Army National Guard: Planned Conversions Are a Positive Step, but
Unvalidated Combat Forces Remain (Briefing Report, 01/29/97,
GAO/NSIAD-97-55BR).

By the end of fiscal year 1999, the Army National Guard plans to have
367,000 personnel in military commands in the 50 states, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Guam. War planners,
the Defense Department (DOD), and the Army have noted that many Guard
combat units are not needed to meet the national security strategy of
fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts.
According to DOD documents and Army officials, these excess forces are
assigned to secondary missions, such as providing wartime rotational
forces, serving as a deterrent to future adversarial regimes, and
supporting civil authorities at home. Previous GAO reports and the
report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces have
discussed the need to make better use of reserve forces. This report
examines how the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study addresses
this need.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-97-55BR
     TITLE:  Army National Guard: Planned Conversions Are a Positive 
             Step, but Unvalidated Combat Forces Remain
      DATE:  01/29/97
   SUBJECT:  Military downsizing
             Armed forces reserves
             Defense contingency planning
             Army reservists
             Cost analysis
             Military cost control
             Federal agency reorganization
             Human resources utilization
             Personnel management
             Reductions in force
IDENTIFIER:  Army National Guard Division Redesign Study
             DOD Bottom-Up Review
             Total Army Analysis Process
             DOD Quadrennial Defense Review
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Briefing Report to Congressional Requesters

January 1997

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD - PLANNED
CONVERSIONS ARE A POSITIVE STEP,
BUT UNVALIDATED COMBAT FORCES
REMAIN

GAO/NSIAD-97-55BR

Army National Guard

(701099)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DOD - Department of Defense
  DIVPAC - Division Project Action Committee
  DCSOPS - Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
  JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff
  PA&E - Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-275525

January 29, 1997

The Honorable John R.  Kasich
Chairman, Committee on the Budget
House of Representatives

The Honorable Steve Buyer
Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives

The Honorable Owen Pickett
House of Representatives

Previous GAO reports\1 and the Department of Defense (DOD) report of
the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces\2 discussed
the need to make better use of reserve forces.  We reviewed the Army
National Guard Division Redesign Study to determine how the study
addressed this need.  We recently briefed your staff on these issues. 
The information we provided at those briefings is detailed in the
sections following this letter. 


--------------------
\1 Army Force Structure:  Future Reserve Roles Shaped by New
Strategy, Base Force Mandates, and Gulf War (GAO/NSIAD-93-80, Dec. 
15, 1992); Force Structure:  Army National Guard Divisions Could
Augment Wartime Support Capability (GAO/NSIAD-95-80, Mar.  2, 1995);
and Army National Guard:  Validate Requirements for Combat Forces and
Size Those Forces Accordingly (GAO/NSIAD-96-63, Mar.  14, 1996). 

\2 Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed
Forces, DOD (Arlington, Va.:  1995). 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

By the end of fiscal year 1999, the Army National Guard plans to have
367,000 personnel in 54 separate state and territorial military
commands in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the
U.S.  Virgin Islands, and Guam.  This number includes about 187,000
personnel organized into
8 combat divisions that include 3 brigades each, 15 enhanced
brigades, and
3 separate combat units, consisting of 2 separate brigades and a
scout group.  In addition to the combat units, the Guard has elements
that support combat units, such as engineers, military police,
military intelligence, and transportation.  The Guard is to be
organized and resourced for federal wartime missions but is also
available to fulfill state missions. 

As we mentioned in our March 1996 report, war planners and DOD and
Army studies noted that many Guard combat units are not needed to
meet the national security strategy of fighting and winning two
nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts.  According to DOD
documents and Army officials, these excess forces are assigned to
secondary missions such as providing wartime rotational forces,
serving as a deterrent hedge to future adversarial regimes, and
supporting civil authorities at home. 

Both the Commission's report and our March 1996 report recommended
that DOD determine the number of Guard combat spaces that are needed;
use unneeded spaces to fill needed, but unresourced, support
requirements; and eliminate the excess.  In response to our
recommendations, DOD stated that the Army National Guard Division
Redesign Study and other studies being conducted by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff would address these issues. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

The Army National Guard Division Redesign Study developed an option
that provides for the conversion of some Guard combat and supporting
forces to fill needed, but unresourced, support requirements.  This
planned conversion is a step in the right direction.  However,
neither this study nor the studies from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation deal with the critical
issues of validating the need for the remaining Guard combat
structure and eliminating any excess forces.  As a result, the
studies leave substantial Guard structure in place that has no valid
war-fighting mission.  According to DOD and Joint Staff officials,
however, the Quadrennial Defense Review may consider them.\3

The Army National Guard Division Redesign Study working group
(chartered by the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and
Plans) and a parallel study group (the Guard's Division Project
Action Committee) considered several options to redesign the Guard
combat divisions to fill support requirements.  Three of these
options were evaluated to determine initial costs and feasibility. 

A General Officers Working Group then selected the option to convert
2 of the Guard's combat divisions and 6 combat brigades--about
42,700 spaces--into required support spaces.  This option also allows
the Guard to keep the other six combat divisions, minus three combat
brigades, and create two new divisions with each division containing
three enhanced brigades and an active duty administrative
headquarters.  The study's preliminary estimates are that it would
take about $2.8 billion to convert these combat spaces and could take
from 10 to 29 years, depending upon annual funding, to complete the
conversion.  However, the Army does not plan to begin this conversion
until it has purchased all the equipment needed to convert another
66,000 active and reserve support spaces, identified through another
Army analysis, into required support spaces.  The total cost for this
first conversion effort is an estimated $2.6 billion.  The final
costs and implementation time frame for the Division Redesign Study
and the feasibility of the new divisions are still being evaluated
and will not be addressed in this report.  According to Army
officials, preliminary results from the cost evaluation indicate that
costs could be less than originally estimated. 


--------------------
\3 This review, established in the Fiscal Year 1997 Defense
Authorization Act, is to be a comprehensive examination of the
defense program and policies. 


   RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense, as he guides the
Quadrennial Defense Review, direct that the review process validate
requirements for Guard combat structure.  We further recommend that,
once this validation is complete, the Secretary of Defense, in
concert with the Secretary of the Army, eliminate any structure
beyond that which is needed to carry out the national security
strategy. 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

To assess DOD's and the Army's efforts to redesign the Guard combat
divisions, we interviewed cognizant officials and obtained and
analyzed the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study and other
relevant documents from DOD; the Army; the Army National Guard; the
Joint Chiefs of Staff; Calibre Systems, Inc.; and DOD's Commission on
Roles and Missions. 

We requested written comments from DOD, but none were provided.  We
discussed the information in this report with cognizant officials and
have made changes where appropriate. 

We conducted this review from August to November 1996 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1

We are providing copies of this report to appropriate House and
Senate committees; the Secretaries of Defense and the Army; the
Director of the Army National Guard; and the Director, Office of
Management and Budget.  We will also provide copies to other
interested parties upon request. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-3504 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report.  The major contributors to this
report were Robert Pelletier, Ann Borseth, and Lisa Quinn. 

Richard Davis
Director, National Security
 Analysis


Briefing Section I BACKGROUND
============================================================== Letter 


   PREVIOUS STUDIES CALL FOR
   CHANGES TO GUARD COMBAT
   DIVISIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

By the end of fiscal year 1999, the Army National Guard plans to have
367,000 personnel in 54 separate state and territorial military
commands in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the
U.S.  Virgin Islands, and Guam.  This number includes about 187,000
personnel organized into
8 combat divisions that include 3 brigades each; 15 enhanced
brigades; and
3 separate combat units, consisting of 2 separate brigades and a
scout group.  In addition to the combat units, the Guard has elements
that support combat units, such as engineers, military police,
military intelligence, and transportation. 

According to Guard policy, the Guard is to be organized and resourced
for federal wartime missions but is also available to fulfill state
missions.  According to a recent study by RAND's National Defense
Research Institute,\4 the Guard over the last decade has used only a
small percentage of its total personnel to meet state requirements. 
RAND also reported that, nationally, state demands on the Guard are
not significant.  RAND concluded that, even in a peak use year, state
missions would not require a large portion of the Guard. 

As we reported in our March 1996 report,\5 war planners and
Department of Defense (DOD) studies stated that the eight combat
divisions are not needed to meet the national security strategy of
fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous major regional
conflicts.  According to DOD's 1993 Report on the Bottom-Up Review,
these forces are assigned to fill secondary missions such as
providing wartime rotational forces, serving as a deterrent hedge to
future adversarial regimes, and supporting civil authorities at home. 

However, the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces
reported that eight Guard combat divisions are too large a force for
these secondary missions and concluded that reserve component forces
with lower priority tasks should be eliminated or reorganized to fill
shortfalls in higher priority areas.  It also concluded that even
after filling the shortfalls, the total Army would still have more
combat spaces than required and recommended that these should be
eliminated from the active or reserve components. 

In response to the recommendations in our March 1996 report, DOD
stated that the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study and other
studies being conducted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense's
Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff would address these issues. 

Briefing Section II

--------------------
\4 Assessing the State and Federal Missions of the National Guard,
RAND, (Santa Monica, Calif.:  1995). 

\5 Army National Guard:  Validate Requirements for Combat Forces and
Size Those Forces Accordingly (GAO/NSIAD-96-63, Mar.  14, 1996). 


THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD DIVISION
REDESIGN STUDY
============================================================== Letter 


   ARMY VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
   CHARTERED REDESIGN WORKING
   GROUP
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army signed a charter on May 16, 1995,
that established the Army National Guard Division Redesign General
Officer Working Group.  According to the Group's charter, the Group
was formed because the Army is in critically short supply of support
forces but continues to maintain Guard combat units that are excess
to war-fighting requirements. 

The purpose of the Working Group was to (1) review the Army's future
unresourced support requirements, (2) review the structure and
missions of the Guard combat elements and develop options for
changing Guard structure to meet future Army requirements, (3)
conduct a resource feasibility assessment of the options, and, (4)
refine and prioritize the options for presentation to the senior Army
leadership.  The guiding principles of the Group, in part, were to
(1) not cause a reduction in the number of Guard division
headquarters, (2) operate within existing Guard force structure and
end strength, and (3) consider the Guard's need to respond to state
missions. 

Members of the Working Group included the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations and Plans (DCSOPS); the Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; the Director, Army National Guard;
the Chief, Army Reserve; the Chief of Staff, Training and Doctrine
Command; the Director of Operations, Forces Command; and
representatives from the Office of the Inspector General, the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Logistics, and the Office of the Director, Program
Analysis and Evaluation.  The Ohio Adjutant General, whose role was
to act as spokesman for the
54 Adjutants General, was added after approval of the charter and
study plan.  According to Guard officials, this was the first time
that the Guard had been invited to sit on a general officer working
group to discuss issues affecting the Guard. 


   TWO GROUPS CONDUCT STUDY BY
   USING A THREE-PHASED APPROACH
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Two groups worked on options to redesign the Guard combat divisions. 
One group, under the direction of the Army's DCSOPS, was composed of
a working council of colonels and members of the Working Group.  The
second group, the Army National Guard Division Project Action
Committee (DIVPAC), was composed of the 54 Adjutants General,
representing each state and territory, and the commanders of the 8
Guard combat divisions. 

The Working Group established a three-phased study protocol by which
the two groups would conduct their studies.  During the first phase,
the two groups were to develop several options for alternative force
structures that would reduce the unresourced support shortfall and
add relevance to the remaining Guard force structure without
violating the guiding principles of the charter.\6 Once the options
had been developed, they would be narrowed to those options that
would be presented to the Working Group.  The Group would then
recommend which options would proceed to phase two of the study.  In
phase two, the one-time and recurring costs associated with
implementing the options were to be developed and analyzed.  In phase
three, the results from the other phases, along with other relevant
criteria to determine the feasibility of implementing the recommended
options, would be analyzed.  From this phase, a final option would be
chosen and briefed to senior Army leadership for a decision and
implementation. 


--------------------
\6 As defined in the study's final report, "relevance" means to
"enhance warfighting capabilities of America's Army." This includes
the missions of supporting the two major regional contingency
scenario, providing a deterrent hedge, and enhancing mobilization. 


   PHASE ONE:  OPTIONS DEVELOPED
   FOR ALTERNATIVE FORCE STRUCTURE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Using a baseline force of 8 Guard divisions, 3 separate combat units,
and 15 enhanced brigades, the first phase of the study focused on
developing a broad range of options for consideration by the Working
Group.  Both study groups used certain design considerations that
were developed early on.  Specifically, the groups were to focus on
enhancing the war-fighting capability of America's Army, reduce the
unresourced support shortfall, provide a force that could respond to
operations other than war, address war-fight requirements of the
Commanders in Chief of the Unified Commands, and meet state-unique
requirements where possible.  Building a force to respond to
operations other than war was later removed as a design
consideration. 

Using these design considerations, the DCSOPS study team developed
11 options and the DIVPAC developed 9.  The DCSOPS study team
presented their 11 options to the Working Group, which then chose 2
of the 11 for further consideration.  The DIVPAC analyzed their 9
options by measuring them against a weighted criteria, ultimately
choosing one option to be presented to the Working Group for further
consideration and evaluation.  Finally, three options--one DIVPAC
option and two DCSOPS options--were approved by the Working Group for
further cost analysis in phase two of the study.  All three options
provided structure to reduce the unresourced support shortfall and
assigned missions that could add to the relevance of the remaining
Guard structure, as defined by the study's final report. 


   PHASE ONE:  THREE OPTIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

   Legend:  xx - division; x -
   brigade; EB - enhanced brigade;
   CA - combined arms; AC - active
   component; NG - National Guard;
   OPFOR - opposing force; RSOI -
   reception, staging, onward
   movement, and integration; OOTW
   - operations other than war.

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

The three options selected by the Working Group were as follows: 

Option one, developed by the DIVPAC, contains the following:  three
Guard divisions that remain in their current configuration and could
be used as a deterrent hedge; three Guard divisions that replace one
division maneuver brigade with an enhanced brigade; two Guard
divisions that would be converted from combat divisions into combined
arms divisions with one combat maneuver brigade and various support
units; two new active component/Guard divisions, each containing an
active component headquarters and three Guard enhanced brigades as
maneuver brigades; two enhanced brigades that remain in their current
configuration; four active component divisions, each having an
integrated enhanced brigade; and six Guard combined arms brigades
converted from the three separate combat units and the three
divisional maneuver brigades.  Additionally, this option provided
that the missions of 6,600 active component support spaces would
migrate to the Guard. 

Option two, developed by the DCSOPS group, contains the following: 
three Guard divisions in their current configuration; three Guard
combined arms divisions; one Guard reception, staging, onward
movement, and integration division;\7 and one Guard opposing force
division, which would help train the enhanced brigades during
mobilization.  The 15 enhanced brigades and 2 of the 3 separate
combat units remain stand-alone entities and are not shown in the
previous chart.  The third separate unit is used as a maneuver
brigade in a combined arms division. 

Option three, also developed by the DCSOPS group, contains the
following:  four Guard divisions in their current configuration; one
Guard combined arms division; one Guard reception, staging, onward
movement, and integration division; one Guard opposing force
division; and one Guard division to respond to operations other than
war.  As in option two, the
15 enhanced brigades and 2 of the 3 separate combat units remain
stand-alone entities and are not shown in the previous chart.  The
third separate unit is again used as a maneuver brigade in a combined
arms division. 


--------------------
\7 A reception, staging, onward movement, and integration division
assists in the deployment process.  The structure is similar to the
combined arms division, but without the maneuver brigade. 


   PHASE TWO:  DETAILED COST
   ANALYSIS
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :10



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

\a One-time costs were calculated two different ways:  (1) with
equipment substitutions and (2) without equipment substitutions. 

\b These reductions in recurring costs will not be realized until
implementation is complete. 

The cost analysis conducted on the three options considered one-time
costs (such as procurement, retraining, facilities, and second
destination transportation costs) and recurring costs (such as annual
operating costs).  According to Army and Guard officials, the
analysis was done by the Army's contractor, Calibre Systems, Inc., to
provide a consistent analysis for both options. 

The contractor calculated the one-time procurement costs in two ways. 
First, it allowed for the use of equipment on hand that matched the
requirement of the new unit, with no substitutions, and computed the
purchase cost of new equipment to fill the remaining requirements. 
Second, it allowed for the use of equipment on hand that matched or
could be substituted for the new unit's equipment requirements and
computed the purchase cost of new equipment to fill the remaining
requirements.  The second calculation produced the lower estimate. 
Both cost estimates were presented in the final assessment. 

The contractor did not consider those offsets that could be achieved
by (1) using equipment that was excess to the new unit's requirements
to fill other Army requirements, (2) selling the excess equipment
through foreign military sales, and (3) using equipment passed to the
Guard from inactivated units or programmed for units through the
modernization process. 

The first two options were both less expensive to operate annually,\8
but their one-time costs were greater.  The third option was the most
expensive option to operate annually but would have incurred lower
one-time costs.  However, the Working Group had decided that cost
would be treated as an independent variable and that the lowest cost
option would not necessarily be the best alternative. 


--------------------
\8 Prior to the analysis, the Working Group directed the contractor
to exclude the cost impact of the migration of missions for 6,600
support spaces that were included as part of option one. 


   DECISIONS REACHED PRIOR TO
   PHASE THREE
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :11



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Options one and two were selected by the Working Group to proceed to
phase three of the study.  Option three was dropped from further
consideration because it reduced the support shortfall by the least
amount and contained a division created to respond to operations
other than war.  The Working Group determined that this was a mission
that could be satisfied by a division remaining in its current
configuration. 

In addition, the DIVPAC modified their option by deleting the
integration of four enhanced brigades into four active component
divisions.  The four enhanced brigades were to remain stand-alone
brigades, thus retaining six enhanced brigades in that status. 


   PHASE THREE:  FEASIBILITY
   ANALYSIS
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :12



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Once the two options were selected for further study, the Working
Group then addressed the feasibility of implementing each option. 
This phase of the study was done by developing and defining the
criteria to be used to show the strengths and weaknesses of each
option, subjectively assessing the advantages and disadvantages of
each criterion, and factoring in the costs determined in phase two as
an independent variable. 

The Group approved nine criteria to be used.  These were relevance to
the war-fight, reduction of unresourced support shortfall, impact on
the active force, amount of Guard maneuver/combat troops integrated
into the war-fight mission, turbulence on Guard units, readiness
impact on lower tiered units, impact on full-time support ratios,
impact on professional development, and impact on force mix.  Each of
the criteria was assigned a weight by using a standard Army computer
program.  Throughout this process, advantages and disadvantages of
each option were subjectively evaluated. 

According to the study, the lowest score is the preferred option when
based on the weighted criteria.  When the scores were summed, option
two received the lowest score.  Option two converts more combat into
support spaces, impacts the active component the least, and would
have the least amount of turbulence to the Guard units.  Option one
scored better than option two in two criteria:  It provides more
professional development opportunities, and it would not generate as
many full-time personnel support requirements.  However, the study's
final report stated that the differences between the two options were
slight. 

During this phase, the estimated costs originally developed in phase
two were revisited as an independent variable.  As stated previously,
option two yields the most expensive one-time costs and the least
amount of savings in recurring costs.  The difference between option
one and two could be greater than reflected in phase two because,
among other things, the one-time and recurring cost estimates
associated with option one do not include the costs related to the
two new active component/Guard divisions. 


   COMPARISON OF OPTIONS
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :13



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

The structural similarities of each option are presented in the
shaded areas on the previous page.  For example, each option
maintains three Guard combat divisions as currently configured.  Each
option also converts some Guard combat brigades and/or divisions into
combined arms units to satisfy an almost identical amount of
unresourced support requirements that have similar missions.\9
Specifically, option one would convert about 42,700 combat spaces to
support spaces; option two would convert about 44,100. 

The principal differences between the options are presented in the
lighter areas on the previous page and focus on three areas:  use of
the enhanced brigades, the migration of spaces, and the opposing
force division. 

  -- Option one moves three of the enhanced brigades into three Guard
     divisions to free up divisional brigades for conversion to
     support spaces.  The option also uses the separate combat units
     for conversion to support spaces.  Option two leaves the
     enhanced brigades as they are currently configured, uses one
     separate unit as a maneuver brigade for a combined arms
     division, and gets all of the unresourced support requirements
     from the converted divisions. 

  -- Option one includes the migration of the missions of 6,600
     existing support spaces from the active component to the Guard. 
     Option two does not include this migration. 

  -- Option two includes an opposing force division.  Option one does
     not, but instead has divisions that could be task organized to
     handle this mission. 

In addition to the difference in the amount of support spaces the
options create, there are also differences in the number and type of
the support units themselves.  For example, option one creates 108
quartermaster units with 15,825 spaces, while option two creates 159
quartermaster units with 21,436 spaces.  Also, option one creates 15
signal corps units with
4,029 spaces, while option two creates 3 signal corps units with
624 spaces. 

Briefing Section III

--------------------
\9 As previously stated, a reception, staging, onward movement, and
integration division is a variation of the combined arms division
without the maneuver brigade. 


THE DECISION
============================================================== Letter 


   WORKING GROUP SELECTS OPTION
   ONE
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :14



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

On the basis of its evaluation of the feasibility analysis, the
Working Group selected option one to present to the senior Army
leadership.  According to the study's final report, this decision was
based on the similarities of the support units, the negligible
difference in the support spaces created, and the slight difference
in the costs of the two options. 

However, the Working Group required two modifications before
proceeding with this option:  (1) the missions of the 6,600 spaces
that were to migrate from the active component would not migrate now
but could migrate into the Guard once the Army's current initiative
to redesign the force for the future is completed and (2) the
proposal for the two new active component/Guard divisions would be
revisited after the next update of the national security strategy. 
This proposal is currently being tested by the Army's Training and
Doctrine Command to determine the viability of the concept. 

The Secretary of the Army approved the Working Group's modified
recommendation on May 14, 1996, and sent a letter to the Secretary of
Defense informing him of the Army's decision.  According to Army
officials, the Secretary of Defense was briefed on August 26, 1996,
and concurred with the Secretary of the Army's decision. 


   ILLUSTRATIVE TIME FRAMES FOR
   IMPLEMENTATION
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :15



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

The previous page depicts illustrative time frames for implementing
option one based on different resourcing alternatives and using the
highest estimated one-time costs.  For example, if $400 million is
provided each fiscal year beginning in 1998, the study's final report
estimated it would take 8 years, or until 2006, to procure new
equipment and an additional
2 years, or until 2008, to complete implementation.  As shown on the
previous page, the less funding that is made available each fiscal
year lengthens the time it takes to complete the conversion. 

However, it is unlikely that funding for the Guard Division Redesign
will be available as early as fiscal year 1998.  According to Army
force structure officials, the support shortfall at the end of the
Total Army Analysis process for the planning period ending in fiscal
year 2003 would be almost 125,000 spaces.\10 Over 66,000 spaces of
this shortfall are to be filled through the conversion of existing
support units in both the active and reserve components.  The
procurement phase of this conversion is to be fully funded before any
of the redesign effort will be undertaken.  The entire conversion,
including procurement and implementation, of the 66,000 spaces is
estimated to cost about $2.6 billion.  However, according to Army
officials, funding for this conversion has not been established and,
therefore, it is not known when the conversion will be completed. 

It appears, therefore, that the redesign will not begin for several
years and that, regardless of which funding alternative on the
previous page is chosen, implementation will take a prolonged period
of time--10 to 29 years.  However, the contractor is currently
refining the final costs and implementation time frames for the
chosen option.  According to Army officials, preliminary results from
this effort indicate that costs could be less than originally
estimated. 

Briefing Section IV

--------------------
\10 The Total Army Analysis is the process by which the Army
determines the nondivisional support requirements, based on
war-fighting scenarios developed by DOD. 


RESPONSE TO PRIOR RECOMMENDATIONS
============================================================== Letter 


   STUDIES DID NOT ADDRESS ALL OF
   PREVIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :16



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

According to DOD, our recommendations and those of the Commission on
Roles and Missions were to be addressed by this study and other
studies conducted by the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation
(PA&E) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).  However, while the Army
National Guard Division Redesign Study and the resulting decision
provides for some Guard support and combat forces to fill needed, but
unresourced, support requirements, none of the studies were chartered
to validate the combat needs or eliminate any excess forces.  This
leaves substantial Guard structure in place that has no valid
war-fight mission.  We still believe these are critical steps that
should be taken. 

According to the study's final report, three of the Guard divisions
remaining in their current configuration were assigned a mission of
deterrent hedge, one of the missions that would add relevance to the
Guard structure.  The report states that this mission was based on
requirements stated in concept plans developed by the Commanders in
Chief of the Unified Commands.  However, on the basis of our review
of war planning documents and discussions with Army war planning
officials, this requirement does not exist in either Commanders'
concept plans, the current Defense Planning Guidance, or any other
war planning documents.  Furthermore, the three divisions, which
include an enhanced brigade in each, were assigned the mission of
enhancing mobilization, also to add relevance.  Both these missions
met the definition of relevance approved by the Working Group. 
However, according to Army war planning officials, there is a formal
analysis process to validate combat and support missions and
requirements needed to carry out the national security strategy that
goes beyond assigning missions to structure.  The study did not
follow this process to determine that the missions assigned to the
structure were valid. 

In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997
(P.L.  104-201), the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is to conduct a Quadrennial
Defense Review as recommended by the Commission.  This review would
be a comprehensive examination of the defense strategy, force
structure, force modernization plans, budget plans, infrastructure,
and other elements of the defense program and policies with a view
toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United
States, and establishing a revised defense program through the year
2005.  According to both Joint Chiefs of Staff and Office of Program
Analysis and Evaluation officials, this review is another opportunity
for DOD to revisit the Commission's and our recommendations to
validate combat forces and eliminate excess Guard structure. 

We concur with these officials and recommend that the Secretary of
Defense, as he guides the review, direct that the review process
validate requirements for Guard combat structure.  We further
recommend that, once this validation is complete, the Secretary of
Defense, in concert with the Secretary of the Army, eliminate any
structure beyond that which is needed to carry out the national
security strategy. 


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