Foreign Assistance: Harvard Institute for International Development's
Work in Russia and Ukraine (Chapter Report, 11/27/96, GAO/NSIAD-97-27).

As the Soviet Union crumbled, the United States sought to help Russia
and the other newly independent states become free market democracies.
The U.S. supported various reforms, including the development of
democratic institutions, the privatization of state-owned property, the
establishment of legal codes, and the creation of mechanisms to operate
a private capital market. The U.S. Agency for International Development,
(USAID) the lead U.S. agency to provide transition assistance, lacked
the contacts and expertise to accomplish this unprecedented task.
Therefore, it turned to private organizations, including the Harvard
Institute for International Development, to provide direct technical
help to Russian reformers. The Institute was also expected to help
oversee U.S. contractors in USAID's Russian economic restructuring
project. The Institute had preexisting relationships with Russian
officials and had already helped establish several Russian institutions
to sustain reforms, including the Russian Privatization Center, which
helped restructure business enterprises and facilitated land reform.
Members of Congress had raised concerns about the noncompetitive nature
of the awards to the Institute and about the Institute's effectiveness.
This report assesses (1) how USAID awarded assistance agreements to the
Institute to carry out work in Russia and Ukraine and (2) the
Institute's role and accomplishments in implementing assistance
agreements to develop a Russian capital market and devise a legal reform
program. GAO also evaluates the effectiveness of the Russian
Privatization Center in implementing USAID post-privatization and land
reform projects.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-97-27
     TITLE:  Foreign Assistance: Harvard Institute for International 
             Development's Work in Russia and Ukraine
      DATE:  11/27/96
   SUBJECT:  International relations
             International cooperation
             Privatization
             Strategic planning
             Foreign technical aid
             Foreign economic assistance
             Securities regulation
             Grant award procedures
             Cooperative agreements
             Foreign governments
IDENTIFIER:  AID Program for Intensive Enterprise Support Programs
             AID Privatization and Economic Restructuring Program for 
             Europe and Former Soviet Union
             AID Financial Management Assistance Program
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to the Ranking Minority Memeber, Committeee on Veterans'
Affairs, House of Representatives

October 1997

GULF WAR ILLNESSES - PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE EFFORTS RELATING TO
EXPOSURES OF U.S.  PERSONNEL TO
CHEMICAL AGENTS

GAO/NSIAD-97-27

Gulf War Illnesses

(703200)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  ATSD(IO) - Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence
     Oversight)
  CENTCOM - U.S.  Central Command
  CIA - Central Intelligence Agency
  CIAInspectorGeneral - Central Intelligence Agency Inspector
     General
  CIAPGW - Central Intelligence Agency Persian Gulf War Illness Task
     Force
  DCIS - Defense Criminal Investigative Service
  DOD - Department of Defense
  NBC - Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
  OSAGWI - Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses
  PAC - Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans'
     Illnesses

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-278006

October 17, 1997

The Honorable Lane Evans
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Veterans' Affairs
House of Representatives

Dear Mr.  Evans: 

As you requested, we have developed information related to the
Department of Defense's (DOD) custody and disposition of information
on the possible use of chemical weapons by Iraq during the Persian
Gulf War.  Specifically, this report provides information as of
September 1997 on the extent to which federal government agencies and
private organizations are examining (1) the potential exposure of
U.S.  military personnel to chemical warfare agents in the Persian
Gulf and (2) the circumstances surrounding gaps in the Nuclear,
Biological and Chemical (NBC) Desk Log maintained by the U.S. 
Central Command (CENTCOM) during the war. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

Approximately 700,000 U.S.  servicemembers served in the Persian Gulf
during some point from August 1990 to June 1991.  According to DOD,
the majority of these personnel returned from the war healthy and
remain fit for duty today.  However, many of these servicemembers are
reporting a wide array of health complaints and disabling conditions,
including fatigue, muscle and joint pain, memory loss, and severe
headaches.  In response to concerns about the servicemembers with
these symptoms and the potential health effects resulting from Gulf
War service, both DOD and the Department of Veterans' Affairs
established programs through which Gulf War veterans could receive
medical examinations and diagnostic services.  Nearly 100,000 of
these servicemembers have participated in clinical evaluation
programs established by these two agencies after the war.  DOD is
conducting medical research studies with comparison groups of both
deployed and non-deployed Gulf War veterans to clarify whether
certain medical conditions may be more common among Gulf War
veterans.  In addition, DOD and several federal agencies, as well as
a number of private organizations, are studying whether
servicemembers may have been exposed to chemical agents during the
war. 

According to CENTCOM headquarters staff, the Command began
maintaining operational logs upon its arrival in the Persian Gulf on
August 8, 1990, until April 13, 1991, when the last major element of
CENTCOM headquarters left the Persian Gulf, for a total of 249 days. 
The purpose of these logs was to provide a chronological record of
key events that occurred each day.  In addition to the operational
logs, the Command's Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical officer began
maintaining an NBC Desk Log in late August 1990.  We were told that
the NBC Desk Log was maintained on a daily basis except for the
periods at the beginning and the end of the deployment.  The
officials said that it is not known with certainty how many daily
entries were made in the NBC Desk Log. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

As of September 1997, 14 federal and private organizations had
efforts underway examining potential exposure of U.S.  servicemembers
to chemical agents and 1 federal organization was examining gaps in
the NBC Desk Log maintained by the U.S.  Central Command.  Relative
to potential exposures to chemical agents, 8 federal and 6 nonfederal
organizations were involved in this effort.\1 Concerning gaps in the
NBC Desk Log, officials from DOD's Office of the Special Assistant
for Gulf War Illnesses estimate that about 200 pages of log entries
may have been produced during the Gulf War.  However, thus far, that
office has only been able to locate 37 pages.  Officials from that
office believe the remaining log pages were destroyed as part of an
office clean out.  Nevertheless, the DOD Inspector General's Defense
Criminal Investigative Service has an investigation underway to
examine these gaps.  Five veterans' organizations have also been
tracking this log issue as part of their overall efforts to gather
data on Gulf War illnesses.  Table 1 summarizes the efforts various
organizations have underway to address these issues. 



                                                                                       Table 1
                                                                       
                                                                           Organizations Studying Gulf War
                                                                                      Illnesses

                                             Federal groups\a                                                                  Private groups\a
                  -----------------------------------------------------------------------  -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                              Desert
                               Senate                                                                         Shield/
                               Veterans'                                CIA PGW                               Storm                     Northwest      Desert Storm
                               Affairs            ATSD(I  ARMY    CIA   Illness     DOD    National Gulf War  Association               Vets for       Justice
Issues            OSAGWI  PAC  Committee     GAO  O)      IG      IG    Task Force  IG     Resource Center    \b            VetCenter   Peace          Foundation         GulfWatch
----------------  ------  ---  ------------  ---  ------  ------  ----  ----------  -----  -----------------  ------------  ----------  -------------  -----------------  ----------
Identifying                                                                                                   X
chemical
exposure
incidents

Identifying       X       X    X             X    X       X       X     X                  X                                X           X              X                  X
incidents in
which U.S.
personnel were
exposed

Examining         X       X    X             X    X       X       X                        X                                X                          X                  X
methods for
identifying and
reporting such
incidents

Disclosing        X       X                  X                    X     X                  X                                X           X              X                  X
chemical
exposure
incidents to the
public

Complying with
laws governing
classified
information

Analyzing laws            X    X                                                                              X             X
governing the
handling of
classified
information

Assessing                      X                                                    X                         X             X
responsibility
for any legal
violations

Custody of
Information

Examining the     X       X    X                                                           X                                X                          X                  X
custody for
information
concerning
chemical weapons

Assessing                 X    X                                                           X                                                           X                  X
changes to
improve the
custody

Investigating                                                                                                 X
gaps in chemical
logs

Disclosing                                   X                                      X                                                                  X                  X
CENTCOM
procedures in
place to record
incidents in NBC
logs

Identifying                                                                                X                                X                          X                  X
instances of
noncompliance
with procedures

Determining                                                                                X                                                           X                  X
changes for
reporting NBC
incidents

Contacting        X                          X                                      X      X                                X                          X                  X
personnel
responsible for
maintaining
records on
chemical weapon
incidents

Analyzing                                                                           X                                                                  X                  X
procedures for
archiving
information on
possible
exposure to
chemical agents

Identifying                                                                                X                                                           X                  X
lessons learned
for reporting
and archiving
information on
chemical
incidents

Reconstructing                                                                             X                                X                          X                  X
gaps in chemical
incident
reporting

Expected          TBD\c   10/  3/98          TBD  TBD     10/97   10/   TBD         TBD    TBD                N/A\d         TBD         TBD            TBD                TBD
Reporting Date            97                                      97
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note:  OSAGWI, Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War
Illnesses; PAC, Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans'
Illnesses; GAO, General Accounting Office; ATSD(IO), Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight; IG Inspector
General; CIA, Central Intelligence Agency; PGW, Persian Gulf War;
CENTCOM, U.S.  Central Command; NBC, nuclear, biological, and
chemical. 

\a The level of effort among the various groups studying Gulf War
illnesses issues varies.  Federal organizations, for the most part,
have studies or investigations of these issues.  For the most part,
veterans groups are collecting and analyzing information, making
Freedom of Information Act requests, and collecting media information
in their role of keeping veterans informed of pertinent developments. 

\b The Association did not provide detailed information on the
specific issues it was reviewing. 

\c To be determined. 

\d The Association does not plan to issue a report. 


--------------------
\1 Numerous other federal and private organizations have conducted
medical research into the potential causes of the symptoms being
reported by Gulf War Veterans.  Many of these organizations are
identified in our report entitled Gulf War Illnesses:  Improved
Monitoring of Clinical Progress and Reexamination of Research
Emphasis Are Needed (GAO/NSIAD-97-163, June 23, 1997). 


   EXAMINATIONS OF THE POTENTIAL
   EXPOSURE OF U.S.  SERVICE
   PERSONNEL TO CHEMICAL WARFARE
   AGENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

Eight federal entities and six veterans organizations have been
involved in examining the potential exposure of U.S.  service
personnel to chemical warfare agents.  In the federal sector,
examinations are underway by DOD's Office of the Special Assistant
for Gulf War Illnesses, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence Oversight, the U.S.  Army Inspector General, and
Director of the Central Intelligence's Persian Gulf War Illnesses
Task Force.  Some of the activities of these federal organizations
are being monitored by four additional organizations:  the
Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans Illnesses, the
Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General, the Senate Committee
on Veterans Affairs Investigative Team, and the General Accounting
Office.  Some of these efforts are scheduled to be completed in 1997
while others will take longer.  The efforts included reviews of
records maintained during the Gulf War to identify potential chemical
exposure incidents; evaluations of the adequacy of the federal
government's response to information on potential exposures to
chemical agents, assessments of the models being used for studies of
chemical incidents, and evaluations of any reported differences in
exposures and illnesses between U.S.  and other allied forces that
participated in the Gulf War. 

Of the 26 organizations representing veterans we contacted, 6 veteran
organizations were conducting examinations as a part of their efforts
to represent the best interests of veterans.  As such, these
examinations are done on a continuing basis with no established
completion dates and generally include the collection and analysis of
information from a variety of sources such as contacts with
individual Gulf War veterans experiencing health problems, Freedom of
Information Act requests made to DOD agencies from other
organizations, and media information on the exposure of veterans to
chemical weapons. 


   EXAMINATIONS RELATED TO GAPS IN
   CENTCOM'S NBC DESK LOG
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

In March 1997, the DOD Inspector General's Defense Criminal
Investigative Service was tasked by the Deputy Secretary of Defense
to lead the effort to determine the circumstances related to gaps in
CENTCOM's NBC Desk Log.  The Service's mandate was to follow all
leads that can be developed on the location of the original log or
copies of it.  If the Service cannot locate a full copy of the log,
it was expected to determine the reasons.  The Service's study had
not yet been completed, and the DOD Inspector General declined to
comment on the details of this investigation to avoid jeopardizing
the investigative effort and protect the privacy of the parties
involved. 

DOD's Army Inspector General and the Office of the Special Assistant
for Gulf War Illnesses (OSAGWI) began efforts to determine the status
of the log but discontinued their work once the Defense Criminal
Investigative Service took responsibility for this matter.  Five
veterans organizations are also examining gaps in the NBC Desk Log as
part of their overall efforts to gather Gulf War illness information. 

To date, OSAGWI has located 37 pages of the NBC Desk Log covering 26
nonconsecutive days from January 17, 1991, through March 12, 1991. 
OSAGWI officials stated that, in their opinion, about 200 pages of
log entries might have been prepared.  Thus, DOD has a hard copy of
less than 20 percent of the log pages that may have been prepared to
record reported nuclear, biological, or chemical events occurring
during the Gulf War.  OSAGWI officials believe that the remaining
pages might have been destroyed as part of an office clean out. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

We obtained oral comments on a draft of this report from DOD and the
federal and private groups that provided information contained in the
report.  While DOD concurred with our findings, it provided several
technical comments, including that we clarify DOD's position on the
number of Gulf War veterans experiencing health problems and on the
maintenance and disposition of NBC Desk Log pages.  We revised the
draft to reflect DOD's comments.  The groups also provided technical
comments which we incorporated as appropriate. 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

To develop a list of examinations of possible exposures to chemical
agents and gaps in CENTCOM's NBC Desk Log as well as obtain
information on each examination's objectives and methodology, we
focused our search for ongoing examinations on three types of
organizations located in the United States:  federal entities,
research organizations such as RAND, and veterans organizations.  We
did not attempt to evaluate the quality or cost of the examinations
being conducted or to identify gaps in or duplication of, efforts
among the examinations.  To avoid jeopardizing the Defense Criminal
Investigative Service's ongoing investigation related to the NBC Desk
Log, we limited our examination to general discussions with Service
personnel on the objectives of their investigation. 

We searched Internet databases, contacted organizations with highly
publicized efforts, and asked their representatives about other
organizations potentially doing examinations. 

We obtained information from the following 18 federal entities about
their efforts, if any, in conducting examinations:  the Presidential
Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses; DOD's Office of
the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses; the Senate Committee on
Veterans' Affairs; the General Accounting Office; the Department of
Veterans Affairs; the Department of Health and Human Services; the
Central Intelligence Agency Persian Gulf War Illness Task Force; the
Defense Intelligence Agency Persian Gulf Focus Group; the Assistant
to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Oversight; the
Institute of Medicine; and the Gulf War Illness Directorate of the
National Security Council.  We also contacted the Inspector General
offices at the Departments of Defense, the Army, Navy, and the Air
Force; the Marine Corps; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Central
Intelligence Agency to determine if they were performing active
examinations or other activities.  In addition, we contacted the
United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, which has been conducting
on-site investigations of Iraq's chemical and biological
capabilities. 

We also contacted 10 research organizations that have previously done
analyses of defense policy and national security issues to determine
whether they had any efforts in the two areas of interest.  We
contacted the MITRE Corporation; the American Enterprise Institute;
the Brookings Institution; the Army War College Strategic Studies
Institute; the Cato Institute; the Center for Defense Information;
the Center for National Policy; the Center for Strategic and
International Studies; the Heritage Foundation; and the RAND
Corporation. 

To identify veterans organizations examining chemical exposures and
the gaps in the NBC Desk Log, we searched several Internet databases,
obtained a list of national veterans' service organizations from the
Department of Veterans' Affairs, and identified additional veterans
organizations by asking representatives of organizations we contacted
about other organizations that might be doing examinations.  We also
asked officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
military services, the DOD legislative liaison offices, and defense
agencies that administer Freedom of Information Act requests to
identify organizations receiving documents pertinent to these topics
under the act.  We subsequently contacted 26 veterans organizations
that we identified and inquired about any examinations that they were
conducting regarding the possible exposure of personnel to chemical
weapons and/or gaps in CENTCOM's the NBC Desk Log. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.1

We conducted our work from May to September 1997. 

As agreed with your staff, unless you publicly announce this report's
contents earlier, we plan no further distribution until 7 days after
its issue date.  At that time, we will send copies of this report to
the Chairman, House Committee on Veterans' Affairs, Chairmen and
Ranking Minority Members, Senate and House Committees on
Appropriations; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and
the Air Force; and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Copies will
also be made available to others on request. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report.  Major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix II. 

Sincerely yours,

Mark E.  Gebicke
Director, Military Operations
 and Capabilities Issues


EXAMINATIONS OF EXPOSURE OF U.S. 
PERSONNEL TO CHEMICAL WARFARE
AGENTS DURING THE GULF WAR AND
GAPS IN CENTCOM'S NBC DESK LOG
=========================================================== Appendix I

A total of 15 federal and private organizations were examining the
potential exposure of U.S.  personnel to chemical or biological
warfare agents and the gaps in U.S.  Central Command's (CENTCOM)
Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) Desk Log.  The objectives,
methodology, and completion dates for each examination are described
below. 


   EXAMINATIONS CONDUCTED BY
   FEDERAL ENTITIES
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1

Nine federal entities had efforts underway either involving the
potential exposure of U.S.  personnel and/or were examining gaps in
CENTCOM's NBC Desk Log.  Two organizations (the Office of the Special
Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses and the Senate Veterans' Affairs
Committee) were examining both issues. 


      OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
      ASSISTANT FOR GULF WAR
      ILLNESSES
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.1

The Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses was
established by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in November 1996.  The
Office's mission is to ensure that (1) Gulf War veterans are
appropriately cared for, (2) DOD is doing everything possible to
understand and explain Gulf War illnesses, and (3) DOD puts into
place all required military doctrine and personnel and medical
policies and procedures to minimize any future problem from exposure
to biological and chemical agents and other environmental hazards. 
As the scope of the Office's tasks became more defined and the amount
and complexity of work increased, the Office's original staff of 20
employees was increased to its present level of 190.  The 190 staff
members consist of 18 DOD servicemembers, 9 DOD civilians, and 163
contractor personnel.  Almost one-half of the staff members are part
of the Examination and Analysis Directorate, whose mission is to
identify what happened before, during, and after the Gulf War as it
relates to various potential causes of illnesses and to potential
future force impacts.  The remainder provide administrative,
analytic, and automation support; technical management and
administration of the website GulfLINK; database and security
management; public affairs services; document control and archiving;
support to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans'
Illnesses; legal services, legislative affairs, veterans liaison, and
health and medical benefits support; correspondence and electronic
mail response services; and notification of potential exposure
mailings. 

To ensure that Gulf War veterans are appropriately cared for, the
Office is, among other things, encouraging veterans to participate in
DOD's Comprehensive Clinical Evaluation Program and the Department of
Veterans' Affairs Gulf War Registry Examination Program.  To satisfy
its other missions, the Office receives information on potential
exposure incidents from a variety of sources, including the military
services, the intelligence community, and unified commands such as
CENTCOM and the Special Operations Command.  The Office also conducts
extensive searches of archives and record depositories and conducts
interviews with subject matter experts, military and civilian
officials, and veterans.  The Office participates in government
interagency deliberations and oversight of government research of
Gulf War illnesses to ensure information sharing and coordination of
activities across the executive branch. 

At the time we completed our fieldwork, the Office was examining 44
incidents.  Of these incidents, 22 involved potential exposures to
chemical and biological warfare agents, and 22 concerned potential
environmental and occupational exposures and medical issues relating
to immunizations, preventive drug treatment, stress, infectious
agents, and other potential causes of illness.  The Office has issued
10 major studies -- 8 case narratives, 1 information paper, and 1
status report.  Of the eight narratives, five are associated with
potential chemical exposures at the Khamisiyah ammunition site in
Iraq, the port of Al Jubayl in Saudi Arabia, and Camp Kuwait.  The
other narratives discuss the analysis of a piece of metal alleged to
be from a Scud missile, Marine Corps' forces movement through
minefields on the Iraqi border, and suspected exposure of a veteran
to a mustard agent.  The information paper provides insight into the
capabilities and performance of the Fox chemical and biological agent
detection vehicle.  A status report was provided to the DOD Inspector
General that discusses the generation, transportation, storage, and
disposition of CENTCOM's NBC Desk Log.  The Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) and the Institute for Defense Analysis have issued
companion reports to the Office's case narratives on the Khamisiyah
incident. 

The Office views case narratives as interim reports that contain
information about the incidents.  The narratives are not final
products; as the Office receives additional information on an
incident, it intends to refine the respective narratives.  As an
example of its ongoing investigative process, the Office has issued
two separate versions of its case narrative on the Khamisiyah
incident in February and July 1997.  During April, the February
narrative was refined to facilitate retrieval of supporting documents
through GulfLINK.  Work is still underway, and there is no scheduled
completion date for the Office's operations. 


      PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY
      COMMITTEE ON GULF WAR
      VETERANS' ILLNESSES
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.2

In December 1996, the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War
Veterans' Illnesses issued its final report, culminating 16 months of
work.\1 The Committee's study covered a wide range of Gulf War
illness issues, including medical care being provided to veterans of
the Gulf War; chemical and biological warfare agent examinations; and
coordination of research programs for Gulf War illnesses among
government agencies.  In January 1997, the President extended the
duration of the Committee for an additional 10 months.  One of the
two principal roles assigned to the Committee at that time was to
oversee the ongoing Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War
Illnesses (OSAGWI) examination into possible chemical or biological
warfare agent exposures during the Gulf War.  In February 1997, the
President tasked the Committee to evaluate the adequacy of the
government's response to the implications of recently declassified
documents associated with chemical munitions at the Khamisiyah
storage depot.  Specifically, the President asked the Committee to
concentrate on (1) when the U.  S.  intelligence and military
communities knew that chemical munitions were present at Khamisiyah
and that U.S.  forces may have been exposed to chemical agents and
(2) whether the government's response was sufficient once this
information was known. 

The Committee issued its Supplemental Letter Report in April 1997. 
The letter report reiterated a conclusion made in the final report
that the evidence of a chemical agent release at Khamisiyah was
overwhelming.  The letter report also stated that (1) substantial
mismanagement and lack of communication among elements of the
military and intelligence committees existed, (2) evidence existed
before the initiation of war fighting that constituted reasonable
cause for concern that Khamisiyah was an ammunition storage facility
that contained chemical munitions, (3) executive branch departments
and agencies made no serious effort to examine the possibility of
chemical warfare agent exposure to U.S.  troops at Khamisiyah until
late 1995, and (4) DOD's consistent denials until June 1996 of the
possibility of exposure of U.S.  troops to chemical warfare agents
cannot be justified. 

Regarding its oversight of OSAGWI's examination into possible
chemical or biological warfare agent exposures during the Persian
Gulf War, the Committee's supplemental letter report addressed three
issues:  (1) the modeling used for plume analysis of chemical agents
and other debris released into the atmosphere after destruction of
the Khamisiyah ammunition storage area, (2) the Committee's access to
information held by DOD, and (3) standards for evaluating detection
or exposure incidents.  In its April 1997 Supplemental Letter Report,
the Committee stated that there were no insurmountable obstacles to
completing the modeling for the Khamisiyah site and barriers raised
to date by CIA and DOD did not warrant continued delays in completing
this project. 

The letter report also criticized the criteria used by OSAGWI for
determining the credibility of reported detection or exposure
incidents, stating that the legal standards of evidence were
inappropriate for these matters.  The Committee stated that DOD
should move quickly toward making conclusions about the incidents
under examination. 

Since the time of its extension, the Committee has convened public
hearings in Salt Lake City, Utah; Charleston, South Carolina;
Memphis, Tennessee; Buffalo, New York; and Alexandria, Virginia.  The
Committee's final report is due to the President in October 1997. 


--------------------
\1 Final Report:  Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War
Veterans' Illnesses (December 31, 1996).  We reviewed the work of the
Committee in a recent report:  Improved Monitoring of Clinical
Progress and Reexamination of Research Emphasis Are Needed
(GAO/NSIAD-97-163, June 23, 1997). 


      SENATE COMMITTEE ON
      VETERANS' AFFAIRS SPECIAL
      INVESTIGATIVE UNIT ON
      PERSIAN GULF WAR ILLNESSESES
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.3

The Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, created its Special
Investigative Unit in February 1997.  The Unit's work is focusing on
three major areas:  (1) DOD and other agency actions taken before,
during, and after the Gulf War that may relate to the current health
problems of Gulf War veterans; (2) Department of Veterans' Affairs
compensation, claims processing, and health treatment issues; and (3)
review of current scientific research, environmental risks, treatment
options, and potential preventive actions connected with veterans'
health. 

The Unit is assessing such efforts as the adequacy of DOD's
preparedness for and intelligence on Iraqi nuclear, biological, and
chemical warfare capabilities; the models being used for plume
analyses of potential chemical exposures incidents, such as the
destruction of the Khamisiyah storage facility; and its
record-keeping activities during and after the Gulf War, including
chemical weapons logs and medical records.  In carrying out these
tasks, the Unit is assessing the efforts of DOD, the Department of
Veterans' Affairs, the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War
Veterans' Illnesseses, and others. 

The Unit has about 20 full-time personnel, including detailees from
other federal agencies, as well as a number of consultants.  The Unit
expects to complete its work and issue a Committee report in March
1998. 


      GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.4

Including this report, we have issued six reports since 1995 on DOD's
ability to protect and treat its forces from chemical and biological
agents and operate its facilities should they become contaminated by
agents.\2 In March 1996, we reported that DOD's emphasis given to
chemical and biological defense matters was insufficient to correct
problems that surfaced during the Gulf War.  We reported that
equipment, training, and medical shortcomings persisted and were
likely to result in needless casualties and a degradation of U.S. 
war-fighting capabilities.  In May 1997, we reported that while DOD's
medical surveillance capabilities had improved somewhat since the
Gulf War, DOD continued to experience problems in the Bosnia
deployment.  Specifically, DOD had not (1) established an accurate
system to track all personnel who deployed, (2) given required
postdeployment medical assessments to all personnel, and (3)
maintained accurate medical records to identify medical visits during
deployment and documentation of personnel receiving the tick-borne
encephalitis vaccine.  We have also issued three classified reports
involving chemical and biological agent defense. 

Besides our completed work, we recently began two efforts involving
potential exposures of personnel to chemical and other agents during
the Gulf War that may be contributing to Gulf War illnesseses.  In
one effort, we are evaluating the experiences of allied forces that
participated in the Gulf War and their reported incidence of
illnesses, if any.  In the second effort, we are evaluating the
adequacy of current U.S.  policies, procedures, and technologies to
(1) defend against single, repeated, or sustained exposure to low
levels of chemical warfare agents and (2) identify, prepare for, and
defend against the possible adverse effects of chemical warfare agent
exposure in combination with other compounds found on the
battlefield.  We have not established a timefame for completing this
work.. 


--------------------
\2 Chemical and Biological Defense:  Emphasis Remains Insufficient to
Resolve Continuing Problems (GAO/NSIAD-96-103, Mar.  29, 1996);
Defense Health Care:  Medical Surveillance Improved Since Gulf War,
but Mixed Results in Bosnia (GAO/NSIAD-97-136, May 13, 1997); and
three classified reports on the defense of Korea, biological agent
defense, and protection of critical ports and airfields. 


      ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY
      OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE
      OVERSIGHT
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.5

In September 1996, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight to
(1) investigate what information concerning Khamisiyah and similar
chemical warfare sites in Iraq was available to DOD prior to the
destruction of the Khamisiyah facility by U.S.  forces, (2) ascertain
what DOD did with that information, and (3) determine whether any
procedure for handling such information should be changed. 

Because of the large number of documents relevant to the examination,
DOD awarded a $2.5 million contract to the MITRE Corporation in
December 1996 to organize and analyze the documents and produce an
independent study.  The purpose of the study was to determine what
information concerning Iraqi chemical warfare weapons, doctrine,
units, sites, intentions, uses, and events was known or not known
within DOD and how the information was used or not used during the
period from the Iraq invasion of Kuwait to the withdrawal of all
forces from Iraq and Kuwait. 

MITRE staff are reviewing millions of documents at all security
classifications from several government sources, including the
Defense Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; CIA; DOD's Gulf War
Declassification Project; and CENTCOM.  In addition, MITRE conducted
about 30 interviews with individuals from DOD and the national
security and intelligence communities to obtain information.  MITRE's
final report will be classified.  A final report will be provided to
the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight,
who will then provide it and his own findings and recommendations to
the Deputy Secretary of Defense. 


      ARMY INSPECTOR GENERAL
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.6

In September 1996, the Secretary of the Army directed the Army
Inspector General to determine the facts surrounding the demolition
of ammunition at Khamisiyah, Iraq in March 1991 by U.S.  Army forces. 
The Inspector General's inquiry was to focus on whether (1) the
presence of chemical munitions was detected at the time the
ammunition was destroyed, (2) such information was reported, and to
what level, and (3) appropriate force protection measures were taken
during demolition operations. 

In October 1996, the Secretary of the Army issued a supplemental
directive to the Army Inspector General.  The Inspector General was
directed to determine (1) the weapons that were destroyed; (2) the
personnel who participated in the destruction; (3) the potential
exposure of those personnel to chemical agents; (4) other personnel
who may have been exposed to chemical agents due to the possible
chemical agent release, considering applicable weather patterns at
the time; (5) any other significant events pertaining to this
incident; and (6) whether similar operations were conducted
elsewhere. 

For the inquiry, a team of four Army Inspector General officers
gathered information and documents from the Gulf War Declassification
Project (on intelligence, health policy, and operations); the
Examination and Analysis Directorate, Office of the Special Assistant
for Gulf War Illnesseses; various Army commands and agencies; CIA;
the Defense Intelligence Agency; and individual soldiers, veterans,
and civilians.  The team collected over 2,000 documents, 300
photographs, 4 video tapes, and 1 audio tape.  In addition, the team
conducted approximately 700 interviews with active duty
servicemembers, veterans, retirees, and civilians.  About one-half of
the interviews were sworn and recorded.  The remainder were
documented with memoranda for the record. 

The Army Inspector General team has completed the inquiry and is
currently in the final stages of writing the report, analyzing and
cross-referencing available data, and coordinating possible results
and conclusions with the appropriate agencies and individuals.  It is
anticipated that a report will be approved for release in October
1997. 


      CIA INSPECTOR GENERAL
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.7

In October 1996, the Director of Central Intelligence requested that
the CIA Inspector General assess the allegations made by two former
CIA employees concerning the handling of information about the
possible exposure of U.S.  forces to chemical weapons during the
Persian Gulf War.  The allegations were that (1) the CIA had hidden,
and continues to hide, evidence of the exposure of U.S.  forces to
chemical weapons during the Gulf War; (2) CIA officials tried to
hinder the former employees' inquiry about this exposure; (3) CIA
employees avoided reviewing the evidence uncovered concerning the
exposure; and (4) the careers of the two former employees were
effectively destroyed because of their insistence on pursuing an
inquiry about the exposure of U.S.  forces to chemical weapons during
the Gulf War.  The allegation that CIA hid information related to
Gulf War Illnesseses was based on three specific concerns:  (1) that
the Agency was not releasing relevant documents in a timely fashion,
(2) that Agency managers had directed the removal of documents from
an Internet website on Gulf War illnesseses run by DOD, and (3) that
the Agency had not provided one of the former employees with
documents requested under the Freedom of Information Act. 

In addition, in February 1997, the President asked the Presidential
Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesseses to address
several questions regarding the Khamisiyah ammunition storage depot. 
As a result of the President's directive to the Committee to take
full account of evidence disclosed by the CIA Inspector General's
ongoing review, a CIA Inspector General assessment team specifically
focused on CIA's handling of information related to Khamisiyah in
order to contribute to resolution of the President's questions. 

A nine-person assessment team has reviewed over 6,000 documents and
interviewed over 175 individuals.  As of September 1, 1997, two draft
reports, one concerning the allegations of the two former employees
and another on the handling of information related to Khamisiyah, had
been distributed to CIA components so that they may provide comments. 
Final reports are expected to be issued by October 31, 1997. 


      DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
      INTELLIGENCE PERSIAN GULF
      WAR ILLNESSESES TASK FORCE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.8

The Task Force, established in February 1997 by the Acting Director
of Central Intelligence, was chartered to provide intelligence
support to the various U.S.  government entities that are examining
Gulf War illnesseses.  The Task Force staff of 50 personnel are from
the intelligence community -- the CIA, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency, and DOD's Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf
War Illnesseses.  As the Task Force completed some of its initial
efforts, many intelligence community personnel returned to their
respective components; however, they continue to be principal points
of contact to the Task Force for specific issues.  The Task Force is
now composed of personnel from CIA, the National Imagery and Mapping
Agency, and the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War
Illnesseses.  Responsibilities of the Task Force include (1)
reviewing previous search criteria and conducting additional searches
as required; (2) managing and accelerating current and ongoing
document declassification efforts; (3) ensuring that DOD and others
can retrieve related classified information quickly; (4) supporting
ongoing CIA modeling efforts, (5) providing analyses of relevant
information; and (6) developing a comprehensive strategy for
communications with DOD, the National Security Council, the
Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesseses,
appropriate congressional committees, the media, and the public. 

According to the Special Assistant to the Director of Central
Intelligence for Persian Gulf War Illnesseses Issues, to meet its
responsibilities, the Task Force has reviewed previous search
criteria on Gulf War illnesseses, conducted broader searches, and
ensured that classified material was passed to DOD and others.  The
broader approach was designed, in part, to discover any evidence
about the potential exposure of U.S.  forces to chemical weapons and
other hazards.  The Task Force's search efforts captured over one
million documents.  The Task Force used an analytical team to prepare
three public papers:  Khamisiyah:  A Historical Perspective on
Related Intelligence, April 1997;" Update on Potential Mustard Agent
Release at Ukhaydir Ammunition Storage Depot, September 1997;
Modeling the Chemical Warfare Agent Release at the Khamisiyah Pit,
September 1997. 

In its April 1997 paper, the Task Force focused on determining what
the intelligence community knew about Iraqi storage of chemical
weapons, particularly the storage of such weapons at the Khamisiyah
ammunition site.  Questions pursued included (1) what and when did
the intelligence community know about the possibility of chemical
weapons at this site and (2) what did the intelligence community, and
when, do internally and externally, with the information collected
and analyzed.  Its paper provides details about the intelligence
community's knowledge of Khamisiyah before, during, and after the
war.  Key issues include problems with multiple databases; limited
sharing of sensitive, but vital, information; and incomplete searches
of files while preparing lists of known or suspected chemical warfare
facilities.  The Task Force is also conducting analyses related to
potential causes of Gulf War illnesseses, including biological,
chemical, radiological, environmental factors, and foreign-reported
illnesseses. 

The Task Force has been working with DOD to produce the
plume-modeling results.  The Task Force was expected to complete its
work by April 1997; however, as of August 31, 1997, its work was
still ongoing. 


      DOD INSPECTOR GENERAL
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.9

In its efforts to identify the causes of a number of illnesseses
being suffered by Gulf War veterans, the Office of the Special
Assistant for Gulf War Illnesseses learned that not all of the pages
of the NBC Desk Log maintained in CENTCOM's J-3 Operations Center
during the war could be found.  The Office has located 37 pages of
the log, covering 26 nonconsecutive days of operations from January
17 to March 12, 1991.  DOD estimated that approximately 200 pages of
the log could be expected to exist.  Thus, DOD has paper copies of
only a small portion (less than 20 percent) of the pages of the
Central Command NBC Desk Log that could have been generated during
the Gulf War. 

On March 3, 1997, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the DOD
Inspector General to take over this inquiry and carry it to
conclusion.  Specifically, the Deputy Secretary directed the
Inspector General's office to follow all leads that could be
developed on the location of the original log or copies, in either
electronic or hard copy versions, and gather all originals and copies
that can be located.  If a full copy of the log cannot be located,
the Inspector General is to explain why. 

The Defense Criminal Investigative Service of DOD's Inspector
General's office is currently examining this issue.  The examination
is being directed by headquarters staff, and the examination team
consists of senior criminal investigators supported by a staff of
auditors and investigative support personnel.  The team's efforts
generally included collecting and analyzing the investigative record
created by the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War
Illnesseses, including numerous transcribed interviews with watch
officers assigned to man the headquarters NBC Desk during the war;
interviews of other persons who may have had access to the log after
the war; and many telephone and written requests for information from
sources throughout DOD.  The team also conducted over 185 interviews
with available witnesses who were involved in the creation of the
CENTCOM NBC Desk Log in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and those in possession
of the log at Central Command in Tampa, Florida, after the conclusion
of the Gulf War.  The team also reviewed over 700,000 pages of
documents at the National Archives, 22,000 pages at CENTCOM, and over
100 computer disks. 

This effort was designated as the Defense Criminal Investigative
Service's top priority and was to be completed as quickly as possible
without sacrificing the thoroughness of the examination. 


   EXAMINATIONS CONDUCTED BY
   VETERANS ORGANIZATIONS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2

We identified six veterans organizations that were reviewing issues
relating to the exposure of U.S.  military personnel to chemical
agents or gaps in CENTCOM's NBC Desk Log.  Five groups were reviewing
both issues.  While the federal organizations have performed
extensive studies or inquires, the veterans organizations for the
most part are collecting and analyzing information, making Freedom of
Information Act requests, and collecting media information in their
role of keeping veterans informed of pertinent developments. 


      NATIONAL GULF WAR RESOURCE
      CENTER, INC. 
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.1

In 1995, the National Gulf War Resource Center, a nonprofit
organization located in Washington, D.C., was founded to support the
efforts of 24 grass roots Gulf War veterans organizations in the
United States and Great Britain working to assist veterans affected
by the war.  The Center serves as a clearinghouse receiving
information from veterans; the Center's member and veteran service
organizations; government agencies; and the media.  It then
disseminates the information to member organizations and interested
groups to assist them in their efforts to assist veterans. 

Starting in 1995, the Center began researching and documenting
chemical warfare agent detection, exposure, and injury incidents
during the Gulf War as well as the issue of the missing, misplaced,
or destroyed chemical logs.  The Center's objectives are to locate,
obtain, and review documents, such as chemical logs, relevant to the
exposure of U.S.  service personnel to chemical warfare agents.  This
work was intended to provide Gulf War veterans with evidence of
chemical agent exposure, if any, so that they could obtain
appropriate health care and compensation and offer suggestions on how
to improve chemical warfare agent detection and protection. 

To achieve these objectives, the Center receives eyewitness accounts
from veterans to determine which units may have been exposed to
chemical warfare agents and then sends requests for relevant
documentation under the Freedom of Information Act to the appropriate
commands and units.  In addition, the Center reviews other
documentation obtained from Congress, the media, DOD, and other
sources to obtain additional information about potential exposures
and the location of relevant corroborating documentation. 

According to a representative of the Center, its work has resulted in
the public release of previously classified information that
contradicted information previously released by DOD.  The
representative also said that, as a result of the Center's work, (1)
DOD confirmed that Gulf War personnel were potentially exposed to
chemical warfare agents, (2) DOD and the Department of Veterans'
Affairs have begun to offer some limited medical screening for
potential toxic exposures experienced during the Gulf War, and (3)
DOD and the Department of Veterans' Affairs have launched new medical
studies following up on private sector studies showing a causal link
between chemical exposures and illnesseses among Gulf War veterans. 
The Center's examination is an ongoing effort with no established
completion date. 


      OPERATION DESERT
      SHIELD/DESERT STORM
      ASSOCIATION
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.2

The Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm Association, located in
Odessa, Texas, was formed in November 1990 to collect and archive any
and all information related to the Gulf War, including the exposure
of service personnel to chemical warfare agents and the circumstances
surrounding gaps in the CENTCOM NBC Desk Log.  The Association was
formed to attempt to prevent a recurrence of the problems that
occurred during the Vietnam War with the government's handling of
exposures of military personnel to Agent Orange.  The founding
members believed that the major problem with the Agent Orange
situation was that no entity outside the government kept any
documentation during the Vietnam War. 

The Association's mission is accomplished through obtaining
government and private documents from worldwide sources, identifying
and collecting newspaper and magazine articles, and recording
television and radio presentations related to the Gulf War.  The
Association plans to continue its examination into all Gulf War
issues including the use of, and exposure to chemical and biological
weapons in the Persian Gulf and gaps in CENTCOM's NBC Desk Log. 
Negotiations are underway to build a permanent archival, research,
and museum facility to provide information resources on all aspects
of the Persian Gulf War to anyone requesting such information. 

In 1991, from its contacts with sick veterans, the Association
determined that there were five areas of concern affecting the health
of service personnel:  human changes to the normal environment in the
Gulf, chemical and biological weapons exposure, radiation exposure,
parasitic infections, and the use of examinational drugs and
vaccines.  Since 1992, Association representatives have testified at
U.S.  and overseas meetings and hearings pertaining to the Gulf War
illnesseses.  Also, in January 1992, the Association co-sponsored the
first "mystery illnesses" conference. 


      THE VETCENTER
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.3

In February 1994, the VetCenter located in Patchogue, New York, was
formed to determine why many Gulf War veterans became ill after the
war.  More specifically, the VetCenter is examining the possible
exposure of U.S.  personnel to chemical warfare agents including
identifying incidents where personnel were exposed and disclosing
this information to the public. 

With respect to CENTCOM's NBC Desk Log, the VetCenter has been
examining the chain of custody and instances of noncompliance with
incident recording procedures.  This is being accomplished through
the correlation of units, locations, and the extent of illnesseses
experienced by veterans in various areas.  Information is collected
primarily from veterans who served in the Gulf War through the use of
surveys posted on the VetCenter's Internet site and through mailings. 
This information is subsequently reviewed and followed up on through
telephone calls, electronic mail, and letters for validation. 
Veterans are asked to back up their statements by submitting photos
and other documentation.  This information is made available to
organizations such as congressional committees and individuals who
are examining the issue.  This work is an ongoing effort with no
established completion date. 


      THE NORTHWEST VETERANS FOR
      PEACE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.4

The Northwest Veterans for Peace, located in Portland, Oregon, began
helping Gulf War veterans and their families obtain medical care
because the organization believed that the government was not
promptly attending to veterans returning to the United States.  In
1993, as a result of a congressional request, the organization began
testing saliva and urine of veterans and their families from an
Oregon National Guard unit that deployed to the Gulf.  In addition,
the organization asked veterans and their families to complete a
questionnaire covering their illnesseses and their jobs, locations,
and time periods in the Gulf.  The questionnaire also asked about any
incident occurring in the Gulf that they believed was either a
chemical or biological incident.  In the summer of 1997, the
organization sent follow-up questionnaires to the veterans to
identify any changes in their health or the health of their families. 
The organization is still receiving questionnaire responses from the
veterans.  The organization has not established a completion date for
this effort. 


      DESERT STORM JUSTICE
      FOUNDATION
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.5

In February 1994, the Desert Storm Justice Foundation, located in
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, was created as a nonprofit organization to
provide support to sick veterans and their families.  The Foundation
also serves as a clearinghouse for information from both governments
and private sources about the possible exposure of U.S.  personnel to
nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare agents during the war,
widely disseminating the information to interested groups and
individuals.  The Foundation's efforts also include gathering
information on gaps in CENTCOM's NBC Desk Log.  This is an ongoing
examination with no established completion date. 


      GULFWATCH
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.6

In March 1991, GulfWatch, located in Hannibal, Missouri, was created
to provide information and documentation to the public regarding what
happened before, during, and after the war on a variety of topics,
including the possible exposure to U.S.  personnel to nuclear,
biological, and chemical warfare agents and gaps in CENTCOM's NBC
Desk Log.  The organization received information from sources in
intelligence agencies, from interviews with individuals who served in
the war, radio call-in programs, and filing requests for documents
under the Freedom of Information Act.  The organization disseminates
the information obtained to researchers and the media with the
objective of providing information on what actually happened during
the Gulf War.  The overall goal of the organization is to obtain
medical care for sick Gulf War veterans and to prevent a recurrence
of such problems.  The investigative efforts of GulfWatch are ongoing
with no established completion date. 


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix II


   NATIONAL SECURITY AND
   INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
   WASHINGTON, D.C. 
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1

Carol R.  Schuster
Donald L.  Patton
Rodney E.  Ragan
William J.  Rigazio
Raymond G.  Bickert
Karen S.  Blum
Sharon E.  Sweeney


   NORFOLK REGIONAL OFFICE
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2

Steve J.  Fox
William L.  Mathers


*** End of document. ***