U.N. Peacekeeping: Status of Long-Standing Operations and U.S. Interests
in Supporting Them (Letter Report, 04/08/97, GAO/NSIAD-97-59).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1)
the budgetary and personnel cost of the eight long-standing U.N.
peacekeeping operations; (2) whether these operations are carrying out
their mandates; (3) the status of efforts to resolve underlying
conflicts; and (4) the reasons the executive branch continues to support
these operations.

GAO noted that: (1) the eight long-standing operations are deployed in
environments where the underlying conflicts have defied diplomatic
resolution, sometimes for decades, and have become, essentially, costly
and open-ended commitments; (2) only two of these operations had
successfully carried out their mandates, while the remaining six either
had only partially carried out their mandates or had not carried them
out; (3) although all but one of these operations were undertaken to
create stable, secure environments to assist diplomatic efforts aimed at
settling these underlying conflicts, diplomatic efforts to resolve these
conflicts had stalled in all but one case; (4) the eight operations
accounted for about $6 billion, over one third, of the $17 billion that
the United Nations has spent on peacekeeping operations since 1948, and
continue to account for a substantial share of current U.N. peacekeeping
budgetary and personnel costs; (5) under current law, the U.S. share of
the estimated annual cost of these operations for 1996 was about $148
million; (6) despite repeated calls from the U.N. Security Council for
the parties to make progress toward settling the underlying conflicts,
as of February 1997, only the conflict in Angola was the subject of
ongoing talks between the disputing parties; (7) despite the
long-standing operations' cost and mixed performance in carrying out
their mandates, U.S. policymakers support continuing these operations
because, in their view, they help to stabilize conflicts that could
threaten U.S. foreign policy objectives; (8) in their judgment, ending
these operations, or even modifying them substantially, would risk
renewed conflict and damage future peacemaking efforts; (9) U.S.
officials told GAO that some of these operations probably would not have
been initially approved under current U.S. and U.N. peacekeeping
policies; (10) at this time, however, U.S. officials see no reasonable
alternative to continuing these operations indefinitely, given their
assessment of the potential harm to U.S. foreign policy objectives if
the underlying conflicts resumed, balanced against what they consider to
be these operations' moderate cost; and (11) in continuing to support
what have become essentially open-ended commitments to peacekeeping,
however, the executive branch does not appear to give adequate
consideration to other factors articulated by U.S. policy that seeks to*

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-97-59
     TITLE:  U.N. Peacekeeping: Status of Long-Standing Operations and 
             U.S. Interests in Supporting Them
      DATE:  04/08/97
   SUBJECT:  International organizations
             International cooperation
             International relations
             Foreign governments
             Foreign policies
             Cost effectiveness analysis
             United Nations military forces
IDENTIFIER:  Middle East
             Cyprus
             Angola
             Kashmir
             Western Sahara
             Israel
             Syria
             Iraq
             Kuwait
             Persian Gulf
             Egypt
             India
             Pakistan
             Morocco
             Algeria
             Lebanon
             Greece
             Turkey
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to the Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House
of Representatives

April 1997

U.N.  PEACEKEEPING - STATUS OF
LONG-STANDING OPERATIONS AND U.S. 
INTERESTS IN SUPPORTING THEM

GAO/NSIAD-97-59

U.N.  Peacekeeping

(711178)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  FrentePOLISARIO - Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia
     el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro (Popular Front for the Liberation of
     Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro)
  MINURSO - U.N.  Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
  PDD-25 - Presidential Decision Directive-25
  PLO - Palestine Liberation Organization
  UNAVEM - U.N.  Angola Verification Mission
  UNDOF - U.N.  Disengagement Observer Force
  UNFICYP - U.N.  Force in Cyprus
  UNIFIL - U.N.  Interim Force in Lebanon
  UNITA - Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola
     (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
  UNIKOM - U.N.  Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission
  UNMOGIP - U.N.  Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
  UNTSO - U.N.  Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine
  FrentePOLISARIO -

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-276145

April 9, 1997

The Honorable Benjamin Gilman
Chairman, Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives

Dear Mr.  Chairman: 

The cost and effectiveness of U.N.  peacekeeping operations and their
relationship to U.S.  interests have emerged as major issues in
recent years.  Most of the over 40 peacekeeping operations undertaken
since 1948 lasted only a few years, but some have continued for years
with no clear end point in sight.  Although the United States was
assessed by the United Nations for peacekeeping operations at a rate
of about 31 percent in 1996, current law limits payment of the U.S. 
contribution to 25 percent.\1 In response to your request, this
report discusses (1) the budgetary and personnel cost of the eight
long-standing U.N.  peacekeeping operations,\2 (2) whether these
operations are carrying out their mandates, (3) the status of efforts
to resolve the underlying conflicts, and (4) the reasons the
executive branch continues to support these operations.  Table 1
shows the eight operations, the years they were authorized, and their
locations. 



                                Table 1
                
                    Long-standing U.N. Peacekeeping
                               Operations

Name                       Year authorized      Location
----------------------  ----------------------  ----------------------
U.N. Truce Supervision           1948           Israel, Egypt,
 Organization (UNTSO)                            Lebanon, Syria
                                                 (Middle East)
U.N. Military Observer           1949           India, Pakistan
 Group in India and                              (Kashmir)
 Pakistan (UNMOGIP)
U.N. Force in Cyprus             1964           Cyprus
 (UNFICYP)
U.N. Disengagement               1974           Israel, Syria (Golan
 Observer Force                                  Heights)
 (UNDOF)
U.N. Interim Force in            1978           Lebanon
 Lebanon (UNIFIL)
U.N. Iraq-Kuwait                 1991           Iraq, Kuwait (Persian
 Observer Mission                                Gulf)
 (UNIKOM)
U.N. Angola                     1991\a          Angola
 Verification Mission
 (UNAVEM) II and III
U.N. Mission for the             1991           Western Sahara
 Referendum in Western
 Sahara (MINURSO)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a We evaluated UNAVEM II and III as one operation, as discussed in
our scope and methodology. 


--------------------
\1 Section 404(b)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of
1994-95 (P.L.  103-236) prohibits the use of funds appropriated after
fiscal year 1995 for the payment of U.S.  assessed contributions for
U.N.  peacekeeping operations in an amount greater than 25 percent of
the total of all assessed contributions for an operation. 

\2 "Long-standing" refers to current (ongoing) operations more than 5
years old, as discussed in our scope and methodology.  All dollar
amounts shown in this report are nominal dollar values and have not
been converted to constant dollars to reflect inflation rates since
1948 because U.N.  officials could not allocate the costs of these
operations by year. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

At the direction of the U.N.  Security Council,\3 the United Nations
undertakes peacekeeping operations to help maintain or restore peace
and security in areas of conflict.  Such operations have been
employed most commonly to supervise and maintain cease-fires, assist
in troop withdrawals, and provide buffer zones between opposing
forces.  The main objective of peacekeeping operations, according to
U.N.  and U.S.  policies, is to reduce tensions and provide a limited
period of time for diplomatic efforts to achieve just and lasting
settlements of the underlying conflicts.  U.N.  and U.S.  policies
state that peacekeeping is not--and should not become--a substitute
for peacemaking.\4 These policies (and peacekeeping authorities)
emphasize the connection between peacekeeping and peacemaking and the
limited nature of peacekeeping, stating that the purpose of
peacekeeping is to provide "finite windows of opportunity" for
parties to resolve disputes and begin reconstructing their societies. 
These policies state that peacekeeping operations should not be
open-ended commitments, but instead, should be linked to concrete
political solutions, and recommend that operations deploy only after
agreed settlement plans are in place. 

In recognition of the fact that U.N.  and U.S.  policies were not
clear regarding the factors to consider when deciding whether to
undertake new or extend existing peacekeeping operations, in recent
years both U.N.  and U.S.  policies have become much more focused on
this issue.  Both now call for disciplined and coherent choices about
which new and existing peacekeeping operations to support.  U.S. 
policy concerning these matters is discussed in Presidential Decision
Directive-25 (PDD-25),\5 the 1996 U.S.  National Security Strategy,
and other executive branch documents, such as the President's 1995
and subsequent annual reports to Congress on peacekeeping.  Among
other things, U.S.  policy requires rigorous scrutiny of existing
operations when they are reviewed by the U.N.  Security Council to
assess the value (to U.S.  interests) of continuing them.\6 U.S. 
policy suggests that U.S.  officials consider voting against
long-standing operations that are failing to carry out their
mandates, in order to free U.N.  resources for other operations. 


--------------------
\3 Under article 24 of the U.N.  charter, the Security Council is
primarily responsible for maintaining international peace and
security.  The Council consists of 5 permanent and 10 nonpermanent
members.  The latter are elected for 2-year terms by the General
Assembly, with five new members elected every year.  Decisions on all
substantive matters require nine affirmative votes and must have the
concurrence of all five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States). 

\4 The United Nations defines peacemaking as actions to resolve
conflicts by peaceful means such as mediation and negotiation. 

\5 PDD-25, a classified document, was issued in May 1994.  An
unclassified summary was issued at the same time. 

\6 Among the factors to be considered in determining broad U.S. 
interests in continuing an operation are whether (1) U.N. 
involvement advances U.S.  interests; (2) there is a threat to or
breach of international peace and security; and (3) the operation has
clear and practical objectives, a mandate appropriate to the mission,
realistic exit criteria, and an identified end point for U.N. 
involvement. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

The eight long-standing operations are deployed in environments where
the underlying conflicts have defied diplomatic resolution, sometimes
for decades, and have become, essentially, costly and open-ended
commitments.  Only two of these operations had successfully carried
out their mandates, while the remaining six either had only partially
carried out their mandates or had not carried them out.  Although all
but one of these operations were undertaken to create stable, secure
environments to assist diplomatic efforts aimed at settling these
underlying conflicts,\7 diplomatic efforts to resolve these conflicts
had stalled in all but one case.  Nevertheless, U.S.  officials
currently see no reasonable alternative to continuing these
operations because they help stabilize conflicts in key areas of the
world. 

The eight operations accounted for about $6 billion (over one-third)
of the $17 billion that the United Nations has spent on peacekeeping
operations since 1948, and continue to account for a substantial
share of current U.N.  peacekeeping budgetary and personnel costs. 
In 1996, for example, they accounted for about 42 percent of the $1.4
billion estimated annual cost of U.N.  peacekeeping and almost 60
percent of the nearly 25,000 troops serving in U.N.  operations
worldwide.  Under current law, the U.S.  share of the estimated
annual cost of these operations for 1996 was about $148 million. 

Our review of U.N.  and U.S.  reports and other information indicates
that the operations in the Golan Heights and Persian Gulf (UNDOF and
UNIKOM) had successfully carried out their mandates and increased
security and stability in their areas of operation.  Operations in
the Middle East, Cyprus, and Angola (UNTSO, UNFICYP, and UNAVEM) had
partially carried out their mandates and made some positive
contributions to stability in their areas of operation.  Operations
in Kashmir, Lebanon, and Western Sahara (UNMOGIP, UNIFIL, and
MINURSO) generally had not carried out their mandates and, according
to U.N.  reports, had contributed marginally to more secure and
stable environments in their areas of operation.  U.N.  and U.S. 
reports, and officials we met with, attributed the six operations'
mixed record of success to a variety of factors, such as lack of
cooperation from the disputing parties and outdated or impractical
mandates.  For example, U.N.  reports identify lack of cooperation by
the parties to the conflict in southern Lebanon as a key factor
keeping the U.N.  operation there from carrying out its mandate. 

Despite repeated calls from the U.N.  Security Council for the
parties to make progress toward settling the underlying conflicts, as
of February 1997, only the conflict in Angola was the subject of
ongoing talks between the disputing parties.\8 Peace talks and other
diplomatic efforts associated with the conflicts in Cyprus, Kashmir,
the Middle East, and Western Sahara had stalled.\9 Only in Angola and
Western Sahara were settlement plans in place before peacekeeping
forces first deployed.  U.N.  and U.S.  officials and experts we met
with attributed the lack of success in settling these conflicts to a
variety of factors, including the weak political will of some
disputing parties and the deeply rooted nature of some of the
conflicts. 

Despite the long-standing operations' cost and mixed performance in
carrying out their mandates, U.S.  policymakers support continuing
these operations because, in their view, they help to stabilize
conflicts that could threaten U.S.  foreign policy objectives.  In
their judgment, ending these operations--or even modifying them
substantially--would risk renewed conflict and damage future
peacemaking efforts.  U.S.  officials told us that some of these
operations probably would not have been initially approved under
current U.S.  and U.N.  peacekeeping policies.  At this time,
however, U.S.  officials see no reasonable alternative to continuing
these operations indefinitely, given their assessment of the
potential harm to U.S.  foreign policy objectives if the underlying
conflicts resumed, balanced against what they consider to be these
operations' relatively moderate cost.  In continuing to support what
have become essentially open-ended commitments to peacekeeping,
however, the executive branch does not appear to give adequate
consideration to other factors articulated by U.S.  policy that seek
to ensure that peacekeeping operations are limited in duration,
linked to concrete political solutions, and have exit criteria and
identified end points for U.N.  involvement. 

This report contains a recommendation that the Secretary of State
take action to begin addressing the issues raised by our analysis. 


--------------------
\7 UNIKOM was deployed to monitor Iraqi compliance with relevant U.N. 
Security Council resolutions, not in support of diplomatic efforts to
end the Persian Gulf conflict. 

\8 Ongoing talks between the disputing parties in Angola support the
implementation of their peace accord. 

\9 The Persian Gulf conflict was never the subject of peace talks. 


   COST OF LONG-STANDING
   OPERATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

U.N.  and U.S.  financial reports and other documents show that the
eight long-standing U.N.  peacekeeping operations account for about
$6 billion (35 percent) of the $17 billion in total costs incurred by
U.N.  peacekeeping operations since 1948, when the first one (UNTSO)
was deployed in the Middle East to monitor the cease-fire after the
first Arab-Israeli War.  Partly because of their longevity, 5 of
these operations are among the 10 most costly U.N.  operations ever
undertaken.  Table 2 shows the eight long-standing operations' total
cost since 1948. 



                                Table 2
                
                  Long-standing Operations' Total Cost
                   since 1948 (through December 1996)

                        (Dollars in millions\a)

Peacekeeping operation        Location                      Total cost
----------------------------  ----------------------------  ----------
UNTSO                         Middle East                         $491
UNMOGIP                       Kashmir                              105
UNFICYP                       Cyprus                               840
UNDOF                         Golan Heights                        662
UNIFIL                        Lebanon                            2,661
UNIKOM                        Iraq-Kuwait                          312
UNAVEM                        Angola                               757
MINURSO                       Western Sahara                       244
======================================================================
Total                                                           $6,072
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a All dollar amounts shown in this table are nominal dollar values. 
They have not been converted to constant dollars to reflect inflation
rates since 1948 because U.N.  officials could not allocate the costs
of these operations by year. 

Source:  Compiled by GAO from U.N.  and U.S.  budget documents. 

The eight long-standing operations also account for a substantial
share of current U.N.  peacekeeping budgetary and personnel costs. 
In 1996, for example, they accounted for about $588 million (42
percent) of the
$1.4 billion estimated annual cost of U.N.  peacekeeping operations
and 14,897 (almost 60 percent) of the 24,919 troops serving in U.N. 
operations worldwide as of December 31, 1996.  At the 25-percent rate
the executive branch is authorized to pay under current law, the U.S. 
share of the estimated annual cost of these operations will be about
$148 million.  The State Department said the size and cost of most
long-standing operations has been reduced over time and attributed
some of these reductions to the implementation of PDD-25.  Table 3
shows the number of U.S.  and other personnel assigned to each
operation, its current estimated annual cost, and the U.S.  share of
these costs. 



                                Table 3
                
                Number of Personnel and Estimated Annual
                 Costs for Long-standing Operations (as
                           of December 1996)

                         (Dollars in millions)

                                            Military
                                           personnel     Annual cost
                                          ------------  --------------
                                                                  U.S.
                                                                share\
Peacekeeping operation                     Total  U.S.   Total       a
----------------------------------------  ------  ----  ------  ------
UNTSO\b                                      163     4     $27      $7
UNMOGIP\b                                     45     0       7       2
UNFICYP                                    1,197     0    24\c       6
UNDOF                                      1,046     0      32       8
UNIFIL                                     4,505     0     126      32
UNIKOM                                     1,102    11    17\d       4
UNAVEM                                     6,608     0     323      81
MINURSO                                      231    15      32    8\\e
======================================================================
Total                                     14,897    30    $588    $148
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Calculated at the 25-percent rate currently authorized by U.S. 
law for payment of assessments for U.N.  peacekeeping.  The United
Nations, however, continues to assess the United States at the rate
of about 31 percent and considers the difference as arrears owed to
the United Nations by the United States. 

\b UNTSO and UNMOGIP are financed through the U.N.  regular budget,
not peacekeeping assessments.  The U.S.  assessment for the U.N. 
regular budget is 25 percent. 

\c Since June 1993, the Cypriot and Greek governments have paid about
half of the annual cost of this operation.  This figure is the net
U.N.  cost. 

\d Since November 1993, the Kuwait government has paid two-thirds of
the annual cost of this operation.  This figure is the net U.N. 
cost. 

\e Although the United States has voted in the U.N.  Security Council
to reauthorize MINURSO since its inception, the executive branch has
not secured funding for this operation since fiscal
year 1994.  Congress ordered the recision of funds appropriated for
fiscal year 1995 and did not approve a supplemental budget request
for fiscal year 1996 that included funds for MINURSO.  The executive
branch did not request funds for MINURSO in its fiscal year 1997
budget, but has requested funds in its fiscal year 1998 budget for
both the current MINURSO assessment, and the arrears accumulated
since 1995 due to its failure to pay the U.N.  assessment for this
operation. 

Source:  Compiled by GAO from U.N.  and U.S.  budget documents. 


   PROGRESS IN CARRYING OUT
   MANDATES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

Two of the eight operations--UNDOF and UNIKOM--generally have carried
out their mandates and helped to maintain stability in their areas of
operation.  Three other operations--UNTSO, UNFICYP, and UNAVEM--have
partially carried out their mandates and made some positive
contributions in their areas of operation.  The remaining three
operations--UNMOGIP, UNIFIL, and MINURSO--generally have not carried
out their mandates and, according to U.N.  reports, had contributed
only marginally to more secure and stable environments in their areas
of operation.  Our assessment of these operations was based on an
extensive review of U.N.  and U.S.  reports, expert studies, and
interviews with U.N., U.S., and foreign government officials. 

In commenting on this report, the U.S.  Mission to the United Nations
noted that categorizing the long-standing operations as "successful,"
"partially successful," or "not successful," based on the degree to
which they carried out their mandates, was a simple, understandable
concept.  However, such a categorization may not be fully adequate to
capture the multidimensional, complex interests involved in each
operation.  We agree with the observation that whether these
operations are carrying out their mandates is but one measure--albeit
an important one--of enduring U.S.  interests in supporting them, and
we discuss the broader contextual issues regarding U.S.  foreign
policy interests in a subsequent section of this report. 


      OPERATIONS GENERALLY
      CARRYING OUT THEIR MANDATES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1


         UNDOF
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1.1

UNDOF was established in May 1974 to monitor the buffer zone between
Israeli and Syrian forces on the Golan Heights established under the
U.S.-negotiated disengagement agreement following the 1973
Arab-Israeli War.\10 Its mandate is to help maintain the cease-fire
between Israel and Syria, supervise the initial disengagement of
Israeli and Syrian forces, and supervise the areas of separation and
arms limitation on the Golan Heights.  Its 6-month mandate has been
renewed each November and May since 1974. 

UNDOF performs its tasks with the cooperation of the parties and
helps maintain stability and calm in its area of operations,
according to U.N.  and U.S.  reports and officials and experts. 
UNDOF personnel man checkpoints and observation posts and conduct
vehicle and foot patrols along predetermined routes within the area
of separation.  The force establishes temporary outposts and conducts
additional patrols from time to time to perform specific tasks. 
Every 2 weeks, UNDOF inspects arms and force levels in the areas of
limitation.  These inspections, carried out with the assistance of
Israeli and Syrian liaison officers, generally have proceeded
smoothly with the cooperation of both parties, although both parties
restrict the movement of UNDOF personnel in some areas.  About 80
UNTSO military observers function as an integral part of UNDOF (as
discussed below).  Since 1992, UNDOF has been streamlined twice,
resulting in a 20 percent reduction in both its size and cost. 


--------------------
\10 U.N.  Security Council resolution 350 (1974). 


         UNIKOM
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1.2

UNIKOM was established in April 1991 to monitor the demilitarized
zone between Iraq and Kuwait, established after the Gulf War, and the
Khawr 'Abd Allah waterway.\11 Its mandate is to monitor and deter
violations of the Iraq-Kuwait border and observe any hostile action
between Iraq and Kuwait.  After 1993, UNIKOM was reinforced and
authorized to take action to prevent or redress small-scale
violations of the border or demilitarized zone.\12 Its mandate
continues indefinitely until all five permanent members of the U.N. 
Security Council agree to end it. 

The U.N.  Secretary General, U.S.  officials, and experts report that
UNIKOM contributes significantly to the calm that prevails in its
area of operation.  UNIKOM monitors the demilitarized zone, which is
about 200 kilometers long and extends 10 kilometers into Iraq and 5
kilometers into Kuwait, and the 40-kilometer-long Khawr 'Abd Allah
waterway with a combination of patrol and observation bases,
observation points, ground and air patrols, and investigation teams. 
U.N.  officials report that the governments of Iraq and Kuwait
generally cooperate with UNIKOM.  It maintains its headquarters at
Umm Qasr and liaison offices in Baghdad and Kuwait City.  Since 1993,
the Kuwaiti government has paid two-thirds of UNIKOM's annual cost,
and after March 1996, the number troops was reduced by 6 percent. 


--------------------
\11 U.N.  Security Council resolution 687 (1991) established, among
other things, a demilitarized zone along the boundary between Iraq
and Kuwait to be monitored by a U.N.  observer force.  U.N.  Security
Council resolution 689 (1991) approved the U.N.  Secretary General's
plan for establishing UNIKOM. 

\12 U.N.  Security Council resolution 806 (1993). 


      OPERATIONS PARTIALLY
      CARRYING OUT THEIR MANDATES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2


         UNTSO
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2.1

UNTSO was established in May 1948 to supervise the Arab-Israeli truce
in Palestine called for by the U.N.  Security Council following the
first Arab-Israeli War.\13 Subsequently, it has performed a variety
of tasks entrusted to it by the U.N.  Security Council.  These
included supervising the 1949 Arab-Israeli armistice agreements,\14
monitoring the cease-fires near the Suez Canal and in the Golan
Heights after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and providing experienced
personnel to support the deployment of other peacekeeping operations. 
It currently helps UNDOF and UNIFIL to implement their mandates by
providing observers to help man observation posts and conduct patrols
and inspections.\15

In the Golan Heights, about 80 UNTSO observers, under the supervision
and operational control of the UNDOF commander, man 11 observation
posts located in the area of separation maintained by UNDOF and in
the vicinity of the lines on both sides; they also inspect the areas
of arms and forces limitation every 2 weeks.  UNTSO generally has
received cooperation from Syrian and Israeli forces in carrying out
these inspections and has helped UNDOF keep its area of operation
calm. 

In southern Lebanon, about 60 UNTSO observers, under the operational
control of the UNIFIL commander, man five observation posts along the
Lebanese side of the 1949 armistice line and operate four mobile
teams in the UNIFIL area of operation under Israeli control where
UNIFIL units are not deployed.  At these locations, UNTSO observes
and monitors the situation but, like UNIFIL (discussed later), has
had limited success in ensuring peace and stability in its area of
operation.\16


--------------------
\13 U.N.  Security Council resolution 50 (1948) called for the
cessation of hostilities in Palestine and decided that the truce
should be monitored by the U.N.  Mediator, with the assistance of a
group of military observers. 

\14 Four armistice agreements were established between Israel and
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.  Israel denounced the agreement
with Egypt in 1956 and the remaining agreements after the 1967
Arab-Israeli War.  The U.N.  Secretary General rejected Israel's
unilateral actions, however, and held that the agreements remained in
force.  The two agreements between Israel, Egypt, and Jordan were
ended by the 1979 Egypt-Israel and 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaties. 
At Egypt's request, however, UNTSO continues to maintain a small post
in the Sinai.  Its office in Amman, Jordan, was closed in 1995. 

\15 UNTSO is funded through the U.N.  regular budget.  Its mandate is
of indefinite duration, so the U.N.  Security Council does not
regularly review and reauthorize it. 

\16 Various sources, including U.N.  and State and Defense Department
officials, said that UNTSO is generally viewed as overlapping UNDOF,
UNIFIL, and the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai. 
These sources noted, however, that (1) UNTSO is the only operation
currently authorized to implement the remaining Arab-Israeli
armistice agreements, (2) it operates in areas of southern Lebanon
where UNIFIL is denied access, and (3) its remaining Sinai post is
valued by Egyptian authorities as a symbol of continued U.N. 
involvement in the peace process with Israel.  State Department said
it is discussing ways to streamline UNTSO's administrative structure
with the U.N.  Secretariat and interested member states, and noted
that the number of military observers assigned to UNTSO has been
reduced from 220 to 163 since August 1995. 


         UNFICYP
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2.2

UNFICYP was established in March 1964 to help end violence between
the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities on the island of Cyprus.\17
Its mandate is to (1) prevent the recurrence of fighting between the
two communities and (2) help maintain law and order and return normal
conditions to the island.  A mediator, designated by the U.N. 
Secretary General, was to promote an overall settlement to the
dispute.\18 Since 1964, UNFICYP's mandate has been periodically
renewed, usually for 6 months. 

Since the 1974 Turkish invasion,\19 UNFICYP has helped prevent the
recurrence of fighting between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot
communities, and the situation has remained generally calm, according
to U.N.  reports and U.S officials.  The parties cooperate with
UNFICYP to a reasonable degree, allowing the force to maintain a
180-kilometer-long buffer zone between the cease-fire lines.\20
UNFICYP uses observation posts and patrols to keep the cease-fire
lines and buffer zone under constant surveillance.  Despite the
absence of major fighting since 1974, violence has nonetheless broken
out on several occasions.  In August 1996, for example, a large
number of civilians entered the buffer zone from both sides, and the
resulting violence left 1 dead and over 74 injured, including 12
UNFICYP personnel.  U.N and U.S.  officials criticized both Greek and
Turkish Cypriot authorities for allowing the incident to occur,
noting that UNFICYP personnel were not equipped for riot control. 

From the beginning of the Cyprus operation, the U.N.  Secretary
General has reported that the presence of foreign troops on Cyprus,
the close proximity of opposing troops along some parts of the buffer
zone, and the influx of arms and military equipment made it more
difficult for UNFICYP to carry out its mandate.  In various
resolutions, the U.N.  Security Council has expressed concern about
these issues, and has urged the parties to reduce force levels and
defense spending.  U.N.  reports show that, despite its best efforts,
UNFICYP has been unable to (1) reduce the number of foreign troops on
Cyprus, (2) convince the parties to withdraw from all positions in
close proximity to the buffer zone,\21 or (3) influence the parties
to slow the modernization of their military forces.  In a June 1996
report on UNFICYP, for example, the U.N.  Secretary General said that
"[d]espite continuous efforts by UNFICYP, no progress had been made
[toward reducing force levels and defense spending on Cyprus].  On
the contrary, both sides have continued to improve their military
capabilities .  .  .  ."\22 U.N.  and U.S.  officials report that the
parties react to improvements in the other's military
capabilities,\23 thus increasing tensions on the island.\24 In a
February 7, 1997, letter to Congress,\25

President Clinton said that ".  .  .  for any [peace] initiative to
bear fruit, the parties must agree to steps that will reduce tensions
and make direct negotiations possible."\26

UNFICYP's efforts to restore normal conditions to Cyprus have been
only partially successful.  It has delivered humanitarian aid to
Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in northern Cyprus and Turkish
Cypriots living in southern Cyprus.  It also has conducted
"humanitarian reviews" that focus on improving living conditions for
these minorities.  According to State Department officials, Greek
Cypriot authorities have agreed to implement UNFICYP's
recommendations for improving living conditions in southern Cyprus,
while Turkish Cypriot authorities have been less cooperative in
improving conditions in the north.  However, UNFICYP has not
increased substantially informal contacts between the two
communities, despite repeated calls from the U.N.  Security Council
and others to increase such contacts as a means of reducing tensions
and promoting understanding. 

Despite UNFICYP's presence, the political situation on Cyprus has
deteriorated since 1964.  Turkish Cypriot authorities have
established a separate government and declared their sovereignty,\27
established a de facto international frontier, and insisted on a
unilateral right to secession--moving Cyprus further away from a
solution that reaffirms the sovereignty of a federated Cypriot state,
as called for in U.N.  Security Council resolutions.  External
involvement in the conflict has increased despite U.N.  efforts,
culminating in the 1974 Turkish intervention in northern Cyprus. 
According to U.N.  Security Council resolutions, U.N.  reports, a
1993 study, and Defense and State Department and foreign government
officials, member states are concerned about the operation's
effectiveness and cost.\28


--------------------
\17 U.N.  Security Council resolution 186 (1964). 

\18 According to U.N.  document S/5653, dated April 11, 1964,
UNFICYP's operations and the mediator's activities were separate but
complementary.  According to a former U.S.  ambassador to Cyprus, for
example, the mediator frequently took the initiative with the parties
to seek arrangements for more normal conditions of life on the
island.  After mediation efforts broke down in 1966, the U.N. 
Secretary General asked his special representative for Cyprus to
employ his good offices to seek a resolution to the conflict.  In
1975, the Security Council, by resolution 367 (1975), asked the
Secretary General to renew his efforts to resolve the conflict. 

\19 After a coup d'etat by Greek Cypriots thought to favor union with
Greece, Turkey invaded northern Cyprus in support of Turkish
Cypriots.  UNFICYP was directed to supervise the cease-fire lines and
de facto buffer zone established between the two sides.  The two
sides have been unable to reach a formal cease-fire agreement and,
according to U.N.  reports, this has significantly complicated
UNFICYP's task. 

\20 The buffer zone varies in width from less than 20 meters in
Nicosia to some 7 kilometers near Athienou.  It covers about 3
percent of Cyprus, including some of the most valuable agricultural
land.  UNFICYP provides security for civilians of both communities
living or working in the buffer zone. 

\21 In May 1989, UNFICYP reached an agreement with both sides whereby
they "unmanned" their positions and ceased their patrols in certain
sensitive locations in Nicosia.  The opposing troops were thus moved
further apart and, as a result, the number of incidents in Nicosia
was reduced.  Subsequent attempts to extend the agreement to cover
all areas where the two sides are in close proximity to each other
have failed. 

\22 U.N.  Secretary General report S/1996/411, June 7, 1996, p.  3. 

\23 According to U.N.  and U.S.  officials and a peacekeeping
journal, Cyprus has become the one of the most densely militarized
areas in the world. 

\24 For example, the Cypriot government's recent decision to purchase
Russian-made SA-10 antiaircraft missile systems prompted the Turkish
government to threaten to use military force to prevent the
installation of those systems. 

\25 Public Law 95-384 (22 U.S.C.  2373 (c)) requires the President to
submit to Congress periodic reports on progress toward a negotiated
settlement of the Cyprus conflict. 

\26 The Secretary of State and the Director of the State Department's
Office of Southern European Affairs recently made similar public
statements.




\27 On November 15, 1983, Turkish Cypriot authorities proclaimed the
"Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus." Only Turkey recognizes this
arrangement. 

\28 Until June 1993, UNFICYP was financed entirely by voluntary
contributions.  Continual deficits prevented timely payment of bills
presented by troop-contributing governments.  Citing the
deteriorating financial situation and frustration over the lack of
progress toward a lasting political solution to the problem on
Cyprus, a number of governments withdrew their forces in 1992 and
1993, bringing UNFICYP's continued existence into question. 
Eventually, other governments contributed troops and the Security
Council, by resolution 831 (1993), brought UNFICYP under the regular
peacekeeping assessment process.  During this period, UNFICYP was
reduced in size by 28 percent.  Since that time, U.N.  assessments
have been used to pay for the portion of UNFICYP's costs not covered
by voluntary contributions.  Together, Greece and Cyprus make
voluntary contributions that cover almost half UNFICYP's annual cost. 


         UNAVEM II AND III
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2.3

UNAVEM II was authorized in May 1991 to help implement a negotiated
settlement of the Angolan civil war.\29 Its mandate was to verify the
implementation the May 1991 peace settlement\30 by (1) monitoring the
cease-fire between Angolan government and Uniao Nacional para a
Independencia Total de Angola\31 (UNITA) forces and (2) observing and
verifying national elections,\32 held in September 1992.  After UNITA
rejected the election results, however, civil war resumed.  After the
November 1994 signing of the Lusaka Accords and the implementation of
a cease-fire between government and UNITA forces, UNAVEM III was
authorized in February 1995 to assist the parties in implementing
this new settlement.\33 Its mandate is to supervise, control, and
verify the (1) cease-fire, (2) quartering and disarming of government
and UNITA forces, (3) integration of government and UNITA military
forces, and (4) formation of a unified national government.\34

UNAVEM III's efforts to help implement the Lusaka Accords have been
only partially successful, according to U.N.  and U.S.  reports and
officials and other sources, largely because the parties have not
fully complied with the accords or fully cooperated with the United
Nations.  In October 1996, for example, the U.N.  Secretary General
reported that overall progress toward implementing the accords was
disappointing.  The cease-fire generally was holding, although there
were a high number of violations in some provinces, and government
troops generally had withdrawn to their barracks.  Over 63,000 UNITA
troops had reported to 15 quartering areas, but overall, fewer
weapons and ammunition were surrendered than expected.  Little
progress had been made toward the formation of an integrated armed
force, as called for by a framework agreement reached by the
government and UNITA in May 1996.  UNAVEM III and others continued to
clear land mines, but their operations were hindered by restrictions
placed on them by UNITA,\35 and casualties continued unabated.\36
Plans to create a unified national government have been postponed as
a result of disagreements over the future status of the UNITA leader
and other issues.  According to Defense Department officials, both
sides claim that
UNAVEM III is biased against them, and factions on both sides have
used this suspicion to undermine the peace process. 

Since early 1996, the Security Council has at times reauthorized
UNAVEM III's mandate for short intervals (1 or 2 months) in an
attempt pressure the parties to improve their compliance, and had
warned the parties that the United Nations would not remain in Angola
indefinitely.  UNAVEM III's mandate was scheduled to end by February
1997, but the U.N.  Security Council reauthorized UNAVEM III's
mandate for 1 month in an attempt to pressure the parties to form a
unified national government.\37 The resolution stressed the need for
the parties, in particular UNITA, to take urgent and decisive steps
to comply with their commitments to ensure the continued involvement
of the international community in the peace process.  Member states
have expressed concerns about the slow pace of implementation of the
Lusaka Accords and warned that the international community cannot
support indefinitely a peace process that is not fully supported by
the parties themselves.  U.S.  officials expect the operation to
continue through August 1997 because of delays in implementing some
elements of the settlement and the time needed to withdraw troops.\38


--------------------
\29 U.N.  Security Council resolution 626 (1988) first established
UNAVEM to monitor the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.  This
mandate was carried out successfully.  U.N.  Security Council
resolution 696 (1991) established a new mandate for the operation and
renamed it UNAVEM II. 

\30 Known as the Acordos de Paz para Angola (Peace Accords for
Angola) or the Bicesse Accords. 

\31 National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. 

\32 U.N.  Security Council resolution 747 (1992) enlarged UNAVEM II's
mandate to include observing and verifying elections in Angola. 

\33 U.N.  Security Council resolution 976 (1995) established a new
mandate for the operation and renamed it UNAVEM III. 

\34 According to an annex to the U.N.  mandate, "control" implies the
act of directing, regulating, verifying, and monitoring.  It does not
imply the use of force. 

\35 According to the State Department, mine clearing operations also
were hindered by confusion and misunderstanding resulting from the
Angolan government's attempt to bring all mine clearing activities
under a single office. 

\36 The United Nations estimates that there are 10 million land mines
in Angola, which suffers from one of the highest per capita mine
accident rates in the world.  There are an estimated 70,000 amputees,
and an executive branch official testified in 1996 that land mines
killed as many as 200 people every week. 

\37 U.N.  Security Council resolution 1098 (1997). 

\38 According to U.N.  and U.S.  officials, a smaller follow-on U.N. 
operation will be needed until the end of 1997 to complete the
implementation of the Lusaka Accords and to consolidate the gains
made so far in the peace process.  In a February 1997 report
(S/1997/115), the U.N.  Secretary General said that the main
activities of this operation, in addition to carrying out residual
military tasks, should focus on political, police, and human rights
issues; humanitarian activities; and public information programs. 


      OPERATIONS GENERALLY NOT
      CARRYING OUT THEIR MANDATES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3


         UNMOGIP
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3.1

UNMOGIP grew out of the U.N.  Commission for India and Pakistan,
which was established in January 1948 to provide its good offices to
the governments of India and Pakistan to facilitate restoring peace
and order and holding a plebiscite on the question of Kashmir\39
joining India or Pakistan.\40 In April 1948, the U.N.  Security
Council recommended the use of military observers to supervise the
cease-fire.\41 The first group of observers did not arrive until
January 1949, after a cease-fire was established.  In July 1949, this
group of observers, which formed the nucleus of UNMOGIP, was directed
to supervise the cease-fire line established by the Karachi agreement
between India and Pakistan.  In March 1951, after the U.N. 
Commission was ended,\42 UNMOGIP was established as an autonomous
operation to continue supervising the cease-fire in Kashmir.\43 Its
mandate is to observe and report, investigate complaints from the
parties of cease-fire violations along the line of control in
Kashmir, and submit its findings to each party and the U.N. 
Secretary General.\44

UNMOGIP's ability to carry out its mandate has been affected by two
major conflicts between India and Pakistan.  In early August 1965,
large-scale fighting broke out along the cease-fire line in Kashmir
and eventually spread south to the India-Pakistan border.  The two
sides agreed to a cease-fire and withdrew their forces to the
positions they held before hostilities began, and UNMOGIP resumed its
tasks.  At the end of 1971, large-scale fighting again broke out
between India and Pakistan.  The 1972 Simla agreement ended this
conflict and established new cease-fire lines. 

UNMOGIP has had limited success in carrying out its mandate since
1972.  According to U.N.  reports and U.S.  officials, UNMOGIP has
been unable since that time to monitor or investigate complaints
fully, or to keep the Security Council fully informed of developments
related to the observance of the cease-fire.  Pakistani military
authorities have continued to lodge complaints with UNMOGIP about
cease-fire violations, but, beginning in 1972, the Indian government
took the position that UNMOGIP's mandate had lapsed.\45 Since then,
the Indian government has not cooperated with UNMOGIP or lodged any
complaints with it, and Indian military authorities have restricted
UNMOGIP's activities on the Indian side of the line of control.\46
UNMOGIP's 45 military observers, according to U.N.  reports, observe,
to the extent possible, and report on the strict observance of the
cease-fire along the 500-mile line of control, about half of which is
in very high mountains and is very difficult to access. 

According to a U.N.  report and State and Defense Department
officials, UNMOGIP's presence has played only a marginal role in
defusing the tense situation between India and Pakistan, two presumed
nuclear powers.  U.N.  and U.S.  officials told us that UNMOGIP has
had limited effectiveness in preventing the escalation of hostilities
in Kashmir and was not in a position to prevent two India-Pakistan
wars in that region.  U.N.  officials maintain that UNMOGIP's role is
not to prevent war--only to monitor and report on cease-fire
violations along the line of control. 


--------------------
\39 Officially known as the State of Jammu and Kashmir. 

\40 U.N.  Security Council resolution 39 (1948). 

\41 U.N.  Security Council resolution 47 (1948). 

\42 Security Council resolution 47 (1948) envisaged three related but
distinct steps:  a cease-fire, a truce period during which India and
Pakistan would withdraw their forces from the area, and (finally)
consultations to establish the conditions for holding a plebiscite. 
No agreement could be reached on the second and third objectives and,
after it became clear that mediation efforts had been exhausted, the
Security Council adopted resolution 80 (1950) by which it decided to
end the U.N.  Commission for India and Pakistan. 

\43 U.N.  Security Council resolution 91 (1951). 

\44 UNMOGIP is funded through the U.N.  regular budget.  Its mandate
is of indefinite duration, so the U.N.  Security Council does not
regularly review and reauthorize it. 

\45 The Indian government's position is that UNMOGIP's mandate
applied only to the line of control that existed prior to the 1971
war--not to the line of control established thereafter. 

\46 Indian authorities, however, have continued to provide
accommodation, transport, and other facilities to UNMOGIP. 


         UNIFIL
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3.2

UNIFIL was established in March 1978 to assist in restoring peace in
southern Lebanon after the Israeli invasion.\47 Its mandate is to (1)
confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, (2)
restore international peace and security in southern Lebanon, and (3)
assist the Lebanese government in reestablishing its effective
authority in southern Lebanon.  Its 6-month mandate has been renewed
each January and July since 1978. 

UNIFIL maintains checkpoints on principal roads, observation posts to
monitor movement in its area of operations, and posts that combine
control and observation functions.  Unarmed UNTSO military observers,
under the operational control of the UNIFIL commander, man five
observation posts and patrol in the area under Israeli control (where
UNIFIL has been unable to deploy).  The mountain terrain in UNIFIL's
area of operations is harsh and rugged, making observation and
movement difficult. 

According to U.N.  reports and U.N., State and Defense Department,
and foreign government officials, UNIFIL generally has been unable to
carry out its mandate.  U.N.  reports consistently state that
"UNIFIL's mandate, contained in Security Council resolution 425
(1978) and reaffirmed by subsequent resolutions, remained
unfulfilled."\48 Israeli forces remain in southern Lebanon, occupying
about 10 percent of Lebanon's territory, and have invaded twice, in
1982 and 1993.  The Israeli military has not allowed UNIFIL to deploy
into the "security zone" established north of the Israel-Lebanon
border.  UNIFIL has been unable to restore peace and security in
southern Lebanon, which remains the site of intense conflict between
Israeli forces and their allies and groups like Hizbollah, an
Iranian-supported terrorist organization.  In April 1996, for
example, Hizbollah launched rocket attacks on settlements in northern
Israel from sites in UNIFIL's area of operation.  Subsequent Israeli
artillery fire killed more than 120 civilians, including more than
100 seeking shelter in a UNIFIL compound.  UNIFIL has been unable to
assist in restoring Lebanese government authority in southern
Lebanon, which is controlled by Israel and its allies and Hizbollah
or other Shiite groups. 

According to U.N.  and U.S.  reports and officials and experts,
UNIFIL endeavors, to the best of its ability, to prevent its area of
operations from being used for hostile activities and to protect
civilians caught in the conflict.  According to Defense Department
and U.N.  officials and other experts, UNIFIL has had a limited
effect on the security situation in southern Lebanon because the
belligerents are not (or are only slightly) restrained by UNIFIL's
presence.  Some officials and experts observed that UNIFIL's mandate
is one-dimensional because it only addresses the Israel-Lebanon
component of the conflict--it had ignored the former conflict between
Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)\49 and ignores
the current conflict between Israel and Hizbollah.  U.N.  reports and
officials state that UNIFIL has no authority to prevent Lebanese
forces, including Hizbollah, from resisting Israel's occupation of
southern Lebanon.  UNIFIL was reduced in size by 10 percent between
1992 and 1993 and by a further 10 percent between 1995 and 1996. 

Although not part of its mandate, UNIFIL helps the local civilian
population if they are subject to harassment and, subject to
available resources, provides humanitarian assistance, medical and
dental care and supplies, water, food, fuel, electricity, engineering
work, and escorts for farmers.  According to U.N.  and U.S. 
officials and experts, withdrawing UNIFIL would have the greatest
effect on local civilians, who would lose the humanitarian and
medical assistance UNIFIL provides, and would create a political and
military vacuum that would likely be filled by Hizbollah. 


--------------------
\47 U.N.  Security Council resolution 425 (1978). 

\48 See, for example, the January 1996 report of the U.N.  Secretary
General on UNIFIL for July 20, 1995, to January 22, 1996 (S/1996/45). 

\49 Southern Lebanon became the site of intense conflict between PLO
and Israeli forces after armed PLO elements arrived from Jordan in
the early 1970s and the 1975-76 Lebanese civil war left the PLO as
the dominant force in the area.  PLO attacks on Israel from bases in
southern Lebanon sparked the March 1978 Israeli invasion that
precipitated the establishment of UNIFIL.  Most PLO forces were
withdrawn from the area in 1993. 


         MINURSO
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3.3

MINURSO was established in April 1991 to help settle the conflict
between Moroccan and tribal forces in Western Sahara, a former
Spanish colony.\50

Under the settlement plan accepted by both sides, its mandate was to
monitor and verify the cease-fire between Moroccan and Frente Popular
para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro\51 (Frente
POLISARIO) forces,\52

verify the reduction of Moroccan troops in Western Sahara, monitor
the confinement of Moroccan and Frente POLISARIO troops in designated
locations, ensure the release of all political prisoners or
detainees, oversee the exchange of prisoners of war, implement a
refugee repatriation program, identify and register voters, organize
and ensure a free referendum on whether Western Sahara should join
Morocco or become an independent state, and proclaim the results. 

Due to the parties' divergent views on key elements of the settlement
plan, MINURSO was unable to implement its full mandate.  Instead,
MINURSO was limited to identifying voters, monitoring local police
and ensuring security and order at voter identification and
registration sites, and verifying the cease-fire.  According to U.N. 
and U.S.  officials and reports and other studies, MINURSO has made
limited progress toward carrying out the first part of its reduced
mandate because the parties were unable to agree on procedures for
voter identification (eligibility) or conducting the referendum.  In
May 1996, the U.N.  Security Council suspended the referendum process
and some other elements of MINURSO's operations and ordered a
reduction in the number of military and civilian staff,\53 but
directed it to continue to monitor the cease-fire between Moroccan
and Frente POLISARIO forces.  According to U.N.  and U.S.  reports,
the voter registration and referendum processes have been suspended
because of a lack of cooperation from Moroccan and Frente POLISARIO
authorities. 

MINURSO continues to monitor the cease-fire, which has largely been
respected by the parties.  According to the State Department, the
maintenance of this cease-fire has helped reduce tensions between
Algeria (which supports Frente POLISARIO) and Morocco and the risk of
broader instability in North Africa.  However, recent threats made by
some Frente POLISARIO leaders to resume fighting if there was no
progress toward a political settlement indicate the frailty of the
cease-fire.  The State Department has informed both parties that the
United States will not support further renewal of MINURSO in its
present form without significant progress toward a political
settlement.  MINURSO's critics say that continued U.N.  presence
favors Morocco's de facto occupation of Western Sahara. 


--------------------
\50 U.N.  Security Council resolution 690 (1991). 

\51 Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de
Oro. 

\52 Frente POLISARIO is the military arm of the Sahrawi tribe.  Its
leader is Mohamed Abdelaziz.  Defense Department officials said that
total Frente POLISARIO strength is probably between 1,000 and 3,000
troops.  In contrast, Morocco has about 100,000 troops in Western
Sahara. 

\53 As a result, MINURSO's monthly budget declined from $5.6 million
to $2.7 million. 


   STATUS OF EFFORTS TO RESOLVE
   THE UNDERLYING CONFLICTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

Although their mandates differ in recognition of the particular
circumstances of the underlying conflicts, seven of the eight
long-standing peacekeeping operations originally were deployed in
support of diplomatic efforts to achieve lasting settlements of these
conflicts.\54 U.N.  and U.S.  policies recognize that peacekeeping
has a much greater chance of success when it is linked with ongoing
diplomatic efforts to achieve a settlement and that, ideally, a
settlement plan should be in place before a force deploys.  We found,
however, that most diplomatic efforts aimed at settling the
underlying conflicts associated with the seven operations have
stalled over time.  As of February 1997, only the conflict in Angola
was the subject of ongoing peace talks (which supported the
implementation of the Lusaka Accords).  Talks associated with the
conflicts in Cyprus, Kashmir, Western Sahara, and Syria and Lebanon
in the Middle East had stalled or stalemated, although U.S. 
officials told us that they hoped to restart talks concerning Cyprus
and Syria during 1997.  Also, only in Angola and Western Sahara were
settlement plans in place before U.N.  forces deployed.\55 Table 4
shows which operations had settlement plans when they were deployed
and summarizes the current status of diplomatic efforts to resolve
the underlying conflicts. 



                                     Table 4
                     
                     Status of Diplomatic Efforts Associated
                          With Long-standing Operations

Operatio  Settlement plan in place when
n\a       deployed?                      Status of related peacemaking efforts
--------  -----------------------------  ---------------------------------------
UNTSO     No                              No current U.N.-sponsored
                                         negotiations.\b
                                          U.S.-sponsored negotiations between
                                         Israel and Syria stalled by
                                         territorial and security issues.
                                          U.S.-sponsored Israel-Jordan peace
                                         process concluded.
                                          U.S.-sponsored Israel-Palestinian
                                         peace process in progress.

UNMOGIP   No                              No current U.N.-sponsored
                                         negotiations or efforts to organize a
                                         plebiscite to settle the status of
                                         Kashmir (the U.N. Commission was
                                         ended in 1951).
                                          India rejects U.N. intervention in
                                         the Kashmir issue.
                                          State Department believes prospects
                                         for an eventual political settlement
                                         have improved recently.\c

UNFICYP   No                              U.N.-and U.S.-sponsored negotiations
                                         stalled by fundamental disagreements
                                         over the nature of the post-conflict
                                         government framework and other issues.
                                          U.N., U.S., and foreign government
                                         officials hope to restart talks in
                                         1997.

UNDOF     No                              No current U.N.-sponsored
                                         negotiations.\b
                                          U.S.-sponsored negotiations between
                                         Israel and Syria stalled by territorial
                                         and security issues.
                                          U.S. officials hope to restart talks
                                         in 1997.

UNIFIL    No                              No current U.N.-sponsored
                                         negotiations.\b
                                          Resolution of conflict in southern
                                         Lebanon tied to the resolution of the
                                         Israel-Syria conflict; negotiations to
                                         end that conflict stalled by
                                         territorial and security issues.

UNAVEM    Yes                             Ongoing talks support implementation
                                         of the Lusaka Accords, which provide
                                         the military and political framework
                                         for demobilizing combatants and forming
                                         a unified national government.

MINURSO   Yes                             U.N.-sponsored settlement plan
                                         stalled by seemingly intractable issues
                                         related to voter identification and
                                         eligibility.
                                          Recent attempts to restart direct
                                         talks between Morocco and Frente
                                         POLISARIO proved unsuccessful.
                                          U.N. Secretary General has named a
                                         Special Envoy (former U.S. Secretary of
                                         State James Baker).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a We excluded UNIKOM from this table because, unlike the other
operations, it was not deployed in support of peace talks. 

\b According to the U.S.  Mission to the United Nations, the United
States has requested that the United Nations not sponsor peace talks
between Israel and Syria or Israel and Lebanon. 

\c Recent elections in the Indian-controlled part of Kashmir and
signals from India and Pakistan of readiness to renew high-level
talks have improved prospects for an eventual settlement, according
to the State Department. 

Sources:  Compiled by GAO from information in U.S.  national security
and budget documents, as well as discussions with U.N., U.S., and
foreign government officials and peacekeeping experts. 

Negotiating and implementing political settlements of underlying
conflicts have proved difficult and elusive over the years.  U.N.,
U.S., and other reports, various officials, and peacekeeping experts
attributed the lack of success in settling conflicts to the following
factors: 

First, many of the conflicts involve particularly contentious or
complicated issues that appear intractable given present
circumstances.  Three of the long-standing operations, for example,
are associated with the Arab-Israeli conflict, which has proved to be
particularly difficult and drawn out.  The U.N.  role in negotiations
to settle this dispute is limited, largely because Israel views the
conditions outlined by various U.N.  General Assembly resolutions as
an unacceptable basis for talks.  U.S.-sponsored talks between Israel
and Syria are currently stalled, and some experts regard a settlement
of the Israeli-Syrian conflict as a necessary precursor to resolving
the conflict in southern Lebanon and ending the "cold peace" between
Israel and Egypt. 

Second, most of the conflicts involve intrastate (civil) and ethnic
conflict and unresolved issues related to decolonization.  The
conflicts in Angola, Cyprus, and Lebanon, for example, involve
intrastate conflict.  Angola, Cyprus, Kashmir, Palestine, and Western
Sahara are all former European colonies.  U.N., U.S., and foreign
government officials and scholars said experience suggests that U.N. 
peacekeeping and diplomatic efforts have been relatively less
successful dealing with deep-seated civil and ethnic strife than with
interstate conflict. 

Third, some of the conflicts are part of a larger conflict, and
negotiations to end them do not include all parties with a
substantial stake in or influence on the conflict.  The Greek and
Turkish governments, for example, have not been direct participants
in the talks to end the conflict on Cyprus, although they both are
deeply involved in the conflict and their support and cooperation are
key to achieving a lasting settlement.  Similarly, diplomatic efforts
to settle the conflict in Western Sahara have not directly addressed
tensions between Algeria and Morocco, which play a large role in that
conflict.\56

Fourth, some of the conflicts involve disputing parties that are
weakly committed to achieving a settlement and are not cooperating
fully.  In 1992 and 1994, for example, the U.N.  Secretary General
reported that a "lack of political will" blocked an agreement on
Cyprus that was otherwise within reach.\57 The U.N.  Security Council
and Secretary General and U.S.  and foreign government officials have
made similar statements about the commitment of the parties to the
conflict in Western Sahara to achieving a settlement.  U.N.  and U.S. 
officials and some experts attributed the disputing parties' weak
commitment partly to the failure of third parties to create the
conditions conducive to achieving a negotiated settlement.  They
cite, for example, an apparent reluctance on the part of the U.N. 
Security Council and U.S.  officials to pressure Greece and Turkey to
resolve their differences over Cyprus as contributing to the lack of
progress toward a settlement in that conflict.\58 \59

Some U.N.  and U.S.  officials and experts attributed the failure of
settlement plans in Angola\60 and Western Sahara to the absence of a
post-referendum power-sharing formula.  In Western Sahara, for
example, the "winner take all" nature of the proposed referendum
removed any incentive for the parties to compromise on voter
identification issues. 

In some conflicts, according to U.N.  and U.S.  reports and
officials, foreign government officials, and experts, the
long-standing U.N.  operations themselves may contribute to the
difficulty of achieving settlements by reducing tensions and making
maintenance of the status quo seem more preferable to the parties
than making the difficult choices and compromises necessary to
achieve settlements.  In such cases, one expert noted, peacekeeping
can provide an excuse for the parties not to tackle peacemaking.  The
long-standing U.N.  presence on Cyprus and in Western Sahara
frequently were cited as examples of this phenomenon.\61 U.N.  and
State Department officials said that, during periodic reviews of
long-standing operations, it is appropriate for the U.N.  Security
Council and member states to ask whether these operations have become
part of the underlying problem. 


--------------------
\54 UNIKOM was deployed to monitor Iraqi compliance with relevant
U.N.  Security Council resolutions, not in support of diplomatic
efforts to end the Persian Gulf conflict. 

\55 In should be noted that current U.S.  policy, which recommends
deploying peacekeeping operations only after an agreed settlement
plan is in place, was not in effect when the long-standing operations
were initially authorized and deployed. 

\56 Algeria and Morocco severed diplomatic relations in March 1976,
shortly after the conflict in Western Sahara started, and did not
restore them until May 1988.  Algeria reportedly supports Frente
POLISARIO by providing arms, military training, and logistical
support, and allows the rebels to operate its main logistics base in
southwestern Algeria, near the border with Western Sahara. 

\57 U.N.  Secretary General reports S/24830 (11/19/92) and
S/1994/629. 

\58 One source ascribed the failure of Cyprus talks in 1992, for
example, to the reluctance of the U.N.  Security Council, and
particularly the United States, to press Turkey for concessions when
Turkish air bases were being used to supply humanitarian aid to Iraqi
Kurds (A Global Agenda:  Issues Before the 48th General Assembly of
the United Nations, John Tessitore and Susan Woolfson, ed.,
University Press of America, Inc., 1993). 

\59 Congress has tried to link aid to Turkey to progress on a Cyprus
settlement on several occasions.  After the Turkish invasion of
Cyprus in 1974, for example, Congress placed an embargo on arms
transfers to Turkey.  Later, after the House of Representatives
rejected a partial lifting of the embargo, Turkey retaliated by
closing U.S.  bases.  The U.S.  embargo lasted until 1978.  Congress
has made other attempts in subsequent years to pressure Turkey to
withdraw its troops from Cyprus. 

\60 The reference is to the failure of the 1991 Bicesse Accords.



\61 A January 1994 Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of
Representatives, staff study report, for example, concluded that
"[m]any observers believe that UNFICYP has become part of the problem
rather than part of the solution, and that its presence lessens any
sense of urgency in finding a solution" to the underlying conflict. 


      ROLE OF PEACEKEEPING IN
      REACHING A SETTLEMENT
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1

Some U.N., U.S., and foreign government officials, peacekeeping
experts, and studies have suggested increasing pressure on the
parties to achieve settlements in some of these conflicts by raising
the cost of delay, for example, by increasing the frequency of U.N. 
Security Council review of the peacekeeping operations or by cutting
their size.  Applying pressure to the parties was a consideration in
recent U.N.  Security Council decisions to reduce the number of
military observers assigned to MINURSO, suspend the voter
identification process in Western Sahara, and reauthorize
UNAVEM III for short intervals.  Some officials were leery of
employing this tactic, however, because its ultimate sanction was the
threat of withdrawing the peacekeeping operations.  Sensing that the
international community actually was not prepared to take such steps,
the parties might continue their delays, leaving the United Nations
with two unappealing choices:  backing down from the threatened
withdrawal or actually withdrawing.  One State Department official
said that pressuring the parties in the short run could pressure the
United Nations and key interlocutors in the longer run because, at
some point, the (implied) threat of withdrawal may become
unbelievable.  Additionally, some U.N., U.S., and foreign government
officials and experts doubt that withdrawing forces would increase
either the pace or fruitfulness of associated peace negotiations. 


   WHY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
   SUPPORTS THE LONG-STANDING
   OPERATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

Despite the cost and mixed performance of long-standing operations in
carrying out their mandates, State Department and other U.S. 
national security officials see no reasonable alternative to
continuing them because, in their judgment, these operations advance
U.S.  foreign policy objectives by helping to stabilize and prevent
the recurrence of conflicts in key areas of the world.  In their
view, the economic and military costs associated with such conflicts
would exceed any savings achieved by ending these operations. 
Additionally, in their view, the political cost and risk of modifying
these operations to bring them more into line with current U.N.  and
U.S.  policies is too high to justify the effort.  Because U.S. 
officials have not identified specific exit criteria or end points
for U.N.  involvement, their support for these operations has become,
in essence, an open-ended commitment--a result which U.S.  policy
seeks to avoid. 


      U.S.  OFFICIALS SUPPORT
      THESE OPERATIONS BASED ON
      POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.1

Our review of reports and other documents, and discussions with
Defense and State Department officials, indicates that U.S. 
policymakers support continuing the eight long-standing U.N. 
operations because, in their judgment, they help to stabilize
conflicts in critical regions of the world--the Middle East, the
Persian Gulf, southern Europe, southern Africa, and southwest Asia. 
According to U.S.  documents and officials, the operations in the
Middle East (UNTSO, UNDOF, and UNIFIL) support the U.S.-led Middle
East peace process by reducing tensions and help uphold the security
of Israel, long a key U.S.  foreign policy concern.  Similarly,
according to these sources, UNIKOM helps safeguard Kuwait's borders,
plus two-thirds of the world's known oil reserves, and underscores
the international community's commitment to blocking Iraqi
aggression, while UNFICYP helps prevent an outbreak of conflict on
Cyprus that could draw Greece and Turkey--key North Atlantic Treaty
Organization allies--into war, endangering both peace and the
stability in the region.  Support for the other long-standing
operations was based on similar considerations.\62

U.S.  officials' and some experts' assessment of the value of the
long-standing operations is based on the premise that ending them
could result in renewed conflicts, which would be substantially more
expensive than maintaining these operations, or send the wrong
diplomatic signals to the parties or region, undermining important
diplomatic efforts.  Additionally, U.S.  officials believe that no
regional or other practical alternatives to U.N.  intervention exist
in these cases.\63 In this context, these officials and some experts
view the eight operations as cost-effective alternatives for the U.S. 
government over taking no action, taking unilateral action, or
helping to resolve or rebuild after a more widespread conflict.\64
According to U.S.  and U.N.  documents and officials, foreign
government officials, and some experts, these operations remain
useful, despite their longevity, because they help stabilize
conflicts at a time when their resolution remains impossible.  For
example, according to U.S.  documents and officials, increased
tensions or renewed conflict on Cyprus could spark a costly regional
conflict between Greece and Turkey.  Likewise, according to these
same sources, ending UNMOGIP could increase tensions and the risk of
war between India and Pakistan by appearing to favor India over
Pakistan.  Table 5 summarizes the information we obtained from U.S. 
officials and other sources regarding the U.S.  foreign policy
interests served by continuing the eight operations. 



                                     Table 5
                     
                     U.S. Foreign Policy Interests Served by
                             Long-standing Operations

Operatio
n         U.S. interests served
--------  ----------------------------------------------------------------------
UNTSO      Contributes to Middle East stability by helping to reduce tensions
          between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
           Operates in areas of southern Lebanon where UNIFIL is not deployed.
           Implements the remaining 1949 Arab-Israeli armistice agreements.
           Withdrawing UNTSO might signal reduced international support for the
          Middle East peace process.

UNMOGIP    Contributes to stability in South Asia by helping to reduce tensions
          between India and Pakistan.
           Demonstrates continued U.N. support for settling the Kashmir
          question by peaceful means.

UNFICYP    Contributes to stability in southern Europe by helping to prevent
          civil war on Cyprus and hostilities between Greece and Turkey.
           Withdrawing UNFICYP would increase tensions and could spark a costly
          regional war.
           Encourages continued diplomatic efforts to reunify Cyprus by
          peaceful means.

UNDOF      Contributes to Middle East stability by helping to ease tensions
          between Israel and Syria.
           Withdrawing UNDOF might signal reduced international support for the
          Middle East peace process.

UNIFIL     Contributes to Middle East stability by helping to ease the
          humanitarian crisis in southern Lebanon.
           Withdrawing UNIFIL might signal reduced international support for
          the Middle East peace process, and would likely increase the influence
          in southern Lebanon of Hizbollah, an Iranian-supported terrorist
          group.

UNIKOM     Contributes to stability in the Persian Gulf by helping to maintain
          the integrity of the Iraq-Kuwait border.
           Helps safeguard international access to the Persian Gulf.
           Underscores the international community's determination to block any
          outlet for Saddam Hussein's expansionist ambitions.

UNAVEM     Helps ease the humanitarian crisis caused by Angolan civil war.
           Contributes to stability in southern Africa by helping to end a
          prolonged civil war.
           Helps reestablish order and security in a country that provides 7
          percent of U.S. oil imports and where U.S. firms are major investors.

MINURSO    Contributes to stability in North Africa by preventing a return to
          hostilities in Western Sahara that could involve Algeria and Morocco.
           Withdrawing U.S. support for MINURSO could damage bilateral
          relations with Morocco, which favors continuing the operation and has
          been a valuable, longtime U.S. friend and ally.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sources:  Compiled by GAO from information in U.S.  national security
and budget documents, as well as discussions with U.N., U.S., and
foreign government officials and peacekeeping experts. 

In the interest of making U.N.  peacekeeping a more selective and
effective tool for advancing U.S.  national security interests,
current U.S.  policy seeks to ensure that peacekeeping operations
have clear and practical mandates, are reviewed periodically by the
U.N.  Security Council, are limited in duration with specified time
frames tied to intermediate or final objectives, and have exit
criteria and identified end points for U.N.  involvement.  U.S. 
officials recognized that the long-standing operations were not fully
consistent with this policy, and told us that some of these
operations probably would not have been initially approved under
current U.S.  (or U.N.) peacekeeping policies.  Some operations, for
example, had outdated or unclear mandates (as previously discussed)
or were not reviewed periodically by the U.N.  Security Council.  At
the time of our review, U.S.  officials had not identified realistic
exit criteria or end points for U.N.  involvement for any of these
operations.  U.S.  budget and other documents and discussion with
State Department officials indicate that U.S.  officials support
continuing these operations until durable peace is achieved in the
underlying disputes.  For example, the State Department said that the
exit criteria for UNIKOM include "a clear indication of Iraq's
peaceful intentions towards its neighbors." Such broad statements do
not (1) provide estimates of when such an end state might be achieved
or (2) indicate what specific intermediate or final objectives are
sought, what actions U.S.  officials will take to achieve those
objectives, or how the peacekeeping operation helps attain those
specific objectives. 

U.S.  officials told us they were reluctant to modify these
operations to bring them more into line with current policies
because, in their view, the political costs and risks of making such
changes were too high to justify the limited benefits.  U.S. 
officials said, for example, that modifying UNIFIL's mandate to more
accurately reflect its current activities\65 could undermine
international support for the operation and send the wrong diplomatic
signals to the parties or region, undermining important U.S.  Middle
East diplomatic efforts.  Similarly, they said that modifying UNMOGIP
to institute periodic Security Council review would increase regional
tensions by appearing to favor Pakistan over India, require approval
by the U.N.  General Assembly, and periodically occupy the Security
Council with a range of contentious issues related to these two
countries' difficult bilateral relationship.  U.S.  officials'
reluctance to modify other long-standing operations was based on
similar considerations. 


--------------------
\62 A 1997 State Department Inspector General report on the
implementation of PDD-25 concluded the following:  (1) national
interest considerations overrode other important factors set out in
PDD-25 when U.S.  officials reviewed U.N peacekeeping operations and
(2) State Department officials had not closely scrutinized
long-standing operations using these factors as called for by PDD-25. 
The Inspector General recommended that U.S.  officials institute a
thorough interagency review of long-standing operations. 

\63 According to U.S.  officials and experts, regional organizations
generally lack both the capability and credibility to field large
peacekeeping forces or intervene successfully in conflicts.  Such
organizations have less resources, are less impartial, and are more
susceptible to the influence of regional powers than the United
Nations.  These officials and experts said, for example, that the
Organization of African Unity lacked the capability to mount a large,
complex peacekeeping operation in Angola, although member countries
contributed substantial numbers of troops to UNAVEM, while the Arab
Maghreb Union lacked the credibility to intervene in Western Sahara
because the conflict involved two key members of that regional
organization, Algeria and Morocco. 

\64 The State Department noted that most of the long-standing
operations had been reduced in size and cost in recent years. 

\65 For example, providing local civilians with humanitarian and
medical assistance. 


   CONCLUSION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

The eight long-standing operations have become costly and open-ended
commitments.  Only two of these operations had successfully carried
out their mandates, while the remaining six either had only partially
carried out their mandates or had not carried them out.  Although
seven of these operations were undertaken to create stable, secure
environments to assist diplomatic efforts aimed at settling these
underlying conflicts, diplomatic efforts to resolve the underlying
conflicts had, in most cases, stalled.  Nevertheless, U.S.  officials
currently see no reasonable alternative to continuing these
operations because they help stabilize conflicts that could threaten
U.S.  foreign policy interests.  In their view, ending these
operations would risk renewed conflict and damage future peacemaking
efforts.  However, continued support of these operations does not
appear to give adequate consideration to other factors articulated by
U.S.  policy that seek to ensure that peacekeeping operations are
limited in duration, linked to concrete political solutions, and have
exit criteria and identified end points for U.N.  involvement. 


   RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

In light of U.S.  interests in supporting well-defined peacekeeping
operations linked to concrete political solutions, we recommend that
the Secretary of State take the lead in working with the U.N. 
Security Council to identify specific exit criteria and strategies
for these operations.  This should be done in a manner consistent
with PDD-25, balancing the need to bring closure to these operations
with other U.S.  interests, such as stabilizing conflicts that pose a
threat to U.S.  foreign policy objectives.  These strategies need not
propose immediate ends to these operations, but rather, may focus on
how and when the desired end states can be achieved, what
intermediate and final objectives are sought, and what specific role
these operations play in achieving the sought-after end states. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9

The U.S.  Mission to the United Nations, after consulting with U.N. 
officials, generally agreed with our report.  The Mission commented
that the report provides a cogent and succinct analysis of the
long-standing operations for guiding congressional policy decisions
on these operations.  The Mission also noted that PDD-25 provides
clear guidance that the duration of peacekeeping operations should be
tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending them.  At
the Mission's suggestion, we have modified our recommendation to
include a reference to PDD-25. 

The State Department raised three general issues:  (1) the eight
long-standing operations play an important role in advancing U.S. 
foreign policy objectives; (2) peacekeeping operations themselves
should not be held responsible for the failure of diplomatic efforts
to resolve underlying conflicts; and (3) the United States cannot use
its veto authority lightly, lest other permanent members of the U.N. 
Security Council be encouraged to use their vetoes, possibly to the
detriment of the United States. 

Our report assesses whether the long-standing operations have
achieved their specific mandates and discusses the role these
operations play in advancing U.S.  foreign policy objectives.  We did
not suggest that any of the operations be terminated without giving
due consideration to the foreign policy objectives being advanced. 
Our report also recognizes that many peacekeeping operations are
intended to provide an opportunity for diplomats to begin their
peacemaking efforts; diplomatic failures are key to the long-term
nature of these peacekeeping operations, not the reverse.  Finally,
we fully agree that the United States should not use its veto
authority in the U.N.  Security Council lightly.  It is for that
reason that we recommend that the Secretary of State take the lead in
working with other Council members to identify exit criteria, end
points, and strategies for these operations that are consistent with
U.S.  interests and objectives. 

The Defense Department commented that our report could be
strengthened by further elaboration on three points.  These are:  (1)
the executive branch must consider a range of factors when evaluating
the renewal of U.N.  peacekeeping operations, such as whether U.N. 
involvement advances U.S.  policy objectives; (2) the executive
branch has taken steps to reduce the cost of these operations or help
spur the disputing parties to resolve their differences; and (3) the
risks and consequences associated with ending the long-standing
operations include the possible resumption of warfare between the
parties. 

We have elaborated on these points in the text of this report.  Our
report discusses the role that these long-standing operations play in
advancing U.S.  foreign policy objectives, but indicates that all the
goals set out in current U.S.  peacekeeping policy may not be
immediately achievable.  As our report points out, however, none of
the long-standing operations has realistic exit criteria,
intermediate objectives, end points, or exit strategies.  We
recognize that the executive branch has taken steps to reduce the
cost of these operations and spur some disputing parties to move
toward resolving the underlying conflicts.  We also recognize that
ending these operations prematurely could result in resumed conflict. 
We have not called on the executive branch to end these operations;
instead, we have recommended that the executive branch, working with
other members of the U.N.  Security Council, develop realistic exit
criteria and intermediate objectives for these operations, and
strategies for achieving them.  In our opinion, more clearly defining
intermediate objectives and specific exit criteria for these
operations will further--not threaten--U.S.  interests. 

The Mission and the Defense Department each also provided technical
comments that have been incorporated into the report as appropriate. 
Comments received from the Mission, State, and Defense are reprinted
in appendixes I through III, respectively. 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :10

Our review focused on the eight current U.N.  peacekeeping operations
shown in table 1 because analysis of U.N.  reports and records showed
that only two operations active for 5 years or more had ever
ended.\66 We evaluated UNAVEM II and III as one operation because (1)
the ultimate U.N.  objective in Angola remained the same
throughout--to help implement a political settlement ending the
Angolan civil war;\67 (2) the U.N.  presence in Angola was continuous
from 1991 to the present and, after the resumption of civil war in
1992, U.N.  officials offered to expand UNAVEM II to help implement a
new peace plan; and (3) various U.N.  and U.S.  documents, including
the President's fiscal year 1997 budget, view the existing operation
as dating from 1991. 

To determine the cost of long-standing U.N.  peacekeeping operations,
we analyzed U.N.  and U.S.  financial reports and discussed these
costs with U.N.  and U.S.  officials who oversee the U.N.  regular
budget and peacekeeping financing.  We did not independently verify
the accuracy of financial information obtained from U.N.  and U.S. 
reports or other sources.  To determine the extent to which these
operations carried out their mandates and the status of diplomatic
efforts to resolve the underlying disputes, we analyzed the U.N. 
Security Council resolutions authorizing these operations, recent
U.N.  reports and evaluations of these operations and associated
diplomatic efforts, and other expert evaluations.  We also discussed
these issues with U.N., U.S., and foreign government officials and
peacekeeping experts.  To determine what factors U.S.  officials
considered when deciding whether to support continuing these
operations, we analyzed State and Defense Department reports and
other documents and discussed this issue with U.S.  officials who
monitor the eight operations and U.S.  regional interests. 

To gather information for our analysis, we interviewed over 40 key
officials at the Departments of Defense and State, the U.S.  Mission
to the United Nations, U.N.  headquarters, and foreign government
missions to the United Nations.  At the State Department, we
interviewed officials in the Bureau of International Organization
Affairs responsible for monitoring the eight operations and the U.N. 
Security Council, as well as officials in the appropriate regional
bureaus.  At the Defense Department, we interviewed officials in the
office that monitors peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Agreements.  At the U.S.  Mission to the
United Nations, we interviewed the political and military advisers
who monitor the eight operations.  At U.N.  headquarters, we
interviewed key officials and military advisers in the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations from the Africa, Asia and Middle East, and
Operations Divisions and from the Lessons Learned Unit; and officials
in the U.N.  Office of Program Planning, Budget and Accounts who
oversee the U.N.  regular budget and peacekeeping financing.  We also
interviewed officials and military advisers from four
troop-contributing countries as well as a number of experts from
institutions such as The Heritage Foundation, the National Defense
University, and the U.S.  Institute for Peace. 

We also reviewed hundreds of reports, plans, and other key documents
at these locations as well as dozens of scholarly studies and journal
articles on U.N.  peacekeeping.  At the State Department, we reviewed
communications with overseas posts and the U.S.  Mission to the
United Nations selected by Department officials.  We also reviewed
the workpapers and a report prepared by the State Department
Inspector General during a recent review of the implementation of
PDD-25.  At the Department of Defense, we reviewed documents
maintained by the office that monitors peacekeeping and humanitarian
operations, including assessments of some long-standing operations
prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency.  Additionally, we
reviewed appropriate U.N.  documents regarding these operations,
including their authorizing resolutions, mandates, and evaluation and
financial reports. 

We conducted our review between February 1996 and February 1997 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


--------------------
\66 The first U.N.  operation in the Sinai ended after almost 11
years, when Egypt withdrew its consent shortly before the 1967
Arab-Israeli War.  The second operation in the Sinai ended after
almost 6 years, when Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty in 1979. 

\67 In contrast, the U.N.  objective in UNAVEM I was to monitor the
withdrawal of foreign (mostly Cuban) troops from Angola as a
precondition for ending that civil war. 


--------------------------------------------------------- Letter :10.1

We are sending copies of this report to other interested
congressional committees, the Secretaries of Defense and State, the
U.S.  Representative to the United Nations, the U.N.  Secretary
General, and other interested parties.  Copies will be made available
to others on request. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any
questions about this report.  Major contributors to this report were
Tetsuo Miyabara and Michael Rohrback. 

Sincerely yours,

Harold J.  Johnson, Associate Director
International Relations and Trade Issues




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I
COMMENTS FROM THE U.S.  MISSION TO
THE UNITED NATIONS
============================================================== Letter 



(See figure in printed edition.)




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix II
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
============================================================== Letter 



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)

Now on p.  19. 

Now on p.  19. 

Now on p.  19. 

Now on p.  21. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

Now on pp.  10-11. 

Now on pp.  11-12. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

Now on p.  14. 

Now on p.  15. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

Now on p.  21. 

Now on p.  22. 

Now on pp.  26-27. 


The following are GAO's comments on the Department of State's letter
dated March 7, 1997. 

GAO COMMENTS

1.  Our report does not say or imply that the long-standing
peacekeeping operations were responsible for the failure of
diplomatic efforts to resolve the underlying conflicts.  The report
clearly states that peacekeeping operations often are established to
provide time for diplomats to undertake peacemaking efforts. 

2.  Our report and recommendation recognize the need to balance a
broad range of U.S.  interests, as described by PDD-25 and other U.S. 
policy, in considering whether to support continuing these
operations, including whether they advance U.S.  foreign policy
objectives by helping to stabilize conflicts in key areas of the
world.  In our opinion, however, goals such as advancing U.S. 
foreign policy objectives and defining more clearly mandates,
endpoints, and exit criteria, as well as laying out a strategy for
achieving the desired end state, are not mutually exclusive.  Various
studies and policy statements suggest just the opposite:  namely,
that clearly defined operations are more likely to achieve their
mandates--and thus advance U.S.  policy objectives. 

3.  We have revised our report to reflect this information. 

4.  Our report does not say or imply that the United States should
invoke its veto to end these operations unilaterally. 

5.  We have deleted this information from our report. 

6.  We have clarified our report on this matter. 

7.  Our report recognizes that U.S.  officials support continuing the
three U.N.  peacekeeping operations in the Middle East because of
their role in promoting stability and easing tensions between Israel
and its Arab neighbors, and that U.S.  officials hope to restart
now-stalled peace talks between Israel and Syria in 1997.  It also
recognizes that U.S.  officials support continuing these operations
until a Middle East peace is achieved.  However, this broad statement
does not provide specific exit criteria or exit strategies for these
U.N.  operations as intended by PDD-25; for example, it does not
identify intermediate objectives (as PDD-25 suggests) that would
allow the executive branch or Congress to assess what progress has
been made over time toward achieving the ultimate objective. 

8.  Our report recognizes that UNTSO military observers (1) monitor
the situation and conduct inspections in the UNDOF area of operation
on the Golan Heights and (2) observe and monitor the situation in the
portion of the UNIFIL area of operation which is under Israeli
control.  According to a recent U.N.  report, these observers are
under the operational control of the UNDOF and UNIFIL commanders and
perform tasks similar to those conducted by UNDOF and UNIFIL troops
to assist in carrying out the mandates of these operations.  In
assigning UNTSO military observers to support UNIFIL, however, the
Security Council stipulated that these observers would continue to
function in southern Lebanon along the 1949 armistice line after the
end of UNIFIL's mandate. 

9.  Our report recognizes that, although unable to carry out its
mandate, UNIFIL endeavors to (1) prevent its area of operations from
being used for hostile activities, (2) protect civilians caught in
the conflict or subject to harassment, and (3) provide humanitarian
and medical assistance. 

10.  Our report recognizes that U.S.  officials support continuing
UNIKOM because it helps protect Kuwait's borders and two-thirds of
the world's known oil reserves, and underscores the international
community's commitment to blocking Iraqi aggression.  We have deleted
the reference to Persian Gulf peace talks. 

11.  Our report recognizes that MINURSO monitors the cease-fire,
which largely has been respected by Morocco and Frente POLISARIO
since 1991. 

12.  Our report recognizes that MINURSO's supporters say it has
helped prevent a resumption of hostilities between Morocco and Frente
POLISARIO, but a balanced presentation requires that we also
recognize that the operation has its detractors as well. 

13.  We have revised our report to clarify the difference between
UNFICYP's mandate, the mandate of the former U.N.  mediator for
Cyprus, and the mandate of the U.N.  Secretary General's good offices
mission (which was undertaken after mediation efforts broke down in
1966). 

14.  By numerous resolutions (1) calling for a political solution
that reaffirms the sovereignty of a single (federated) Cypriot state,
(2) rejecting the current de facto division of the island, and (3)
condemning and rejecting the 1983 declaration of a separate Turkish
Cypriot state, the U.N.  Security Council has made it clear that
preserving a single Cypriot state is an objective of the Secretary
General's good offices mission. 

15.  From the beginning of the Cyprus operation, the U.N.  Secretary
General has reported that the presence of foreign troops and the
influx of arms and military equipment was a cause of concern for
UNFICYP with regard to the discharge of its mandate.  In various
resolutions, the U.N.  Security Council has expressed concern about
the continued modernization of military forces on Cyprus, and has
urged both sides to reduce force levels and defense spending.  On
numerous occasions, the Secretary General has reported on UNFICYP's
efforts to implement these and other measures aimed at reducing the
likelihood of cease-fire incidents.  In June 1996, for example, the
Secretary General reported that "[d]espite continuous efforts by
UNFICYP, no progress has been made towards [reducing force levels and
defense spending on Cyprus].  On the contrary, both sides have
continued to improve their military capabilities."\1

16.  We have revised our report to clarify that the political
situation on Cyprus has deteriorated during UNFICYP's long-standing
presence. 

17.  Our report recognizes lack of political will by the parties as
one factor contributing to lack of success in settling the underlying
conflict on Cyprus. 

18.  Our report recognizes that U.S.  officials (1) consider UNMOGIP
a cost-effective means of furthering U.S.  foreign policy goals in
South Asia, (2) maintain that withdrawing or modifying the operation
could harm relations with Pakistan or India, and (3) believe that the
operation serves to mitigate tensions between the two
(nuclear-capable) countries.  We have revised our report to reflect
that recent developments may improve prospects for an eventual
political settlement of the Kashmir dispute. 

19.  Although Greece and Turkey may be involved in the mediation
efforts, tensions between these two countries, which play a large
role in the Cyprus conflict, are not directly addressed by diplomatic
efforts to settle the conflict. 

20.  The broad statement that achievement of a comprehensive peace is
the exit strategy for an operation does not identify specific
criteria or intermediate objectives (as PDD-25 suggests) that would
allow for accurate assessments of what incremental progress has been
made toward achieving the ultimate objective. 



(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix III

--------------------
\1 U.N.  Secretary General report S/1996/411, June 7, 1996, p.  3.



COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
============================================================== Letter 



(See figure in printed edition.)





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============================================================ Chapter 0

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*** End of document. ***