United Nations: Limitations in Leading Missions Requiring Force to
Restore Peace (Letter Report, 03/27/97, GAO/NSIAD-97-34).
GAO examined the United Nation's (U.N.) ability to lead missions
requiring the use of force to restore or maintain peace, focusing on:
(1) what precedents exist for authorizing the United Nations to lead
peace operations requiring some measure of force to achieve their
objectives; and (2) whether limitations exist in the U.N.'s ability to
lead peace operations calling for the use of force.
GAO noted that: (1) the U.N. Security Council has three precedents for
mandating the United Nations to lead peace operations where the use of
force was authorized under chapter VII of the U.N. charter, the missions
in Somalia, Bosnia, and Eastern Slavonia; (2) in four other U.N.-led
operations, the Security Council established mission objectives that
required some measure of force to be achieved, but did not explicitly
authorize its use under chapter VII; (3) although the United Nations has
improved its capability to support peace operations, GAO's study
indicates there are, nonetheless, organizational limits of the United
Nations that increase the risk of U.N.-led operations calling for the
use of force; (4) the limitations stem from the U.N.'s structure as an
organization of individual sovereign states, which provides the world
forum for international diplomacy; (5) because the United Nations is an
international political body, and as such, does not have the attributes
of sovereignty, it cannot conscript troops and arms from member states;
(6) similarly, because member states cannot or will not relinquish
command over their own troops, U.N. force commanders cannot always be
sure their orders will be carried out; (7) this places the following
three limitations on operations calling for the use of force that are
led by the United Nations; (8) first, the United Nations cannot ensure
that troops and resources will be provided to carry out and reinforce
operations as necessary, especially since such operations are risky and
nations volunteering troops and arms may not have a national interest in
the operation; (9) second, the U.N. force commander cannot be assured
his orders will be carried out, particularly in dangerous situations
where his authority over national contingents may be questioned or
second-guessed by national authorities who do not relinquish command of
their troops to the United Nations; (10) third, because of the U.N.'s
core principle of respecting national sovereignty, it generally seeks
the consent of all parties to the conflict in conducting a peace
operation and thus has not developed an overall approach to guide
operations calling for the use of force; and (11) these three factors
have limited the operational effectiveness of U.N.-led peace operations
calling for the use of force.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-97-34
TITLE: United Nations: Limitations in Leading Missions Requiring
Force to Restore Peace
DATE: 03/27/97
SUBJECT: International organizations
United Nations military forces
Military intervention
International relations
International cooperation
Military operations
Foreign governments
IDENTIFIER: Haiti
Lebanon
Somalia
Yugoslavia
Korea
Iraq
Bosnia
Eastern Slavonia
Rwanda
Congo
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO report. Delineations within the text indicating chapter **
** titles, headings, and bullets are preserved. Major **
** divisions and subdivisions of the text, such as Chapters, **
** Sections, and Appendixes, are identified by double and **
** single lines. The numbers on the right end of these lines **
** indicate the position of each of the subsections in the **
** document outline. These numbers do NOT correspond with the **
** page numbers of the printed product. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
** A printed copy of this report may be obtained from the GAO **
** Document Distribution Center. For further details, please **
** send an e-mail message to: **
** **
** **
** **
** with the message 'info' in the body. **
******************************************************************
Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Committees
March 1997
UNITED NATIONS - LIMITATIONS IN
LEADING MISSIONS REQUIRING FORCE
TO RESTORE PEACE
GAO/NSIAD-97-34
United Nations
(711093)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
DOD - Department of Defense
IFOR - Implementation Force
MNF - multinational force
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ONUC - U.N. Operation in the Congo
PDD-25 - Presidential Decision Directive-25
PLO - Palestinian Liberation Organization
RPF - Rwanda Patriotic Front
UNAMIR - U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda
UNHCR - U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIFIL - U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon
UNITAF - Unified Task Force
UNMIH - U.N. Mission in Haiti
UNOSOM - U.N. Operation in Somalia
UNPROFOR - U.N. Protection Force (Bosnia)
UNTAES - U.N. Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja
and Western Sirmium
USACOM - United States Atlantic Command
USAID - U.S. Agency for International Development
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-259387
March 27, 1997
The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
Chairman
The Honorable Lee Hamilton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
The founders of the United Nations intended the organization to play
a major role in maintaining international peace and security, using
force if necessary. During the Cold War, however, the United Nations
did not have many opportunities to carry out peace operations
involving military force because the superpowers vetoed most such
U.N. actions. On two occasions during that time, in the Congo and
Lebanon, the Security Council issued resolutions that required the
missions to use some measure of force to achieve their objectives.
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.N. Security Council has
authorized a number of U.N. operations involving the use of force to
help restore or maintain peace. For example, the Security Council
authorized the use of force in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia
under chapter VII of the U.N. charter, which authorizes "action with
respect to threats to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of
aggression." Given the U.N.'s performance in leading peace operations
involving the use of force, some experts now question whether the
United Nations is an appropriate organization to lead such missions.
Others, including a former U.N. Secretary General, believe that the
United Nations may be an appropriate organization to lead such
missions, but that inadequate resources and operational structure
have been the primary factors limiting the U.N.'s effectiveness. We
examined this issue, with particular focus on
-- what precedents there are for authorizing the United Nations to
lead peace operations requiring some measure of force to achieve
their objectives and
-- whether there are limitations in the U.N.'s ability to lead
peace operations calling for the use of force.
This report is based on our studies of U.N. peace operations
conducted over the past 5 years,\1 as well as our current work that
included (1) field study at several locations where U.N. missions
used force conduct operations; (2) interviews at these missions with
military commanding officers, peacekeepers, civilian directors, and
line staff; and (3) analysis of U.S., U.N., North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), and other documents and situation reports on
peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations. We conducted this
review under our basic legislative authority and are addressing it to
you because the matters discussed in this report fall within your
Committees' jurisdiction.
--------------------
\1 A list of GAO Products on peacekeeping and peace enforcement is
presented at the end of this report.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
According to U.N. reports and Security Council statements,
peacekeeping missions are operations in the field using military
and/or civilian personnel to help maintain international peace and
security, but where the use of force is not authorized except in
self-defense. Such missions require voluntary troop contributions
from member states, since the United Nations has no troops of its
own, and are generally considered to be authorized under chapter VI
of the U.N. charter, although Security Council resolutions mandating
peacekeeping missions frequently omit specific charter citations.
According to the U.N. Secretary General, and based on nearly 50
years of experience, three core principles guide peacekeeping
missions led by the United Nations: (1) obtaining the consent of the
warring parties to the peacekeeping mission, (2) ensuring the
peacekeepers remain neutral and impartial in their actions and do not
interfere in the nation's internal affairs, and (3) using force only
in self-defense. Although peace operations have been increasingly
used to help resolve internal conflicts, these principles still
apply.
In addition to peacekeeping missions conducted with the consent of
the parties involved in the conflict, the U.N. Security Council can
also authorize enforcement actions, under chapter VII of the U.N.
charter, that call for the use of force to maintain or restore peace.
Such operations can be large scale military efforts that obtain
international sanction from the United Nations but are led by
individual nations or coalitions, such as the actions in Korea
(1950-53) and Iraq (1990-91). Or they can be smaller operations led
by the United Nations, such as in Somalia. These operations are
defined by the U.S. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other
Than War as the application of military force, or the threat of its
use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel
compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or
restore international peace and order.\2 Consent by the warring
parties is not required in these operations and neutrality may not be
relevant. Security Council resolutions mandating such operations
usually cite chapter VII of the U.N. charter as their authority.
(See app. I for background on the use of force in the U.N.
charter.)
Although the United Nations has considerable experience in leading
peacekeeping missions and an overall approach to conducting them, it
has not worked out accepted core principles and an overall approach
to guide operations calling for the use of force.
For this report, we use the term peace operation to refer to the
entire spectrum of U.N. activities aimed at maintaining or restoring
peace and security, ranging from traditional peacekeeping missions to
chapter VII peace enforcement to operations falling somewhere in
between.
--------------------
\2 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-07, June 16,
1995.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
The U.N. Security Council has three precedents for mandating the
United Nations to lead peace operations where the use of force was
authorized under chapter VII of the U.N. charter--the missions in
Somalia, Bosnia, and Eastern Slavonia.\3 In four other U.N.-led
operations, the Security Council established mission objectives that
required some measure of force to be achieved, but did not explicitly
authorize its use under chapter VII. In these operations--the Congo,
Rwanda, Lebanon, and Haiti--the Security Council authorized the
United Nations to lead missions and, respectively, to use the means
necessary to apprehend, detain, and deport foreign forces; establish
secure humanitarian zones; take measures to assure the effective
restoration of Lebanese sovereignty; and help ensure a secure
environment. (See app. II for operations authorized by the U.N.
Security Council).
Although the United Nations has improved its capability to support
peace operations, our study indicates there are, nonetheless,
organizational limits of the United Nations that increase the risk of
U.N.-led operations calling for the use of force. These limitations
have been overcome when a nation with sufficient military prestige,
credibility, and the commitment of military forces necessary to
conduct operations has taken the lead role in the U.N. operation.
The limitations stem from the U.N.'s structure as an organization of
individual sovereign states, which provides the world forum for
international diplomacy. Because the United Nations is an
international political body, and as such, does not have the
attributes of sovereignty, it cannot conscript troops and arms from
member states. Similarly, because member states cannot or will not
relinquish command over their own troops, U.N. force commanders
cannot always be sure their orders will be carried out. This places
the following three limitations on operations calling for the use of
force that are led by the United Nations.
-- First, the United Nations cannot ensure that troops and
resources will be provided to carry out and reinforce operations
as necessary, especially since such operations are risky and
nations volunteering troops and arms may not have a national
interest in the operation.\4
-- Second, the U.N. force commander cannot be assured his orders
will be carried out, particularly in dangerous situations where
his authority over national contingents may be questioned or
second-guessed by national authorities who do not relinquish
command of their troops to the United Nations.
-- Third, because of the U.N.'s core principle of respecting
national sovereignty, it generally seeks the consent of all
parties to the conflict in conducting a peace operation and thus
has not developed an overall approach to guide operations
calling for the use of force.
These three factors have limited the operational effectiveness of
U.N.-led peace operations calling for the use of force. For example,
despite Security Council approval, the United Nations was not able to
obtain adequate troops, equipment, and reinforcements to carry out
the operations in Rwanda (1993-96), Bosnia (1992-95), and Somalia
(1992-95). Nations were unwilling to provide the necessary troops,
reinforcements, and resources when requested. Limits on U.N.
command and control during actions in the Congo (1960-64), Somalia
(1992-95), Bosnia (1992-95), and Lebanon (1978 and ongoing) hindered
U.N. commanders from effectively deploying U.N. peacekeepers to
mission-critical locations. And the U.N.'s use of force in Somalia,
Bosnia, and the Congo was uncertain at key points and lacked
credibility as the U.N. operations relied heavily on the consent of
the warring parties to conduct operations. (See app. III for
background descriptions of these operations.)
In contrast, the second phase of the U.N. mission in Haiti
(UNMIH)--(1995-96) has been operationally effective, as has been the
operation in Eastern Slavonia to date (1996 and ongoing). For the
second phase of UNMIH, a nation with credible and respected military
authority provided leadership and command and control structures.
The United States acted as the lead nation for the second phase of
UNMIH and (1) ensured adequate resources were available for planning;
(2) provided the necessary information, troops, armament, and
political influence; and (3) used its command and control structure
and its doctrine for operations other than war to help guide
operations. Under the U.S. doctrine, the core principle of
obtaining the consent of the parties was not the predominant
principle. In Eastern Slavonia, the operation is conducted as a
variant of the lead nation concept. The force commander is Belgian
and his Belgian military staff provide headquarters command and
control and are assured support by the NATO force in Bosnia.
--------------------
\3 The U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission was authorized to redress
small-scale violations of the Demilitarized Zone, but is on such a
small scale that it is not counted as one of the missions where the
use of force was clearly authorized.
\4 Article 43 of the U.N. charter provides for special agreements
with member states to make armed forces available on call to the
Security Council. The United Nations has never entered into such an
agreement with any member state.
PRECEDENTS FOR U.N.-LED USE OF
FORCE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
The United Nations has had considerable experience in conducting
peacekeeping missions, but has limited experience in leading
operations requiring the use of force to help restore or maintain
peace. The United Nations has led and completed two operations where
the use of force was explicitly authorized under chapter VII of the
U.N. charter--Somalia and Bosnia. The U.N. operation in Eastern
Slavonia is also authorized to use force under chapter VII, and, as
of March 1997, it was still ongoing.
The distinction between peacekeeping and those operations authorized
to use force is not always clear in practice. As early as 1958, a
U.N. report on one of the first peacekeeping missions, the U.N.
Emergency Force, noted that a broad interpretation of self-defense
might well blur the distinction between peacekeeping and combat. The
report concluded that the use of force to defend U.N. personnel,
property, and positions that the U.N. commander ordered to be held,
constituted self-defense and was peacekeeping. Any use of force that
was initiated to attain a forward objective was not authorized.
In four operations, the Security Council mandates established
objectives that required some measure of force to be achieved, but
the Security Council resolutions did not state that the operations
were authorized under chapter VII of the U.N. charter. The Security
Council resolutions for U.N. Operations in the Congo (ONUC) stated
that peacekeepers were to take necessary steps to provide the
government of the Congo with military assistance in fulfilling their
tasks. After ONUC was unable to accomplish its mandate, Security
Council Resolution 169 authorized the U.N. operation to take
vigorous action, including the requisite measure of force, if
necessary, to apprehend, detain, and deport all foreign military and
paramilitary personnel, political advisers not under U.N. command,
and mercenaries.\5
The U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was authorized to use
force for humanitarian purposes. Security Council Resolution 918 of
May 1994 directed the U.N. mission to contribute to the security and
protection of displaced persons, refugees, and civilians by
establishing and maintaining secure humanitarian areas, where
feasible, and provide security for the distribution of relief
supplies and humanitarian relief operations. The resolutions further
noted that the 1993 killing of the President of Burundi, as well as
the massive exodus of refugees to neighboring countries, constituted
a humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions and a threat to
international peace and security. Therefore, peacekeepers might be
required to take action against groups threatening civilians. In
June 1994, the Security Council, acting under chapter VII, also
authorized France to protect civilians and mandated all countries to
enforce an arms embargo on Rwanda.
Security Council Resolution 425 established the U.N. Interim Force
in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and mandated it to confirm the withdrawal of the
Israeli army from Southern Lebanon and restore international peace
and security in the area. The Secretary General report (S/12611)
implementing the Security Council resolution stated that the interim
force would, among other things, use its best efforts to prevent a
recurrence of fighting and ensure that its area of operation would
not be used for hostile activity of any kind. The U.N. operation
was also given responsibility to "control movement and take all
measures deemed necessary to assure the effective restoration of
Lebanese sovereignty." It was instructed to use force only in
self-defense. Self-defense was defined as including "resistance to
attempts by forceful means to prevent it (the U.N. force) from
discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council."
After the first phase of UNMIH was unable to accomplish its mission,
a second phase of UNMIH was authorized. The second phase of UNMIH
began after a multinational force accomplished its mandate under
Security Council Resolution 940, of using all necessary means under
chapter VII to "facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military
leadership. . . and the restoration of the legitimate
authorities." Security Council Resolution 940 also authorized the
second phase of UNMIH to (1) assist in sustaining the secure and
stable environment established by the U.S.-led coalition in Haiti and
(2) protect international personnel and installations.
--------------------
\5 In an advisory opinion entitled Certain expenses of the United
Nations (ICJ Reports, 1962, p. 151 ff.), the International Court of
Justice voted 9 to 5 that ONUC was "not an enforcement action within
the compass of Chapter VII of the (U.N.) Charter." The opinion stated
that "it must lie within the power of the Security Council to police
a situation even though it does not resort to enforcement action
against a State." One of the five dissenting jurists noted in his
opinion that U.N. planes bombed positions, used antiaircraft
batteries, engaged its forces in offensive maneuvers, and used deadly
force in doing so. He noted that this would qualify as a
common-sense case of enforcement.
LIMITS ON U.N.-LED USE OF FORCE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
As discussed, the United Nations had little experience leading
operations calling for the use of force prior to the end of the Cold
War. Since then it has undertaken several, most of which have been
less than fully successful. The United Nations and member states
have studied these operations and developed a series of lessons
learned which they intend to implement for future operations. They
have also undertaken a broad range of initiatives to improve the
operational support for peacekeeping.
Nonetheless, there remain three limitations on the U.N. effectively
leading peace operations that call for the use of force. These are
(1) the U.N.'s inability to ensure that sufficient troops, armaments,
and reinforcements will be available to effectively use force in
operations; (2) the uncertainty that orders of the U.N. commander
will be carried out by national contingents in the field; and (3) the
U.N.'s lack of an approach to guide the use of force. However, these
limits have been effectively dealt with when a nation with sufficient
credibility, prestige, and commitment has taken the lead.
LIMITATIONS WHEN ARMED
FORCES ARE NEEDED
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1
According to U.S. military doctrine, it is critical for missions to
have sufficient armed forces when needed, especially in situations
where force may be necessary. This not only provides a credible
deterrent to opposition, but also ensures adequate troops and
armament to conduct operations. However, U.N. operations,
particularly those in which combat may take place, do not have
assurance of timely and adequate troops and reinforcement. The
United Nations must negotiate voluntary help from member states.
This process involves obtaining
-- authorization from the Security Council,\6
-- voluntary force contributions from member states,\7 and
-- approval by the General Assembly for the operation's budget that
is usually paid for by member nations in addition to their
regular U.N. assessments.\8
Although the United Nations has been working on standby force
arrangements to ensure the right troops and forces are available for
missions, nations could still refuse to provide these forces.
Several examples help illustrate that (1) the United Nations, as an
organization could not ensure troops, arms, and reinforcements would
be available when needed, particularly, in U.N.-led operations that
called for the use of force; whereas (2) lead nations have provided
the resources, command, and direction to make the U.N. force
credible in carrying out operations calling for the use of force.
--------------------
\6 This authorization includes receiving a draft operational plan
from the Secretariat, approval of at least 9 of 15 Security Council
members, and no veto from the 5 permanent members.
\7 The contributors specify the number and type of forces provided,
command and control arrangements, and other troop-contributing
agreements such as mission and area of operations.
\8 This approval must include a draft budget prepared by the
Secretariat and review by the Advisory Committee on Administrative
and Budgetary Questions, which implies compromise on the activities
and overall cost.
RWANDA
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1.1
Civil war erupted in Rwanda beginning in 1990. In 1994, the United
Nations was mandated to protect civilians at risk and establish
secure humanitarian zones. But the United Nations could not obtain
military forces to do so. The U.N. Secretary General planned a
deployment in three stages during the spring of 1994. In the first
stage, UNAMIR would concentrate on providing security in the capital,
Kigali, and escorting relief convoys; in the second and third stages,
troops would fan out across the country and protect displaced persons
and humanitarian organizations. This deployment was estimated to
take 31 days, or until mid-June 1994. However, the United Nations
fell far short of meeting this goal. UNAMIR, which had been reduced
to 444 troops in May 1994, did not begin to receive additional forces
until early August; it did not reach its full troop strength until
November. UNAMIR command officials who were in charge during the
eruption of civil war said UNAMIR had repeatedly requested additional
support, but no nation would volunteer troops as the war escalated in
and around Kigali. As a result, UNAMIR was not able to respond to
the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of civilians. In New York,
the Security Council did not authorize additional troops as it
debated about the mission's objectives, about whether the objectives
were practical and politically feasible, and about whether member
states would actually provide the resources needed. (See app. II
for background on the Rwanda mission.)
Delays in UNAMIR's budget approval process further illustrate the
U.N.'s basic limits in obtaining resources when needed. The General
Assembly did not approve the total budget for UNAMIR's first 6 months
of operation--October 5, 1993, to April 4, 1994--until April 5, one
day after the budget period had ended. To conduct its operations,
UNAMIR received funding in advance of formal approval, but the
advance was 25 percent less than requested. Similarly, the budget
for UNAMIR's next 8 months of operation--April 5, 1994, to December
9, 1994--was approved just 10 days before the end of the budget
period. Further, the advance funds covered only about 53 percent of
the requested budget ($70 million of an approved $132 million).
According to U.N. officials, the lack of funds hindered the
procurement of needed vehicles, spare parts, food rations, and
contracts to airlift troop contingents to Rwanda. In addition, from
October to late November 1994, UNAMIR had neither advance funding nor
an approved budget and, consequently, operated without legal
financial authority.
BOSNIA
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1.2
In Bosnia, the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) could not obtain
approval for the number or range of fully equipped troops required to
carry out the operation. The U.N. Secretary General reiterated in
March 1994 that 34,000 additional troops would be required to carry
out its mandate to deter attacks against 6 safe areas. However, the
Security Council only authorized an additional 7,600 troops. As a
result, the United Nations considered UNPROFOR's troop strength
insufficient to carry out the Security Council mandates. The
unavailability of troops meant that UNPROFOR could not deploy
sufficient troops in safe areas such as Gorazde. And, in Bihac,
troops without enough weapons and supplies were rotated in. Safe
areas were attacked on several occasions, and in July 1995 Srebrenica
and Zepa were overrun and, according to reports from the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, possibly thousands
of civilians and soldiers were executed.
SOMALIA
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1.3
In Somalia, the U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) was not
authorized sufficient troops to carry out its mandate. Although
UNOSOM II's mandate was broader both in terms of functions and area
of deployment than the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF), 24
percent fewer troops were authorized. Also, according to U.N.
reports, troops were volunteered late, and equipment was not provided
in a timely manner and was inadequate. Operations began in May 1993,
and by July 20,000 of the 28,000 UNOSOM II-authorized troops had been
deployed; the full strength was only reached by October 1993, 6
months after UNOSOM II's mandate had been approved. Moreover, some
contingents arrived without appropriate weapons and equipment, such
as armored personnel carriers and communications capability, and had
inadequate intelligence. As a result, the factions on the ground
were emboldened to act. During a June 5, 1993, planned U.N.
inspection of militia weapons storage sites, U.N. forces, including
Pakistanis and Nigerians, were attacked in incidents orchestrated by
one of factions. Because of a lack of common communications
equipment, neither the Pakistanis nor the Nigerians were able to
request help directly from the Italian brigade, which had armored
vehicles. Twenty-four Pakistanis were killed, 57 were injured, and 6
were missing.\9 In subsequent reports, the U.N. Secretary General
acknowledged that insufficient troop strength and lack of proper
equipment limited UNOSOM II's ability to fulfill its mandate.
--------------------
\9 Of the six missing Pakistanis one died in captivity and five were
later released. Also injured were one Italian and three U.S.
soldiers.
LEBANON
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1.4
Several factors have prevented UNIFIL from effectively carrying out
its mandate of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, helping
restore Lebanese sovereignty and ensuring that its area of operation
is not used for hostile activity of any kind. A primary factor is
that UNIFIL does not have the support from U.N. member states to
effectively carry out its mission. The size of the force has in fact
been reduced in recent years. Despite UNIFIL's mandate, which limits
it to weapons of a defensive character only, UNIFIL does not have
sufficient armament and troops to credibly deter the warring parties
from violating Lebanese territory or to deploy its forces in their
designated areas of operation. For example, on June 6, 1982, after
worldwide Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) attacks on
Israeli civilians and officials, Israel invaded Lebanese territory to
retaliate against PLO strongholds in Lebanon. At some points, UNIFIL
attempted to deter the Israeli advance but, it quickly abandoned the
effort and the entire UNIFIL area of operation was soon completely
behind Israeli lines. In addition, UNIFIL has been unable to prevent
attacks by Hezbollah (the Islamic fundamentalist organization) on
Israel and, according to the Secretary General, has no right to
impede Lebanese acts of resistance against the occupying force.
While UNIFIL has not been able to accomplish its mandate, it remains
deployed as a signal of the international concern about the area, and
its humanitarian efforts contribute to providing order in the area as
well as providing a neutral authority to which the civilian
population of southern Lebanon can turn.
HAITI
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1.5
In contrast, UNMIH was able to marshal resources as needed because a
sovereign nation, the United States, declared restoration of
democracy in Haiti a national interest and led the operation. The
United States ensured adequate troops and resources were available to
prepare the environment for UNMIH, plan for the operation, and
implement it. For example, the United States led a multinational
force (MNF), committing over 20,000 U.S. military personnel,
including carrier battle groups, a special operations task force, a
marine air ground task force, and other support to ensure a secure
environment for UNMIH. In planning UNMIH, the United States provided
the United Nations with information, military logisticians, and
military planners. Of crucial importance was U.S. assistance during
the transition from the MNF to a U.N.-led operation. The United
States sponsored training programs on command and control, doctrine,
and operations for many of the UNMIH troop contingents and U.N.
personnel. Logistical support contracts for rations, supplies, and
equipment already in place were extended for UNMIH until formal U.N.
bidding could take place. And a quick reaction force of 1,500,
including 550 special forces and helicopters, remained to help
provide security. According to DOD officials, if reinforcements were
needed, the United States would quickly make additional resources
available.
EASTERN SLAVONIA
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1.6
The U.N. Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and
Western Sirmium (UNTAES) is tasked under chapter VII of the U.N.
charter to demilitarize the region (mainly of Serbian military and
paramilitary forces) and take other steps in returning the area to
Croatia. UNTAES has NATO commitment for military support when
needed. UNTAES also obtained credible force protection of its own,
including four mechanized infantry battalions, organized into
monitoring and protection forces, one tank company, one
reconnaissance company, and transport and antitank helicopter
squadrons. Although UNTAES did not receive the troop level requested
by the Secretary General, it more importantly has NATO commitment for
close air support and further assistance from the NATO-led force in
Bosnia if needed. According to U.N. and U.S. officials, leadership
by NATO members is a critical factor in the operation's effectiveness
thus far, given the former warring factions' belief that a U.N.-led
operation is not credible in using force. Moreover, the former
warring parties in the region clearly understand that NATO will make
resources and support available to UNTAES if necessary. This support
provides assurance that resources will be available if needed and
adds credibility to the UNTAES operation.
LIMITS ON COMMAND AND
CONTROL
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2
According to military experts, effective command and control of
military units is essential in peace operations calling for the use
of force because quick and consistent responses to orders are
critical in combat. However, reflecting the political reality of
national sovereignty in the United Nations, command over national
contingents--the right to issue orders concerning all military
aspects of missions--has not been given to the United Nations.
From the U.S. perspective, this point is made clear in The Clinton
Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,
which describes Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), issued
in 1994. The paper strongly notes that no President has ever ceded
command over U.S. forces. It goes on to state that "[t]he sole
source of legitimacy for U.S. commanders originates from the U.S.
Constitution, the federal law and the Uniform Code of Military
Justice and flows from the President to the lowest U.S. commander in
the field."
PDD-25 does distinguish between command and operational control. It
states that under some circumstances it may be advantageous to place
U.S. forces under the operational control of a foreign commander and
this will be done if it serves the national interest. Similarly, the
United Nations makes a distinction between overall command, which
sovereign states exercise over their troops, and field command, which
the U.N. commander exercises in issuing operational orders.
However, member states even limit U.N. operational control through
agreements that specify their troops' area of operation and
acceptable missions. Moreover, commanders of national contingents
frequently contact their national capitals for instructions on
whether or how to execute operational orders given by the U.N.
commander. However, in the two peace operations where respected
sovereign member states took the lead military roles, they provided
strong leadership and had the credibility and respect necessary to
effectively control the national contingents within their command.
Several examples help illustrate the limits of U.N. command and
control and the greater control over operations by credible lead
nations.
CONGO
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2.1
In the Congo, command and control was at times unclear. At the very
outset of operations, the U.N. force commander's arrival was delayed
and a general from one of the troop contributing nations declared
himself de facto commander until the force commander arrived.
According to U.N. reports, this was a serious problem and the
general had to be replaced immediately by a U.N. official. In the
field, some national contingents worked outside of the U.N. chain of
command. For example, one U.N. contingent began to disarm elements
of the Congolese national force without authority to do so and had to
return the weapons later. Another contingent was ordered to
apprehend mercenaries as authorized by Security Council Resolution
169. Nevertheless, the contingent refused to carry out the order,
saying it was beyond the contingent's mandate. According to
analyses, a lack of unity of purpose existed among the various troop
contributing nations as some nations favored one faction over another
and there was a larger competition between the United States and the
Soviet Union. Each nation tried to gain a political advantage in
Africa and used the Congo to demonstrate it was interested in
decolonization and national sovereignty in Africa. According to
expert and U.N. reports, the lack of clear command and control
hampered ONUC and weakened its effectiveness in carrying out
operations.
SOMALIA
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2.2
The situation in Somalia also illustrates the limits on U.N. command
and control. During operations in 1993, UNOSOM II troop contingents
waited for instructions from their national authorities before
following orders from the U.N. force commander. For example, one
contingent did not follow orders to remain in the capital, Mogadishu.
Thus, when fighting erupted in its sector, other national contingents
were at a disadvantage. Further, the contingent had begun
independent negotiations with one of the warring parties, refused to
participate in certain actions in Mogadishu, and then successfully
requested redeployment. In a report to the Security Council, the
Secretary General said the structure of command and control in UNOSOM
II was weakened by the independent actions of some contingent
commanders. Some contingents appeared to act independently of the
directives and orders issued by the force commander.\10
--------------------
\10 Another unit that supported UNOSOM II was the U.S. quick
reaction force. Although actions were coordinated with the U.N.
special representative in Somalia, the quick reaction force was not
under U.N. command.
BOSNIA AND NATO
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2.3
Questioning an order also occurs when national contingents might be
endangered or there is doubt about the U.N. commander's authority.
In Bosnia, such weaknesses limited UNPROFOR's ability to carry out
its mandates. For example, one troop contingent was ordered to
redeploy to Mostar, where intense fighting was endangering the
civilian population. The troop contingent did not redeploy, saying
that the order exceeded UNPROFOR's mandate. The issue was raised to
higher levels and resulted in an exchange of letters between the
Security Council and the troop contingent's government. According to
U.N. officials, the Security Council believed the order to redeploy
was a valid part of UNPROFOR's mandate, while the troop contingent's
government believed it was an unacceptable risk and outside of its
agreement. These delays and refusals to carry out orders prevented
UNPROFOR from providing security for the area and limited its ability
to deter further conflict.
Operations that NATO carries out face similar issues with command and
control in that member countries retain authority over their troops.
However, NATO has worked on its command and control arrangements for
nearly 50 years. It has an integrated command structure that builds
each participating nation into the command. Moreover, the
organizational basis of NATO has a unity of purpose. It is a
military organization intended to accomplish security objectives.
U.N. operations, on the other hand, reflect the organization's
emphasis on respecting the interests of all members. The dual chain
of command in the U.N.'s Bosnia operation provides a telling example.
In order to launch airstrikes against parties attacking safe areas in
Bosnia, both NATO and the United Nations had to provide
authorization. The United Nations insisted on the "dual key" system
because it had to take into consideration the interests of all member
countries, particularly those on the ground. On several occasions
Bosnian Serbs attacked areas declared safe by the United Nations and
NATO authorized airstrikes to deter the attacks. However, the United
Nations refused to give its own authorization. This refusal led to a
loss of credibility for the mission but preserved the U.N.'s core
political concern of ensuring its own neutrality and taking into
account the concerns of national contingents opposed to the
airstrikes.
HAITI
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2.4
Unlike other U.N. operations, the second phase of UNMIH had clear
and effective control of troop contingents. Although UNMIH was a
U.N. operation, the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) played a central
role in planning operations for both the MNF that preceded UNMIH and
the transition to a U.N. operation. The UNMIH force commander was a
U.S. Major General who reported to the U.N. special representative
of the Secretary General, but for military issues was directly
responsible to USACOM. There was a clear understanding that the
Major General was in command of military decisions. Operational
orders were communicated to all national contingents through a unit
of 550 U.S. special forces troops who had the communications
equipment to act as liaisons with national contingents. Further,
about 40 percent of the UNMIH peacekeepers were U.S. troops, and
U.S. contingents were co-located with other national contingents in
key locations such as Port-au-Prince, Cap Haitien, and Gonaives. The
chain of command for military matters was clearly headed by the U.S.
commander, and operational orders were expected to be carried out.
EASTERN SLAVONIA
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2.5
Command and control of UNTAES is also clear and unambiguous. Both
the U.N. transitional administrator and the force commander are from
NATO member countries and, according to UNTAES officials, national
contingents participating in UNTAES clearly accept their orders,
authority, and control of operations. The force commander is a
Belgian Major General who has adapted the NATO command and control
structure for UNTAES, staffing key positions on all shifts with
Belgian military personnel. This ensures a unity of command and
direct communications links to NATO. The U.N. transitional
administrator is a U.S. foreign service officer, seconded to UNTAES,
who is responsible for political aspects, but leaves military
implementation to the military professionals. For example, unlike
UNPROFOR, which initially required extensive consultation between the
United Nations and NATO prior to close air support, authorization for
air support has been delegated directly to UNTAES and Allied Forces
South (the NATO command carrying out the airstrikes). Although there
is technically a dual-key arrangement, the strategic working
relationship between the commands of UNTAES and Allied Forces South
and their uniformity with NATO procedures makes command and control
for air support efficient and uniform. According to Department of
Defense (DOD) officials, this clear and unambiguous command and
control arrangement is possible because of NATO's full commitment and
support for the operation and because UNTAES leadership is provided
by NATO members.
U.N. APPROACH TO PEACE
OPERATIONS LIMITS THE
EFFECTIVE USE OF FORCE
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3
The importance of respecting the sovereignty of member states also
shapes the U.N. approach to conducting peace operations for
operations with objectives requiring the use of force. This limits
the effective use of force when it is needed. The U.N. basic
approach to conducting peace operations is to (1) obtain the consent
of the warring parties for the U.N. action and (2) maintain strict
neutrality in carrying out operations. According to U.N. documents,
these principles recognize that a U.N. operation is an intrusion
into the domestic affairs of a nation. Therefore, even when the use
of force is authorized, the U.N. operation tries to obtain the
consent of whatever national authority exists.
In recent years, U.N. member states have debated the dimensions of
consent without agreeing on a doctrine for how consent fits into
operations calling for the use of force. The United Nations
recognizes there are limits to respecting sovereignty, particularly
when violations of human rights occur and national authority has
broken down.\11 In such situations, humanitarian intervention to
protect civilians and others at risk may override concerns of
sovereignty and obtaining the consent of all warring parties is not
viable. Another issue advanced by some member states is that
legitimacy rather than consent is the right approach for operations
calling for the use of force. Legitimacy requires, first of all,
international sanction and support, based on a Security Council
resolution that has been debated and agreed upon by the Security
Council. Legitimacy, particularly when national authority has broken
down, also requires that order be firmly restored, rather than
obtaining the consent of all warring factions. Once order is
restored, broad support for using force to maintain order should be
sought within the population. Despite these debates, a U.N.
doctrine or a basic approach has not yet been developed for
operations calling for the use of force, and in recent discussions,
some member states stress that all U.N. operations must respect the
fundamental sovereignty of member countries.
In UNMIH and UNTAES, the two instances where respected member states
provided strong military leadership, the member states used their own
doctrines to help guide the operations' use of force. These
doctrines emphasized security for troops and personnel and the
legitimacy of the operations. In both cases, the approaches stressed
that the international resolutions, based on the overall consent for
the operations, gave the peace operations legitimacy to use force to
carry out the mission. The operations thus did not require the
continuing consent of the warring factions for their actions.
Attaining the missions' objectives was the primary purpose rather
than ensuring respect for sovereignty. This approach differentiated
UNMIH and UNTAES from other U.N. operations calling for the use of
force. Several examples illustrate how relying on consent has placed
limits on the operational effectiveness of U.N.-led missions calling
for the use of force.
--------------------
\11 For example, in An Agenda for Peace, the Secretary General
stated, "(t)he foundation-stone of this work is and must remain the
State. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are
crucial to any common international progress." But he also
acknowledged that the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty had
passed and the United Nations had a commitment to address brutal
ethnic, religious, and cultural strife.
CONGO
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3.1
During ONUC's initial phases, operations were carried out only with
the consent of the warring parties. U.N. member states were
concerned with balancing the need to restore order in the Congo with
the need to avoid interfering in its internal affairs. Obtaining
consent from the warring factions led to severe disruptions in
building up troop strength and redistributing forces within the
country to carry out the mission's mandates. In the province of
Katanga, which had broken away from the rest of the Congo, the United
Nations wanted to deploy greater numbers of troops to restore civil
order and expel foreign forces, particularly European mercenaries who
were supporting the Kataganese forces. In negotiating with the
Katanga provincial government, the United Nations agreed to place
troops in restricted locations and subject to a number of conditions.
As a result, while troop deployment proceeded rapidly to 18,000 in
the country, it took 2 years to reach sufficient troop strength in
Katanga. An average of 500 U.N. troops per month were deployed in
Katanga. Consequently, it took 2 years to build up to the authorized
troop strength and delayed the U.N. forces from building a credible
presence.
BOSNIA
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3.2
In Bosnia, UNPROFOR's enforcement authority was expanded under
chapter VII of the U.N. charter (particularly in U.N. Security
Resolution 836) to deter attacks against safe areas and provide
security for humanitarian relief convoys. Nevertheless, UNPROFOR
continued to (1) obtain movement clearances for its vehicles from
warring factions before driving from one area to another, (2) acceded
to roadblocks that prevented delivery of both humanitarian aid and
equipment and supplies for its own troops, and (3) allowed warring
factions to influence the deployment of troops along confrontation
lines. According to the director of UNPROFOR's civil affairs group,
operations in Bosnia were carried out as though it was a peacekeeping
mission in which consent was required to conduct operations, even
though new mandates authorized the use of force in certain
situations.
Another example from Bosnia illustrates the U.N.'s emphasis on
getting consent and maintaining the appearance of neutrality even
when the use of force is authorized. During air, missile, and ground
attacks on the safe area of Bihac during November 1994, UNPROFOR
tried to negotiate an end to the bombardment by sending letters to
Bosnian Serb authorities. When the letters did not work, NATO flew
numerous reconnaissance missions over Bihac and pressed for U.N.
authorization to launch broad airstrikes against the Bosnian Serb
positions threatening the area. The United Nations denied
authorization. The United Nations also insisted on providing
specific warnings of airstrikes to the offending party and debated
with NATO about providing the parties with the targets selected.
NATO officials believed providing such information was inappropriate
and it not only jeopardized its pilots but also weakened its
credibility. Subsequently, towns surrounding Bihac fell to the
Bosnian Serb Army, and five peacekeepers were wounded and one was
killed. Regarding the airstikes, U.N. officials were concerned that
airstrikes would undermine U.N. neutrality and hinder any
cooperation it was receiving from the parties. U.N. officials were
also concerned that airstrikes against one of the warring parties,
even if they were carried out to enforce a Security Council mandate,
were acts of war, not peacekeeping, and had no place in a U.N.
mission. The Secretary General also said that airstrikes were not
used partly because of U.N. doctrine and partly because he was
concerned about possible retaliation against UNPROFOR's other ground
forces throughout Bosnia and Croatia. Military observers, civilian
personnel, and hundreds of peacekeepers from several nations were
taken hostage or detained during certain periods when U.N. action
was being contemplated.
SOMALIA
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3.3
Somalia provides a similar example of how obtaining consent can limit
enforcement operations. Although UNOSOM II was authorized to use
force to achieve disarmament and the U.N. Secretary General regarded
disarmament as crucial for the overall success of the mission, UNOSOM
II initially sought to act with the consent of the parties. UNOSOM
relied on the warring factions to voluntarily disarm and store their
weapons in areas under their control. To verify compliance, UNOSOM
provided the factions with written notice of planned inspections of
weapons storage sites. Emphasizing the importance of cooperation and
consent over effective enforcement, debates within UNOSOM II focussed
not on whether written notice should be provided, but how much
warning time should be given to the factions before inspections. By
mid-1993, the Secretary General realized that requiring the consent
and cooperation of the parties was ineffective and inappropriate.
HAITI
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3.4
In contrast to other U.N. operations that relied on consent as the
principal operating approach in the field, the second phase of UNMIH
(1995-96) used the U.S. doctrine for operations other than war to
help guide field operations. The U.S. doctrine is based on six
principles: (1) implementing explicitly defined objectives, (2)
emphasizing unity of effort, (3) ensuring adequate security for
itself, (4) exercising restraint, (5) being perserverant, and (6)
ensuring legitimacy. Under this doctrine, consent was an important
element in ensuring the legitimacy of UNMIH and the consent of
Haitian government authorities was obtained before the second phase
of operations began. But once there was consent on UNMIH's mandate,
operations proceeded with vigor and certainty rather than by
negotiation. Moreover, legitimacy was only one portion of the
doctrine. The second phase of UNMIH also stressed security by
retaining military, political, and informational advantage over
potential warring parties. UNMIH also adopted robust rules of
engagement that allowed it to be proactive and to take the initiative
in using force beyond self-defense. For example, in ensuring a
secure environment, UNMIH used roadblocks and searches and actively
disarmed Haitians in certain situations. UNMIH's quick reaction
force also acted promptly and proactively to disturbances in November
1995.
EASTERN SLAVONIA
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3.5
The Eastern Slavonia operation was authorized after Croatia and the
local Serb population requested the United Nations to implement the
basic agreement to demilitarize and peacefully transfer the area from
Serb to Croatian control. However, once consent was obtained in the
basic agreement, UNTAES adopted NATO doctrine and rules of engagement
to carry out the operation. Under this doctrine, developed for the
Implementation Force in Bosnia,\12 force protection and legitimacy
are fundamental tenets. Consent of the parties on the ground, as
well as agreement from Serbia and Croatia, was important in
legitimizing the mission. However, consent was obtained to use force
if necessary to carry out the mandate. Thus operations on the ground
are carried out forcefully if necessary. On several occassions,
UNTAES made it clear that it would be reasonable in implementing
operations, but also that force would be used when needed. For
example, when the Scorpion paramilitary unit occupied oil fields in
Eastern Slavonia, UNTAES first expressed its concern and told the
paramilitary unit to withdraw. When it did not withdraw, an armored
unit was sent directly to the area and forced it to disperse.
--------------------
\12 The Implementation Force (IFOR) was the NATO operation that
replaced UNPROFOR. IFOR's mission was to implement provisions of the
peace settlement for Bosnia, also known as the Dayton Accords. IFOR
was authorized by the United Nations but has no U.N. involvement.
CONCLUSION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
The United Nations has successfully led peacekeeping missions as part
of its mandate under the U.N. charter. However, its record in
effectively carrying out operations requiring the use of force has
been less noteworthy. This is due, in part, to several limitations
of the organization: the United Nations must rely on sovereign
member states to volunteer the means for carrying out missions; U.N.
force commanders cannot always be sure that orders will be carried
out; and the U.N.'s core principles of neutrality, impartiality, and
seeking consent of warring parties have limited effective action to
restore peace. In Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Lebanon,
and the Congo, U.N. missions had operational problems because they
lacked the necessary resources, did not have an effective command and
control structure, and did not have an approach appropriate to
conducting operations calling for the use of force. However, in the
cases of Haiti and Eastern Slavonia, the limitations were overcome.
In these situations, the prestige and credibility of the nations'
leading the operations and the assurance of adequate forces made it
possible to conduct effective operations, with all parties assured
that force would be used if necessary.
Given its limitations in leading operations requiring the use of
force, the United Nations may not be an appropriate vehicle for
heading missions where force is required to restore peace and order
if vital U.S. national interests are at stake, unless a nation or
coalition with sufficient military capability and commitment leads
the operation. In missions that do not involve vital national
interests but call for the use of force, the United Nations will most
likely still confront fundamental limitations as an effective lead
organization. Nonetheless, U.N. missions may still be an
appropriate vehicle in such situations. They can assist in the
provision of humanitarian relief, signal the international
community's concern, and demonstrate a willingness to provide some
level of support.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
The Department of State and DOD commented on a draft of this report.
The State Department generally concurred with the conclusions of the
report. DOD agreed with the conclusion of the report that, given its
limitations, the United Nations may not be an appropriate vehicle for
heading missions where force is required to restore peace if vital
U.S. national interests are at stake, unless a nation or coalition
with sufficient military capability and commitment leads the
operation.
DOD further commented that the causal factors of success or failure
are many and diverse and indicated that geopolitical and other
contextual variables had affected the execution of the missions
requiring the use of force that were executed over nearly four
decades. Moreover, DOD stated that U.N. capabilities to carry out
such operations are a function, in part, of the organization's
institutional structure and the commitment of member states.
Finally, DOD indicated that lessons had been learned from peace
operations over the past few years and that as a result a more
effective approach to conducting peace operations had been developed
by the United Nations and member states.
We agree, and have previously indicated that geopolitical factors and
a variety of operational variables may affect the degree of success
or failure attributed to any specific U.N. operation.\13 However,
our analysis indicates that missions requiring the use of force and
led by the United Nations have consistently had in common the three
limiting factors we discuss in this report. Moreover, our research
led us to conclude that even if the specific geopolitical and
operational variables were to have been addressed for each mission,
the limitations discussed in this report would have remained, thus
placing at risk the missions' success. This brought into question
whether the United Nations could be an effective vehicle for
implementing missions requiring the use of force. Clearly the
factors we point to--resources, command and control, and overall
approach--weakened the day-to-day conduct of the operations and
compromised the U.N.'s ability to respond to the field challenges.
The impacts on operations are documented in U.N. reports and our
prior reports and are recognized in U.N. Security Council
resolutions. We agree with DOD's comments that these factors are a
function of the U.N.'s institutional structure and member states'
commitment. As stated in our report, the United Nations is at its
core a political body of individual members and not an organization
that has independent resources and power of its own.
Our review indicated that the United Nations and member states have
learned from recent missions that call for the use of force. We have
attempted to reflect this in the report, particularly in our
discussion of the decisions that were taken regarding the structure
of the operation in Eastern Slavonia. However, we believe that the
fundamental lesson learned is reflected in State's and DOD's
concurrence that the United Nations may not be the appropriate
organization to undertake peace operations requiring the use of
force.
The Department of State and DOD provided technical comments, which we
have incorporated into the report as appropriate.
--------------------
\13 For example, in U.N. Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Recent
Missions (GAO/NSIAD-94-9, Dec. 29, 1993), we discussed political
feasibility and the importance of a comprehensive political
framework.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
To assess the U.N.'s operational effectiveness and limitations in
undertaking peace missions, we analyzed the mandates of all U.N.
peace operations, reviewed Secretary General and field mission
reports on these operations, and synthesized information and analyses
of our past reports of these missions. Over the past few years, we
have also conducted field study at numerous peace missions while they
were in operation, such as those in Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia,
Haiti, Rwanda, northern Iraq, Cambodia, the Sinai, Cyprus, El
Salvador, Honduras, and Syria. At these peace missions, we observed
operations and obtained data on casualties, troop deployment, and
civilian activities; situation reports; standing orders for both
civilian and military peacekeepers; force commander operations
orders; faxes and cables on operations; and other documentation. We
also interviewed U.N. officials and military observers,
peacekeepers, contingent commanders, and civilian staff from a full
range of participating countries in every region. From these
interviews, we obtained valuable international perspectives on
peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Among the officials we
interviewed were the special representatives of the Secretary General
and the force commanders for the operations in Haiti, the former
Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Cambodia.
To obtain the U.N.'s perspective on the effectiveness of its peace
operations, we received from the U.N. Secretariat, official reports
on operations, operating procedures, manuals, budgetary documents,
and policy and planning documents. We also interviewed officials
from the U.N. Departments of Peacekeeping Operations, Administration
and Management, Humanitarian Affairs, and Political Affairs and the
Office of Legal Affairs. Among the officials we interviewed were the
under secretaries general of these departments and the professional
line staff in the offices implementing operations. For several of
the missions, we were updated by the U.N. Observation Center, which
provides 24-hour coverage of all U.N. peace operations.
Since refugee and humanitarian operations are such an important part
of peacekeeping and peace enforcement, we obtained detailed reports
and operational documents from the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and interviewed UNHCR officials both in Geneva,
Switzerland, and in the field at several of the missions. We also
spoke with officials and representatives of many human rights and
humanitarian organizations both in the field and at their
headquarters. Some of these included the International Red Cross and
Red Crescent, the International Committee for the Red Cross, Human
Rights Watch, the International Organization for Migration, Doctors
Without Borders, and the International Rescue Committee.
To obtain U.S. perspectives on U.N. peacekeeping and enforcement
operations, we conducted work at DOD, the Departments of State and
Justice; the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); the
U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and the U.S. Mission to NATO.
Some of the State and USAID locations where we conducted work were
Washington, D.C.; New York, N.Y.; London, England; Paris, France;
Brussels, Belgium; Thailand; Cambodia; Israel; Egypt; Cyprus; El
Salvador; Haiti; Croatia; Bosnia; and Rwanda. We also conducted work
at DOD locations, including Washington, D.C.; the European Command in
Stuttgary, Germany; and the Atlantic Command in Newport, Virginia.
From the U.S. agencies, we obtained their regulations, doctrine, and
manuals on the conduct of peace operations; their situation reports
on the countries where peace operations were ongoing; their reports
of the security and political situations; and cables on the U.N.
peace operations. We observed interagency working groups on several
of the missions and received security and political briefings from
the agencies. We also interviewed officials from the U.S.
Departments of Defense and State, USAID, and the U.S. Mission to the
United Nations, and the U.S. Mission to NATO about specific peace
operations and obtained their perspectives and analysis on the
conduct of operations.
We also sought the views and opinions of scholars and researchers and
obtained comments on a draft of this report from those at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Thomas J. Watson, Jr.,
Institute for International Studies, and the Henry L. Stimson
Center, which we have taken into consideration in finalizing this
report.
We performed our review in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :7.1
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking
Minority Members of the House and Senate Committees on
Appropriations, House Committee on National Security, and Senate
Committee on Armed Services. We are also sending copies to the
Secretaries of State and Defense, the U.S. Permanent Representative
to the United Nations, and the U.N. Secretary General. We will also
make copies available to others upon request.
Please contact me at (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix VI.
Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director
International Relations and Trade Issues
U.N.'S USE OF FORCE: ITS BASIS IN
THE U.N. CHARTER
=========================================================== Appendix I
The history of the United Nations shows that its founders intended
the world organization to be an effective instrument in maintaining
world security. The U.N.'s first purpose, as set forth in its
charter, is to maintain international peace and security and to
collectively prevent aggression and threats to peace. This
fundamental purpose was born out of the destructiveness of World War
II and the determination by the allied forces to construct an
international organization capable of preventing further wars. After
conferences among the major powers in Cairo and Yalta, the Prime
Ministers expressed a common sentiment: "We affirm that after the
war a world organization to maintain peace and security should be set
up and endowed with the necessary power and authority to prevent
aggression and violence."\1
The U.N. charter sets forth the organization's principles and builds
further the foundation for U.N. action to restore peace. Article
2(3), states that "all members shall settle their international
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace
and security, and justice, are not endangered." Expanding on this
principle, article 2(4) states that "all members shall refrain from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state. . . ." Article 24 gives the
U.N. Security Council primary responsibility to maintain peace and
security and authority to act on behalf of the other member states.
Finally, article 25 obligates member states to accept and carry out
the decisions of the Security Council.
With the foundation for forceful U.N. action, chapter VII of the
U.N. charter (articles 39-51) lays out the implementing framework
and member states' obligations.\2 The Security Council can call upon
U.N. member states to impose complete or partial interruption of
economic relations, travel, and communication with nations
endangering peace, or, under article 42, may itself "take such action
by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security." Article 43 obligates
member states to "undertake to make available to the Security
Council, on its call and in accordance with an agreement or
agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights
of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international
peace and security." These agreements on the number and types of
forces to be provided "shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the
initiative of the Security Council." Any such agreement is subject to
the constitutional procedures of the contributing member state.
Chapter VII of the U.N. charter further establishes a military staff
committee, composed of the chiefs of staff of the five permanent
members, to assist the Security Council in planning and determining
the strategic direction of U.N. military action.
To date, no nation has ever arranged to provide armed forces to the
United Nations as called for under article 43. In 1946, an attempt
was made to establish ground rules for contributing military forces
and armaments to the Security Council, designating where the forces
should be garrisoned, setting a time limit for committing U.N.
forces to an enforcement action, and specifying what base facilities
should be made available. This attempt failed because of
disagreement between the Soviet Union and the four other permanent
members of the Security Council and among the allies themselves.
During ratification of the charter, U.S. Senators clearly recognized
the power potentially authorized to the United Nations to undertake
peace enforcement. According to Congressional Records at the time,
one Senator commented that article 43 was an "innovation in
international law. . . . Unlike the League of Nations, here is
something that has teeth to keep the peace of the world."\3 Another
Senator noted that "collective action to curb the aggressor seems to
be the only answer to this problem."\4
Nonetheless, the U.S. Congress expressed reservations about ceding
control of military forces to the United Nations. These concerns
were expressed in the U.N. Participation Act of 1945 as amended, and
in the debate about ratifying the U.N. charter. The U.N.
Participation Act authorizes the President to negotiate article 43
agreements with the United Nations but expressly reserves approval to
Congress. The act further states that with regard to article 43,
nothing within the act "shall be construed as an authorization to
make available to the Security Council for such purpose armed forces,
facilities, or assistance . . . ." The act also prohibits the
President from employing the armed forces under chapter VII of the
U.N. charter without prior congressional consent. In addition, it
limits other U.S. participation to 1,000 U.S. armed forces
personnel.
--------------------
\1 Quoted from The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, ed.
Bruno Simma (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 8.
\2 In chapter VI (articles 33-38) of the U.N. charter, measures are
set forth to peacefully resolve disputes likely to endanger
international security, including mediation, arbitration, and
investigation by the United Nations. Although peacekeeping is not
mentioned in the charter, chapter VI provides the basis for U.N.
peace operations not involving enforcement.
\3 Congressional Record (Vol. 91, S8021, 1945).
\4 Congressional Record (Vol. 91, H7958, 1945).
NATIONS INSISTED ON
AUTONOMOUS ROLE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.1
Although the U.N. charter gives the Security Council a central role
in maintaining international security, it also formally recognizes
the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense outside
of the United Nations. According to reports of the founding
conferences, article 51 of the U.N. charter (right of individual and
collective self-defense) and chapter VIII (Regional Arrangements,
articles 52-54) were drafted to address nations' concerns that
enforcement authority was too concentrated in the Security Council.\5
The underlying debate reflected the desire for a world body capable
of maintaining peace versus the interests of nations to retain power
in their geographic regions. Article 51, for example, explicitly
recognizes the legitimate role of individual nations and groupings in
maintaining security.\6 It also recognizes the "inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations."
Numerous defense alliances have used article 51 to legitimize their
collective security outside the formal U.N. framework, and nations
have relied on it to justify their independent enforcement actions.\7
For example, the North Atlantic Treaty states that an attack on any
member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) shall be
considered an attack against all. The treaty further commits its
members, acting under article 51 of the U.N. charter, to take all
measures, including the use of armed force to restore the security of
the North Atlantic area. Other security arrangements, including the
Western European Union, the South-East Asia Collective Defense
Treaty, and the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and
Korea, rely on article 51 as a legal basis for their collective
security arrangements.\8
Nations also broadly cite article 51 to legitimize the use of force
outside the formal U.N. framework. For example, in 1978, Uganda and
Tanzania made sustained attacks against each other along their common
border, justifying the inherent right of self-defense under article
51. Between October 12 and 29, Uganda claimed it had repulsed
Tanzania and proceeded to capture several hundred square miles of
Tanzania. Tanzania waged retaliatory attacks and intervened in
Uganda, claiming its action was an act of self-defense under article
51 of the U.N. charter. These uses of force took place outside of
the U.N. apparatus but justified actions based on the U.N. charter.
Similarly, U.S. action in Grenada and Panama were justified partly
on the right of self-defense.
Chapter VIII of the U.N. charter explicitly recognizes the role of
regional organizations within the U.N. framework of collective
security. Article 52 states that nothing precludes regional
arrangements for dealing with the maintenance of international peace
and security as appropriate for regional action, provided the actions
taken are consistent with the U.N. charter. Article 53 continues:
"The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional
arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority.
But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements
or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security
Council."
Although the U.N. charter authorizes regional organizations to help
maintain international security within the U.N. framework, they can
also act autonomously under article 51. For example, the League of
Arab States, a regional organization with observer status at the
United Nations, asserts that armed aggression directed against one of
its members is directed against them all. The members are to
undertake all means available, including armed force, to repel the
aggression. In its Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation,
the League cites article 51 of the U.N. charter and the right of
legal defense as its standards. Other regional organizations, such
as the Organization of American States, the Organization of African
Unity, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Commonwealth of Independent
States, and the Economic Community of West African States, have
similar arrangements.
Regional organizations have also undertaken independent initiatives
under article 51. For example, in August 1990, the Economic
Community of West African States sent a monitoring force to Liberia
to help bring about a cease-fire in its civil war. Fighting had
begun in 1989 when Liberia's National Patriotic Liberation Front
launched an attack against the forces of the President of Liberia; by
August 1990, a third party, the United Liberation Movement of
Liberia, entered the fight. In subsequent fighting, over 150,000
civilians were killed, 700,000 became refugees, neighboring Sierra
Leone was used as a rebel base and invaded by one of the factions,
and the peacekeeping force became involved in enforcement measures
against the warring factions. The Security Council was not consulted
nor had it approved the peacekeeping action before it took place.
Nonetheless, in January 1991, the President of the Security Council
commended the peacekeeping action, and in November 1992 the Security
Council passed its first resolution in support of the Economic
Community of West African States.
Regional organizations have also cooperated with the United Nations
in peacekeeping and other operations. Subsequently, the Security
Council and General Assembly have passed several resolutions
encouraging further cooperation with regional organizations to
undertake peacekeeping and other operations.
--------------------
\5 For example, according to a State Department report, the Latin
American and Arab states desired that regional autonomy be preserved;
the Soviet Union and the United States did not want a United Nations
dictating action in their spheres of influence, and smaller states
generally expressed uneasiness over the power of the Security
Council.
\6 In drafting the charter, national representatives recognized the
necessity of individual or collective response outside of the U.N.
framework if a member state was attacked but a permanent member
vetoed Security Council action. Additionally, Latin American nations
and others advocated the need for autonomous collective action
through regional security arrangements. Inclusion of the term
"collective" self-defense was to legitimize security arrangements in
the Americas under the Act of Chapultapec, which declared that an act
of aggression against one American state shall be considered an act
of aggression against all. (U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin No. 297
[Mar. 3, 1945], p. 297.
\7 Writing 12 years ago, Oscar Schachter went even further, stating,
"We are bound to conclude that the collective security system of the
U.N. Charter has now been largely replaced by fragmented collective
defense actions and alliances founded on article 51." Oscar
Schachter, "The Right of States to Use Armed Force," Michigan Law
Review, v. 82 (April/May 1984), pp. 1620-46. According to
Schachter in 1996, there is now greater hope for the United Nations
as a collective security system, but such a system would certainly
not be a panacea.
\8 Considerably more security arrangements, both active and defunct,
cited article 51 of the U.N. charter to legitimize their security
arrangements. These treaties, such as the Australia, New Zealand,
United States Security Treaty; the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation
and Mutual Assistance; and the Gulf Cooperation Council are all
justified explicitly or implicitly on the basis of article 51.
UNITED NATIONS HAS PRECEDENT FOR
LEADING PEACEKEEPING
========================================================== Appendix II
From its inception in 1945, the United Nations has led peacekeeping
operations to help maintain international order. In 1946, military
observers attached to a field mission established by the Security
Council investigated allegations by Greece that neighboring states
were making cross-border incursions. From 1948 to March 1997, the
United Nations led 42 peace operations--34 peacekeeping, 4 authorized
in whole or in part under chapter VII of the U.N. charter, and 4
where the mandates implied force was to be used to conduct
operations. According to U.N. documents, over 750,000 military,
civilian, and police personnel have participated in these missions.
Table II.1 lists the peacekeeping and other missions led by the
United Nations since 1948.
Table II.1
U.N. Peacekeeping and Other Peace
Missions Since 1948
Mandate and key U.N.
Mission Location Years authorizing documents
------------------------ ------------- ------------- ------------------------
The following are Peacekee
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.N. Trace Supervision Palestine 1948-ongoing Supervise observance of
Organization truce in Palestine and
various ceasefires.
(Security Council
Resolutions--S/Res/50,
73, 101, 236, 339)
U.N. Military Observer India/ 1949-ongoing Supervise observance of
Group in India and Pakistan ceasefires and
Pakistan agreements. (S/Res/47,
91, 201)
U.N. Emergency Force I Egypt/Israel 1956-67 Secure and supervise
ceasefire. (General
Assembly Resolutions GA
998, 1000, 1001, 1125)
U.N. Observation Group Lebanon 1958-58 Ensure no illegal
in Lebanon infiltration of arms and
personnel across
Lebanese border. (S/
Res/128)
U.N. Security Force in Indonesia 1962-63 Monitor ceasefire and
West Guinea help ensure order under
U.N. supervised transfer
of national
administration from
Netherlands to
Indonesia. (GA 1752)
U.N. Yemen Observation Yemen 1963-64 Observe disengagement
Mission between Saudi-Arabia and
Yemen. (S/Res/179)
U.N. Peacekeeping Force Cyprus 1964-ongoing Use best efforts to
in Cyprus prevent recurrence of
fighting and contribute
to maintenance and
restoration of law and
order; supervise
ceasefire. (S/Res/186;
Aide-memoire of the
Secretary General S/
5653)
U.N. India Pakistan India/ 1965-66 Supervise ceasefire. (S/
Observer Mission Pakistan Res/211)
Mission of the Dominican 1965-66 Observe and report on
Representative of the Republic violations of ceasefire
Secretary General in the among warring parties.
Dominican Republic (S/Res/203)
U.N. Emergency Force II Egypt/Israel 1973-79 Supervise implementation
of ceasefire and
redeployment of forces.
Use best efforts to
prevent recurrence of
fighting. (S/Res/340 and
341; Secretary General
Report--S/11052 Rev.1)
U.N. Disengagement Israel/Syria 1974-ongoing Use best efforts to
Observer Force maintain ceasefire and
its observance. (S/Res/
350; S/11302/ADD.1)
U.N. Good Offices Afghanistan/ 1988-90 Assist personal
Mission in Afghanistan Pakistan representative of the
and Pakistan Secretary General in
ensuring implementation
of agreements. (S/Res/
622, 647)
U.N. Iran-Iraq Military Iran/Iraq 1988-91 Verify, confirm,
Observer Group supervise ceasefire and
withdrawal of forces.
(S/Res/598, 619, 631,
642, 651)
U.N. Transition Namibia 1989-90 Help ensure cessation of
Assistance Group (Angola, hostilities, troop
Cuba, South confinement to bases;
Africa) supervise and ensure
conditions for free and
fair elections. (S/Res/
435, 632)
U.N. Angola Verification Angola 1989-91 Verify redeployment and
Mission I withdrawal of Cuban
troops. (S/Res/626)
U.N. Observer Group in Central 1989-92 Verify agreement to
Central America America cease arms and troop
infiltration. Facilitate
voluntary demobilization
of Nicaraguan Contras.
(S/Res/644, 650, 653)
U.N. Advance Mission in Cambodia 1991-92 Assist parties to
Cambodia maintain ceasefire. (S/
Res/717, 728)
U.N. Angola Verification Angola 1991-95 Verify and monitor
Mission II ceasefire; observe and
monitor electoral
process and elections.
(S/Res/696, 747)
U.N. Observer Mission in El Salvador 1991-95 Monitor, observe, and
El Salvador verify all aspects of
agreements--human
rights, cessation of
armed conflict, and
security situation, and
elections. (S/Res/693,
729, 832)
U.N. Mission for the Western 1991-ongoing Monitor and verify
Referendum in Western Sahara ceasefire,
Sahara demobilization, prisoner
exchanges; organize and
ensure free and fair
referendum. (S/Res/690,
907)
U.N. Transitional Cambodia 1992-93 Ensure implementation of
Authority in Cambodia Comprehensive Political
Agreement; organize free
and fair elections;
oversee disarmament,
reconstruction,
repatriation, and
control of government.
(S/Res/745, 860, 880)
U.N. Operation in Somalia 1992-93 Monitor the agreed
Somalia I ceasefire, provide
security for
humanitarian relief
operations, and assist
in establishing
security. (S/Res/751,
775, 794)
U.N. Operation in Mozambique 1992-94 Help implement peace
Mozambique plan, including
monitoring and verifying
the ceasefire and
demobilization of
troops, monitoring
elections, and help in
the provision of
humanitarian aid. (S/
Res/797, 850, 879, 957)
U.N. Observer Mission Ugandan side 1993-94 Monitor/verify that no
Uganda-Rwanda of the border military assistance
crosses Rwanda-Uganda
border. (S/Res/846, 872,
891, 928)
U.N. Mission in Haiti-- Haiti 1993-96 Help implement
initial phase provisions of the
Governor's Island
agreement; assist in
modernizing armed and
police forces (S/Res/
867, 905, 933)
U.N. Observer Mission in Georgia 1993-ongoing Monitor and verify
Georgia implementation of
ceasefire agreement and
observe situation; act
as liaison with ongoing
CIS peace missions. (S/
Res/849, 854, 858, 881)
U.N. Observer Mission in Liberia 1993-ongoing Monitor peace agreement
Liberia in cooperation with
ECOWAS peace operation.
(S/Res/866, 911, 950,
972)
U.N. Aouzou Strip Chad 1994-94 Verify withdrawal of
Observer Group Libyan forces from
Aouzou Strip between
Libya and Chad. (S/Res/
915)
U.N. Mission of Tajikistan 1994-ongoing Assist in monitoring the
Observers in Tajikistan implementation of the
ceasefire and cessation
of hostile acts and act
as liaison with ongoing
peace operations. (S/
Res/968, 999, 1030,
1061)
U.N. Angola Verification Angola 1995-ongoing Assist in compliance of
Mission III the Lusaka Protocol,
including ceasefire and
humanitarian assistance.
(S/Res/976, 1008, 1045)
U.N. Preventive Macedonia 1995-ongoing Monitor and report on
Deployment Force situation in border
area. (S/Res/983, 1027,
1046)
U.N. Confidence Croatia 1995-ongoing Assist in implementation
Restoration Operations of ceasefire agreement
in Croatia between Croatia and
Serbia and controlling
movement over Croatia's
international borders.
(S/Res/981, 990)
U.N. Mission in Bosnia Bosnia and 1995-ongoing Assist and monitor law
and Herzegovina Herzegovina enforcement activities
in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. (S/Res/
1035)
U.N. Mission of Croatia 1996-ongoing Observe and monitor
Observers in the situation along a narrow
Prevlaka strip of land separating
Croatia and Bosnia. (S/
Res/1038)
U.N. Special Mission in Haiti 1996-ongoing Assist the government of
Haiti Haiti in maintaining a
secure environment and
professionalizing the
civilian police. (S/
Res/1063; S/1996/813)
The following mission of s have ectives measure
force to be accomplishe mandates with requiring
obj d. some
U.N. Operations in the Congo 1960-64 Take necessary steps to
Congo (now Zaire) provide government of
Congo with military
assistance in fulfilling
their tasks. Use
requisite measure of
force, if necessary, to
apprehend, detain, and
deport all foreign
military and
paramilitary personnel.
(S/Res/143, 145, 146,
169)
U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon 1978-ongoing Confirm withdrawal of
Lebanon (UNIFIL) Israeli forces; restore
international security;
assist government of
Lebanon regain
authority. Use best
efforts to prevent
recurrence of fighting
and ensure area of
operation is not used
for hostile activity of
any kind. Control
movement and take all
measures to assure the
effective restoration of
Lebanese sovereignty.
(S/Res/425, 426; S/
12611)
U.N. Assistance Mission Rwanda 1993-96 Contribute to the
in Rwanda security of Kigali;
monitor ceasefire
agreement. Assist in
humanitarian relief.
Contribute to security
and protection of
refugees and civilians
at risk; establish
secure humanitarian
areas, where feasible;
provide security for
humanitarian relief
operations. (S/Res/872,
918, 925)
U.N. Mission in Haiti-- Haiti 1995-96 Assist in sustaining the
second phase secure and stable
environment; protect
international personnel
and installations, and
professionalize armed
forces and police. (S/
Res/940, 975)
The following missions were authorized under chapter VII to use force to carry
out some objectives
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Iraq-Kuwait 1991-ongoing Observe and, by its
Observation Mission presence, deter
violations of
demilitarized zone. Take
physical action to
prevent or redress
small-scale violations
of DMZ. (S/Res/687, 806)
U.N. Protection Force Former 1992-95 Provide security for
(UNPROFOR) Yugoslavia humanitarian relief;
(Bosnia) deter attacks against 6
safe areas, using air
power from regional
organizations, if
necessary. (S/Res/764,
776, 836)
U.N. Operations in Somalia 1993-95 Use enforcement measures
Somalia II (UNOSOM) to ensure a secure
environment, disarm the
warring factions, and
ensure the delivery of
humanitarian aid, and
assist in rebuilding
Somali institutions. (S/
Res/814)
U.N. Transitional Eastern 1996-ongoing Supervise
Administration for Slavonia demilitarization of
Eastern Slavonia, Eastern Slavonia and
Baranja, and Western organize elections. (S/
Sirmium (UNTAES) Res/1037, 1043)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.N. Security Council has authorized member states or coalitions
to lead several actions where the use of force, embargo, or sanctions
were authorized. Table II.2 lists several important actions.
Table II.2
U.N. Security Council Resolutions
Authorizing Member State Action
Main Security
Location and Council
initial date Leader and action resolutions
------------- -------------------------------------------------- -------------
Korea 1950 U.S.-led coalition defended South Korea against S/Res/83, 84,
invasion by North Korea. 85
Rhodesia 1965 British naval vessels imposed embargo and S/Res/217,
prevented ships from unloading oil in Rhodesia. 232, 253
South Africa All states impose arms and economic embargo S/Res/418
1977 International economic embargo without specific
leadership.
Iraq 1990 All states impose economic embargo on Iraq and S/Res/661,
Iraq forces in Kuwait; impose air and maritime 665, 670, 678
embargo. U.S.-led coalition enforced Iraq's
withdrawal from Kuwait.
Iraq 1991 U.S.-led coalition undertook humanitarian S/Res/688
intervention (Operation Provide Comfort) to ensure
security for Kurds in Iraq. Imposed a no-fly zone.
Former NATO countries lead a maritime, arms, and economic S/Res/757,
Yugoslavia embargo on Serbia and Montenegro. 787
1991
Libya 1992 All states impose economic sanctions on Libya. S/Res/742
Rwanda 1992, International community imposes arms embargo on S/Res/918,
1994 Rwanda. France uses all necessary means to protect 929
safe areas and provide humanitarian relief.
Somalia 1992- All states impose and arms embargo on Somalia. S/Res/733,
1993 U.S.-led coalition uses all means necessary to 794
establish a secure environment for humanitarian
relief.
Liberia 1992 All states impose a weapons embargo on Liberia. S/Res/788
Bosnia 1993 NATO enforces no-fly zone; and uses air power, S/Res/816,
with U.N. concurrence, to deter attacks against 824
safe areas.
Haiti 1993, United States imposes maritime embargo against S/Res/841,
1994 Haiti; leads multinational force to restore 873, 875,
rightful authority to Haiti and provide secure 917, 940
environment.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.N. EXPERIENCE IN THE USE OF
FORCE
========================================================= Appendix III
This appendix provides information on U.N. peace missions in
Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Lebanon, the Congo, and
Haiti.
SOMALIA
The United Nations established UNOSOM I in April 1992, in response to
civil war and the death of an estimated 500,000 Somalis. UNOSOM I
was authorized to monitor a cease-fire, which had been negotiated
among Somalia's warring clans, and escort relief convoys to feed the
starving population. Within months, however, the U.N. Secretary
General concluded that clan leaders were using force and the threat
of force to prevent UNOSOM's deployment--only 564 of the authorized
level of 4,219 troops had been allowed into Somalia by the end of
1992.
Accordingly, in December 1992, the United Nations authorized a
U.S.-led mission, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), under chapter VII
of the U.N. charter, to create a secure environment for the
humanitarian relief effort. With 37,000 troops, UNITAF opened the
airport and seaport, repaired roads and airfields, and protected
international agencies and nongovernment organizations. The
Secretary General reported in January 1993 that UNITAF had escorted
convoys delivering 25,000 tons of food. UNITAF also undertook
limited disarmament by banning and confiscating heavy weapons and
arms in its area of operations. However, UNITAF was deployed only in
central and southern Somalia. Although UNITAF relied for the most
part on a credible show of force to achieve its objective, it
responded aggressively to occasional incidents of armed opposition.
For example, when one faction violated the cease-fire by attacking
another faction, UNITAF destroyed the heavy weapons of the aggressor
and forced the faction to withdraw. In another incident, Nigerian
forces under UNITAF repelled an attack by militias in Somalia's
capital, Mogadishu.
The United Nations resumed leadership of operations in May 1993 with
UNOSOM II. UNOSOM II was authorized under chapter VII to establish a
secure environment throughout Somalia, disarm warring factions,
assist in political reconciliation, and foster social and economic
reconstruction. Its authorized troop level was 28,000 and, in
addition, the United States provided a quick reaction force.
However, in transferring the mission from U.S. command to U.N.
command, there were unresolved issues: the United States and United
Nations did not agree on (1) the meaning of UNITAF's mandate, (2) the
criteria for its withdrawal, or (3) the timing of the transition.
The Secretary General expected UNITAF to create a secure environment
throughout Somalia by "neutralizing heavy weapons, disarming
irregular forces and gangs, and inducing individuals to hand in their
weapons." However, UNITAF did not interpret its mandate as including
coercive or large-scale disarmament of the Somali factions. Also,
UNITAF established security not throughout the country, but only in
the hardest-hit areas of central and southern Somalia. In regard to
timing, the United States expected UNITAF to be a quick turnaround
operation, with a U.N. takeover immediately as UNITAF withdrew. The
Secretary General expected the transition to be gradual--but by the
date of the transfer--May 4, 1993--most of the U.S. troops and
senior civilian personnel had already been withdrawn.
RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:0.1
Although UNOSOM II had a broader mandate than UNITAF in providing a
secure environment and disarming the warring parties throughout the
country, it was authorized 25 percent fewer troops. By July 1993,
only 20,000 of the 28,000 authorized troops had been deployed. It
was not until October 1993--6 months after UNOSOM II's mandate had
been approved--that full troop strength was reached. Furthermore,
some contingents did not have armored personnel carriers and radio
equipment capable of communicating directly with other contingents.
As a result, on June 5, 1993, barely 1 month after the transition,
UNOSOM II troops were unable to respond adequately when faced with
attacks from Somali factions during a planned U.N. arms inspection.
Assaults were launched against the recently deployed Pakistanis,
Nigerians, and Italians. The Pakistanis and the Nigerians were
unable to contact the Italian brigade to ask for help. In those
attacks, 24 Pakistanis were killed.
COMMAND AND CONTROL ISSUES
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:0.2
A number of incidents revealed the limits on U.N. command and
control, particularly in regard to following orders issued by the
U.N. force commander. Waiting for instructions from their own
national authorities, U.N. contingents sometimes did not adhere to
orders from the force commander. For example, in one instance a
contingent did not follow orders to remain in its area of
responsibility in Mogadishu. Therefore, when fighting commenced in
the contingent's area, other national contingents were in a
disadvantageous position. Moreover, the contingent appeared to act
autonomously, starting negotiations with one of the warring Somali
factions, declining to be a part of actions in Mogadishu, and
successfully seeking to redeployment in another region of the
country.\1 On October 3, 1993, a U.S. force not under U.N. command
executed a military strike against the stronghold of one of the
faction leaders believed responsible for the killing of the
peacekeepers. After the U.S. force came under extreme hostile fire,
an extraction operation was mounted that included armored units from
UNOSOM units. But the operation was not successful and the incident
resulted in the deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers and a consequent U.S.
announcement that it would withdraw the bulk of its troops by March
31, 1994. Other nations also decided to remove their contingents but
provided a holding action until March 1995, when all U.N. troops
were removed.\2
--------------------
\1 For an analysis of Somalia operations see U.N. Peacekeeping:
Lessons Learned in Recent Missions (GAO/NSIAD-94-9, Dec. 29, 1993).
\2 For a discussion of the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia see, Peace
Operations: Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Somalia
(GAO/NSIAD-94-175, June 9, 1994).
U.N. APPROACH TO CONDUCTING
OPERATIONS
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:0.3
Although UNOSOM II was authorized to use force, it relied on the
militias to voluntarily disarm and store their weapons in areas under
their control. UNOSOM also provided the militias with written notice
of planned inspections of weapons sites. However, when one such
inspection on June 5, 1993, provoked attacks on the U.N. troops,
UNOSOM beginning on June 12 launched a series of air and ground
offensive operations against the militias. After 1 month, the
Secretary General decided to return to peaceful disarmament of all
factions and militias. However, the militias continued offensive
operations and in November 1993, the Secretary General acknowledged
the failure of this approach and further attempts to disarm the rival
factions were halted.
UNOSOM II did not achieve major aspects of its mandate. It did not
enforce the cease-fire, disarm the factions, or successfully repel
attacks against its own troops. Clan fighting, looting, and banditry
continued, attacks against relief organization personnel increased,
and anti-UNOSOM propaganda was widely used.
However, UNOSOM II aided the delivery of humanitarian relief by
escorting humanitarian convoys and providing security for
humanitarian organizations and activities. UNOSOM II also
facilitated discussion among the Somalis to promote national
reconciliation, conducted field surveys and inspections for demining
projects, refurbished office buildings and repaired court and prison
facilities, certified district and regional councils, trained
judicial personnel, and helped to establish a police force.
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Fighting began in the former Yugoslavia in 1991 when Serbia, the
largest of the republics, forcibly attempted to prevent Croatia from
becoming an independent nation. After fierce fighting, Croatia and
Serbia signed a cease-fire. The Security Council established
UNPROFOR in February 1992 to help (1) supervise the withdrawal of
Serbian forces and demilitarize disputed areas and (2) return
displaced persons to their homes and monitor human rights.
Bosnia, another republic, voted for independence in March 1992, and
fighting broke out between the new Bosnian government and Bosnian
Serbs, who were opposed to independence from Serbia. In June 1992,
the United Nations recognized Bosnia as an independent nation, and
UNPROFOR's mission was extended to Bosnia. Over the following 3
years, UNPROFOR in Bosnia was mandated under chapter VII of the U.N.
charter to (1) facilitate and protect the delivery of humanitarian
aid and (2) use necessary means, including air power from regional
organizations, to deter attacks against six areas declared safe.
Over the course of its existence, UNPROFOR gradually increased in
size to an authorized strength of nearly 58,000 in June 1995. It was
further supported by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
which agreed to provide airstrikes to carry out UNPROFOR mandates and
give close air support to defend UNPROFOR troops coming under hostile
fire.
Overall, UNPROFOR had limited effectiveness in carrying out its
enforcement mandates. In Bosnia, UNPROFOR did not effectively (1)
deter attacks on the six safe areas or (2) protect its troops and
staff from being taken hostage. Sarajevo, 1 of the 6 safe areas, was
bombarded regularly by Bosnian Serbs, resulting in an estimated
10,000 killed or missing and 60,000 wounded between 1992 and February
1995. Bihac, another safe area, was attacked in November 1994, with
airstrikes and missiles launched from an airbase in Croatia. The
Security Council authorized limited NATO airstrikes on the airfield,
but Bosnian and Croatian Serbs continued their attacks on the ground
and nearly overran Bihac. During this time, UNPROFOR troops were
taken hostage. On successive days in early December 1994, between
316 and 439 UNPROFOR personnel became hostages.\3
--------------------
\3 For an analysis of U.N. operations in Bosnia see, Peace
Operations: Update on the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia
(GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR, May 8, 1995) and Humanitarian Intervention:
Effectiveness of U.N. Operations in Bosnia (GAO/NSIAD-94-156BR,
April 13, 1994).
LACK OF RESOURCES
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:0.4
The inability to obtain Security Council approval for troops to carry
out the U.N.'s mandate to deter attacks against the six safe areas
hindered U.N. efforts in Bosnia. In January 1994, the U.N.
Secretary General had stated that 34,000 additional troops would be
necessary to fulfill the mandate. The Security Council, however,
responded by authorizing only 7,600 more troops. Thus, the United
Nations did not deploy armed forces sufficient to deter attacks
against the safe areas of Bihac, Gorazde, Srebrenica, and Zepa.
ISSUES OF COMMAND AND
CONTROL
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:0.5
Problems also occurred with command and control of the troops in
Bosnia, limiting UNPROFOR's ability to fulfill its mandates. Similar
to the incident in Somalia, one troop contingent refused to redeploy
to Mostar, saying that the order exceeded UNPROFOR's
responsibilities. When the matter was discussed by the Security
Council and the troop contingent's government, it became clear that a
difference in interpretation of the mandate was at issue. According
to U.N. officials, the Security Council considered the order to
redeploy to be a valid part of UNPROFOR's mandate; on the other hand,
the troop contingent's government regarded redeployment as an
unacceptable risk and outside of its agreement.
U.N. APPROACH TO THE USE OF
FORCE
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:0.6
Although UNPROFOR had authority under chapter VII to use force to
carry out some of its tasks, it still sought consent from the warring
parties to take certain actions. UNPROFOR asked for permission for
its vehicles to move from one area to another, agreed to the
imposition of roadblocks that impeded the delivery of humanitarian
aid as well as equipment for its forces, and permitted warring
parties to have a say in where troops would be placed along
confrontation lines. Thus, according to the director of UNPROFOR's
civil affairs group, Bosnian operations functioned as peacekeeping
missions (where consent is a requirement) despite the mandates'
authorization of enforcement authority. UNPROFOR was also reluctant
to call for NATO airstrikes to help it deter attacks against areas
declared safe by U.N. mandates.
In July 1995, Croatian Serb forces crossed the Bosnian border to join
with Bosnian Serb troops for another attack on the Bihac pocket. But
Bihac did not fall. In July 1995, the safe areas of Srebrenica and
Zepa were attacked and fell to Bosnian Serb forces, resulting in the
flight of thousands of inhabitants and the killing of others, as
confirmed in July 1996 investigations of mass gravesites near
Srebrenica.
In response to such attacks, the Security Council authorized a rapid
reaction force composed of heavily armed troops, artillery, and
helicopters. The rapid reaction force reported to the U.N. command
but operated under robust rules of engagement and did not wear the
traditional blue helmets signifying peacekeeping or paint its
vehicles white as did other UNPROFOR units. Following the fall of
Srebrenica and Zepa, the North Atlantic Council further agreed to
take more vigorous steps to prevent further Bosnian Serb aggression
and stated that airstrikes would be carried out under existing
Security Council resolutions and did not need further U.N.
authorization. In December 1995, UNPROFOR ended its mission and was
replaced with a peace enforcement mission led by NATO.
Although UNPROFOR did not achieve its enforcement mandates in Bosnia,
it did help the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and
other humanitarian organizations provide vital humanitarian aid for
three winters. UNPROFOR provided logistical support, security, and
escorts. It also operated Sarajevo airport from 1992 to 1994, which
allowed Sarajevo to receive most of its food when road access was cut
off. Finally, UNPROFOR helped deter banditry and undertook
confidence-building measures, such as joint patrols to facilitate the
federation between Bosnian Muslims and Croats; helped negotiate
arrangements to reduce fighting in besieged enclaves such as Maglaj
and Vitez; and arranged for the demilitarization of hundreds of
kilometers of confrontation lines.
RWANDA
A 3-year civil war between Rwanda's two main ethnic groups--the Hutu,
who led the Rwandan government, and the Tutsi, who led the Rwanda
Patriotic Front (RPF)--ended in August 1993 when the two sides signed
the Arusha Peace Agreement. Two months later, the U.N. Security
Council established the U.N. Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)
to monitor the cease-fire, contribute to the security of Kigali, and
coordinate humanitarian assistance.
The civil war resumed after the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi were
killed when their airplane was shot down on April 6, 1994. Hutus
began massacring Tutsis. In response, the RPF launched a military
offensive, and the government collapsed. The Security Council
withdrew all but 440 of the 2,486 UNAMIR troops and adopted a second
mandate on April 21, directing UNAMIR to act as an mediator between
the warring parties. As ethic and political violence intensified,
the Secretary General reported that an estimated 250,000 to 500,000
people had been massacred and well over 1 million had either been
internally displaced or had become refugees in neighboring countries.
On May 17, 1994, the Security Council approved a third mandate,
establishing UNAMIR II and authorizing it to (1) protect displaced
persons, refugees, and civilians under threat, using force to
establish safe zones and (2) provide security for the distribution of
humanitarian aid.
LACK OF RESOURCES
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:0.7
The U.N. Secretary General had planned a deployment of U.N.
military forces in three stages during the spring of 1994. This
deployment was to take 31 days, or until mid-June. Nevertheless,
full troop strength did not occur until November, despite UNAMIR's
repeated requests. During this time, the Security Council debated
about whether member states would actually provide the needed
resources. Because of this delay, UNAMIR was not able to provide
security to the hundreds of thousands of displaced and endangered
civilians.
During the month of July, the RPF defeated the Rwandan government
army, unilaterally declared a cease-fire, and established a new
government, effectively ending the civil war. However, as a result
of the RPF's advance in the northwest, about 1.2 million Hutus began
to flee toward the southwest and crossed into Zaire. An estimated
10,000 refugees per hour went over the border and entered the town of
Goma, Zaire. This massive influx of refugees created a severe
humanitarian crisis. In November 1994, the Security Council approved
UNAMIR's fourth mandate, adding to its existing tasks the
responsibilities of (1) providing security for the U.N.
International Tribunal for Rwanda\4
and human rights officers and (2) assisting in training a national
police force.
Although UNAMIR was not authorized under chapter VII of the U.N.
charter, its mandates to protect displaced persons and refugees as
well as establish secure sanctuaries for endangered civilians implied
that force was to be used to carry out the mandate. However, UNAMIR
was not able to prevent or significantly mitigate the ethnic and
political violence during the civil war. Weak command and control as
well as the absence of a U.N. enforcement doctrine were not major
factors in the Rwandan situation. According to the U.N. officials
and representatives of humanitarian organizations, an estimated
500,000 men, women, and children--or over 45 percent of the Tutsi
population--were murdered during the conflict. Estimates are that
from 200,000 to 300,000 of them were killed after UNAMIR II's mandate
was approved.
After a Rwandan government was reestablished in late July 1994,
UNAMIR had only limited success in fulfilling its mandate. The
operation did not protect displaced persons and refugees from
government soldiers and other armed groups. For example, UNAMIR was
unable to protect refugees enroute to their home communes, according
to the Secretary General's reports. In January and April 1995,
UNAMIR did not protect displaced persons at two camps in southwest
Rwanda when government soldiers opened fire on the camps, resulting
in the deaths of hundreds of people--including women and children.
Finally, UNAMIR has not been able to create a secure environment
within Rwanda to facilitate the repatriation of the refugees.
According to U.N. reports, the security situation continues to
deteriorate, the number of people detained by the government for
their alleged involvement in the genocide remains high, reports of
government executions and torture persist, and banditry as well as
other acts of violence against civilians have occurred.
The operation has, however, provided security to human rights
monitors, the International Tribunal, U.N. specialized agency
personnel, and nongovernmental organizations; escorted humanitarian
convoys; helped resettle thousands of displaced persons; and trained
candidates for Rwanda's national police force.
LEBANON
The United Nations established UNIFIL in 1978 after an Israeli
incursion into South Lebanon in response to a Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) attack near Tel Aviv that killed 37 and wounded
76. UNIFIL had three major objectives: (1) confirm the withdrawal
of Israeli forces to the international border, (2) restore peace and
security to South Lebanon, and (3) help the government of Lebanon
restore its authority there. To that end, UNIFIL was directed to
establish and maintain an area of operation in South Lebanon to serve
as a buffer between the combatants, supervise and monitor the
established cease-fire, and ensure the "peaceful character" of its
area of operations by making certain that no unauthorized armed
personnel entered and by controlling movement within. UNIFIL was
authorized to use force only in self-defense, which included
resistance to attempts by forcible means to prevent UNIFIL from
accomplishing its mandated objectives. UNIFIL was directed to take
all measures deemed necessary to assure the effective restoration of
Lebanese sovereignty. As the daunting nature of its task became
apparent, the United Nations increased UNIFIL's size from 4,000 to
6,000 personnel in 1978, and to 7,000 in early 1982. Currently,
UNIFIL has about 4,500 U.N. peacekeepers.
According to U.N. reports, UNIFIL was unable to accomplish its
mandate from its inception, in part because the Israeli government
and PLO authorities never fully accepted it. UNIFIL could not
establish a clear and effective area of operation in South Lebanon.
Israeli and PLO authorities were unable to agree on the tasks UNIFIL
should undertake, and so could not consent to an area of operation.
In addition, Israeli forces did not withdraw fully from South Lebanon
and turned some positions over to the "de facto" forces (the
Christian militia, led by Major Saad Haddad and later known as the
South Lebanon Army) instead of UNIFIL. The de facto forces, which
were financed, trained, and equipped by Israel, at times denied
UNIFIL units freedom of movement in South Lebanon and subjected them
to severe harassment. Israeli, de facto, and PLO forces also opposed
any movement of the Lebanese Army into parts of South Lebanon,
preventing the government of Lebanon from restoring its authority in
these areas.
As a result, intense exchanges of fire and infiltration continued
after UNIFIL deployed. Attempting to reduce infiltration, UNIFIL
units were redeployed and efforts were made to improve its
surveillance capabilities. However, given the difficulty of the
terrain, the lack of clear enforcement powers, and the noncooperation
of the parties, the United Nations recognized that it was virtually
impossible to prevent infiltration attempts. In June 1982, in
response to worldwide PLO attacks on Israeli civilians and officials,
Israel again invaded Lebanon. UNIFIL forces attempted to delay the
Israeli advance, but lightly armed UNIFIL units were no match for
heavily armed Israeli forces. The entire UNIFIL area of operation
was soon completely behind Israeli lines.
--------------------
\4 On November 8, 1994, the U.N. Security Council established an
international tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for genocide
and other serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in Rwanda and neighboring countries.
LACK OF RESOURCES
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:0.8
Part of the problem in restoring order in Lebanon is that no
political consensus has emerged on how to deal with the situation.
Consequently no nation has been willing to provide the troops and
equipment necessary to effectively carry out the mandate. UNIFIL has
lacked the forces to prevent Hezbollah (the Islamic fundamentalist
group) from attacking Israel. Nevertheless, UNIFIL stands as a
symbol of U.N. resolve to provide humanitarian assistance to the
local Lebanese population.
Regarding command and control, weaknesses in this area remain. These
weaknesses inhibit UNIFIL's ability to coordinate actions and most
effectively deploy U.N. forces. However, the underlying operational
issue is the lack of clear international will and consensus to
effectively carry out the U.N. mandates.
In a January 1996 report, the Secretary General stated that the
situation in Lebanon was unchanged, with Southern Lebanon still
occupied and UNIFIL's mandate to help restore Lebanese sovereignty
unfulfilled. This situation was underscored in April 1996, when
Hezbollah launched rocket attacks on northern Israel from locations
near UNIFIL headquarters. In retaliation, Israel fired artillery
fire at the locations, and several days of exchanges ensued. During
one of the exchanges, over 100 Lebanese civilians were killed in the
compound area of one of the UNIFIL contingents.
THE CONGO
The U.N. Operations in the Congo\5
(ONUC) was not authorized under chapter VII of the U.N. charter but
stands as the earliest example of a large U.N. peacekeeping effort
that used force in carrying out its mandate. The Congo, an area the
size of the United States east of the Mississippi River and with 14
million people, became independent of Belgium in June of 1960, but
was ill prepared for this responsibility. Belgium had allowed little
freedom in the Congo, with rights to free speech and a free press
permitted just 6 months before independence. Thus, the Congolese
lacked the political traditions to function as a nation state.
Belgium agreed to assist in the transition by providing
administrators and technical assistance. Belgium also agreed to help
maintain security for the transition to independence and was to
continue to command the 24,000-man Congolese national police. Just
days after independence and the election of the first President, the
police force rioted after promotions and pay increases were denied by
the Belgian commander. Belgium subsequently sent in troops to
protect its citizens from the general breakdown of order.
On July 14, just 2 weeks after the police revolt, the first of six
U.N. mandates for intervention was adopted. The two main goals of
this early phase were to (1) establish law and order and (2)
facilitate the withdrawal of the Belgian forces. The Security
Council viewed the Belgian and other foreign mercenary presence as a
threat to decolonization. However, Belgium insisted it had no
further territorial designs on the Congo, and the official Belgian
troops left speedily. As the U.N. intervention proceeded, the new
government suffered a civil and constitutional crisis: the
resource-rich Katanga province seceded, with the help of foreign
mercenaries. In addition, the President and Prime Minister of the
newly organized government emerged as combatants, using their own
forces and supporters to fight each other.
--------------------
\5 The former Congo, or Leopoldville, changed its name to Zaire in
1971. The country now known as the Congo is a small neighbor that
has never been the subject of peacekeeping.
LACK OF RESOURCES
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:0.9
At its peak strength in July 1961, ONUC numbered over 19,800 troops.
According to U.N. military officials at the time, the total number
of forces were insufficient to provide security for a country as
large as the Congo. Nevertheless, according to U.N. and other
studies, this lack of troops was not as great a problem as the
inability to deploy them to strategic locations.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:0.10
Regarding weaknesses in command and control, some national
contingents operated outside of the U.N. chain of command to bolster
their own national interests. For example, one U.N. contingent
disarmed parts of the Congolese police and were later told they had
acted beyond their mandate and had to return the weapons. Another
contingent was ordered to apprehend mercenaries as called for under
Security Council Resolution 144. However, the contingent resisted
this order, saying it exceeded the contingent's mandate.
In another instance during operations in Katanga, ONUC troops
executed a plan to both eliminate the foreign mercenaries and secure
ONUC's unimpeded movement throughout the country. After successfully
advancing and executing phases of the plan, ONUC troops were ordered
to halt. However, they continued to advance and secured the town of
Jadotville, a major stronghold of one of the political factions. The
failure to halt operations was blamed on a communication failure.
However, a report explained "The commanding officer in the field
decided that militarily, at any rate, he had no choice but to deal
with the military situation before him. In this decision he had in
mind, particularly, his military training; the security and morale of
his troops; the scorched-earth threats of Mr. Tshombe; the
information obtained from two captured mercenaries that Mr. Tshombe
had just been exhorting them to hold up the ONUC advance for three
days after which world public opinion would force the United Nations
to withdraw . . .\6
--------------------
\6 Report of the Secretary General, S/5053/Add. 14, Annex XXXIV.
APPROACH TO CONDUCTING
OPERATIONS
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:0.11
Because of concerns about intruding into the Congo's domestic
sovereign affairs, ONUC operated with the consent of the warring
factions and this limited its ability to effectively conduct
operations. Disruptions in building up troop strength and
redistributing forces throughout the country occurred. The United
Nations, in dealing with the provincial government in Katanga, agreed
to restrictions and introduced about 500 U.N. troops per month to
the area, leading to a 2-year buildup to full strength. Further,
ONUC assented to its troops being placed in restricted locations.
Thousands were killed and atrocities occurred, but ONUC could not
prevent many of the human rights violations in Katanga. Further, the
U.N. forces were viewed by some as intrusive and partisan and
sometimes exceeded their mandate by either taking action or refusing
to take action. The Security Council issued further mandates in an
effort to deal with the complex, evolving situation, first
authorizing ONUC to use of "force in the last resort" to prevent
civil war in February 1961. Later mandates included wording, such as
"to bring Congolese forces under control," that led to a severe
breakdown in U.N.-Congolese government relations. The President of
the Congo accused the Secretary General of duping him into agreeing
to a U.N. force and claimed the international attorneys had deceived
him. Indeed, disgruntled by ONUC's actions, the various factions
attacked the U.N. forces. In one incident in April 1961, 44 Ghanian
peacekeepers were killed in an ambush by ANC troops and in November
1961, 13 Italian peacekeepers were killed.
ONUC finally did help restore security and end the secession of
Katanga province, but many other elements in the ONUC mandate were
incompletely fulfilled or not fulfilled at all. For example, the
Congolese police force was not reformed. The deaths of 234
peacekeepers and of U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold and the
disputes about whether member states were obligated to pay for the
Congo action resulted in a political and financial crisis for the
United Nations.
HAITI
The crisis in Haiti began in September 1991, when the democratically
elected President Jean Bertrand Aristide went into exile after being
deposed in a military coup led by General Raoul Cedras. In June
1993, following nearly 2 years of human rights abuses by the coup
leaders, the U.N. Security Council imposed economic and political
sanctions on Haiti. In July, President Aristide and General Cedras
met at Governors Island, New York, and signed an agreement for
President Aristide's return to power in October 1993. In September
1993, the Security Council authorized UNMIH to implement the
provisions of the Governors Island Agreement. However, armed groups
of individuals prevented UNMIH contingents from landing in
Port-au-Prince, Haiti's capital. The Security Council reimposed
sanctions, but political assassinations and human rights abuses
continued.
Then, in July 1994, the Security Council passed Resolution 940 under
chapter VII of the U.N. charter and mandated a multinational force
(MNF) led by the United States to use the means necessary to (1)
facilitate the departure of the military leadership and to restore
the legitimate government to power and (2) establish and maintain a
secure and stable environment during the transition. In September
1994, hours before the MNF planned to intervene in Haiti, General
Cedras stepped down.
Consisting of approximately 20,000 troops from more than 25
countries, the MNF quickly established itself throughout Haiti. The
majority of troops were in the two major cities, Port-au-Prince and
Cap Haitien, but MNF special forces teams were also based in 27 towns
and operated in about 500 locations. The MNF disbanded the Haitian
army and took control of its heavy weapons. Army officers above the
rank of major remained in place without function until the beginning
of 1995, when they were dismissed by President Aristide. In
addition, the MNF disbanded paramilitary groups and confiscated about
33,000 weapons--20,000 from seizures, including heavy weapons from
the Haitian army units--and more than 13,000 from a buy-back program.
Both the U.N. and the Haitian government expressed concerns that
weapons were still in the hands of government opponents. However,
the MNF found no evidence of remaining weapons caches, although it
had conducted confiscation raids and instituted traffic checkpoints
in the capital. According to the Organization of American States,
the United Nations, and local human rights organizations, a
significant decrease occurred in political violence and human rights
abuses compared to previous levels.
RESOURCES
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:0.12
Because the United States considered actions in Haiti to be in the
national interest, the second phase of UNMIH was able to call on U.S.
resources as needed. The United States led the MNF that preceded
UNMIH, committing 18,000 U.S. military personnel, helicopters, and
naval support. In addition, the United States gave the United
Nations considerable information and provided military logisticians
and planners. When the MNF made its transition to a U.N.-led
activity, the U.S. sponsored training programs on command and
control, doctrine, and operations for many of the UNMIH troops and
civilians. Valuable logistical support contracts for rations,
supplies, and equipment already in place were supplied to the second
phase of UNMIH until the U.N. bidding process could begin. Of
considerable assistance, too, was the quick reaction force of 1,500,
including 550 special forces and helicopters, that stayed in place to
bolster security. And it was clear that should trouble reoccur,
further U.S. resources would be close at hand.
By March 1995, the MNF had successfully completed its mandate and
returned control of operations to UNMIH, which under its second phase
was authorized 6,000 troops and 800 civilian police. Although UNMIH
was authorized under chapter VI of the U.N. charter, its
expectations were to ensure a secure environment while the Haitian
government resumed full civilian control. By the end of March, the
United Nations had successfully deployed nearly all its troops and
most of its senior civilian staff to Haiti. About 70 percent of
UNMIH had been part of the MNF, and the United Nations had to arrange
for the additional deployment of contingents from seven countries.
Five of these had arrived by the transition date--only two small
contingents had not yet come.\7 Similarly, the U.N. civilian staff
landed in Haiti according to plan, as the 50-person advance team in
the country since November 1994 was gradually augmented. With its
military and civilian leadership in place, the United Nations
commissioned the United States to conduct a week-long training course
for military and civilian officials in early March to foster
implementation of command and control arrangements, common
understanding of rules of engagement, and coordination between
military and civilian components of the mission.
--------------------
\7 Negotiations were continuing for the possible deployment of a
small contingent from a third country.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:0.13
While the second phase of UNMIH was a U.N. operation, the U.S.
Atlantic Command (USACOM) was a primary actor in planning maneuvers
for both the MNF and the transition to U.N. command and control.
The UNMIH force commander was a U.S. Major General who reported to
the U.N. special representative of the Secretary General; however,
for military issues, he was directly responsible to USACOM and in
command of military decisions. All other national contingents
received their operational orders through coordination with the U.S.
special forces troops, who had the communications equipment to ensure
that orders were accurately relayed. In addition, about two-fifths
of the UNMIH forces were U.S. troops. These troops were placed with
other national contingents in such important areas as the Haitian
capital, Cap Haitien, and Gonaives. While UNMIH was clearly a U.N.
operation, the chain of command for military matters was led by the
U.S. commander. Furthermore, operational orders were expected to be
carried out through the liaison process led by U.S. special forces.
APPROACH TO CONDUCTING
OPERATIONS
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:0.14
In the second phase of the UNMIH operation, an accepted, clear
doctrine was present. This doctrine relied on six principles: (1)
implementing explicitly defined objectives, (2) emphasizing unity of
effort, (3) ensuring adequate security for itself, (4) exercising
restraint, (5) being perserverant, and (6) ensuring legitimacy. The
United States employs these principles in operations other than war.
While obtaining the consent of the warring parties was an important
element in ensuring the legitimacy of UNMIH, it was only one portion
of the doctrine. Stressing a united team effort and security, UNMIH
retained military, political, and informational advantage over
potential warring parties. UNMIH also was proactive and took the
initiative in using assertive actions when necessary to carry out the
mandate. For example, UNMIH used roadblocks and searches, actively
disarming Haitians in certain situations in order to ensure a secure
environment.
From April to July 1995, UNMIH assisted the government of Haiti in
sustaining a secure and stable environment, professionalizing the
armed forces, creating a separate police force, and establishing an
environment conducive to the conduct of free and fair elections.
Since the MNF had destroyed military opposition to the government,
criminal and vigilante activity was the major threat to public
safety. During March, there were 101 reported murders; this number
dropped to 79 in April, 75 in May, and 63 in June. The June 1995
local and parliamentary elections were held in a relatively secure
environment. However, election rallies and meetings of the
opposition were disrupted, and 94 vigilante murders occurred between
March and June, including the assassinations of prominent Haitian
politicians and former members of the disbanded Haitian armed forces.
To maintain a secure environment for run-off elections and the
presidential election in December, UNMIH increased patrols and
provided greater protection for the President of Haiti. However, in
November, an attack on two supporters of the President caused violent
demonstrations. The quick reaction force was proactive in responding
to the demonstrations, and UNMIH increased patrols in the area to
stabilize the situation. Nevertheless, following an emotional
funeral speech by the President, violence broke out, particularly in
Port-au-Prince, Gonaives, and Cap Haitien. At least seven people
were killed. UNMIH again reestablished control, but the violence
underscored the fragile security situation. In December 1995,
presidential elections were held in a secure and generally peaceful
environment.\8
The gradual withdrawal of UNMIH's contingents began in December 1995,
and the final U.S. contingent of UNMIH withdrew from Haiti in April
1996. The Secretary General, however, recommended UNMIH continue
with a small force to help ensure a peaceful transition. In April
1996, a force of 1,500 troops and 250 police was approved by the
Security Council and remains in place.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix IV
--------------------
\8 See Haiti: U.S. Assistance for the Electoral Process
(GAO/NSIAD-96-147, July 5, 1996).
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
========================================================= Appendix III
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix V
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
========================================================= Appendix III
(See figure in printed edition.)
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix VI
NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Joseph C. Brown
Rona Mendelsohn
Zina D. Merritt
Tet Miyabara
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
Mark C. Speight
RELATED GAO PRODUCTS
============================================================ Chapter 0
Bosnia: Costs Are Uncertain but Likely to Exceed Estimates
(GAO/NSIAD-96-120BR, Mar. 14, 1996).
Peace Operations: U.S. Costs in Support of Haiti, Former
Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda (GAO/NSIAD-96-38, Mar. 6, 1996).
Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors
on Unit Capability (GAO/NSIAD-96-14, Oct. 18, 1995).
Peacekeeping: Assessment of U.S. Participation in the Multinational
Force and Observers (GAO/NSIAD-95-113, Aug. 15, 1995).
Peace Operations: Update on the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia
(GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR, May 8, 1995).
Peace Operations: Estimated Fiscal Year 1995 Costs to the United
States (GAO-NSIAD-95-138BR, May 3, 1995)
Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response
to Regional Conflicts (GAO-NSIAD-95-51, Mar. 8, 1995)
Peace Operations: Information on U.S. and U.N. Activities
(GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR, Feb. 13, 1995).
United Nations: How Assessed Contributions for Peacekeeping
Operations Are Calculated (GAO/NSIAD-94-206, Aug. 1, 1994).
Humanitarian Intervention: Effectiveness of U.N. Operations in
Bosnia (GAO/NSIAD-94-156BR, Apr. 13, 1994).
Peace Operations: Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Somalia
(GAO/NSIAD-94-175, June 9, 1994).
U.N. Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Recent Missions
(GAO/NSIAD-94-9, Dec. 29, 1993).
Haiti: Costs of U.S. Programs and Activities Since the 1991
Military Coup (GAO/NSIAD-93-252FS, Aug. 5, 1993).
U.N. Peacekeeping: Observations on Mandates and Operational
Capability (GAO/T-NSIAD-93-15, June 9, 1993).
Serbia-Montenegro: Implementation of U.N. Economic Sanctions
(GAO/NSIAD-93-174, Apr. 22, 1993).
United Nations: U.S. Participation in Peacekeeping Operations
(GAO/NSIAD-92-247, Sept. 9, 1992).
*** End of document. ***