Food Security: Preparations for the 1996 World Food Summit (Letter
Report, 11/07/96, GAO/NSIAD-97-44).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed U.S. preparations for
the 1996 World Food Summit, focusing on: (1) the origin, purpose, and
financing of the summit; (2) the process used by member countries of the
United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) to prepare and
negotiate a policy declaration and plan of action for approval by world
leaders or their representatives; (3) the U.S. approach to the summit;
(4) key issues that have arisen in the negotiations; and (5) the role
and views of nongovernmental organizations (NGO).

GAO found that: (1) in 1994, the FAO Director General consulted with
world leaders and others about the usefulness of holding a global
conference on world food security issues; (2) after considerable initial
skepticism on the part of the United States and a number of other
countries, a consensus eventually emerged on the desirability of
renewing the 1974 commitment to achieve world food security for all and
to agree upon effective policies and strategies for dealing with the
root causes of hunger in the 1990s and beyond; (3) to facilitate
reaching an agreement, each member country government was encouraged to
prepare its own position paper on food security issues; (4) according to
the United States, the primary responsibility for reducing food
insecurity rests with each country, and it is critical that all
countries adopt policies that promote self-reliance and facilitate food
security at all levels; (5) negotiations on a draft policy declaration
and plan of action highlighted serious philosophical differences between
developed and developing countries regarding the overall approach to
food security and also among developed countries regarding trade and
other more specific issues; (6) in September 1996, NGO from numerous
countries held a global consultation and reached consensus on a broad
statement of key views that was provided to the Committee on World Food
Security for use in its negotiations on the policy statement and plan of
action; (7) the NGO statement differed in a number of significant ways
from the U.S. government's position on food security issues; (8) the
statement did not fully subscribe to reliance on free markets, supported
by self-sufficiency in food, and favored public regulation of food
prices; and (9) NGO also concluded that international trade
liberalization is not the solution to the problem of food security and
in many cases undermines it.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-97-44
     TITLE:  Food Security: Preparations for the 1996 World Food Summit
      DATE:  11/07/96
   SUBJECT:  International organizations
             International relations
             International food programs
             Strategic planning
             Population growth
             Developing countries
             Food supply
             Foreign trade policies
             Agricultural policies
             International agreements
IDENTIFIER:  1996 World Food Summit
             Sub-Saharan Africa
             South Asia
             1994 Conference on Population and Development
             Rome (Italy)
             Puerto Rico
             Canada
             Australia
             European Union
             New Zealand
             Marrakesh, Morocco
             Geneva (Switzerland)
             China
             Japan
             South Korea
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Requesters

November 1996

FOOD SECURITY - PREPARATIONS FOR
THE 1996 WORLD FOOD SUMMIT

GAO/NSIAD-97-44

Food Security

(711196)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  ACC - Administrative Committee on Coordination
  CFS - Committee on World Food Security
  ERS - Economic Research Service
  FAO - Food and Agricultural Organization
  GATT - General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
  GNP - Gross National Product
  G-77 - Group of Developing Countries
  IFPRI - International Food Policy Research Institute
  IWG - Interagency Working Group
  MMT - million metric tons
  NGO - nongovernmental organizations
  ODA - Official Development Assistance
  OECD - Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
  OMB - Office of Management and Budget
  USAID - U.S.  Agency for International Development
  USDA - U.S.  Department of Agriculture
  USTR - U.S.  Trade Representative
  WTO - World Trade Organization

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-275367

November 7, 1996

The Honorable Nancy Landon Kassebaum
Chair
The Honorable Russell D.  Feingold
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on African Affairs
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate

The Honorable Tony P.  Hall
House of Representatives

This report responds to your request that we monitor and analyze U.S. 
preparations for the World Food Summit to be held in Rome, Italy,
between November 13 and 17, 1996. 

This report addresses the following:  (1) the origin, purpose, and
financing of the summit; (2) the process used by member countries of
the U.N.  Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) to prepare and
negotiate a policy declaration and plan of action for approval by
world leaders or their representatives; (3) the U.S.  approach to the
summit; (4) key issues that have arisen in the negotiations; and (5)
the role and views of nongovernmental organizations (NGO). 

FAO was founded in October 1945 with a mandate to raise levels of
nutrition and standards of living, to improve agricultural
productivity, and to better the conditions of rural populations.  FAO
is the largest autonomous agency within the United Nations.  It has
174 member nations plus Puerto Rico (associate member) and the
European Community (member organization) and more than 2,000
professional staff.  FAO's biennial budget is set at $850 million,
and FAO-assisted projects attract more than $2 billion per year from
donor agencies and governments for investment in agricultural and
rural development projects. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

Food security is concerned with hunger and malnutrition.  The U.S. 
position paper prepared for the World Food Summit states that food
security exists when all people at all times have physical and
economic access to sufficient food to meet their dietary needs for a
productive and healthy life. 

Food security has several important dimensions:  (1)
availability--achieved when sufficient supplies of food of
appropriate quality are consistently available to all individuals;
(2) access--ensured when households and all individuals in them have
adequate resources to obtain appropriate foods for a nutritious diet;
and (3) utilization--refers to the proper biological use of food
through adequate diet, water, sanitation, and health care. 

According to the U.S.  position paper, world food security is
important to the United States for humanitarian, economic, and
national security reasons.  The United States and other nations that
signed the 1974 World Food Conference Declaration agreed that all
governments should accept the goal of achieving world food security
within 10 years.  More than
20 years later, the world still falls far short of this goal. 
Eighty-eight countries are currently classified as low-income and
food-deficit states.  According to FAO, close to 800 million people,
or 20 percent of the developing world's population, are chronically
undernourished.  Most of these people are in South Asia and
sub-Saharan Africa.  In addition, millions of other people in more
affluent societies do not have enough food to meet their basic needs. 
And millions more experience prolonged hunger during part of the
year, or suffer birth defects, growth retardation, mental deficiency,
lethargy, blindness, or death because they do not have the diversity
of food necessary to meet their total needs.  An estimated 200
million children under the age of 5 suffer protein or energy
deficiencies. 

The world has made some important progress toward reducing food
insecurity.  For example, according to FAO estimates, 35 percent of
people in developing countries were chronically malnourished in
1969-71, but only 20 percent were by 1990-92.  However, FAO has
projected that, unless the root causes underlying food insecurity are
addressed by 2010, 700 million to 800 million persons worldwide will
still be chronically undernourished.  In sub-Saharan Africa alone,
FAO projects that the chronically undernourished will increase from
about 200 million to more than 300 million people in the next 15
years.  Most of the rest of the chronically undernourished will be
found in South Asia. 

Poverty is a primary obstacle to food security.  Worldwide, 1.3
billion people, or nearly one-quarter of the world's population, live
on less than
$1 a day.  Their low income makes them especially vulnerable when
prices for basic commodities increase rapidly and sharply.  Other
important factors affecting food security include weather, civil
strife and war, widespread unemployment or underemployment,
inadequate returns to food producers, unsustainable use of natural
resources, high-debt service, overvalued exchange rates, and
distorted international markets. 


      FUTURE OUTLOOK
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :1.1

In 1996, world grain stocks reached a 20-year low and grain prices
reached an all-time high,\1 and world food aid has been in a sharp
decline.  Food insecurity and food aid problems could increase
significantly over the short, medium, and long run.  There are
several reasons why this is so. 

Although population growth rates have been declining , the world's
population is expected to increase by 2.6 billion people by 2025.  As
a result, even with modest income growth, world food supplies will
have to at least double by that year, according to the World Bank.\2
The Bank concludes that due to land and water constraints, future
increases in food supplies must come primarily from increasing
yields, rather than from area expansion and more irrigation.  This
would require a doubling of current yields over the next 30 years,
which is uncertain. 

An October 1995 U.S.  Department of Agriculture (USDA) Economic
Research Service (ERS) study\3

found that world food aid needs will nearly double over the next
decade simply to maintain current consumption levels.  This is true
even if one makes reasonably optimistic assumptions about recipient
countries' ability to produce their own food or to import food
commercially.  Far higher food aid levels would be required if the
target was to meet minimum nutritional standards.  The study
concluded that there is a looming mismatch between food aid resources
and needs.  If global food aid budgets are maintained at 1995 levels,
the gap between needs and resources will grow rapidly.  Factors
limiting food aid availabilities include changes in agricultural
policies that will likely reduce agricultural surpluses and
reductions in aid budgets of donor countries.  According to the
study, funding will be the major factor affecting food aid shipments
in the future.  It noted that recent governmentwide budget reductions
in the United States and in some other countries have already
resulted in significant reductions in food aid donations.  For
example, food aid shipments of grain by donors peaked at 15.2 million
metric tons (mmt) in 1992-93, declined to 12.6 mmt in 1993-94, and
were estimated to have declined to 8.4 mmt in 1994-95.  U.S. 
shipments peaked at 8.5 mmt in 1992-93 and were estimated to drop to
4.2 mmt by 1994-95.  These reductions have already affected the food
security of at least some recipient countries. 

According to many experts, other factors affecting the future of
world food security include the following: 

  -- Many major agricultural producers, including the United States,
     Canada, Australia, and the European Union, are implementing
     increasingly more market-oriented agricultural policies, partly
     in response to the 1994 Uruguay Round trade agreement of the
     General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  More
     market-oriented policies are likely to result in a reduction of
     agricultural surpluses and in less grain held in stocks,
     particularly in government-held stocks.  Lower average stocks,
     in turn, may lead to more year-to-year volatility in grain
     markets.\4 Current U.S.  agricultural policy removes the link
     between income support payments and farm prices.  As a result,
     incentives for surplus agricultural production are diminished. 
     U.S.  government-held stocks are likely to decline sharply.\5

  -- Although signatories to the 1994 Uruguay Round trade agreement
     agreed to establish mechanisms to ensure that implementation
     would not adversely affect food aid commitments to meet the
     legitimate needs of developing countries and stressed the need
     for sufficient food aid, the signatories were not specific on
     how this is to be accomplished. 

  -- To the extent that trade liberalization results in slightly
     higher grain prices than without the agreement, food aid
     availabilities may be reduced because a given budget will
     purchase less grain. 


--------------------
\1 Grain prices have moderated in recent months.  See also footnote
4. 

\2 Alex F.  McCalla, Agriculture and Food Needs to 2025:  Why We
Should Be Concerned (Washington, D.C.:  The World Bank, Oct.  1994). 

\3 Food Aid Needs and Availabilities:  Projections for 2005
(Washington, D.C.:  USDA Economic Research Service, Oct.  1995). 

\4 In September 1996, USDA's Economic Research Service concluded that
relatively low stocks will persist through at least 1997 despite
projected increases in upcoming global harvests that will ease
immediate supply pressures.  This will leave the world particularly
vulnerable, it said, to major crop shortfalls or demand shocks, and
will very likely mean more price variability than in the past. 

\5 According to ERS, prospects for large-scale rebuilding of global
grain stocks in the next few years are slim, given budgetary
constraints and recent exporting countries' policies not to build
stocks.  Stock decisions will be increasingly made by the private
sector, ERS said, and private stock holding will likely be
substantially smaller than the large government stock levels of the
1980s. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

In 1994, the FAO Director General consulted with world leaders and
others about whether it would be useful to hold a global conference
on world food security issues, the first since 1974.  According to
U.S.  officials, initially there was considerable skepticism on the
part of the United States and a number of other countries.  However,
consensus eventually emerged on the desirability of renewing the 1974
commitment to achieve world food security for all and to agree upon
effective policies and strategies for dealing with the root causes of
hunger and malnutrition in the 1990s and beyond.  The consensus also
included understandings that the summit would not establish new
institutions for promoting food security or pledges from donor
countries for increased levels of assistance and that the summit
would be carefully planned to hold down costs. 

The primary products of the summit are to be (1) a policy declaration
containing seven major commitments for advancing global food
security, approved by heads of state or their representatives and (2)
a plan of action setting forth objectives and actions needed to
implement the policy commitments.  The FAO Secretariat prepared early
drafts of the policy statement and plan.  However, FAO member
countries found the drafts unacceptable and took over the drafting
process through the Committee on World Food Security (CFS).\6 To
facilitate reaching agreement, each member country government was
encouraged to prepare its own position paper on food security issues. 
In addition, FAO regional conferences addressed the subject. 
Intensive negotiations to reach agreement on a final document were
conducted between the end of July and the end of October, primarily
in CFS.  The intention was to secure agreement before the summit
itself.  During the summit, leaders would formally approve the policy
declaration and deliver speeches on the subject. 

U.S.  preparations for the summit have been led by a high-level
interagency working group consisting of 13 agencies and cochaired by
USDA's Under Secretary for Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services,
the Department of State's Under Secretary for Global Affairs, and the
Administrator of the U.S.  Agency for International Development
(USAID).  The interagency group produced a U.S.  government position
paper on food security issues and collaborated with Canadian
officials in drafting a joint "North America" position paper. 

According to the United States, the primary responsibility for
reducing food insecurity rests with each country, and it is critical
that all countries adopt policies that promote self-reliance and
facilitate food security at all levels, including food availability,
access, and utilization.  Furthermore, the most important
prerequisite for improving food security within a country is the
development and implementation of an appropriate policy framework. 
Other key U.S.  views include the following: 

  -- All countries should promote trade because self-sufficiency in
     food is not sustainable in many countries. 

  -- Governments should facilitate investments in infrastructure,
     invest in basic health and sanitary services, and develop
     institutions that promote sustainable development in a
     democratic and nondiscriminatory manner. 

  -- Over reliance on resource transfers from developed to developing
     countries is detrimental to self-reliance and food security. 

  -- The most progress in food security is achieved by nations that
     have pursued policy reform, macroeconomic stabilization, and
     structural adjustments. 

  -- The United States plans to concentrate its assistance on
     countries whose national policies enhance food security. 

According to U.S.  officials, negotiations on a draft policy
declaration and plan of action got underway in January 1996.  By late
July-early August, the discussions highlighted serious philosophical
differences between developed and developing countries regarding the
overall approach to food security and also among developed countries
regarding trade and other more specific issues.  As a result, the
negotiations became difficult and protracted.  From the perspective
of U.S.  goals for the summit, much of the discussion was (1) focused
on government intervention rather than government facilitation; (2)
protectionist rather than supportive of trade liberalization; and (3)
too centered on international resource transfers rather than on
national and private sector action to promote open markets, better
natural resource management, and population stabilization. 

A series of difficult and protracted bilateral and multilateral
negotiations were held in September and October.  Member countries
finally reached agreement on text for a policy declaration and plan
of action on October 31.  Some specific examples of key differences
that arose during the negotiations are as follows. 

  -- Right to Food and Other Human Rights.  Most countries were
     prepared to affirm that "every human being has the fundamental
     right to be free from hunger and malnutrition,.  .  ." language
     from the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and
     Cultural Rights, to which the United States is not a party.  The
     United States was reluctant to endorse a "right to food" because
     of concern within the Administration that the government might
     be opening the door to a possible lawsuit by malnourished
     individuals within the United States.  In addition, the United
     States was not willing to endorse a right to food without
     language also endorsing other human rights.  The final document
     affirms the right of everyone to be free from hunger but calls
     for work to clarify the right and better define the rights
     related to food and to propose ways to implement and realize
     these rights.  The document also concludes that promotion and
     protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms is
     essential. 

  -- Definition of Food Security.  Developing countries sought to
     define food security narrowly in terms of hunger, malnutrition,
     and poverty versus a broader definition, favored by the United
     States and others, that included conflict avoidance and
     resolution, sustainable development, environmental protection,
     good governance, population stabilization, human rights, and
     open markets.  Developing countries eventually agreed to define
     the term more broadly. 

  -- Environment.  The United States was concerned that the draft
     document did not pay sufficient attention to the importance of
     sustainable development.  A U.S.  proposal to include the term
     "environmental" into a list of policy frameworks--political,
     economic, and social--deemed essential to food security was not
     well supported by other countries.  Developing countries were
     particularly concerned about their ability to meet environmental
     commitments and thus the possibility that developed countries
     could raise trade barriers to their food and agricultural
     exports.  The United States was able to find several other
     places in the document where references to sustainable
     development and environmental issues were accepted by all
     countries.  For example, the final document notes that
     environmental degradation contributes significantly to food
     insecurity and states that increased food production should
     happen within the framework of sustainable management of natural
     resources.  At the same time, the international community and
     member countries commit to make every effort to ensure that
     environmental measures do not unfairly affect market access for
     developing countries' food and agricultural exports. 

  -- Population Stabilization.  The United States and many other
     countries sought language committing countries to take
     population concerns into account when developing economic and
     social development plans.  However, a very small but vocal group
     of developing countries insisted that there be no reference to
     population in the final document.  Some countries were not
     willing to accept references to population planning or
     reproductive health services on the ground that such language
     endorses abortions.  However, during the end of the October
     negotiating session, these countries agreed to accept language
     on population and reproductive health with reference to the 1994
     International Conference on Population and Development. 

  -- Pledges for New Assistance and Role of Private and Public
     Investment.  Notwithstanding the agreement that the summit would
     not be a pledging conference, developing countries sought
     commitments from donor countries to increase their levels of
     official development assistance and to resolve the external debt
     problems of the developing nations.  The developing countries
     eventually agreed that specific commitments would not be made. 

  -- Target Dates for Reducing/Eliminating Food Insecurity.  The
     developing countries and others sought a commitment to reduce by
     one-half the number of chronically malnourished people by 2010
     and to eliminate food insecurity within one generation.  The
     United States and a number of other countries felt these targets
     were not realistic.  Agreement was eventually reached on seeking
     to reduce the number of malnourished by one-half by 2015 and not
     cite any specific date for eliminating food insecurity. 

  -- Trade Liberalization.  The United States, Australia, Canada, and
     New Zealand, with support from exporting Group of Developing
     Countries (G-77), sought agreement on language calling for
     further agricultural trade liberalization.\7 Latin American and
     Southwest Pacific countries pushed for trade negotiations that
     would be based on the effective removal of subsidies and
     barriers that distort trade.  However, China, Japan, and South
     Korea emphasized a need to protect domestic food production, and
     many delegations said that domestic production must increase and
     trade-restrictive measures were essential and valid to achieve
     this purpose.  The final document essentially drops references
     to further trade liberalization beyond the Uruguay Round
     agreement and does not include language justifying trade
     protection. 

  -- Implementation of the Marrakesh Decision.\8 The 1994 GATT trade
     agreement included a written decision in which trade ministers
     agreed that during implementation of the agricultural trade
     reform program, appropriate mechanisms would be established to
     ensure that implementation of the reforms does not adversely
     affect the availability of food aid at a level that is
     sufficient to continue to provide assistance in meeting the food
     needs of developing countries, especially least-developed and
     net food-importing developing countries.  Developing countries,
     with considerable support from most other countries, favored
     including language calling for early or full implementation of
     the agreement.  The United States emphasized that it was too
     early for the reforms to have caused any measurable adverse
     effect and proposed language that the agreement would be
     effectively applied.  Eventually, the United States agreed to
     full implementation within the World Trade Organization. 

As with other recent international conferences, FAO sought wide
participation by interested NGOs in preparations for the summit. 
Among other activities, NGOs were encouraged to work with their
respective governments in expressing their views on food security. 
NGOs held regional forums to reach consensus on views that were
provided to the FAO regional conferences.  In September 1996, NGOs
from numerous countries held a global consultation and reached
consensus on a broad statement of key views that was provided to CFS
for use in its negotiations on the policy statement and plan of
action. 

The NGO statement differed in a number of significant ways from the
U.S.  government's position on food security issues.  For example,
the statement did not fully subscribe to reliance on free markets,
supported by self-sufficiency in food, and favored public regulation
of food prices.  In addition, NGOs did not fully endorse the view
that countries should produce those things in which they have a
comparative advantage and rely on trade to obtain those goods for
which they lack a comparative advantage.  According to the NGO
statement, developing countries are often forced to import food from
overseas, so their food security is subject to the vagaries of the
international market.  NGOs also concluded that international trade
liberalization is not the solution to the problem of food security
and in many cases undermines it. 

U.S.  NGOs were also active in preparations for the summit and
interacted with the U.S.  government in a variety of ways.  Most
importantly, they provided formal comments at two public forums held
by the U.S.  government and the U.S.  and Canadian governments,
respectively.  In addition, a number of U.S.  NGOs attended the
global consultation, where they generally endorsed the key points
statement issued by the NGOs in Rome.  Some of the U.S.  NGOs who
participated actively in the preparations for the summit told us that
they were disappointed with the U.S.  government's process for
securing and responding to their views.  In general, they felt that
the government waited too long before allowing them to comment on the
drafting of the U.S.  position paper, did not treat them as full
partners in the process, and did not seriously consider many of their
views.  U.S.  officials expressed surprise when advised about these
comments.  They felt that ample opportunity had been provided to NGOs
to participate in the process.  Moreover, they said U.S.  NGOs had
generally showed little interest until the approach of a
U.S.-sponsored public forum held in early June 1996. 

Appendixes I through V provide additional information on these
issues. 


--------------------
\6 The Committee on World Food Security is a Committee of the FAO's
Council.  It (1) continuously reviews the current and prospective
demand, supply, and stock position for basic foodstuffs within the
context of world food security; (2) makes periodic evaluations of the
adequacy of current and prospective stock levels in aggregate, as
well as in exporting and importing countries, to ensure a regular
flow of basic foodstuffs and food aid to domestic and world markets
in times of short crops or serious crop failures; (3) reviews steps
taken by governments to implement an international undertaking on
world food security; and (4) recommends such short-term and long-term
policy action as may be necessary to remedy any difficulty forseen in
ensuring adequate cereal supplies for minimum world food security. 

\7 G-77 countries are a group of developing countries that signed a
joint statement in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1964 articulating members'
collective interests in the areas of promoting economic cooperation
among developing countries and in negotiating economic matters with
developing countries.  G-77 membership is now over 125 countries. 

\8 The understanding was made in Marrakesh, Morocco, and is commonly
referred to as the Marrakesh Decision. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of
Agriculture, the Secretary of State, and the USAID Administrator, or
their designees.  We obtained oral comments on November 1, 1996. 
Representatives of these agencies generally agreed with the
information presented in this report but asked that we update our
discussion of the negotiations to reflect developments through
October 31, 1966.  We did so.  They provided their perspective on our
discussion of the views of a number of U.S.  NGOs concerning U.S. 
preparations for the summit.  Their perspective is presented in this
letter and and in appendix V.  In addition, they provided some
technical comments, which we incorporated into the report where
appropriate. 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

Numerous federal agencies have been involved in the development of
U.S.  objectives for the World Food Summit.  We identified the role
played by each but concentrated especially on those agencies that are
shown to have been the leading players.  These were USDA, the
Department of State, and USAID.  We also attended several high-level
interagency working group meetings.  We monitored the September and
late October negotiating sessions of CFS in Rome, Italy.  We met with
representatives of 17 U.S.  NGOs that were actively involved in
preparations for the summit and obtained their views.\9 We also
attended two open forums that USDA, State, and USAID held in June
1996, at which many NGOs commented on draft U.S.  position papers. 
In addition, we observed the NGO global consultation in Rome. 

We obtained and analyzed relevant studies, reports, and other
documents from U.S.  government agencies, as well as international
organizations (primarily FAO, the International Food Policy Research
Institute (IFPRI), and the World Bank) and private entities.  In
addition, we obtained testimonial evidence from relevant U.S. 
government officials; officials of several foreign governments, FAO,
the World Food Program, and World Bank officials; and other experts. 

To describe the recent status of world food security and U.S.  food
assistance levels, we made use of data compiled by others, including
U.S.  government agencies such as ERS and USAID, and international
organizations such as FAO and the World Bank.  We did not make
independent projections of world agricultural production or food
security.  Rather, we relied on a review and assessment of the
results of studies conducted by other experts, as well as testimonial
evidence by experts concerning such studies. 

We conducted our review from May 1996 to November 1996 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


--------------------
\9 They were the Adventist Development and Relief Agency, Associates
of the National Agricultural Library, Bread for the World Institute,
CARE, Center of Concern, Coalition for Food Aid, Earthsave
International, Harrison Institute for Public Law, Humane Society of
the United States, Institute for Agriculture and Trade, Lutheran
World Relief, Maryknoll Fathers and Brothers, National Farmers Union,
Save the Children, U.S.  Network for Habitat II, World Food Day, and
World Sustainable Agriculture. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1

We are sending copies of this report to USDA's Under Secretary for
Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services, the State Department's Under
Secretary for Global Affairs, and the Administrator of USAID.  We
will also send copies to appropriate congressional committees. 
Copies will be made available to others upon request. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4128.  The major contributors to this report
were
Phillip J.  Thomas, Gezahegne Bekele, and Wayne H.  Ferris. 

Harold J.  Johnson, Associate Director
International Relations and Trade Issues


ORIGIN, PURPOSE, AND FINANCING OF
THE 1996 WORLD FOOD SUMMIT
=========================================================== Appendix I

During 1994 the Director General of the U.N.  Food and Agricultural
Organization (FAO) consulted a large number of heads of state and
government and delegations from all global regions represented at FAO
about whether it would be useful to hold a summit of world leaders to
address global food security issues, the first since 1974.  The
Director General felt that the personal participation of heads of
state and government was needed to mobilize all the government
departments required to provide a comprehensive vision of the
multiple dimensions of the food issue.  In addition, it was expected
that the high visibility of a summit would be more effective in
raising awareness at the level of policy- and decision-making in the
public and private sectors, as well as among the media and the public
at large. 

According to U.S.  officials, initially there was considerable
skepticism on the part of the United States and a number of other
countries.  For one thing, several summits on other issues had
already been held or scheduled in the 1990s,\1 and successful summits
require considerable preparation and involvement of high-level
officials over a sustained period of time.  Consequently, there was
concern about whether governments would have sufficient energy and
time to prepare for another summit, as well as the willingness to pay
for the added expenses of both the preparations and a summit itself. 
For another thing, there was concern that a summit might simply
become a vehicle whereby low-income, food-deficit countries would
seek additional pledges of assistance from developed countries and
not meaningfully address the root causes of food insecurity. 

Eventually, the Director General found an emerging consensus on the
desirability of convening a World Food Summit.  Its purpose would be
to renew the 1974 commitment to end hunger for all and to agree upon
effective policies and strategies for dealing with the root causes of
hunger and malnutrition in the 1990s and beyond.  In October 1995,
FAO members gave their unanimous approval to the Director General's
proposal to convene the summit.  During the preceding months, growing
support for the summit had been confirmed by discussions at sessions
of the FAO Council and FAO regional conferences, as well as by
resolutions and recommendations adopted at numerous other
intergovernmental meetings. 

FAO members agreed that the summit would not require monetary pledges
from developed to developing countries, nor would it create new
financial mechanisms, institutions, or bureaucracy.  Each
participating nation would consider independently how and what it
might want to contribute to the implementation of the policies,
strategies, and plan of action that would be adopted by the summit. 
Members also agreed that the summit would be carefully planned to
keep costs to a minimum and at the same time ensure sound preparation
in terms of physical arrangements and logistics; technical and policy
documents; and consultation with governments, nongovernmental
organizations (NGO), and others.  Some of the steps taken to hold
down costs include the following: 

  -- Regularly scheduled sessions of FAO's governing bodies,
     including members' regional conferences and the Committee on
     World Food Security (CFS), were to be used to the maximum extent
     possible for summit preparations. 

  -- The summit would be held in FAO's headquarters in Rome, using
     existing conference facilities and services, to avoid costs to
     both FAO and member nations resulting from holding such a
     meeting away from the headquarters. 

  -- The organizational work was entrusted to a small group of
     professionals from various FAO departments, who will return to
     their normal work following the end of the summit.  Permanent
     representatives of governments to FAO's headquarters in Rome
     would fully participate in the process. 

  -- Maximum use was to be made of FAO's own expertise to prepare a
     comprehensive set of technical documents in advance of the
     summit, and the cooperation of other organizations was sought in
     their preparation. 

  -- The basic costs of holding the summit were to be financed by
     FAO's regular program.  However, voluntary contributions in cash
     and in kind have been sought to cover other costs, in
     particular, to encourage wide participation from developing
     countries and NGOs. 

  -- All participants are being encouraged to avoid holding
     receptions and dinners during the summit and to donate any funds
     that would have been used for hospitality to the financing of a
     special program for food production in support of low-income,
     food-deficit countries. 

In September 1996, the Secretary General for the World Food Summit
told us that about $2 million had been budgeted for the World Food
Summit for 1996 to cover the costs of such things as pay for staff
detailed from FAO to work on the summit and extra meetings.\2 She
said the $2 million would not cover all of the extra costs and that
she did not yet know what the overall additional cost would be. 
However, the Secretary General said that a considerable amount of
money had been saved by the use of the FAO's regular meetings and
facilities to handle the summit. 


--------------------
\1 Among others, they include the International Conference on
Nutrition (1992), U.N.  Convention on the Law of the Sea (1992),
Convention on Biological Diversity (1992), U.N.  Conference on
Environment and Development (1992), World Conference on Human Rights
(1993), International Conference on Population and Development
(1994), World Summit for Social Development (1995), Kyoto Declaration
and Plan of Action on the Sustainable Contribution of Fisheries to
Food Security (1995), Fourth World Conference on Women (1995), and
the Leipzig Declaration on and the Global Plan of Action for the
Conservation and Sustainable Utilization for Plant Genetic Resources
for Food and Agriculture (1996). 

\2 The Secretary General said that the Inter-Sessional Working Group
meetings and the September CFS meeting were not considered regular
meetings. 


THE PROCESS OF PREPARING A POLICY
STATEMENT AND PLAN OF ACTION FOR
APPROVAL BY WORLD LEADERS
========================================================== Appendix II

The summit is to be held in Rome during November 13-17, 1996.  The
primary product of the summit is intended to be a policy declaration
and plan of action on universal food security, for implementation by
all parties concerned:  governments, international institutions, and
all sectors of civil society.  The policy statement, to be signed by
heads of state or their representatives, is to be a relatively brief,
concise statement on the problem confronting the world and broadly
stated commitments for addressing the situation.  The plan of action
is to be a longer document that sets out objectives and actions
considered necessary to fulfill the commitments made in the policy
declaration. 

The process for preparing a policy statement and plan of action for
approval by world leaders has included several major elements: 

  -- drafting of a policy statement and plan of action document,
     initially by the Secretariat and subsequently by CFS or the
     Inter-Sessional Working Group;

  -- drafting by CFS members of individual countries papers to form
     the basis for positions that each country's government would
     advocate in negotiations leading up to the summit;

  -- discussion of the subject at FAO regional conferences, with
     suggestions and recommendations for the policy statement and
     plan of action forwarded to CFS;

  -- discussion of the subject by various forums of NGOs, with
     suggestions and recommendations for the policy statement and
     plan of action forwarded to member countries, the FAO regional
     conferences, or CFS; and

  -- negotiations on drafts of a policy statement/plan of action by
     CFS and its subordinate groups. 


      FAO DRAFT POLICY DECLARATION
      AND PLAN OF ACTION
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:0.1

In April 1995, well before the FAO's approval of convening a summit,
the FAO Secretariat drafted what were referred to as possible
elements of a draft policy declaration and plan of action for world
leaders to sign at a summit.  These elements were presented to and
discussed by member countries at FAO meetings.  In December 1995, the
Secretariat prepared a draft policy statement/plan of action that
sought to take account of the members' views.  This draft was
reviewed at a meeting of CFS from January 29 through February 2,
1996.  The U.S.  view was that the draft was generally acceptable in
substance, but overly long and unfocused.  Other CFS members were
also not satisfied with the document.  Member countries asked the
Secretariat to prepare a revised draft document.  CFS established an
Inter-Sessional Working Group to conduct its work until its next
scheduled meeting in September. 

The Secretariat's revised draft was reviewed by the Inter-Sessional
Working Group in March 1996.  The group was still not satisfied with
the document and decided to take over the drafting process.  (Since
then, the Secretariat has acted as technical adviser and facilitator
in the drafting process.) A small committee that included the
officers of the Inter-Sessional Working Group, known as the Bureau,
was charged with preparing the next draft of a policy statement/plan
of action. 

In addition, FAO regional conferences, held between March and early
July (for the Near East, Africa, Europe, Asia and the Pacific, and
Latin America and the Caribbean), also discussed the policies and
priority actions needed to ensure food security in the member
countries of the respective regions.  To stimulate discussion on the
issue, the Secretariat provided each conference with a paper on the
food security situation and issues in its respective region.  Each
paper also included a proposed draft statement on actions for
addressing regional food security, along with the Secretariat's
observation that the conference could recommend its transmission to
CFS as that region's contribution to the World Food Summit plan of
action.  In addition, the Secretariat provided the regional
conferences with a copy of its March draft policy statement and plan
of action. 

The regional conferences provided member state governments with
another vehicle for providing guidance to their Rome-based
representatives on what they would like to see in a policy statement
and plan of action.\1 It was hoped that the conferences would begin
the process of building consensus that would lead to the eventual
approval of a draft document by all CFS members. 

Based on comments and amendments proposed by members of the
Inter-Sessional Working Group at its May and June meetings, as well
as consultations with Regional Chairs of CFS and individual members
and observers of the Inter-Sessional Working Group, in early July the
Bureau prepared a new draft policy statement and plan of action for
discussion by the Inter-Sessional Working Group from July 29 through
August 2, 1996.  (See app.  IV for a discussion of key issues that
arose during negotiations between late July and the end of October
1996.)


--------------------
\1 A few of the regional conferences took unusual steps.  For
example, CFS members at the European conference refused to discuss
the FAO Secretariat's draft of possible European actions to be
recommended for the plan of action.  The regional conference for
Latin America and the Caribbean also chose to ignore the
Secretariat's paper.  Instead, it focused on a draft statement and
plan of action that had been prepared in Rome by the Latin American
representatives to FAO.  Attendees agreed to adopt the Rome-produced
document but to also include a nonconsensus appendix containing
delegations' comments on the document. 


U.S.  APPROACH TO THE SUMMIT
========================================================= Appendix III

Key actions taken by the U.S.  government in preparing for the summit
include establishing a high-level interagency working group to
oversee and guide the process, preparing a U.S.  government position
paper on the World Food Summit, preparing jointly with Canada a North
American position paper on the summit, and inviting NGOs and the
public more generally to provide input to the process. 

As early as April 1995, the U.S.  government designated the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) as the lead agency for U.S. 
preparations for the summit and established a "core group" comprising
representatives from USDA, the State Department, and the U.S.  Agency
for International Development (USAID) to staff the issue.  The U.S. 
National Secretary for the summit was a USDA official from the
Foreign Agriculture Service, and he chaired the core group. 
According to U.S.  officials, the group was not very active between
then and the early part of 1996 but did help prepare positions on the
FAO Secretariat's draft and subsequent draft policy action and plan
of action. 

In late March 1996, USDA's Under Secretary for Farm and Foreign
Agricultural Services, with the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture, took action to expand the interagency process.  The goal
was to fully engage USDA and other agencies in addressing broad
policy issues and preparing for the summit, including developing a
U.S.  country paper, providing regional coordination with Canada,
securing input from the public, and establishing policy guidance for
U.S.  negotiators.  A high-level Interagency Working Group (IWG) was
established.  Initially, it was cochaired by the USDA Under Secretary
and the State Department's Under Secretary for Global Affairs. 
Subsequently, USAID's Administrator was designated as third cochair. 
IWG includes broad representation.  In addition to the three cochair
agencies, it has representatives from the Office of the Vice
President, the National Security Council, the National Economic
Council, the Office of the U.S.  Trade Representative (USTR), the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Department of the
Treasury, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, the
Department of Health and Human Services, the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Central
Intelligence Agency, and the National Intelligence Council.  As of
October 31, 1996, IWG had met seven times. 

At the same time, the interagency core group was expanded to include,
on an as-needed and as-desired basis, staff at the working level to
do much of the day-to-day work.  The core group has met on a weekly
basis and prepared the various drafts of the U.S.  country paper, the
U.S.  draft input into the North American paper, and positions for
negotiations in CFS.  Much of the core group work has been staffed by
USDA, the State Department, and USAID.  However, some other agencies
have had considerable input on certain specific issues.  For example,
USTR has played a key role with regard to trade issues and the
Department of Commerce with regard to world fishery issues. 

The core group prepared a draft paper for discussion at the first IWG
meeting on April 8, 1996.  Based on comments received, the paper was
substantially revised and was considered the first draft of the U.S. 
country position paper for the World Food Summit.  The paper was
discussed at the second IWG meeting on April 30.  Thereafter, the
draft went through additional revisions before being finalized in
early July.  The paper is entitled "The U.S.  Contribution to World
Food Security." During approximately the same period of time, members
of the core group, with oversight by IWG, collaborated with Canadian
officials in drafting a joint paper titled "Food Security Situation
and Issues:  A North American Perspective."\1 Both papers formed the
bases for positions that the United States advocated in negotiations
leading up to the summit. 


--------------------
\1 In conformity with FAO's regional organization, the term "North
America" refers to Canada and the United States.  Mexico is part of
FAO's regional group for Latin America and the Caribbean. 


   INVOLVEMENT OF NGOS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:1

As discussed in a later section, U.S.  NGOs with an interest in food
security provided comments to the U.S.  government as it was
developing the U.S.  position paper and the joint position paper with
Canada.  In addition, they have participated in other activities
designed to influence the content of the policy declaration and plan
of action. 


   U.S.  POSITION ON SUBSTANTIVE
   ISSUES
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2

The U.S.  position paper, finalized in early July, and the
U.S.-Canada North American paper, finalized in early August, formed
the basis for positions that the United States has advocated in
negotiations leading up to the summit.  These papers summarize the
U.S.  analysis of the principal causes of food insecurity at the
individual, household, local, national, and global levels and
identify major actions that the U.S.  government believes are needed
to reduce food insecurity.  The United States sought to persuade CFS
and its various working groups to draft and adopt a policy statement
and plan of action that is consistent with the U.S.  overall
assessment of the problem and actions needed to reduce food
insecurity. 

In the U.S.  view, food insecurity is a complex problem with multiple
causes:  natural disasters; war and civil strife; inappropriate
national policies; poverty; barriers to trade; environmental
degradation; excessive population growth; gender inequality; poor
health; and inadequate development, dissemination, adaptation, and
adoption of agricultural and other research and technology. 

According to U.S.  policy, the primary responsibility for reducing
food insecurity rests with each country, and it is critical that all
countries adopt policies that promote self-reliance and facilitate
food security at all levels, including food availability, access, and
utilization.  Furthermore, the most important prerequisite for
improving food security within a country is the development and
implementation of an appropriate policy framework.  The United States
advocates the following national policies and actions to improve food
security: 

  -- Governments should act as facilitators rather than intervenors. 
     National policies that facilitate the development of markets and
     expand the individual's freedom of action are the best guarantor
     of national food security.  Such policies require transparency
     and the opportunity for full and meaningful participation in
     decision-making by all members of society.  Governments should
     create and sustain a stable economic environment that is
     conducive to the full participation of the private sector and
     foster political stability without resorting to repressive
     measures.  Governments should combat graft and corruption
     wherever it exists, especially in the political and economic
     systems. 

  -- All countries should work to promote liberalized trade to
     maximize the potential for economic growth (within the context
     of sustainable development) and to realize the benefits of
     comparative advantage.  Self-sufficiency in food production is
     not a viable or sustainable solution for many countries. 
     Governments should provide a macroeconomic and trade environment
     with linkages to global markets so that long-term changes are
     transmitted to the domestic economy, thus avoiding macroeconomic
     imbalances that could induce destabilizing adjustments. 

  -- Governments should invest in a public goods infrastructure that
     includes transportation, communication, education, and social
     safety nets.  And it should provide basic health and sanitary
     services, maintain basic levels of nutrition, and facilitate
     voluntary population stabilization. 

  -- Governments should ensure a political system that does not
     discriminate against women.  All countries must recognize the
     essential role of women, who work to produce more than half of
     the food in developing countries.  Greater emphasis needs to be
     placed on child survival, family planning, and other
     reproductive health information and services. 

  -- Governments should establish a general development policy that
     (1) does not discriminate against agricultural or fisheries
     sectors nor against rural or coastal areas and (2) recognizes
     that poverty alleviation requires an integrated approach to
     rural development. 

  -- Governments should develop institutions and land tenure systems
     that provide broad access to land services and incentives for
     users to protect and invest in the long-term productivity of
     natural resources. 

  -- All countries should promote the critical role of sustainable
     development in the agriculture, forestry, and fisheries sectors,
     and these policies must be environmentally sound.  Governments
     should adopt policies that provide an effective incentive
     structure for sustainable management of natural resources,
     including soil, water, and genetic resource management, and
     preservation of biological diversity.  Food, agricultural, and
     fishery policies should be consistent with the resource
     endowment of the country and supportive of its natural
     comparative advantage. 

  -- Greater emphasis needs to be placed on agricultural research and
     extension services.  Governments should emphasize investment in
     agricultural research and technical education, international
     research systems, and policies that facilitate the flow of
     knowledge and technology among and within countries while
     protecting intellectual property rights so necessary to provide
     incentives for private sector research. 

In the U.S.  view, countries that have demonstrated the most progress
in achieving food security are those that have seriously pursued
policy reform, macroeconomic stabilization, and structural
adjustment, while focusing government activities on public goods
investment and the provision of safety nets.  The United States
believes that such commitment and assumption of responsibility at the
national level create a climate conducive to private and public
external investment.  Consequently, the United States has said that
it plans to concentrate its assistance efforts on those countries
that are willing to review and change their national policies to
improve their own food security.  This approach is consistent with
USAID statements in recent years that it is concentrating its
assistance efforts on those countries that are partners in
development and that can achieve sustainable development results. 
According to USAID, sustainable development cannot be achieved in
countries that are not willing to change their policies, do not allow
their own citizens to participate adequately in the development
process, and have not invested their own resources in sustainable
development or have invested a disproportionate amount in the
military at the expense of development. 


   ACTIONS ADVOCATED BY THE UNITED
   STATES TO ASSIST THE FOOD
   INSECURE COUNTRIES
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:3

In September 1996, the United States advised other countries that in
the U.S.  view, the international community can play a catalytic role
in helping food-insecure countries by providing development
assistance and, where necessary emergency food aid.  However, the
United States said that an overreliance on resource transfers from
the developed to the developing countries will only decrease, rather
than enhance, self-reliance and the achievement of food security. 

Consistent with the agreed-upon aims of the World Food Summit, during
negotiations on the policy declaration and plan of action, the United
States has opposed language that might be interpreted as requiring
additional resource pledges by the developed countries or the
creation of new financial mechanisms, institutions, or bureaucracies. 
This approach is also consistent with U.S.  budgetary constraints and
congressionally mandated reductions in foreign assistance
expenditures.  In addition, it should be noted that the United States
is in arrears on its dues owed to the United Nations, and some of its
specialized agencies, for example, FAO.  According to U.S.  officials
to whom we spoke, OMB advised IWG that the United States was not in a
position to make new resource commitments to food-insecure countries
during the World Food Summit.  These officials also said that many
other developed countries also face a difficult budget environment
and are also unwilling to consider new pledges during the summit. 

Although the United States is not prepared to pledge additional
resources at this time, the government has said that it intends to
continue to play a major role in promoting food security around the
world.  According to the U.S.  position paper, the United States
plans to accomplish this objective by

  -- enhancing U.S.  government support for research and technology
     development in agriculture and related sectors, both at home and
     abroad;

  -- employing an integrated approach to sustainable development,
     with a strong emphasis on those countries that show a good-faith
     willingness to adopt necessary policy reforms;

  -- continuing support for food security through the use of
     agriculture programs, development assistance, and food aid;

  -- continuing support for international efforts to respond to and
     prevent humanitarian crises that create a need for emergency
     food;

  -- continuing efforts to encourage and facilitate implementation of
     food security-related actions adopted at recent international
     conferences or established in recently agreed-to conventions;\2

  -- working within the multilateral system to enhance global
     approaches to food security;

  -- working with all countries to achieve freer trade and to ensure
     that the benefits are equitably realized and urging all
     countries to open their markets in the interest of achieving
     greater stability and participation in the world market; and

  -- continuing to work toward food security for all Americans. 


--------------------
\2 During September 1996 negotiations on the policy declaration and
plan of action, the United States supported inclusion of references
to conclusions reached and action plans adopted at a number of recent
international conferences and conventions.  In the U.S.  view,
implementation of the goals of these conferences and conventions can
make a significant contribution to global food security.  For
example, the 1992 U.N.  Conference on Environment and Development,
the 1992 International Conference on Nutrition, the 1994 U.N. 
Conference on Population, and the 1995 Fourth World Conference on
Women emphasized sustainable national policies that would help
promote global food security.  At the same time, U.S.  negotiators
opposed language that would represent a significant retreat from the
conclusions and goals of recent international forums. 


KEY ISSUES THAT HAVE ARISEN DURING
THE NEGOTIATIONS
========================================================== Appendix IV

The Inter-Sessional Working Group met from July 29 to August 2, 1996,
to address the Bureau's revised policy statement and plan of action. 
According to U.S.  officials,

  -- the discussions and negotiations highlighted serious
     philosophical differences between developed and developing
     countries regarding the overall approach to food security and
     also among developed countries regarding trade and other more
     specific issues;

  -- the session was largely an exercise in adding to the draft text
     and proposing specific language changes (by the end of the
     meeting, the text had increased to 40 pages and about 800
     bracketed items (text on which consensus was lacking)); and

  -- much of the discussion was (1) disconcertingly focused on
     government intervention rather than on government facilitation;
     (2) protectionist rather than supportive of trade
     liberalization; and (3) too centered on international resource
     transfers rather than on national-level and private-sector
     action--including promotion of open markets, better natural
     resource management, and population stabilization--to encourage
     self-reliance and household food security. 

Nonetheless, U.S.  officials concluded the meeting was relatively
productive, particularly because member country delegations came to
the meeting prepared not only to discuss but also to negotiate, to a
limited extent, the draft text.  As a result, positions of the
respective groups were tabled, an important prerequisite for
negotiation. 

On September 21, CFS met to further negotiate the draft document that
had resulted from the late July-early August meeting.\1 The
negotiations were lengthy and cumbersome, partly because of (1) the
large number of bracketed text items that had to be addressed, (2)
important substantive differences of views, and (3) language
translation problems. 

Although several substantive issues remained unresolved at the end of
the round of negotiations on September 30, the U.S.  view was that
significant progress had been made.  At the start of the informal
negotiations, on September 20, CFS country delegations were working
with a draft document of approximately 40 pages and 800 brackets of
text.  When the negotiations broke off, the draft documents had been
reduced from approximately 40 pages to 35 pages, and the roughly 800
bracketed items had been reduced to about 220. 

Following a personal appeal by the FAO Director General, the FAO
Council suspended part of its October session to permit a 2-day
reconvening of CFS.  CFS met on October 8-9 to seek additional
consensus on bracketed points.  The session was useful in removing
some brackets and clarifying positions on remaining difficult issues. 
However, there was no movement on major issues. 

On October 28-31, CFS met again with the avowed purpose of obtaining
consensus on all remaining issues.  In fact, the committee reached
agreement on a consensus text to be submitted to heads of state or
their representatives at the summit.  It is up to each member
country's government to decide whether to enter reservations or
interpretations with regard to specific parts of the text. 
Governments have until November 13 to advise if they have any
reservations or interpretations with regard to the text.  A
reservation means that a government does not agree with the passage
cited.  In an interpretative statement, a government explains its
position with regard to the passage cited. 


--------------------
\1 The September negotiations had originally been scheduled to last 5
days, with a goal of reaching full consensus on both the policy
statement and plan of action.  However, the negotiations were
extended because of the large number of unresolved issues.  Two days
of informal negotiations were conducted prior to the scheduled start
on September 21, and negotiations continued for another 3 days beyond
the originally planned end date of September 27. 


   BROAD OUTLINE OF AN OVERALL
   AGREEMENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1

The agreed-upon text includes seven broadly stated commitments. 

One:  We will ensure an enabling political, social, and economic
environment designed to create the best conditions for the
eradication of poverty and for durable peace, based on full and equal
participation of women and men, which is most conducive to achieving
sustainable food security for all. 

Two:  We will implement policies aimed at eradicating poverty and
inequality and improving physical and economic access by all, at all
times, to sufficient, nutritionally adequate, and safe food and its
effective utilization. 

Three:  We will pursue participatory and sustainable food,
agriculture, fisheries, forestry, and rural development policies and
practices in high- and low- potential areas, which are essential to
maintaining adequate and reliable food supplies at the household,
national, regional and global levels, and combat pests, drought, and
desertification, considering the multifunctional character of
agriculture. 

Four:  We will strive to ensure that food, agricultural trade, and
overall trade policies are conducive to fostering food security for
all through a fair and market-oriented world trade system. 

Five:  We will endeavor to prevent and be prepared for natural
disasters and man-made emergencies and to meet transitory and
emergency food requirements in ways that encourage recovery,
rehabilitation, development, and a capacity to satisfy future needs. 

Six:  We will promote optimal allocation and use of public and
private investments to foster human resources, sustainable food,
agriculture, fisheries and forestry systems, and rural development,
in high- and low- potential areas. 

Seven:  We will implement, monitor, and follow-up this plan of action
at all levels in cooperation with the international community. 


   SIGNIFICANT ISSUES THAT EMERGED
   DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:2

Key issues that arose during the July through October negotiations
include the following. 


      RIGHT TO FOOD, CODE OF
      CONDUCT, AND RESPECT FOR
      HUMAN RIGHTS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IV:2.1

The draft policy statement contained bracketed text affirming that
"every human being has the fundamental right to be free from hunger
and malnutrition." The phrase "right to be free from hunger" is from
the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, to which the United States is not a party.  The language was
originally introduced into the draft policy statement and plan of
action at the request of FAO.  At the request of the United States,
this language remained bracketed at the end of the September
negotiations.  The United States preferred language from the U.N. 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which states that "every human
being has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health
and well-being of himself (herself) and family, including food."
However, it deserves noting that in 1974 the United States endorsed
the World Food Conference's Declaration, which proclaimed that "every
man, woman, and child has the inalienable right to be free from
hunger and malnutrition."

U.S.  officials told us that when it comes to endorsing human rights,
the United States prefers to focus on political rights, such as free
speech and religion, rather than on things over which governments
have less control, such as food, housing, water, and so forth.  For
example, one official said, the U.S.  government has for decades
subscribed to the "aspirational goal" of everyone's right to be free
from hunger but does not "guarantee" such a right to every citizen. 
According to another U.S.  official, the United States vests rights
to pursue objectives (such as to develop to one's full potential)
rather than rights to objects (such as food and housing). 
Governments alone are not the only actors who provide things to
people.  Most people in society secure food either by growing it
themselves or purchasing it in the marketplace.  Policies are needed
that allow people to pursue their basic needs.  In the United States
you cannot simply say that people have a right to housing or food,
the official said.  Rather, people have a right to protection that
enables them to pursue their basic needs. 

The United States has also been reluctant to endorse a "right to
food" because of concern within the Administration that the
government might be opening the door to a possible lawsuit by
undernourished individuals within the United States. 

The September negotiations scarcely discussed the right-to-food issue
because the proposed language appeared in the policy declaration, and
the declaration was only negotiated briefly at the end of the CFS
session.  Most of the negotiations concerned language in the plan of
action.  The September draft plan of action also proposed that FAO
and the U.N.  High Commissioner for Human Rights should better define
or clarify what a "right to food" means and propose ways to implement
the right.  One bracketed suggestion would require that FAO and the
Commissioner consider the appropriateness of formulating an
international code of conduct for implementing the right to food. 

In the U.S.  view, any consideration of endorsing a right to food and
a code of conduct needed to occur within the context of references to
other human rights.  During the September negotiations, some
countries opposed including language affirming "respect for human
rights." A State Department official told us that if other countries
were not willing to endorse other important human rights, it would
not make sense for the United States to agree to endorse a right to
food.  The official indicated that the United States would be
prepared to see the summit not go forward if agreement could not be
reached on this point. 

The completed text agreed to by CFS at the end of October reaffirms
the right of everyone to have access to safe and nutritious food,
consistent with the right to adequate food and the fundamental right
of everyone to be free from hunger.  The document also states that
promotion and protection of all human rights and fundamental
freedoms, including the right to development and the progressive
realization of the right to adequate food for all, is indispensable
to the goal of achieving sustainable food security for all.  The
final document drops specific reference to a code of conduct. 
However, members stated their objective to clarify the content of the
right to adequate food and the fundamental right of everyone to be
free from hunger, as stated in the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.  More specifically, they
invited the U.N.  High Commissioner for Human Rights, in consultation
and collaboration with others, to better define the rights related to
food and to propose ways to implement and realize these rights as a
means of achieving the commitments and objectives of the World Food
Summit.  In addition, the document specifically noted that some
countries are not parties to the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights. 

According to the U.S.  Permanent Representative to FAO in Rome, the
United States is pleased that the final document recognizes the
importance of all human rights and recognizes the need to further
clarify what is meant by rights related to food as stated in the
covenant.  In his view, since the United States is not a party to the
covenant, the United States is likely to file an interpretive
statement indicating that the document's objectives and actions
relating to the covenant do not apply to the United States. 

On a related issue, the final text affirms that food should not be
used as an instrument for economic and political pressure.  It
specifically underscores the importance of international cooperation
in refraining from unilateral measures consistent with the
international law and the Charter of the United Nations.  This
language was the result of a compromise essentially between Cuba,
Iran, Iraq, and Libya on the one hand and the United States on the
other hand. 


      CONFLICT AVOIDANCE AND
      CONFLICT RESOLUTION;
      DEMOCRACY AND GOOD
      GOVERNANCE; AND OPEN MARKETS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IV:2.2

During the July negotiations, many developed countries proposed that
open markets and representative democracy were the best foundations
for sustainable food security, but many developing countries
responded that poverty and underdevelopment were problems that
required eradication before the developing world focused on
institution-building.  Concepts of democracy, conflict avoidance and
resolution, peace, and responsibility of governments were quickly
bracketed, and G-77 group repeatedly accused the industrialized
countries of the Northern Hemisphere of trying to impose their ideas
on the less developed countries of the Southern Hemisphere.  Further,
G-77 sought to delete the term "political" from the commitment,
calling on governments to ensure "an enabling political, social and
economic environment, designed to achieve the best conditions for the
reduction of poverty and durable peace."

In September 1996, the United States and many other countries
supported language for the plan of action whereby countries would
commit to ensuring a "democratic" political environment and "good
governance." However, they were opposed by countries from G-77 and
China.  As a result, the draft policy statement contained bracketed
text affirming support for democracy and good governance.  The United
States considered this a major unresolved issue. 

The completed text agreed to by CFS at the end of October includes
the following objective:  To prevent and resolve conflicts peacefully
and create a stable political environment, through respect for all
human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy, a transparent and
effective legal framework, transparent and accountable governance and
administration in all public and private national and international
institutions, and effective and equal participation of all people, at
all levels, in decisions and actions that affect their food security. 


      ENVIRONMENT
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IV:2.3

Another major issue from the perspective of the United States had to
do with sustainable development and environmental concerns.  The
United States was concerned that the July 1996 draft document did not
pay sufficient attention to the importance of sustainable
development.  Initially, developing countries were reluctant to
include proposed additions to the text on this matter.  In addition,
when the U.S.  delegation sought to insert the term "environmental"
into a list of policy frameworks--political, economic, and
social--deemed essential to food security, most other countries were
not supportive.  However, the United States was able to find places
in the document where references to sustainable development and
environmental issues were accepted by all countries.  For example,
the final document notes that environmental degradation contributes
significantly to food insecurity and states that increased food
production, which must be undertaken, should happen within the
framework of sustainable management of natural resources. 

G-77 countries were particularly concerned about the possible use of
environmental measures as trade barriers to their food and
agricultural exports.  In the final document, the international
community, in cooperation with governments and civil society,\2
pledge, as appropriate, to make every effort to ensure that
environmental measures do not unfairly affect market access for
developing countries' food and agricultural exports. 


--------------------
\2 Civil society is a term that includes individuals, corporations,
and NGOs. 


      POPULATION STABILIZATION
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IV:2.4

The United States and many other countries sought language committing
countries to take population concerns into account when developing
economic and social development plans.  However, a very small but
vocal group of developing countries, taking a very narrowly focused
view of what is involved to achieve food security, insisted that
there was no relationship between food security and population
stabilization and, therefore, no reference to population should be in
the document.  Some of the same countries were also not willing to
accept references to reproductive health on the grounds, as they
define it, such language could involve abortions. 

The U.S.  delegation and others argued that the ability to reconcile
food needs with the constraints imposed on food production by natural
resource endowments and environmental degradation argues strongly for
continuing the recent slowing of population growth with the goal of
eventually stabililizing population.  The United States also argued
that integrating population and reproductive health strategies is key
to addressing the cycle of frequent pregnancies and increasing child
care demands that diminish a woman's capacity to provide a
nutritional diet for her family or take advantage of new technologies
or market opportunities to improve food security.  According to a
U.S.  official, the U.S.  approach was consistent with language
agreed to in previous international conferences that recognized that
population programs and reproductive health care are an integral part
of social, economic, and cultural development, which focuses on
meeting the needs of individual men and women and improving the
quality of life of all people. 

At the end of the October 1996 negotiating session, the small group
of opponents agreed to endorse language on population and
reproductive health with reference to the 1994 International
Conference on Population and Development.  That conference included
the reservations of some governments on reproductive health language. 
Thus, the final document includes references to population policies,
family planning, and reproductive health. 


      RESOURCE COMMITMENTS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IV:2.5

In July, 1966, G-77 interventions focused on declining official
development assistance (ODA) grants and loans as the reason for
continuing food insecurity.  The United States initially found it
difficult to refocus the discussion on what it felt were the more
important roles of policy and private foreign and domestic
investments.  In September, G-77 countries supported language that
directed specific attention to falling levels of ODA in recent years
and that would commit developed countries to fully complying with an
ODA target of 0.7 percent of the gross national product (GNP) that
was adopted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) in the 1970s without U.S.  participation.  G-77
supported language whereby governments would commit, in cooperation
with international and private financing institutions, to reverse a
falling trend in international funding commitments to agricultural
development and to reach and maintain an investment flow of $15
billion annually by 2010.  In addition, G-77 supported language that
would have committed member countries to resolving the external debt
problems of the developing countries. 

The United States was opposed to the ODA language on the grounds that
ODA is only one, and not the major, source of funding for food
security and that the World Food Summit is not a pledging conference. 
A compromise on ODA was agreed to whereby governments would commit to
strengthen efforts toward fulfilling the ODA target.  The United
States gave notice that it would not oppose inclusion of this
agreement in the document but that the United States would file an
interpretive statement concerning it.  CFS members agreed to drop
text calling for attaining a specific level of investment in
agricultural development. 

Still bracketed at the end of September was text whereby governments
would commit to "mobilize adequate" resources to support national
efforts for the earliest possible achievement of sustainable world
food security.  This text, or similar language, was dropped from the
completed text agreed to at the end of October. 

With regard to debt relief, the United States opposed language to
convert the least- developed countries' external debt to implement
summit commitments.  In September, compromise language was agreed to
whereby member countries will endeavor to mobilize and optimize the
use of technical resources from all sources, including debt relief,
in order to raise investment to the levels needed to contribute to
food security. 


      TARGET DATES FOR ACHIEVING
      FOOD SECURITY
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IV:2.6

The draft text for the September negotiations included bracketed text
proposing that countries commit to reduce by 2010 the number of
undernourished people in the world to half their present level and to
eradicate hunger in countries, within one generation.  G-77 urged
adoption of all targets, while most OECD countries expressed
skepticism.  The United States was opposed on the grounds that the
targets were not realistic.  During the September negotiations,
members agreed to compromise language for the plan of action whereby
members envisaged reducing the number of undernourished people to
half their present level no later than 2015 and a midterm review to
ascertain whether it is possible to achieve this target by 2010. 
U.S.  officials believe that achieving the 2015 target is possible
but would be difficult.  The compromise language did not include any
target date for complete elimination of hunger. 


      TRADE LIBERALIZATION
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IV:2.7

As previously discussed, the United States favors a document that
commits member states to pursue further trade liberalization to
maximize the potential for economic growth and to realize the
benefits of comparative advantage.  However, in July 1996, China,
Japan, and South Korea emphasized a need to protect domestic
production.  Further, many delegations said that domestic production
must increase and that trade-restrictive measures were essential and
valid to achieve this purpose.  Japan, South Korea, Switzerland, and
the European Union proposed including various types of language that
would allow countries to make use of trade protectionist measures. 
In the U.S.  view, doing so would represent a step backwards from
what was achieved in the Uruguay Round trade agreement.  During July,
the United States, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, with support
from exporting G-77 countries, introduced language on trade
liberalization and the benefits to food security of an open trading
system.  Latin American group members pushed for trade negotiations
that would be based on the effective removal of subsidies and
barriers that distort trade.  North American members--the United
States and Canada--proposed strengthening language on export subsidy
restrictions, and the European Union proposed deleting such language. 
The European Union members indicated some concern that trade
liberalization references would define the basis for future World
Trade Organization (WTO) agriculture negotiations, and Japan
indicated it was against supporting further trade negotiations. 

During July, Switzerland proposed, with considerable support from
others, language to ensure the compatibility of food and agricultural
trade policies with the sustainable management of natural resources. 
However, the United States, Canada, and South-West Pacific countries
noted that trade and environment discussions were underway in the WTO
and OECD and their outcome should not be prejudged in the summit. 

The September negotiations on the trade commitment were very
contentious.  The United States sought to get all of the
protectionist-type language dropped from the text.  In addition, the
United States and others argued that the trade text focused too much
on agriculture and that countries should look at overall trading
opportunities and the trading system more broadly.  However, the
protectionist countries did not yield on most of their proposed text. 
As a result, the section on trade remained heavily bracketed. 

The final text agreed to at the end of October essentially dropped
all references to an agreement to promote further trade
liberalization.  A statement that trade generates economic
efficiencies from comparative advantages was revised to eliminate
direct reference to comparative advantage.  However, the document
discusses the positive role of trade in contributing to food security
and states it is essential that all members of WTO respect and
fulfill the totality of undertakings of the Uruguay Round. 
Governments also commit to supporting the continuation of the reform
process underway as a result of the Uruguay Round.  According to U.S. 
officials, the document dropped or adequately revised all of the
language that might have been used to justify trade protectionist
measures. 

The completed document dropped language urging all countries to
refrain from using export restrictions that limit the access of
trading partners to agricultural products but includes language
stating that food-exporting countries should act as reliable sources
of supplies to their trading partners and give due consideration to
the food security of importing countries, especially the low-income,
food-deficit countries.  The document urges WTO members to refrain
from using export restrictions in accordance with the WTO Agreement
on Agriculture.  The document also dropped language whereby countries
would commit to eventually eliminating subsidies on food exports to
developing countries that undermine production in those countries. 
It kept language reaffirming that countries would reduce subsidies on
food exports in conformity with the Uruguay Round agreement. 


      IMPLEMENTING THE MARRAKESH
      DECISION AND TAKING OTHER
      MEASURES TO ADDRESS THE
      NEGATIVE IMPACTS OF PRICE
      INSTABILITY
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IV:2.8

The 1994 Uruguay Round trade agreement included a written
understanding reached by trade ministers in Marrakesh, Morocco, on
April 15, 1994.  Commonly referred to as the "Marrakesh Decision,"
the understanding recognized that during implementation of the
Uruguay Round agricultural trade reform program, least-developed and
net food-importing countries might experience negative effects in
terms of the availability of adequate supplies of basic foodstuffs
from external sources on reasonable terms and conditions, including
short-term difficulties in financing of normal levels of commercial
imports.  As a result, the ministers agreed to establish appropriate
mechanisms to ensure that implementation of the reforms does not
adversely affect the availability of food aid at a level that is
sufficient to continue to provide assistance in meeting the food
needs of developing countries, especially least-developed and net
food-importing developing countries.  To this end, the ministers
agreed to do the following: 

  -- to review the level of food aid established periodically by
     Committee on Food under the Food Aid Convention of 1986 and to
     initiate negotiations in the appropriate forum to establish a
     level of food aid commitments sufficient to meet the legitimate
     needs of developing countries during the reform program;

  -- to adopt guidelines to ensure that an increasing proportion of
     basic foodstuffs is provided to least-developed and net
     food-importing countries in fully grant form and/or on
     appropriate concessional terms in line with article IV of the
     Food Aid Convention of 1986; and

  -- to give full consideration in the context of their aid programs
     to requests for the provision of technical and financial
     assistance to least-developed and net food-importing developing
     countries to improve their agricultural productivity and
     infrastructure. 

The ministers also recognized that as a result of the Uruguay Round,
certain developing countries might experience short-term difficulties
in financing normal levels of commercial imports and that in order to
address such financing difficulties, these countries might be
eligible to draw on the resources of international financial
institutions under existing facilities, or such facilities as might
be established. 

The agreement further specified that the provisions of the decision
would be subject to regular review by the WTO Ministerial Conference
and that follow-up to the decision would be monitored by the WTO's
Committee on Agriculture. 

During the July negotiations, it was argued that countries that must
import should receive protection from "price vulnerability," and
debate was intense over the Marrakesh commitment to aid net food
importers who might be hurt by price increases related to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  Most groups wanted to make
every effort to implement the decision, while the United States and
Canada suggested that WTO members take appropriate steps to follow up
on the decision.  North American members also opposed language on
safeguards for unstable world prices, instead proposing
WTO-compatible language on the ability of importing countries to
purchase adequate supplies of basic foodstuffs from external sources
on reasonable terms and conditions. 

During the September negotiations on the World Food Summit documents,
the G-77 countries sought approval of language committing countries
either to implementation or early implementation of the Marrakesh
Decision and of language that would ensure that international
financial institutions would help the least-developed and net
food-importing developing countries meet their short-term
difficulties in financing essential food imports.  The G-77
attributed recently high world grain prices to Uruguay Round
agricultural reforms.  The United States recognized that recent
market prices for grains had adversely affected the least-developed
and net food-importing countries but opposed the proposed language on
the ground that the Uruguay Round reforms were just beginning to be
implemented and thus it was too early for the reforms to have had any
measurable adverse effects. 

The United States was concerned that language calling for
implementation of the agreement suggested that adverse impacts had
already occurred and that corrective action was needed.  As a result,
the United States supported alternative language that the Marrakesh
Decision should be "effectively applied." No agreement was reached on
this issue.  With regard to the action of international financial
institutions, CFS members agreed to replace the term "ensure" with
"encourage." In the end-of-October negotiations, the United States
agreed to accept language that the decision be fully implemented
within WTO. 

The European Union, Japan, and the G-77 also supported other language
whereby governments would commit to take necessary steps to minimize
the possible negative effects of price instability on food-importing
countries, including basic foodstuffs.  The United States did not
endorse the proposed language, since it might raise expectations for
creating international reserves, international commodity agreements,
increased food aid, or other assistance.  This language remained
bracketed at the end of September.  The agreed-upon text at the end
of October dropped references to governments and the international
community taking necessary steps to mitigate possible negative
effects of world price instability on food imports.  But the
agreement states that governments and the international community,
recognizing the effects of world price fluctuations, will examine
WTO-compatible options and take any appropriate steps to safeguard
the ability of importing countries, especially low-income,
food-deficit countries, to purchase adequate supplies of basic
foodstuffs from external sources on reasonable terms and conditions. 


      HUNGER MAPS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IV:2.9

The draft plan of action included a proposal, supported by Japan, the
G-77, and FAO, that governments, in cooperation with civil societies
and international organizations, prepare as quickly as possible and
update thereafter "hunger maps" for each low-income, food-deficit
country and for other countries and regions vulnerable to food
emergencies.  The concept of a hunger map was introduced at a January
1996 meeting of CFS as a means to better assess and monitor the food
security situation in various parts of the world, as well as to raise
awareness of the problem.  According to an FAO Secretariat study,
current information available to FAO would allow hunger mapping only
at the national level and would not allow for identification of (1)
dispersion and identification of hungry people within a country, (2)
energy deficiencies of a transitional or seasonal nature, or (3)
trends linked to changes in the pattern of food distribution.  The
United States and a number of other developed countries were
concerned that CFS might approve a new data system that was not fully
thought out and that would duplicate existing information developed
by other programs, such as those in the World Food Program and the
World Health Organization, as well as FAO.  And they wanted to ensure
that all relevant institutions would be involved. 

During the September negotiations, it was agreed to use the term
"food insecurity and vulnerability information and mapping system" in
place of "hunger maps." It was further agreed that emphasis would be
placed on analysis and effective coordination among international and
national agencies, including making maximum use of existing data and
information systems.  It was also agreed that subsequent technical
consultation meetings would deal with the full definition of various
types of hunger maps. 


      SUMMIT FOLLOW-UP AND
      COORDINATION WITHIN THE U.N. 
      AGENCIES
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:2.10

Governments agreed that they will (1) develop national action plans
for implementing the summit plan of action, including establishing or
improving national mechanisms to set priorities; (2) develop,
implement, and monitor the components of action within designated
time frames, based both on national and local needs; and (3) provide
the necessary resources for their functioning.  The final text also
states that within the global framework, governments should cooperate
actively with one another and with U.N.  organizations, financial
institutions, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations,
and public and private sectors on programs directed toward the
achievement of food security for all. 

An important issue arose regarding the mandate to be given to FAO and
coordination within the U.N.  system for international-level
monitoring and follow-up after the summit.  One set of proposals
favored by FAO and the G-77 countries would have given FAO lead
responsibility in cooperation with other U.N.  bodies but would not
have required involvement of the U.N.  Administrative Committee on
Coordination (ACC).  ACC is the U.N.  committee tasked with
coordination and integrated follow-up to U.N.-sponsored conferences
in the U.N.  system.  An alternative set of proposals would have
ensured FAO leadership of follow-up within the U.N.  agencies, but
also would have required that the ACC coordinate follow-up within the
U.N.  system consistent with its role in other recent international
conferences.  The United States and many other countries felt that
ACC must be involved to secure the necessary level of cooperation
required from other U.N.  bodies.  Text on this issue remained
bracketed at the end of September, but U.S.  officials thought that
substantial progress had been made in clarifying the issue and that
the latter approach would eventually be approved. 

The text agreed to at the end of October notes that the international
community and the U.N.  system, including FAO, as well as other
agencies and bodies according to their mandate, contributed greatly
to the implementation of the World Food Summit plan of action.  The
text states that the member governments through CFS will be
responsibile for monitoring the implementation of the plan of action. 
The ACC is invited to ensure appropriate interagency coordination
and, when considering the Chair of any ACC mechanisms for interagency
follow-up to the World Food Summit, to recognize the major role of
FAO in the field of food security, within its mandate.  The text
dropped language stating that any ad hoc ACC mechanism considered to
promote interagency follow-up on food security must be led by FAO. 

In terms of follow-up, the completed text calls upon governments to
establish or improve national mechanisms to set priorities; develop,
implement, and monitor the components of action for food security
within designated time frames, based on national and local needs; and
provide the necessary resources for their functioning.  Governments,
in cooperation among themselves and with international institutions,
will start in 1997 to review the adequacy and effectiveness of the
allocation and use of financial and human resources for action
required to ensure food for all as a follow-up to the World Food
Summit and will reallocate available resources accordingly, with
special reference to the needs of countries facing deteriorating food
security, nutrition, health, and resource. 

At the end of October, CFS members agreed on a number of specific
actions to be taken to increase the likelihood that the plan of
action will lead to useful and measurable results.  Accordingly, the
text states that in partnership with all actors of civil society and
in coordination with relevant international institutions, governments
will take the following actions: 

  -- Establish, through the CFS, a timetable; procedures; and
     standardized reporting formats, which do not duplicate similar
     reports to the U.N., FAO and other agencies, on the national,
     subregional, and regional implementation of the World Food
     Summit plan of action. 

  -- Set out in CFS a process for developing targets and verifiable
     indicators of national and global food security where they do
     not exist. 

  -- Report to CFS on national, subregional, and regional
     implementation of the World Food Summit plan of action, drawing
     on a food insecurity and vulnerability information and mapping
     system, once established, as an analytical aid. 

  -- Monitor, through the CFS, the national, subregional and regional
     implementation of the World Food Summit plan of action, using
     reports from national governments, reports on U.N.  agency
     follow-up and inter-agency coordination, and information from
     other relevant international institutions. 

  -- Encourage the effective participation of relevant actors of
     civil society in the CFS monitoring process, recognizing their
     critical role in enhancing food security. 

  -- By 2006, undertake in CFS and within available resources a major
     broad-based progress assessment of the implementation of the
     World Food Summit plan of action and a mid-term review of
     achieving the target of reducing the number of undernourished
     people to half their present level no later than 2015. 


THE ROLE OF NGOS IN PREPARATIONS
FOR THE WORLD FOOD SUMMIT
=========================================================== Appendix V

This appendix discusses how NGOs\1 were invited to participate in
preparations for the World Food Summit.  It presents views that were
adopted by a large group of NGOs from around the world that
participated in a global consultation and relates these views to the
U.S.  position for the summit.  We do not comment on the merits of
the views expressed.  In addition, this appendix discusses views some
U.S.  NGOs shared with us concerning how the U.S.  government
involved them in the process. 

Similar to other recent international conferences and summits of
world leaders, and consistent with the summit's objective of
producing a policy declaration and plan of action for implementation
by all concerned parties, FAO sought wide participation by interested
NGOs in preparations for the summit.  NGOs, along with governments
and other civil society actors, were seen as having a very important
role to play in analyzing problems of food insecurity and proposing
remedial action at various levels.  These levels ranged from
international and national policy-making to planning, implementing,
and monitoring activities related to food security at the local
level. 

In January 1996, FAO invited NGOs to participate in the summit
preparatory process by (1) providing comments on the technical papers
prepared for the summit, (2) exchanging information and promoting
dialogue on food security issues, and (3) providing feedback on the
plan of action and identifying areas of concern for follow-up action
by NGOs at the national and international level.  NGOs were
especially asked to share their experience with food security
problems and programs based on their development work, particularly
at the grassroots level and with poor communities.  In inviting NGOs
to participate, FAO said that given the wide diversity of NGOs and
their many interests, all NGOs would not be expected to agree on a
common position.  However, they were encouraged to at least group
themselves into "caucuses."

At the national level, NGOs were invited to work with the national
secretariat or committee established by the government in each
country to coordinate summit preparations.  They were also encouraged
to promote seminars, workshops, and symposiums or roundtables on the
summit's main issues.  At the regional level, NGOs were invited to
provide input to the FAO regional conferences.  Before each regional
conference, a 2-day NGO meeting was held.  NGOs agreed on concerted
positions, recommendations, and declarations that were presented to
the conferences.  NGOs attended the conferences either as members of
their respective national delegations\2

or as observers.  Reports on the results of the regional NGO meetings
were prepared by the Secretariat and distributed to interested
parties.  NGOs were also invited to participate in the
Inter-Sessional Working Group meetings as observers. 

At the global level, NGOs were invited to attend a 3-day
consultation, September 19-21, just before the CFS scheduled
September 23-27 meeting.  The main objective was to enable
participants to discuss the draft policy statement and plan of action
and to produce concrete proposals concerning them for CFS.  FAO
anticipated that the CFS session would be the last negotiating forum
for the draft and thus the final opportunity to provide input to the
document before its submission to heads of state and government for
approval at the summit.  The NGOs' September forum and key views that
they expressed to CFS at that time are separately discussed in a
later section of this report. 

With regard to the summit itself, NGOs were invited to participate if
selected to serve on their respective national delegations.  In
addition, FAO invited a group of relevant and competent NGOs to
participate as observers.  FAO said it would not be able to accredit
all NGOs that might like to attend due to space constraints. 
National NGOs were encouraged to seek representation through their
international federations or networks.  Preference is being given to
those NGOs that have previously worked with FAO and those that
participated in the preparatory work. 

The costs of holding the NGO forums and September consultation were
financed by voluntary contributions from governments and private
sector organizations that were paid into a special trust fund set up
by FAO.  According to the Secretary-General of the World Food Summit,
FAO's budget has not been used to finance these costs. 

NGOs are holding a special forum, beginning 2 days before the start
of the summit and continuing throughout the period of the summit. 
The forum is being hosted by Italian NGOs and paid for by voluntary
contributions from the Italian government and others.  During the
first 2 days the NGOs will review the completed policy declaration
and plan of action and seek to reach consensus on a statement that
they will present to the summit itself.  During the summit, NGOs plan
to hold workshops and discussions on various aspects of food
security, to network with one another and country delegations, and to
attend summit sessions. 


--------------------
\1 Some NGOs are international, meaning that they operate in two or
more countries and have an international organization. 

\2 Each country's government decided whether to include NGOs on its
delegation. 


   INVOLVEMENT OF U.S.  NGOS IN
   PREPARATIONS FOR THE SUMMIT
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1

The U.S.  government assigned one official as a liaison to U.S.  NGOs
to encourage and help facilitate their participation in the process
leading up to the summit.  The principal vehicle used to secure NGO
views on food security issues was two public forums, where NGOs were
invited to comment on drafts of the U.S.  government position paper
and the U.S.-Canada North American position paper. 

On June 3, 1996, an open forum was held at USDA headquarters in
Washington, D.C., to receive comments on a May 17 draft of the U.S. 
government's position paper.  Forty-seven U.S.  NGOs provided formal
comments on the paper.  The forum was led by officials from USDA, the
State Department, and USAID.  Successive panels of NGO
representatives (typically four to five in a panel) were held, with
representatives orally summarizing their organizations' comments and
views.  (Most NGOs also presented written statements for the record.)
A limited amount of time was allowed for discussion between the U.S. 
officials and the panels. 

On June 24 and 25, an open U.S.-Canadian forum was held in East
Lansing, Michigan, to receive comments from NGOs and the public on a
draft of the North American paper.  More than 20 NGOs and interested
persons provided formal comments on the paper.  In addition, during
the 2 days before the forum, some 35 U.S.  and Canadian NGOs met to
discuss the draft and prepare a statement of key points.  Their
statement was presented to the forum. 

Both forums presented a variety of critical comments and concerns
regarding the draft papers.  Among some of the critical comments made
at the June 3 forum were the following: 

  -- The paper focuses too much on government policy and actions and
     not enough on the individual and local community. 

  -- The paper is too complacent about the treatment of U.S. 
     domestic food security. 

  -- The United States is not sufficiently proactive in considering
     alternative food reserve schemes at the international and
     national levels. 

  -- The paper stresses agriculture, but U.S.  foreign assistance
     allocations do not reflect the same emphasis. 

  -- The paper does not adequately address the importance of soil and
     water management. 

  -- Countries that have trade policies that discriminate between
     domestic and export demand are causing food insecurity in
     importing countries. 

U.S.  officials recorded the views of NGOs at the public forums. 
Following the meetings, the core group summarized the comments,
assessed their content, and reported the results to IWG.  The core
group recommended that some changes be made to the U.S.  position
paper, and U.S.  officials told us that some of the recommended
changes were implemented.  The core group concluded that some of the
NGO comments were too specific to be included in the paper and that
others were not appropriate. 

U.S.  NGOs had a number of other opportunities to express their
views.  For example, some NGOs were invited to attend small meetings
with U.S.  officials where discussions were held on at least some
aspects of food security.  Some of these meetings took place before
the public forums.  In addition, the core group held periodic
briefings for NGOs and the public more generally on the progress of
preparations for the summit.  NGOs were able to raise questions at
the briefings.  Also, as was the case with other NGOs, U.S.  NGOs
could attend meetings of FAO's Inter-Sessional Working Group and of
CFS. 

Twenty-three U.S.  NGOs attended the September 19-21 global NGO
consultation on the draft policy statement and plan of action,
immediately prior to the negotiation session on the draft plan of
action and policy statement by CFS.  A number of these NGOs stayed on
to observe and to try to influence the outcome of the negotiations. 

During the week of negotiations, the U.S.  delegation held a daily
briefing for the U.S.  NGOs to advise them of the status of the talks
and to listen to their concerns and views.  U.S.  NGOs were unhappy
that none of them were on the U.S.  delegation, as was the case with
some of the other country delegations (e.g., Canada had included
three of its NGOs).  Part-way though the week, the U.S.  delegation
invited the U.S.  NGOs to nominate two of the U.S.  NGO
representatives to attend morning U.S.  strategy sessions.  The U.S. 
NGOs did so.  In addition, the U.S.  delegation agreed to consider
suggestions from the various U.S.  NGOs on proposed language changes
with respect to text in the plan of action.  On a number of
occasions, U.S.  officials told NGOs that their suggestions had been
helpful and used by the United States in the negotiations. 

On October 25, 1996, USDA announced that 10 individuals from the
private sector had been selected to accompany the U.S.  delegation to
the summit.  They will advise the delegation, participate in
negotiations of World Food Summit documents, and attend the NGO forum
and related activities.  According to USDA, the three cochairs of the
IWG made the selections, and the selection process was designed to
ensure representation of various groups that have a stake in world
food security issues.  The organizations represented include
AFRICARE; Hubert H.  Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs;
Land-O-Lakes, Inc.; McNamara Farms; National Farmers Union; the
National Food Processors Association; Pioneer Hi-Bred International
Inc.; Save the Children; Tuskegee University; and Zero Population
Growth. 


      U.S.  NGOS' VIEWS ON THE
      U.S.  EFFORT TO INVOLVE THEM
      IN PREPARATIONS FOR THE
      SUMMIT
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.1

We had individual or group discussions with U.S.  representatives of
17 NGOs that participated in preparations for the World Food Summit. 
Of the 17 organizations, 10 sent representatives to the global
consultation of NGOs in September 1996 and 7 made presentations at
the public forums.  Representatives of many of these NGOs had a
number of critical comments about how the U.S.  government involved
NGOs in the preparations.  Their biggest complaints were that the
U.S.  government waited too long before affording them an opportunity
to comment in a serious manner on the development of the U.S. 
government's position papers, did not treat them as full "partners"
in the process, and frequently did not seriously consider NGO views
when offered. 

Many of the U.S.  NGOs who were critical of the process told us that
they had wanted an opportunity to sit at the table and work side by
side with U.S.  officials at the start of the process of developing a
U.S.  position paper for the summit.  However, they said, they were
never invited to do so.  They acknowledged that some NGOs were
invited to attend small meetings, including with some high-level
officials, before the paper was begun or well developed but said some
of the discussions seemed to be more of a monologue than a dialogue
and some food security issues could not be discussed.  By the time
the public forums were held, these NGOs said, the U.S.  position was
so far along it was not possible for their views to be adequately
discussed and considered.  They acknowledged that some changes were
made to the U.S.  paper following the forums but said the changes did
not go far enough. 

In addition, these NGOs said that they were concerned that their
views had been solicited more for pro forma reasons and less for
serious substantive consideration.  They also suggested that the U.S. 
officials who organized the process during spring 1996 lacked
experience with previous international conferences where, they
claimed, U.S.  NGOs had been involved in a much more substantive way
and with positive results.  They also suggested that previous
conferences had led U.S.  officials to be leary of working more
closely with NGOs in the future because it is troublesome to U.S. 
officials when disagreements occur. 

As discussed on page 47, many of the key points expressed by NGOs
(not just U.S.  NGOs) at the September 19-21 consultative session
differed significantly from the substantive positions adopted by the
U.S.  government.  U.S.  NGOs that participated in the consultation
generally agreed with the key points adopted by the NGO forum.\3

Therefore, the dissatisfaction of those NGOs who were critical of the
U.S.  process may be partly a result of the significant difference in
views.  For example, if U.S.  NGOs had been invited to sit at the
table with the U.S.  core team at the start of the development of the
U.S.  position paper, NGOs might have come away from the process
nearly as dissatisfied--assuming the U.S.  government did not
significantly change its views during the process. 


--------------------
\3 One U.S.  NGO disagreed with the vote on the overall document.  At
least one other U.S.  NGO was not present for the vote.  As discussed
later, the document noted that not every participant necessarily
endorsed every point as formulated.  Representatives of several U.S. 
NGOs told us that while they agreed with the general substance of the
key points statement, the tone of the document was stronger than they
would have preferred. 


      U.S.  GOVERNMENT VIEWS ON
      THE INVOLVEMENT OF NGOS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.2

U.S.  officials expressed surprise when advised that a number of the
NGOs were critical of how the U.S.  government had involved NGOs in
preparations for the summit, including the preparation of the U.S. 
position paper.  The officials told us that they themselves had been
disappointed by the level of participation by U.S.  NGOs in
preparations for the summit. 

For example, U.S.  officials said that in general U.S.  NGOs showed
little interest in the summit until about the time the government
started preparing for the June 3 forum.  The U.S.  National Secretary
said that his recollection was that only one NGO showed up for a
briefing held in early 1996, even though the event had been published
in the Federal Register and faxes had been sent to many known NGOs. 
In addition, he said, during the first 5 months of 1996, he averaged
only a few telephone calls a month from NGOs and these calls did not
express any real concern about the process for securing NGOs' views. 
The official appointed to liase with U.S.  NGOs observed that
although more than 300 NGOs are accredited to USAID alone, less than
25 U.S.  NGOs attended the September global consultation.  In
addition, he said, some key umbrella-like organizations that interact
with many NGOs had shown little interest in the summit.  U.S. 
officials also expressed disappointment with a relative lack of
interest on the part of farm and commodity groups, major
environmental and population organizations, trade groups, and big
business. 

U.S.  officials acknowledged that NGOs had not been invited to sit at
the table with the government in the actual drafting of the paper. 
However, the officials said that they had worked hard to advise
interested NGOs of the types of views that were being considered by
government drafters for inclusion in the position paper and to secure
the reaction of the NGOs.  According to the officials, a number of
meetings were held with interested NGOs for this purpose. 

U.S.  officials speculated on a number of possible reasons as to why
NGO participation was not stronger but could not offer a definitive
conclusion on this matter. 

U.S.  officials said NGOs' interest in the summit had increased
somewhat following the September NGO global consultation.  For
example, they said, a wider variety of NGOs showed up for an October
17 briefing on the summit.  In addition, in late October, the
Secretary of Agriculture received three letters, each representing a
considerable number and variety of organizations, providing views on
the U.S.  position for the summit.  Among other things, these letters
reflected concern with the positions against trade expressed by NGOs
at the global consultation (see discussion in the next section).  All
of the letters offered support for existing trade agreements, and two
of the letters supported the U.S.  government's position favoring
further trade liberalization.  Two of the letters also urged U.S. 
support for a variety of other policies and programs to promote food
security in developing countries. 


   KEY POSITIONS CONVEYED BY NGOS
   TO CFS IN SEPTEMBER 1996
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:2

During September 19-21, 1996, more than 200 NGOs or civil society
organizations from more than 83 countries and all regions of the
world met in Rome at the invitation of FAO for a consultation on the
World Food Summit.  The purpose was to provide views to CFS' draft
policy declaration and plan of action. 

According to FAO, the organizations represented a wide variety of
groups.\4 According to our analysis of a provisional list of the
participants, however, most countries were represented by only one or
two NGOs.  However, Italy was represented by 63 NGOs (perhaps because
Italy was the host country for the forum), the United States by 23,
the United Kingdom by 15, France by 10, Belgium and the Netherlands
by 8, Canada by 7, and Germany and Switzerland by 6.  In addition,
Brazil, Japan, Mexico, and the Philippines were represented by five
NGOs; India, Spain, and Venezuela by four; and Bangladesh, Egypt,
Kenya, Malaysia, Senegal, Sudan, and Turkey by three. 

During the consultation, participants formed working groups to review
different parts of the draft policy declaration and plan of action. 
Each group prepared recommended changes to the text of the document
for which it was responsible.  In addition, NGOs decided to issue an
overall statement of their own in response to the positions expressed
in the draft CFS documents.  Each working group prepared a set of key
points for its part of the document.  On the final night of the
session, all of the participants met to discuss and debate the
various sets of key points.  Changes were agreed upon, and an
overwhelming majority of the NGOs voted to approve 29 key substantive
points.\5 The document was formally conveyed to CFS when it met in
plenary session on September 23. 

Specific proposals of the working groups for amending the text of the
draft policy statement and plan of action were consolidated in
English only.  There was not sufficient time for FAO to have these
proposals translated into several languages for discussion and
approval by NGOs in plenary session.  As a result, these proposals
were informally made available to CFS as additional input to the
negotiating process. 

A number of NGOs' key points appear to be consistent with U.S.  views
on food security and with views CFS provisionally approved on
September 30.  However, a considerable number of the NGOs' key points
disagree in part or in whole with key U.S.  views on food security. 


--------------------
\4 The variety of groups included farmers, peasants, farmworkers,
fisherfolk, indigenous communities, herders, consumers, urban poor
people, children's rights activists, urban communities,
industrialists, emergency aid workers, legal workers, AIDS solidarity
advocates, commerce, food workers, scouts, gender equality advocates,
urban workers, family advocates, human rights advocates, antihunger
advocates, university professors, researchers, social workers,
breastfeeding advocates, organic and conventional agriculture
advocates, agroecological and sustainable agriculture advocates, the
international press, service clubs, peace advocates, education
workers, cooperatives, academics, voluntary workers, nongovernmental
organization networks, mothers, the private enterprise sector,
foodgrain banks, health workers, religious groups, fair trade
advocates, environmentalists, nutrition workers, and women, children
and youth organizations of civil society. 

\5 The document noted that "as is usual when large assemblies adopt
substantive statements, not every participant can necessarily endorse
every point as formulated."


   NGOS' VIEWS THAT DIFFERED
   SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THE U.S. 
   POSITION ON FOOD SECURITY
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:3

NGOs' at the September 1996 global consultation presented
significantly different views from the United States on the operation
of economic markets, comparative advantage, self-sufficiency, trade
liberalization, public and private investment (including the level of
ODA), international food reserves, and the Marrekesh Decision.  Other
issues on which NGOs expressed at least partially different views
include structural adjustment programs and debt forgiveness and food
reserves. 


      RELIANCE ON MARKETS,
      COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, AND
      SELF-SUFFICIENCY
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:3.1

NGOs did not fully subscribe to reliance on free markets.  On the one
hand, they said governments should support small-scale producers and
farms that are economically sound.  On the other hand, they said that
food security is a human right that must take precedence over the
dictates of the marketplace.  In addition, they favored public
regulation of food prices in urban areas and establishment of a
decentralized system of local, national, and regional food reserves
for staple crops that would be used to stabilize prices of staple
foods. 

NGOs also did not fully endorse the view that countries should
produce those things in which they have a comparative advantage and
rely on trade to obtain those goods for which they lack a comparative
advantage.  According to the NGO statement, developing countries are
often forced to import food from overseas, so their food security is
subject to the vagaries of the international market.  Developing
countries should strive to achieve self-sufficiency in basic food
staples, NGOs said.  In addition, the NGO statement said that when
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture expires in 2000, it must
be renegotiated to ensure the exemption of all staple food crops from
trade liberalization commitments, in support of the sovereign right
of countries to protect their national food self-sufficiency. 

To help promote self-sufficiency, NGOs urged governments to "directly
support" small farmers and fisherfolk, promoting their productivity,
since they are responsible for most food staple production.  The NGO
statement did not define what is covered by the term "directly
support." However, a representative of one NGO said that he
understood the point to mean that governments should target their
agricultural support policies toward small farmers.  For example, he
said, agricultural extension agents in developing countries often
concentrate on larger producers.  The term does not necessarily mean
that governments should subsidize small producers, he said, although
it could include subsidies.  Regarding the latter, he noted that
governments in major agricultural producing and exporting countries
have subsidized their producers. 


      TRADE LIBERALIZATION
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:3.2

According to NGOs, "international trade liberalization is not the
solution to the problem of food security and, in many cases,
undermines it." In many countries, the NGOs said, trade agreements
have driven farmers and farmworkers, especially women, off the land,
creating national and regional dependency on food imports for future
generations.  According to NGOs, international agricultural trade is
dominated by a small number of transnational companies, and their
market power enables them to compete unfairly with local food
producers in developing countries.  For example, according to NGOs,

     "four food companies control the vast majority of the global
     grain trade.....  Similarly, a small number of companies control
     virtually every agricultural commodity--a trend which will
     worsen as global agribusiness substitutes developing country
     commodity exports with biotechnologically engineered products. 
     The monopolistic position of these companies impedes the
     development of local food markets and in fact is rapidly
     displacing them in many regions of the world as trade
     liberalization proceeds.  Therefore, we urge governments to
     establish regulations in a code of conduct restricting such
     practices by transnational corporations."

In addition, NGOs indicated that the transnational corporations are
benefiting from reliance on "unsustainable practices." These
practices were not explicitly defined.  However, elsewhere in their
key points, NGOs said that they favored "socially and ecologically
fair trade." A representative of one NGO told us that the latter
means, for example, that companies should not employ child labor in
producing their goods or unsafe environmental practices.  Companies
that do so, the representative said, have reduced costs and thus can
compete unfairly with companies that observe good social and
ecological practices. 

Consistent with their view that trade liberalization is harming food
security, NGOs called upon governments to put a freeze on the
implementation of further agricultural liberalization until after a
thorough study of the impacts of the Uruguay Round and other trade
agreements is undertaken.  Furthermore, as the Uruguay Round
Agreement on Agriculture expires in the year 2000, they said, it must
be renegotiated with a comprehensive food security clause ensuring
the exemption of all staple food crops from trade liberalization
commitments. 


      INVESTMENT AND RESOURCE
      COMMITMENTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:3.3

NGOs expressed the view that all donor nations should immediately
comply with the OECD target of committing 0.7 percent of GNP to ODA
and should restore the share of ODA allocated to food security
objectives.  According to NGOs, ODA has to be separated from private
international investment because the goals of each are different, and
even in areas where private international investment is necessary,
the investment has to be strongly regulated. 

As previously discussed, the United States has never subscribed to
the OECD target of 0.7 percent of GNP.  The United States believes
that ODA is important but also believes that only the international
private sector is capable of generating most of the developing
countries' needs for investment from external sources. 


      IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
      MARRAKESH DECISION
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:3.4

NGOs called for implementation of the Marrakesh Decision without
commenting specifically on whether they thought the Uruguay Round had
already adversely affected the least developed and net food-importing
countries.  As discussed earlier, the United States had opposed
language for the plan calling for implementation, or early
implementation of the decision, while supporting language that the
decision be "effectively applied." However, the United States
eventually agreed to language for full implementation. 


   OTHER NGO VIEWS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:4


      STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
      PROGRAMS AND DEBT
      FORGIVENESS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:4.1

According to NGOs, poverty in the developing countries results from,
among other causes, structural adjustment programs and external debt. 
Structural adjustment programs and external debt of the developing
countries are seriously limiting the achievement of food security,
they said, and thus need to be reconsidered.  NGOs said that in some
cases structural adjustment programs promoted by international
financial institutions endanger access to land, water, sanitation,
food, and nutrition and should be renegotiated to ensure consistency
with the right to safe food for all.  Regarding debt, NGOs said,
cancellations should be implemented, especially for the
least-developed countries.  Otherwise, NGOs said, governments of the
countries will have to continue converting agriculture from domestic
food production to cash crops for export to generate foreign
exchange, directly aggravating food shortages and import dependence
while increasing environmental degradation. 

As discussed earlier, the U.S.  view is that countries that have
demonstrated the most progress in achieving food security are those
that have seriously pursued policy reform, macroeconomic
stabilization, and structural adjustment.  At the same time, the
United States has joined other CFS members in endorsing language
whereby countries and international financial institutions will
cooperate among themselves to make every effort to ensure that food
security and poverty eradication goals and programs are safeguarded
in difficult times of economic transition, budget austerity, and
structural adjustment. 

Regarding debt relief, the United States and other members have
agreed on language to intensify the search for practical and
effective solutions to debt problems of developing countries.  They
also support the recent initiatives of international financial
institutions to reduce the total external debt burden of heavily
indebted poor countries. 


      FOOD RESERVES
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:4.2

As mentioned earlier, NGOs said they favor the establishment of a
decentralized system of local, national, and regional food reserves
for staple crops that would be used to stabilize prices of staple
foods.  In addition, NGOs said that national and international food
reserves that are freely accessible are essential for states and
communities to exercise food sovereignty.  NGOs did not specify who
should pay for the establishment of such reserves or how such
reserves would be controlled to ensure that adequate supplies would
be produced to meet regular demand.  However, they did say that
priority should be given to mobilizing and using local resources in
creating food reserves (as well as emergency food aid) and that
international organizations should ensure that small farmers'
organizations can compete on an equal footing with local commercial
interests when purchasing such reserves or food aid. 

The United States has supported language for the plan of action
whereby governments commit to pursuing at local and national levels,
as appropriate, adequate, cost-effective strategic food reserve
policies and programs.  However, the United States is opposed to the
establishment of an international emergency food reserve.  In
addition, it opposed proposed language for the plan of action that
would have supported international organizations, particularly FAO,
examining possible international action to ensure an adequate level
of global food security reserves.  Such language has been dropped
from the draft text.  According to a U.S.  official involved in the
negotiations, the United States opposes international food reserves
because of the difficulties that would arise in deciding how to
finance, hold, and trigger the use of such reserves. 


*** End of document. ***