Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Force Overseas
(Letter Report, 07/21/97, GAO/NSIAD-97-207).
Since a terrorist bomb killed 19 U.S. military personnel in Saudi Arabia
last year, U.S. forces are significantly better protected from terrorist
attacks in such high-risk areas as Turkey and the Middle East, but
troops in many regions remain vulnerable because there are no mandatory
security standards for military buildings. In addition, the Defense
Department (DOD) has placed less emphasis on addressing vulnerabilities
in countries that are currently considered to have a lower threat. GAO
recommends that DOD develop common standards and procedures that would
include (1) standardized vulnerability assessments to ensure a
consistent level of quality and to allow comparisons among different
sites, (2) DOD-wide physical security standards that are measurable yet
provide flexibility when required by local circumstances, and (3)
procedures to maintain greater consistency among commands in their
implementation of threat condition security measures.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-97-207
TITLE: Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its
Force Overseas
DATE: 07/21/97
SUBJECT: Terrorism
Military bases
Military personnel
Armed forces abroad
Explosives
Facility security
IDENTIFIER: Saudi Arabia
Middle East
Turkey
Europe
Riyadh (Saudi Arabia)
Khobar Towers (Dhahran, Saudi Arabia)
Dhahran (Saudi Arabia)
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Requesters
July 1997
COMBATING TERRORISM - STATUS OF
DOD EFFORTS TO PROTECT ITS FORCES
OVERSEAS
GAO/NSIAD-97-207
DOD's Antiterrorism Program
(703174)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
DOD - Department of Defense
JCS/J-34 - Joint Chiefs of Staff/Deputy Directorate for Combating
Terroism
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-277464
July 21, 1997
The Honorable Ike Skelton
House of Representatives
The Honorable John Glenn
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
As you requested, we have reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD)
efforts to protect U.S. forces from terrorist attacks. This report
addresses (1) measures taken at overseas U.S. bases to enhance the
security of deployed personnel and (2) recent DOD initiatives to
improve its antiterrorism\1 program. We plan to issue a separate
report on national counterterrorism policy and strategy; the roles,
responsibilities, programs, and activities of federal agencies under
this policy; and the mechanisms for coordinating interagency efforts.
--------------------
\1 For the purposes of this report, we are using the DOD term
"antiterrorism" to refer to defensive measures used to reduce the
vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts.
Counterterrorism, in contrast, refers to offensive measures taken to
prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Antiterrorism and
counterterrorism are elements of a broader concept known as combating
terrorism. In turn, combating terrorism is part of a much broader
concept known as force protection. Other elements of force
protection are physical security, operations security, protective
services, and law enforcement operations.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
In November 1995, a car bomb exploded in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia,
killing five Americans who were working at the Office of the Program
Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard. A few months later, in June
1996, another terrorist bomb detonated near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.
The explosion killed 19 U.S. service personnel living in a high-rise
apartment building at the Khobar Towers military complex. Hundreds
more were injured. Soon after the Khobar Towers bombing, the
Secretary of Defense appointed a task force headed by retired
four-star Army General Wayne A. Downing to investigate the incident
and make recommendations on how to prevent or minimize the damage of
future attacks. The Downing Assessment Task Force completed its work
in August 1996. The Secretary of Defense on the whole concurred with
the task force's report and announced a series of measures intended
to improve the protection of deployed U.S. forces. He said that the
threat of sophisticated, organized terrorism against our overseas
forces was now a fact of life and that U.S. leaders must adopt a
"radically new mind-set" with regard to international terrorism. In
early 1997, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided a
status report to Congress on DOD's response to the Downing task
force. The Chairman stated DOD was implementing all of the task
force's recommendations.\2
The task force found that DOD lacked a comprehensive, consistent
approach to antiterrorism that is based on common guidance,
standards, and procedures. A top priority, it said, should be
designating a single element in DOD to oversee an integrated system
approach to force protection efforts, manage resources, and assist
commanders in the field. At that time, DOD lacked a single entity
with responsibility for the program, and the task force stated this
had an adverse impact on the posture of forces in the field. The
task force noted that policies, standards, and available resources
all varied significantly among both service and joint forces. The
Downing task force identified key principles for managing and
improving the Department's antiterrorism program. We used these as
the primary criteria for our review.
DOD does not know how much is being spent on antiterrorism because it
cannot easily determine what costs are associated with its
antiterrorism program. DOD has estimated that it spends about $4
billion a year on combating terrorism--the term DOD uses when
discussing both antiterrorism and counterterrorism--but this figure
includes broad cost elements such as physical security,
counterintelligence, security and investigative matters, and
counterterrorism.\3 In addition, certain costs related to
antiterrorism are not captured in the $4 billion estimate. In
particular, the estimate does not include funds being spent by base
commanders from their base operations accounts--the money they use to
finance the day-to-day operations of their activities. Also not
included in this estimate is the cost of dual-use items such as
ballistic body armor or armored vehicles that can be used in support
of a unit's primary mission or to defend and protect against a
terrorist attack.
DOD designates the terrorist threat level faced by personnel in each
country. A five-step scale is used to describe the severity of
threat. These steps, from highest to lowest, are critical, high,
medium, low, and negligible. Threat levels may be raised or lowered
based on new information or analysis. In May 1997, DOD had
designated 13 countries as having a high threat level and
1--Lebanon--as having a critical threat level (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: Countries Where the
Terrorist Threat Is Critical or
High (as of May 15, 1997)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: Defense Intelligence
Agency.
(See figure in printed
edition.)
--------------------
\2 As of June 3, 1997, DOD said all but 2 of the task force's 81
recommendations had been implemented. Implementation of the two
remaining recommendations was delayed by procurement problems.
\3 About 90 percent of the costs in DOD's $4 billion estimate are for
civilian and military personnel such as contract guards and military
police.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
Many deployed U.S. forces are better protected today from terrorist
attacks similar to the one that occurred at Khobar Towers. During
March and April 1997, we visited 30 overseas sites and found that
security improvements were most evident where the risk of terrorism
is the greatest, such as Turkey and the Middle East. DOD has placed
less emphasis on addressing vulnerabilities in countries that are
currently considered to have a lower threat. Senior military
commanders and defense officials we met with emphasized that they can
reduce, but not eliminate, vulnerabilities and that further terrorist
attacks against
U.S. forces should be expected. They also observed that efforts to
defend against terrorism are complicated by a number of factors,
including the ability of terrorists to decide where and when to
attack and to choose from a wide selection of targets. Nevertheless,
the officials said, some risk must be accepted as the United States
pursues its national security strategy abroad.
Since the bombing at Khobar Towers, DOD has initiated a number of
changes aimed at improving its antiterrorism program. For example,
DOD has established a new office for combating terrorism on the Joint
Staff, enhanced the antiterrorism responsibilities of the geographic
combatant commands, and instituted a vulnerability assessment process
under the aegis of the Joint Staff. These initiatives, however, have
not resulted in a comprehensive, consistent approach to antiterrorism
as called for by the Downing task force. For instance, DOD's force
protection focal point has not provided the geographic combatant
commanders the guidance the commanders believe they need to carry out
their expanded antiterrorism responsibilities. Such guidance would
include establishing standards for assessing vulnerabilities and
agencywide physical security requirements designed to provide a
minimum level of protection to U.S. forces no matter where they are
located. A comprehensive, consistent approach to antiterrorism using
common standards would give commanders a more objective basis for
determining whether they are providing adequate protection to their
facilities and personnel. Further, DOD would have a capability to
compare vulnerabilities at different sites on a worldwide basis and
thus ensure that sufficient emphasis is being placed on the most
vulnerable areas.
PROTECTION OF MANY U.S. FORCES
HAS IMPROVED, BUT
VULNERABILITIES REMAIN
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
During our visits to overseas bases, we found significant security
improvements have been made in Turkey and the Middle East to protect
against vehicle bombs. In these countries, sites have been fortified
in various ways against a terrorist attack, particularly against a
truck bomb similar to the one that struck Khobar Towers. Commanders
have attempted to extend the stand-off\4 distance around their
facilities, and where sufficient stand-off cannot be obtained, they
are using other measures to mitigate against the impact of a truck
bomb.
Saudi Arabia has seen the most profound changes, as thousands of DOD
personnel have been moved to remote facilities in the desert and
restricted from leaving base throughout their entire tour. Most
military dependents have been sent back to the United States to
reduce their exposure to the terrorist threat. Many dependents are
also being withdrawn from Kuwait and Bahrain. In Turkey, an off-base
apartment building dedicated solely to U.S. military personnel was
closed because it was considered too vulnerable to a truck bomb
attack. The personnel living in this building were relocated to
on-base housing or dispersed to other off-base housing facilities.
The base also had installed concrete barriers to make on-base
residential areas and headquarters buildings less vulnerable and had
begun to repair holes in the perimeter fence.
DOD has placed less emphasis on improving security at sites where the
terrorist threat is not considered to be high. Base officials at
many of the installations we visited identified numerous
vulnerabilities that were still to be addressed. For instance,
stand-off distance around base facilities, including housing, was
often a few feet or less. Facilities were frequently located in
populated areas, abutting public roads and privately owned land,
offices, or residences. Base officials said it would be very
difficult to defend these facilities against a truck bomb attack like
the one at Khobar Towers. However, they said it was impractical to
obtain sufficient stand-off distance either due to shortages of
suitable land or the high cost of obtaining it.
During our visits, military officials told us that the question is
not whether additional terrorist attacks will occur, but when, where,
and how. In this light, they emphasized that while vulnerabilities
to attacks can be reduced, a "zero defects" approach to fighting
terrorism is not possible. DOD faces a number of obstacles in
defending against future terrorist attacks. First, DOD has a large
presence in many countries around the world, offering a plethora of
potential targets. DOD does not have the resources to fully protect
all of them all the time. Second, predictive intelligence on
terrorist attacks is difficult to obtain. Commanders, therefore, may
not be in a position to prevent an attack from occurring; they can
only prepare to minimize the consequences from an attack. Third, DOD
installations are often located on host nation installations and, as
a result, there are limitations on the security measures DOD can
undertake. Political and cultural considerations outside the control
of local commanders may influence decisions that affect security.
According to DOD officials, terrorism is a pervasive phenomenon,
whose specific threats are difficult to predict. It is worldwide in
scope, with some terrorist organizations state supported and some
only loosely affiliated, in support of multiple causes. It is a
transnational phenomenon, cutting across geographic and political
boundaries. Areas considered safe and benign one day, such as Saudi
Arabia prior to the bombings, can quickly become high threat the
next. According to these officials, terrorism's tactic is not to
challenge U.S. military power directly, but to weaken U.S. resolve
through indirect attacks on weak links with high publicity value.
In a September 1996 report to the President, the Secretary of Defense
said executing the national security strategy to protect U.S.
interests requires the physical presence of U.S. forces in many
nations, presenting constant exposure to the threat. U.S.
commanders in the past have accepted operating locations that present
serious security challenges in today's terrorist environment. The
location of Khobar Towers, for example, was difficult to defend, but
the complex was paid for by the Saudis and convenient to U.S.
military work areas. In most of the countries we visited, we found
that many U.S. forces are located in urban areas, closely surrounded
by easily accessible buildings or roads.
In many cases overseas, U.S. forces work at facilities that are
owned by the host nation, and they depend on the host nation for
important security functions. U.S. forces in the Middle East are
prevented from patrolling outside their own perimeter fencing. At
one location we visited in Europe, entry to the base is controlled by
host nation security forces with no U.S military role. The U.S.
military does not have its own perimeter at this base and may not
approach the base perimeter without escort.
Some officials expressed concern that efforts to isolate and fortify
DOD facilities could make other targets more vulnerable. For
instance, terrorists could decide to target small military offices,
housing areas, or vehicular traffic outside the main installations.
In most of the countries we visited, many U.S. military personnel
were living in off-base housing complexes or in individual quarters
dispersed among the civilian population. In Naples, Italy, for
instance, residences for U.S. personnel were spread out over an
approximately 350 square-mile area. At one base we visited,
antiterrorism officials were fairly comfortable with the security of
the base but were concerned about a five-story housing complex for
unaccompanied personnel that is located in a residential area off a
heavily traveled street. This housing complex lacked basic physical
security features such as protective window coating, a central fire
alarm system, and adequate perimeter fencing.
In addition to choosing different targets, terrorists can also alter
their mode of attack. For instance, some commanders in the Middle
East are concerned that terrorists will switch to weapons that can be
fired over perimeter defenses from hidden locations. One U.S.
commander was concerned that terrorists could launch indirect fire
attacks from several sectors of the surrounding city. Such attacks
are difficult to defend against because these weapons can be set up,
fired, and moved from concealed areas very quickly. U.S. security
officials at a base in Europe said because the host nation-controlled
base perimeter is easily penetrated, they believe themselves to be
more vulnerable to suitcase bombs than to truck bombs.
--------------------
\4 According to DOD officials, stand-off is the distance between the
base facilities and uncontrolled public and private land.
DOD HAS TAKEN STEPS TO IMPROVE
THE ANTITERRORISM PROGRAM
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
DOD has initiated a number of changes in the antiterrorism program
since the Khobar Towers bombing. Announcing the initiatives in
September 1996, the Secretary of Defense stated that their intended
aggregate effect was to (1) place antiterrorism up front as a major
consideration with other key mission goals, (2) ensure that the
threat and antiterrorism measures are constantly evaluated, and (3)
empower commanders with increased resources and flexibility to be
responsive to changes in threat.
Some of the major initiatives are as follows:
-- The Secretary of Defense issued a revision of DOD Directive
2000.12, which governs the Department's antiterrorism program.
-- The Secretary of Defense assigned the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, to be his principal advisor on antiterrorism. To support
this added responsibility, the Chairman created a new office in
the Joint Staff--the Deputy Directorate for Combating Terrorism
(JCS/J-34).
-- The Secretary of Defense directed that the five geographic
combatant commanders take on increased antiterrorism
responsibilities. The commanders of the U.S. Atlantic Command,
U.S. Central Command,
U.S. European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S.
Southern Command are now responsible for ensuring the protection
of DOD personnel in their area of responsibility. Prior to
this, no DOD components were explicitly given this
responsibility.
-- Under the direction of JCS/J-34, the Defense Special Weapons
Agency began to conduct vulnerability assessments at
installations. The assessments, which supplement those done by
other DOD components, are intended to help commanders understand
their vulnerabilities to terrorist attack and to give them
options for enhancing security and mitigating weapon effects.
-- DOD has mandated more robust antiterrorism training for
personnel deploying to medium- and high-threat countries. The
training is intended to increase awareness of the threat and
provide information on individual protective measures.
Additional training is to be provided to (1) personnel
designated as unit antiterrorism instructors and advisors, (2)
officers attending precommand courses, and (3) executive-level
officials with antiterrorism responsibilities.
-- The Secretary of Defense established a $14-million centrally
controlled fund to support emergency, high-priority
antiterrorism requirements not funded by the services. The fund
is managed by JCS/J-34.
-- The services have also planned or instituted changes in their
approach to antiterrorism. Most notably, the Air Force has
created a Force Protection Group that will be among the first to
deploy in a contingency. The group, consisting of personnel
from a variety of specialties, will be responsible for
establishing the security infrastructure at the deployment site.
During our visits overseas, we found evidence that commanders at all
levels were placing more emphasis on the antiterrorism program than
they had prior to Khobar Towers. Since that bombing, most sites had
appointed an antiterrorism focal point, established a team to address
antiterrorism issues, and conducted additional vulnerability
assessments to identify needed improvements.
By far the most progress had been made by the U.S. Central Command
and its service component commands. U.S. Central Command's area of
responsibility includes the Middle East, the region with the most
high-threat countries. The special emphasis at U.S. Central Command
is not unexpected given that its forces were the most recent targets
of terrorist attacks. Among other actions, the command had
-- determined the range of specific terrorist threats it needed to
counteract in its area of responsibility, including a
20,000-pound truck bomb;
-- devised threat-based standards, such as stand-off, to guide the
design and construction of new facilities and modifications to
existing structures;
-- established a forward activity that is responsible for
coordinating antiterrorism in the region and reports directly to
the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command; and
-- identified a need for hundreds of additional security personnel
and filled these slots.
The U.S. European Command, whose area of responsibility includes
large parts of Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, also had made
progress. Its Army component was particularly active in addressing
antiterrorism issues. For instance, it had updated its operations
order governing antiterrorism at Army sites, conducted assessments of
the antiterrorism programs of its subordinate commands, and
established a senior-level working group to make antiterrorism
funding decisions.
DOD STILL NEEDS TO DEVELOP A
COMPREHENSIVE, CONSISTENT
APPROACH TO ANTITERRORISM
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
DOD's current emphasis on antiterrorism was still relatively new at
the time we completed our review in June 1997--1 year after the
Khobar Towers bombing. Nevertheless, our work raises concerns that
its initiatives fall short of correcting the shortcomings identified
in the Downing task force report and of meeting the needs of
commanders in the field. The task force envisioned a comprehensive,
consistent DOD approach to combating terrorism spearheaded by one
office that would develop policy and standards, act as an advocate,
assist commanders in the field, and manage resources on both a
routine and emergency basis. On the basis of our review, we believe
DOD's combating terrorism office--JCS/J-34--has not taken an active
enough role in providing the antiterrorism tools commanders are
requesting. For instance, DOD has not
-- provided common standards to assess vulnerabilities,
-- promulgated prescriptive physical security standards that would
require at least a minimum level of protection to U.S. forces,
-- ensured consistency in the security countermeasures commands
take in responding to threats, and
-- clarified security responsibilities for all its personnel
overseas.
The Downing task force found that in the absence of definitive
guidance from DOD, local commanders approach force protection based
on general guidance from their service component commands or on their
own knowledge and experience and that of their staff. Based on our
site visits, we found that, outside the U.S. Central Command, this
was generally still the case. In our view, DOD's failure to impose a
comprehensive approach to combating terrorism, as envisioned by the
Downing task force, has resulted in a program that still lacks
consistency and coordination.
DOD NEEDS A MORE ACTIVE
ANTITERRORISM FOCAL POINT TO
PROVIDE THE GUIDANCE
COMMANDERS ARE REQUESTING
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1
One of the central conclusions of the Downing task force was that DOD
needed a stronger centralized approach to antiterrorism. To
implement this approach, the task force said, a single DOD entity
should be designated as responsible for antiterrorism. This entity,
among other things, should develop and issue physical security
standards, inspect compliance with these standards, manage resources
on both a routine and emergency basis, and assist field commanders
with antiterrorism matters, the task force said. The task force
found in its review that the lack of a single DOD entity responsible
for antiterrorism had had an adverse impact on the posture of forces
in the field.
In response to the task force recommendation, the Secretary of
Defense acknowledged the need for a more centralized focus and
clearer lines of responsibility for establishing, coordinating, and
overseeing force protection. Accordingly, he appointed the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as DOD's focal point for antiterrorism
and directed the Chairman to establish an office to carry out the
antiterrorism responsibilities. This new office, JCS/J-34, has
subsequently become involved in a wide variety of antiterrorism
issues.
JCS/J-34 sees its role as synchronizing the efforts of the Joint
Staff in combating terrorism, to include assisting the combatant
commands in the execution of their new antiterrorism
responsibilities, but not to the extent of prescribing policies and
procedures to the geographic combatant commands for carrying out
their new antiterrorism responsibilities. In addition, JCS/J-34 has
no plans to develop and issue physical security standards (discussed
further later in this report), nor does it plan to conduct compliance
inspections as recommended by the Downing task force.\5
JCS/J-34 officials said they are precluded from exercising authority
over the antiterrorism program because the Chairman is not in the
geographic combatant commanders' chain of command. These officials
said the Secretary of Defense is the single DOD entity with authority
over the antiterrorism program. However, the Secretary of Defense
directed that the joint staff office review standards, doctrine,
deployments, budgets, audit plans, technology development programs,
and all other aspects of force protection policy and programs and
recommend any action needed. For example, JCS/J-34 is the principal
author of DOD's new combating terrorism program standards to be
issued by the Secretary of Defense. Although the new program
standards lack the detailed and descriptive criteria called for by
the Downing task force, they demonstrate that JCS/J-34 has the
capability to develop prescriptive standards for issuance by the
Secretary of Defense.
Moreover, on the basis of our review, we believe there is a need for
this type of guidance. During our visits to the geographic combatant
commands and their service component commands, officials identified a
need for more guidance to help them carry out their expanded force
protection responsibilities. For example:
-- A senior official at U.S. Southern Command said that additional
guidance should be provided to help commanders determine when
sufficient antiterrorism measures had been taken.
-- Senior antiterrorism officials at U.S. European Command and
U.S. Central Command said they were waiting for implementation
guidance from DOD on how to fulfill the requirement that they
identify and report antiterrorism deficiencies in their area of
responsibility.
-- U.S. Air Forces in Europe recommended that DOD develop an
antiterrorism "postulated threat" to assist in developing
security measures, manning standards, and construction
specifications.
-- U.S. Central Command requested that a DOD-wide standard for
stand-off distance be developed. When DOD declined to issue
such a standard,
U.S. Central Command developed its own. However, there were
still questions about the appropriate risk to accept from a
20,000-pound truck bomb. One subordinate command advocated
doubling the stand-off distance standard to decrease the
potential damage to personnel.
--------------------
\5 JCS/J-34 and the Defense Special Weapons Agency have stressed that
their new vulnerability assessments are not intended as inspections.
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS
DIFFER IN FREQUENCY,
APPROACH, AND QUALITY
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.2
Vulnerability assessments are tools commanders use to evaluate their
ability to defend against terrorist attack and to highlight security
weaknesses that terrorists could exploit. Currently, however, there
is not a common understanding within DOD of how to conduct a
vulnerability assessment or what constitutes a high-quality
assessment. DOD and the services have prescribed few requirements
for conducting vulnerability assessments. The result is that
commanders in the field may receive a detailed and useful assessment
or they may receive one that is of little to no use. Furthermore, in
the absence of standardized assessments, DOD cannot compare the
results from different sites and determine, on a worldwide basis, how
well its forces are protected.
We reviewed selected vulnerability assessments completed after the
Khobar Towers bombing and found inconsistencies in frequency,
approach, and quality.
-- Some sites have had numerous assessments, while others have had
none. At many high-threat sites, numerous assessments had been
conducted. One site in Kuwait had been assessed at least nine
times between July 1996 and March 1997. Officials at many sites
we visited expressed concern about the high frequency of, and
lack of cohesion among, assessments. Conversely, officials at
some component commands told us that vulnerability assessments
had never been conducted at sites in their area of
responsibility. In the absence of a vulnerability assessment,
commanders are not in a position to answer the question, "How
vulnerable are you to terrorist attack?"
-- Few of the assessments covered all the minimum functions
suggested in DOD guidance. DOD suggests, but does not require,
that at a minimum, vulnerability assessments address four areas:
(1) weaknesses in physical security plans, programs, and
structures; (2) inefficiencies in personnel practices and
procedures related to security and incident control, response,
and resolution; (3) enhancements in operational procedures; and
(4) resources necessary to meet security requirements. Many of
the assessments we reviewed addressed physical security, but few
addressed all four areas.
-- Some vulnerability assessments had limited value because they
did not identify specific vulnerabilities. For example,
assessments for Air Force and Navy sites in Panama did not
mention specific vulnerabilities, making it impossible to
determine what, if any, improvements were needed to decrease
their vulnerability to terrorist attacks. These assessments
instead gave a single numerical rating of vulnerability based on
a number of elements such as location, terrain, and access. A
force protection official at U.S. Southern Command said these
assessments were not useful for making antiterrorism decisions.
In contrast, Army assessments in Panama were very detailed.
-- Threat information was not well defined. According to DOD
guidance, a threat analysis provides a basis for assessing the
terrorist risk to a given site, including the likelihood of
terrorist attack and the mode of attack. It is a precursor to
the vulnerability assessment. However, some of the assessments
we reviewed did not mention the threat against which the site
needed to defend itself. Others vaguely referred to the
terrorist threat, but lacked specifics on the mode or modes of
attack that would most likely be used. Still others postulated
a threat that appeared incongruent with threat assumptions made
elsewhere. Most notably, an assessment conducted for a
headquarters building in the United States postulated a truck
bomb threat that was twice the size of the bomb DOD estimates
was used in the Khobar Towers bombing.
We also found that some commanders believe they must implement all
recommendations contained in vulnerability assessments. While the
assessments are a tool to help commanders identify their security
weaknesses, we were told that since the Khobar Towers bombing some
commanders feel they must implement all recommendations from
vulnerability assessments, whether they agree with them or not. They
are taking this approach out of fear that if terrorists attack their
forces, they could be criticized for failing to implement a
recommended corrective action that, in hindsight, would have
mitigated the damage from the attack.
Vulnerability assessments lack consistency because DOD has not
established common standards for them. The Downing task force
criticized the current approach to conducting vulnerability
assessments, noting that DOD lacked standards governing their
frequency, format, and content. DOD has acknowledged that
vulnerability assessments vary widely in scope and comprehensiveness.
Further, DOD has acknowledged that common approaches and standards
are needed, but it does not plan to impose standards that would apply
to all assessments. JCS/J-34 officials told us this was not their
role. We reviewed DOD's proposed program standards and found the
following standards regarding vulnerability assessments:
"DOD Components will schedule a higher headquarters level assessment
of their installations and [Antiterrorism/Force Protection] Programs
at least once every three years."
"Commanders will prepare a terrorist physical security vulnerability
assessment for facilities, installations, and operating areas within
their area of responsibility. The assessment will address the broad
range of physical threats to the security of personnel and assets."
In our opinion, these standards will not address the shortcomings we
identified when we reviewed the vulnerability assessments because
they do not provide specific requirements for methodology, scope, and
content.
DOD HAS NOT ISSUED
PRESCRIPTIVE PHYSICAL
SECURITY STANDARDS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.3
In its investigation of the Khobar Towers bombing, the Downing task
force found that DOD had not established physical security standards,
including standards governing the design and construction of new
buildings or the modification of existing structures against the
terrorist threat. The Downing task force recommended that DOD adopt
prescriptive physical security standards. We found that DOD had not
implemented this recommendation and had no plans to do so.
The Downing task force held up the State Department's physical
security standards as an example for DOD to follow in developing its
own standards. The task force characterized the standards as
detailed and descriptive. Most importantly, the task force stated,
State had adopted the standards as requirements, not as guidance.
State's standards, developed in coordination with the Overseas
Security Policy Board, apply to all U.S. missions abroad under the
authority of a chief of mission. The standards were created
primarily for U.S. diplomatic offices and residential facilities.
They are based on the assessed threat level in the country, with the
result that facilities in higher threat countries must meet more
stringent requirements. For high-threat areas, the standards address
such physical security concerns as the height of perimeter walls,
entry control, stand-off distance, and the location of parking areas.
Currently, DOD requires its components to deploy a physical security
system to protect defense resources. But, unlike at State, its
regulations do not establish physical security standards that define
what is acceptable or unacceptable. The new standards developed by
JCS/J-34, noted above, also do not provide detailed and descriptive
requirements. The standards, rather, are considered "performance
standards" that are intended to lead commanders through an assessment
of their antiterrorism capabilities. For instance, one standard
states, "Commanders will develop and implement a physical security
plan, as part of the [antiterrorism/force protection] program, that
incorporates facilities, equipment, trained personnel, and procedures
into a comprehensive effort designed to provide maximum antiterrorism
protection to personnel and assets." More specific guidance to
implement these performance standards is provided in a DOD handbook,
but the handbook guidance is advisory only.\6
JCS/J-34 officials told us they had no plans to issue DOD-wide
physical security standards. They believe that the variability in
threat and vulnerabilities among geographic areas and individual
sites precludes such standards. However, we noted that diplomatic
missions also face different threats and vulnerabilities yet are
required to meet State's physical security standards. The JCS/J-34
officials said commanders responsible for antiterrorism may establish
standards if they choose. Of the five geographic combatant commands,
only U.S. Central Command had developed prescriptive design
standards. Central Command officials said that since DOD declined to
issue standards for protecting facilities against a bomb blast, they
developed their own. Officials at the other geographic combatant
commands had various opinions regarding the need for DOD-wide
physical security standards. For instance, U.S. European Command
officials stated that DOD should establish minimum physical security
standards for each threat level and then require the services to
publish more specific guidance. Such an approach would allow for
differences among the services. U.S. Pacific Command officials
believe that measurable DOD-wide physical security standards are a
good idea if they provide flexibility to allow for variability in the
threat and local circumstances. U.S. Navy Europe stated that there
is an absolute need for a DOD-wide standard that is tough enough to
force all activities to a minimum level of compliance but flexible
enough to allow an activity to adjust for impediments that impact its
ability to comply.
In its report, the Downing task force noted that commanders are
currently left to a subjective determination of what is safe and
unsafe. With the exception of the U.S. Central Command, we
confirmed this observation during our site visits and came across
instances where decisions to build facilities in the absence of
DOD-wide physical security standards had resulted in serious security
lapses.
-- Newly completed dormitories in one country we visited are
located close to a heavily traveled public road. Base officials
believe that the road presents a vulnerability to truck bombs
similar to the bomb that exploded at Khobar Towers. During our
visit, they were contemplating closing the road or building a
tunnel to reroute traffic away from the dormitories. The
installation had not yet begun to calculate the cost of these
measures.
-- In one country, a new $1.9 million facility was being built on a
city street with no stand-off distance. The geographic
combatant command assessed the facility's vulnerabilities during
construction and recommended that it be relocated to a more
secure location. Furthermore, the command found that with one
exception, none of the off-base facilities it visited in this
country conformed with the advisory guidelines contained in
DOD's antiterrorism handbook.
-- A headquarters building under construction in the United States
is considered to be so unsafe that a service assessment team
suggested that it be relocated. The additional cost to improve
the security at this leased facility is estimated to be about $1
million per year.
--------------------
\6 DOD 0-2000.12-H, Protection of DOD Personnel and Activities
Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence, dated February
1993.
SECURITY THREAT CONDITIONS
ARE INCONSISTENTLY APPLIED
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.4
DOD has established a system of terrorist threat conditions to
indicate the security posture at its sites. All DOD components are
required to implement the system. One objective of the system is to
provide a common framework to facilitate interservice coordination.
The geographic combatant commanders are required to ensure that
threat conditions are uniformly implemented in their area of
responsibility. Commanders may choose from one of five threat
conditions--Normal, Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, and Delta--depending on
their assessment of the threat and other factors such as target
vulnerability, criticality of assets, and the availability of
security resources. Threat Condition Normal indicates that a general
threat of possible terrorist activity exists but warrants only a
routine security posture. Threat Condition Delta, on the other hand,
applies to the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred
or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against
a specific location is likely. In this case, commanders are required
to implement a series of security measures. The other threat
conditions fall between Normal and Delta, with each one having
associated security measures.
The Downing task force noted that personnel restrictions based on
threat conditions varied widely. DOD's guidance states that the
threat condition system is designed to provide commanders with
flexibility, to enable them to temper actions based on their best
judgment and knowledge of the local situation. DOD officials added
that commanders and managers must take account of the mission, the
threat, and specific circumstances, all of which may require higher
levels of force protection. During our review, however, we found
continued inconsistencies in the implementation of the threat
condition system that did not appear to have any basis in mission,
threat, or circumstance. For example:
-- Some commanders in the Middle East implemented markedly
different interpretations of the security measures associated
with Threat Condition Charlie. In one country, for instance,
personnel from one service were permitted to leave the base,
whereas personnel belonging to another service at two nearby
bases could not. In a second country, personnel at one
installation were generally confined to the installation but
allowed to make limited forays to an off-base civilian housing
complex. Personnel at other installations in this country were
confined to their bases except for mission-essential travel.
-- Even within the same base, interpretations of Threat Condition
Charlie could be inconsistent. At one base, personnel under one
combatant command were restricted to base except for
mission-essential travel. At this same base, personnel assigned
to a security assistance organization were permitted to go to
restaurants and shopping areas downtown, with no clear
requirement that these trips be mission related. These same
groups also implemented markedly different controls over the
many third country workers who provide cooking, cleaning, and
maintenance services to the base. The combatant command
required escorts for their workers while the security assistance
organization allowed its third country workers to come and go in
their area of the base unescorted.
-- Commanders in two Middle Eastern countries had been generally
maintaining the intense security posture associated with Threat
Condition Charlie for the 9 months since the June 1996 Khobar
Towers bombing, even though this posture was supposed to be used
only for short durations in response to imminent terrorist
action. The extended use of the measures associated with this
threat condition, such as the cancellation of social events; the
placing of cafes, theaters, and other high-risk areas off
limits; and the increased requirements for guard personnel, is
recognized as likely to create a hardship on the units and their
personnel. Several of the commanders we visited called for
review of the threat condition system in light of the current
security environment.
-- Differences in interpreting threat condition measures can have
an operational impact. In the Middle East one command refused
to allow one of its transport aircraft to land because a
disabled aircraft was already on the ground. The command
believed that under Threat Condition Charlie, two of its
aircraft could not be on the ground at the same time in one
location, and the command diverted the flight to Cairo, Egypt.
However, the local commander responsible for designating the
threat condition advised us that he would have allowed the
aircraft to land.
-- The rationale for establishing a particular threat condition was
not always clear. In a low-threat country for instance, one
base had established Threat Condition Normal, whereas an
abutting base belonging to another service had established
Threat Condition Bravo--two levels above Normal. Officials at
the base designated as Bravo said they were under the impression
that a higher headquarters had mandated that they be at this
threat condition. They added that they were not actually
implementing the security measures associated with Bravo. We
were subsequently informed that the threat condition at this
base would be lowered.
-- The security forces commander at one base in Europe said he did
not have a trained and ready auxiliary force. As a result, if
the threat condition were raised to Charlie, his forces would
have to concentrate their efforts on guarding critical assets
and could not protect office, housing, shopping, and
recreational areas where personnel congregate.
ANTITERRORISM RESPONSIBILITY
FOR SOME DEPLOYED PERSONNEL
REMAINS UNCLEAR
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.5
Antiterrorism support for some personnel deployed overseas may be
inadequate because DOD has not ensured that responsibility for their
security is clear. The Secretary of Defense took steps following the
bombings in Saudi Arabia to clarify antiterrorism responsibilities
for DOD elements on the Arabian peninsula. DOD is aware that similar
problems exist in other countries, but it has largely left it to
local military officials to address the issue.
As noted earlier, DOD has recently assigned the five geographic
combatant commanders the responsibility for ensuring the security of
all DOD personnel in their area of responsibility. However,
approximately
30,000 DOD personnel deployed abroad do not fall under the command of
a geographic combatant commander. Some of these personnel, such as
those assigned to a Defense Attache Office and Marine embassy guards,
fall under the authority of a chief of mission, who is responsible
for their security. However, many others, while formally under the
authority of a chief of mission, have been described as falling into
a gray area between the force protection responsibility of the
geographic combatant commander and the chief of mission.
The U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and the Commander-in-Chief,
U.S. European Command, were very concerned about security gaps for
gray-area DOD personnel in that high-threat country. The embassy,
working with local U.S. military representatives, identified nearly
1,500 gray-area personnel, including several hundred assigned to the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Many of these personnel
were receiving little or no security support from the embassy. Such
support can include things such as security guards, physical security
assessments of housing and work places, and threat information. The
officials said that antiterrorism responsibilities for these
personnel must be clarified. If there is a question about DOD's or
NATO's responsibility for any of these gray-area personnel, then they
should be withdrawn from Turkey, the embassy said. Alternatively, if
the embassy is to be given responsibility for these personnel, then
it must also have explicit authority over them to enforce State's
security regulations. Furthermore, the embassy must receive a
concomitant increase in resources to cover its added
responsibilities. Missions in other European countries have raised
similar concerns about gray-area DOD personnel. These missions
believe they should be responsible for protecting only those DOD
personnel accredited to the mission. They said they lack the
resources to take on responsibility for additional DOD personnel.
Following the bombings in Saudi Arabia, DOD and the Department of
State agreed that security responsibilities in the region had become
muddled. The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the
Secretary of State, decided to take on security responsibility for
most DOD personnel on the peninsula. Under a memorandum of
understanding between the two agencies, U.S. Central Command
negotiated with each chief of mission to specifically determine which
DOD elements will fall under the antiterrorism responsibility of the
combatant commander and which will fall under the responsibility of
the mission.
DOD has not taken such a comprehensive approach to resolving
gray-area problems outside the Arabian peninsula. Rather, the
geographic combatant commands and in-country military representatives
have been working with the missions to identify gray-area personnel
and address security issues at the local level. Embassy officials in
Turkey expressed frustration with this approach. They believe their
ability to address security issues is limited and that fundamental
policy decisions must be addressed at high levels within DOD and the
State Department. For instance, U.S. officials in Turkey will not
be able to unilaterally order gray-area DOD elements to modify their
operations for security purposes. Nor can they resolve resource
matters on their own. They advocated that a memorandum of agreement
similar to that for the Arabian peninsula be extended to other
countries. Officials at other embassies said a more comprehensive
approach is needed. For instance, embassy and military officials in
Italy said there is no mechanism to ensure that the embassy is
informed about the number and location of DOD personnel in country.
DOD and State Department officials are addressing gray-area issues
through a joint working group and are considering establishing a
memorandum of understanding that would apply to countries outside the
Arabian peninsula. As in the Arabian peninsula, such a memorandum of
understanding would require implementation agreements between each
chief of mission and the combatant commander.
CONCLUSIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
We recognize that individual commanders are responsible for ensuring
the protection of their forces, to include employing appropriate
antiterrorism procedures. Nevertheless, we believe that the
Department of Defense has not taken the steps necessary to promote a
comprehensive, consistent approach to antiterrorism that will give
commanders at all levels the tools they need to fulfill their
antiterrorism responsibilities. A lack of prescriptive, measurable
standards leaves commanders without an objective basis for
determining whether their antiterrorism measures are sufficient.
Moreover, DOD lacks assurance that the antiterrorism programs
implemented by local commanders meet a consistent minimum standard
for all overseas personnel.
RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
We recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop common standards and procedures to
include
-- standardized vulnerability assessments to ensure a consistent
level of quality and to provide a capability to compare the
results from different sites,
-- DOD-wide physical security standards that are measurable yet
provide a means for deviations when required by local
circumstances, and
-- procedures to maintain greater consistency among commands in
their implementation of threat condition security measures.
To ensure that security responsibility for DOD personnel overseas is
clear, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the necessary
steps to ensure that the memorandum of understanding now under
discussion with the Department of State is signed expeditiously.
Further, the Secretary should provide the geographic combatant
commanders with the guidance to successfully negotiate implementation
agreements with chiefs of mission.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with all but
one of the recommendations. It did not concur with our
recommendation for DOD-wide physical security standards. DOD
disagreed with our view that JCS/J-34, as the designated
antiterrorism focal point within DOD, should take a more active role
in prescribing common standards. Issuing such standards would exceed
JCS/J-34's authority, DOD asserted, and as a Washington, D.C.-based
office, JCS/J-34 would not be able to react quickly enough to changes
in terrorist tactics. In addition, DOD stated that commanders are
responsible for the physical security of their personnel and should
not be told how to accomplish this task. DOD believes that its
proposed combating terrorism "performance-based standards,"
supplemented by existing physical security guidance, will be
sufficient to assist commanders. Finally, DOD stated that in
advocating a more active focal point, we had misrepresented the
spirit and intent of the Downing Assessment Task Force.
We continue to believe that common DOD standards would aid commanders
by providing them with a more objective basis for determining whether
their forces are adequately protected from terrorist threats. Many
of the commanders and antiterrorism officials we spoke with
specifically noted the need for, and the importance of, DOD-wide
standards. The most obvious source of common DOD standards is
JCS/J-34 because it is the designated focal point within the
Department. As discussed in the report, we recognize that it is the
Secretary of Defense who formally issues DOD standards, and we are
not asking that JCS/J-34 exceed its authority as a staff office.
However, JCS/J-34, through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, has
been given the mandate to take an active role in reviewing and
recommending changes to the antiterrorism program. It should take
full advantage of this role by advocating, and leading the
development of, common standards. If DOD continues to believe that
JCS/J-34 is not the appropriate entity to develop common standards,
then the Secretary of Defense should consider assigning this task to
another entity. The fundamental point remains: DOD-wide standards
are needed to assist commanders in protecting their forces from
terrorist attack.
We agree with DOD that any physical security standards must be
flexible to accommodate DOD's unique security situations and have
included this in our recommendation. The common DOD standards could
be supplemented as needed by the geographic combatant commands and
their service component commands. Similarly, if a waiver system is
required, it could be implemented by these commands rather than by a
central office in Washington such as JCS/J-34. Moreover, in our view
and in the view of several commanders we spoke with, a waiver system
is likely to add a measure of accountability to the program and
ensures that senior-level officials are aware of potential problems.
We disagree that we have misrepresented the spirit and intent of the
Downing Assessment Task Force when we advocate a more active focal
point. In conducting our review, we drew extensively from the task
force report, and we believe our report is consistent with its spirit
and intent. While DOD is correct when it notes that the task force
report stated that the single DOD element should not become a
substitute for commanders at all levels applying experience,
expertise, and resources to the protection of its forces, it failed
to note the task force's opinion that the lack of a single element in
DOD for force protection had an adverse impact on the posture of the
forces in the field. Throughout its report, the task force
emphasized the need for a single DOD element responsible for force
protection. Specifically, the task force stated:
"The continued threat from terrorism strongly argues for a
single element within the DOD to develop policy and standards
for force protection, to act as an advocate for greater priority
to this effort, to assist commanders in developing and
implementing force protection measures at overseas sites, and to
manage resources on both a routine and emergency basis. This
agency must have resources, authority to act, and the mandate to
support directly forces challenged by terrorist threats."
The Secretary of Defense, in his September 15, 1996, report to the
President entitled "The Protection of U.S. Forces Deployed Abroad,"
stated:
"General Downing's report correctly recognizes the need for a
stronger centralized approach to force protection within DOD.
There indeed should be a single individual designated as
responsible for ensuring that our policies will result in
adequate force protection measures being taken and for auditing
the performance of our units."
Moreover, we spoke with a senior member of the Downing Assessment
Task Force regarding the role of a single entity, and he confirmed
our interpretation. He also confirmed that the task force intended
that DOD adopt physical security standards that were specific,
directive in nature, and applicable across the Department.
In its report, the task force repeatedly emphasized the need for
mandatory standards (as opposed to advisory guidance) regarding
physical security. For example, it recommended that the Secretary of
Defense "establish prescriptive DOD physical security standards" and
"designate a single agency within DOD to develop, issue, and inspect
compliance with force protection physical security standards."
The following are examples of specific observations made by the task
force regarding prescriptive physical security standards:
"Because neither [DOD O-2000.12-H] nor any DOD directive
provides formal force protection standards with which the
service components must comply, commanders are left to a
subjective determination of what is safe or unsafe. Unlike the
Department of Defense, the Department of State has mandated
physical security standards . . . . Regional Security
Officers [at U.S. missions] are responsible for ensuring
compliance with the [State] standards which are detailed and
descriptive. They rely in part on the assessed Threat Level in
the country. They are regularly supplemented. Most
importantly, they are recognized as requirements by the
Department of State."
"DOD O-2000.12-H provides guidance on physical security for
U.S.-occupied facilities. It does not consider the structural
characteristics of buildings to be protected. It does not
define standards for design, materials, or construction of new
buildings or modification of existing buildings . . . .
Construction and modification standards are required to ensure
that buildings occupied by U.S. forces provide appropriate
protection in the specific threat environment in each country.
The addition of Shatter Resistant Window Film is listed in [DOD
O-2000.12-H] as a suggested measure to mitigate the effects of
blast, but it is not required . . . . DOD must address the
significance of blast effects with formal standards."
"There are no DOD standards for warning systems. This was a
significant factor that contributed to the injuries sustained in
the attack on Khobar Towers . . . . Standards must address
requirements for and utility of warning systems in a range of
potential environments."
In its comments, DOD also stated that our report uses anecdotal
evidence and represents a "snapshot" of a program that has undergone
dramatic changes since we completed our fieldwork. In criticizing
the use of anecdotal evidence, DOD appears to be referring to the
illustrative examples used throughout the report. We believe that
the evidence we gathered during the course of our work was reliable,
relevant, and sufficient to support our findings, conclusions, and
recommendations. We visited approximately 30 overseas bases as well
as all 5 geographic combatant commands and most of their service
component commands (see app. I). During these visits we obtained
(1) testimonial evidence from designated antiterrorism officers and
others, (2) documentary evidence such as vulnerability assessments
and corrective action plans, and (3) physical evidence based on our
own observations. The results of our work are based on the totality
of this evidence and not, as DOD implies, primarily on anecdotes.
With respect to DOD's comment on the timeliness of our review, we
recognize in the report that DOD's renewed emphasis on antiterrorism
is only about a year old--dating to the Khobar Towers bombing.
Nevertheless, we believe that the report accurately reflects the
current status of DOD's antiterrorism efforts and that the program
has not changed dramatically, as DOD states, since we completed our
field visits in March and April 1997. When we asked DOD officials to
provide evidence of dramatic changes in the program, they stated that
(1) the geographic combatant commands now have access to the draft
combating terrorism performance standards; (2) the Joint Staff and
the Defense Special Weapons Agency are coordinating their
vulnerability assessments with the combatant commands and the
services; and (3) requests submitted to the JCS/J-34-managed
combating terrorism fund have increased. All three of these
initiatives were ongoing during our review and do not bring into
question the currency of our work.
DOD's comments and our further evaluation of them are presented in
appendix II. DOD also provided technical comments concerning factual
information in the report, and we have modified the report where
appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :8.1
Our scope and methodology are discussed in appendix I.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense,
the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff; the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; and the Secretary of
State. We will make copies available to other interested parties
upon request.
The major contributors to this report were Sharon Cekala,
Donald L. Patton, Carole Coffey, John Nelson, Robert Crowl, and
Thomas Gosling. If you or your staff have any questions concerning
this report, please call me on (202) 512-5140.
Mark E. Gebicke
Director, Military Operations
and Capabilities Issues
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
=========================================================== Appendix I
Representative Ike Skelton and the Ranking Minority Member, Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, asked that we review the
Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to protect U.S. forces from
terrorist attacks. In response to this request, we reviewed (1)
measures taken at overseas U.S. bases to enhance the security of
deployed personnel and (2) recent DOD initiatives to improve its
antiterrorism program.
For our review of antiterrorism measures taken at overseas U.S.
bases, we visited the five geographic combatant commands, many of
their service component commands, and selected overseas sites where
U.S. forces are deployed. Most of the sites we visited were in
countries that DOD considers to be a high threat (Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, and Turkey) or a medium threat (Bahrain,\1 Italy, and Qatar).
We also visited sites in Panama and Germany, which are considered
low-threat countries. We conducted these visits in March and April
1997. During the visits, we met with designated antiterrorism
officials and others involved in the program to discuss the progress
that had been made in identifying and addressing vulnerabilities
since the Khobar Towers bombing. We also reviewed pertinent
documents, such as vulnerability assessments, corrective action
plans, and records pertaining to the work of command and base
antiterrorism teams. We also toured the installations to inspect
vulnerabilities. In addition, we discussed and reviewed documents
regarding funding, intelligence, training, and host nation
relationships.
The geographic combatant commands and the component commands we
visited were as follows:
-- U.S. Central Command, U.S. Central Command Air Forces, U.S.
Navy Forces Central Command, U.S. Army Forces Central Command.
-- U.S. European Command, U.S. Army Europe, U.S. Navy Europe,
U.S. Air Forces in Europe.
-- U.S. Southern Command, Special Operations Command South, U.S.
Army South.
-- U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Pacific Air Forces,
Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, U.S. Army Pacific, Marine
Forces Pacific, Special Operations Command Pacific.
-- U.S. Atlantic Command, Air Combat Command, U.S. Army Forces
Command.
The sites we visited, by country, were as follows:
--------------------
\1 Shortly after our visit, the threat level in Bahrain was changed
from medium to high.
BAHRAIN
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1
U.S. Navy Headquarters and Support Compound
Mina Salman pier facilities
Aviation Unit, Bahrain International Airport
DOD Dependents School
Mannai Plaza Housing Compound
GERMANY
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2
Ramstein Air Base
26th Area Support Group, U.S. Army
ITALY
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3
Aviano Air Base
Caserma Ederle, U.S. Army
Naval Support Activity Naples
KUWAIT
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4
Ahmed Al Jaber Air Base
Ali Al Salem Air Base
Camp Doha Prepositioning Site
Aviation Unit, Kuwait City International Airport
PANAMA
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5
Howard Air Force Base
Fort Clayton Army Base
Naval Station (Rodman) Panama Canal
QATAR
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:6
Camp Snoopy, Qatar International Airport
Al Udeid Air Base (under construction)
As Sayliyah Prepositioning Site
Al Messilah Housing Compound
Umm Said pier facilities
SAUDI ARABIA
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:7
Eskan Village
Prince Sultan Air Base
Al Yamama Housing Compound
Site 12
Eagletown
U.S. Military Training Mission Detachment
Al Rakah Housing Compound
TURKEY
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:8
Incirlik Air Base
To review recent DOD initiatives to improve its antiterrorism
program, we interviewed officials and obtained information from the
Deputy Directorate for Combating Terrorism, Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS/J-34); the Office for Counterterrorism Analysis, Defense
Intelligence Agency; the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller);
the Defense Special Weapons Agency; the Departments of the Army, the
Air Force, and the Navy; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps; and the
geographic combatant commanders and service component commands.
During our site visits, we discussed the impact of DOD's initiatives
on their ability to protect their forces, including the problems they
faced in implementing their antiterrorism responsibilities. We also
obtained their views on other initiatives that DOD could undertake.
In addition, we reviewed pertinent DOD and service documents, such as
directives, regulations, and guidance on combating terrorism and the
reports of the DOD Antiterrorism Task Force and the Downing
Assessment Task Force. The task forces were created to recommend
improvements to DOD's antiterrorism program following the two
terrorist bombings in Saudi Arabia. The Downing task force
identified key principles for managing and improving the Department's
antiterrorism program. We used these as the primary criteria for our
review.
Because the Department of State has security responsibilities for
many DOD personnel overseas, we met with the Director for Overseas
Operations, Bureau of Diplomatic Security; the U.S. Ambassadors to
Kuwait, Qatar, and Turkey; and the Regional Security Officers
responsible for Bahrain, Great Britain, Italy, Kuwait, Panama, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. We obtained their views on the missions'
ability to provide security to DOD personnel and on the probems, if
any, of expanding their security responsibilities to additional DOD
personnel overseas. At some of these missions, we also met with DOD
officials who fall under the security responsibility of the State
Department.
We conducted our review between October 1996 and June 1997 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix II
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
=========================================================== Appendix I
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
The following is our response to DOD's letter dated June 30, 1997.
GAO COMMENTS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:9
1. We met with DOD officials to review their concerns and deleted
references to specific locations. DOD officials approved these
changes. These changes do not affect the message of our report.
2. In our view, using the standards in DOD Instruction 2000.XX will
not resolve the vulnerability assessment problems we noted during our
review. First, the standards are performance standards, not physical
security standards. Because these performance standards focus on
policies, procedures, and plans rather than physical security, it is
not clear how they can be used to identify physical security
vulnerabilities. The inability to identify specific vulnerabilities
was a problem we noted with some of the assessments we reviewed.
Second, because the standards are not detailed and descriptive, they
are subject to interpretation by the many different agencies and
individuals who conduct vulnerability assessments. In the absence of
more specific, measurable standards, the fundamental issues of
methodology, scope, and completeness discussed in our report will
remain.
Also, as of early July 1997, DOD had not issued DOD Instruction
2000.XX. DOD officials said they could not estimate when the
instruction would be issued. In addition, at the time we completed
our fieldwork, only the Central Command had established its own
standards, a key component of the assessment process according to
DOD.
3. As DOD acknowledges in its comments, this guidance is advisory in
nature. Furthermore, the Downing Assessment Task Force found that
many commanders in the field were not aware of this guidance and,
thus, were not using it.
4. Our recommendation does not encourage DOD to limit the
commander's prerogative to establish the threat condition security
measures for his or her unit, but we would encourage the Department
to take the necessary steps to ensure that these measures are based
on a realistic assessment of the mission, the threat, and the
specific circumstances of the local situation. During our review we
noted inconsistencies in the threat condition system that did not
appear to be based on these factors. For example, in the instance
cited by DOD in its comments, the security assistance personnel are
permitted to leave the base for nonmission-related activities, such
as shopping and eating at restaurants.
5. The steps DOD is taking should promote greater consistency in how
vulnerability assessments are conducted. However, in the absence of
formal DOD standards, the combatant commands and services may still
choose to deviate from the program of instruction used by the Joint
Service Integrated Vulnerability Assessment teams. Therefore, we
continue to believe that common standards and procedures for
conducting vulnerability assessments are needed to ensure a
consistent level of quality and to provide a capability to compare
results from different sites.
6. Neither DOD Directive 2000.12 nor DOD Instruction 2000.XX
requires that commanders establish prescriptive physical security
standards for each area of responsibility. As we noted in comment 2,
only the Central Command has established prescriptive standards.
7. As of early July 1997, the memorandum of understanding had not
been signed. DOD officials said they could not estimate when it
would be signed.
8. As discussed in our report, the memorandum of understanding and
accompanying agreements should address (1) the authority of a chief
of mission to direct DOD entities to comply with State security
standards and (2) the resources of the mission to fulfill its
security responsibilities with respect to DOD personnel. DOD does
not address these concerns in its comments.
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