    Foreign Assistance: Harvard Institute for International Development's
    Work in Russia and Ukraine (Chapter Report, 11/27/96, GAO/NSIAD-97-27).

    As the Soviet Union crumbled, the United States sought to help Russia
    and the other newly independent states become free market democracies.
    The U.S. supported various reforms, including the development of
    democratic institutions, the privatization of state-owned property, the
    establishment of legal codes, and the creation of mechanisms to operate
    a private capital market. The U.S. Agency for International Development,
    (USAID) the lead U.S. agency to provide transition assistance, lacked
    the contacts and expertise to accomplish this unprecedented task.
    Therefore, it turned to private organizations, including the Harvard
    Institute for International Development, to provide direct technical
    help to Russian reformers. The Institute was also expected to help
    oversee U.S. contractors in USAID's Russian economic restructuring
    project. The Institute had preexisting relationships with Russian
    officials and had already helped establish several Russian institutions
    to sustain reforms, including the Russian Privatization Center, which
    helped restructure business enterprises and facilitated land reform.
    Members of Congress had raised concerns about the noncompetitive nature
    of the awards to the Institute and about the Institute's effectiveness.
    This report assesses (1) how USAID awarded assistance agreements to the
    Institute to carry out work in Russia and Ukraine and (2) the
    Institute's role and accomplishments in implementing assistance
    agreements to develop a Russian capital market and devise a legal reform
    program. GAO also evaluates the effectiveness of the Russian
    Privatization Center in implementing USAID post-privatization and land
    reform projects.

    --------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

     REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-97-27
         TITLE:  Foreign Assistance: Harvard Institute for International
                 Development's Work in Russia and Ukraine
          DATE:  11/27/96
       SUBJECT:  International relations
                 International cooperation
                 Privatization
                 Strategic planning
                 Foreign technical aid
                 Foreign economic assistance
                 Securities regulation
                 Grant award procedures
                 Cooperative agreements
                 Foreign governments
    IDENTIFIER:  AID Program for Intensive Enterprise Support Programs
                 AID Privatization and Economic Restructuring Program for
                 Europe and Former Soviet Union
                 AID Financial Management Assistance Program

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    Cover
    ================================================================ COVER

    Report to the Ranking Minority Memeber, Committeee on Veterans'
    Affairs, House of Representatives

    October 1997

    GULF WAR ILLNESSES - PUBLIC AND
    PRIVATE EFFORTS RELATING TO
    EXPOSURES OF U.S.  PERSONNEL TO
    CHEMICAL AGENTS

    GAO/NSIAD-97-27

    Gulf War Illnesses

    (703200)

    Abbreviations
    =============================================================== ABBREV

      ATSD(IO) - Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence
         Oversight)
      CENTCOM - U.S.  Central Command
      CIA - Central Intelligence Agency
      CIAInspectorGeneral - Central Intelligence Agency Inspector
         General
      CIAPGW - Central Intelligence Agency Persian Gulf War Illness Task
         Force
      DCIS - Defense Criminal Investigative Service
      DOD - Department of Defense
      NBC - Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
      OSAGWI - Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses
      PAC - Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans'
         Illnesses

    Letter
    =============================================================== LETTER

    B-278006

    October 17, 1997

    The Honorable Lane Evans
    Ranking Minority Member
    Committee on Veterans' Affairs
    House of Representatives

    Dear Mr.  Evans:

    As you requested, we have developed information related to the
    Department of Defense's (DOD) custody and disposition of information
    on the possible use of chemical weapons by Iraq during the Persian
    Gulf War.  Specifically, this report provides information as of
    September 1997 on the extent to which federal government agencies and
    private organizations are examining (1) the potential exposure of
    U.S.  military personnel to chemical warfare agents in the Persian
    Gulf and (2) the circumstances surrounding gaps in the Nuclear,
    Biological and Chemical (NBC) Desk Log maintained by the U.S.
    Central Command (CENTCOM) during the war.

       BACKGROUND
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

    Approximately 700,000 U.S.  servicemembers served in the Persian Gulf
    during some point from August 1990 to June 1991.  According to DOD,
    the majority of these personnel returned from the war healthy and
    remain fit for duty today.  However, many of these servicemembers are
    reporting a wide array of health complaints and disabling conditions,
    including fatigue, muscle and joint pain, memory loss, and severe
    headaches.  In response to concerns about the servicemembers with
    these symptoms and the potential health effects resulting from Gulf
    War service, both DOD and the Department of Veterans' Affairs
    established programs through which Gulf War veterans could receive
    medical examinations and diagnostic services.  Nearly 100,000 of
    these servicemembers have participated in clinical evaluation
    programs established by these two agencies after the war.  DOD is
    conducting medical research studies with comparison groups of both
    deployed and non-deployed Gulf War veterans to clarify whether
    certain medical conditions may be more common among Gulf War
    veterans.  In addition, DOD and several federal agencies, as well as
    a number of private organizations, are studying whether
    servicemembers may have been exposed to chemical agents during the
    war.

    According to CENTCOM headquarters staff, the Command began
    maintaining operational logs upon its arrival in the Persian Gulf on
    August 8, 1990, until April 13, 1991, when the last major element of
    CENTCOM headquarters left the Persian Gulf, for a total of 249 days.
    The purpose of these logs was to provide a chronological record of
    key events that occurred each day.  In addition to the operational
    logs, the Command's Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical officer began
    maintaining an NBC Desk Log in late August 1990.  We were told that
    the NBC Desk Log was maintained on a daily basis except for the
    periods at the beginning and the end of the deployment.  The
    officials said that it is not known with certainty how many daily
    entries were made in the NBC Desk Log.

       RESULTS IN BRIEF
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

    As of September 1997, 14 federal and private organizations had
    efforts underway examining potential exposure of U.S.  servicemembers
    to chemical agents and 1 federal organization was examining gaps in
    the NBC Desk Log maintained by the U.S.  Central Command.  Relative
    to potential exposures to chemical agents, 8 federal and 6 nonfederal
    organizations were involved in this effort.\1 Concerning gaps in the
    NBC Desk Log, officials from DOD's Office of the Special Assistant
    for Gulf War Illnesses estimate that about 200 pages of log entries
    may have been produced during the Gulf War.  However, thus far, that
    office has only been able to locate 37 pages.  Officials from that
    office believe the remaining log pages were destroyed as part of an
    office clean out.  Nevertheless, the DOD Inspector General's Defense
    Criminal Investigative Service has an investigation underway to
    examine these gaps.  Five veterans' organizations have also been
    tracking this log issue as part of their overall efforts to gather
    data on Gulf War illnesses.  Table 1 summarizes the efforts various
    organizations have underway to address these issues.

                                                                                           Table 1

                                                                               Organizations Studying Gulf War
                                                                                          Illnesses

                                                 Federal groups\a                                                                  Private groups\a
                      -----------------------------------------------------------------------  -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                  Desert
                                   Senate                                                                         Shield/
                                   Veterans'                                CIA PGW                               Storm                     Northwest      Desert Storm
                                   Affairs            ATSD(I  ARMY    CIA   Illness     DOD    National Gulf War  Association               Vets for       Justice
    Issues            OSAGWI  PAC  Committee     GAO  O)      IG      IG    Task Force  IG     Resource Center    \b            VetCenter   Peace          Foundation         GulfWatch
    ----------------  ------  ---  ------------  ---  ------  ------  ----  ----------  -----  -----------------  ------------  ----------  -------------  -----------------  ----------
    Identifying                                                                                                   X
    chemical
    exposure
    incidents

    Identifying       X       X    X             X    X       X       X     X                  X                                X           X              X                  X
    incidents in
    which U.S.
    personnel were
    exposed

    Examining         X       X    X             X    X       X       X                        X                                X                          X                  X
    methods for
    identifying and
    reporting such
    incidents

    Disclosing        X       X                  X                    X     X                  X                                X           X              X                  X
    chemical
    exposure
    incidents to the
    public

    Complying with
    laws governing
    classified
    information

    Analyzing laws            X    X                                                                              X             X
    governing the
    handling of
    classified
    information

    Assessing                      X                                                    X                         X             X
    responsibility
    for any legal
    violations

    Custody of
    Information

    Examining the     X       X    X                                                           X                                X                          X                  X
    custody for
    information
    concerning
    chemical weapons

    Assessing                 X    X                                                           X                                                           X                  X
    changes to
    improve the
    custody

    Investigating                                                                                                 X
    gaps in chemical
    logs

    Disclosing                                   X                                      X                                                                  X                  X
    CENTCOM
    procedures in
    place to record
    incidents in NBC
    logs

    Identifying                                                                                X                                X                          X                  X
    instances of
    noncompliance
    with procedures

    Determining                                                                                X                                                           X                  X
    changes for
    reporting NBC
    incidents

    Contacting        X                          X                                      X      X                                X                          X                  X
    personnel
    responsible for
    maintaining
    records on
    chemical weapon
    incidents

    Analyzing                                                                           X                                                                  X                  X
    procedures for
    archiving
    information on
    possible
    exposure to
    chemical agents

    Identifying                                                                                X                                                           X                  X
    lessons learned
    for reporting
    and archiving
    information on
    chemical
    incidents

    Reconstructing                                                                             X                                X                          X                  X
    gaps in chemical
    incident
    reporting

    Expected          TBD\c   10/  3/98          TBD  TBD     10/97   10/   TBD         TBD    TBD                N/A\d         TBD         TBD            TBD                TBD
    Reporting Date            97                                      97
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Note:  OSAGWI, Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War
    Illnesses; PAC, Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans'
    Illnesses; GAO, General Accounting Office; ATSD(IO), Assistant to the
    Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight; IG Inspector
    General; CIA, Central Intelligence Agency; PGW, Persian Gulf War;
    CENTCOM, U.S.  Central Command; NBC, nuclear, biological, and
    chemical.

    \a The level of effort among the various groups studying Gulf War
    illnesses issues varies.  Federal organizations, for the most part,
    have studies or investigations of these issues.  For the most part,
    veterans groups are collecting and analyzing information, making
    Freedom of Information Act requests, and collecting media information
    in their role of keeping veterans informed of pertinent developments.

    \b The Association did not provide detailed information on the
    specific issues it was reviewing.

    \c To be determined.

    \d The Association does not plan to issue a report.

    --------------------
    \1 Numerous other federal and private organizations have conducted
    medical research into the potential causes of the symptoms being
    reported by Gulf War Veterans.  Many of these organizations are
    identified in our report entitled Gulf War Illnesses:  Improved
    Monitoring of Clinical Progress and Reexamination of Research
    Emphasis Are Needed (GAO/NSIAD-97-163, June 23, 1997).

       EXAMINATIONS OF THE POTENTIAL
       EXPOSURE OF U.S.  SERVICE
       PERSONNEL TO CHEMICAL WARFARE
       AGENTS
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

    Eight federal entities and six veterans organizations have been
    involved in examining the potential exposure of U.S.  service
    personnel to chemical warfare agents.  In the federal sector,
    examinations are underway by DOD's Office of the Special Assistant
    for Gulf War Illnesses, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
    Intelligence Oversight, the U.S.  Army Inspector General, and
    Director of the Central Intelligence's Persian Gulf War Illnesses
    Task Force.  Some of the activities of these federal organizations
    are being monitored by four additional organizations:  the
    Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans Illnesses, the
    Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General, the Senate Committee
    on Veterans Affairs Investigative Team, and the General Accounting
    Office.  Some of these efforts are scheduled to be completed in 1997
    while others will take longer.  The efforts included reviews of
    records maintained during the Gulf War to identify potential chemical
    exposure incidents; evaluations of the adequacy of the federal
    government's response to information on potential exposures to
    chemical agents, assessments of the models being used for studies of
    chemical incidents, and evaluations of any reported differences in
    exposures and illnesses between U.S.  and other allied forces that
    participated in the Gulf War.

    Of the 26 organizations representing veterans we contacted, 6 veteran
    organizations were conducting examinations as a part of their efforts
    to represent the best interests of veterans.  As such, these
    examinations are done on a continuing basis with no established
    completion dates and generally include the collection and analysis of
    information from a variety of sources such as contacts with
    individual Gulf War veterans experiencing health problems, Freedom of
    Information Act requests made to DOD agencies from other
    organizations, and media information on the exposure of veterans to
    chemical weapons.

       EXAMINATIONS RELATED TO GAPS IN
       CENTCOM'S NBC DESK LOG
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

    In March 1997, the DOD Inspector General's Defense Criminal
    Investigative Service was tasked by the Deputy Secretary of Defense
    to lead the effort to determine the circumstances related to gaps in
    CENTCOM's NBC Desk Log.  The Service's mandate was to follow all
    leads that can be developed on the location of the original log or
    copies of it.  If the Service cannot locate a full copy of the log,
    it was expected to determine the reasons.  The Service's study had
    not yet been completed, and the DOD Inspector General declined to
    comment on the details of this investigation to avoid jeopardizing
    the investigative effort and protect the privacy of the parties
    involved.

    DOD's Army Inspector General and the Office of the Special Assistant
    for Gulf War Illnesses (OSAGWI) began efforts to determine the status
    of the log but discontinued their work once the Defense Criminal
    Investigative Service took responsibility for this matter.  Five
    veterans organizations are also examining gaps in the NBC Desk Log as
    part of their overall efforts to gather Gulf War illness information.

    To date, OSAGWI has located 37 pages of the NBC Desk Log covering 26
    nonconsecutive days from January 17, 1991, through March 12, 1991.
    OSAGWI officials stated that, in their opinion, about 200 pages of
    log entries might have been prepared.  Thus, DOD has a hard copy of
    less than 20 percent of the log pages that may have been prepared to
    record reported nuclear, biological, or chemical events occurring
    during the Gulf War.  OSAGWI officials believe that the remaining
    pages might have been destroyed as part of an office clean out.

       AGENCY COMMENTS
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

    We obtained oral comments on a draft of this report from DOD and the
    federal and private groups that provided information contained in the
    report.  While DOD concurred with our findings, it provided several
    technical comments, including that we clarify DOD's position on the
    number of Gulf War veterans experiencing health problems and on the
    maintenance and disposition of NBC Desk Log pages.  We revised the
    draft to reflect DOD's comments.  The groups also provided technical
    comments which we incorporated as appropriate.

       SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

    To develop a list of examinations of possible exposures to chemical
    agents and gaps in CENTCOM's NBC Desk Log as well as obtain
    information on each examination's objectives and methodology, we
    focused our search for ongoing examinations on three types of
    organizations located in the United States:  federal entities,
    research organizations such as RAND, and veterans organizations.  We
    did not attempt to evaluate the quality or cost of the examinations
    being conducted or to identify gaps in or duplication of, efforts
    among the examinations.  To avoid jeopardizing the Defense Criminal
    Investigative Service's ongoing investigation related to the NBC Desk
    Log, we limited our examination to general discussions with Service
    personnel on the objectives of their investigation.

    We searched Internet databases, contacted organizations with highly
    publicized efforts, and asked their representatives about other
    organizations potentially doing examinations.

    We obtained information from the following 18 federal entities about
    their efforts, if any, in conducting examinations:  the Presidential
    Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses; DOD's Office of
    the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses; the Senate Committee on
    Veterans' Affairs; the General Accounting Office; the Department of
    Veterans Affairs; the Department of Health and Human Services; the
    Central Intelligence Agency Persian Gulf War Illness Task Force; the
    Defense Intelligence Agency Persian Gulf Focus Group; the Assistant
    to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Oversight; the
    Institute of Medicine; and the Gulf War Illness Directorate of the
    National Security Council.  We also contacted the Inspector General
    offices at the Departments of Defense, the Army, Navy, and the Air
    Force; the Marine Corps; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Central
    Intelligence Agency to determine if they were performing active
    examinations or other activities.  In addition, we contacted the
    United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, which has been conducting
    on-site investigations of Iraq's chemical and biological
    capabilities.

    We also contacted 10 research organizations that have previously done
    analyses of defense policy and national security issues to determine
    whether they had any efforts in the two areas of interest.  We
    contacted the MITRE Corporation; the American Enterprise Institute;
    the Brookings Institution; the Army War College Strategic Studies
    Institute; the Cato Institute; the Center for Defense Information;
    the Center for National Policy; the Center for Strategic and
    International Studies; the Heritage Foundation; and the RAND
    Corporation.

    To identify veterans organizations examining chemical exposures and
    the gaps in the NBC Desk Log, we searched several Internet databases,
    obtained a list of national veterans' service organizations from the
    Department of Veterans' Affairs, and identified additional veterans
    organizations by asking representatives of organizations we contacted
    about other organizations that might be doing examinations.  We also
    asked officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
    military services, the DOD legislative liaison offices, and defense
    agencies that administer Freedom of Information Act requests to
    identify organizations receiving documents pertinent to these topics
    under the act.  We subsequently contacted 26 veterans organizations
    that we identified and inquired about any examinations that they were
    conducting regarding the possible exposure of personnel to chemical
    weapons and/or gaps in CENTCOM's the NBC Desk Log.

    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.1

    We conducted our work from May to September 1997.

    As agreed with your staff, unless you publicly announce this report's
    contents earlier, we plan no further distribution until 7 days after
    its issue date.  At that time, we will send copies of this report to
    the Chairman, House Committee on Veterans' Affairs, Chairmen and
    Ranking Minority Members, Senate and House Committees on
    Appropriations; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and
    the Air Force; and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Copies will
    also be made available to others on request.

    Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any
    questions concerning this report.  Major contributors to this report
    are listed in appendix II.

    Sincerely yours,

    Mark E.  Gebicke
    Director, Military Operations
     and Capabilities Issues

    EXAMINATIONS OF EXPOSURE OF U.S.
    PERSONNEL TO CHEMICAL WARFARE
    AGENTS DURING THE GULF WAR AND
    GAPS IN CENTCOM'S NBC DESK LOG
    =========================================================== Appendix I

    A total of 15 federal and private organizations were examining the
    potential exposure of U.S.  personnel to chemical or biological
    warfare agents and the gaps in U.S.  Central Command's (CENTCOM)
    Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) Desk Log.  The objectives,
    methodology, and completion dates for each examination are described
    below.

       EXAMINATIONS CONDUCTED BY
       FEDERAL ENTITIES
    --------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1

    Nine federal entities had efforts underway either involving the
    potential exposure of U.S.  personnel and/or were examining gaps in
    CENTCOM's NBC Desk Log.  Two organizations (the Office of the Special
    Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses and the Senate Veterans' Affairs
    Committee) were examining both issues.

          OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
          ASSISTANT FOR GULF WAR
          ILLNESSES
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.1

    The Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses was
    established by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in November 1996.  The
    Office's mission is to ensure that (1) Gulf War veterans are
    appropriately cared for, (2) DOD is doing everything possible to
    understand and explain Gulf War illnesses, and (3) DOD puts into
    place all required military doctrine and personnel and medical
    policies and procedures to minimize any future problem from exposure
    to biological and chemical agents and other environmental hazards.
    As the scope of the Office's tasks became more defined and the amount
    and complexity of work increased, the Office's original staff of 20
    employees was increased to its present level of 190.  The 190 staff
    members consist of 18 DOD servicemembers, 9 DOD civilians, and 163
    contractor personnel.  Almost one-half of the staff members are part
    of the Examination and Analysis Directorate, whose mission is to
    identify what happened before, during, and after the Gulf War as it
    relates to various potential causes of illnesses and to potential
    future force impacts.  The remainder provide administrative,
    analytic, and automation support; technical management and
    administration of the website GulfLINK; database and security
    management; public affairs services; document control and archiving;
    support to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans'
    Illnesses; legal services, legislative affairs, veterans liaison, and
    health and medical benefits support; correspondence and electronic
    mail response services; and notification of potential exposure
    mailings.

    To ensure that Gulf War veterans are appropriately cared for, the
    Office is, among other things, encouraging veterans to participate in
    DOD's Comprehensive Clinical Evaluation Program and the Department of
    Veterans' Affairs Gulf War Registry Examination Program.  To satisfy
    its other missions, the Office receives information on potential
    exposure incidents from a variety of sources, including the military
    services, the intelligence community, and unified commands such as
    CENTCOM and the Special Operations Command.  The Office also conducts
    extensive searches of archives and record depositories and conducts
    interviews with subject matter experts, military and civilian
    officials, and veterans.  The Office participates in government
    interagency deliberations and oversight of government research of
    Gulf War illnesses to ensure information sharing and coordination of
    activities across the executive branch.

    At the time we completed our fieldwork, the Office was examining 44
    incidents.  Of these incidents, 22 involved potential exposures to
    chemical and biological warfare agents, and 22 concerned potential
    environmental and occupational exposures and medical issues relating
    to immunizations, preventive drug treatment, stress, infectious
    agents, and other potential causes of illness.  The Office has issued
    10 major studies -- 8 case narratives, 1 information paper, and 1
    status report.  Of the eight narratives, five are associated with
    potential chemical exposures at the Khamisiyah ammunition site in
    Iraq, the port of Al Jubayl in Saudi Arabia, and Camp Kuwait.  The
    other narratives discuss the analysis of a piece of metal alleged to
    be from a Scud missile, Marine Corps' forces movement through
    minefields on the Iraqi border, and suspected exposure of a veteran
    to a mustard agent.  The information paper provides insight into the
    capabilities and performance of the Fox chemical and biological agent
    detection vehicle.  A status report was provided to the DOD Inspector
    General that discusses the generation, transportation, storage, and
    disposition of CENTCOM's NBC Desk Log.  The Central Intelligence
    Agency (CIA) and the Institute for Defense Analysis have issued
    companion reports to the Office's case narratives on the Khamisiyah
    incident.

    The Office views case narratives as interim reports that contain
    information about the incidents.  The narratives are not final
    products; as the Office receives additional information on an
    incident, it intends to refine the respective narratives.  As an
    example of its ongoing investigative process, the Office has issued
    two separate versions of its case narrative on the Khamisiyah
    incident in February and July 1997.  During April, the February
    narrative was refined to facilitate retrieval of supporting documents
    through GulfLINK.  Work is still underway, and there is no scheduled
    completion date for the Office's operations.

          PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY
          COMMITTEE ON GULF WAR
          VETERANS' ILLNESSES
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.2

    In December 1996, the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War
    Veterans' Illnesses issued its final report, culminating 16 months of
    work.\1 The Committee's study covered a wide range of Gulf War
    illness issues, including medical care being provided to veterans of
    the Gulf War; chemical and biological warfare agent examinations; and
    coordination of research programs for Gulf War illnesses among
    government agencies.  In January 1997, the President extended the
    duration of the Committee for an additional 10 months.  One of the
    two principal roles assigned to the Committee at that time was to
    oversee the ongoing Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War
    Illnesses (OSAGWI) examination into possible chemical or biological
    warfare agent exposures during the Gulf War.  In February 1997, the
    President tasked the Committee to evaluate the adequacy of the
    government's response to the implications of recently declassified
    documents associated with chemical munitions at the Khamisiyah
    storage depot.  Specifically, the President asked the Committee to
    concentrate on (1) when the U.  S.  intelligence and military
    communities knew that chemical munitions were present at Khamisiyah
    and that U.S.  forces may have been exposed to chemical agents and
    (2) whether the government's response was sufficient once this
    information was known.

    The Committee issued its Supplemental Letter Report in April 1997.
    The letter report reiterated a conclusion made in the final report
    that the evidence of a chemical agent release at Khamisiyah was
    overwhelming.  The letter report also stated that (1) substantial
    mismanagement and lack of communication among elements of the
    military and intelligence committees existed, (2) evidence existed
    before the initiation of war fighting that constituted reasonable
    cause for concern that Khamisiyah was an ammunition storage facility
    that contained chemical munitions, (3) executive branch departments
    and agencies made no serious effort to examine the possibility of
    chemical warfare agent exposure to U.S.  troops at Khamisiyah until
    late 1995, and (4) DOD's consistent denials until June 1996 of the
    possibility of exposure of U.S.  troops to chemical warfare agents
    cannot be justified.

    Regarding its oversight of OSAGWI's examination into possible
    chemical or biological warfare agent exposures during the Persian
    Gulf War, the Committee's supplemental letter report addressed three
    issues:  (1) the modeling used for plume analysis of chemical agents
    and other debris released into the atmosphere after destruction of
    the Khamisiyah ammunition storage area, (2) the Committee's access to
    information held by DOD, and (3) standards for evaluating detection
    or exposure incidents.  In its April 1997 Supplemental Letter Report,
    the Committee stated that there were no insurmountable obstacles to
    completing the modeling for the Khamisiyah site and barriers raised
    to date by CIA and DOD did not warrant continued delays in completing
    this project.

    The letter report also criticized the criteria used by OSAGWI for
    determining the credibility of reported detection or exposure
    incidents, stating that the legal standards of evidence were
    inappropriate for these matters.  The Committee stated that DOD
    should move quickly toward making conclusions about the incidents
    under examination.

    Since the time of its extension, the Committee has convened public
    hearings in Salt Lake City, Utah; Charleston, South Carolina;
    Memphis, Tennessee; Buffalo, New York; and Alexandria, Virginia.  The
    Committee's final report is due to the President in October 1997.

    --------------------
    \1 Final Report:  Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War
    Veterans' Illnesses (December 31, 1996).  We reviewed the work of the
    Committee in a recent report:  Improved Monitoring of Clinical
    Progress and Reexamination of Research Emphasis Are Needed
    (GAO/NSIAD-97-163, June 23, 1997).

          SENATE COMMITTEE ON
          VETERANS' AFFAIRS SPECIAL
          INVESTIGATIVE UNIT ON
          PERSIAN GULF WAR ILLNESSESES
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.3

    The Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, created its Special
    Investigative Unit in February 1997.  The Unit's work is focusing on
    three major areas:  (1) DOD and other agency actions taken before,
    during, and after the Gulf War that may relate to the current health
    problems of Gulf War veterans; (2) Department of Veterans' Affairs
    compensation, claims processing, and health treatment issues; and (3)
    review of current scientific research, environmental risks, treatment
    options, and potential preventive actions connected with veterans'
    health.

    The Unit is assessing such efforts as the adequacy of DOD's
    preparedness for and intelligence on Iraqi nuclear, biological, and
    chemical warfare capabilities; the models being used for plume
    analyses of potential chemical exposures incidents, such as the
    destruction of the Khamisiyah storage facility; and its
    record-keeping activities during and after the Gulf War, including
    chemical weapons logs and medical records.  In carrying out these
    tasks, the Unit is assessing the efforts of DOD, the Department of
    Veterans' Affairs, the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War
    Veterans' Illnesseses, and others.

    The Unit has about 20 full-time personnel, including detailees from
    other federal agencies, as well as a number of consultants.  The Unit
    expects to complete its work and issue a Committee report in March
    1998.

          GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.4

    Including this report, we have issued six reports since 1995 on DOD's
    ability to protect and treat its forces from chemical and biological
    agents and operate its facilities should they become contaminated by
    agents.\2 In March 1996, we reported that DOD's emphasis given to
    chemical and biological defense matters was insufficient to correct
    problems that surfaced during the Gulf War.  We reported that
    equipment, training, and medical shortcomings persisted and were
    likely to result in needless casualties and a degradation of U.S.
    war-fighting capabilities.  In May 1997, we reported that while DOD's
    medical surveillance capabilities had improved somewhat since the
    Gulf War, DOD continued to experience problems in the Bosnia
    deployment.  Specifically, DOD had not (1) established an accurate
    system to track all personnel who deployed, (2) given required
    postdeployment medical assessments to all personnel, and (3)
    maintained accurate medical records to identify medical visits during
    deployment and documentation of personnel receiving the tick-borne
    encephalitis vaccine.  We have also issued three classified reports
    involving chemical and biological agent defense.

    Besides our completed work, we recently began two efforts involving
    potential exposures of personnel to chemical and other agents during
    the Gulf War that may be contributing to Gulf War illnesseses.  In
    one effort, we are evaluating the experiences of allied forces that
    participated in the Gulf War and their reported incidence of
    illnesses, if any.  In the second effort, we are evaluating the
    adequacy of current U.S.  policies, procedures, and technologies to
    (1) defend against single, repeated, or sustained exposure to low
    levels of chemical warfare agents and (2) identify, prepare for, and
    defend against the possible adverse effects of chemical warfare agent
    exposure in combination with other compounds found on the
    battlefield.  We have not established a timefame for completing this
    work..

    --------------------
    \2 Chemical and Biological Defense:  Emphasis Remains Insufficient to
    Resolve Continuing Problems (GAO/NSIAD-96-103, Mar.  29, 1996);
    Defense Health Care:  Medical Surveillance Improved Since Gulf War,
    but Mixed Results in Bosnia (GAO/NSIAD-97-136, May 13, 1997); and
    three classified reports on the defense of Korea, biological agent
    defense, and protection of critical ports and airfields.

          ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY
          OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE
          OVERSIGHT
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.5

    In September 1996, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the
    Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight to
    (1) investigate what information concerning Khamisiyah and similar
    chemical warfare sites in Iraq was available to DOD prior to the
    destruction of the Khamisiyah facility by U.S.  forces, (2) ascertain
    what DOD did with that information, and (3) determine whether any
    procedure for handling such information should be changed.

    Because of the large number of documents relevant to the examination,
    DOD awarded a $2.5 million contract to the MITRE Corporation in
    December 1996 to organize and analyze the documents and produce an
    independent study.  The purpose of the study was to determine what
    information concerning Iraqi chemical warfare weapons, doctrine,
    units, sites, intentions, uses, and events was known or not known
    within DOD and how the information was used or not used during the
    period from the Iraq invasion of Kuwait to the withdrawal of all
    forces from Iraq and Kuwait.

    MITRE staff are reviewing millions of documents at all security
    classifications from several government sources, including the
    Defense Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; Departments of
    State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; CIA; DOD's Gulf War
    Declassification Project; and CENTCOM.  In addition, MITRE conducted
    about 30 interviews with individuals from DOD and the national
    security and intelligence communities to obtain information.  MITRE's
    final report will be classified.  A final report will be provided to
    the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight,
    who will then provide it and his own findings and recommendations to
    the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

          ARMY INSPECTOR GENERAL
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.6

    In September 1996, the Secretary of the Army directed the Army
    Inspector General to determine the facts surrounding the demolition
    of ammunition at Khamisiyah, Iraq in March 1991 by U.S.  Army forces.
    The Inspector General's inquiry was to focus on whether (1) the
    presence of chemical munitions was detected at the time the
    ammunition was destroyed, (2) such information was reported, and to
    what level, and (3) appropriate force protection measures were taken
    during demolition operations.

    In October 1996, the Secretary of the Army issued a supplemental
    directive to the Army Inspector General.  The Inspector General was
    directed to determine (1) the weapons that were destroyed; (2) the
    personnel who participated in the destruction; (3) the potential
    exposure of those personnel to chemical agents; (4) other personnel
    who may have been exposed to chemical agents due to the possible
    chemical agent release, considering applicable weather patterns at
    the time; (5) any other significant events pertaining to this
    incident; and (6) whether similar operations were conducted
    elsewhere.

    For the inquiry, a team of four Army Inspector General officers
    gathered information and documents from the Gulf War Declassification
    Project (on intelligence, health policy, and operations); the
    Examination and Analysis Directorate, Office of the Special Assistant
    for Gulf War Illnesseses; various Army commands and agencies; CIA;
    the Defense Intelligence Agency; and individual soldiers, veterans,
    and civilians.  The team collected over 2,000 documents, 300
    photographs, 4 video tapes, and 1 audio tape.  In addition, the team
    conducted approximately 700 interviews with active duty
    servicemembers, veterans, retirees, and civilians.  About one-half of
    the interviews were sworn and recorded.  The remainder were
    documented with memoranda for the record.

    The Army Inspector General team has completed the inquiry and is
    currently in the final stages of writing the report, analyzing and
    cross-referencing available data, and coordinating possible results
    and conclusions with the appropriate agencies and individuals.  It is
    anticipated that a report will be approved for release in October
    1997.

          CIA INSPECTOR GENERAL
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.7

    In October 1996, the Director of Central Intelligence requested that
    the CIA Inspector General assess the allegations made by two former
    CIA employees concerning the handling of information about the
    possible exposure of U.S.  forces to chemical weapons during the
    Persian Gulf War.  The allegations were that (1) the CIA had hidden,
    and continues to hide, evidence of the exposure of U.S.  forces to
    chemical weapons during the Gulf War; (2) CIA officials tried to
    hinder the former employees' inquiry about this exposure; (3) CIA
    employees avoided reviewing the evidence uncovered concerning the
    exposure; and (4) the careers of the two former employees were
    effectively destroyed because of their insistence on pursuing an
    inquiry about the exposure of U.S.  forces to chemical weapons during
    the Gulf War.  The allegation that CIA hid information related to
    Gulf War Illnesseses was based on three specific concerns:  (1) that
    the Agency was not releasing relevant documents in a timely fashion,
    (2) that Agency managers had directed the removal of documents from
    an Internet website on Gulf War illnesseses run by DOD, and (3) that
    the Agency had not provided one of the former employees with
    documents requested under the Freedom of Information Act.

    In addition, in February 1997, the President asked the Presidential
    Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesseses to address
    several questions regarding the Khamisiyah ammunition storage depot.
    As a result of the President's directive to the Committee to take
    full account of evidence disclosed by the CIA Inspector General's
    ongoing review, a CIA Inspector General assessment team specifically
    focused on CIA's handling of information related to Khamisiyah in
    order to contribute to resolution of the President's questions.

    A nine-person assessment team has reviewed over 6,000 documents and
    interviewed over 175 individuals.  As of September 1, 1997, two draft
    reports, one concerning the allegations of the two former employees
    and another on the handling of information related to Khamisiyah, had
    been distributed to CIA components so that they may provide comments.
    Final reports are expected to be issued by October 31, 1997.

          DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
          INTELLIGENCE PERSIAN GULF
          WAR ILLNESSESES TASK FORCE
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.8

    The Task Force, established in February 1997 by the Acting Director
    of Central Intelligence, was chartered to provide intelligence
    support to the various U.S.  government entities that are examining
    Gulf War illnesseses.  The Task Force staff of 50 personnel are from
    the intelligence community -- the CIA, the Defense Intelligence
    Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Imagery and
    Mapping Agency, and DOD's Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf
    War Illnesseses.  As the Task Force completed some of its initial
    efforts, many intelligence community personnel returned to their
    respective components; however, they continue to be principal points
    of contact to the Task Force for specific issues.  The Task Force is
    now composed of personnel from CIA, the National Imagery and Mapping
    Agency, and the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War
    Illnesseses.  Responsibilities of the Task Force include (1)
    reviewing previous search criteria and conducting additional searches
    as required; (2) managing and accelerating current and ongoing
    document declassification efforts; (3) ensuring that DOD and others
    can retrieve related classified information quickly; (4) supporting
    ongoing CIA modeling efforts, (5) providing analyses of relevant
    information; and (6) developing a comprehensive strategy for
    communications with DOD, the National Security Council, the
    Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesseses,
    appropriate congressional committees, the media, and the public.

    According to the Special Assistant to the Director of Central
    Intelligence for Persian Gulf War Illnesseses Issues, to meet its
    responsibilities, the Task Force has reviewed previous search
    criteria on Gulf War illnesseses, conducted broader searches, and
    ensured that classified material was passed to DOD and others.  The
    broader approach was designed, in part, to discover any evidence
    about the potential exposure of U.S.  forces to chemical weapons and
    other hazards.  The Task Force's search efforts captured over one
    million documents.  The Task Force used an analytical team to prepare
    three public papers:  Khamisiyah:  A Historical Perspective on
    Related Intelligence, April 1997;" Update on Potential Mustard Agent
    Release at Ukhaydir Ammunition Storage Depot, September 1997;
    Modeling the Chemical Warfare Agent Release at the Khamisiyah Pit,
    September 1997.

    In its April 1997 paper, the Task Force focused on determining what
    the intelligence community knew about Iraqi storage of chemical
    weapons, particularly the storage of such weapons at the Khamisiyah
    ammunition site.  Questions pursued included (1) what and when did
    the intelligence community know about the possibility of chemical
    weapons at this site and (2) what did the intelligence community, and
    when, do internally and externally, with the information collected
    and analyzed.  Its paper provides details about the intelligence
    community's knowledge of Khamisiyah before, during, and after the
    war.  Key issues include problems with multiple databases; limited
    sharing of sensitive, but vital, information; and incomplete searches
    of files while preparing lists of known or suspected chemical warfare
    facilities.  The Task Force is also conducting analyses related to
    potential causes of Gulf War illnesseses, including biological,
    chemical, radiological, environmental factors, and foreign-reported
    illnesseses.

    The Task Force has been working with DOD to produce the
    plume-modeling results.  The Task Force was expected to complete its
    work by April 1997; however, as of August 31, 1997, its work was
    still ongoing.

          DOD INSPECTOR GENERAL
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.9

    In its efforts to identify the causes of a number of illnesseses
    being suffered by Gulf War veterans, the Office of the Special
    Assistant for Gulf War Illnesseses learned that not all of the pages
    of the NBC Desk Log maintained in CENTCOM's J-3 Operations Center
    during the war could be found.  The Office has located 37 pages of
    the log, covering 26 nonconsecutive days of operations from January
    17 to March 12, 1991.  DOD estimated that approximately 200 pages of
    the log could be expected to exist.  Thus, DOD has paper copies of
    only a small portion (less than 20 percent) of the pages of the
    Central Command NBC Desk Log that could have been generated during
    the Gulf War.

    On March 3, 1997, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the DOD
    Inspector General to take over this inquiry and carry it to
    conclusion.  Specifically, the Deputy Secretary directed the
    Inspector General's office to follow all leads that could be
    developed on the location of the original log or copies, in either
    electronic or hard copy versions, and gather all originals and copies
    that can be located.  If a full copy of the log cannot be located,
    the Inspector General is to explain why.

    The Defense Criminal Investigative Service of DOD's Inspector
    General's office is currently examining this issue.  The examination
    is being directed by headquarters staff, and the examination team
    consists of senior criminal investigators supported by a staff of
    auditors and investigative support personnel.  The team's efforts
    generally included collecting and analyzing the investigative record
    created by the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War
    Illnesseses, including numerous transcribed interviews with watch
    officers assigned to man the headquarters NBC Desk during the war;
    interviews of other persons who may have had access to the log after
    the war; and many telephone and written requests for information from
    sources throughout DOD.  The team also conducted over 185 interviews
    with available witnesses who were involved in the creation of the
    CENTCOM NBC Desk Log in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and those in possession
    of the log at Central Command in Tampa, Florida, after the conclusion
    of the Gulf War.  The team also reviewed over 700,000 pages of
    documents at the National Archives, 22,000 pages at CENTCOM, and over
    100 computer disks.

    This effort was designated as the Defense Criminal Investigative
    Service's top priority and was to be completed as quickly as possible
    without sacrificing the thoroughness of the examination.

       EXAMINATIONS CONDUCTED BY
       VETERANS ORGANIZATIONS
    --------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2

    We identified six veterans organizations that were reviewing issues
    relating to the exposure of U.S.  military personnel to chemical
    agents or gaps in CENTCOM's NBC Desk Log.  Five groups were reviewing
    both issues.  While the federal organizations have performed
    extensive studies or inquires, the veterans organizations for the
    most part are collecting and analyzing information, making Freedom of
    Information Act requests, and collecting media information in their
    role of keeping veterans informed of pertinent developments.

          NATIONAL GULF WAR RESOURCE
          CENTER, INC.
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.1

    In 1995, the National Gulf War Resource Center, a nonprofit
    organization located in Washington, D.C., was founded to support the
    efforts of 24 grass roots Gulf War veterans organizations in the
    United States and Great Britain working to assist veterans affected
    by the war.  The Center serves as a clearinghouse receiving
    information from veterans; the Center's member and veteran service
    organizations; government agencies; and the media.  It then
    disseminates the information to member organizations and interested
    groups to assist them in their efforts to assist veterans.

    Starting in 1995, the Center began researching and documenting
    chemical warfare agent detection, exposure, and injury incidents
    during the Gulf War as well as the issue of the missing, misplaced,
    or destroyed chemical logs.  The Center's objectives are to locate,
    obtain, and review documents, such as chemical logs, relevant to the
    exposure of U.S.  service personnel to chemical warfare agents.  This
    work was intended to provide Gulf War veterans with evidence of
    chemical agent exposure, if any, so that they could obtain
    appropriate health care and compensation and offer suggestions on how
    to improve chemical warfare agent detection and protection.

    To achieve these objectives, the Center receives eyewitness accounts
    from veterans to determine which units may have been exposed to
    chemical warfare agents and then sends requests for relevant
    documentation under the Freedom of Information Act to the appropriate
    commands and units.  In addition, the Center reviews other
    documentation obtained from Congress, the media, DOD, and other
    sources to obtain additional information about potential exposures
    and the location of relevant corroborating documentation.

    According to a representative of the Center, its work has resulted in
    the public release of previously classified information that
    contradicted information previously released by DOD.  The
    representative also said that, as a result of the Center's work, (1)
    DOD confirmed that Gulf War personnel were potentially exposed to
    chemical warfare agents, (2) DOD and the Department of Veterans'
    Affairs have begun to offer some limited medical screening for
    potential toxic exposures experienced during the Gulf War, and (3)
    DOD and the Department of Veterans' Affairs have launched new medical
    studies following up on private sector studies showing a causal link
    between chemical exposures and illnesseses among Gulf War veterans.
    The Center's examination is an ongoing effort with no established
    completion date.

          OPERATION DESERT
          SHIELD/DESERT STORM
          ASSOCIATION
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.2

    The Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm Association, located in
    Odessa, Texas, was formed in November 1990 to collect and archive any
    and all information related to the Gulf War, including the exposure
    of service personnel to chemical warfare agents and the circumstances
    surrounding gaps in the CENTCOM NBC Desk Log.  The Association was
    formed to attempt to prevent a recurrence of the problems that
    occurred during the Vietnam War with the government's handling of
    exposures of military personnel to Agent Orange.  The founding
    members believed that the major problem with the Agent Orange
    situation was that no entity outside the government kept any
    documentation during the Vietnam War.

    The Association's mission is accomplished through obtaining
    government and private documents from worldwide sources, identifying
    and collecting newspaper and magazine articles, and recording
    television and radio presentations related to the Gulf War.  The
    Association plans to continue its examination into all Gulf War
    issues including the use of, and exposure to chemical and biological
    weapons in the Persian Gulf and gaps in CENTCOM's NBC Desk Log.
    Negotiations are underway to build a permanent archival, research,
    and museum facility to provide information resources on all aspects
    of the Persian Gulf War to anyone requesting such information.

    In 1991, from its contacts with sick veterans, the Association
    determined that there were five areas of concern affecting the health
    of service personnel:  human changes to the normal environment in the
    Gulf, chemical and biological weapons exposure, radiation exposure,
    parasitic infections, and the use of examinational drugs and
    vaccines.  Since 1992, Association representatives have testified at
    U.S.  and overseas meetings and hearings pertaining to the Gulf War
    illnesseses.  Also, in January 1992, the Association co-sponsored the
    first "mystery illnesses" conference.

          THE VETCENTER
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.3

    In February 1994, the VetCenter located in Patchogue, New York, was
    formed to determine why many Gulf War veterans became ill after the
    war.  More specifically, the VetCenter is examining the possible
    exposure of U.S.  personnel to chemical warfare agents including
    identifying incidents where personnel were exposed and disclosing
    this information to the public.

    With respect to CENTCOM's NBC Desk Log, the VetCenter has been
    examining the chain of custody and instances of noncompliance with
    incident recording procedures.  This is being accomplished through
    the correlation of units, locations, and the extent of illnesseses
    experienced by veterans in various areas.  Information is collected
    primarily from veterans who served in the Gulf War through the use of
    surveys posted on the VetCenter's Internet site and through mailings.
    This information is subsequently reviewed and followed up on through
    telephone calls, electronic mail, and letters for validation.
    Veterans are asked to back up their statements by submitting photos
    and other documentation.  This information is made available to
    organizations such as congressional committees and individuals who
    are examining the issue.  This work is an ongoing effort with no
    established completion date.

          THE NORTHWEST VETERANS FOR
          PEACE
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.4

    The Northwest Veterans for Peace, located in Portland, Oregon, began
    helping Gulf War veterans and their families obtain medical care
    because the organization believed that the government was not
    promptly attending to veterans returning to the United States.  In
    1993, as a result of a congressional request, the organization began
    testing saliva and urine of veterans and their families from an
    Oregon National Guard unit that deployed to the Gulf.  In addition,
    the organization asked veterans and their families to complete a
    questionnaire covering their illnesseses and their jobs, locations,
    and time periods in the Gulf.  The questionnaire also asked about any
    incident occurring in the Gulf that they believed was either a
    chemical or biological incident.  In the summer of 1997, the
    organization sent follow-up questionnaires to the veterans to
    identify any changes in their health or the health of their families.
    The organization is still receiving questionnaire responses from the
    veterans.  The organization has not established a completion date for
    this effort.

          DESERT STORM JUSTICE
          FOUNDATION
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.5

    In February 1994, the Desert Storm Justice Foundation, located in
    Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, was created as a nonprofit organization to
    provide support to sick veterans and their families.  The Foundation
    also serves as a clearinghouse for information from both governments
    and private sources about the possible exposure of U.S.  personnel to
    nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare agents during the war,
    widely disseminating the information to interested groups and
    individuals.  The Foundation's efforts also include gathering
    information on gaps in CENTCOM's NBC Desk Log.  This is an ongoing
    examination with no established completion date.

          GULFWATCH
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.6

    In March 1991, GulfWatch, located in Hannibal, Missouri, was created
    to provide information and documentation to the public regarding what
    happened before, during, and after the war on a variety of topics,
    including the possible exposure to U.S.  personnel to nuclear,
    biological, and chemical warfare agents and gaps in CENTCOM's NBC
    Desk Log.  The organization received information from sources in
    intelligence agencies, from interviews with individuals who served in
    the war, radio call-in programs, and filing requests for documents
    under the Freedom of Information Act.  The organization disseminates
    the information obtained to researchers and the media with the
    objective of providing information on what actually happened during
    the Gulf War.  The overall goal of the organization is to obtain
    medical care for sick Gulf War veterans and to prevent a recurrence
    of such problems.  The investigative efforts of GulfWatch are ongoing
    with no established completion date.

    MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
    ========================================================== Appendix II

       NATIONAL SECURITY AND
       INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
       WASHINGTON, D.C.
    -------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1

    Carol R.  Schuster
    Donald L.  Patton
    Rodney E.  Ragan
    William J.  Rigazio
    Raymond G.  Bickert
    Karen S.  Blum
    Sharon E.  Sweeney

       NORFOLK REGIONAL OFFICE
    -------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2

    Steve J.  Fox
    William L.  Mathers

    *** End of document. ***