any changes in this guidance would likely alter Army
support force requirements. 

To determine the extent to which TAA 2003 resulted in sufficient
combat support/combat service support force structure to support the
two-MRC scenario and OOTWs, we reviewed the Army's documentation on
TAA processes, assumptions, and results.  We interviewed Army
officials at Department of the Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C.;
Concepts Analysis Agency, Bethesda, Maryland; U.S.  Forces Command,
Fort McPherson, Georgia; and U.S.  Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC), Fort Monroe, Virginia, and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

Our review of TAA 2003 included analyses of the risks associated with
the number and type of active and reserve support forces allocated to
support war-fighting requirements; how the Army's assumptions
compared to those in defense guidance, previous TAAs, or used in
other DOD, Army, or external defense studies; and how the major
assumptions used in TAA can affect force structure outcomes
(including measures of risk).  We also examined TAA processes to
determine if the Army (1) obtained adequate participation by
stakeholders in the process, including major commands and commanders
in chief (CINC) and (2) scrutinized data inputs used in its war-fight
models to determine if they were free from error.  In addition, we
discussed TAA 2003 results and methodology with OSD officials. 
Further, to better understand how the requirements of the joint
war-fighting commands are considered in the TAA process and how CINCs
are affected by TAA results, we requested information and received
formal responses from the CINCs of the U.S.  Atlantic Command, the
U.S.  Central Command, the U.S.  European Command, and the U.S. 
Pacific Command. 

To assess Army streamlining initiatives and their potential for
reducing military personnel devoted to institutional Army functions,
we obtained documentation and held discussions with officials from
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs; the Army's Office of Program Analysis and
Evaluation; the Army Budget Office; Department of the Army
Headquarters; the U.S.  Army Force Management Support Agency,
Washington, D.C.; U.S.  Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia;
U.S.  TRADOC, Fort Monroe, Virginia, and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas;
the U.S.  Army Medical Command, Fort Sam Houston, Texas; and the U.S. 
Army Materiel Command's Management Engineering Activity, Huntsville,
Alabama.  We reviewed major commands' TDA requirements processes and
discussed proposals for increased use of workload-based management to
assess the TDA requirements determination process.  To assess TDA
streamlining, we identified and reviewed Army streamlining studies,
including Force XXI, major command reengineering, and Army
headquarters policy initiatives that resulted in reductions in
military and civilian resources, as well as budgetary savings.  We
also assessed limitations to further streamlining of the TDA force
due to legal, cultural, and operational requirements.  We did not
review the justification for TDA positions that are required by law
or controlled by other agencies. 

To assess the implications of DOD's planned reduction in active Army
end strength, we examined the objectives and implementing guidance
for the Army's Force XXI campaign,which DOD cited as justification
for the reduction, and the personnel reductions realized or
anticipated as a result of these initiatives.  We also considered
OSD's internal assessment of the Army's TAA 2003 process and the
potential for changes in defense strategy resulting from the
Quadrennial Defense Review.  Lastly, we considered the current status
of TDA streamlining and the results of TAA 2003. 

DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report.  These
comments are discussed and evaluated in chapters 2 and 3 and are
reprinted in appendix V.  Additional comments from the Army are
discussed and evaluated in chapter 4. 

We conducted our review from September 1995 to October 1996 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


ARMY CAN SUPPORT TWO MRCS WITH
MODERATE RISK
============================================================ Chapter 2

The Army believes that it can provide support forces for two MRCs at
a moderate level of risk.  However, in assessing risk, the Army found
that 42 percent of all support forces required in the first 30 days
of the first MRC would be late arriving to theater because they
cannot mobilize and deploy in time.  The Army also found that it
would have very few active support forces available to send to the
second MRC--only 12 percent of the total support forces needed.  In
addition, the Army did not authorize 19,200 positions that are needed
to bring some existing units up to their full required strength. 
Finally, units totaling 58,400 positions were not authorized any
personnel because the Army's total wartime support requirement
exceeds available personnel authorizations. 

The Army's risk assessment depends largely on the assumptions and
model inputs that were adopted for TAA 2003.  Some of these
assumptions were favorable in that they minimized risks to U.S. 
forces.  For example, to be consistent with defense guidance, TAA
assumed that U.S.  forces had immediate access to ports and airfields
in the theater of operations, faced limited chemical attacks, and
were immediately available for redeployment if previously committed
to OOTWs.  Less optimistic assumptions would have led to higher
support requirements.  On the other hand, the Army did not consider
all available resources to satisfy its unmet support force
requirements, such as some support force capabilities that currently
reside in the Army's eight National Guard divisions and the TDA
force, and support available from outside contractors and defense
civilians.  Also, while TAA is an analytically rigorous process, some
aspects of its methodology could be improved.  For example, TAA lacks
mechanisms for adjusting to change during its 2-year cycle; some
model inputs, such as consumption of fuel and water, were not
sufficiently scrutinized; and sensitivity analyses were generally not
used to measure the impact of alternative assumptions and resourcing
decisions on risk.  Changes to any of the key assumptions or other
model inputs could produce significantly different force structure
requirements than those determined in TAA 2003, and potentially
different risk levels. 


   TAA PROCESS BALANCES
   WAR-FIGHTING RISK WITH RESOURCE
   CONSTRAINTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1

Based on defense guidance, other Army guidance and inputs, wargaming
assumptions, unit allocation rules,\1 and logistical data, TAA
determines the number and type of support units the Army needs to
execute the national military strategy.  TAA then allocates Army
personnel authorizations, both active and reserve, among these
support force requirements to minimize war-fighting risk.  TAA is an
advance planning tool that tries to anticipate potential war-fighting
scenarios and personnel availability approximately
9 years in the future. 

TAA consists of a series of campaign simulation models and force
structure conferences attended by representatives from key Army staff
offices and commands, as well as the unified commands.  A strategic
mobility analysis is performed to determine the arrival times of Army
forces in theater and identify shortfalls.  This is followed by a
theater campaign analysis to gauge force movement and unit strength
over time, as well as personnel and equipment losses.  Outputs from
these models, along with approved unit allocation rules and logistics
data, are input into the final Army model, Force Analysis Simulation
of Theater Administration and Logistics Support.  This model
generates the required support forces by type and quantity, and
specifies when they are needed in theater and what their supply
requirements would be.  The support forces identified by the model
are then matched to actual Army support units. 

At this point, priorities are established among the competing
requirements, and approaches are discussed to mitigate the risks of
unmet requirements.  One approach has been to authorize fewer
personnel to some units than are required to meet their full wartime
requirement.  Additionally, the active/reserve force mix is examined
on a branch by branch\2 basis to assess whether sufficient active
forces are available to meet early deployment requirements.  The
approved force structure is forwarded to the Army's Chief of Staff
for final approval as the base force for programming Army resources
for the next Program Objective Memorandum.  A more detailed
description of the Army's TAA process is provided in appendix I. 


--------------------
\1 Unit allocation rules quantify each type of support unit's
capability, mission, and doctrinal employment as applied to specific
wartime scenarios. 

\2 Individuals in the Army are assigned to specialties or branches of
the Army according to the functions they would perform in combat or
in support of the combat units. 


   ARMY ASSESSES ITS WAR-FIGHTING
   RISK AS MODERATE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2

The Army concluded that its authorized support forces, resulting from
TAA 2003, were consistent with the moderate risk force delineated in
the October 1993 BUR.  This force, among other things, must be able
to fight and win two MRCs that occur nearly simultaneously.  To
assess the risk level associated with its support forces, the Army
employed four measures:  late risk, second MRC risk, unmet
requirements risk, and casualty risk.  Each of the risks was
quantified; however, their collective impact on the war fight was not
modeled by the Army.  Rather, the Army's overall assessment of
moderate risk is based on military judgment. 


      42 PERCENT OF REQUIRED
      SUPPORT FORCES ARRIVE LATE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.1

TAA stipulates that support units needed in the first 30 days of the
first MRC should be drawn from the active force because of the time
needed to mobilize, train, and deploy reserve units.  This is
consistent with defense guidance.  However, TAA 2003 found that about
79,000 of the more than 188,000 support force positions required in
the first 30 days of the first MRC do not arrive on time because the
Army lacks sufficient numbers of active support forces to meet these
requirements and must rely on reserve forces instead.  This
represents 30 percent of the 260,000 total authorized Army force
needed during this time period, and 42 percent of the Army support
forces required.  Branches with the most late arrivals include
engineering, transportation, quartermaster, and medical--branches
with high concentrations of reserve personnel.  This risk is
exacerbated when the Army relies on reserve forces during the first 7
days of the war fight.  Almost one-quarter of the reserve support
forces assigned to meet requirements during the first 30 days (19,200
positions) are needed in the first 7 days of the MRC. 

The 30-day time frame to mobilize and deploy reserve support forces
is substantiated in classified studies by the RAND Corporation that
examined the availability of reserve forces and by Army officials
responsible for reserve mobilization activities.  The Army estimates
that mobilizing reserve forces, from unit recall to arrival at the
port of embarkation, takes about 15 days for a small support unit and
31 days for a large unit.  Personnel may be transported by air, but
their equipment likely will be shipped by sea.  Depending on whether
the equipment sails from the east or west coast and to which theater,
it will take an additional 12 to 30 days to arrive, unload, and
assemble the equipment.  Therefore, a small reserve unit will be
available for the war fight no earlier than 27 days after call-up,
and a large reserve unit will require at least 43 days. 
(See app.  II for a listing of mobilization tasks and the time
required to complete them.)

OSD officials believe that if it were possible to reduce late risk by
making more active forces available during the first 30 days,
strategic lift constraints would limit the number of active support
forces that could be moved to theater.  Army officials noted that to
the extent that any active support personnel are available to replace
late reservists and could be moved, the Army's risk of late arrivals
would be lower. 


      FEW ACTIVE SUPPORT FORCES
      AVAILABLE FOR SECOND MRC
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.2

The availability of active support forces for the second MRC was
another risk measure used in TAA 2003.  Specifically, as the
availability of active forces declined--and with it a corresponding
increased reliance on reserve forces--risk was assumed to increase. 
The second MRC will have access to relatively small numbers of active
support forces, most of them having deployed already in support of
the first MRC.  Consequently, the Army must rely on reserve component
forces to meet most of its requirements in the second MRC.  Only 12
percent of the support forces needed in the second MRC are active,
compared with 47 percent in the first MRC.  Branches with low
representation of active forces in the second MRC include engineer,
transportation, quartermaster, and artillery.  High reliance on
reserves for use in the second MRC may not entail greater risk
assuming there is adequate warning time and mobilization has already
occurred.  The same risk of late arrival would apply if mobilization
was delayed. 


      UNITS TOTALING 58,400
      POSITIONS EXIST ONLY ON
      PAPER, AND SOME ACTIVE UNITS
      ARE ALLOCATED FEWER
      POSITIONS THAN REQUIRED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.3

An objective of TAA is to allocate resources among competing support
force requirements.  In the case of TAA 2003, the Army's force
structure requirements initially exceeded its authorized positions by
144,000 positions.  At the conclusion of TAA, units totaling 58,400
positions were not allocated any positions and exist only on paper,
and other existing active units were allocated 19,200 fewer positions
than needed to meet mission requirements. 

Table 2.1 illustrates the Army's approach to allocating its resources
in TAA 2003.  Drawing from its active, National Guard, and Reserve
forces, the Army identified 528,000 authorized TOE positions that it
could apply to its 672,000 Army requirement to fight two MRCs,
leaving an initial imbalance of 144,000 positions.  The Army's total
TOE force is actually higher than 528,000 positions (see table 2.1),
but some resources are excluded from consideration in TAA, such as
the eight National Guard divisions the Army considers as a strategic
hedge, and forces needed to perform unique mission requirements. 



                               Table 2.1
                
                   Calculation of TAA 2003 Shortfall

                                                 Action to    TAA 2003
                                                reduce TAA   remaining
Description of Army action                       shortfall   shortfall
----------------------------------------------  ----------  ----------
Army TOE requirement to fight two MRCs             672,000
 (including both combat and support forces)

 Less: Available Army position authorizations      528,000

 Initial shortfall calculated by TAA               144,000
Less: Positions converted from lower priority       66,000
 units
 to other types
                                                  78,000\a
 Remaining Shortfall

 Comprised of:                                                58,400\b
 Units totally unstaffed                                        19,200
 Understaffed active support units
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Rounded. 

\b Host nation support reduces the Army's shortfall to about 44,000. 

Source:  Department of the Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

The Army then analyzed all of its support forces at Corps level and
above to determine how it could reduce the risk associated with its
shortfall.  This resulted in the Army shifting about 66,000\3 active
and reserve positions from support units excess to the war fight to
higher priority support units.  Units providing fire fighting,
engineering, and medical support were among those selected for
conversion.  After these conversions, the Army was left with a
shortfall of about 78,000 positions.  This shortfall was allocated as
follows.  Some existing active support units were authorized fewer
positions than are needed to meet their full wartime requirement.\4
In TAA 2003, these amounted to about 19,200 positions.  The
expectation is that these understrength units would be brought up to
full strength before being mobilized.  These additional personnel
would come from the Individual Ready Reserve\5 or new recruits.  The
remaining shortfall of 58,400 positions represents units that are
needed to meet a wartime requirement but have not been allocated any
position authorizations, that is, units that exist only on paper. 
Table 2.2 shows how each of the Army's major support branches will be
affected by the conversions and where the remaining 58,400 positions
in vacant units reside.\6 Among the branches benefiting most were
quartermaster and transportation, which accounted for more than half
of the initial shortfall in totally vacant units. 



                               Table 2.2
                
                Major Category Adjustments to Authorized
                               Positions

                                                           Shortage of
                                  Initial shortage          authorized
                                     of authorized     positions after
Branch                                   positions     TAA adjustments
------------------------------  ------------------  ------------------
Chemical                                     1,100                 700
Engineer                                     4,400               2,900
Artillery                                    1,200               1,200
Medical                                     12,400               2,000
Ordnance                                     3,700                 100
Quartermaster                               31,600              21,300
Signal                                       3,800               4,000
Personnel service support                    1,200                 300
Armor                                        1,100               1,100
Military police                              2,400                   0
Special operations                           1,700                   0
Air defense                                  4,600               4,300
Headquarters                                   300                 200
Transportation                              45,100              20,400
Logistics                                      500                   0
======================================================================
Total                                    124,800\a            58,400\a
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Does not add due to rounding. 

Source:  Department of the Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Two additional actions were taken by the Army to mitigate the risk
associated with its remaining unmet requirements.  The Army estimates
that host nations will be able to provide the equivalent of over
14,000 positions to offset some requirements, leaving a shortfall of
about 44,000 positions in vacant units.  The Army also plans to
implement an option developed by the Army National Guard Division
Redesign Study to convert 42,700 Army National Guard combat division
positions to required support positions--eliminating most of the
remaining vacant units.  However, according to the study, these
conversions will cost up to an additional $2.8 billion and could take
many years to complete. 


--------------------
\3 Converting these 66,000 active and reserve support positions to
different positions will cost an estimated $2.6 billion. 

\4 The Army allocates authorized positions to units commensurate with
their mission and when they are scheduled to deploy.  A unit
allocated its full wartime requirement has an authorized level of
organization of one, whereas a unit authorized to fill 80 percent of
its required positions has an authorized level of organization of
three. 

\5 The Individual Ready Reserve is a manpower pool of pretrained
individuals who have already served in active units or in the
reserves and may have some part of their military service obligation
remaining. 

\6 For many years, the Army's support force requirements have greatly
exceeded the number of support forces authorized.  See appendix III
for a comparison of TAA 2003 and TAA 2001 unmet requirements. 


      EXPECTED CASUALTIES ARE
      ANOTHER MEASURE OF WAR-FIGHT
      RISK
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.4

The Army computes the number of casualties expected for each MRC as
another measure of risk.\7 Casualties are computed through a model
that uses the Army's full two-conflict requirement of 672,000, rather
than the 528,000 authorized Army positions to meet that requirement. 
The number of casualties is a function of the population at risk,
which is reflected in defense guidance; the wounded in action rate,
which is calculated in the TAA modeling; and the disease, nonbattle
injury rate, which is established by the Army Surgeon General. 
Campaign simulations generate the combatant battle casualties, which
accounts for about 80 percent of all casualties.  The remaining 20
percent are extended to support forces with algorithms.  Variables
that are considered in arriving at casualty estimates include the
battlefield location (e.g., brigade area, division rear, and
communications zone); intensity of the war fight (e.g., defend,
attack, and delay); and the weapon systems involved.  The Army uses a
high-resolution model that pits individual weapon systems against one
another to project equipment and personnel killed or injured for a
multitude of platforms (e.g., 12 different types of tanks, light
armored vehicles, and helicopters), according to their lethality
under various conditions (e.g., moving, stationary, and exposed). 

Once the Army computes its casualties for each MRC, it does not
increase its force requirements to provide casualty replacements. 
Otherwise, its personnel requirements would be much higher and
shortfalls would be greater.  The Army reasons that given the
anticipated short duration of the MRCs, there will be little
opportunity for significant replacements of individuals killed or
otherwise unavailable for duty.  However, if a need arose, individual
replacements likely would be drawn from soldiers who had just
completed their introductory training or by mobilizing the Individual
Ready Reserve. 


--------------------
\7 Casualty numbers are classified. 


   SOME MODELING ASSUMPTIONS LEAD
   TO UNDERSTATED REQUIREMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3

Some of the assumptions and model inputs adopted for TAA 2003 lead to
understated support force requirements.  Without rerunning the
theater campaign models with different assumptions and model inputs,
the Army cannot determine the impact of changes in most of these
assumptions, such as delaying the call-up of reserve forces on force
requirements.  However, some assumptions lend themselves to estimable
force level equivalents, such as coalition support requirements.  To
the extent that less favorable assumptions would increase the Army's
support requirements, the risks associated with the current force may
be higher than suggested by TAA 2003 results. 


      TAA 2003 USED MANY OF THE
      SAME FAVORABLE ASSUMPTIONS
      CITED IN DEFENSE GUIDANCE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.1

During TAA, the Army used many key assumptions in modeling the two
MRCs that were identical or similar to assumptions cited in the
defense guidance then in effect.  Some of these assumptions were
favorable, that is, they tended to minimize risk to U.S.  forces and
objectives.  These included: 

  -- Immediate access to ports and airfields.  TAA assumed that U.S. 
     forces would have immediate, unobstructed access to ports and
     airfields in the theater of operation.  An adverse case
     excursion was modeled in which immediate access to primary ports
     and airfields was denied in a one-MRC scenario.  This excursion
     reflected a requirement for additional positions above that
     needed for two nearly simultaneous MRCs when it was assumed that
     immediate access would be available.  Over 90 percent of this
     additional requirement was for transportation and quartermaster
     positions--positions already in short supply.  However, in
     stating its requirements for TOE forces, the Army used the base
     case requirement of 672,000 positions. 

  -- Timely decisions by the National Command Authorities.  TAA
     assumed that the call-up of reserve forces coincided with the
     day U.S.  forces deploy to the first MRC and that the activation
     of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, civilian aircraft that augment
     the military in wartime, occurs early.\8 For the reserve call-up
     to occur on the same day as the first deployment of U.S.  forces
     assumes that it occurs at the earliest feasible opportunity. 

  -- Limited chemical use.  TAA assumed limited use of chemical
     weapons by enemy forces in each of the MRCs.  Because of the
     constrained amount of chemical weapons modeled, some TAA
     participants did not believe the scenario provided a realistic
     representation.  A more intensive chemical attack was modeled in
     a single MRC adverse case excursion.  Results of this excursion
     indicated a requirement for additional support forces, but this
     is not reflected in the overall TAA base case requirement of
     672,000 spaces.  For example, casualties resulting from chemical
     attacks were not modeled in TAA 2003 to identify the medical
     support requirement. 

Changes to any of these assumptions would have resulted in higher
force requirements than those determined in TAA 2003.  However,
rather than present a range of requirements to reflect the results of
less favorable assumptions, the Army focused solely on the base case
in arriving at the results of TAA 2003.  A list of the key
assumptions used in TAA 2003 is provided in appendix IV. 


--------------------
\8 Under 10 U.S.C.  12304, the President can activate up to 200,000
reservists for not more than 270 days, without a declaration of war
or other national emergency. 


      OTHER ASSUMPTIONS ALSO
      RESULTED IN LOWER FORCE
      REQUIREMENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.2

Support force requirements would also have been higher had the Army
not taken steps to eliminate some workload requirements from
consideration in TAA.  For example, no requirements were added to
support coalition partners, although historically the Army has
provided such support.  OSD officials estimate that support to
coalition partners would result in an additional requirement of from
6,500 to 20,000 spaces. 

Also, support force requirements were determined based on a steady
state demand rate, which does not account for above average periods
of demand.  This approach, called smoothing, disregards the
cumulative effect of work backlogs.  Smoothing can be problematic for
units whose resources are based on the amount of workload to be
performed, such as transportation, fuel supply, and ammunition supply
units.\9 For example, fuel off-loaded onto a pier will remain on the
pier until transportation is available to move it.  With smoothing,
this backlog of fuel is forgotten; no resources are applied toward it
because the Army model does not take into account workload that was
not performed previously.  Rather, the model considers each time
period during the operation as a discrete, independent event. 

The effects of smoothing tend to diminish over time.  However, for
relatively short wars, such as those envisioned in illustrative
planning scenarios contained in defense guidance, the impact can be
significant.  For TAA 2003, the effect of smoothing understated the
support force requirement by more than 28,000 positions, according to
Army officials.  The branches most affected by smoothing were
transportation (more than 18,400 positions) and quartermaster (more
than 3,800 positions), the two branches with the highest number of
unmet requirements, smoothing notwithstanding.  Army officials told
us that the requirement for cargo transfer and truck companies during
the first 30 days of the first MRC is almost twice as great (183
percent) when the requirement is not smoothed, and three times as
great over the entire conflict. 


--------------------
\9 Exceptions are medical and some combat engineer units.  Their
requirements were not smoothed, but rather computed to handle peak
requirements. 


   TAA REQUIREMENTS DO NOT
   ADEQUATELY REFLECT U.S.  ROLE
   IN OOTWS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4

Since TAA 2003 requirements are based on the two-MRC scenario, some
officials have questioned whether the Army has given adequate
attention to the role of OOTWs in the post-Cold War period and the
demands these operations place on Army forces.  In particular, some
DOD officials, including CINCs, have concerns that the Army has not
adequately considered delays or degradation in capability resulting
from the extraction of forces from an OOTW to an MRC, or to the
potential demands on supporting forces resulting from multiple OOTWs. 
Despite these concerns, the Army has no plans to change its approach
to OOTWs in the currently ongoing TAA 2005. 


      ARMY FOLLOWS DEFENSE
      GUIDANCE ON OOTWS BUT COULD
      EXPERIENCE SHORTAGES IN SOME
      TYPES OF UNITS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4.1

Defense guidance directed the Army to base TAA 2003 requirements on
either two nearly simultaneous MRCs or on one MRC and one OOTW,
whichever produced the greater requirement.  To make this assessment,
the Army modeled the force structure requirements of four individual
OOTW excursions using defense illustrative planning scenarios and
supporting intelligence and threat analysis information.  These
included requirements for a peace enforcement, humanitarian
assistance, peacekeeping, and a lesser regional contingency
operation. 

Based on its modeling results, the Army concluded that requirements
for one OOTW plus an MRC was less than the two-MRC war-fight
requirement.  In fact, the Army found that the aggregate support
requirements of all four OOTWs were less than the support
requirements for one MRC.  Accordingly, the Army believes the needs
of OOTWs can be satisfied by fulfilling the MRC requirements. 

The Army also observed that OOTWs could stress certain support
specialties and used its excursion results to help "sharpen its
assessment" of how Army resources should be allocated.  For example,
the Army conducted quick reaction analyses of the operational concept
for employment and support of forces under the four defense planning
OOTW scenarios.  Among other results, these analyses identified a
need for additional active Army support specialties, including
transportation and quartermaster capability.  The Army also found
these specialties to be in short supply when it examined the impact
of redeploying forces from an OOTW to an MRC.  During OOTWs, the Army
relies on active support forces and reserve volunteers, prior to a
presidential call-up of reserve forces.  To help mitigate this risk,
Army officials told us they decided, to the extent possible, to
redistribute resources during TAA to help overcome these key
shortfalls.  As shown on table 2.2, the Army shifted positions from
other lower priority requirements to both the transportation and
quartermaster branches in TAA 2003, although shortages remain and
these branches are still heavily reliant on reserve forces. 


      TAA ASSUMES THAT FORCES
      ASSIGNED TO OOTWS CAN
      READILY REDEPLOY TO MRCS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4.2

In the event the United States becomes involved in a major conflict,
defense guidance assumes that the Army will withdraw its forces
committed to OOTWs to respond to an MRC.  Neither the Army nor the
defense guidance acknowledges any potential for delays or degradation
of mission capability of forces previously assigned to OOTWs in
determining the Army's support force requirements.  However, both the
Army's own analyses and comments from the CINCs question this
assumption. 

For example, as part of its risk assessment for TAA, the Army
conducted an excursion to determine whether involvement in a
significant OOTW would result in insufficient support force structure
for the first 30 days of an MRC.  The Army analysis found that about
15,000 active support forces participating in a sizable OOTW were
required for this first MRC.  The Army assumed it could extract these
forces from the OOTW without delays or degradation in capability, but
it provided no analysis to support this position.  In contrast,
TRADOC Analysis Center, in conducting a classified study on strategic
risks, assumed as a given, that 20,000 Army active component
resources would be committed to one or more OOTWs and would not be
available to participate in the two-MRC war fight.  Another TRADOC
analysis has highlighted the reconstitution challenges encountered
when moving support forces from an OOTW environment to an MRC, where
personnel and equipment requirements frequently differ.  During the
planning phase of TAA 2003, the Forces Command commander recommended
that the Army first determine the level of force structure it was
willing to commit to OOTWs and then exclude this OOTW force from
participating in the first MRC war fight.  Both the TRADOC Analysis
Center and the Forces Command commander were acknowledging that
extraction from OOTWs could not be performed without consequences. 

CINCs also expressed concern regarding the Army's handling of OOTWs
in TAA 2003.  For example, the CINC, U.S.  Atlantic Command, stated
that his major concern was in transitioning from an OOTW to an MRC,
especially in the case of units with unique or highly specialized
training and/or equipment.  Similarly, the CINC, U.S.  European
Command asserted that some allowance must be developed in TAA to
account for OOTW-type requirements, considering (1) their impact on a
heavily committed resource base (i.e., active Army combat and support
personnel) and (2) the time necessary to extract the troops from such
missions if U.S.  forces must be shifted to contend with an
overwhelming threat to U.S.  strategic interests.  The CINC believes
this is particularly important because U.S.  commitments to these
operations are significant and the trend to involve U.S.  forces in
such operations is on the rise. 

Our past review further supports the CINCs' concerns.  We reported
that critical support and combat forces needed in the early stages of
an MRC may be unable to redeploy quickly from peace operations
because certain Army support forces are needed to facilitate the
redeployment of other military forces.\10 In addition, our follow-on
peace operations study cited this deficiency as significant, because
in the event of a short-warning attack, forces are needed to deploy
rapidly to the theater and enter the battle as quickly as possible to
halt the invasion.\11


--------------------
\10 Bottom-Up Review:  Analysis of Key DOD Assumptions
(GAO/NSIAD-95-56, Jan.  31, 1995). 

\11 Peace Operations:  Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect
Response to Regional Conflicts (GAO/NSIAD-95-51, Mar.  8, 1995). 


      MULTIPLE OOTWS COULD ADD TO
      ARMY RISK
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4.3

As part of its analysis of the four OOTW excursions, the Army
developed troop lists and overall size estimates for each type of
OOTW.  These force size estimates suggest that multiple OOTWs could
result in a major commitment of personnel resources--resources that
have not been fully evaluated in the TAA process.  This is the view
of the current CINC, U.S.  European Command, based on his expanded
troop involvement in Bosnia, Macedonia, Turkey, and Africa.  The CINC
asserts that essential support personnel have been stretched to the
limit for resourcing the above military operations in his area of
geographic responsibility, including those associated with providing
fuel supply and distribution capacity, heavy truck transportation,
military police, fuel handling, and communications repair.  By their
nature, these operations tend to be manpower intensive.  Thus, the
CINC stated that the next TAA process should consider how to include
specific operational scenarios of a lesser regional scale (i.e.,
OOTWs), in addition to the two MRCs. 

The Army lacks the quantitative data to assess how such potentially
burdensome and repeated deployments of support troops in OOTW-like
operations impact the Army.  However, comments from both the CINCs
and some Army officials suggest the need for improved force structure
planning for such contingencies.  Army officials responsible for TAA
responded that the Army must assume that the forces needed for
OOTW-type operations will come from the same pool of forces
identified for use in the event of one or more MRCs, because this is
a defense guidance requirement.  As a result, the Army plans no
future changes in how TAA approaches multiple OOTWs and their
resourcing implications.  This includes TAA 2005, which is now
underway. 


   AVAILABLE SUPPORT PERSONNEL
   WERE EXCLUDED FROM TAA PROCESS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5

In resourcing the Army's support requirements for fighting two MRCs,
the Army did not consider all available personnel at its disposal. 
By better matching available personnel with its requirements, we
believe the Army could mitigate some of the risks disclosed in TAA
2003 results.  Specifically, TAA did not consider support
capabilities that currently exist in the National Guard's eight
divisions, civilian contractor personnel, TDA military personnel, or
civilian defense personnel.  Considering these personnel, most of
which would be suitable to meet requirements for later deploying
units, could enable the Army to somewhat reduce its shortfall of
support personnel.  However, it would not resolve the Army's shortage
of active support personnel to meet requirements in the first 30
days.  TAA gave limited recognition to some host nation support to
reduce the number of positions in unresourced units to 44,000, but is
reluctant to place greater reliance on this resource until DOD
resolves major issues as to when and how much support host nations
will provide. 


      ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5.1

In TAA 2003, the Army did not consider how to use the support
capability that currently exists in the eight Army National Guard
divisions that the Army does not envision using during a two-conflict
scenario.  Based on the Army's analysis, some support capabilities in
the National Guard divisions are similar or identical to support
units in short supply.  In our March 1995 report,\12 we found that
personnel in these divisions could be used to fill 100 percent of the
vacant positions for 321 types of skills, including helicopter
pilots, communications technicians, repair personnel, military police
officers, intelligence analysts, and fuel and water specialists.  In
response, DOD formally concurred with our recommendation that the
Army identify specific support requirements that could be met using
National Guard divisional support units and develop a plan for
accessing that support capability.  This capability was not
considered in TAA 2003 and we know of no plans to consider it in TAA
2005.\13 Army officials advised us that while the National Guard
units have specific personnel and equipment that could be used in
wartime, the units do not clearly correlate with support units, and
would likely deploy piecemeal rather than as full units, as the Army
prefers.  For this reason, Army officials advised us that there are
no efforts underway to consider these personnel in TAA, as we
recommended, even though in a wartime situation, the Army would, in
fact, make use of these resources as a "fallback." Since Army
officials agreed that in some cases (for example, transportation),
there may be potential for deployment to MRCs, planning how to access
these forces in advance could reduce the number of unfilled positions
in TAA.  However, it would not reduce the Army's late risk (i.e., the
risk that forces might not arrive in the first 30 days of the first
MRC), since these forces could not be mobilized, trained, and
deployed in time. 


--------------------
\12 See pp.  5-7 of our report, Force Structure:  Army National Guard
Divisions Could Augment Wartime Support Capability (GAO/NSIAD-95-80,
Mar.  2, 1995). 

\13 These National Guard support capabilities exist today---they do
not hinge on the Army's action to convert 42,700 combat positions to
support positions at a cost of $2.8 billion, as detailed in a May
1996 National Guard division redesign study. 


      CIVILIAN CONTRACT PERSONNEL
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5.2

Contract personnel were also not considered in TAA 2003.  The Army is
already making greater use of contract personnel to provide many of
the support services typically provided by its combat service support
personnel.  For example, through its Logistics Civil Augmentation
Program, the Army has used contractor personnel to provide base camp
construction and maintenance, laundry, food supply and service, water
production, and transportation.  In terms of timing, the Army's
current contract calls for logistical and construction support to be
initiated within 15 days of the Army's order.  Among the most recent
operations using contractor personnel are:  Operation Restore Hope
(Somalia); Operation Support Hope (Rwanda); Operation Uphold
Democracy (Haiti); Operation Joint Endeavor (Bosnia); and Operation
Deny Flight (Aviano, Italy).  Civilian contractors were also used
extensively in both the Korean and Vietnam wars to augment the
logistical support provided to U.S.  forces.  However, the Army made
no assessment in TAA 2003 to determine how much of its unresourced
requirement could potentially be offset by contractor personnel. 


      TDA PERSONNEL
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5.3

TAA 2003 also did not consider the potential use of TDA military
personnel (with the exception of medical) and civilians, even though,
in some instances, these personnel can and do deploy--sometimes on
very short notice.  Chapter 3 will discuss the need to unify the
Army's separate processes for allocating personnel to TOE and TDA, so
that personnel who perform similar functions are considered together. 


      HOST NATION SUPPORT REDUCES
      UNMET REQUIREMENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5.4

Another potential resource pool the Army could consider to a greater
extent is host nation support.  To minimize war-fight risk, the Army
does not use host nation support to offset requirements without a
signed agreement from the host nation, and then only in cases where
the joint war-fighting command is confident the support will be
provided when and where needed.  Host nation support that meets this
test is only used to offset requirements for units that were not
allocated any positions in TAA.  In TAA 2003, host nation support
offset over 14,000 of these positions. 

OSD officials who have reviewed TAA 2003 suggested that the Army
place a greater reliance on host nation support by relaxing the
requirement that the United States have formal agreements with the
host nation to provide the support.  OSD estimates that the Army
could reduce its support force shortfall by as much as 42,000 if it
were to count on likely host nation support even though formal
agreements may not be in place.  However, the Army's current position
is consistent with that of the Secretary of Defense, as reported in
the Fiscal Year 1995 Annual Statement of Assurance to the President
and Congress, under the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act. 
In that statement, the Secretary cites a material weakness in the
Central Command's program for validating quantities of wartime host
nation support presumed to be available for use by U.S.  forces, but
not documented by formal agreements. 

The Central Command's corrective action plan requires that lists of
commodities and services required from the host nations be organized
by location and time of availability and that the host nations'
political and military leaderships agree to these lists.  We followed
up with the Central Command to determine the status of their
corrective action plan and were told that while efforts were underway
to obtain such agreements, nothing was definite.  Chapter 4 addresses
further actions under way to respond to OSD's analysis. 


   SOME ASPECTS OF TAA'S
   METHODOLOGY COULD BE IMPROVED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:6

While TAA is an analytically rigorous process, it is not an exact
science.  There are many assumptions and uncertainties involved in
sizing Army support forces, and seemingly small changes can
dramatically alter its final outcome.  Among TAA's strengths are that
it bases many of its decisions on established Army doctrine, involves
senior leadership throughout the process, and includes consensus
building mechanisms among the branches.  On the other hand, the Army
may be able to improve some aspects of TAA's methodology.  For
example, not all TAA model inputs were scrutinized to ensure they
were free from error; the process does not easily accommodate changes
that occur during its 2-year implementation cycle; TAA's
transportation model is not rerun with the required force; and the
Army does not prioritize deficiencies that remain and develop action
plans to mitigate risk. 


      PARTICIPANTS QUESTIONED
      VALIDITY OF TAA MODEL INPUTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:6.1

Participants' exposure to TAA modeling was limited and focused on the
results of the war gaming, not its methodology and detailed
assumptions.  Nonetheless, in TAA 2003, participants detected errors
in model inputs late in the process, after the models had been run
and requirements had been identified.  While allocating positions,
participants began to question whether fuel and water consumption
rates had been understated.  Since the TAA process had already been
delayed as the Army considered how to account for OSD's planned
20,000 reduction in end strength, the Army had an opportunity to
convene a supplemental conference to allow time to rerun the models
with revised inputs.  The result was an additional support
requirement of 48,000 positions.  This experience caused some
participants to question the degree to which the Army had scrutinized
its planning data and assumptions.  It also provides an illustration
of how changes in the model inputs can dramatically alter the final
results of TAA. 

In another example, the Army was able to reduce its medical-related
support requirements in TAA 2003 by reducing the medical evacuation
time from 30 to 15 days.  Previously, the policy was 15 days within
the first 30 days of the conflict and 30 days thereafter.  This one
change, which was supported by the Army's medical branch, reduced the
need for hospital beds in theater by 35 percent.  This change led to
reductions in branches like engineer and quartermaster, and in some
types of medical units.  Both OSD and Army officials agree that key
model inputs, such as those for fuel, ammunition, and medical, need
to be reviewed and validated because they can have such a significant
impact on TAA results. 

The Army is responsible for providing certain logistics support to
the other services during the two MRCs.  TAA acknowledged the need
for Army personnel to support the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine
Corps forces, and the Army solicited their wartime requirements
through the war-fighting CINCs.  For example, in TAA 2003, the Army's
assistance consisted primarily of providing overland transport of
bulk fuel and ammunition.  Based on CINC inputs, the Army added about
24,000 support positions to assist the other services in these areas,
meeting 79 percent of their requirements.  According to a Forces
Command official, during a war, the war-fighting CINCs determine
where to allocate these personnel.  Additionally, some Army officials
believe that some of the logistical support requirements such as
those for transportation may be understated because the Army
typically receives a poor response from the CINCs concerning the
other services' requirements.  The Army acknowledges it needs more
accurate estimates of the other services' needs. 


      TAA RESULTS CAN BE OVERTAKEN
      BY EVENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:6.2

Because of the time needed to complete a full TAA cycle, almost 2
years, the Army may find that key assumptions or data inputs, while
valid at the time, have essentially been overtaken by events.  TAA
has a limited ability to accommodate changes in strategy or key
assumptions that occur beyond its initial planning phase.  This
inability to accommodate change undercuts the Army's case that TAA is
focused on the future, that is, Army force structure required 9-years
out.  The following examples in TAA 2003 illustrate this point. 

  -- First, soon after TAA 2003 was completed, the Secretary of
     Defense issued new guidance reflecting a significant change in
     scenarios.  TAA 2003 assumed that the MRCs would be sequenced
     differently, consistent with earlier guidance.  A subsequent
     analysis by the Army showed that if the more current guidance
     had been used, an additional 40,000 warfight support positions
     would have been required.  TAA 2005 could also be impacted by
     changes in defense strategy since the Army plans to run its
     models based on the existing two-conflict strategy.  The ongoing
     Quadrennial Defense Review could change this strategy and lessen
     the usefulness of the Army's TAA results. 

  -- Second, in the middle of the TAA 2003 process, OSD issued a
     directive for the Army to reduce its active end strength by
     20,000 toward a goal of 475,000 as early as practical, but no
     later than 1999.  Army officials told us that TAA could not
     accommodate this change since it could not anticipate what parts
     of its force would be affected by the mandated cut, and any
     changes to its combat forces would affect how the Army fights. 
     This, in turn, would result in changes to various inputs to the
     war fight model itself. 


      TAA TRANSPORTATION MODEL NOT
      RERUN WITH REQUIRED FORCE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:6.3

The TAA process could be enhanced if additional analyses were
conducted to reveal the impact of force size on the movement of
forces to fight two major conflicts.  The Army could have refined its
mobility assessment by running the TAA 2003 required force through
its transportation model, rather than exclusively relying on the
earlier TAA 2001 required force.  TAA models were run in the early
stages of the process using a prior TAA (i.e., TAA 2001) generated
force structure to establish a baseline for flowing forces into
theater and to fight the war.  At the conclusion of this phase of
TAA, the Army determines its total war-fighting requirement. 
However, the Army does not rerun its models with this "required" TAA
2003 force to assess the impact of this larger force on moving forces
to theater.  Army officials agreed that rerunning its transportation
model using the required force would improve TAA, and the Army is
currently considering how to use its iterative modeling capability to
its best advantage in TAA 2005. 


      REMAINING DEFICIENCIES ARE
      NOT PRIORITIZED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:6.4

The Army does not prioritize force deficiencies that remain after TAA
is completed and all force structure decisions are made, nor does it
indicate what is being done to mitigate war-fighting risks.  Examples
of risk reduction measures include:  use of new technology to
overcome personnel shortages; new training initiatives (e.g., cross
training personnel to perform more than one function); changing
doctrine where appropriate; or drawing on other resource pools not
addressed in TAA (e.g., civilians, reserves, and contractors). 
Although not formally documented in the TAA 2003 process, the
Director of Army Force Programs told us that he is identifying
actions to further mitigate the risks identified in TAA 2003.  The
Director cited studies on the feasibility of home station deployment
and having unequipped reservists falling in on prepositioned
equipment located in counterpart active Army units (e.g., the Army's
truck fleet could handle a greater workload if it had more drivers to
take more shifts).  In a period of declining resources, actions such
as these could help the Army use its available resources more
efficiently. 


   CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:7

While the Army believes it can support two MRCs, given existing force
levels, and 10 fully active divisions, it has accepted some
risks--most notably the lack of sufficient active support forces
during the first 30 days of an MRC.  TAA results indicate that 42
percent of all required support forces needed in the first 30 days of
the first conflict will arrive late--about 79,000 soldiers.  These
late arrivers are tasked to provide essential services such as
medical, engineering, transportation, and quartermaster support.  The
Army is also counting on the arrival of about 15,000 predominantly
support personnel previously deployed to OOTWs during the first 30
days, even though CINC and Army officials question their availability
and readiness during this time frame.  Further, because the Army
discounts peaks in demand in establishing its requirements through a
technique called "smoothing," actual workload for some types of units
during the first 30 days is actually much higher than TAA 2003
requirements reflect--almost twice as high for some transportation
units.  Finally, TAA results reveal that the Army will have few
active support forces--about 12 percent of total support forces
required--available to support the second MRC and that 19,200
required active support positions in existing units are not
authorized to be filled.  Moreover, units totaling 58,400 positions
are not authorized any personnel at all because the Army's total
wartime support requirement exceeds available personnel
authorizations.  The Army plans to mitigate this risk by relying on
host nation personnel and converting some Army National Guard combat
forces to support forces.  These conversions are not yet funded and
could take many years to be accomplished. 

Our examination of TAA assumptions and model inputs found that the
Army used many favorable assumptions that may have understated risks
to U.S.  forces, such as limited chemical use by the enemy, assured
port availability, and no delays in the call-up of reserves forces. 
In particular, the Army does not appear to have adequately considered
delays or degradation in capability resulting from the extraction of
forces from an OOTW to a major conflict, or to the potential demands
on support forces resulting from multiple OOTWs.  War-fighting
commanders believe that such multiple OOTWs will add to the Army's
war-fighting risk.  Since the Army does not conduct sensitivity
analyses to assess the impact of less favorable assumptions, it does
not know the extent to which changes in these underlying assumptions
would increase Army support requirements and related risks.  On the
other hand, the Army could mitigate some risks by expanding its
resource pool to include support capabilities that currently exist in
the National Guard and TDA forces, as well as contract
services--resources that, with the exception of medical, are
presently excluded from TAA. 

While TAA is an analytically rigorous process with extensive modeling
and wide participation by key Army personnel, some aspects of its
methodology could be improved.  Some participants questioned whether
the Army had sufficiently scrutinized key model inputs, such as
consumption factors for fuel and water.  In addition, by not
rerunning the campaign models with its required force, the Army
missed an opportunity to fully assess how mobility limitations
affected risk. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:8

To improve TAA's ability to accurately project war-fighting
requirements and allocate the Army's personnel resources, we
recommend that the Secretary of the Army

  -- reexamine key model inputs to ensure they are accurate and
     consistent with war-fighting scenarios;

  -- perform analysis to determine how multiple OOTW support force
     requirements might differ from support force requirements based
     on two MRCs and bring any variances to the attention of the
     Secretary of Defense so that he can consider them in developing
     defense guidance;

  -- perform sensitivity analyses on significant model inputs,
     assumptions, and resourcing decisions to determine their impacts
     on war-fighting risk.  For example, although the Army used
     assumptions established by defense guidance, determining the
     implications of less favorable conditions, such as delayed
     call-up of reserves, would provide the Army with additional
     information on which to base its assessment of risk;

  -- rerun TAA models with the required force to assess the impact of
     force size on mobility requirements; and

  -- determine how support units resident within the eight National
     Guard divisions, TDA military personnel, contractor personnel,
     and DOD civilians can be used to fill some support force
     requirements. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:9

In written comments on a draft of this report DOD fully concurred
with four of our recommendations and partially concurred with one
(see app.  V).  DOD noted that the Army has already planned some
actions to resolve issues we identified.  For example, DOD stated the
Army is closely scrutinizing its model inputs for TAA 2005, beginning
with a rigorous review of all 3,000 allocation rules, and major
studies to review fuel consumption factors and casualty rates.  The
Army also plans to analyze the impact of multiple OOTWs on support
requirements and agreed that the current assumption that all units
involved in OOTWs will be immediately available for the war fight is
flawed and overly optimistic.  The Army also plans to conduct other
sensitivity analyses and excursions in TAA 2005, beyond those
required by defense guidance.  Further, the Army will rerun TAA
models with the required force to provide the force flow data needed
to improve its analysis of risk. 

However, DOD only partially concurred with our recommendation to
consider other personnel resources in filling its support force
requirements.  The Army plans to consider some types of Army National
Guard Division assets to fill support force shortfalls where the
capabilities are nearly a match, such as aviation assets.  The Army
also plans to further analyze how to use its TDA structure to meet
both OOTW and war-fighting requirements.  In the future, deployable
TDA forces will be considered part of the Army's operating force. 
However, DOD differs with us on recognizing civilian contractor
personnel in TAA.  The Army believes that while contractor personnel
enhance the Army's capabilities, they should not be considered an
available resource in TAA since contractor personnel are not funded
in the outyears of the Program Objective Memorandum.  The Army also
expressed concern about its ability to provide security to
contractors in an MRC environment.  Because contractor personnel have
historically been used by the Army to provide support in many
different types of overseas environments, both OOTWs and MRCs, we
believe that, as a minimum, the Army could treat contractor personnel
in the same way it treats host nation support--as an offset to unmet
requirements.  The Army can make assumptions concerning the funding
of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, just as it makes
assumptions about such issues as the availability of host nation
support, the size of the active Army force, or the level of
modernization of the force in future years. 


THE ARMY PLANS TO ELIMINATE SOME
INSTITUTIONAL MILITARY POSITIONS
BUT IS CONSTRAINED BY A WEAK
REQUIREMENTS PROCESS
============================================================ Chapter 3

Despite numerous Army initiatives to improve its TDA requirements
determination process since the late 1970s, the Army cannot allocate
its TDA personnel based on the workload required to complete TDA
missions.  As a result, the Army does not have a tool to prioritize
TDA functions and has made across-the-board cuts in TDA that are not
analytically based.  Ongoing command and Army-wide initiatives to
manage TDA based on workload, to include analyzing what work needs to
be done and assessing how processes can be improved, will require
senior Army leadership support for successful implementation. 

The Army has reviewed some TDA functions and identified a potential
to reduce its TDA by up to 4,000 military positions as a result of
its initial streamlining efforts.  However, the Army's end strength
will not be reduced; rather, the positions will be used to offset
shortfalls in TOE support forces.  Plans for some of these
initiatives, however, have not been finalized and it is difficult to
definitively quantify some savings.  Army TDA streamlining will
continue through 2007.  The Army is evaluating several options to
consolidate its major commands, which could further reduce TDA
requirements for active military personnel and introduce more
efficient business practices.  However, such a reorganization could
be hampered without workload-based requirements.  The Army's
potential for streamlining TDA will also be limited by several laws
and regulations, such as civilian downsizing and TDA positions that
are protected from Army force reduction initiatives. 

Finally, some personnel in TOE and TDA units perform similar
functions which calls into question the need for separate resourcing
processes.  Some features of the Army's process for using TDA medical
personnel to fill positions in TOE medical units may provide a model
for other functions with both TOE and TDA missions. 


   INSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ARE
   NOT WELL SUPPORTED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1

Weaknesses in the Army's ability to fully define force requirements
for the institutional Army in terms of workload are long standing and
have been reported by us and the Army since the late 1970s. 
Workload-based management is designed to help managers determine the
resources needed to complete a job and logically respond to resource
cuts.  For example, using workload-based management, a manager could
determine how many trainers would be required to train a certain
number of students in a specified period of time.  Weaknesses in its
program leave the Army unable to analytically support its TDA
requirements or define the risks of reducing this portion of the Army
forces.  Further, a weak requirements process prevents the Army
leadership from making informed choices as to possible trade-offs
among TDA functions and commands based on highest priority needs. 

According to Army regulation and policy, force requirements are to be
logically developed from specific workload requirements derived from
mission directives.  Responsibility for allocating personnel
resources to fulfill TDA missions belongs to the major commands.  For
fiscal year 1998, the Army projects its TDA force at over 123,000
military positions and over 247,000 civilian positions.  Although TDA
functions are carried out by military and civilian personnel
depending on the type of mission, our focus was on the active
military Army.  Table 3.1 shows the distribution of active military
TDA positions for fiscal year 1998. 



                               Table 3.1
                
                Distribution of Authorized TDA Military
                     Positions for Fiscal Year 1998

                                                          Military TDA
Command                                                      Positions
--------------------------------------------------  ------------------
Training and Doctrine Command                                   44,823
Medical Command                                                 25,229
Forces Command                                                  13,278
Intelligence and Security Command                                6,303
Army Materiel Command                                            3,057
U.S. Army Europe                                                 3,025
Special Operations Command/Special Operations                    2,812
 Forces
U.S. Army Pacific                                                2,499
Eighth U.S. Army                                                 1,429
Military District Washington                                     1,381
Personnel Command                                                1,112
U.S. Military Academy                                              928
U.S. Army South                                                    528
Corps of Engineers                                                 505
Criminal Investigation Command                                     390
Other\a                                                         16,148
======================================================================
Total Authorized TDA Positions                                 123,447
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Category includes positions allocated to the Army National Guard,
field operating agencies, and Joint and Defense agencies. 

Source:  Army force structure database as of November 1996. 

In response to our 1979 report criticizing the Army for its lack of
workload-based information on which to determine personnel
requirements, the Army developed a workload-based personnel
allocation system, known as the Manpower Staffing Standards System. 
This system was intended to determine minimum essential requirements
to accomplish TDA workload and identify operational improvements to
increase efficiency and effectiveness.  However, command officials
told us that this process was time consuming and labor intensive,
taking as long as 3 years to analyze a single function, and that the
standards generated by it were often obsolete by the time they were
issued.  In 1994, the Army Audit Agency found that, as a result of
these problems and lack of management tools to collect workload data,
managers were not able to effectively determine or manage their TDA
workloads and thus could not be assured that limited personnel
resources were being distributed to the highest priority functions. 


      COMMANDS EMPLOY VARYING
      LEVELS OF WORKLOAD-BASED
      ANALYSIS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.1

During our review, Army headquarters officials acknowledged that the
Army cannot articulate its TDA force structure in terms of workload,
and we found varying levels of compliance with the Army's
workload-based management regulation at the major commands we
contacted.  The Intelligence and Security Command, with a 1998 TDA
active end strength authorization of over 6,000, does not have a
formal manpower study program due to downsizing and changes in
workload.  Allocation of TDA resources is done based on command
guidance with functional staff's input.  An official at Forces
Command, which has a 1998 active component TDA of about 13,000, told
us that workload-based manpower management had not been a high
priority in recent years because of turmoil in the workforce caused
by downsizing and reallocation of workload due to base realignments
and closures.  Forces Command has a plan to conduct a comprehensive
manpower assessment at each of its installations by the year 2000. 
This assessment will include validating work requirements, developing
manning levels based on workload, and using cross-installation
comparisons of functions to establish a model for future manpower
requirements determination. 

TRADOC, the Medical Command, and the Army Materiel Command had more
extensive workload-based management processes.  Both the Medical
Command and TRADOC employ workload-based standards for about 60
percent of their TDA positions and have processes to review workloads
and resource allocations according to established requirements.  The
Army Materiel Command, which has a largely civilian workforce, began
a review of all of its functions in March 1995 and completed this
review of over 60,000 authorized military and civilian positions in
January 1997.  The review includes validating units' requirements,
analyzing and projecting workload, and applying available resources
to that workload.  Having visibility over the workload and the
resources needed to complete it gives commanders greater control over
their resources and enables them to identify inefficiencies.  For
example, at the Medical Command, the Surgeon General holds
"bankruptcy hearings" for units that exceed established workload
benchmarks. 


      ARMY SECRETARIAT IS
      PROMOTING WORKLOAD-BASED
      MANAGEMENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.2

The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
has developed a new methodology for workload-based management that is
intended to address concerns that the Army does not know how big its
institutional force needs to be to satisfy its requirements.  The
Army's methodology includes an analysis of (1) the work that needs to
be done based on organizational mission, (2) how to improve processes
through better methods, benchmarking, capital investment, automation
and improved facilities, and (3) the most appropriate technique for
linking people to work.  In addition, the Army is pilot testing an
automated system for collecting and analyzing workload information
and monitoring efficiency based on time spent completing functions. 
Army officials told us that the system could provide managers at all
levels significant visibility over TDA resources and could ultimately
be used to make trade-offs among TDA functions Army-wide.  The
Assistant Secretary's office is also increasing its review of major
commands' requirements determination processes. 

Differing management philosophies on the use of workload-based
requirements could challenge the Army-wide adoption of workload-based
management.  For example, one resource management official told us
that he preferred across-the-board percentage cuts rather than cuts
weighted according to workload, because this allows the commanders
more autonomy in how they allocate their resources.  In October 1996,
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
stated that a challenge to adopting workload-based management will be
changing the perspective of resourcing officials from a philosophy of
managing personnel resources based on budget to managing personnel
resources based on workload. 

Although managing to budget allows commanders to allocate resources
based on available budgets, we believe that using it as the
sole-allocation process does not provide the commander a vision of
what cannot be done as a result of declining budgets and may
discourage commands from identifying efficiencies if they know they
will be receiving a cut regardless.  In addition, managing to budget
does not provide an analytical basis on which to make trade-offs
among TDA workload priorities.  For example, during deliberations for
TAA 2001, which was completed in 1993, an attempt by major command
representatives to allocate a cut in TDA positions among their
commands ended in gridlock, in part due to the lack of an analytical
basis on which to divide the resources.  The result was that each
command's TDA military positions were cut by 7.5 percent, regardless
of its individual missions or requirements.  Such a cut impacts some
commands more than others.  For example, Intelligence and Security
Command officials told us that 75 percent of its officers were
controlled by other agencies; therefore, it could not eliminate any
of these positions.  As a result, an across-the-board 7.5 percent
reduction applied to Intelligence and Security Command officers fell
disproportionately on the remaining 25 percent of its officers that
the command had authority over. 

Efforts to allocate resources based on workload will require the
support of the Army leadership to be successful.  The long-standing
weaknesses with the Army's process, despite numerous efforts to
improve it, suggest that a higher level of reporting and oversight
may be warranted.  However, the Army has not reported its historic
lack of compliance with its workload-based allocation policy as a
material weakness under the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act
(P.L.  97-255).  Policy implementing the act requires agencies to
establish internal controls to provide reasonable assurance that
programs are efficiently and effectively carried out in accordance
with applicable law and policy.  One criterion for determining
whether an internal control weakness is material is if it
significantly weakens safeguards against waste.  If lack of workload
analysis, which does not comply with Army policy and does not
safeguard against waste, was reported to the Secretary of Defense as
a material weakness, the Secretary of the Army would be required to
develop a corrective action plan with milestones for completion.  As
required by OSD guidance, responsible OSD officials would then need
to assess whether this problem is a DOD-wide systemic weakness and
whether it is a weakness of sufficient magnitude to be reported in
OSD's annual statement of assurance to the President and Congress. 


   THE ARMY IS STREAMLINING ITS
   INSTITUTIONAL FORCE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2

Despite the lack of workload data to define specific requirements of
the TDA force, the Army is re-engineering its processes and
redesigning the overall TDA organization through a series of
streamlining initiatives.  Although these efforts have some aspects
that are similar to workload analysis, these are one-time, Army-wide
assessments intended to provide a forum for re-engineering many Army
functions.  The Army defines re-engineering as a "fundamental
rethinking and radical redesign of business processes to achieve
dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures of
performance." In contrast, workload management is a tool for
conducting more micro-levels of analysis on a unit-by-unit basis. 

The streamlining and re-engineering effort, known as the Force XXI
Institutional Army Redesign, is one component of the overall Force
XXI redesign.  The other two components are the redesign of the
combat forces and an effort to incorporate information age technology
into the battlefield.  The institutional redesign will take place in
three phases to correspond with presidential budget cycles.  Phase I,
completed in March 1996, resulted in modifications to the 1998-2003
Army Program Objective Memorandum.  Phases II and III will be
completed in time to update the 2000-2005 and the 2002-2007 budgets,
respectively. 

As a result of the phase I reviews of TDA missions, to include
acquisition, training, mobilization, recruiting, personnel management
and redesign of the Department of Army Headquarters, the Army
eliminated 13 headquarters offices, realigned a major command, and
identified almost 4,000 active military positions that will be cut
from TDA and transferred to the TOE end strength between 1998 and
2003.  Before the TDA cuts were identified, TAA 2003 applied 2,000
TDA positions to unmet support force requirements in anticipation of
the streamlining results.  Officials told us that the remaining 2,000
positions will also be transferred to the deployable portion of the
force to fill shortages in units that are at less than full strength,
although they could not specify the units.  Furthermore, many of the
4,000 positions that are being shifted are based on initiatives that
have not been fully tested or approved.  Thus, the expected savings
are not assured. 

The largest single planned transfer of 2,100 positions is the result
of an Army proposal to replace active TDA military assigned to the
Senior Reserve Officer Training Corps with reserve component,
noncommissioned and retired officers.  This proposal is being studied
by TRADOC and would require a change in legislation to authorize the
use of retired and additional reserve personnel, according to the
Army.  If pilot testing shows the concept is infeasible, or if the
legislative enabler the Army is proposing is not passed, the Army
would need to find a means to accomplish this function since it has
already taken these TDA reductions.  In another example, the Army
anticipates reducing attrition,\1 thereby freeing up 750 TDA
positions associated with training and recruiting.  The Army's plan
to reduce attrition is based primarily on establishing an advisory
council to provide commanders with attrition statistics and review
policies that impact attrition.  As a result, the Army cannot be
certain that the anticipated TDA transfers can be realistically
accomplished. 


--------------------
\1 Attrition is defined as a soldier leaving the Army before his or
her term of enlistment has expired. 


      ONGOING ORGANIZATIONAL
      REVIEWS COULD REDUCE TDA
      POSITIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.1

The Army's efforts to streamline its institutional force are linked
to a conceptual model delineated in a draft Department of the Army
Pamphlet, 100xx entitled "Force XXI Institutional Force Redesign."
The model identifies the core competency of the TDA force, divides
this competency into 4 core capabilities, and divides the 4
capabilities into 14 core processes, as shown in table 3.2. 



                               Table 3.2
                
                   Core Competency, Capabilities, and
                  Processes of the Institutional Army

Core competency                 Core capabilities   Core processes
------------------------------  ------------------  ------------------
Create, provide and sustain     Direct and          Planning and
the land component of the       resource the force  policy
combatant commander's joint/                        development
multinational force                                 Direction and
                                                    assessment
                                                    Financial
                                                    management
                                                    Information
                                                    management

                                Develop the force   Develop doctrine
                                                    Devevelop
                                                    requirements
                                                    Acquire and
                                                    sustain
                                                    individuals
                                                    Identify and
                                                    develop leaders

                                Generate and        Tailor, mobilize
                                project the force   and project land
                                                    power
                                                    Support
                                                    organizational
                                                    training

                                Sustain the force   Acquire, maintain,
                                                    and sustain
                                                    equipment
                                                    Maintain and
                                                    sustain land
                                                    operations
                                                    Acquire and
                                                    sustain
                                                    facilities
                                                    Operate
                                                    installations
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  Department of the Army Pamphlet 100xx (final draft as of
October 15, 1996). 

The Army plans to align its organizations around the core
capabilities and core processes, so that there would be one office
with lead responsibility for each process.  For example, under the
current structure, several commands, including TRADOC, the
Intelligence and Security Command, and U.S.  Army, Europe, have
responsibility to develop Army doctrine.  Under the streamlined
model, TRADOC would have the lead responsibility for doctrine
writing. 

The Army will use this framework to align the TDA organization with
core processes.  The Army has developed three organizational models
that would reduce the number of major commands and are intended to
eliminate duplication, establish clearer lines of authority,
streamline resource management, and could further reduce TDA military
personnel.  For example, one model would reduce the Army from its
current structure of 14 major commands to a total of 10 commands,
with 3 major commands and 7 Army service component commands to
support the CINCs.  The three major commands would be aligned to the
"Develop the Force," "Generate and Project the Force," and the
"Sustain the Force" core capabilities with the Department of the Army
Headquarters assuming responsibility for the "Direct and Resource"
capabilities.  However, these models are illustrative and were
presented as a starting point for further discussion and do not
directly address shortfalls in defining requirements based on
workload.  As such, officials said they could not provide a specific
date on which any of these models would be in place or estimate how
many positions might be saved through streamlining. 


      ARMY MUST CONSIDER
      LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY
      GUIDANCE WHEN STREAMLINING
      TDA
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.2

Additional streamlining of the Army's TDA force must accommodate
limitations from legislative, regulatory, and budgetary guidance. 
These actions can influence the size and composition of the
institutional Army force, but are outside the Army's span of control. 
For example, DOD's ongoing civilian drawdown limits the Army's
ability to convert military positions to generally less expensive
civilian positions.  In 1994 and 1996, we reported that there were
opportunities for the Army to convert certain enlisted and officer
support positions from military to civilian status, but to overcome
impediments to conversion, the Secretary of Defense would need to
slow the civilian drawdown, or the Congress would need to reprogram
funding.\2 Further, officials in the commands we visited pointed to
budgetary challenges to converting military positions to civilians. 
First, the commands are reluctant to convert military positions to
civilian positions because they cannot be assured that operations and
maintenance money, which funds civilian pay, will be available to
hire a new civilian.  Officials told us that the transfer of a
military position to a civilian position is authorized years before
the civilian is hired and sometimes by the year of execution,
inadequate operations and maintenance funding prevent the command
from hiring a new civilian.  Second, local commanders have a
disincentive to civilianize because civilian positions are paid in
full from the installation's budget while military personnel are paid
out of the Army's centralized military personnel budget. 

Also, some active military TDA positions are required by law or
controlled by other agencies.  As a percentage of the active
component TDA force, these positions, sometimes referred to as
"fenced" positions, will have increased from 29 percent in 1991 to a
projected 37 percent in 2001.  For example, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 restricts the Secretary of
Defense from reducing medical personnel without providing
certification to Congress that the number reduced is in excess of
that required and that the reduction would not cause an increase in
costs to those covered under the Civilian Health and Medical Program
of the Uniformed Services.  Positions controlled by other agencies
include those assigned to the National Foreign Intelligence Program. 
Under executive order, these positions are required and budgeted by
the Director of Central Intelligence and cannot be reallocated
without his permission.  Table 3.3 summarizes the major categories of
fenced positions and the change from 1991 to 2001. 



                               Table 3.3
                
                 Comparison of "Fenced" TDA Positions,
                             1991 and 2001

                                1991 End strength   2001 End strength
                                ------------------  ------------------
                                  Number   Percent    Number   Percent
Category                          of TDA    of TDA    of TDA    of TDA
------------------------------  --------  --------  --------  --------
National Foreign Intelligence     11,276         7     7,719         6
 Program
Special Operations Forces          2,326         1     2,863         2
Joint                              5,108         3     5,039         4
Defense Health                    30,123        18    25,096        20
Active Component Support to            0         0     5,000         4
 the Reserves
======================================================================
Total fenced positions            48,833        29    45,717        37
======================================================================
TDA                              169,605       100   125,120       100
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  The 1991 and 1997 Army submittals to President's Budgets. 

Although fencing ensures that selected high-priority missions are
adequately staffed, to the extent positions are fenced, the Army must
disproportionately reduce other non-fenced TDA categories to absorb
across-the-board reductions. 


--------------------
\2 DOD Force Mix Issues:  Greater Reliance on Civilians in Support
Roles Could Provide Significant Benefits (GAO/NSIAD-95-5, Oct.  19,
1994) and DOD Force Mix Issues:  Converting Some Support Officer
Positions to Civilian Status Could Save Money (GAO/NSIAD-97-15, Oct. 
23, 1996). 


   DIVISION BETWEEN TOE AND TDA IS
   BECOMING LESS DISTINCT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3

The distinction of a deployable TOE force and a nondeployable TDA
force is becoming less clear and calls into question the necessity of
maintaining separate processes to allocate personnel resources.  The
draft Army Pamphlet 100xx acknowledges a blurred distinction between
operational and institutional forces because institutional forces are
increasingly being called on to perform tactical support functions in
areas such as intelligence, communications, transportation,
logistics, engineering, and medical support.  For example, an
Intelligence and Security Command official told us that all of its
TDA military personnel along with almost 600 civilians at the command
are considered deployable.  At Forces Command, we were told that TDA
personnel assigned to directly support a TOE unit are expected to
deploy with that unit.  Another example is military police.  In
recognition of historical deployments of TDA military police to
support law and order operations in theater, the Army plans to
convert 1,850 TDA military police positions to TOE.  The initiative
would establish modular military police organizations that would be
designed to provide capabilities in peace, conflict, and war. 

However, with the exception of medical, TDA specialties with
potential use in a deployment are not considered available to be
distributed among requirements in the TAA process.  TAA does not
model the relative risks of reducing TDA units compared to reducing
below-the-line support TOE units.  Nor does it consider trade-offs
between below-the-line support units and support units embedded in
combat divisions.  Thus, the Army could overstate the risk of
shortages in a below-the-line TOE branch, when in practice, TOE
support units in combat divisions or TDA personnel are capable of
performing similar functions.  A unified resourcing process would
give the Army visibility over all capabilities available to complete
its missions, regardless of their classification as TOE or TDA. 

The Army's process for handling medical requirements may provide a
model for functions that are resident and required in both TOE and
TDA forces.  During peacetime, some deployable hospitals are
maintained by a small cadre of personnel.  During deployments, these
hospitals are filled in with designated TDA medical personnel whose
peacetime TDA mission is to staff Army medical treatment facilities. 
Medical reservists are in turn called up to back fill the medical
treatment facilities.  In TAA 2003, about 5,000 requirements were
filled with predesignated TDA medical positions.  While it may not be
feasible to back fill certain specialties with reservists, two
features of the medical model could be reviewed for broader
application.  First, the medical model formally recognizes and
quantifies the dual duties of personnel assigned to TDA functions in
peacetime but expected to deploy in operations.  Second, it gives
visibility to all medical assets, regardless of their classification
as TOE or TDA forces. 


   CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4

Army initiatives to analytically define and allocate TDA resources
according to workload have not been effective.  Although ongoing
initiatives show some promise, they will require significant support
by the Army leadership.  If implemented, workload-based management
could identify opportunities to streamline TDA functions and ensure
that active military positions are allocated most efficiently. 

Of the potential 4,000 required positions for transfer to TOE by the
Force XXI institutional redesign, many are contingent on Army plans
that have either not been finalized or that are difficult to
quantify.  As a result, the anticipated reallocation should be viewed
with caution.  There is potential for further savings as the Army
streamlines its TDA by aligning the organization with TDA core
processes; however, streamlining may be limited by legislative,
regulatory, and budgetary guidance. 

The reliance of TOE units on TDA personnel to complete missions calls
into question the need for separate resourcing processes.  A more
unified process would permit the Army to consider how it can best
meet requirements from a wider range of personnel at its disposal. 
In addition, it would allow for better management of personnel
resources--one of the Army's most expensive budget items. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5

To improve the management and allocation of personnel resources to
the institutional Army, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army

  -- report to the Secretary of Defense the Army's long-standing
     problem with implementing workload-based analysis as a material
     weakness under the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act to
     maintain visibility of the issue and ensure action is taken and

  -- closely monitor the military positions the Army plans to save as
     the result of Force XXI initiatives and have a contingency plan
     in place in the event that these savings do not materialize. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:6

DOD's comments on these recommendations appear in appendix V.  DOD
agreed that the Secretary of the Army should report its long-standing
problems in managing its institutional personnel as a material
weakness under the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act and
develop a sound basis for allocating resources to these functions. 
As part of this effort, the Army intends to assess the potential
benefit to the Army of new workload-based management tools being
pilot tested by an office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army. 
DOD also concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of the
Army closely monitor the military positions saved under Force XXI. 
The Army's intent is to apply any such savings to authorization
shortfalls in existing support units.  However, the Army acknowledges
that it is too soon to speculate on the size of any future savings. 


A SMALLER ACTIVE ARMY SUPPORT
FORCE DOES NOT APPEAR FEASIBLE AT
THIS TIME, BUT A SMALLER COMBAT
AND TDA FORCE MAY BE POSSIBLE IN
THE FUTURE
============================================================ Chapter 4

Reducing active Army support forces does not appear feasible now
based on TAA 2003 results, which show that the Army cannot meet its
early deployment needs.  But a smaller combat and TDA force may be
possible in the future, based on ongoing Army initiatives and efforts
under way to review U.S.  defense strategy and forces. 

Nevertheless, OSD's current position on active Army end strength was
not supported by detailed analysis.  OSD cited potential end strength
savings from the Army's Force XXI streamlining initiatives as a basis
to reduce the Army's end strength to 475,000.  However, while Force
XXI's emphasis on digitization and more efficient logistics practices
may achieve end strength savings in the long term, these savings do
not appear likely to occur by 1999, the time frame OSD established to
achieve the 20,000 position drawdown.  Following its decision to
reduce the Army by 20,000 positions, OSD reviewed TAA 2003 results. 
OSD's study questioned the Army's determination of its support
requirements but did not examine downsizing of the active Army. 

OSD's assessment of the appropriate size of the active Army could
change as a result of the congressionally mandated Quadrennial
Defense Review.  DOD is expected to assess a wide range of issues,
including the defense strategy of the United States, the optimum
force structure to implement the strategy, and the roles and missions
of reserve forces.  The number of divisions required or the mix of
heavy and light divisions may change if a new strategy is adopted. 
Also, options may exist for restructuring the Army's active divisions
by integrating some reserve forces.  Options to expand the role of
the reserves would have the effect of reducing requirements for
active combat forces. 


   OSD DID NOT BASE ITS PLAN TO
   REDUCE THE ARMY'S END STRENGTH
   ON DETAILED ANALYSIS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1

In April 1995, to free resources for modernization programs, OSD
directed the Army to reduce its end strength by 20,000 no later than
1999.  This guidance was reflected in DOD's 1997 FYDP, which reduced
the Army's active force by 10,000 positions in both 1998 and 1999,
along with related military personnel funding.  However, in March
1996, the Army Chief of Staff testified that the active Army should
not get any smaller.  Instead, the Army planned to identify savings
within its own budget sufficient to avoid the 20,000 position
reduction. 

A memorandum from the Secretary of Defense cited the Army's Force XXI
initiative as the means by which the Army would identify efficiencies
to reduce the force.  However, according to Army documentation, Force
XXI's primary focus is to increase capability by leveraging
technology, not to attain specific end strength reductions.  The Army
is experimenting with ways to streamline its TOE forces through its
Force XXI redesign of its combat divisions, known as Joint Venture. 
For example, Joint Venture's focus on increasing situational
awareness by digitizing the battlefield and better managing logistics
could reduce the size of Army divisions.  However, the division
redesign is not yet finalized and will not be fully implemented until
2010.  The Army's streamlining of its TDA force under Force XXI has
identified about 4,000 excess active military spaces, but the Army
plans to reallocate those spaces to fill unmet requirements in active
TOE support forces. 

The Army's efforts to streamline TDA under Force XXI, and additional
streamlining initiatives and policy changes proposed by Army
leadership, enabled the Army to increase its military personnel
account throughout its fiscal year's 1998-2003 Program Objective
Memorandum to pay for the 20,000 spaces eliminated in DOD's 1997
FYDP.  Based on Army projections, we estimate that from 1998 to 2003,
the Army will need about $3 billion in savings to pay for the 20,000
positions.  The Army has identified almost $9 billion in savings over
that same period, but considers only about $2 billion of those
savings as finalized; the remaining $7 billion will require
coordination and oversight among several Army organizations to be
realized.  For example, recommendations to reduce logistics costs,
including reductions in acquisition lead time and spare parts
inventories, account for over $2 billion in savings and will result
in overhead cuts to the logistics community.  The benefit of the
overhead cuts will be realized by the commands through lower
logistics costs.  An Army official told us that such a disconnect
between the entity doing the cutting and the entity receiving
reductions in cost could make some of the initiatives difficult to
manage.  Further, some of the savings are based on across-the-board
cuts to headquarters overhead that are not analytically based. 

As discussed in chapter 3, the Army has identified a potential to
reduce its TDA force by 4,000 active military positions as a result
of its initial Force XXI streamlining initiatives.  Ongoing
streamlining initiatives could further reduce TDA requirements for
active military personnel. 


   OSD ASSESSMENT OF TAA 2003 DID
   NOT ADDRESS ACTIVE ARMY END
   STRENGTH
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2

As a separate initiative, OSD reviewed TAA 2003's methodology and
results, but did not examine the issue of active Army end strength. 
OSD questioned whether the Army's 672,000 TOE requirement was high
based on its analysis of selected TAA assumptions and model inputs,
and its comparison of Army support requirements based on TAA to those
used in a 1995 DOD war game known as Nimble Dancer.  OSD's assessment
was limited to an analysis of TOE forces, both active and reserve,
and did not consider the question of availability of reserve forces
during the first 30 days of a conflict, as did the Army's TAA
analysis.  Nor did OSD assess another risk factor the Army deemed
important, availability of active forces for the second MRC.  The OSD
study did not recommend a smaller Army, but did ask it to study some
issues that affect the size of its TOE force. 


      OSD QUESTIONED TAA MODEL
      INPUTS AND ASSUMPTIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2.1

The Army did not agree that its support force requirements were high. 
However, at the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the
Army did agree to review model inputs and assumptions that OSD
questioned and to determine the impact of any changes on the size of
the Army's support forces.  The Army also responded that it would
make adjustments to TAA 2003 results if any errors were identified. 
Among OSD's principle concerns were the following: 

  -- Casualty estimates.  OSD questioned whether the TAA models
     produced valid casualty estimates because of variances between
     Army casualty estimates and actual casualties experienced in
     battles dating back to World War II.  Army casualty estimates
     are not used to size the Army medical force, but do influence
     support requirements in the theater of operations such as for
     quartermaster and engineer branches. 

  -- Fuel consumption.  OSD questioned whether Army fuel consumption
     rates were high based on a review of actual fuel issued to units
     during the Gulf War. 

  -- Host nation support.  OSD believed the Army could reduce its
     active support requirements by placing greater reliance on
     support from host nations.  Currently, the Army reduces its
     unmet requirements by the amount of host nation support it
     expects to receive, based on signed agreements.  (See chapter 2
     for a discussion of material weaknesses in DOD's host nation
     support program.)

The Army has arranged for an independent analysis of its casualty
estimation methodology and has asked the Director of the Joint Staff
to query the CINCs concerning the availability of additional host
nation support.  The Army is conducting its own detailed analysis of
its fuel consumption rates. 


      OSD BELIEVES TAA
      REQUIREMENTS ARE HIGH
      COMPARED TO NIMBLE DANCER
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2.2

OSD used the 1995 DOD war game Nimble Dancer to evaluate the
reasonableness of the Army TOE requirements.  By comparing the Nimble
Dancer Army force level requirement of 457,000 TOE spaces to the TAA
2003 Army-generated war fight requirement of 672,000 TOE spaces
(195,000 combat and 477,000 support forces), OSD identified a
potential overstatement of 215,000 spaces.  After adjusting for
different assumptions used in TAA 2003 and Nimble Dancer, OSD
concluded that the Army TAA 2003 requirements were high. 

While there may be insights to be gained by analyzing some aspects of
the Nimble Dancer war game, we believe comparing the Army's TAA 2003
force requirements against the Nimble Dancer force is problematic. 
In Nimble Dancer, DOD identified the availability of sufficient
support forces as critical to the outcome of the conflict and
determined that shortages could delay the start of the counterattack
in the second MRC.  However, as we noted in our June 1996 report on
Nimble Dancer,\1 DOD did not model or analyze in detail the
sufficiency of support forces during the war game.  For purposes of
its baseline modeling, DOD assumed that support forces would
accompany combat units when they deployed.  Game participants held
discussions concerning the impact of support force shortfalls, but
deferred further analysis to the Army's TAA 2003.  The 457,000 spaces
OSD used as a baseline for comparison to TAA 2003 was a notional Army
force based on TAA 2001 and its purpose was to assess mobility, not
end strength, requirements.  Only the combat forces were played in
the war game itself.  Given the limited consideration given to
support forces in Nimble Dancer, we do not believe comparisons with
Army TAA 2003 are meaningful. 

Although OSD asserts that Army support requirements are high, it
endorsed the concept of converting reserve positions from combat to
support to fill the Army's unmet requirements.  These conversions
were recommended by us in past reports, the Commission on Roles and
Missions and most recently in a National Guard Division Redesign
Study. 

In addition to the studies previously mentioned, the Deputy Secretary
of Defense directed OSD analysts to assess whether DOD has sufficient
mobility assets to move (1) the Army's full TOE requirement of
672,000, and (2) the force actually planned in the Army's fiscal
year's 1998-2003 Program Objective Memorandum.  In particular, the
Deputy Secretary is interested in how scenario timelines would be
affected if mobility assets are constrained to those actually
planned.  During TAA 2003, the Army relied on the Mobility
Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update to establish available
lift to move forces to theater.  This was consistent with Secretary
of Defense guidance. 


--------------------
\1 Bottom-Up Review:  Analysis of DOD War Game to Test Key
Assumptions (GAO/NSIAD-96-170, June 21, 1996). 


   QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW MAY
   IMPACT ARMY ACTIVE MILITARY
   PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 requires
DOD to conduct a Quadrennial Defense Review by May 15, 1997.  An
independent panel of defense experts will submit a comprehensive
assessment of DOD's report and conduct an assessment of alternative
force structures by December 1, 1997.  In conducting its review, DOD
must assess a wide range of issues, including the defense strategy of
the United States, the force structure best suited to implement the
strategy, the roles and mission of reserve forces, the appropriate
ratio of combat forces to support forces, and the effect of OOTWs on
force structure.  The number of Army divisions or the mix of heavy
and light divisions may change as a result of this study,
particularly if a new strategy is adopted.  For example, a strategy
that places more emphasis on OOTWs might result in an active Army
that has fewer heavy divisions and assigns a higher percentage of its
active forces to support units.  The review will also provide an
opportunity to reassess the role of the Army's reserve forces.  For
example, as a result of the BUR and the Army's experience in the
Persian Gulf War, the Army discontinued its reliance on reserve
component "round- up" and "round-out" brigades to bring the active
divisions to full combat strength during wartime.  However, options
may exist to adopt some variant of this concept, such as integrating
reserve forces at the battalion level or assigning reserve forces a
role in later deploying active divisions.  Options to expand the role
of the reserves would have the effect of reducing requirements for
active combat forces. 


   CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:4

OSD did not support its plan to reduce the Army's active end strength
with detailed analysis.  OSD's assessment of TAA 2003 identified
issues worthy of further analysis, but did not draw conclusions about
the size of the active Army. 

Future active Army end strength will likely be affected by several
ongoing Army streamlining initiatives, and potential changes to
military strategy and the role of reserve forces resulting from the
upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review.  TDA streamlining may identify
additional opportunities to reduce active TDA personnel by reducing
the number of major commands and adopting broader use of workload
analysis.  Force XXI's emphasis on digital technology and just in
time logistics may result in smaller combat divisions in the future. 
Other options for restructuring combat forces include reassessing the
mix of heavy and light divisions and assigning reserve forces a role
in later deploying active divisions.  However, given the risks the
Army has accepted in its active support forces, we do not believe it
is feasible for the Army to reduce its active support forces at this
time. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:5

In addition to DOD's official agency comments (see app.  V), the Army
provided technical comments on a draft of this report concerning the
role of reserve forces in any new strategy proposed by the
Quadrennial Defense Review.  The Army believes that the use of
round-up/round-out brigades is a Cold War concept not viable for an
early response power projection force.  However, the Army says it is
currently studying options to employ "multi-component" units, that
is, combining an active unit with an associated reserve unit that is
organized with fully trained personnel and minimal equipment.  Upon
mobilization, associate units would deploy and augment the active
component unit, or earlier deploying reserve component units,
increasing their capability by adding qualified personnel. 

Our report does not recommend a return to the round-up and round-out
concept used in the past.  Rather, our intention was to suggest that
there may be a variant of this concept that would allow the Army to
make greater use of its reserve forces.  The Quadrennial Defense
Review provides an opportunity for such new concepts to be
considered.  We have not reviewed the multi-component concept
currently being analyzed by the Army, but agree that new approaches
that better integrate the Army's active and reserve forces and
optimize the use of available equipment should be explored. 


THE TAA PROCESS
=========================================================== Appendix I

The Total Army Analysis (TAA) is a phased force structure analysis
process that the Army conducts biennially to determine its support
force requirements.  TAA does this by modeling a theater-level war
fight for a combat force.  This combat simulation considers and
generates information on a multitude of planning factors and
consumption rates, including ammunition, equipment repair, and
casualty rates; unit arrival dates; and geographical characteristics
of the theater.  Military judgment then is applied to this
quantitative analysis to produce the Army's support force required to
(1) execute the national military strategy as set forth in the
defense guidance, (2) compare the program force to war-fight
requirements, and (3) enable the Army to make force programming
decisions which balances war-fighting risk and resource constraints. 

Initial broad guidance for TAA is provided by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff.  This guidance
includes the number, size, and type of combat forces; troop strength
levels in Europe and Korea; Army funding levels; and representative
war-fight scenarios.  The focus of TAA is primarily to support the
theater war fight outlined in the defense guidance MRC scenarios.  No
allowances are made for other contingency requirements, such as
Bosnia, or training, mobilization, and deployment requirements. 

There is substantial qualitative review of model results in the form
of Army-wide conferences.  These conferences are attended by colonel-
and general officer-level representatives from the Army Staff, the
major commands, schools and integrating centers, the war-fighting
CINCs, the National Guard Bureau, and Office of the Chief of the Army
Reserves.  This broad participation is intended to ensure accuracy,
credibility, and acceptance of TAA results throughout the Army.  The
final product of TAA is the approved force structure baseline of the
Army, the Army's Program Objective Memorandum force.  TAA consists of
four phases:  Phase I, Force Guidance; Phase II, Quantitative
Analysis; Phase III, Qualitative Analysis; and Phase IV, Leadership
Review and Program Objective Memorandum Development.  These phases
are depicted in figure I.1. 

   Figure I.1:  The TAA Process

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


      PHASE I, FORCE GUIDANCE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.1

Phase I is the forum where all model input and planning assumptions
are reviewed and approved.  Two key data sources are the Army's force
planning data and assumptions (AFPDA) and unit allocation rules.  The
AFPDA is a single-source document that the Army relies on for
developing planning factors for its theater-level studies such as
TAA.  The AFPDA contains logistics data and information on
consumption rates for all classes of supply based on the intensity of
the war fight.  Data regarding threat and allied forces, support to
and from other services, and other planning factors crucial to force
structure development also are considered.  Unit allocation rules
translate the capabilities of specific support units into
quantitative statements of a unit's capability, mission, and
doctrinal employment as it applies to a specific scenario.  Over
1,500 different allocation rules were applied in TAA 2003 for each
theater. 

The three principal unit allocation rules are existence, workload,
and manual.  An existence-based rule allocates units depending on the
existence of other units.  For example, for each division in a corps
there are two military police companies.  A workload-based rule ties
unit requirements to a measurable task.  For example, for every
30,000 personnel there is one post office.  Workload driven
requirements can vary according to the nature of the threat, the
environment (e.g., arid conditions require more water for
consumption), lines of communication, and other factors.  A
manual-based rule allocates units without a standard basis, to
reflect a theater's physical or organizational structure.  For
example, allocating a number of units to link communications systems
based on a theater's geographic characteristics and the number of
headquarters needing such connectivity.  Phase I does not
differentiate between active and reserve forces when establishing the
force requirements. 


      PHASE II, QUANTITATIVE
      ANALYSIS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.2

During phase II, the Army employs a suite of campaign simulation
models to estimate the number and type of support forces required to
sustain the combat force, unconstrained by available resources.  A
strategic mobility analysis is performed to determine the arrival
times of Army forces in theater and identify strategic mobility
shortfalls.  This is followed by a theater campaign analysis to gauge
force movement and unit strength over time, as well as personnel and
equipment losses.  Outputs from these models, along with approved
unit allocation rules and logistics data, are used to determine
support force requirements using the Force Analysis Simulation of
Theater Administration and Logistics Support (FASTALS) model. 
FASTALS generates the required support forces by type, quantity, when
they are needed in theater, and their supply requirements.  The
support forces identified by FASTALS are then matched to actual Army
support units using other models.  The matching process contains an
embedded logic that guides unit assignment.  For example, it ensures
that active units are applied to forward stationed requirements. 
Army units are applied toward requirements until the unit inventory
is exhausted.  The difference between the required force and the
inventory of actual Army units is evaluated during phase III. 


      PHASE III, QUALITATIVE
      ANALYSIS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.3

During phase III, the initial Army Program Objective Memorandum force
is developed, constrained by upfront end strength and fiscal
guidance.  During this phase, the FASTALS-generated support force
requirements and the analysis of those requirements are validated. 
Units that cannot be matched to war-fight requirements are
characterized as either (1) strategic reserve (such as the 8 Army
National Guard divisions and certain enhanced brigades); (2) unique
(such as units in Europe and Panama that perform unique strategic,
allied, or national missions, and the Old Guard); or (3) excess
forces that do not match up with a war-fight requirement. 

Where possible, these excess forces are converted to match a
corresponding war-fight requirement.  Each specialty is analyzed to
determine the effect of resourcing units at less than their full
requirement, and the active reserve force mix is examined on a
case-by-case basis.  Conference participants discuss approaches to
mitigate risk and establish priorities among competing requirements
for limited resources. 


      PHASE IV, LEADERSHIP REVIEW
      AND PROGRAM OBJECTIVE
      MEMORANDUM DEVELOPMENT
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.4

During phase IV, a force program review is convened to resolve any
support force resourcing issues not resolved in phase III.  This
review is chaired by the Army Vice Chief of Staff.  The approved
force structure is forwarded to the Army Chief of Staff for final
approval as the base force for programming resources for the Army's
Program Objective Memorandum. 


RESERVE MOBILIZATION PROCESS
========================================================== Appendix II

The Army estimates that mobilizing reserve forces, from unit recall
to arrival at the port of embarkation, takes about 15 days for a
small support unit and 31 days for a large unit.  Representative
tasks associated with the mobilization process follow.  The time it
takes to complete them are presented in figure II.1. 

  -- Pre-mobilization phase

Maintain personnel mobilization packets. 

Ensure medical and dental examinations are current. 

Ensure personnel have required security clearances. 

Complete family care plans. 

Screen personnel for members not available for mobilization. 

Prepare and maintain a unit alert roster. 

Establish liaison with the mobilization station. 

Ensure continual maintenance of all equipment. 

  -- Alert phase

Coordinate mission related travel. 

Identify advance party members. 

Screen and promote eligible personnel. 

Order unit members to active duty. 

Respond to press inquiries. 

Prepare and submit property requisitions. 

Prepare and assemble logistics documentation. 

Request convoy movement frequencies. 

  -- Home station phase

Identify medically disqualified personnel. 

Verify financial and insurance options. 

Conduct personal affairs briefing. 

Prepare unit status report. 

Conduct physical inventory of all assigned property. 

Prepare security clearance rosters. 

Process record of emergency data. 

Verify identification cards and tags. 

  -- Mobilization phase

Move personnel to the mobilization station. 

Conduct medical and dental exams. 

Ensure all administrative and finance matters are in order. 

Conduct training assessment and schedule training. 

Perform individual and unit level training. 

Perform theater-specific and new equipment training. 

Perform required maintenance of unit equipment. 

Pack and load. 

  -- Port of embarkation phase

Move equipment to the seaport of embarkation. 

Move unit to the airport of embarkation. 

   Figure II.1:  Reserve
   Mobilization Timeline

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


COMPARISON OF TAA 2001 AND TAA
2003 UNMET REQUIREMENTS DATA
========================================================= Appendix III

                                  Units required
                                that exist only on
                                     paper\a        Total Positions\a
                                ------------------  ------------------
Branch                          TAA 2001  TAA 2003  TAA 2001  TAA 2003
------------------------------  --------  --------  --------  --------
Quartermaster                        209       158    11,749    21,295
Transportation                       230       122    30,244    20,370
Air Defense                           31        10     8,604     4,266
Signal                                12        16     3,958     4,084
Engineer                             323       759     2,720     2,860
Medical                               32        39     1,231     1,986
Artillery                             26         2     2,379     1,150
Armor                                  0         2         0     1,100
Chemical                               3         4       327       674
Special Operations Forces             20         0     3,660         0
Personnel Service Support             82       104     1,180       347
Theater/Corps Headquarters           104        94       276       188
Ordnance                             184        22     2,965       102
Aviation                               1         0       298         0
Combat Service Support                 1         0       193         0
Military Intelligence                  3         0       444         0
Military Police                        1         0       176         0
Multifunctional Logistics and          1         0       115         0
 Headquarters
======================================================================
Totals                             1,263     1,332    70,519    58,422
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a TAA 2001 and TAA 2003 were developed using different defense
guidance and end strength numbers, thus their results cannot be
directly correlated. 


KEY ASSUMPTIONS USED IN TAA 2003
========================================================== Appendix IV

TAA 2003 assumption                      Army rationale
---------------------------------------  ---------------------------------------
Active Army end strength will be         The Army reached its 495,000 active end
495,000.                                 strength target in fiscal year 1996 and
                                         assumed that this end strength would be
                                         maintained through fiscal year 2003.
                                         Since OSD announced its intention to
                                         reduce Army end strength by 20,000
                                         during the TAA 2003 process and did not
                                         provide guidance on the composition of
                                         the proposed 475,000 active force, the
                                         Army opted to retain its 495,000 active
                                         end strength for TAA 2003.

The Army will have 10 active Army        TAA 2003 requirement for two MRCs will
combat divisions, 15 National Guard      consider only those units with a war-
enhanced brigades, and 8 National Guard  fight mission, which can reasonably be
divisions, as specified in defense       expected to deploy to theater.
guidance.
                                         Army National Guard divisions and
The Army will employ all 10 of its       remaining enhanced brigades are
active divisions and some enhanced       considered a strategic reserve to
brigades in the two-MRC scenario.        respond to adverse situations.

TOE requirements (both combat and        Doctrinally correct TOEs for combat and
support) are based on units resourced    support forces were modeled in TAA
at 100 percent of their personnel        2003. However, adjustments were made,
authorizations (full authorized level    reducing TOE requirements from 690,000
of organization).                        to 672,000.

Units due to arrive in theater in the    This is consistent with defense
first 30 days of the first MRC will be   guidance. The Army determined that time
predominantly in the active component.   delays associated with the call-up and
                                         mobilization of reserve forces
                                         generally preclude their arrival in
                                         theater in the first 30 days. The Army
                                         estimates that a large support unit
                                         would be available in 31 days after
                                         mobilization, and a small support unit
                                         would be available in 15 days. This
                                         does not count transit time to the
                                         theater for personnel and equipment.

Operations other than war (OOTW) force   According to defense guidance, the Army
requirements will not be added to the    can base its TOE requirements on either
two-MRC force requirements. Rather,      two nearly simultaneous MRCs or on one
adjustments will be made within the      MRC and one OOTW, whichever produced
two-MRC requirement to satisfy the       the greater force requirement.
needs of OOTWs.

There will be no force requirement for   Although the Army does not include
casualty replacements.                   casualty replacements in calculating
                                         its force requirements, the TAA war-
                                         fight model estimates their numbers. If
                                         individual replacements were needed,
                                         they would likely be drawn from active
                                         soldiers who had just completed their
                                         introductory training or from the
                                         Individual Ready Reserves.

Host nation support will be considered   The Army wants assurances that its
if stipulated in signed agreements with  support needs in the early stages of
the host nations' military/political     the war fight will be met and is
leadership. This support is considered   unwilling to accept the risk that the
in the resourcing phase of TAA, not in   host nation may not make that support
requirements determination. An           available in the time frames required.
exception to this rule is positions      In the absence of formal agreements,
attributed to pipeline usage and the     the Army will consider some host nation
handling of some enemy prisoners of      support as offsets to unfilled
war. These positions are assumed to be   requirements during the TAA resourcing
filled by host nations and are not       phase.
given visibility in either requirements
determination or resourcing.

The TOE requirement for two MRCs will    The Army is reluctant to offset its TOE
be based on the use of uniformed         requirements with contractor personnel
military personnel (active and reserve)  because it cannot foresee the status of
only. TAA 2003 will not consider the     contracts 9 years into the future.
potential use of contractor personnel.

All of the modernization force enablers  These force enablers include strategic
identified in defense guidance will be   lift, additional prepositioned
available on time and in the quantities  equipment in theater, and increased
programmed.                              stocks of antiarmor precision-guided
                                         munitions.

The Army will have immediate access to   Defense guidance assumes U.S. forces
ports and airfields in the theaters of   will have immediate access to ports and
operation.                               airfields. An excursion run in TAA 2003
                                         in which immediate access was denied
                                         indicated additional support force
                                         requirements.

There will be no delays or degradation   Defense guidance assumes that U.S.
of capability resulting from the         forces assigned to an OOTW are
transfer of support forces from an OOTW  immediately available to redeploy to an
to an MRC.                               MRC. An excursion was run in TAA 2003
                                         in which the Army tested whether it has
                                         sufficient active support force
                                         structure for the first 30 days of an
                                         MRC while involved in a significant
                                         OOTW. Results indicated that force
                                         requirements do not increase
                                         significantly.

No additional requirement will be        This is consistent with defense
provided for post-hostility operations.  guidance. The Army assumed that the
                                         forces needed for post-hostility
                                         operations would be drawn from the
                                         force structure needed to execute the
                                         two MRCs.

Medical support requirements will be     The TAA war-fight model generated
based on casualty and disease,           casualty estimates for combat troops;
nonbattle injury rates and on the        algorithms were used to apply casualty
theater medical evacuation policy.       rates to support personnel. Disease,
                                         nonbattle injury rates were set by the
                                         Army Surgeon General.

Unique force structure requirements      The Army allocates resources to unique
outside of the two-MRC scenario will     force structure requirements and then
not be included in the 672,000 TOE war-  applies remaining resources to the war-
fight requirement.                       fight requirement.

Active units will arrive in theater on   The Army assumes that strategic lift
time.                                    force enhancers have been implemented
                                         on schedule, thus permitting active
                                         forces to arrive on time.

No force requirements will be added for  The Army did not add force requirements
support to coalition partners.           to support coalition partners in TAA
                                         2003 because it cannot quantify their
                                         needs. Historically, the Army has
                                         provided support to coalition partners.

Requirements for the first MRC will be   This is consistent with defense
determined without foreknowledge of the  guidance. It precludes reserving forces
second MRC.                              and assets for the second MRC.

The MRCs will occur in the sequence      Defense guidance used for TAA 2003
established by defense guidance          reversed the order of the MRCs modeled
published in May 1994.                   in TAA 2001.

Separation time between the two MRCs     The Army followed defense guidance.
will be consistent with defense
guidance.

The Army will begin the                  The counteroffensive in the second MRC
counteroffensive phase of an MRC when    occurs later in TAA 2003 than in the
adequate support forces arrive in        DOD wargame Nimble Dancer. Nimble
theater.                                 Dancer did not analyze support forces
                                         in detail and initiated the
                                         counteroffensive before adequate
                                         support forces arrive.

A 15-day theater medical evacuation      MRCs are estimated to be high intensity
policy will be used.                     and of short duration. Casualties
                                         unable to return to duty within 15 days
                                         are not expected to be needed for the
                                         war fight. By reducing the evacuation
                                         policy from 30 days to 15 days from TAA
                                         2001 to TAA 2003, the Army was able to
                                         reduce the number of hospitals needed
                                         in theater and the related
                                         transportation and other support
                                         requirements associated with those
                                         hospitals.

TDA medical personnel will deploy to     In TAA 2003, active TDA medical
the MRCs.                                personnel deploy to meet war-fight
                                         requirements. TDA personnel who deploy
                                         are replaced with reservists.

Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up    This is consistent with defense
occurs on the day U.S. forces deploy to  guidance.
the first MRC.

Theater stockage policy will be 30 days  This is consistent with current Army
of supply.                               policy.

U.S. Army forces in Europe and the       There is a legislative mandate to
Pacific will be available to deploy to   maintain overseas troop strengths of
an MRC.                                  65,000 and 26,000 forces in Europe and
                                         the Pacific, respectively. Forces which
                                         deploy to an MRC may be replaced with
                                         reserve forces based in the United
                                         States.

Adversaries will not use nuclear or      This is consistent with defense
biological weapons and will use a        guidance. An excursion was run in TAA
limited amount of chemical weapons.      2003 in which the amount of chemical
                                         weapons was increased. Excursion
                                         results indicated additional support
                                         force requirements.

Army forces will not swing from one MRC  This is consistent with defense
to the other.                            guidance.

All units will have a readiness rating   This is consistent with defense
of C-3 or better before deploying.       guidance.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix V
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
========================================================== Appendix IV



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Now on p.  45. 



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Now on p.  45. 

Now on p.  45. 

Now on p.  45. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

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(See figure in printed edition.)


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix VI


   NATIONAL SECURITY AND
   INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
   WASHINGTON, D.C. 
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix VI:1

Carol R.  Schuster, Associate Director
Janet A.  St.  Laurent, Assistant Director
Gwendolyn R.  Jaffe, Evaluator-in-Charge
Joseph J.  Faley, Senior Evaluator
Margaret A.  Klucsarits, Senior Evaluator
Marc J.  Schwartz, Senior Evaluator
Joseph W.  Kirschbaum, Evaluator

*** End of document. ***