Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy

Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National
Policy and Strategy (Chapter Report, 09/26/97, GAO/NSIAD-97-254).

Under the sponsorship of the National Security Council, various
interagency groups have been formed to coordinate the efforts of the
more than 40 federal agencies that combat terrorism. The intelligence
community has its own committee on terrorism. Key federal efforts to
prevent and deter terrorist acts include gathering and sharing
intelligence information on terrorist threats and keeping foreign
terrorists and materials from entering the United States. Federal
efforts to combat terrorist acts and to manage the consequences of these
incidents include designating lead agencies for crisis response,
establishing interagency quick-reaction support teams, creating special
operational teams or units, developing contingency plans, and conducting
interagency training and exercises. For both crisis management and
consequence management, federal efforts include special teams and units
to deal with nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Federal agencies
are also assessing the capabilities of state and local jurisdictions to
respond immediately to and manage the consequences of domestic terrorist
incidents involving weapons of mass destruction and provide them
training and assistance.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

REPORTNUM: NSIAD-97-254
TITLE: Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement
National Policy and Strategy
DATE: 09/26/97
SUBJECT: Interagency relations
Terrorism
National defense operations
Federal intelligence agencies
Bombs
International cooperation
Americans abroad
Crime prevention
Law enforcement information systems
IDENTIFIER: Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
FBI Domestic Emergency Support Team
Dept. of State Foreign Emergency Support Team
Dept. of State Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program
Dept. of State TIPOFF Program
Saudi Arabia
New York (NY)
Oklahoma City (OK)

Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National
Policy and Strategy (Chapter Report, 09/26/97, GAO/NSIAD-97-254).

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National
Policy and Strategy (Chapter Report, 09/26/97, GAO/NSIAD-97-254).

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

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ns99135b A Report to Congressional Requesters

May 1999 COMBATING TERRORISM

Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism Operations

National Security and International Affairs Division Lett er

B-282474 Letter May 13, 1999 The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of
Representatives

The Honorable Christopher Shays Chairman, Subcommittee on National
Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations Committee
on Government Reform House of Representatives

Terrorist attacks against U. S. personnel and interests
domestically and abroad highlight the need for effective U. S.
efforts to combat terrorism. As requested, we prepared this
unclassified summary of our February 1999 classified report to you
on interagency counterterrorist operations. Specifically, we
examined how agencies worked together in counterterrorist
operations and special events; strengths and weaknesses

of international and domestic counterterrorist exercises; and
agency and interagency processes to capture and share lessons
learned.

Results in Brief In the last 3 years, federal agencies have
conducted several successful interagency operations overseas,
including some in which suspected terrorists have been returned to
the United States to stand trial. In addition, federal agencies
have deployed personnel and equipment to prepare for many special
events such as the Atlanta Olympic Games. However, federal
agencies have not completed interagency guidance and resolved
command and control issues. Proposed interagency Domestic
Guidelines have not been completed, nor coordinated with all
federal agencies with domestic counterterrorism roles. For
example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has not
coordinated the proposed Domestic Guidelines with the Department
of the Treasury even though it could have a significant role in

an actual terrorist incident. Furthermore, approval of proposed
interagency International Guidelines has been delayed because the
Department of State, the Department of Justice, and the FBI have
not reached agreement on the level of State participation in
highly sensitive missions to arrest suspected terrorists overseas.
In addition, some interagency and

intergovernmental command and control issues regarding domestic
counterterrorist operations have not been fully resolved.

To improve their preparedness to respond to terrorist incidents,
federal agencies have conducted over 200 exercises, of which about
half included three or more federal agencies and about one third
included state and local participants. However, agencies have not
fully achieved the interagency counterterrorist exercise program
directed in a June 1995 Presidential Directive because an
interagency Exercise Subgroup has not prepared and

submitted, and senior agency officials have not approved, an
interagency program. As a result, some complex transfers of
command and control between agencies have not been exercised.
International counterterrorism exercises, sponsored for many years
by the Department of Defense (DOD), are relatively comprehensive
in that they include many federal agencies and test tactical units
along with State Department's leadership role and

DOD's command and control. In contrast, domestic exercises
sponsored by the FBI and the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA)-- the lead federal agencies for domestic operations are not
as comprehensive. The FBI exercise program focuses on its regional
and field offices' tactical capabilities to respond and generally
has not included the Bureau's full interagency leadership role
that is expected to be critical during a domestic

terrorist incident. Recently, the FBI has made significant
progress and taken steps to enhance its program in this regard.
The FEMA counterterrorism exercise program consists of tabletop
exercises and does not include field exercises that would deploy
personnel and equipment,

and practice roles and responsibilities in realistic settings.
DOD, the Department of Energy (DOE), and FEMA have requirements
and processes in place to capture lessons learned from
counterterrorist operations and exercises. These agencies,
however, did not capture lessons learned for all the exercises
they led or all the field exercises they

participated in. Other federal agencies had less rigorous
requirements and processes for capturing lessons learned. There is
also no requirement or process to capture lessons learned at the
interagency level. Establishing a process to record and share the
lessons learned of counterterrorism operations and exercises would
be beneficial and could improve future operations.

In our classified report, we made several recommendations to
enhance interagency guidance, command and control, exercises, and
processes to capture and share lessons learned.

Background The U. S. policy and strategy on combating terrorism
have been evolving since the 1970s and are articulated in
Presidential Directives and

implementing guidance. These guidance documents divide activities
to combat terrorism into three elements: preventing and deterring
terrorism; responding to a terrorist crisis, and managing the
consequences after a terrorist attack. One of the highest
priorities in the federal government is to prevent and prepare for
terrorist attacks that use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 1
Crisis management includes efforts to stop a terrorist

attack, arrest terrorists, and gather evidence for criminal
prosecution. Consequence management includes efforts to provide
medical treatment and emergency services, evacuate people from
dangerous areas, and

restore government services. When terrorist attacks occur without
adequate threat warning, crisis response and consequence
management will be concurrent activities.

U. S. Policy, Lead Agencies, U. S. policy to combat terrorism was
formalized in 1986 with the issuance of and Guidance

National Security Decision Directive 207, which primarily focused
on terrorist incidents overseas. After the bombing of a federal
building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, the President issued
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 in June 1995, which
enumerated responsibilities for

federal agencies in combating terrorism, including domestic
incidents. In May 1998, the President issued PDD 62 that
reaffirmed PDD 39 and further articulated responsibilities for
specific agencies. PDD 62 also established a

National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and
Counterterrorism, within the National Security Council, to
coordinate agencies' programs. These directives, and the
guidelines and contingency

plans that implement them, call for robust, tailored and rapidly
deployable interagency teams to conduct well- coordinated and
highly integrated operations. PDDs 39 and 62 assigned or
reaffirmed lead and supporting roles to various federal agencies
and established interagency support teams. The State Department is
the lead agency for international terrorist incidents. An

interagency Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) was established
to provide advice and support to U. S. ambassadors, Washington
decisionmakers, and host governments. Similarly, the FBI is the
lead federal agency

1 For the purpose of this report, WMD are defined as nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons or agents. Within the federal
government, there is disagreement as to the precise definition,
especially whether large conventional explosives should be
included.

for domestic crisis response. An interagency Domestic Emergency
Support Team (DEST) was established to provide advice and support
to FBI onscene commanders. Both the FEST and DEST consist of
rapidly deployable interagency teams tailored to the specific
terrorist incident. For example, experts from DOD, DOE, the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) or the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) might be part of the

teams if the incident involved WMD. The State Department and the
FBI determine the composition of the FEST and DEST, respectively.
The PDDs also affirmed FEMA as the lead agency for coordinating
consequence management in domestic incidents. Other agencies have
important support roles in combating terrorism. For example, DOD
could provide significant support to other agencies, both for
international incidents and for domestic incidents involving WMD.
DOE provides support and technical expertise

related to nuclear devices and radiological events. EPA provides
expertise and support in incidents involving certain hazardous
chemicals. The U. S. Secret Service designs and implements
operational security at designated special events to provide
protection against terrorist attacks. 2

Lead federal agencies drafted interagency guidance to provide
operational details for implementing PDD 39. The State Department,
as the lead federal agency for international incidents, drafted
Coordinating Subgroup Guidelines for the Mobilization, Deployment,
and Employment of U. S. Government Elements in Response to an
Overseas Terrorist Incident (also known as the International
Guidelines). The International Guidelines outline procedures for
deploying the FEST and otherwise coordinating

federal operations overseas. The FBI, as lead federal agency for
domestic crisis response, drafted Guidelines for the Mobilization,
Deployment, and Employment of U. S. Government Agencies in
Response to a Domestic Terrorist Threat or Incidence in Accordance
With Presidential Decision Directive 39 (also known as the
Domestic Guidelines) and the United

States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of
Operations Plan (also known as the CONPLAN). The Domestic
Guidelines describe specific procedures and responsibilities of
deploying the DEST, particularly in WMD incidents, while the
CONPLAN provides overall guidance to federal, state, and local
officials on how the federal government is structured to respond
to a terrorist threat or incident in the United States. FEMA, the
lead federal agency for domestic consequence management,
coordinated and completed an interagency annex to the Federal
Response

2 For more detailed information on interagency coordination mechanisms and the roles and responsibilities of lead and supporting federal agencies, see our report entitled Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy (

GAO/NSIAD-97-254
, Sept. 26, 1997).
2 For more detailed information on interagency coordination
mechanisms and the roles and responsibilities of lead and
supporting federal agencies, see our report entitled Combating
Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy
and Strategy ( GAO/NSIAD-97-254 , Sept. 26, 1997).

Plan that discusses how the federal government would assist state
and local authorities in managing the consequences of a terrorist
attack in the United States. Support agencies developed their own
guidance to be used to support an interagency terrorism response.
For example, DOD developed a detailed contingency plan to guide
its actions in deploying and responding to a terrorist incident
and HHS developed a plan to deal with

the health and medical consequences of terrorist attacks. Issues
Identified Through

In 1996, a congressional committee held hearings to provide
oversight of Congressional Oversight counterterrorism programs,
highlighting interagency operational and

and Legislation coordination challenges and issues. In 1996, the
Nunn- Lugar hearings focused on the preparedness of the federal
government to conduct counterterrorist operations at the agency,
interagency, and

intergovernmental levels (i. e., with state and local
governments). 3 Some of the issues highlighted in the hearings
were as follows: Domestic interagency counterterrorism exercises
should be more

comprehensive and held more often and should go beyond tabletop
exercises to field exercises where personnel and equipment rapidly
deploy to a location and practice their activities. The FBI and
FEMA needed to exercise their operations together when

crisis response and consequence management was concurrent.
Domestic interagency counterterrorism exercises should include the

full array of federal, state, and local agencies. Individual
agencies should capture lessons learned from counterterrorism
exercises, disseminate such lessons both internally and
externally, and track corrective actions.

There should be an interagency process to capture lessons learned
and track corrective actions.

Following the Nunn- Lugar hearings, Congress passed the Defense
Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (commonly known as
the NunnLugar- Domenici Act). 4 The act designated DOD as the lead
agency to enhance domestic preparedness for WMD terrorism by
providing federal, 3 These hearings were sponsored by Senators
Nunn and Lugar of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs in March 1996. See
Senate Hearing 104- 422 part III. 4 See title XIV of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (P. L. 104- 201,
Sept. 23, 1996).

state, and local emergency response personnel with, among other
things, training and advice. The legislation led to the creation
of the Nunn- LugarDomenici Domestic Preparedness Program, which
was intended to be an interagency and intergovernmental effort
among key agencies with responsibilities for crisis and
consequence management in the event of a

terrorist incident. We reported separately on the implementation
of this program. 5 Agencies Operate

We found that federal agencies worked together and generally
coordinated Together But Need to

their counterterrorist activities. For example, federal agencies
carried out several overseas operations and prepared for domestic
special events. Resolve Key Issues However, interagency guidance
for coordinating federal operations both overseas and domestically
has not been approved or fully coordinated. In addition, several
command and control issues related to domestic operations have not
been resolved.

Agencies Successfully In the 3 years following PDD 39, federal
agencies successfully participated

Performed Operations and in many counterterrorist activities. In
actual operations and special events,

Prepared for Special Events agencies generally coordinated their
activities. For example, we examined

several overseas counterterrorist operations and found that
agencies generally followed the draft interagency International
Guidelines. DOD, the FBI, and the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) performed their respective roles in military planning, law
enforcement, and intelligence gathering under the oversight of the
State Department (e. g., the ambassador). Minor interagency
tensions or conflicts during these operations were resolved

and did not appear to have posed risk to the missions. Examples of
these overseas operations include several overseas arrests to
bring suspected terrorists back to the United States for trial
outside of normal extradition channels. Interagency teams
consisting of the FBI, the State Department, DOD, and CIA
conducted these missions. These arrests included those of

Ayyad Najim in July 1995, Wahli Khan in December 1995, Tsutomo
Shirasaki in September 1996, Matwan Al- Safadi in November 1996,
Mir Aimal Kansi in June 1997, and Mohamed Said Rasheed in June
1998. 6

5 See Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help
Prioritize and Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr.
9, 1998) and Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve
Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-
3, Nov. 12, 1998).

6 Other successful overseas arrests just outside our scope (June
1995 to June 1998) included those of Ramzi Yousef in February 1995
and Mohamed Sadeck Odeh and Mohamed Rasheed Daoud Al Owhali in
August 1998.

Key agencies have also prepared for and deployed personnel in
advance to many special events. Special events are high visibility
events in which federal agencies initiate contingency measures.
For recent major special events, such as the 50 th anniversary of
the United Nations in 1995, the Atlanta Olympic Games in 1996, and
the Presidential Inauguration in 1997,

federal agencies prepared contingency plans for a possible
terrorist attack and provided protection to the President and
other dignitaries. For example, federal agencies sending advance
or contingency teams to the Atlanta Olympics included Secret
Service, the FBI, FEMA, DOD, DOE, HHS, EPA, CIA, the State
Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the Bureau of Alcohol
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), the U. S. Customs Service,

the Internal Revenue Service, and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC). Federal agencies also exercised their personnel
together in advance of these events against various
counterterrorism scenarios. For example, before the Atlanta
Olympics, federal agencies conducted eight exercises with
scenarios specific to the games. Our review of these special
events indicated that most agencies involved gained valuable
experience in coordinating their activities. Agency officials
cited special events as successful efforts to integrate personnel
and assets across federal agencies. In preparing for such events,
federal agencies also worked closely with state and local agencies
and nongovernmental organizations. These operations and special
events enhanced federal agencies' abilities to coordinate and
integrate their activities.

Interagency Guidance Not With the exception of FEMA, lead federal
agencies have not completed

Approved or Fully interagency guidance on counterterrorist
operations more than 3 years

Coordinated after PDD 39 directed them to do so. The FBI, which
drafted the Domestic Guidelines and CONPLAN, coordinated drafts of
these documents with five other federal agencies (FEMA, DOD, DOE,
HHS, and EPA) that could have

major operational roles in a domestic terrorist incident. These
federal agencies have still not given their final approval to
either document. Further, the FBI has not coordinated the Domestic
Guidelines or the CONPLAN with other federal agencies that would
have counterterrorist roles in certain circumstances, such as
Treasury Department, the NRC, and

the Departments of Transportation and Agriculture. Of the agencies
omitted, the Treasury Department is the most significant, due to
its special capabilities that have been called upon and could be
needed in a variety of possible terrorist incidents. For example,
the Secret Service protects the President and other designated
protectees from terrorist attacks and plays

a key counterterrorist security role at major special events. The
U. S. Customs Service provides aircraft at special events to
detect and monitor aircraft activity and to perform interception
if necessary. ATF supports FBI investigations of terrorist crimes
involving explosives. In addition, the Treasury Department has
numerous field personnel who could support FBI crisis management
efforts. The NRC would provide expertise and technical support in
a terrorist incident involving facilities, materials, and
activities

that it licenses (e. g., nuclear power plants). The Department of
Transportation includes the Federal Aviation Administration, which
has jurisdiction over aircraft hijackings in certain
circumstances, and the Coast Guard, which has jurisdiction over
hazardous materials (e. g., WMD) in U. S. waterways. The
Department of Agriculture is responsible for providing emergency
food assistance. Department of Agriculture officials said they
would monitor and ensure the safety of the food supply where a WMD
agent is released, potentially contaminating crops or livestock or
food processing facilities.

FBI officials said that they coordinated the Domestic Guidelines
and CONPLAN with the five other agencies (FEMA, DOD, DOE, HHS and
EPA) because those agencies were cited most prominently in PDD 39.
However,

PDD 39 also cited Treasury as having an important role in
counterterrorism. These officials told us that they plan to
coordinate the Domestic Guidelines and CONPLAN with other agencies
once the FBI and the five other agencies agree on the documents.
FBI officials did not have an estimate on when the five agencies
would approve either document or when these documents would be
coordinated with other appropriate agencies. We believe that the
FBI, as lead federal agency for crisis management in domestic
terrorist incidents, would better serve that role by

fully coordinating both documents with all federal agencies that
have counterterrorist roles.

The International Guidelines have also not been approved as final.
These guidelines, which were drafted by the State Department and
provide procedures for overseas incidents and operations, had not
been approved because of differences among agencies about overseas
arrests. Specifically, the Departments of State and Justice have
not reached agreement on specific operational issues related to
these missions. Since our classified report was issued, a State
Department official told us the Department

deleted procedures for these arrests from the International
Guidelines to expedite their approval, but the different views on
operational matters continue. He stated that the guidelines are in
the final coordination stage.

Command and Control The FBI and the Secret Service were not always
coordinating their

Issues Require Resolution command and control structures or
contingency plans with each other in the period we reviewed. FBI
and Secret Service officials acknowledged

that the two agencies had not worked well together, and cited
efforts underway to improve coordination and cooperation between
the two agencies for special events. Specifically, the Directors
of the FBI and Secret Service mutually agreed to a command and
control plan and signed the agreement in October 1998. This
agreement has been submitted to the Attorney General and the
Secretary of the Treasury for final approval. The two agencies
also stated that they recently had conducted a joint tabletop
exercise to test their command and control relationship.

DOD needs to clarify its internal command and control structure
for domestic operations. Although not a lead federal agency, DOD
could have a major supporting role in any federal response to
terrorist incidents in the United States, particularly those
involving WMD. In reviewing DOD's participation in domestic
support operations, special events, and exercises, we found
several command and control issues where guidance was either
confusing or conflicting. To resolve these issues, DOD is
undertaking a

high- level review of its support to civilian authorities,
generally under the rubric of homeland defense. The National
Defense Panel recommended that DOD emphasize homeland defense
more, and use military assets to assist law enforcement agencies
in combating terrorism, and incorporate

its forces into all levels of government to manage the
consequences of a WMD- type attack. 7 The Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff has chartered a study called UCP 21, which is
reviewing these issues and may recommend changes to the Unified
Command Plan the overall command

structure for military forces. 8 There are also unresolved issues
of intergovernmental command and control (i. e., whether the
federal, state, or local government is in charge) in certain
circumstances. For consequence management, federal guidance the
Federal Response Plan and its Terrorism Incident Annex indicates 7
The National Defense Panel was an independent nonpartisan group of
private sector experts, established by Congress to review the
national security strategy. The panel issued a report,

Transforming Defense, National Security in the 21st Century, in
December 1997. 8 By statute (10 U. S. C. 161), the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, conducts a biennial review of the Unified Command
Plan and recommends revisions as appropriate. For more information
on this process, see Unified Command Plan: Atlantic and Southern
Command Participation in 1995 Review

(GAO/NSIAD-97-41BR, Dec. 5, 1996).

that state and local authorities are in overall charge of recovery
efforts and that the federal government is in a support role. For
crisis management, the overall leadership of the response at the
incident site is not as clear. The FBI has recently taken some
steps to work with state and local governments to better define
their respective lead and support roles in managing a terrorist
crisis.

Strengths and PDD 39 required key federal agencies to ensure that
their counterterrorist Weaknesses in

capabilities were well exercised. We found that federal agencies
had conducted a number of counterterrorist exercises following PDD
39. Counterterrorist

However, while agencies were exercising together, there was no
formal Exercises interagency program as envisioned in PDD 39. We
also found that international crisis management exercises were
more comprehensive than domestic crisis exercises, though neither
included scenarios of no- warning terrorist attacks. Consequence
management exercises sponsored by FEMA

were not comprehensive, but other federal agencies were making
progress exercising their capabilities. Agencies Conducted Many

Federal agencies conducted 201 exercises to improve their
preparedness Exercises Since PDD 39

for counterterrorist operations in the past 3 years. In general,
exercises test and validate policies and procedures, test the
effectiveness of response capabilities, and increase the
confidence and skill level of personnel. In addition, exercises
identify strengths and weaknesses before they arise in an actual
incident. Exercises further allow agencies to apply operational
lessons learned from past exercises and actual deployments. In
counterterrorism, where federal operations are inherently
interagency matters, exercises also allow the various departments'
and agencies' personnel to become familiar with each others'
missions and procedures and learn to coordinate and operate
together. Interagency exercises can help identify aspects of
cooperation that work well and problems and

conflicts that require interagency resolution. Table 1 shows the
number of federal counterterrorism exercises that different
agencies participated in and led.

Table 1: Agency Participation and Leadership in Federal
Counterterrorism Exercises in the 3 Years Following PDD 39 (June
1995 to June 1998) Total exercises Agency

Participated in Led

DOD 143 97 FBI 99 24 FEMA 76 16 HHS 68 3 Secret Service 65 46 EPA
47 1 DOE 36 5 State 24 1 CIA 21 0 Department of Veterans Affairs
12 4 ATF 10 4 Other 36 3 Note: When more than one agency sponsored
an exercise, all sponsoring agencies were counted as the lead
agency; thus, the column total exceeds 201 exercises. CIA noted
that while it does not lead these types of exercises, it practices
its support role through participation in other agencies'
exercises. Other federal agencies include the Department of
Transportation; U. S. Capitol Police; and 13 other agencies,
offices, or bureaus.

Source: Our analysis of agencies' data. The agencies conducted a
mixture of tabletop exercises in which agency officials discuss
scenarios around a table or other similar setting, and field
exercises where agency leadership and operational units actually
deploy to practice their skills and coordination in a realistic
field setting. Of the total 201 exercises, 85 (or 42 percent) were
tabletop exercises and 116

(or 58 percent) were field exercises. Counterterrorism exercises
included both conventional and WMD scenarios to prepare federal
agencies for a wide variety of possible situations. In many of the
exercises, federal agencies gained experience working together. Of
the 201 federal

counterterrorist exercises, 140 (or 70 percent) were interagency
exercises involving more than one federal department or
independent agency. 9 Of these 140 interagency exercises, 96 were
major interagency 9 For the purpose of this report, we defined
interagency as involving more than one federal

department or independent agency. For example, DOD- led exercises
that included both Army and Navy participation, or Justice- led
exercises that included the FBI and Bureau of Prisons
participation, were not considered interagency exercises.

exercises and included three or more departments or independent
agencies. In some of the exercises, federal agencies also gained
experience working with state and/ or local authorities, and
nongovernmental organizations. Specifically, 69 (or 34 percent) of
the 201 exercises were intergovernmental, and 18 (or 9 percent)
included nongovernmental or other private organizations. Four
exercises included foreign government participation to simulate
federal agency integration in international incidents.

Interagency Exercise We found that there was no formal interagency
exercise program as

Program Has Not Been Fully envisioned in PDD 39. The National
Security Council established an Achieved

interagency Exercise Subgroup co- chaired by the State Department
(for international exercises) and the FBI (for domestic exercises)
that also included FEMA, DOD, HHS, DOE, EPA, CIA, NRC, and the
Departments of Transportation and Agriculture as members. The
purpose of the Exercise Subgroup is to promote interagency
discussions of exercises, but it has not implemented PDD 39
requirements to prepare or receive approval for interagency
exercise objectives and a schedule of exercises. Interagency field
exercises occur when individual agencies, particularly DOD and
DOE, invite other agencies to participate. Because individual
agencies that sponsor or participate in exercises tend to focus on
their own roles, some

complex transfers of command and control between agencies have not
been exercised, particularly in domestic scenarios. We believe
that without interagency exercises objectives set by the Exercise
Subgroup, agencies are not likely to exercise these key scenarios.
As a result, the federal government will be less prepared to
respond in a tailored, synchronized manner if an incident occurs.
Officials from State, FBI, DOD, DOE, EPA, and HHS said that the
Exercise Subgroup has fallen short of achieving its full
objectives. These officials cited a number of obstacles to full
implementation of the group as envisioned in PDD 39 and in the
group's charter.

Despite the incomplete implementation of an interagency exercise
program as envisioned in PDD 39, in the 3 years since PDD 39,
there were 96 counterterrorist field and tabletop exercises
involving 3 or more agencies. These interagency exercises occurred
because individual sponsoring agencies, such as DOD, invited other
agencies to participate in their exercises. For example, DOD's
Domestic Preparedness Program tabletop exercises form the core of
interagency exercises with a focus on domestic

consequence management and intergovernmental participation.

International Crisis International crisis management exercises are
more comprehensive than Exercises More

domestic exercises. DOD's and DOE's well- developed international
field Comprehensive Than

exercise programs have enhanced the preparedness of the federal
Domestic Crisis Exercises government to conduct counterterrorist
operations overseas. The State Department uses DOD- led and DOE-
led exercises to practice its leadership role in international
terrorist incidents. Each year, DOD and DOE sponsor several
international interagency field exercises. Commanders and exercise
planners take several steps to challenge participants in these
exercises. For example, these exercises test rapid and no- notice
deployment of command elements and tactical units to locations
worldwide. In addition, these exercises also frequently test the
FEST, so rapid and no- notice deployments also can be practiced by
the full cadre of interagency players. While exercises do not
guarantee success, they have resulted in a high degree of
preparedness of federal agencies to operate overseas in a
terrorist crisis.

Domestic crisis response exercises are led by law enforcement
agencies and primarily provide tactical training to their crisis
response teams. Many of these exercises center around the response
capabilities of the lead agency, rather than coordinating an
interagency response and therefore do not include many of the
federal, state, and local agencies that would be needed to
effectively respond, or the entire range of activities required to
respond to a terrorist crisis.

The FBI's domestic crisis response program is well developed with
regularly scheduled field exercises that test regional and field
office capabilities at the tactical level. 10 But the program
generally does not exercise the broader interagency leadership
role that the Bureau would play in a major terrorist incident.
Some aspects of this leadership role have been tested in selected
exercises, such as FBI- led exercises done in preparation for the
Atlanta Olympics. The FBI has begun taking steps to enhance its
program and it played a significant interagency leadership role in
a June 1998 exercise sponsored by DOD. FBI officials noted that
the

Bureau had increased this program's budget resources which they
had previously cited as an impediment to a more robust program.

10 For the purpose of this report, the tactical level refers to
the personnel and activities occurring at a specific site to
eliminate or capture a terrorist or terrorists and to render safe
and remove a conventional or unconventional weapon or device.

The Secret Service conducts a variety of counterterrorist
exercises for its special agents related to its mission to protect
the President. The exercises generally involve continuity of
operations of the White House or protecting

the President or other officials. Some of the exercises included
other federal agencies (generally DOD), state and local police,
and fire and rescue authorities. The Secret Service generally did
not conduct exercises with the FBI, although the two agencies have
overlapping responsibilities at special events. 11 In the few
cases in which both agencies participated in the same exercise,
they did not exercise how they would interact in a

terrorist incident. The Secret Service plans to increase the
agency's counterterrorism exercise program to reflect its new role
in certain special events. For example, in preparing for the World
Energy Council in Houston

in September 1998, the Secret Service conducted a tabletop
exercise that included FBI and state and local authorities. In its
comments on our classified report, the Secret Service stated that
it planned to conduct the exercises with the FBI on scenarios
where the two agencies need to work together. ATF conducts
exercises that test its crisis response and investigation roles in
terrorist bombings. These exercises do not involve tests of ATF's
supporting role in an interagency response led by the FBI. ATF
generally does not exercise with FBI, although the two agencies
have potentially overlapping responsibilities, such as in cases
where the sources of bombings are unknown. 12 ATF is developing a
crisis management exercise program similar to the FBI program. ATF
exercises feature its Critical Incident Management Response Team
and involve its regional Special Response Teams. FBI exercises
feature its Critical Incident Response

Group and involve its Hostage Rescue Team and regional Special
Weapons and Tactics teams. The ATF and FBI scenarios that we
reviewed were similar, and ATF officials were unable to make any
distinction between

their program and the FBI's program. Based upon our analysis of
the ATF's program, it appears that ATF is exercising its lead in
incidents in which the 11 In addition to both agencies providing
some type of security function at special events, their statutory
authorities may result in potential overlap. Secret Service has
the statutory mission to protect the President and other
protectees (18 U. S. C. 3056), and also investigates any
threatening criminal activity against the President pursuant to
that authority. The FBI has the statutory mission to investigate
attacks upon the President (18 U. S. C. 1751).

12 FBI and ATF have a 1973 Memorandum of Understanding on which
agency has primary investigative jurisdiction in a bombing based
upon such factors as the target of the bomb. If the perpetrator of
the bombing is unclear, both agencies may claim jurisdiction. FBI
and ATF officials have been meeting to resolve their differences
on this issue.

FBI, not ATF, would lead. The lack of coordination on exercises
between these two law enforcement agencies could reduce the
effectiveness of the total federal response to a terrorist
incident and lead to duplication of effort.

In addition, crisis management exercises, both international and
domestic, always end in the successful tactical resolution of the
incidents and do not include more likely scenarios where terrorist
attacks are successful, or occur without adequate threat warning.
Thus, the full gamut of interagency crisis management activities
is not tested. For example, in the 3 years following PDD 39, the
FBI did not conduct or participate in a field exercise that
simulated the concurrence of crisis response and consequence

management to deal with a major terrorist incident. Consequence
Management

Domestic consequence management exercises are not well developed.
Exercises Not

PDD 39 designated FEMA as the lead federal agency for consequence
Comprehensive

management in domestic terrorist events. In addition, the fiscal
year 1995 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations tasked FEMA to
develop exercises to focus on the consequences of terrorist
incidents as part of its exercise program. In response to these
taskings, FEMA sponsored a series

of interagency counterterrorism tabletop exercises that focused on
interagency and intergovernmental issues. However, FEMA has not
planned or sponsored an interagency field exercise to test its
consequence management leadership role. Tabletop exercises are
useful to the extent they identify important policy and
operational issues that need to be resolved. However, tabletop
exercises are not a substitute for field

exercises that test the federal government's ability to use and
coordinate personnel and assets in a realistic setting. FEMA
officials told us that they lack the resources to manage an
interagency field exercise program. They also stated that they are
reluctant to commit resources to field exercises because the
Domestic Guidelines and CONPLAN are still not approved and that
they do not want to exercise their staff using procedures that may
not be correct because of additional changes in these guidance
documents.

Commenting on our classified report, FEMA noted that numerous
other disaster- related operations (which were outside the scope
of our review) significantly improved the federal government's
overall response capabilities to conduct consequence management in
terrorist incidents.

Federal agencies or entities other than FEMA have sponsored some
consequence management field exercises. The Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA) sponsored four recent domestic field exercises that
dealt with

the medical aspects of consequence management in a terrorist
attack using WMD. For example, in March 1997, VA sponsored an
exercise, in conjunction with the state of Minnesota, that
simulated a terrorist attack

on a federal building with explosives laced with radioactive
material, and the subsequent decontamination and treatment of
hundreds of casualties. Commenting on our classified report, VA
stated that numerous other disaster- related exercises (which were
outside the scope of our review) also improved VA's consequence
management capabilities. DOD sponsored two recent domestic field
exercises that also dealt with the medical aspects

of consequence management in a terrorist attack using WMD. For
example, in September 1997, DOD sponsored a field exercise (co-
sponsored by VA) to practice providing medical care to victims of
a terrorist WMD attack. That exercise, which had over 2,000
participants, also included state and local responders, and local
community hospitals.

In addition, some states and cities have sponsored field exercises
on consequence management, some of them in conjunction with the
DOD Domestic Preparedness Program. For example, in November 1997,
New York City sponsored a field exercise based on a scenario where
terrorists released chemical agents. The objectives of this
exercise were to test first

responder's ability to appropriately evaluate and respond to a
chemical attack and fully integrate the city's incident command
system. DOD, in conjunction with cities, plans to conduct more
than 100 Domestic Preparedness Program field exercises in the next
several years.

Better Processes to Lessons learned processes are practices that
allow an agency to learn from

Capture Lessons its successes and mistakes to improve its
performance. We found that DOD, DOE, and FEMA had relatively good
processes in place to capture

Learned Could and share lessons learned, while other agencies had
less rigorous

Improve Future processes. There was also no interagency process in
place to capture and

Operations share lessons learned, but agencies were starting to
implement a process at the end of our review.

DOD, DOE, and FEMA Have A key part of any lessons learned process
is preparing an After Action

Requirements and Report (AAR) or other evaluation that provides an
official description of

Processes to Capture the results of an operation, special event,
or exercise. An AAR typically

Lessons Learned includes a summary of objectives, operational
limitations, major participants, a description of strengths and
weaknesses, and recommended

actions. Effective follow- up and validation also are important
parts of a lessons learned process, as they are the only means to
ensure that

problems have been corrected. Another important feature of a
lessons learned process is the dissemination within an
organization and, where appropriate, to other organizations, of
aspects of operations that worked well and those that need further
improvement or development. For

counterterrorism operations, which are inherently interagency
matters, the lessons learned process should also address the
interaction between different agencies to highlight problems for
resolution in interagency forums or by top national leadership.

The DOD and DOE processes for capturing lessons learned had
several positive characteristics in comparison to the other
agencies' processes we reviewed. DOD and DOE had requirements to
produce AARs and their officials or contractors wrote AARs, made
specific recommendations, disseminated AARs to different
organizational units, and produced AARs for some exercises and
events led by other agencies. For example, we

observed DOE contractors as they entered lessons learned data real
time during a June 1998 exercise led by DOD. Some DOD field
exercises included data evaluation plans in advance to ensure that
lessons were learned on the specific exercise objectives. In
addition, DOD and DOE officials included interagency issues in
their AARs and sometimes disseminated them to other agencies.

DOD and DOE officials cited the value of a sound AAR process to
improving their performance and said that on the basis of issues
identified in earlier AARs, they had improved operations. For
example, DOD

exercises helped determine and refine policy and procedures on the
final disposition of WMD devices. Policy issues on this topic were
identified in AARs going back to 1993. In the intervening years,
DOD continued to include this issue in its tabletop exercises. In
1996, a new policy was incorporated into a formal contingency
plan. The new policy was further tested in tabletop exercises in
1997 and finally in field exercises in 1998.

While there are remaining issues to be resolved on the final
disposition of a WMD device, DOD officials were able to track
their progress on this issue. DOE reorganized its Nuclear
Emergency Search Team on the basis of

lessons learned from a series of exercises. We were able to track
the evolution of the Nuclear Emergency Search Team through past
evaluations and AARs written by DOE.

Although the DOD and DOE lessons learned processes were good in
comparison to the other agencies we reviewed, we did note some
weaknesses in their processes. DOD and DOE did not write AARs for
all of the counterterrorism operations, special events, or
exercises that they

participated in. Both DOD and DOE officials stated that emerging
crises or the tempo of operations did not always allow staff to
write AARs. In addition, dissemination of lessons learned were
sometimes limited because of security classifications. Finally,
our prior report, which included a broader and more detailed
review of DOD's lessons learned programs,

discussed weaknesses in the collection, analysis, dissemination,
and ultimate use of lessons learned. 13

FEMA also had relatively sound lessons learned requirements and
processes as part of its Comprehensive Exercise Program for
designing, conducting, and evaluating exercises. For several
years, FEMA had been developing computer software to record
lessons learned from exercises and monitor corrective actions. 14
FEMA produced AARs on the tabletop exercises it led but not for
exercises led by other agencies. Contractors usually wrote AARs
and FEMA officials reviewed and approved them. FEMA disseminated
its AARs both internally and externally. FEMA's AARs generally
included interagency issues for those exercises that included
other agencies. For example, the AAR on FEMA's June 1996 Cirrus
Wind exercise stressed the need for FEMA and FBI to work together
to understand their responsibilities for consequence and crisis
management.

Other Agencies' Lessons Federal agencies other than DOD, DOE, and
FEMA had less rigorous

Learned Processes Not Well processes for capturing lessons learned
and producing AARs. The other Developed agencies did not have a
written policy that required that they produce AARs

or a formal process to capture lessons learned. The production of
AARs by some of these other agencies was sporadic, particularly
for operations, special events, and exercises led by other
agencies. In addition, few of these other agencies included
discussions of interagency issues in their AARs. Finally, the
dissemination of AARs was limited at many agencies,

which minimized the benefits of lessons learned. These limitations
make it more difficult for the agencies to capture the strengths
and weaknesses shown in operations or exercises so they can
continue or expand good practices or take corrective actions when
necessary to improve future performance. Table 2 describes
selected agencies' processes for capturing

lessons learned and producing AARs. 13 See Military Training:
Potential to Use Lessons Learned to Avoid Past Mistakes is Largely
Untapped (GAO/NSIAD-95-152, Aug. 9, 1995). While the review
examined DOD lessons learned processes, it did not specifically
focus on counterterrorist operations or exercises. 14 At the end
of our review, FEMA officials told us they were testing software
to implement this corrective action program throughout the agency.

Table 2: Characteristics of Federal Agencies' Processes to Capture
Lessons Learned From Counterterrorist Operations, Special Events,
and Exercises Agency policy and/ or process to

Actual agency production of after AAR discussion of interagency
Agency capture lessons learned action reports issues and
dissemination DOD Policy requires AARs; formal process Generally
produces AARs for AARs generally discuss interagency is Joint
Universal Lessons Learned operations, special events, and

issues; AARs disseminated internally System. exercises, including
those led by and sometimes externally. other agencies.

DOE Policy requires AARs; formal process Generally produces AARs
for special AARs generally discuss interagency is After Action
Tracking System. events and exercises, including those

issues; AARs disseminated internally led by other agencies. and
sometimes externally.

FEMA Policy requires AARs; formal process Produces no AARs for
special events; AARs generally discuss interagency is Corrective
Action Program. produces AARs for FEMA exercises, issues; AARs
disseminated internally but not those led by other agencies.

and sometimes externally. ATF No formal policy or process.
Produces AARs for some operations; AARs do not discuss interagency
produces no AARs for special events; issues; AARs disseminated
internally. produces AARs for ATF exercises, but

not those led by other agencies. FBI No formal policy or process.
Produces no AARs for operations or AARs generally do not discuss

special events; generally produces interagency issues; AARs AARs
for FBI field exercises but not disseminated internally to
tabletop exercises or those led by participating FBI offices, but
not to other agencies.

FBI Headquarters or externally. EPA No formal policy or process.
Sometimes produces AARs for

AARs generally discuss interagency special events and exercises,
issues; AARs disseminated internally, including those led by other
agencies.

but not externally. Secret Service No formal policy or process.
Generally produces AARs for special

AARs generally do not discuss events; produces no AARs for

interagency issues; AARs not exercises led by Secret Service or
disseminated internally or externally. other agencies.

State No formal policy or process. Rarely produces AARs for
operations Not applicable. and exercises, even if led by State.
AARs rarely done.

HHS No formal policy or process. Rarely produces AARs for
operations Not applicable. or exercises, even if led by HHS. AARs
rarely done.

Note: We did not include VA or CIA in this table because we did
not conduct detailed reviews of their processes to capture lessons
learned. Both agencies did write AARs for selected exercises.

Source: Our analysis of agencies' data.

Many agencies did not produce AARs even in cases where they led an
exercise. Agencies lead exercises because they have specific
objectives to achieve, and one purpose of exercises is to capture
lessons that might

improve future operations. Nevertheless, we found many cases where
agencies devoted their resources to develop exercise objectives
and conduct an exercise, yet did not write AARs. For example, the
FBI has

sponsored the Weapons of Mass Destruction Interagency Support
Exercise

series, which includes numerous federal agencies and has the
objective to advance interagency coordination for terrorist
attacks. However, FBI has not produced AARs on any of the four
tabletop exercises. Table 3 shows whether agencies produced AARs
for the exercises they led.

Table 3: Production of After Action Reports by Selected Federal
Agencies for the Counterterrorism Exercises They Led in the 3
Years Following PDD 39 (June 1995 to June 1998).

Total exercises AARs produced by Agency led by agency lead agency

DOD 97 79 (81%) Secret Service 47 0 FBI 22 13 (59%) FEMA 16 14
(88%) DOE 5 5 (100%) ATF 4 4 (100%) VA 4 2 (50%) HHS 3 0 State 1 0
EPA 1 1 (100%) Other 3 1 (33%) Note: Includes both tabletop and
field exercises the agency led. The Secret Service noted that its
lessons learned are based on special events, not its exercise
program. Other government agencies include the Department of
Transportation, U. S. Capitol Police, and 13 other agencies,
offices or bureaus.

Source: Our analysis of agencies' data.

Many agencies also did not produce AARs when they participated in
a field exercise. Field exercises are very resource intensive
because they require a great deal of advance planning and because
agency personnel and equipment actually deploy to another
location. Again, we found cases where agencies led or otherwise
participated in field exercises but did not produce AARs. For
example, in a recent DOD- sponsored field exercise,

FEMA developed specific objectives and tasks to be accomplished
and sent several staff to planning meetings and to the week- long
exercise itself, yet it did not produce an AAR. Table 4 shows the
extent to which agencies

produced AARs for field exercises that they participated in.

Table 4: Production of After Action Reports by Selected Federal
Agencies for Counterterrorist Field Exercises That They
Participated in for the 3 Years Following PDD 39 (June 1995 to
June 1998).

Total field exercises AARs produced for field Agency agency
participated in exercises by agency

DOD 72 38 (53%) Secret Service 52 0 FBI 32 18 (56%) FEMA 16 0
State 15 1 (7%) DOE 13 10 (77%) HHS 13 2 (15%) ATF 9 4 (44%) VA 6
2 (33%) EPA 4 1 (25%) Other 14 0 Note: Includes all field
exercises, whether the agency led the exercise or not. Secret
Service noted that its lessons learned are based on special
events, not its exercise program. Other government agencies
include the Department of Transportation, U. S. Capitol Police,
and 13 other agencies, offices, or bureaus.

Source: Our analysis of agencies' data.

Officials from these agencies generally cited a lack of dedicated
staff or the tempo of ongoing operations or exercises as reasons
they did not write AARs or otherwise capture lessons learned. In
our view, agencies that devote the resources to lead exercises or
to participate in other agencies' field exercises should also
devote the resources to writing AARs to capture lessons learned.
Some officials noted that they hold a hotwash (i. e., an

oral AAR discussion) after an exercise which, they said, served
the purpose of capturing lessons learned. Hotwashes are valuable
because they are held immediately after exercises; however, their
value is limited to the

participants that attend. Written AARs, on the other hand, provide
accountability because they identify and document problems or
issues and can be used to track the progress of corrective action.
By not producing written AARs, agencies are forfeiting many of the
benefits of participating in exercises. In commenting on our
classified report, several agencies cited efforts underway to
develop or improve processes for capturing lessons learned at
their individual agencies.

Interagency Lessons The 1996 Nunn- Lugar hearings highlighted
that, although some agencies

Learned Process Being wrote AARs and made recommendations, there
were recurrent interagency

Developed problems because there was no central place where
officials assembled

and analyzed AARs together to discuss interagency problems. During
our review, we also found no AAR or lessons learned process at the
interagency level. The Exercise Subgroup charter included the
discussion of lessons learned and AARs. While this interagency
forum had been used to discuss specific exercises, there was no
process to review individual agency AARs that raise interagency
issues. For more than 2 years, the group has

discussed developing a formal interagency process and has looked
specifically at the processes being used by DOD and DOE. The State
Department has been a repository for various agencies' AARs for

international exercises, but Department officials there said they
lacked the staff and standing to analyze them, separate out the
interagency issues, and prepare related evaluations or make
recommendations. At the time of our review, the FBI was in charge
of developing an interagency AAR process, but no decisions had
been made. In commenting on our classified report, several
agencies noted that the Exercise Subgroup had recently adopted an
interagency AAR process and was starting to implement it.

Conclusions During the last 3 years, federal agencies have worked
together in many operations and special events and have generally
coordinated their activities. However, issues of interagency
guidance and command and control remain that need to be addressed
to enhance the federal government's ability to effectively respond
to terrorist incidents. Federal agencies have participated in many
interagency counterterrorism exercises in the last 3 years.
However, an interagency exercise program, as directed in PDD 39,
has not been fully achieved, so exercises have not generally
practiced key transfers of authority among responding federal
agencies.

International field exercises, generally led by DOD, include the
full cadre of interagency players in demanding scenarios and some
are done with no notice. In contrast, domestic counterterrorism
exercises are not as demanding in testing the interagency ability
to respond. The FBI's crisis management field exercises have
provided good practice for its tactical response units but have
generally not exercised the Bureau's interagency

leadership role and rapid deployments for no- warning terrorist
attacks. FEMA's consequence management exercises have been limited
to tabletop exercises that do not fully test the federal
government's ability to provide a rapid interagency response in a
realistic exercise environment. Although agencies can benefit most
from counterterrorism exercises if they produce

AARs and have a process to capture lessons learned, most of the
agencies that we reviewed did not do so. Although counterterrorism
is inherently an interagency response, there was also no
interagency process to capture

lessons learned. At the close of our review, agencies said they
were adopting several measures to address these issues at both the
agency and interagency level.

Recommendations This report makes no recommendations. However, in
our classified report, we made several recommendations to enhance
interagency guidance, command and control, exercises, and
processes to capture and share lessons learned. DOD classified
these recommendations as a result of its security review of our
classified report.

Agency Comments We received written comments on our classified
report from 15 agencies, including the Departments of Justice,
State, Treasury; DOD, DOE, HHS, VA;

and FEMA, EPA, CIA, NRC, ATF, the Secret Service, U. S. Customs
Service, and Internal Revenue Service. The National Security
Council declined to provide official comments on the report. Many
of the agencies concurred or partially concurred with the report
and our recommendations and cited

recent steps taken to implement them. For example, DOE stated that
our report was an accurate assessment of both the progress and the
lingering shortfalls within the interagency counterterrorist
community. NRC stated that our recommendations will provide a
blueprint for resolving many of

the interagency difficulties outlined in the report. Other
agencies did not concur with parts of our report and provided
additional information about their programs or cited improvements
underway. For example, the Department of Justice cited progress in
interagency guidance, command and control relationships, exercise
programs, and processes to capture lessons learned. We did not
reproduce agency comments in this report due to security
classification reasons. However, we incorporated their

unclassified comments in this report as appropriate. Scope and We
focused our examination on counterterrorist activities in the 3-
year Methodology

period following the issuance of PDD 39 in June 1995. We obtained
documents and interviewed officials at the Departments of Justice,
State, Treasury (including the Secret Service and ATF), DOD, DOE,
HHS, VA, CIA, EPA, FEMA, NRC, and the U. S. Capitol Police. We
also obtained information on matters pertaining to
intergovernmental counterterrorist

operations (e. g., those involving federal, state, and local
entities) from state and local officials and selected federal
field offices in the course of our related work on DOD's Domestic
Preparedness Program. We compiled a list of 230 counterterrorism
activities that included operations, special events, and exercises
that were conducted from June 1995 to June 1998. In some cases, we
discussed counterterrorist activities before and after that
period, but we did not include them in the statistics we compiled
and analyzed. We did not review covert activities or law
enforcement cases (e. g., criminal investigations and arrests of
terrorists)

except in the cases of overseas arrests, which are interagency
operations. We also did not include aircraft hijackings or related
exercises, where the Federal Aviation Administration is generally
the lead federal agency. To ensure the accuracy of our list of
activities, appropriate federal agencies

reviewed it for completeness and accuracy. We also examined policy
guidelines, contingency plans, AARs, and other documents from
actual operations, special events, and exercises. Further, we
attended and

observed interagency meetings, planning sessions, and exercises.
We performed our work in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards between November 1997 and September
1998.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution
of this report until 30 days after its issue date. At that time we
will send copies to appropriate congressional committees, the
federal agencies discussed in this report,

and to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. We
also will make copies available to other interested parties upon
request. If you have any questions about this report, please
contact Mark Gebicke, Director for National Security Preparedness
Issues, at (202) 512- 5140. Other major contributors to this
report were Davi M. D'Agostino, Stephen L. Caldwell, Alan M.
Byroade, Lee Purdy, and Raymond J. Wyrsch.

Henry L. Hinton, Jr. Assistant Comptroller General

Related GAO Products Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Testing
Status and Views on Operational Viability of Pulsed Fast Nuetron
Analysis Technology (GAO/GGD-99-54, Apr. 13, 1999). Combating
Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public Health
Initiatives (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112, Mar. 16, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat
Terrorism (GAO/ T- NSIAD/ GGD- 99- 107, Mar. 11, 1999). Combating
Terrorism: FBI's Use of Federal Funds for CounterterrorismRelated
Activities (FYs 1995- 98) (GAO/GGD-99-7, Nov. 20, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic
Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov.
12, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn- Lugar- Domenici
Domestic Preparedness Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, Oct. 2, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues (GAO/T-
NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23, 1998). Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk
Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments
(GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires
Better Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1,
1997).

Combating Terrorism: Efforts to Protect U. S. Forces in Turkey and
the Middle East (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44, Oct. 28, 1997).

Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement
National Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997).

Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces
Overseas (GAO/NSIAD-97-207, July 21, 1997).

Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Changes Needed in the Management
Structure of Emergency Preparedness Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-91, June
11, 1997).

State Department: Efforts to Reduce Visa Fraud (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-
167, May 20, 1997).

Aviation Security: FAA's Procurement of Explosives Detection
Devices (GAO/RCED-97-111R, May 1, 1997). Aviation Security:
Commercially Available Advanced Explosives Detection Devices
(GAO/RCED-97-119R, Apr. 24, 1997).

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Responsibilities for Developing
Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technologies (GAO/NSIAD-97-95,
Apr. 15, 1997).

Federal Law Enforcement: Investigative Authority and Personnel at
13 Agencies (GAO/GGD-96-154, Sept. 30, 1996).

Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed (GAO/ T-
RCED/ NSIAD- 96- 151, Sept. 11, 1996). Terrorism and Drug
Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives and Narcotics
(GAO/ NSIAD/ RCED- 96- 252, Sept. 4, 1996).

Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security
(GAO/ T- RCED/ NSIAD- 96- 237, Aug. 1, 1996).

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Threats and Roles of Explosives
and Narcotics Detection Technology (GAO/ NSIAD/ RCED- 96- 76BR,
Mar. 27, 1996).

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U. S. Efforts to Improve
Nuclear Material Controls in Newly Independent States (GAO/ NSIAD/
RCED- 96- 89, Mar. 8, 1996).

Aviation Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and
International Challenges (GAO/RCED-94-38, Jan. 27, 1994).

Nuclear Security: Improving Correction of Security Deficiencies at
DOE's Weapons Facilities (GAO/RCED-93-10, Nov. 16, 1992).

Nuclear Security: Weak Internal Controls Hamper Oversight of DOE's
Security Program (GAO/RCED-92-146, June 29, 1992).

Electricity Supply: Efforts Underway to Improve Federal Electrical
Disruption Preparedness (GAO/RCED-92-125, Apr. 20, 1992).

State Department: Management Weaknesses in the Security
Construction Program (GAO/NSIAD-92-2, Nov. 29, 1991).

Chemical Weapons: Physical Security for the U. S. Chemical
Stockpile (GAO/NSIAD-91-200, May 15, 1991). State Department:
Status of the Diplomatic Security Construction Program (GAO/NSIAD-
91-143BR, Feb. 20, 1991).

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Related GAO Products Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-135 Combating Terrorism

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