The Results Act: Observations on DOD's Draft Strategic Plan
(Correspondence, 08/05/97, GAO/NSIAD-97-219R).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the draft strategic
plan submitted by the Department of Defense (DOD) as required by the
Government Performance and Results Act.

GAO noted that: (1) DOD's draft plan includes discussions of each of the
six critical components required in strategic plans; (2) overall, while
some of the plan's components are of higher quality than others, the
plan represents an adequate start for addressing the requirements of the
Results Act; (3) the draft plan contains a succinct mission statement
and general goals and objectives that cover DOD's major functions and
operations; (4) however, the overall plan could be improved by
clarifying sections, adding information, and improving the plan's
format; (5) the plan's overall quality could be enhanced by: (a) stating
more completely and explicitly its strategies for achieving each goal
and including schedules for initiating and completing significant
actions; (b) discussing more clearly how external factors link to and
could affect achieving its goals; (c) describing in more detail the
program evaluations used in establishing its strategic goals and
identifying the key issues to be addressed in future evaluations; (d)
addressing what DOD has done or plans to do to resolve its persistent
management problems, including specific steps it plans to take, the time
frames and resources needed to implement its plans, and identification
of any external factors that could impede resolution; (e) beginning now
to work closely with Congress and other stakeholders in developing
performance goals and measures; (f) identifying programs and activities
that crosscut with other agencies' programs and discussing how those
efforts are being coordinated; and (g) developing one clear and succinct
document primarily based on the Quadrennial Defense Review and formatted
to correspond with the Results Act's requirements and the other
expectations for Results Act plans; (6) DOD's plan included some
discussion of formidable management problems DOD currently faces; (7)
these problems are important because they could affect DOD's ability to
meet its strategic goals and objectives; (8) however, DOD's discussions
of management problems could be more complete; (9) the significant
problems DOD faces with managing its contract operations were not
discussed; and (10) DOD's major concern about the reliability of
program-related and financial management information systems does not
mention how data limitations would affect its ability to measure
performance and ultimately to effectively manage its programs.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-97-219R
     TITLE:  The Results Act: Observations on DOD's Draft Strategic Plan
      DATE:  08/05/97
   SUBJECT:  Agency missions
             Strategic planning
             Program evaluation
             Financial management systems
             Public administration
             Inventory control systems
             Internal controls
             Information resources management
             Interagency relations
             Congressional/executive relations
IDENTIFIER:  DOD Strategic Logistics Plan
             DOD Quadrennial Defense Review
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER



September 1997


GAO/NSIAD-97-219R

DOD's Draft Strategic Plan

(709284)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  BOP - Federal Bureau of Prisons
  CFO - Chief Financial Officers
  CIM - Corporate Information Management
  DEA - Drug Enforcement Administration
  DOD - x
  DOJ - Department of Justice
  FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
  INS - Immigration and Naturalization Service
  NPR - National Performance Review
  OMB - Office of Management and Budget
  QDR - Quadrennial Defense Review

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-277495

August 5, 1997

The Honorable Richard K.  Armey
Majority Leader
House of Representatives

The Honorable John R.  Kasich
Chairman, Committee on the Budget
House of Representatives

The Honorable Dan Burton
Chairman, Committee on Government
 Reform and Oversight
House of Representatives

The Honorable Bob Livingston
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

Subject:  The Results Act:  Observations on DOD's Draft Strategic
Plan

On June 12, 1997, you asked us to review the draft strategic plans
submitted by cabinet departments and selected major agencies to
facilitate consultations with the Congress as required by the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (the Results Act). 
This letter is our response to that request concerning the Department
of Defense (DOD). 


   OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
   METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

Our overall objective was to review and evaluate DOD's draft
strategic plan.  Specifically, you asked us to review the draft plan
and assess (1) whether it complies with the act's requirements and
its overall quality, (2) whether it reflects DOD's key statutory
authorities, (3) whether it reflects interagency coordination of
crosscutting functions, (4) whether it addresses major management
problems we have previously identified, and (5) whether DOD's data
and information systems can provide reliable information about
performance. 

The Secretary of Defense states in DOD's May 1997 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) report that the report will serve as DOD's overall
strategic planning document and is intended to fulfill the
requirements of the Results Act.  On June 23, 1997, the Secretary
submitted to the congressional authorization committees and the
Senate and House Appropriations Committees a letter summarizing how
DOD believes the QDR complies with Results Act planning requirements. 
Congressional staff asked us to review this summary letter for
compliance with the Results Act.  Since the letter describes how DOD
believes the QDR meets strategic planning requirements, we analyzed
both the letter and the QDR report together and refer to them in this
letter as DOD's draft strategic plan.  We sought to determine whether
the letter and the QDR report, taken together, contained the elements
that were required by the Results Act and the other elements you
asked us to look for in agencies' plans.  We did not evaluate the
assumptions underlying the QDR report and made no judgment about them
or whether the QDR report met the purposes of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, which required the review. 
We are, however, evaluating certain aspects of the QDR report in a
separate review. 

Our overall assessment of DOD's draft strategic plan (the May 1997
QDR report and the June 1997 summary letter) was generally based on
our knowledge of DOD's operations and programs, our numerous reviews
of DOD, and other information available at the time of our
assessment.  Specifically, the criteria we used to determine whether
the draft plan complied with the requirements of the Results Act were
the act itself, supplemented by the Office of Management and Budget's
(OMB) guidance on developing the plans (Circular A-11, Part 2).  To
make judgments about the overall quality of the draft plan and its
elements, we used our May 1997 guidance for congressional review of
the plans as a tool.\1

To determine whether the draft plan contained information on
interagency coordination and addressed major management challenges,
we relied on our general knowledge of DOD's operations and programs
and the results of our previous reports.  A list of our major related
products on DOD operations is included at the end of this letter. 

As you requested, we coordinated our work on DOD's key statutory
authorities and DOD's capacity to provide reliable information with
the Congressional Research Service and the DOD Inspector General's
office, respectively.  We did our work between July 7 and July 25,
1997, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. 


--------------------
\1 Agencies' Strategic Plans Under GPRA:  Key Questions to Facilitate
Congressional Review (GAO/GGD-10.1.16, May 1997). 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

DOD has a $250 billion budget, which is 15 percent of the federal
budget and an estimated 3.2 percent of the U.S.  gross domestic
product, to provide for national security.  It currently has 1.45
million active duty military personnel, 900,000 military reserve
personnel, and 800,000 civilian personnel.  In addition to the Army,
the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD includes 24
defense agencies, such as the Defense Logistics Agency and the
Defense Special Weapons Agency.  With 10 active Army divisions, 3
Marine expeditionary forces, 13 active Air Force fighter wings, 202
bombers, 11 active aircraft carriers, 10 active naval air wings, 12
amphibious ready groups, 73 attack submarines, 128 surface combatant
ships, and reserve units and other equipment, and with 200,000 of its
troops overseas, DOD maintains worldwide influence. 

DOD has been involved in strategic planning for many years, and the
QDR is the fourth major review of the military since the end of the
Cold War.\2 DOD intended the QDR to be a fundamental and
comprehensive examination of America's defense needs from 1997 to
2015, including potential threats, strategy, force structure,
readiness posture, military modernization programs, defense
infrastructure, and other elements of the defense program. 
Additional planning efforts are underway or planned, however. 
Included in these efforts are

  -- a separate force structure assessment, which is required by the
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 to be
     undertaken by a nonpartisan, independent national defense panel
     and provided to Congress no later than December 1997;

  -- a report on defense reforms, which is to be provided by a DOD
     task force in November 1997; and

  -- a report with recommendations on DOD headquarters and
     cross-service occupational specialties, which is to be provided
     in August 1997. 

Planning is a dynamic process, and the ongoing and planned
activities, along with any additional input from OMB, congressional
staff, and other stakeholders, could result in changes to DOD's plan. 
It is important to recognize that, under the Results Act, a plan is
not due until September 30, 1997.  Furthermore, the Results Act
anticipated that it may take several planning cycles to perfect the
process and that the plan due September 30 itself would be
continually refined as various planning cycles occur.  Thus, our
comments reflect a snapshot status of DOD's plan at this time. 

The Results Act requires an agency's strategic plan to contain six
critical components.  They are (1) a comprehensive mission statement;
(2) agencywide long-term goals and objectives for all major functions
and operations; (3) approaches (or strategies) and the various
resources needed to achieve the goals and objectives; (4) a
relationship between the long-term goals and objectives and the
annual performance goals; (5) an identification of key factors,
external to the agency and beyond its control, that could
significantly affect the achievement of the strategic goals; and (6)
a description of the program evaluations used to establish or revise
strategic goals and a schedule for future program evaluations. 


--------------------
\2 The other three reviews were the 1991 Base Force Review, the 1993
Bottom-Up Review, and the 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions of
the Armed Forces. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

DOD's draft plan includes discussions of each of the six critical
components required in strategic plans.  Overall, while some of the
plan's components are of higher quality than others, the plan
represents an adequate start for addressing the requirements of the
Results Act.  Of note, the draft plan contains a succinct mission
statement and general goals and objectives that cover DOD's major
functions and operations.  However, the overall plan could be
improved by clarifying sections, adding information, and improving
the plan's format.  For example, the plan's overall quality could be
enhanced by

  -- stating more completely and explicitly its strategies for
     achieving each goal and including schedules for initiating and
     completing significant actions;

  -- discussing more clearly how external factors link to and could
     affect achieving its goals;

  -- describing in more detail the program evaluations used in
     establishing its strategic goals and identifying the key issues
     to be addressed in future evaluations;

  -- addressing what DOD has done or plans to do to resolve its
     persistent management problems, including specific steps it
     plans to take, the time frames and resources needed to implement
     its plans, and identification of any external factors that could
     impede resolution;

  -- beginning now to work closely with Congress and other
     stakeholders in developing performance goals and measures;

  -- identifying programs and activities that crosscut with other
     agencies' programs and discussing how those efforts are being
     coordinated; and

  -- developing one clear and succinct document primarily based on
     the QDR and formatted to correspond with the Results Act's
     requirements and the other expectations for Results Act plans. 

Further, to its credit, DOD's plan included some discussion of
formidable management problems DOD currently faces.  These problems
are important because they could affect DOD's ability to meet its
strategic goals and objectives.  However, DOD's discussions of
management problems could be more complete.  For example, the
significant problems DOD faces with managing its contract operations
were not discussed.  Additionally, DOD's major concern about the
reliability of program-related and financial management information
systems does not mention how data limitations would affect its
ability to measure performance and ultimately to effectively manage
its programs. 

Addressing these areas would provide decisionmakers and stakeholders
the information necessary to ensure that DOD has strategies that are
well thought-out for resolving ongoing problems, achieving its goals
and objectives, and becoming more results-oriented, as expected by
the Results Act. 


   DOD'S DRAFT PLAN DISCUSSES THE
   ACT'S REQUIREMENTS BUT COULD
   ELABORATE ON SOME COMPONENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

DOD's draft plan includes discussions of each of the six critical
components required in strategic plans.  Overall, while some of the
plan's components are of higher quality than others, the plan
represents an adequate start for addressing the requirements of the
Results Act.  However, its plan could be improved if it were to more
closely follow the guidance provided in OMB Circular A-11 and to
include more comprehensive discussions for each of the required
components.  Two exceptions are the mission statement, which
succinctly states DOD's mission, and the general goals and
objectives, which cover DOD's major functions and operations. 


      MISSION STATEMENT
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1

A mission statement provides an agency focus by explaining why it
exists and what it does.  OMB Circular A-11 states that an agency's
mission statement should briefly define the basic purpose of the
agency, with particular focus on its core programs and activities. 
DOD's draft plan includes a concise mission statement that meets this
criterion.  It states, "The mission of the Department of Defense is
to support and defend the Constitution of the United States, to
provide for the common defense of the United States, its citizens and
its allies, and to protect and advance U.S.  interests around the
world."


      GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2

DOD's draft plan covers its major functions and operations under the
following six goals and objectives: 

1.  Harness the unmatched capabilities of the U.S.  armed forces to

  -- shape the international security environment in favorable ways
     by promoting regional stability, preventing crises and reducing
     threats, and deterring adversaries on a day-to-day basis;

  -- respond to the full spectrum of crises--from deterrence to
     smaller-scale contingency operations to major theater war--when
     it is in the U.S.  interests to do so and maintain the
     capability to deter and, if necessary, defeat large-scale,
     cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping
     time frames, preferably in concert with regional allies; and

  -- prepare now to meet the challenges of an uncertain future by
     transforming U.S.  combat capabilities and support structures to
     be able to shape and respond effectively well into the 21st
     century. 

2.  Recruit and retain well-qualified military personnel and provide
them with an equal opportunity and a high quality of life. 

3.  Support friends and allies by sustaining and adapting security
alliances, enhancing coalition warfighting, and forging military
relationships that protect and advance U.S.  security interests. 

4.  Pursue a focused modernization effort that maintains U.S. 
qualitative superiority in key warfighting capabilities, exploits the
Revolution in Military Affairs,\3 and supports the joint operational
concepts delineated in Joint Vision 2010.\4

5.  Maintain the U.S.  edge in combat readiness while seeking
efficiencies and improved operating procedures.  6.  Fundamentally
reengineer DOD and achieve a 21st century infrastructure by reducing
costs and eliminating unnecessary expenditures while maintaining
required military capabilities across all DOD mission areas.  Employ
modern management tools and exploit the Revolution in Business
Affairs.\5

The Results Act requires an agency's plan to include outcome-related
goals and objectives that relate to the agency's general goals and
objectives for its major functions and operations.  Also, our May
1997 guidance for congressional review of agencies' strategic plans
states that an agency's strategic goals should explain what results
are expected from the agency's major functions.  DOD's goals address
its major mission-related functions--preparing for and defending the
United States and its interests--and generally appear to be oriented
to outcomes.  However, DOD's goals are expressed in terms that may
make it difficult for DOD to translate them into quantitatively
measurable performance goals so that stakeholders and decisionmakers
can determine whether the goals are actually being achieved. 


--------------------
\3 The Revolution in Military Affairs refers to efforts to develop
the improved capabilities needed to significantly enhance joint
military operations, particularly improved information and command
and control capabilities that can provide DOD an advanced, secure,
open command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capability. 

\4 Joint Vision 2010 is the Joint Chiefs of Staff's conceptual
template for how America's armed forces plan to channel the vitality
and innovation of their people and leverage technological
opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint
warfighting.  It develops four operational concepts for fighting in
the early 21st century--dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full
dimensional protection, and focused logistics. 

\5 The Revolution in Business Affairs refers to DOD's efforts to
reengineer its infrastructure and business practices, such as
outsourcing and privatizing a wide range of support activities and
reducing unneeded standards and specifications. 


      STRATEGIES AND THE RESOURCES
      NEEDED TO ACHIEVE GOALS AND
      OBJECTIVES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3

DOD's draft plan includes considerable discussion of the strategies
it will use to achieve its goals and objectives.  However, although
the discussions in general could be more complete and explicit,
discussions are more informative for some goals than for others.  The
draft plan also discusses in general the resources that will be
needed to achieve the goals, such as a stable budget, the number of
military and civilian personnel, the force structure, and some of the
technologies.  It does not, however, contain the schedules for
initiating or completing significant strategy actions that OMB
Circular A-11 guidance requires in agencies' strategic plans.  DOD
could improve the plan and provide stakeholders and decisionmakers a
more complete understanding of its strategies by fully and explicitly
listing the strategies for achieving each of its general goals and
objectives and including, where feasible, schedules for initiating
and completing significant strategy actions. 

One of the more informative presentations of strategies to achieve a
goal was DOD's discussion of its sixth goal--fundamentally
reengineering DOD.  Our work has shown that it will be key for DOD to
continue working to change its culture to one that is more acceptive
of modern business practices to successfully implement this strategy. 
Among DOD's strategies for this goal are (1) outsourcing certain
Defense Logistics Agency functions; (2) consolidating Defense
Information Service Agency information processing centers; (3)
conducting public-private competitions for certain depot maintenance
work; (4) streamlining the security investigative process at the
Defense Investigative Service; (5) taking maximum advantage of
acquisition reform; (6) increasing cooperative development programs
with allies; (7) competing, outsourcing, or privatizing military
department infrastructure functions that are closely related to
commercial enterprises; (8) reducing unneeded standards and
specifications; (9) integrating process and product development; and
(10) increasing the use of commercial technology, dual-use
technology, and open systems.  Further, DOD expects additional
reengineering ideas and recommendations to result from an August 1997
report on the study of headquarters and cross-service occupational
specialties and in a November 1997 report from the Task Force on
Defense Reform.  Another of its strategies for reengineering is to
seek legislation for two more base realignment and closure rounds and
relief from the statutory requirement that at least 60 percent of
depot maintenance activities be done in DOD depots.  DOD also plans
to make additional legislative proposals to further streamline and
increase efficiency in its operations. 

On the other hand, DOD's discussion for its second goal--recruiting
and retaining well-qualified military personnel and providing them an
equal opportunity and a high quality of life--was less informative. 
The draft plan notes that DOD (1) has identified where policy or
practice changes that will improve quality-of-life can be made and
will implement them; (2) remains committed to funding pay raises and
other compensation; (3) will make every effort to continue its
commitment to provide adequate funding in areas such as housing,
community and family support, transition assistance as further
reductions are made in military forces, and morale and recreation
activities; and (4) will continue placing a priority on educational
assistance. 


      RELATING ANNUAL PERFORMANCE
      GOALS TO GENERAL GOALS AND
      OBJECTIVES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.4

DOD's draft plan represents a good start toward trying to link DOD's
general goals with quantitatively measurable annual performance goals
or descriptions of what would represent progress toward achieving
general goals.  Such a linkage is important because it would allow
Congress to judge whether DOD is achieving its goals.  The Results
Act calls for quantifiable performance measures, if feasible.  If
such measures are not feasible, however, the act allows, with
authorization from OMB, for the use of descriptive statements of both
a minimally effective and a successful program.  The draft plan
states that its annual performance plan, which the Results Act first
requires for fiscal year 1999 and is not yet completed, will include
the required performance measures or descriptive statements along
with the general goals to which they relate.  However, DOD's goals
are expressed in terms that may make it difficult for DOD to
translate them into quantitatively measurable performance goals that
will enable stakeholders and decisionmakers to determine the extent
to which they are actually being achieved.  That could be the reason
some measures DOD is currently planning to use measure resource
inputs or outputs rather than results.  For example, DOD currently
plans to compare the force structure it will need with the force
structure included in its future budgets as a measure of achieving
its first goal--shaping the international security environment,
responding to crises, and preparing now to meet uncertain future
challenges.  As another example, DOD plans to report the number of
major joint exercises conducted during a fiscal year as one measure
of its fifth goal--maintaining the U.S.  edge in combat readiness. 
DOD's draft plan notes that it plans to work with key stakeholders in
developing the Results Act performance plan that is first required
for fiscal year 1999.  By beginning now to work closely with Congress
and other stakeholders to develop its performance measures and goals,
DOD might improve the specificity with which it could relate general
goals and objectives and performance goals and measures in its
strategic plan and also better assure that its annual performance
plan, when completed, will meet the purposes of the Results Act. 


      KEY EXTERNAL FACTORS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.5

OMB Circular A-11 points out that agencies' achievement of their
goals and objectives can be influenced by certain external factors
that exist, occur, or change over the time period covered by their
plans.  The circular notes that these factors can be economic,
demographic, social, or environmental in nature.  It states that the
strategic plan should describe each external factor, indicate its
link with a particular goal(s), and describe how achieving the goal
could be affected by the factor. 

DOD's draft plan identified the following factors it believes are
external and could influence the achievement of its goals and
objectives: 

  -- The uncertainty of the international environment, particularly
     the potential emergence of a regional great power or near-peer
     competitor in the 1997-2015 time frame or of "wild card"
     scenarios, such as the unanticipated emergence of new
     technological threats, for which the United States is
     unprepared. 

  -- The possibility that Congress may not enact legislative changes
     DOD included among its strategies for achieving its sixth goal
     about fundamentally reengineering the Department, particularly
     authority for two more base realignment and closure-type
     processes to help reduce DOD infrastructure and relief from the
     statutory requirement to perform at least 60 percent of depot
     maintenance activities in DOD depots. 

  -- The possibility that annual appropriations could fall below the
     $250 billion per year, adjusted for inflation, which DOD says
     will be needed to achieve its goals.  (We believe this should
     not be considered an external factor, because receiving a
     reasonable budget is the basis of an agency's strategic plan
     under the Results Act.)

DOD could improve the draft plan by clearly discussing the linkage of
each external factor with the goals and the effect of each external
factor on the goals.  DOD's draft plan does not clearly link the
international environment factor with particular goals or discuss the
implications on goal achievement.  The draft plan does indicate that
if the legislative changes are not made and savings in infrastructure
costs are not realized, DOD may not have the level of procurement
funding it will need to achieve its fourth goal--modernizing the
force.  DOD plans to use savings from reducing infrastructure to
increase its procurement funding from the $42.6 billion it requested
for fiscal year 1998 to $60 billion a year by fiscal year 2001. 


      PROGRAM EVALUATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.6

The Results Act requires an agency's plan to include a description of
the program evaluations that were used in establishing its strategic
goals and to lay out a schedule for future program evaluations. 
OMB's Circular A-11 guidance calls for a brief description of the
program evaluations that were used in preparing the plan and for the
plan to outline (1) the general scope and methodology for planned
future evaluations, (2) key issues to be addressed, and (3) a
schedule for future evaluations. 

Although DOD's draft plan identifies various reviews DOD relied on in
developing the draft, particularly reviews of strategy, force
structure, readiness, modernization, infrastructure, human resources,
and information operations and intelligence, it does not clearly
discuss how program evaluations were used in establishing the
strategic goals.  A clear and complete discussion would improve the
plan.  Additionally, although the draft plan states that future
evaluations will be done annually in the May to September time frame,
it does not clearly outline the key issues to be addressed. 
Including a fuller discussion of the key issues to be addressed is
another way the draft plan could be improved. 


      OBSERVATIONS ON THE OVERALL
      QUALITY OF THE PLAN
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.7

Although the draft plan discusses each of the six Results Act's
requirements, the overall quality of the plan could be improved by
incorporating the suggestions discussed in the prior sections.  For
example, we noted the plan could be improved if DOD more completely
and explicitly stated its strategies for achieving each goal and
included schedules for initiating and completing significant strategy
actions. 

Additionally, we believe that the plan's overall quality would be
significantly enhanced if the entire plan was presented in one clear
and succinct document formatted in sections to correspond to the six
critical components required in the plans and included the additional
factors, such as major management problems and crosscutting
functions, that you indicated should be discussed in agencies' plans. 

DOD's was the only draft agency strategic plan we obtained that used
a planning document prepared to meet another requirement for its
Results Act plan.  Other agencies' draft plans were prepared
specifically to meet the requirements of the Results Act.  We
understand the Secretary of Defense's intent to use the results of
the QDR in meeting the strategic planning requirements of the Results
Act.  However, as DOD's draft plan is currently constructed, two
documents are required for stakeholders and decisionmakers to fully
understand the degree to which DOD complies with Results Act
strategic planning requirements--the QDR report and the June 23, 1997
summary letter that describes how the QDR meets the requirements by
linking the requirements to the QDR report.  We think that one
document--a stand alone strategic plan prepared specifically to meet
the requirements of the Results Act, regardless of the base from
which it was drawn--could significantly improve stakeholders' and
decisionmakers' understanding of how DOD is meeting the strategic
planning requirements of the Results Act. 


   DOD'S STATUTORY
   RESPONSIBILITIES ARE REFLECTED
   IN ITS MISSION, GOALS, AND
   OBJECTIVES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

DOD's strategic plan does not discuss the major pieces of legislation
that serve as the basis for its mission statement.  However, in its
statements of mission, goals, and objectives, DOD's plan reflects its
broad statutory defense responsibilities.  DOD's statutory
responsibilities are primarily found in title 10 of the United States
Code.  The organizational structure of the Department of Defense was
established by the National Security Act of 1947.  The current
structure also reflects the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986, which modified how DOD's mission is
implemented.  With the Secretary of Defense as its head, DOD is
composed of several entities, including the three military
departments.  The Secretary is vested with the authority, direction,
and control of the Department (10 U.S.C.  113), but it is the
component military departments, not the Secretary, that are vested
with the specific authorities reflected in DOD's mission statement
and goals.  Generally, these authorities pertain to the defense of
the United States, supporting national policies, implementing
national objectives, and waging war (10 U.S.C.  ï¿½ï¿½ 3062, 5062, and
8062).  Additionally, the secretaries of the military departments,
while subject to the authority, direction, and control of the
Secretary of Defense, have broad governance over their respective
departments in such areas as recruiting, organizing, equipping,
supplying, and training (10 U.S.C.  ï¿½ï¿½ 3013, 5013, and 8013). 


   INCLUDING CROSSCUTTING
   ACTIVITIES WOULD IMPROVE DOD'S
   STRATEGIC PLAN
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

Crosscutting functions are not identified as such in DOD's draft
plan, nor are the statutes that authorize DOD operations in areas of
concern to other federal agencies specifically mentioned.  A key area
where coordination with other agencies is essential to the
accomplishment of DOD's mission is in the development and
implementation of national security strategy and the shaping of the
international environment.  In addition to DOD, other agencies with
key roles include the Department of State, the National Security
Council, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Department of
Energy, and to a lesser extent, the U.S.  Agency for International
Development.  For example, failed or failing states such as Somalia,
the former Yugoslavia, and Albania create instability, internal
conflict, and humanitarian crises that require a joint and
coordinated response by several U.S.  agencies.  Moreover, DOD,
State, and other agencies cooperate in a number of programs and
activities aimed at helping to shape the international environment. 
These include security assistance programs, the International
Military Education and Training program, and other international arms
agreements.  While DOD's draft strategic plan acknowledges that DOD's
efforts in these areas are clearly integrated with U.S.  diplomatic
efforts, the extent and mechanisms for cooperation and coordination
are not described. 

The federal government's adaptive responses over time to new needs
and problems have also contributed to fragmentation and overlap in a
host of other program areas.  DOD, for example, has crosscutting
programs in such diverse areas as education, telemedicine, personnel
security, environmental compliance, export promotion, and community
development, among others.  Although DOD's plan touches briefly on
biological and chemical threats, its interaction with other agencies
on these matters, such as assisting the Attorney General in an
emergency situation, is not dealt with in detail.  Similarly, DOD's
plan does not discuss its interaction with various law enforcement
agencies in our country's war on drugs.  For example, the plan does
not mention that DOD is the lead agency for the detection and
monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs in support
of the counterdrug activities of federal, state, local, and foreign
law enforcement agencies or that it is authorized to share
information with and make equipment available to law enforcement
agencies.  Further, although DOD and other agencies involved with
environmental issues have experimented with a wide range of
partnerships in recent years, the plan does not discuss these
efforts. 

Consultation and coordination are important for these and other
crosscutting programs because successfully meeting program goals may
depend on actions by both DOD and partner agencies.  In the
environmental area, for example, cooperative efforts with other
agencies, conservation organizations, and concerned citizens can be
an important tool in ensuring timely and cost-effective environmental
protection.  Overlapping and fragmented programs waste scarce funds,
confuse and frustrate program customers, and limit the overall
effectiveness of the federal effort.  Additionally, the Results Act's
focus on results implies that federal programs contributing to the
same or similar results should be closely coordinated to ensure that
goals are consistent, and as appropriate, program efforts are
mutually reinforcing.  Therefore, we believe DOD's strategic plan
should include a discussion of crosscutting programs to provide
decisionmakers and other stakeholders the information necessary to
help ensure that DOD has designed well thought-out strategies in
consultation with partner agencies to achieve programmatic and other
goals. 


   STRATEGIC PLAN'S COVERAGE OF
   MAJOR MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES IS
   MIXED
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

Over the years, we, the DOD Inspector General, and the services'
inspectors general have reported on major management problems that
DOD faces in carrying out its mission.  More recently, in our
high-risk series report\6 and related testimony,\7 we noted that DOD
has long-standing management problems in six high-risk areas: 
financial management, information technology, weapon systems
acquisition, contract management, infrastructure, and inventory
management.  DOD also reported material internal control weaknesses
related to all of these areas except weapon systems acquisition and
infrastructure in its fiscal year 1996 Federal Managers' Financial
Integrity Act report to the President and Congress.  It is important
for DOD to correct these management problems because every dollar it
spends inefficiently is one less dollar it has to spend on
modernizing its forces and keeping them ready to perform their
missions. 

DOD has taken or plans actions to correct most of these problems and
has made progress in some areas.  For example, in response to our
recommendations, DOD implemented certain commercial practices in its
inventory management area, such as direct vendor delivery for
medical\8 and food\9 items, and states in the plan that it will
continue to take advantage of business process improvements being
pioneered in the private sector.  DOD, to its credit, also included
some discussion in the draft plan of what it is doing or plans to do
to resolve most of these problems. 

The extent of DOD's coverage of these persistent management problems
(high-risk areas) in its draft plan is mixed, however, as noted in
table 1.  In determining the extent of coverage given these areas, we
considered several factors, including whether DOD's draft plan
identified (1) the actions it had taken, was taking, or planned to
take to resolve the problems; (2) the time frames for correcting the
problems; (3) the resources needed to resolve the problems; and (4)
any external factors that might impede DOD's efforts. 

Using these criteria, the high-risk area with the best
coverage--infrastructure--lists several steps DOD has taken or is
planning to take, such as requesting authority for two additional
rounds of base realignments and closures; restructuring laboratories
and research, development, and test facilities; outsourcing and
privatizing noncore activities; and taking advantage of private
sector practices, among others.  It includes time frames, needed
resources, and external factors for some but not all elements of its
strategy to resolve this problem.  In the area with the least
coverage--contract management--the plan merely states that DOD will
streamline vendor pay but does not discuss how past control problems
over contract expenditures are being or will be addressed. 

Most of the other management problems lack specificity in terms of
steps DOD will take to resolve them, time frames for resolution,
needed resources, or external factors that could affect successful
resolution.  At a minimum, in problem areas where DOD has taken
successful corrective actions, it would be useful for DOD to discuss
how it addressed the problems and intends to prevent them from
resurfacing.  The plan could identify other problems where DOD may
have had less success and discuss how it plans to resolve them.  Such
details could be useful in determining the extent to which these
persistent management problems could impede DOD's efforts to achieve
its goals and objectives or its efforts at measuring performance. 
DOD could significantly improve its strategic plan by including this
degree of specificity, since its ability to successfully implement
the Results Act could be hampered by these persistent management
problems. 



                                Table 1
                
                 Extent to Which Persistent Management
                Problems Are Covered in DOD's Strategic
                                  Plan

High-risk
area          The problem                  Coverage in the plan
------------  ---------------------------  ---------------------------
Financial     DOD does not have adequate   Partial. The plan states
management    financial management         that DOD plans to
              processes in place to        consolidate and outsource
              produce the information it   much of this function.
              needs for making decisions
              affecting its operations
              and accountability.

Information   DOD spends billions          Partial. The plan states
management    annually on information      that DOD plans to
and           technology but makes system  consolidate 16 large
technology    selections without           information processing
              appropriately analyzing      centers into 6 but lacks
              costs, benefits, and         specific discussion of how
              technical risks;             it will ensure the systems
              establishing realistic       are compatible and the data
              project schedules; or        produced are reliable.
              considering how business
              process improvements could
              affect technology
              investments.

Weapon        Wasteful practices,          Partial. The plan states
systems       including establishing       DOD will take maximum
acquisition   questionable requirements    advantage of acquisition
              for weapon systems;          reform but lacks
              projecting unrealistic       specificity on how the
              cost, schedule, and          reforms are expected to
              performance estimates; and   address the problems.
              beginning production before
              adequate testing has been
              completed, add billions of
              dollars to defense weapon
              systems acquisition costs.

Contract      Inadequate controls over     None. The plan does not
management    contract expenditures risk   discuss how controls will
              millions of dollars in       be strengthened, only that
              overpayments to              DOD will streamline vendor
              contractors.                 pay.

Infrastructu  In recent years, DOD has     Partial. The plan discusses
re            undergone substantial        specific steps DOD is
              downsizing in force          taking or plans to take to
              structure but commensurate   reduce infrastructure and
              reductions in operations     quantifies the expected
              and support costs have not   reductions.
              been achieved.

Inventory     Fundamental control          Partial. The plan discusses
management    deficiencies in inventory    DOD initiatives such as
              management systems and       Joint Total Asset
              procedures make DOD          Visibility and the Global
              vulnerable to billions of    Combat Support System but
              dollars in unneeded          lacks specifics and time
              inventory.                   frames.
----------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------
\6 High-Risk Series:  An Overview (GAO/HR-97-1, Feb.  1997). 

\7 DOD High-Risk Areas:  Eliminating Underlying Causes Will Avoid
Billions of Dollars in Waste (GAO/T-NSIAD/AIMD-97-143, May 1, 1997). 

\8 DOD Medical Inventory:  Reductions Can Be Made Through the Use of
Commercial Practices (GAO/NSIAD-92-58, Dec.  5, 1991). 

\9 DOD Food Inventory:  Using Private Sector Practices Can Reduce
Costs and Eliminate Problems (GAO/NSIAD-93-110, June 6, 1993). 


   DOD DOES NOT HAVE RELIABLE
   INFORMATION FOR HELPING ACHIEVE
   ITS GOALS OR MEASURING ITS
   RESULTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

A lack of reliable management information is a serious problem
throughout DOD.  Until the DOD can reliably obtain such information,
its ability to effectively oversee and manage its vast operations,
including developing and implementing a viable strategic plan for
achieving the performance measurement objectives of the Results Act,
will continue to be impaired.  If DOD is to obtain reliable
management information, it must overcome a number of challenging
problems, particularly those in the critical areas of financial
management and information systems technology. 

DOD has acknowledged a departmentwide problem in accumulating
accurate and complete cost accounting information.  Without reliable
cost and other management information, DOD will be limited in its
ability to establish reasonable performance measures and to reliably
assess progress against these measures across the spectrum of its
operations.  As DOD faces difficult decisions associated with
balancing scarce resources with critical needs, accurate, reliable,
and timely information on financial aspects of performance will be
particularly important to consider in judging program results.  In
addition, DOD has had only limited success in implementing
departmentwide information technology initiatives.  Yet, many of the
goals and objectives included in the DOD's draft plan rely heavily on
the effective use of information technology. 


      DOD FACES CONSIDERABLE
      CHALLENGE IF IT IS TO
      DEVELOP RELIABLE FINANCIAL
      INFORMATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :8.1

Financial statements, prepared and audited in accordance with the
Chief Financial Officers' (CFO) Act, provide an annual scorecard to
measure DOD's progress in resolving its financial management
reporting deficiencies.  Since 1991, several of the military services
and major DOD components have attempted to prepare financial
statements in accordance with the CFO Act's requirements.  None of
the financial statements prepared by the military services or major
DOD components have been sufficiently reliable to withstand the
scrutiny of a financial statement audit.  In addition, auditors found
that DOD's first attempt to prepare departmentwide financial
statements for fiscal year 1996 were unauditable due to problems
within DOD's accounting systems and internal control structure. 

Deficiencies identified in auditors' reports have prevented DOD
managers from obtaining reliable financial information needed for
sound decisionmaking across the spectrum of the Department's
financial operations.  In addition, auditors have consistently found
that DOD financial data available for decisionmaking have been
adversely affected because many basic control procedures either were
not in place or were not followed.  Auditors have also reported that
DOD lacks reliable information on billions of dollars of
disbursements as well as on other critical areas of the Department's
operations. 

Our and DOD auditors' reports have confirmed that DOD does not have
accurate cost data for almost all of its assets, such as inventories
of equipment, aircraft, and missiles, nor can DOD accumulate reliable
information on the cost of its business activities and critical
operations.  For example, auditors have reported that DOD managers
did not have accurate information on actual operating and capital
costs to consider when making decisions to replace or upgrade weapon
systems or on the actual costs associated with base closure and
realignment decisions.  Our reports have also disclosed that
pervasive weaknesses in DOD's general computer controls placed DOD at
risk of improper modification or loss of sensitive financial data. 
In addition, as discussed in the following section, DOD's information
system efforts, including systems relied on to provide financial
data, will be critical to reliably measuring performance.  DOD relies
on an estimated 10,000 automated systems to carry out its mission,
including accounting, finance, logistics, personnel, budgetary, and
other management information.  Few of these systems are effectively
tied together.  DOD has acknowledged that its financial operations
are plagued with duplicative processes and are slow and error prone. 

DOD has recognized the importance of tackling these financial
management deficiencies and has many initiatives planned or underway
that are intended to address them.  One of the major initiatives
directed at improving its cost accounting capabilities was the
establishment of a set of working capital funds intended to focus
attention on the total costs of carrying out certain critical DOD
business operations, including helping to better manage the costs
associated with maintaining DOD's weapon systems.  However, DOD's
efforts in this area have been plagued with implementation problems. 
For example, past financial reports on the funds' operations were not
sufficiently reliable to determine whether they met their financial
goal of operating on a break-even basis.  DOD has also begun an
initiative directed at better ensuring that senior DOD managers play
a more active role in correcting poor controls. 

To its credit, DOD has also recognized business process reengineering
as a key element in its financial management reform initiatives. 
However, we have expressed concern over whether reengineering efforts
have focused largely on greater use of technology within existing
processes and organizations.  Using this approach may not result in
the radical improvements in processes and practices--and associated
financial management information--DOD envisioned. 

We believe that DOD's draft plan could be significantly enhanced by
addressing how it will ensure that financial data used to measure and
manage program performance are complete, reliable, and timely.  At a
minimum, DOD's strategic plan could include a discussion of what DOD
has done, is doing, and plans to do to address financial data
problems, particularly those highlighted through the annual public
scorecard provided by the CFO Act financial statement audits, and the
ease or difficulty it anticipates in obtaining financial data needed
to assist in measuring results.  Because of the widespread nature of
acknowledged financial management deficiencies and the large number
of DOD components relied on to carry out the DOD's financial
operations, it is also critical for DOD's plan to address the
development of actions to unite the organizational support and
commitment of DOD's logistics, personnel, accounting, and budget
components. 


      DOD FACES CONSIDERABLE
      CHALLENGE IN MANAGING
      INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IF IT
      IS TO ACHIEVE ITS GOALS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :8.2

Many of DOD's general goals and objectives rely on the effective use
of information technology to obtain the stated goal, as well as to
measure progress toward its achievement.  For example, DOD's sixth
goal--to fundamentally reengineer the Department to reduce
infrastructure costs by using modern management tools and exploiting
the Revolution in Business Affairs--will require fundamental changes
in the underlying support systems.  Further, DOD's first strategic
goal for harnessing the capabilities of the U.S.  armed forces also
relies on the effective use of information technology.  For example,
in discussing in its draft plan the critical enablers necessary to
sustain military capabilities, DOD states that "our global
communications must allow for the timely exchange of information,
data, decisions, and orders.  .  .  The ability to gather, process,
and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of reliable and precise
information anywhere in the world and under any conditions is a
tremendous strategic and military advantage." To achieve this
capability, DOD must develop computer systems and communications
channels that interoperate seamlessly, develop and enforce data
standards, and greatly reduce system redundancy. 

We have consistently reported that DOD has not succeeded in its
efforts to modernize its information infrastructure.  In fact, we
placed DOD's Corporate Information Management (CIM) initiative on our
list of government information management and technology programs at
high risk.  CIM was intended, in large part, to reengineer key
business processes and reduce the number of redundant DOD systems. 
With CIM, DOD intended that business services such as logistics and
health care would be improved and that costs would be greatly
reduced.  This effort has not succeeded, in part, because of DOD's
difficulty in managing large-scale technology initiatives across the
Department.  The prevailing culture too frequently demands unique
solutions at each organizational level. 

The Clinger-Cohen Act was enacted in 1996 to foster better management
of technology resources at all levels by encouraging strong
leadership in technology management oversight, calling for effective
controls over technology investments, and requiring agencies to
consider alternatives before making substantial investments in
technology upgrades or systems modernization.  Because DOD's
strategic goals are so fundamentally linked to technology and because
DOD has experienced significant difficulties in managing technology
initiatives, we believe its strategic plan would be significantly
enhanced by more explicitly linking these goals to a strategy for
improving management and oversight through implementation of the
Clinger-Cohen Act. 

Additionally, DOD should recognize the dramatic impact the year 2000
problem\10 will likely have on computer operations throughout the
agency--including the mission critical applications identified in its
draft strategic plan.  Our initial review of DOD components' response
to the year 2000 problem has been mixed.  While some small segments
within DOD are responding well to the issue, other organizational
units face a potential disaster unless planning and implementation
activities are dramatically improved. 

Finally, DOD needs to recognize in its plan that many of its
individual systems are extremely vulnerable to data loss, unwanted
browsing, and loss of access due to computer hacking.  Our 1996
report showed that DOD suffered over 250,000 hacker attacks in 1995,
with over 60 percent of the attacks successfully gaining access.\11
In discussing the global security environment, DOD's draft plan
recognizes that information warfare capability is one of a number of
areas of "particular concern," especially as it involves
vulnerabilities that could be exploited by potential opponents. 
Again, this problem is so pervasive throughout DOD and so critical to
successful implementation of its goals that we believe its plan
should specifically address this issue. 


--------------------
\10 On January 1, 2000, many computer systems, including DOD and
defense contractor systems, if not adequately modified, will either
fail to run or malfunction simply because the equipment and software
were not designed to accommodate the change of the date to the new
millennium. 

\11 Information Security:  Computer Attacks at Department of Defense
Pose Increasing Risks (GAO/AIMD-96-84, May 22, 1996). 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9

On July 30, 1997, we provided a draft of this letter to DOD for
comment.  On July 31, 1997, we met with Department officials, who
agreed that DOD's strategic plan could be improved in some respects. 
They indicated that as DOD's planning processes move forward, DOD
will consider the suggestions made in our letter. 

Regarding our discussion on crosscutting federal agencies' programs,
DOD officials stated that DOD coordinates and cooperates with other
federal agencies extensively as part of its ongoing strategic
planning process.  They believed such coordination and cooperation
were consistent with DOD's effort to make the most efficient use of
government resources. 

Regarding our discussion on persistent management problems, the
officials said that addressing persistent management problems in an
agency's strategic plan is not required by the Results Act.  They
noted, however, that each management problem identified in our letter
is being actively addressed in DOD.  Much of the detail, they said,
can be found in underlying DOD strategic plans, such as the DOD
Logistics Strategic Plan, which provides DOD managers and
stakeholders with comprehensive planning information.  They added
that DOD managers, oversight bodies, and stakeholders can get a
better understanding of how the Department is addressing these areas
by referring to these lower-level plans.  DOD officials said that the
persistent management problems mentioned in our letter are addressed
in the following lower level-plans. 

  -- Financial Management:  DOD Chief Financial Officer's Financial
     Management Report and 5 Year Plan 1996-2000 and the Defense
     Finance and Accounting Service, Accounting Systems Strategic
     Plan (Apr.  1997). 

  -- Information Management and Technology:  DOD Information
     Technology Management Plan (Mar.  1997). 

  -- Weapons Systems Acquisition:  Acquisition Reform - Mandate for
     Change (Feb.  1994); Defense Acquisition Pilot Programs Annual
     Report (1996); Acquisition Reform Benchmarking Group Final
     Report (June 1997); and DOD's Three Year Acquisition Goals as a
     designated National Performance Review Reinvention Impact Center
     (RIC) (July 1997). 

  -- Contract Management:  Defense Logistics Agency Performance
     Report (May 1997). 

  -- Infrastructure:  the Secretary of Defense commissioned a report
     from the Task Force on Defense Reform, which is due in November
     1997. 

  -- Inventory Management:  DOD Logistics Strategic Plan (June 1996);
     update expected in October 1997. 

We did not evaluate or comment in this letter on DOD's efforts to
address persistent management problems or its coordination and
cooperation with other agencies on crosscutting programs.  Our point
is that DOD could improve its draft strategic plan by including more
of a discussion of these topics.  With respect to major management
problems, we recognize that this type of information is not
specifically required to be included in DOD's plan.  However, as we
state in our letter, DOD's persistent management problems could
impede its efforts to achieve its goals and objectives and to measure
performance.  Therefore, we continue to believe that DOD's strategic
plan should include a more extensive discussion of the steps it has
taken or plans to take to resolve its management problems. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :9.1

As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce its
contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this letter
until 30 days from its issue date.  At that time, we will send copies
of this letter to the Minority Leader of the House of
Representatives; Ranking Minority Members of your Committees; the
Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of other Committees that have
jurisdiction over DOD activities; the Secretary of Defense; and the
Director, Office of Management and Budget.  Copies will be made
available to others on request. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-8412 or Ken Knouse at (202) 512-9280
if you or your staff have any questions concerning this letter. 
Major contributors to this report are listed in enclosure I. 

David R.  Warren, Director
Defense Management Issues


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
=========================================================== Appendix I


   NATIONAL SECURITY AND
   INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION
   WASHINGTON, D.C. 
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1

Charles I.  (Bud) Patton, Jr.
Kenneth R.  Knouse, Jr.
F.  Earl Morrison
Yolanda C.  ElSerwy
Harold J.  Johnson, Jr.
Barbara L.  Wooten


   ACCOUNTING AND INFORMATION
   MANAGEMENT DIVISION WASHINGTON,
   D.C. 
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2

Jack L.  Brock, Jr.
Geoffrey B.  Frank


   OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL,
   WASHINGTON, D.C. 
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3

William T.  Woods


============================================================ Chapter 0


============================================================ Chapter 1


============================================================ Chapter 2


RELATED GAO PRODUCTS
============================================================ Chapter 3


   HIGH-RISK AREAS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1

DOD High-Risk Areas:  Eliminating Underlying Causes Will Avoid
Billions of Dollars in Waste (GAO/T-NSIAD/AIMD-97-143, May 1, 1997). 

Defense Financial Management (GAO/HR 97-3, Feb.  1997). 

Defense Contract Management (GAO/HR-97-4, Feb.  1997). 

Defense Inventory Management (GAO/HR 97-5, Feb.  1997). 

Defense Weapon Systems Acquisition (GAO/HR 97-6, Feb.  1997). 

Defense Infrastructure (GAO/HR 97-7, Feb.  1997). 

Information Management and Technology (GAO/HR 97-9, Feb.  1997). 


   DEFENSE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2

Financial Management:  DOD Inventory of Financial Management Systems
Is Incomplete (GAO/AIMD-97-29, Jan.  31, 1997). 

DOD Accounting Systems:  Efforts to Improve System for Navy Need
Overall Structure (GAO/AIMD-96-99, Sept.  30, 1996). 

Navy Financial Management:  Improved Management of Operating
Materials and Supplies Could Yield Significant Savings
(GAO/AIMD-96-94, Aug.  16, 1996). 

CFO Act Financial Audits:  Navy Plant Property Accounting and
Reporting Is Unreliable (GAO/AIMD-96-65, July 8, 1996). 

Financial Management:  DOD Needs to Lower the Disbursement
Prevalidation Threshold (GAO/AIMD-96-82, June 11, 1996). 

Information Security:  Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose
Increasing Risks (GAO/AIMD-96-84, May 22, 1996). 

Navy Anti-Deficiency Act Training (GAO/AIMD-96-53R, Apr.  12, 1996). 

Defense Business Operations Fund:  DOD Is Experiencing Difficulty in
Managing the Fund's Cash (GAO/AIMD-96-54, Apr.  10, 1996). 

CFO Act Financial Audits:  Increased Attention Must Be Given to
Preparing Navy's Financial Reports (GAO/AIMD-96-7, Mar.  27, 1996). 

Financial Management:  Challenges Facing DOD in Meeting the Goals of
the Chief Financial Officers Act (GAO/T-AIMD-96-1, Nov.  14, 1995). 

Financial Management:  Challenges Confronting DOD's Reform
Initiatives (GAO/T-AIMD-95-146, May 23, 1995). 

Financial Management:  Challenges Confronting DOD's Reform
Initiatives (GAO/T-AIMD-95-143, May 16, 1995). 

Financial Management:  Control Weaknesses Increase Risk of Improper
Navy Civilian Payroll Payments (GAO/AIMD-95-73, May 8, 1995). 

Travel Process Reengineering:  DOD Faces Challenges in Using Industry
Practices to Reduce Costs (GAO/AIMD/NSIAD-95-90, Mar.  2, 1995). 

Defense Business Operations Fund:  Management Issues Challenge Fund
Implementation (GAO/AIMD-95-79, Mar.  1, 1995). 


   DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3

Contract Management:  Fixing DOD's Payment Problems Is Imperative
(GAO/NSIAD-97-37, Apr.  10, 1997). 

Defense Depot Maintenance:  Privatization and the Debate Over the
Public-Private Mix (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-146, Apr.  16, 1996). 

DOD Procurement:  Use and Administration of DOD's Voluntary
Disclosure Program (GAO/NSIAD-96-21, Feb.  6, 1996). 

DOD Procurement:  Millions in Contract Payment Errors Not Detected
and Resolved Promptly (GAO/NSIAD-96-8, Oct.  6, 1995). 

High-Risk Series:  Defense Contract Management (GAO/HR-95-3, Feb. 
1995). 

DOD Procurement:  Overpayments and Underpayments at Selected
Contractors Show Major Problem (GAO/NSIAD-94-245, Aug.  5, 1994). 

DOD Procurement:  Millions in Overpayments Returned by DOD
Contractors (GAO/NSIAD-94-106, Mar.  14, 1994). 


   DEFENSE INVENTORY MANAGEMENT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4

Inventory Management:  The Army Could Reduce Logistics Costs for
Aviation Parts by Adopting Best Practices (GAO/NSIAD-97-82, Apr.  15,
1997). 

Defense Inventory Management:  Problems, Progress, and Additional
Actions Needed (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-109, Mar.  20, 1997). 

1997 DOD Budget:  Potential Reductions to Operation and Maintenance
Program (GAO/NSIAD-96-220, Sept.  18, 1996). 

Defense IRM:  Critical Risks Facing New Materiel Management Strategy
(GAO/AIMD-96-109, Sept.  6, 1996). 

Navy Financial Management:  Improved Management of Operating
Materials and Supplies Could Yield Significant Savings
(GAO/AIMD-96-94, Aug.  16, 1996). 

Inventory Management:  Adopting Best Practices Could Enhance Navy
Efforts to Achieve Efficiencies and Savings (GAO/NSIAD-96-156, July
12, 1996). 

Defense Logistics:  Requirement Determinations for Aviation Spare
Parts Need to Be Improved (GAO/NSIAD-96-70, Mar.  19, 1996). 

Best Management Practices:  Reengineering the Air Force's Logistics
System Can Yield Substantial Savings (GAO/NSIAD-96-5, Feb.  21,
1996). 

Inventory Management:  DOD Can Build on Progress in Using Best
Practices to Achieve Substantial Savings (GAO/NSIAD-95-142, Aug.  4,
1995). 

Best Practices Methodology:  A New Approach for Improving Government
Operations (GAO/NSIAD-95-154, May 1995). 

Defense Business Operations Fund:  Management Issues Challenge Fund
Implementation (GAO/NSIAD 95-79, Mar.  1, 1995). 

High-Risk Series:  Defense Inventory Management (GAO/HR-95-5, Feb. 
1995). 

Defense Supply:  Inventories Contain Nonessential and Excessive
Insurance Stocks (GAO/NSIAD-95-1, Jan.  20, 1995). 

Defense Supply:  Acquisition Leadtime Requirements Can Be
Significantly Reduced (GAO/NSIAD-95-2, Dec.  20, 1994). 


   DEFENSE WEAPON SYSTEMS
   ACQUISITION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5

Defense Aircraft Investments:  Major Program Commitments Based on
Optimistic Budget Projections (GAO/NSIAD-T-97-103, Mar.  5, 1997). 

Weapons Acquisition:  Better Use of Limited DOD Acquisition Funding
Would Reduce Costs (GAO/NSIAD-97-23, Feb.  13, 1997). 

Acquisition Reform:  Implementation of Title V of the Federal
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (GAO/NSIAD-97-22BR, Oct.  31,
1996). 

Combat Air Power:  Joint Mission Assessments Needed Before Making
Program and Budget Decisions (GAO/NSIAD-96-177, Sept.  20, 1996). 

Best Practices:  Commercial Quality Assurance Practices Offer
Improvements for DOD (GAO/NSIAD-96-162, Aug.  26, 1996). 

Navy Aviation:  F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal Operational
Improvement at High Cost (GAO/NSIAD-96-98, June 18, 1996). 

Comanche Helicopter:  Testing Needs to Be Completed Prior to
Production Decisions (GAO/NSIAD-95-112, May 18, 1995). 

Tactical Aircraft:  Concurrency in Development and Production of F-22
Aircraft Should Be Reduced (GAO/NSIAD-95-59, Apr.  19, 1995). 

High-Risk Series:  Defense Weapon Systems Acquisition (GAO/HR-95-4,
Feb.  1995). 

Electronic Warfare:  Most Air Force ALQ-135 Jammers Procured Without
Operational Testing (GAO/NSIAD-95-47, Nov.  22, 1994). 


   DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:6

Air Force Depot Maintenance:  Privatization-in-Place Plans Are Costly
While Excess Capacity Exists (GAO/NSIAD-97-13, Dec.  31, 1996). 

Army Depot Maintenance:  Privatization Without Further Downsizing
Increases Costly Excess Capacity (GAO/NSIAD-96-201, Sept.  18, 1996). 

Navy Depot Maintenance:  Cost and Savings Issues Related to
Privatizing-in-Place at the Louisville, Kentucky, Depot
(GAO/NSIAD-96-202, Sept.  18, 1996). 

Defense Acquisition Infrastructure:  Changes in RDT&E Laboratories
and Centers (GAO/NSIAD-96-221BR, Sept.  13, 1996). 

Defense Infrastructure:  Cost Projected to Increase Between 1997 and
2001 (GAO/NSIAD-96-174, May 31, 1996). 

Military Bases:  Opportunities for Savings in Installation Support
Costs Are Being Missed (GAO/NSIAD-96-108, Apr.  23, 1996). 

Military Bases:  Closure and Realignment Savings Are Significant, but
Not Easily Quantified (GAO/NSIAD-96-67, Apr.  8, 1996). 

Defense Infrastructure:  Budget Estimates for 1996-2001 Offer Little
Savings for Modernization (GAO/NSIAD-96-131, Apr.  4, 1996). 

Defense Transportation:  Streamlining of the U.S.  Transportation
Command Is Needed (GAO/NSIAD-96-60, Feb.  22, 1996). 

Military Bases:  Analysis of DOD's 1995 Process and Recommendations
for Closure and Realignment (GAO/NSIAD-95-133, Apr.  14, 1995). 


   INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND
   TECHNOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:7

Defense IRM:  Strategy Needed for Logistics Information Technology
Improvement Efforts (GAO/AIMD-97-6, Nov.  14, 1996). 

DOD Accounting Systems:  Efforts to Improve Systems for Navy Need
Overall Structure (GAO/AIMD-96-99, Sept.  30, 1996). 

Defense IRM:  Critical Risks Facing New Materiel Management Strategy
(GAO/AIMD-96-109, Sept.  6, 1996). 

Defense Transportation:  Migration Systems Selected Without Adequate
Analysis (GAO/AIMD-96-81, Aug.  29, 1996). 

Defense Management:  Selection of Depot Maintenance Standard System
Not Based on Sufficient Analyses (GAO/AIMD-95-110, July 13, 1995). 

Defense Management:  Impediments Jeopardize Logistics Corporate
Information Management (GAO/NSIAD-95-28, Oct.  21, 1994). 

Defense Management:  Stronger Support Needed for Corporate
Information Management Initiative to Succeed (GAO/AIMD/NSIAD-94-101,
Apr.  12, 1994). 


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